I'm an engineer in the O&G industry (well construction), and can answer the BOP question for you. BOP's typically have several options available for controlling pressure: annular preventer/s; pipe rams; shear rams and blind rams. They all serve different functions, depending on the pipe/casing/tubular that's in the well, or even if the well is empty at the stage it is being used. Similarly, they all have different pressure ratings. This is the reason BOP's are quite large - these several sub-components are all stacked upon one another. The reason you can't just have a valve that closes on the BOP, is that in *most* well construction operations you have a tubular of some sort running through the BOP. As a result, you can use things like the annular preventer - which looks somewhat like a giant rubber donut - to be compressed around the pipe and seal the annular cavity (ie. the gap between the outside of tubular and the inside of the BOP). Given these are large deformable rubber elements (with some sort of metal backup, effectively), they're usually on the lower end of the pressure rating scale, but they have the added benefit of being suitable for sealing around tubulars of various diameters - from small to large. Similarly, they can also be stripped through (ie. the tubular can possibly be moved up or down while the annular is engaged and providing some level of pressure control). These are pretty commonly used for things like back-side pressure tests at lower pressures (eg. packer or casing tests). In contrast, the next option being the pipe rams rely on you knowing the outer diameter (OD) of the pipe that is situated across the rams - and you typically have a given set of variable bore pipe rams that are suitable for sealing a specific range of tubular OD's (eg. 3-1/2" - 5-1/2 and 4-1/2" - 7" OD; different rams). As a result, if the equipment across the BOP (aka. "the stack") at the time is outside the OD range of these rams, then they can't be used (ie. won't seal and/or will cause mechanical damage to the rams/equipment). If the equipment is in the range of the OD's, then you use the appropriate pipe ram to seal and usually with a higher pressure rating. The added benefit of the pipe ram is that you can usually "hang off" the tubulars in the rams, provided the weight is within the design range. This potentially allows you to disconnect yourself from the drill/tubular string without having to shear the pipe - provided you've got the right equipment in the hole to allow this disconnect. Next you have the shear rams - and they're literally as the name suggests - designed to cut through tubulars of certain size/wall thickness and seal the BOP. Typically reserved for critical situations, and sometimes testing when there are no tubulars in the well. These usually have pretty high pressure ratings. Finally there's the blind rams - these are literally to used when there's nothing in the well, and they seal the BOP. It's not uncommon to find combination blind/shear rams (ie. the shear rams are used as blind rams when there's nothing in the well). Again, these also have pretty high pressure ratings. Now all the above sounds fairly straight forward - but keep in mind this is just the function of the individual rams/annulars. There's nothing on the BOP side that stops potential influx from *inside* the tubulars. As such, you typically have some sort of well control valve that you will install on the tubular string (eg. TIW's, Full Opening Safety Valves etc.), or something like the IBOP's (Internal BOP) on the top drive, in order to control the influx of fluids from inside the pipe. You actually still need to know exactly what tubular is across the stack at all times, and also where any changes in OD are on the given tubular (eg. drill pipe body may be 5" OD, but you also have tool joints that are around 6-5/8" OD, for about 1-2 feet at each end of the pipe... so you need to make sure the tool joints aren't across the given ram/annular you're planning to seal with). Also, on semi-submersibles and drill ships, the drill string will heave with the rig (ie. move up and down with the wave motion, as the rig/ship rises and falls); while the BOP is effectively locked to bottom on the wellhead/conductor. As a result - in anything but perfectly dead calm weather - you need to ensure you have some sort of motion compensation activated for the drill string (eg. compensator; or active heave draw works). This effectively tries to counteract the movement of the rig by moving the drill-string up or down in the opposite direction to the rig movement, making it somewhat stationary downhole. If you don't use such compensation and you close the annular, you'll effectively be stripping through the annular constantly (ie. moving up/down) and will wear it prematurely, and possibly damage it (eg. changing OD such as the tool joint trying to pass through it). Similarly for the pipe rams - if you manage to shut them on the pipe without compensation - you're effectively locking the pipe to the seabed... so the pipe left between the pipe ram and the rig floor will effectively be exposed to the tensile and compressive forces imparted to it as the rig heaves up and down. This could buckle the pipe in the riser; part the pipe under tension; or even damage the rams. Oh, and for semi-subs and drill ships you also need to take tidal movements into account - as this can move your pipe potentially several meters (ie. 20ft) relative to the BOP, depending on if it's high/low tide, and the tidal patterns in the region you're operating (some areas have crazy tides moving large distances over short times, while some have minimal movement over the same relative time).
Following up on this - even if you do manage to shut the well in with an influx inside the well/pipe - you then need to remove the influx from the pipe/well, and regain well control prior to proceeding. This typically involves monitor pressures and volumes; followed by controlled circulation of the well fluids to displace the influx. Typically this involves sending *small* amounts to the vent lines/separators during the controlled displacement. Similarly, it may involve weighting up the drilling fluid to be pumped, and this all takes time. Keep in mind that a gas influx into the wellbore will usually have *significantly* higher pressure and volume than a small oil influx. ie. the gas is essentially massively compressed and likely partially dissolved into the formation oil (or even potentially into oil/synthetic based mud). This compressed gas typically is more buoyant than the other drilling fluids and wants to migrate towards surface. As a result, you can end up with a slug/volume of gas at high pressure (ie. not that far off reservoir pressure) trapped below the BOP. You can think of it along the lines of when you do try to bleed off pressure, you end up with a large volume of gas being circulated, but only a small change in pressure (ie. the gas is highly compressible... so it's expanding significantly as the pressure drops). For anyone interested, there is a technology around called Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD). Essentially it's like drilling with a rotating BOP annular which is constantly active during the drilling process, and you have a series of valves (chokes) on the outlet side of the circulation system... effectively by choking the outlet side of the circulation system, you artificially increase the bottom hole pressure exerted on the formation/reservoir. This is *only* during circulation however. These systems do have limitations as far as pressure is concerned, and are quite complex in their operation... but they allow you to drill through difficult formations by adjust downhole pressures on the fly; allow you drill faster via lower overbalance (and therefore lower confining pressure); potentially lower formation damage etc.
@@heyitsjel Yeah, I suppose if you fracture a level of rock in the formation by providing too much pressure that it can't handle, either the oil might start escaping all over the place when it shatters into chunks, or the layer may compact under the ocean's pressure, giving you a not-quite-rock layer that will shift when you try to get through it again. That would be bad and complicated..!
So basically these BOP while seen by the public as the last resort perfect solve all safety equipment are actually very finicky and require very special circumstances to be able to work properly
So what happens when the person who knows how to do all this is asleep? How many people on board the rig have the knowledge of all these systems and have the agency to use them? @@heyitsjel
Things were looking up...I got off the WWII video and book kick, stopped paying as much attention to the news...got back into my interests and hobbies.... BOOM: I'm fully addicted to terrifying maritime disaster stories. ... I... guess I can make this work. ... (I am loving this channel though, seriously. Well done. Magnetic, enthralling storytelling. )
Been binging your content man, appreciate the level of understanding of not only the numerous dangers but also the people who live and make their livelihoods on and below the waves. Many thanks 👍🍻
It always surprises me that Piper Alpha didn't have some kind of lockout-tagout system in place for "not to be started under any circumstances" situations.
The very first thing I thought was "why is this critical info being left on a random piece of paper that nobody would assume to read?" Always have a box for critical info at the entrance that people MUST walk by and see before starting the shift...or just use computers and require the system to be checked for critical info.
I have to say You put your videos,posts and content together really very impressively I’ve enjoyed your content for sometime now and just wanted to say thanks Keep posting your videos watching what you compile is much more entertaining than the crap on Uk terrestrial television
It is absolutely insane to me that the paperwork for different components of the same repair job weren't kept together while the job was ongoing. A paperclip or stapler and a end of shift discussion would have saved a crew full of lives, the health of the North Sea, an entire oil rig, and millions/billions of dollars.
I am pretty sure that is company bulshit. Lockout procedures for complex systems like these existed longer than I've been alive. Actual engineers I would have created precise step-by-step instructions on how to do these maintenance and repair operations. That would include literal locks , safety tape lockout tags etc. you probably seen these if you've been in a factory or a mill. And the only people who would be experts on this rig would be the engineers.. that would be to investigators talk to. So it sounds to me like the engineers were covering their ass, or this some management d******order that supervisor to cut it on anyway, or something similar. A simple accident is going to cost the company a lot less money than outright negligent buy a manager or its engineers. One costs you an insurance company some money. The other costs the rig operator 10s or hundreds of millions
It sounds a bit insane. They should/would've marked the inflicted equipment with tags/locks. And just a couple more copies of paperwork regarding the affected equipment in the correct containers could've saved them all. I have no experience with this sort of thing. Just a couple of shift changes and the whole chain of command falls apart? Sounds a bit far fetched to me.
@@Itcr0 In any large factory they have LOTO procedures (lockout tag out). It seems to me some ome must have cut the machine isolator and relevant valve locks off to get it running, It`s strange how none of this was mentioned in the H&SE investigation; more like the locks were cut off but kept quiet about it.
Not a mechanical engineer and not in the oil industry, but: A BOP is designed to shut the well in a reversible way. First, you can have Annular Preventers which are annular rubber tubes which can be inflated by hydraulic oil. When they are inflated, they press tightly against the drill pipe, sealing the well. Next, we have Pipe Rams. They close the space around the drilling pipe with thick steel plates which have an opening for the drill pipe, thus leaving it intact. Finally, we have Shear Rams and Blind Shear Rams which cut the drilling pipe. It's the last resort. So in summary: Yes, there are reversible methods to seal a well but the last resort is always an irreversible method which has a higher reliability than the reversible methods.
I do wonder if the irreversible method is considered cheaper too. Cheaper to install at the outset and bank on it never being needed. The others sound like they may require more upkeep and would almost certainly require regular testing, costing money in the form of shut down time. These companies definitely put profit ahead of all else, the question is how far does that go?
@@fr89k kicks are significantly less common offshore - at least in today's oilfield - where things are more regulated. The few times you hear about kicks these days, are usually in exploration wells where the subsurface geology and pressure regimes aren't understood so well (ie. encounter an unexpected over-pressured zone with not enough mud weight in the hole; and as a result you take an influx). US land... well that's a different story. It's the wild west.
@@bluebelle8823 the irreversible "permanent" option is basically cement plug/s placed to isolate production zones (ie. mitigate cross-flow between subsurface zones), and also cement plug/s isolating producing zones from surface/shallow zones. Without going into too much detail, it depends on the region and regulations you follow eg. UKOG; NORSOK etc., but some require the cement plugs be placed "rock to rock" ie. the casing must be perforated; milled or similar, to allow the cement plugs to seal without relying on the casing (which could ultimately corrode or fail over time). The number of cement plugs is ultimately determined by regulations, and operational capability/requirements. eg. you may place one long plug (eg. a 200ft combination plug), or maybe multiple smaller plugs (eg. 2x 100ft plugs). Usually 100ft is the *minimum* for a single barrier, assuming it's all good cement. Ideally a few hundred foot for each plug is good practice, in order to ensure that at least 100ft of cement (per plug) is considered of good quality. In horizontal or highly deviated wells, cement plug placement can be a little more difficult, as the cement typically wants to "slump", which can result in channels near the top part (highside) of the wellbore. There's numerous ways to overcome this problem, like pumping thixotropic cements (ie. thickens / becomes gel-like when it's not being pumped, while it's curing); and also using specific cementing tools (eg. kick-off tools) to prevent the cement from being disturbed once it's been pumped.
It hits home when I hear people losing their lives on oil rig. My dad worked at Aramco plant in KSA for over 30 years. He is known as crazy dad in our family because he does some crazy and borderline dangerous things, which normal folks won't do. For example, he will unscrew the 30 lbs LPG/Propane tank and light it up directly at the tank opening. You might think that the tank would explode. But it doesn't. As everyone around him would panic, scream and run for life, he would laugh and put his hand over tank opening and extinguish it. But even such daredevil man - my dad told us to never work on oil rig or chemical plant. He doesn't tell us about his bad experiences but we guess that they bring bad memories to him.
It's absolutely ridiculous that the other 2 platforms continued pumping oil and gas even though they could clearly see the flames from 20 miles away. Not having authority to shut down production is ridiculous but unfortunately it shows the mentality back then that production takes priority over everything else basically because of money. It seems unthinkable that production superseded lives.
Yes, but even if they had stopped pumping, because of the pressure and inventory still in the piplines, the contents would still have come out and fed the fire. It has always been a bit of a myth that if Tartan had stopped earlier, lives would have been saved - they wouldn't. But still not great.
@@Master-Disaster There was 3 tonnes per second of gas being pumped and ignited on Piper. Shutting down Tartan was an obvious requirement. That Tartan OIM was a snake and should have been jailed. "The Prod Super could have shut down had he felt it was warranted"
@@Master-Disaster How about this analogy: if a bucket of water is overflowing because I have a hose dipped in it that feeds it water, and then choosing to either cutting off the source of the water coming through the hose or not... sounds like an easy decision. Sure, there's still stuff in the pipeline, but when then flow keeping getting fed versus 'not' ....
Working from the Sedco 704, I was a diver on the Piper Alpha in 1977. During that period it was common for at least one of the flare stacks to develop a leak, and I have photos that I took of one of flare stacks melting, then falling into the sea, with black smoke curling up into and above the helideck. As I recall, the platform was much rusted out underneath the sea. In those days I also worked on the Claymore platform. Photos I took at night from the Sedco 704 when it was about quarter mile from the Piper show a beautiful, golden, spectacular night scene. It looked paradisical, but in reality it was the fire of hell.
So essentially, (unless I’m missing something), the catastrophic disaster that occurred on the Piper Alpha platform could have been averted with a simple hand written notice left on the control panel by the day shift engineers stating, “To all subsequent shift engineers managers...Do NOT start Pump A under ANY circumstances! The Pump A safety valve is only HAND TIGHT at this time! See safety valve paper work.” ~The day shift control room manager Unbelievable... 😐😫😤🤯🤬
Thank you for this paper doll account the individual stories so people can really get the logistics risks and legal failures of these disasters. Again, why have you not been picked up for a streaming service or at the very least a syndication which even I had at one point? You're too damn good for RUclips
Deepwater Horizon. Once the Captain did come to his senses and realise the severity he was a good captain. He left his people, got a knife and went back to save them. After recently watching the compilation on captains who abandoned the ship it is a good thing to hear.
I love this channel! It’s one of my favorites. I would like to know more about the host too! I’m curious about his background, how he became such a great historian on ocean/ship/oil rigs etc. and what all experiences he has had himself.
Honestly the piper alpha disaster is just terrifying. Was one of the first things I was told about when I started in the industry. Communication is so important
Re-watching this video with my boyfriend and he pointed out that the Piper Alpha incident might have been an inspiration for Still Wakes The Deep (a horror game we both like) and now we cant stop making connections between the two
Electronics that are responsible for the control of the Rigs ballast should be redundant, so where water can’t penetrate. Backups on backups on backups. The oil companies have the $$ zero excuse
"You need to react quickly and correctly, under stress." Like guys in the '30's working in factories beside massive flywheels, molten steel, and forge hammers. And a sign that says "Don't get hurt at work." Not supposed to get hurt, so getting squashed, flailed, or incinerated is totally on you.
There is a way to temporarily cap the pipe. It is 1000x more expensive and would certainly land the driller in court on environmental discharge. They weigh the cost/benefit and roll the dice on the system that should have functioned properly if all maintenance was completed. Murphys is always in the room.
A blowout preventer generally has multiple phases of operation. It can be operated in a non-destructive way, like you asked. But if pressure control is completely lost, it can exceed what these valves can contain. They work using annular preventers; Deepwater Horizon's just failed. BOP's, as far as I know, already work like you say; severing the line is merely the final step where even the 'shutoff' failed to stop the flow. The Hail Mary, if you will.
If anything out of the norm happens. I can guarantee you i will be out of my room and out on to deck. I won't have to wait to be told what to do. Especially, if I'm walking on the walls. But I won't have to make those decisions because I will never be working out at sea on any vessel. *🙏🏻Rest In Peace🕊* to all the Men and women that were lost.
Crikey mate 😂 kiwi? That's like saying me Aussie accent is irish 🍀 to be fair, it saved me asking. I would have picked SA or Zimbabwe, I always get either wrong! 😊 love your documentaries, you deserve more subscribers.
Did i hear you say they needed permission to shut down production site to an explosion and fire? These oil companies are ridiculous in how low they seem to value the lives of their workers.
The blow out preventer didn't work because they mixed up the + and - wires. Thats like hooking the red wire instead of the black wire in your cars battery. How can you make a mistake like that? Its literally like putting the batteries in backwards. When I got into electronics in the second grade I knew that mixing up the black and red wires was bad. We should have hired 2nd graders to wire the blowout preventer shears.
35 years later and people in the UK even layman still go quiet if you say Piper Alpha. ( watch fire in the night.... horrifically well done documentary you will NEVER forget)
Offshore rigs are very expensive. When a company gets involved with an investment like that I'm not convinced they are including the maintenance cost with the purchase and operations. The Deepwater Horizon was a good example of a rig that required extensive repairs and upgrades that were never done. That is what really caused the disaster. Poor maintenance and poor management.
Welders make the world go round….and when they fail….they can leave unforseen weaknesses in the heart of even the safest idea. Think about how many thousands of miles of welds hold together nuclear power plants and all of the worlds largest ships and buildings! And if your friends with a bunch of welders….that might make you fairly uneasy 😅
I saw that documentary of the Horizon - when that ET said he could hear the generators running away - Thats when you hit the ESD - that floods the exaust and intake with halon to prevent fire from blowing out the engines exaust pipes helping the well gas not to catch on fire - Apparintly the engineers that handled the generator room were not in the generator room at the time of the blow out - I was a SCR electrican, ive shut down generator more than once during blow outs - I never heard on what ignighted that gas but my thiughts are that when those generators overspeeded when the were breath gas - fire shot out the exaust - Another was the blow out preventer was shut in and it was laying next to the casing on the gulf floor - That indicates that the pressure was so grate nothing would have prevented that blow out - The blow out preventer was blown off the casing because of exsseive high pressure if im correct - If a sensor detects gas in the air an mergency genrator will lock out - Modern rigs have huge battery banks that run the rigs essentials when the ESD is activated or triped - Ive never heard any thing mentioned about the UPS -
I do not suggest watching any videos or listening to any podcasts about the sinking of the Britanic. That is harrowing. Those people escaped the ship and then got caught in the propellers.
The oil company doesn't give a crap about the employment my husband worked for Halliburton for 10yrs I've heard the boss say they didn't care about the guys they were going to the rjg if it killed them
I think you got your place names wrong. Ardersier is on the opposite side of the Moray Firth, nowhere near Nigg, where the platforms are constructed. Nigg actually sits at the mouth of the Cromarty Firth, where you will see numerous rigs either waiting to be towed, or still under construction.
Re pipa alpha. OK massive failure in the permit to work procedures. I can't understand why there was only 2 of these pumps if were so vital. I can't understand why when removing the valve a blanking plate was only fitted hand tight. Mind-boggling!
this video is really well put together and highlights some incredible footage. but honestly, while it's fascinating to watch, it does make me wonder if we're focusing too much on these disasters instead of finding sustainable solutions for the future. what do you all think?
51:44 I'd say this is addressed by training and checklists, similar to what pilots use. If the information you are getting matches certain conditions then you take action X. Repeated practice with training removes a lot of the emotional obstacles. 52:00 There is nothing wrong with starting with the "least costly remedy", this is a form of triage. You don't want your doctor giving you dozens of x-rays every time you get a headache. There are other actions available to stop a blowout before you have to sever the pipe. Unfortunately it turned out that the blowout preventer was incorrectly configured. Now what could be coming into play is "What if the info is wrong?" and the penalty for making a mistake could be career destroying. I doubt you'd get a pat on the back and "You did your best with what you thought was happening. It is ok that we've been put a month off schedule." so they are very nervous to take quick and decisive action. The USCSB did a very good analysis of the Deepwater Horizon failure. ruclips.net/video/FCVCOWejlag/видео.html
Avafors 1959 - 1983. 150 meter long, 15 350 dwt. Built in Gothenburg 🇸🇪, sold, renamed Yampol (of Odessa) and broken up and used for it's steel in Split, then Yugoslavia 1983. For what I can find, Avafors was one of the smaller ships built by Götaverken that year. The Trinity Shipper (though not a bulkskip) seems quite impressive , and M/s Malgomaj. Not comperable. But anyway
I'm a big fan of Deadliest Catch, but off-shore drilling operations seems like a much more dangerous occupation than crab fishing. Most of us don't really think about the risks taken by those who provide us with fancy dining or the essential need for crude oil. I can guarantee that I will pause and say a prayer of thanks whenever I fill up my tank or enjoy some fine edibles.
The Deepwater Horizon's EDS failed to operate because A) Its batteries were weak and hadn't been checked in however-many-years. Perhaps 10 by then, I think he said? B) The 'Blind Shear Ram' was a 'slightly-lacking design' which only worked about 50% of the time when commanded to close the well. A number of fault-conditions, like a torsioned or 'folded' pipe might present a 'stiff line' in its fold or torque-area which is notably-harder to cut through. C) There were other issues, many many of them, in fact, but one of the few biggest remainders is that the BOP and the Dead Man Switch had been un-tested and unmaintained for years; both of the redundant control modules in the Dead Man switch portion were unable to operate. One of them had SOME voltage...maybe enough to activate the shear ram, maybe not, but it never got to try because its solenoid had failed over the years, and it was unable to hydraulically-activate its shear-ram. The other control unit had dead batteries...both sets of batteries were dead, so it was useless. AND its solenoid was also unusable, I think, but it had no power to even try anyway. The other module had one dead battery pack, and the other had all of NINE volts. 9, out of 27, I think. Why 27? I forget...something about their chemistry. Anyway, this was a stupid design in the first place because somehow the BOP control modules didn't realize that their batteries were not just 'down one or two cells' but 'so dead that they were utterly-inoperable', and had been like that for a long time? It doesn't do the kind of self-checks my $100 UPS under my DESK does?! Nope, it doesn't. Which is even more embarrassing if you remember that the device was in constant communication with the topside systems. It could have spared a small circuit to let it do full offline battery checks by having one control pod try to switch over to battery power and judge how fast its voltage goes down. "Not being UTTERLY dead" doesn't take a lot of IC smarts, soooo that should have been easy. I'll make a WILD guess and say that that BOP was popular not because it was top-rated for safety and effectiveness in its stand-alone dead-man mode, but because it was the CHEAPEST thing that 'technically' fit all of the job requirements. Deepwater Horizon was entirely preventable on several levels...and everyone saved a buck, so those levels were bypassed or ineffective.
I worked with several guys who had been on Deepwater Horizon for many years before. I ventured "Jeeez - you guys dodged a bullet there!" Someone else responded with "It might not have occurred had they been on board". One of them may have queried the whole process of abandonment and pushed back hard enough. You never know.
@@AliG-iq4gd That totally does make sense. I know they were being leaned-on to reduce worker hours and costs because of the platform cost overruns, and rig workers apparently make a good bit of money. If the guys who were there were less stretched-thin, or if there were more people there to let someone spare more than tenths-of-a-second at a time, they may well have avoided it. ONE person with a spine calling B.S. on the 'bladder effect' claim, or activating the EDS before the circuit was destroyed (and thus when rig power was still available to it, I believe?) would have avoided most or all of the issue...it's sad.
I worked in Stavanger that year Alexander Kielland whent down - think it was spring type .. and also attended the first try to turn A Kielland in Gandsfjorden Hinna -Stavanger - first 1980 and later 1983 not to sucsessfull however but 6 souls was saved - the rig was finally dragged out to Nedstrandsfjorden, to be sinked . Its final seagrave at att the depth of 700 meters for remembranse - 30 souls of 123 lost are still missing - R.I.P - Idid my last tripp after 45 years offshore this summer and now just happy to enjoy my life with my loving wife and and long row of kids and friends - but remember the good times and the badwill never leav me. Thank you Equinor (former Statoil) + Old Hydro - Aker Solutions and many more- Im happy to have served well an Norway today - Safety always first to any cost
God damn. It's truly unbelievable that BP are still doing business. Texas City and Deep water Horizon are two of the worst industry accidents and they were both a reflection of their cost cutting and terrible safety culture.
Imagine what would have happened when you was still a diver - if I kept distracting you with adverts. You would end up the subject of one of your own shows. I bet you would do a fine job at it as well.
On the ocean ranger crew they didn’t know how to work the ballast system and made things a lot worse. It was said if they had just cleaned up the water and went to bed they would have lived to see the sun rise.
With Accidents on Oil Rigs, I am always more concerned about Spilt Oil & The Environmental Impact on Marine Wildlife for years to come, Damage from some oil spills will be felt by Ecosystems for hundreds of years to come.
Be cool to actually know what the crew was dealing with concerning the ballast system. I mean what was it they needed to know to operate it manually? What valve went to what pipe and to what ballast? And so on, just something indepth about the ballast system instead of, it shorted out and they did not know how to use it manually. The ballast control system is why it sunk.
Deepwater horizon, a simply baffling display of panic and sheer idiocy from higher ups to me. Your life is very clearly being put in danger and the person in charge is refusing to take action, stop waiting for the clearance to pull the emergency alarm and just do what must be done, never hesitate.
Have you talked about the scorpion? Id like to see your thoughts on scorpion as there is conspiracy and many unanswered questions about its sinking. It remains very intact for a submarine that slipped below its crush depth
@stuglife5514 based on the publicly available footage of the wreck, I would agree, but if that were true it conflicts with the official narrative of hydrogen explosion in the battery compartment. It would be more indicitive of the hot running torpedo theory, or even the theory of enemy action sinking the vessel. The released navy ROV footage of the scorpion is very sombering and impressive
So the first one confused me. The way you explained it it sounds like everyone made reasonable decisions and an oopsie happened. But this is not how safety on complex systems works. Lockouts have been a standard on industrial systems, factory machinery add everything else for a very long time, Actual engineers not mechanics weather design precise procedures for safety lockouts.. especially for things like safety valves. It would be a well bubba nose sort of thing there would be precise instructions, literal locks , red or yellow safety tape. It is insane to leave any high pressure pipe anything hand tight. The location of those maintenance checklists shouldn't matter. The engineers job would be too specifically designer procedure where accidents like this can't happen. Somebody f***** up here or multiple somebody's. 4 as we are in children most likely a manager told the supervisor to just turn the f****** thing on. Unforeseeable accident is going to cost a company a whole lot less money than management making stupid and negligent decisions.
As dumb s it might sounds... But after yours vid's I got really invested in oilrig job and I'm trying to get on one for like 3 months. Not successfully but still trying!
I was born and raised in Alaska, if you move there and are persistent, red tape is cut by government and a barrel of oil stays above 30-35$ a barrel you’ll get a job on a oil rig. Or at least goto work in the oil fields. It’s the coldest weather I’ve ever been in and all you do is work 12 hours a day minimum 7 days a week. I worked 6 weeks on 2 weeks off for PGS doing seismic and spent 2 years working for pool arctic Alaska. Not sure if either still exist but ConocoPhillips is always hiring.
Im no deepsea diving expert but using a cutting torch to cut into a gas/fuel tank seems obsurd on the face of it. R u sure u had that part right. Id think no diver would attempt such a foolish manuver.
I'm an engineer in the O&G industry (well construction), and can answer the BOP question for you. BOP's typically have several options available for controlling pressure: annular preventer/s; pipe rams; shear rams and blind rams. They all serve different functions, depending on the pipe/casing/tubular that's in the well, or even if the well is empty at the stage it is being used. Similarly, they all have different pressure ratings. This is the reason BOP's are quite large - these several sub-components are all stacked upon one another.
The reason you can't just have a valve that closes on the BOP, is that in *most* well construction operations you have a tubular of some sort running through the BOP. As a result, you can use things like the annular preventer - which looks somewhat like a giant rubber donut - to be compressed around the pipe and seal the annular cavity (ie. the gap between the outside of tubular and the inside of the BOP). Given these are large deformable rubber elements (with some sort of metal backup, effectively), they're usually on the lower end of the pressure rating scale, but they have the added benefit of being suitable for sealing around tubulars of various diameters - from small to large. Similarly, they can also be stripped through (ie. the tubular can possibly be moved up or down while the annular is engaged and providing some level of pressure control). These are pretty commonly used for things like back-side pressure tests at lower pressures (eg. packer or casing tests).
In contrast, the next option being the pipe rams rely on you knowing the outer diameter (OD) of the pipe that is situated across the rams - and you typically have a given set of variable bore pipe rams that are suitable for sealing a specific range of tubular OD's (eg. 3-1/2" - 5-1/2 and 4-1/2" - 7" OD; different rams). As a result, if the equipment across the BOP (aka. "the stack") at the time is outside the OD range of these rams, then they can't be used (ie. won't seal and/or will cause mechanical damage to the rams/equipment). If the equipment is in the range of the OD's, then you use the appropriate pipe ram to seal and usually with a higher pressure rating. The added benefit of the pipe ram is that you can usually "hang off" the tubulars in the rams, provided the weight is within the design range. This potentially allows you to disconnect yourself from the drill/tubular string without having to shear the pipe - provided you've got the right equipment in the hole to allow this disconnect.
Next you have the shear rams - and they're literally as the name suggests - designed to cut through tubulars of certain size/wall thickness and seal the BOP. Typically reserved for critical situations, and sometimes testing when there are no tubulars in the well. These usually have pretty high pressure ratings.
Finally there's the blind rams - these are literally to used when there's nothing in the well, and they seal the BOP. It's not uncommon to find combination blind/shear rams (ie. the shear rams are used as blind rams when there's nothing in the well). Again, these also have pretty high pressure ratings.
Now all the above sounds fairly straight forward - but keep in mind this is just the function of the individual rams/annulars. There's nothing on the BOP side that stops potential influx from *inside* the tubulars. As such, you typically have some sort of well control valve that you will install on the tubular string (eg. TIW's, Full Opening Safety Valves etc.), or something like the IBOP's (Internal BOP) on the top drive, in order to control the influx of fluids from inside the pipe.
You actually still need to know exactly what tubular is across the stack at all times, and also where any changes in OD are on the given tubular (eg. drill pipe body may be 5" OD, but you also have tool joints that are around 6-5/8" OD, for about 1-2 feet at each end of the pipe... so you need to make sure the tool joints aren't across the given ram/annular you're planning to seal with). Also, on semi-submersibles and drill ships, the drill string will heave with the rig (ie. move up and down with the wave motion, as the rig/ship rises and falls); while the BOP is effectively locked to bottom on the wellhead/conductor. As a result - in anything but perfectly dead calm weather - you need to ensure you have some sort of motion compensation activated for the drill string (eg. compensator; or active heave draw works). This effectively tries to counteract the movement of the rig by moving the drill-string up or down in the opposite direction to the rig movement, making it somewhat stationary downhole. If you don't use such compensation and you close the annular, you'll effectively be stripping through the annular constantly (ie. moving up/down) and will wear it prematurely, and possibly damage it (eg. changing OD such as the tool joint trying to pass through it). Similarly for the pipe rams - if you manage to shut them on the pipe without compensation - you're effectively locking the pipe to the seabed... so the pipe left between the pipe ram and the rig floor will effectively be exposed to the tensile and compressive forces imparted to it as the rig heaves up and down. This could buckle the pipe in the riser; part the pipe under tension; or even damage the rams. Oh, and for semi-subs and drill ships you also need to take tidal movements into account - as this can move your pipe potentially several meters (ie. 20ft) relative to the BOP, depending on if it's high/low tide, and the tidal patterns in the region you're operating (some areas have crazy tides moving large distances over short times, while some have minimal movement over the same relative time).
Following up on this - even if you do manage to shut the well in with an influx inside the well/pipe - you then need to remove the influx from the pipe/well, and regain well control prior to proceeding. This typically involves monitor pressures and volumes; followed by controlled circulation of the well fluids to displace the influx. Typically this involves sending *small* amounts to the vent lines/separators during the controlled displacement. Similarly, it may involve weighting up the drilling fluid to be pumped, and this all takes time.
Keep in mind that a gas influx into the wellbore will usually have *significantly* higher pressure and volume than a small oil influx. ie. the gas is essentially massively compressed and likely partially dissolved into the formation oil (or even potentially into oil/synthetic based mud). This compressed gas typically is more buoyant than the other drilling fluids and wants to migrate towards surface. As a result, you can end up with a slug/volume of gas at high pressure (ie. not that far off reservoir pressure) trapped below the BOP. You can think of it along the lines of when you do try to bleed off pressure, you end up with a large volume of gas being circulated, but only a small change in pressure (ie. the gas is highly compressible... so it's expanding significantly as the pressure drops).
For anyone interested, there is a technology around called Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD). Essentially it's like drilling with a rotating BOP annular which is constantly active during the drilling process, and you have a series of valves (chokes) on the outlet side of the circulation system... effectively by choking the outlet side of the circulation system, you artificially increase the bottom hole pressure exerted on the formation/reservoir. This is *only* during circulation however. These systems do have limitations as far as pressure is concerned, and are quite complex in their operation... but they allow you to drill through difficult formations by adjust downhole pressures on the fly; allow you drill faster via lower overbalance (and therefore lower confining pressure); potentially lower formation damage etc.
Thanks. I really appreciate the detailed information. Really interesting for laymen like me.
@@heyitsjel Yeah, I suppose if you fracture a level of rock in the formation by providing too much pressure that it can't handle, either the oil might start escaping all over the place when it shatters into chunks, or the layer may compact under the ocean's pressure, giving you a not-quite-rock layer that will shift when you try to get through it again. That would be bad and complicated..!
So basically these BOP while seen by the public as the last resort perfect solve all safety equipment are actually very finicky and require very special circumstances to be able to work properly
So what happens when the person who knows how to do all this is asleep? How many people on board the rig have the knowledge of all these systems and have the agency to use them? @@heyitsjel
hell yeah dude, i love listening to your stories, its about time we had a long form compilation :)
Money/profits is valued over safety and human life in so many of these oil rig disasters. It’s really disheartening that nothing seems to change.
I was just thinking the same thing. Money is the only thing that matters for the higher ups. Who cares about the poor souls who die because of greed.
Not Good!
300,000 barrels a day. That’s a lot of money man
Nothing really changes because of the lack of oversight in whatever happens in the ocean.
@@joshuabenitez3260 Nothing changes because those responsible are never punished in any meaningful way,
Things were looking up...I got off the WWII video and book kick, stopped paying as much attention to the news...got back into my interests and hobbies.... BOOM: I'm fully addicted to terrifying maritime disaster stories. ... I... guess I can make this work. ... (I am loving this channel though, seriously. Well done. Magnetic, enthralling storytelling. )
Thanks. Welcome aboard
Just a suggestion...might as well check out the caving, cave diving, airplane, outdoor, wingsuit, and parachuting disasters as well.
Been binging your content man, appreciate the level of understanding of not only the numerous dangers but also the people who live and make their livelihoods on and below the waves.
Many thanks 👍🍻
I like this format of compilations. 👍
It always surprises me that Piper Alpha didn't have some kind of lockout-tagout system in place for "not to be started under any circumstances" situations.
The very first thing I thought was "why is this critical info being left on a random piece of paper that nobody would assume to read?" Always have a box for critical info at the entrance that people MUST walk by and see before starting the shift...or just use computers and require the system to be checked for critical info.
When did they actually start using lockout tagout procedures?
Piper alpha was the catalyst for the systems used in offshore drilling today.
I 💯agree!! Also I believe Ocean Ranger port glass was sabotaged. Kinda weird the only view port that broke was in Ballast control room!
I have to say
You put your videos,posts and content together really very impressively
I’ve enjoyed your content for sometime now and just wanted to say thanks
Keep posting your videos watching what you compile is much more entertaining than the crap on Uk terrestrial television
Thanks, I really appreciate that
It is absolutely insane to me that the paperwork for different components of the same repair job weren't kept together while the job was ongoing. A paperclip or stapler and a end of shift discussion would have saved a crew full of lives, the health of the North Sea, an entire oil rig, and millions/billions of dollars.
I am pretty sure that is company bulshit. Lockout procedures for complex systems like these existed longer than I've been alive. Actual engineers I would have created precise step-by-step instructions on how to do these maintenance and repair operations. That would include literal locks , safety tape lockout tags etc. you probably seen these if you've been in a factory or a mill.
And the only people who would be experts on this rig would be the engineers.. that would be to investigators talk to. So it sounds to me like the engineers were covering their ass, or this some management d******order that supervisor to cut it on anyway, or something similar. A simple accident is going to cost the company a lot less money than outright negligent buy a manager or its engineers. One costs you an insurance company some money. The other costs the rig operator 10s or hundreds of millions
It sounds a bit insane. They should/would've marked the inflicted equipment with tags/locks. And just a couple more copies of paperwork regarding the affected equipment in the correct containers could've saved them all. I have no experience with this sort of thing. Just a couple of shift changes and the whole chain of command falls apart? Sounds a bit far fetched to me.
@@Itcr0 In any large factory they have LOTO procedures (lockout tag out). It seems to me some ome must have cut the machine isolator and relevant valve locks off to get it running, It`s strange how none of this was mentioned in the H&SE investigation; more like the locks were cut off but kept quiet about it.
I can't say I enjoy these stories, but I am fascinated. Thank you for sharing them.
Not a mechanical engineer and not in the oil industry, but: A BOP is designed to shut the well in a reversible way. First, you can have Annular Preventers which are annular rubber tubes which can be inflated by hydraulic oil. When they are inflated, they press tightly against the drill pipe, sealing the well. Next, we have Pipe Rams. They close the space around the drilling pipe with thick steel plates which have an opening for the drill pipe, thus leaving it intact. Finally, we have Shear Rams and Blind Shear Rams which cut the drilling pipe. It's the last resort. So in summary: Yes, there are reversible methods to seal a well but the last resort is always an irreversible method which has a higher reliability than the reversible methods.
I do wonder if the irreversible method is considered cheaper too. Cheaper to install at the outset and bank on it never being needed. The others sound like they may require more upkeep and would almost certainly require regular testing, costing money in the form of shut down time. These companies definitely put profit ahead of all else, the question is how far does that go?
@@bluebelle8823 Kicks are a common occurrence during drilling, so you need to have reversible methods anyways.
@@fr89k kicks are significantly less common offshore - at least in today's oilfield - where things are more regulated. The few times you hear about kicks these days, are usually in exploration wells where the subsurface geology and pressure regimes aren't understood so well (ie. encounter an unexpected over-pressured zone with not enough mud weight in the hole; and as a result you take an influx).
US land... well that's a different story. It's the wild west.
@@bluebelle8823 the irreversible "permanent" option is basically cement plug/s placed to isolate production zones (ie. mitigate cross-flow between subsurface zones), and also cement plug/s isolating producing zones from surface/shallow zones. Without going into too much detail, it depends on the region and regulations you follow eg. UKOG; NORSOK etc., but some require the cement plugs be placed "rock to rock" ie. the casing must be perforated; milled or similar, to allow the cement plugs to seal without relying on the casing (which could ultimately corrode or fail over time).
The number of cement plugs is ultimately determined by regulations, and operational capability/requirements. eg. you may place one long plug (eg. a 200ft combination plug), or maybe multiple smaller plugs (eg. 2x 100ft plugs). Usually 100ft is the *minimum* for a single barrier, assuming it's all good cement. Ideally a few hundred foot for each plug is good practice, in order to ensure that at least 100ft of cement (per plug) is considered of good quality.
In horizontal or highly deviated wells, cement plug placement can be a little more difficult, as the cement typically wants to "slump", which can result in channels near the top part (highside) of the wellbore. There's numerous ways to overcome this problem, like pumping thixotropic cements (ie. thickens / becomes gel-like when it's not being pumped, while it's curing); and also using specific cementing tools (eg. kick-off tools) to prevent the cement from being disturbed once it's been pumped.
It hits home when I hear people losing their lives on oil rig. My dad worked at Aramco plant in KSA for over 30 years. He is known as crazy dad in our family because he does some crazy and borderline dangerous things, which normal folks won't do. For example, he will unscrew the 30 lbs LPG/Propane tank and light it up directly at the tank opening. You might think that the tank would explode. But it doesn't. As everyone around him would panic, scream and run for life, he would laugh and put his hand over tank opening and extinguish it. But even such daredevil man - my dad told us to never work on oil rig or chemical plant. He doesn't tell us about his bad experiences but we guess that they bring bad memories to him.
Thanks for sharing
It's absolutely ridiculous that the other 2 platforms continued pumping oil and gas even though they could clearly see the flames from 20 miles away.
Not having authority to shut down production is ridiculous but unfortunately it shows the mentality back then that production takes priority over everything else basically because of money.
It seems unthinkable that production superseded lives.
Yes, but even if they had stopped pumping, because of the pressure and inventory still in the piplines, the contents would still have come out and fed the fire. It has always been a bit of a myth that if Tartan had stopped earlier, lives would have been saved - they wouldn't. But still not great.
@@Master-Disaster it would still atop earlier..
"I don't have the authority..."
@@Master-Disaster There was 3 tonnes per second of gas being pumped and ignited on Piper. Shutting down Tartan was an obvious requirement. That Tartan OIM was a snake and should have been jailed. "The Prod Super could have shut down had he felt it was warranted"
@@Master-Disaster How about this analogy: if a bucket of water is overflowing because I have a hose dipped in it that feeds it water, and then choosing to either cutting off the source of the water coming through the hose or not... sounds like an easy decision. Sure, there's still stuff in the pipeline, but when then flow keeping getting fed versus 'not' ....
Incredibly sad, very informative also.
Thank you
Im always excited to see a new video in my feed from you mate. )
I'm rewatching them just cause I like the way you explain everything and your voice.
👍🏻Thanks, I really appreciate that
Working from the Sedco 704, I was a diver on the Piper Alpha in 1977. During that period it was common for at least one of the flare stacks to develop a leak, and I have photos that I took of one of flare stacks melting, then falling into the sea, with black smoke curling up into and above the helideck. As I recall, the platform was much rusted out underneath the sea. In those days I also worked on the Claymore platform. Photos I took at night from the Sedco 704 when it was about quarter mile from the Piper show a beautiful, golden, spectacular night scene. It looked paradisical, but in reality it was the fire of hell.
Geez. Incredible
Damn how did you dive with balls of steel?
So essentially, (unless I’m missing something), the catastrophic disaster that occurred on the Piper Alpha platform could have been averted with a simple hand written notice left on the control panel by the day shift engineers stating, “To all subsequent shift engineers managers...Do NOT start Pump A under ANY circumstances! The Pump A safety valve is only HAND TIGHT at this time! See safety valve paper work.” ~The day shift control room manager
Unbelievable...
😐😫😤🤯🤬
Pretty much
Your consistent quality content will hit 1M subs in no time! Keep doing your thing mate. Cheers
👌🏻Thanks, I really appreciate that
Thank you for this paper doll account the individual stories so people can really get the logistics risks and legal failures of these disasters. Again, why have you not been picked up for a streaming service or at the very least a syndication which even I had at one point? You're too damn good for RUclips
🤭 thanks. Very kind words
This is definitely one of the best maritime channels on YT. Such quality content.
I hope your subs rise quickly.
Thanks. 👌🏻
My boyfriend is a rig drilling consultant.Now ,i know how high pressure is his job at work. Interesting content. Thank u
Deepwater Horizon. Once the Captain did come to his senses and realise the severity he was a good captain. He left his people, got a knife and went back to save them. After recently watching the compilation on captains who abandoned the ship it is a good thing to hear.
I love this channel! It’s one of my favorites. I would like to know more about the host too! I’m curious about his background, how he became such a great historian on ocean/ship/oil rigs etc. and what all experiences he has had himself.
I really enjoyed these stories. Thank you
👍🏻
Thank you, sir is a very good job of explaining it so even a guy like me who has never saw an oil rig can understand
Honestly the piper alpha disaster is just terrifying. Was one of the first things I was told about when I started in the industry. Communication is so important
Re-watching this video with my boyfriend and he pointed out that the Piper Alpha incident might have been an inspiration for Still Wakes The Deep (a horror game we both like) and now we cant stop making connections between the two
Interesting. I don’t know the game. I’ll have to look it up.
@@waterlinestories Its an amazing game, we hope you like it :D
@@GODJESUSAMONGUSI literally just watched the full game yesterday from IGP. Amazing game. Absolutely terrifying experience in the first 30 mins
Yes 20 second mark! I love your videos I know there are some stories in Mexico please do some! Also I love your videos!
Nice compilation!
Electronics that are responsible for the control of the Rigs ballast should be redundant, so where water can’t penetrate. Backups on backups on backups. The oil companies have the $$ zero excuse
"You need to react quickly and correctly, under stress." Like guys in the '30's working in factories beside massive flywheels, molten steel, and forge hammers. And a sign that says "Don't get hurt at work." Not supposed to get hurt, so getting squashed, flailed, or incinerated is totally on you.
Who put a dam window in the room with all the electrical controls
Engineers are not as smart as you would think sometime.
great compilation, but you forgot one, the Byford dolphin (saturation diving, but still under an oil rig).
I’ve a got a sat diving compilation planned. 👌🏻
A friend of my Mum’s was on Ocean Ranger and ironically a relative of his was on Piper Alpha
How long shall we tolerate denials?!
(1912) Titanic: "But this ship can't sink!"
(2010) Deep Water Horizon: "But this rig can't blow up!"
congrats on the context badge, it must mean you're over that truth target. thank you for your video.
My husband worked on rigs for thirty years... they don't can about the workers
There is a way to temporarily cap the pipe. It is 1000x more expensive and would certainly land the driller in court on environmental discharge.
They weigh the cost/benefit and roll the dice on the system that should have functioned properly if all maintenance was completed.
Murphys is always in the room.
A blowout preventer generally has multiple phases of operation. It can be operated in a non-destructive way, like you asked. But if pressure control is completely lost, it can exceed what these valves can contain. They work using annular preventers; Deepwater Horizon's just failed. BOP's, as far as I know, already work like you say; severing the line is merely the final step where even the 'shutoff' failed to stop the flow. The Hail Mary, if you will.
I find your content very interesting. I like learning about all these accidents knowledge is power
5:17 “leaves without discussing the loose-fitting flange.” Was there an INOP sign or the equivalent? Did I miss that?
When he pushed the emergency stop button that should’ve alerted the whole Rig,you would think?.
If anything out of the norm happens. I can guarantee you i will be out of my room and out on to deck. I won't have to wait to be told what to do. Especially, if I'm walking on the walls.
But I won't have to make those decisions because I will never be working out at sea on any vessel.
*🙏🏻Rest In Peace🕊*
to all the Men and
women that were lost.
And we have the hubris to believe humans can "save the planet"
My dude just casually proposing a “tap style on-and-off BOP” that would save hundreds of millions per accident “if it’s possible.”
South African host or Kiwi? Great content btw. Keep up the good work 👏
South African. But I live in Germany now. Thanks for watching
I asked him the exact same thing when I discovered the channel :) Are you south african, @RKarmaKill?
Crikey mate 😂 kiwi? That's like saying me Aussie accent is irish 🍀 to be fair, it saved me asking. I would have picked SA or Zimbabwe, I always get either wrong! 😊 love your documentaries, you deserve more subscribers.
Thank you for asking so I didn't have to
Your vids are top notch, subbed
The Piper Alpha is still the stuff that nightmares are made of.
I love your videos
👌🏻
Did i hear you say they needed permission to shut down production site to an explosion and fire? These oil companies are ridiculous in how low they seem to value the lives of their workers.
I see a pattern in those accident
The blow out preventer didn't work because they mixed up the + and - wires. Thats like hooking the red wire instead of the black wire in your cars battery. How can you make a mistake like that? Its literally like putting the batteries in backwards. When I got into electronics in the second grade I knew that mixing up the black and red wires was bad. We should have hired 2nd graders to wire the blowout preventer shears.
35 years later and people in the UK even layman still go quiet if you say Piper Alpha. ( watch fire in the night.... horrifically well done documentary you will NEVER forget)
Lovely video. I mean they're scary but it's good to know these stories 🌊
Offshore rigs are very expensive. When a company gets involved with an investment like that I'm not convinced they are including the maintenance cost with the purchase and operations. The Deepwater Horizon was a good example of a rig that required extensive repairs and upgrades that were never done. That is what really caused the disaster. Poor maintenance and poor management.
Thank you for sharing with us ,
A WHOLE HOUR. AWESOME ❤❤
FAVORITE SITE FOR SURE😉😉
That's one job they couldn't pay enough to do. The ocean can swallow anything mankind can build
Where’s the redundancies for clamping the pipe-way?
The rubber mats on the Alpha Phoniex had drain holes in them. They are common in many industries. How does oil pool on a perforated surface?
Everytime the maintenance people is slacking of, kaboom.
Welders make the world go round….and when they fail….they can leave unforseen weaknesses in the heart of even the safest idea. Think about how many thousands of miles of welds hold together nuclear power plants and all of the worlds largest ships and buildings! And if your friends with a bunch of welders….that might make you fairly uneasy 😅
I saw that documentary of the Horizon - when that ET said he could hear the generators running away -
Thats when you hit the ESD - that floods the exaust and intake with halon to prevent fire from blowing out the engines exaust pipes helping the well gas not to catch on fire -
Apparintly the engineers that handled the generator room were not in the generator room at the time of the blow out -
I was a SCR electrican, ive shut down generator more than once during blow outs -
I never heard on what ignighted that gas but my thiughts are that when those generators overspeeded when the were breath gas - fire shot out the exaust -
Another was the blow out preventer was shut in and it was laying next to the casing on the gulf floor -
That indicates that the pressure was so grate nothing would have prevented that blow out -
The blow out preventer was blown off the casing because of exsseive high pressure if im correct -
If a sensor detects gas in the air an mergency genrator will lock out -
Modern rigs have huge battery banks that run the rigs essentials when the ESD is activated or triped -
Ive never heard any thing mentioned about the UPS -
I eatched these already individually, but these stories are still shocking on my rewatch
“They narrowly miss and the man is chopped up by the propellers” this was haunting to hear.
No. Re-listen. It says he narrowly missed being chopped up by the propellers.
I do not suggest watching any videos or listening to any podcasts about the sinking of the Britanic. That is harrowing. Those people escaped the ship and then got caught in the propellers.
The oil company doesn't give a crap about the employment my husband worked for Halliburton for 10yrs I've heard the boss say they didn't care about the guys they were going to the rjg if it killed them
I think you got your place names wrong. Ardersier is on the opposite side of the Moray Firth, nowhere near Nigg, where the platforms are constructed. Nigg actually sits at the mouth of the Cromarty Firth, where you will see numerous rigs either waiting to be towed, or still under construction.
Re pipa alpha. OK massive failure in the permit to work procedures. I can't understand why there was only 2 of these pumps if were so vital. I can't understand why when removing the valve a blanking plate was only fitted hand tight. Mind-boggling!
this video is really well put together and highlights some incredible footage. but honestly, while it's fascinating to watch, it does make me wonder if we're focusing too much on these disasters instead of finding sustainable solutions for the future. what do you all think?
51:44 I'd say this is addressed by training and checklists, similar to what pilots use. If the information you are getting matches certain conditions then you take action X. Repeated practice with training removes a lot of the emotional obstacles.
52:00 There is nothing wrong with starting with the "least costly remedy", this is a form of triage. You don't want your doctor giving you dozens of x-rays every time you get a headache. There are other actions available to stop a blowout before you have to sever the pipe. Unfortunately it turned out that the blowout preventer was incorrectly configured. Now what could be coming into play is "What if the info is wrong?" and the penalty for making a mistake could be career destroying. I doubt you'd get a pat on the back and "You did your best with what you thought was happening. It is ok that we've been put a month off schedule." so they are very nervous to take quick and decisive action.
The USCSB did a very good analysis of the Deepwater Horizon failure. ruclips.net/video/FCVCOWejlag/видео.html
Good morning everyone. Who else woke up here?
Avafors 1959 - 1983. 150 meter long, 15 350 dwt. Built in Gothenburg 🇸🇪, sold, renamed Yampol (of Odessa) and broken up and used for it's steel in Split, then Yugoslavia 1983. For what I can find, Avafors was one of the smaller ships built by Götaverken that year. The Trinity Shipper (though not a bulkskip) seems quite impressive , and M/s Malgomaj. Not comperable. But anyway
When i was a young man i turned down a job at sea.
I have never regretted that decision.
I'm a big fan of Deadliest Catch, but off-shore drilling operations seems like a much more dangerous occupation than crab fishing. Most of us don't really think about the risks taken by those who provide us with fancy dining or the essential need for crude oil. I can guarantee that I will pause and say a prayer of thanks whenever I fill up my tank or enjoy some fine edibles.
What about a fully submersible rig?
dankie hoor :)
Plesuur
The Deepwater Horizon's EDS failed to operate because A) Its batteries were weak and hadn't been checked in however-many-years. Perhaps 10 by then, I think he said? B) The 'Blind Shear Ram' was a 'slightly-lacking design' which only worked about 50% of the time when commanded to close the well. A number of fault-conditions, like a torsioned or 'folded' pipe might present a 'stiff line' in its fold or torque-area which is notably-harder to cut through. C) There were other issues, many many of them, in fact, but one of the few biggest remainders is that the BOP and the Dead Man Switch had been un-tested and unmaintained for years; both of the redundant control modules in the Dead Man switch portion were unable to operate. One of them had SOME voltage...maybe enough to activate the shear ram, maybe not, but it never got to try because its solenoid had failed over the years, and it was unable to hydraulically-activate its shear-ram. The other control unit had dead batteries...both sets of batteries were dead, so it was useless. AND its solenoid was also unusable, I think, but it had no power to even try anyway. The other module had one dead battery pack, and the other had all of NINE volts. 9, out of 27, I think. Why 27? I forget...something about their chemistry. Anyway, this was a stupid design in the first place because somehow the BOP control modules didn't realize that their batteries were not just 'down one or two cells' but 'so dead that they were utterly-inoperable', and had been like that for a long time? It doesn't do the kind of self-checks my $100 UPS under my DESK does?!
Nope, it doesn't. Which is even more embarrassing if you remember that the device was in constant communication with the topside systems. It could have spared a small circuit to let it do full offline battery checks by having one control pod try to switch over to battery power and judge how fast its voltage goes down. "Not being UTTERLY dead" doesn't take a lot of IC smarts, soooo that should have been easy. I'll make a WILD guess and say that that BOP was popular not because it was top-rated for safety and effectiveness in its stand-alone dead-man mode, but because it was the CHEAPEST thing that 'technically' fit all of the job requirements. Deepwater Horizon was entirely preventable on several levels...and everyone saved a buck, so those levels were bypassed or ineffective.
I worked with several guys who had been on Deepwater Horizon for many years before. I ventured "Jeeez - you guys dodged a bullet there!" Someone else responded with "It might not have occurred had they been on board". One of them may have queried the whole process of abandonment and pushed back hard enough. You never know.
@@AliG-iq4gd That totally does make sense. I know they were being leaned-on to reduce worker hours and costs because of the platform cost overruns, and rig workers apparently make a good bit of money. If the guys who were there were less stretched-thin, or if there were more people there to let someone spare more than tenths-of-a-second at a time, they may well have avoided it. ONE person with a spine calling B.S. on the 'bladder effect' claim, or activating the EDS before the circuit was destroyed (and thus when rig power was still available to it, I believe?) would have avoided most or all of the issue...it's sad.
After the Piper disaster, I worked on the control systems for automatic shutdown valves at St Fergus and several platforms in the North Sea.
I was offshore when the Keilland went down, it was one bad storm.
OK what the hell happened to lock out procedures
I worked in Stavanger that year Alexander Kielland whent down - think it was spring type .. and also attended the first try to turn A Kielland in Gandsfjorden Hinna -Stavanger - first 1980 and later 1983 not to sucsessfull however but 6 souls was saved - the rig was finally dragged out to Nedstrandsfjorden, to be sinked .
Its final seagrave at att the depth of 700 meters for remembranse - 30 souls of 123 lost are still missing - R.I.P -
Idid my last tripp after 45 years offshore this summer and now just happy to enjoy my life with my loving wife and and long row of kids and friends - but remember the good times and the badwill never leav me. Thank you Equinor (former Statoil) + Old Hydro - Aker Solutions and many more- Im happy to have served well an Norway today - Safety always first to any cost
God damn. It's truly unbelievable that BP are still doing business. Texas City and Deep water Horizon are two of the worst industry accidents and they were both a reflection of their cost cutting and terrible safety culture.
Imagine what would have happened when you was still a diver - if I kept distracting you with adverts. You would end up the subject of one of your own shows. I bet you would do a fine job at it as well.
On the ocean ranger crew they didn’t know how to work the ballast system and made things a lot worse. It was said if they had just cleaned up the water and went to bed they would have lived to see the sun rise.
It wasn't that they didn't know how to use it, there was an electrical fault, caused by an open porthole, which they had no idea about, at the time.
@@deathbycheese850They knew just enough about the system to be dangerous. Training was lackluster at best and safety was a “dirty “ word
With Accidents on Oil Rigs, I am always more concerned about Spilt Oil & The Environmental Impact on Marine Wildlife for years to come,
Damage from some oil spills will be felt by Ecosystems for hundreds of years to come.
Be cool to actually know what the crew was dealing with concerning the ballast system. I mean what was it they needed to know to operate it manually? What valve went to what pipe and to what ballast? And so on, just something indepth about the ballast system instead of, it shorted out and they did not know how to use it manually. The ballast control system is why it sunk.
Deepwater horizon, a simply baffling display of panic and sheer idiocy from higher ups to me. Your life is very clearly being put in danger and the person in charge is refusing to take action, stop waiting for the clearance to pull the emergency alarm and just do what must be done, never hesitate.
Dangerous job, but they get paid very well
It's so sad that everyone was jumping off the rig when Derrick was burning alive.
Have you talked about the scorpion? Id like to see your thoughts on scorpion as there is conspiracy and many unanswered questions about its sinking.
It remains very intact for a submarine that slipped below its crush depth
Fuck
Something tells me the pressure was equalized before she slipped below crush depth
@stuglife5514 based on the publicly available footage of the wreck, I would agree, but if that were true it conflicts with the official narrative of hydrogen explosion in the battery compartment.
It would be more indicitive of the hot running torpedo theory, or even the theory of enemy action sinking the vessel. The released navy ROV footage of the scorpion is very sombering and impressive
There is a huge diff between greed and the poor build on the Alexander Kjelland. Poor build quality happens. Greed is a human decision...
So the first one confused me. The way you explained it it sounds like everyone made reasonable decisions and an oopsie happened.
But this is not how safety on complex systems works.
Lockouts have been a standard on industrial systems, factory machinery add everything else for a very long time,
Actual engineers not mechanics weather design precise procedures for safety lockouts.. especially for things like safety valves. It would be a well bubba nose sort of thing there would be precise instructions, literal locks , red or yellow safety tape. It is insane to leave any high pressure pipe anything hand tight. The location of those maintenance checklists shouldn't matter. The engineers job would be too specifically designer procedure where accidents like this can't happen.
Somebody f***** up here or multiple somebody's. 4 as we are in children most likely a manager told the supervisor to just turn the f****** thing on. Unforeseeable accident is going to cost a company a whole lot less money than management making stupid and negligent decisions.
32:32 I’m actually in Houston Texas and 1 year after the explosion, I was born
As dumb s it might sounds... But after yours vid's I got really invested in oilrig job and I'm trying to get on one for like 3 months. Not successfully but still trying!
I think it must be an incredible environment to work in. Best of luck finding one.
I was born and raised in Alaska, if you move there and are persistent, red tape is cut by government and a barrel of oil stays above 30-35$ a barrel you’ll get a job on a oil rig. Or at least goto work in the oil fields. It’s the coldest weather I’ve ever been in and all you do is work 12 hours a day minimum 7 days a week. I worked 6 weeks on 2 weeks off for PGS doing seismic and spent 2 years working for pool arctic Alaska. Not sure if either still exist but ConocoPhillips is always hiring.
@@TheronAnderson-hy3lp already tried there but they don't look for newbies from eu to hire... But thanks a lot for advicec:
LOTO could have helped with the condensate pump
i like the hand gestures little puppet who is pulling your strings
An evil overlord. Help, he won't let me out🥺
this guy goes out into the sea?? after telling us all those horror stories, he's really got curage
Maybe there isn't any way to make oil rigs safe, I wonder if it could be taken over by robotics to do the job instead.
In my optics piper alpha takes the cake, but gets beaten by deep water in round 2.
Different generations. Can't put them both in the ring at the same time.
Im no deepsea diving expert but using a cutting torch to cut into a gas/fuel tank seems obsurd on the face of it. R u sure u had that part right. Id think no diver would attempt such a foolish manuver.
All of these are fine examples of Corporate Greed!!!!