I have watched your videos and you are the only person who has answered my questions on the side of reason. You have single handedly brought me back to the faith. I dont know what to do now... can I communicate with God...I feel lied to by the new wave of atheism...
You can totally communicate with God. Prayer is the No. one thing you should do. But as well, you need to be open to letting God answer you as it's fitting. This may mean in subtle ways, a "feeling" or anything else. God bless you brother
As someone heavily influenced by oneness pentecostalism, and whose main struggle is with the trinity, this makes a lot of sense and was very helpful. Thank you
For starters, I'll elaborate. I, too, affirm divine simplicity and see it as wholly incompatible with all forms of the trinitarian doctrine, except those which are trinitarian in name only (e.g., Swedenborgianism). This presentation alleges that the distinction in persons is in God's relations (knower, known & act of self-understanding) and that these relations are NOT distinct from the divine essence and that the distinction is not logical or notional. First, what are relations without relata (objects between which a relation is said to hold)? Since pursuant to simplicity, God cannot be "objects," there can therefore be no relations in God except that which God has with Himself. You will note that the presenter calls God "he" throughout his argument which in the most straightforward, common sense meaning refers to one person, not three (e.g., "God knows Himself"). Thus, all that appears to be said here is that God relates to Himself which is not, in itself, particularly trinitarian. Any Oneness advocate can say the same thing. Second, since the relations are wholly identical with the essence, on what basis are they really distinct from each other? According to Catholicism and the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), God's attributes (love, justice, mercy, etc.) are also wholly identical with the essence too. Each attribute is real and not merely logical, yet they are one in God. In other words, there is not one attribute of love and another attribute of justice. We (DDS advocates) say rather that something analogous to love and something analogous to mercy is one and undivided in God so that God is love and God is mercy. The distinction between the two IN GOD is logical even though the attributes are real (they are neither imaginary nor accidental). Thus, on what basis is there a difference between the persons of the Trinity? To explain, what each person has in common is the divine essence. According to Catholic trinitarianism, each person is fully identical with the Godhead. Thus, their distinction is in their relations, not in the divine essence. But here we have an obvious contradiction. Since there is no distinction between the relations and the essence, the essence cannot then be the basis of the distinction. Let's say we have A and B and that A and B are really distinct from each other. Each would have some things in common and somethings not common. We can call what they have in common the Principle of Commonality (PC), and we can call what they do not have in common the Principle of Distinction (PD). Two things follow from this. First, PC ≠ PD because if they were equivalent, then we would be saying that what A & B have in common is identical to what they do not have in common (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. Consequently, PC ≠ PD. Moreover, PC cannot account for the real distinction between A & B. Only PD can account for the distinction. If there is only PC, then A = B and they would not be distinct at all (except nominally) but rather identical. To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd. So, based on the presentation here, there is no basis for the distinction between the persons. If the Godhead is absolutely one and undivided and if there is no real distinction between the essence and the relations, there is therefore no rational basis for asserting a real distinction between the persons. Recall that on Catholicism, the attributes are wholly identical with the Godhead too, yet Catholics claim no real distinction between them. Rather, the attributes are wholly and completely the one supreme Godhead without real distinction. Thus, if the persons (relations) are also wholly and completely the one supreme Godhead, there cannot be any real distinction between them either. We thus, as shown above, have a logical contradiction which renders the doctrine false on its face.
@@fredrikjohansson2743 Hi, Fredrik. Thanks for the question, and I'll directly answer it in a moment. However, you begin your post with, "So..." which of course implies that you read my post. If that is the case, then the contradiction remains whether or not I can adequately answer your question. A contradiction does not become true because somebody else doesn't have an explanation. For example, if your vacuum cleaner cannot pick up dirt, it doesn't help matters to point out that my vacuum is also defective. Your vacuum cleaner remains inadequate regardless my inability to do anything about it. Now, with respect to your question, let's look at the verse: _Joh __8:54__ Jesus answered, If I honour myself, my honour is nothing: it is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say, that he is your God_ The first counter-question I'd ask is why does Jesus' honor amount to nothing? If Jesus is God, then it would follow that His personal honor is just as effective as the Father's honor, no? If divine simplicity is true, there is no divine attribute that the Father has that the Son lacks. So, whatever honor the Father can give can be equally given by the Son. And this is of course the first clue that Jesus isn't speaking as God; He is speaking as a man. It is the divinity that legitimizes the ministry of the man (the Son), but lest there be any confusion as to the actual identity of the person in the Son, He states: _Joh __8:58__ ...Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am_ We thus see Jesus fulfilling two roles: Servant and Sovereign. As to the Spirit, He fills all of heaven, and as to the flesh, He fulfills the role of a subordinate sacrifice. We see two modes of revelation, not two persons.
@@davidcoleman5860 Thanks for the informative answer sir!=) At the present I'm not a Christian, but just strolling around the web asking people in an attempt to find a viable position.
The problem is that strict Plotinian divine simplicity makes identity claims 1) The Father is identical to the Divine Essence 2) The Son is identical to the Divine Essence 3) Therefore, the Son is identical to the Father, but your dogma states that the Father and Son are not identical. Even if a subject knows an object, then there are three distinctions here, the knower, the knowing and the known. How are the three persons of the Trinity distinct? Is the distinction a rational one? If that is true, then the distinction is just in the mind of the believer, and thus you have modalism. Is the distinction a real one, if that is the case, then the substances exist independent and separable of each other, and you would have polytheism. Is the distinction a modal one, in that case the separability is one way in which one member exists independent of the others, whereas the others depend on him, this would result in subordinationism. You seem to be arguing that because the Christian God is simple, all of these distinctions do not compromise his simplicity, even though you don't explain how these distinctions do not compromise his simplicity, you just assert he is simple. This seems to be your argument. 1) The Christian deity is simple 2) Therefore whatever distinctions exist amongst the members of the Trinity do not compromise this deity's simplicity, and the explanation for that is the Christian deity is simple.
When you say that the Father is identical to the Divine Essence, and the Son is identical to the Divine Essence, yet the Father and Son are not identical, I don’t see how that is any different from the dogma of the Holy Trinity.
@@@gregoryvess7183 The problem is that the dogma is incoherent. Without using terms like reflexivity or transitivity, just think of what it means for a to be identical to b. They would be the same thing, without differing in either their formal intelligibility or some type of material instantiation. The distinction would just be a rational one, with no distinction of any kind in reality. So, if the Father is identical to the Divine Essence, and the Son is identical to the Divine Essence it would follow that the Father is identical to the Son. If A is identical to C, and B is identical to C, then A is identical to B. The problem is that Divine Simplicity will force identity, since the Divine Essence must not be distinct from any of its attributes. May I ask you a question, how are the Father and Son distinct? Is the distinction between "Unbegotten" and "Begotten" just in the mind the believer, or is the distinction actually in the Godhead, with the Father having the attribute of being "Unbegotten", and the Son having the attribute of being "Begotten", which are distinct attributes.
@@Nyklot439 I'm on my phone so I can't address your questions point by point. However, I'm wondering who are the figures you've read exactly in regards to Catholic divine simplicity? Because every single one of your points is answer (some of them even by a popular level video of Bishop Barron). I might be able to address them when I get home, later in the night. I'm assuming you're a Platonist, right? I'll be curious to see if you can hold your position when I release my developed absolute simplicity demonstration and refute Platonism's argument for "The One", along his current day defenders like Lloyd Gerson and the other contributors in his volume of The Enneads (2017). Not that Platonism was the intended target (it was always Non-Trinitarian theism & Jungianism). It seems however that Platonism also falls into that group.
Moses Maimonides (Rambam) that great Jewish Plotinian advocate makes a similar point about inconsistency in the Guide to the Perplexed. 'If one believes Him to be One and to possess a number of attributes, one in fact says he is One but thinks He is many. This is the same as the Christians say: He is One, but He is three, and the three are One. There is no difference between saying this and saying: He is One but has many attributes..' MN Book 1 Ch.50
The divine Persons are subsisting relations in the Godhead. The Father is paternity, the Son is filiality, the Spirit is spiration. So I guess the only way the Persons are distinct from each other is by the law of identity: paternity is not filiality, filiality is not spiration, etc. It coheres with the simplicity of the Godhead due to the law of noncontradiction: as long as one relation specifically doesn't exist within God alone, then the Godhead can have as many relations as necessary intrinsic to it. Also, those relations exist in relation to each other. For example, the presence of paternity entails that there is an object of paternity subsequent to the principle of paternity. That object of paternity would be filial in relation to its principle. Therefore, filiality exists alongside paternity. *Therefore, Father and Son exist together*.
In question 39 of the Summa Aquinas says, "the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person." Me and most others who have read this take it to mean that each subsistence or person in the Trinity is identical to God's essence. So, Father = essence, Son = essence, and Spirit = essence. But under the classical identity relation this means that Father = Son. That's just inconsistent unless we are niave modalists. I've listened to this a few times and will listen again. I don't understand how this point is addressed in the video. Maybe i am being dense and missed it. If so please correct me. Maybe you hold a view different from Aquinas? If I actually held to Aquinas' view of simplicity I would try to show that Aquinas had some sort of relative identity or constitution relation in mind instead (don't think that's the case. Then I would try to give a meaningful account of relative identity that is both internally consistent and consistent with my version of simplicity. Or else I would try and show that divine simplicity does not entail that each person = essence. Then which ever route I took I would represent it in first order logic and find a model. This would prove consistency. If a theory is inconsistent then it has no model. Frankly I dont think any of this is needed. The Cappadoccians and John Damascene have a coherent and adequate conception of the Trinity. The subsistence of the Father is the one uncaused cause. (This is Roman Catholic Dogma too the Father is the only uncaused cause and cause of Son and Spirit) In this sense there is one God. The subsistence of the Son just is God's Logos and Wisdom eternally caused by generation from the Father as a Mind generates Word. He is not the Father because the Father is not generated or begotten. The Spirit is just His Spirit who eternally proceeds from Him. Each subsistence is fully divine with the same divinity. While linguistic convention might allow us to call them three gods, We do not say this because there is one power one will and a concord of mind, and activities shared by them, not similar but one and the same. If they did not share the same will and power or if there was a divergence of divine Mind then we would really have 3 Gods. This is why I reject most forms of social trinitarianism as false.
It's odd that I have come to the exact same conclusion from my reading of St. John and the Cappadocians. I think the latin accounts, in attempting to avoid polytheism, lend themselves to incoherence, and so the best trinitarian models are found in the East amongst the aforementioned Doctors.
Since God by definition is uncaused, to say that the Son and the Spirit are caused renders the term "God" equivocal. If this is somehow an internal generation or procession, then you'll ultimately end up with the same problem you criticize---that to maintain simplicity, A = B = C. Otherwise, there must be an aspect of the essence unique to a person which makes composition unavoidable. Indeed, your "concord of mind" is directly compositional. And if it's an external generation and procession, not only are we still saddled with an equivocal term (God), we also have outright tritheism. Moreover, if you insist that there is one mind in the Trinity and that the one mind is not composed, then on what basis are the persons distinct (different)? Let's say that A and B are really alike and really distinct. What they have in common is what we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC), and what they do not have in common is what we can call the Principle of Distinction (PD). We can thus see that PC ≠ PD for what makes A & B alike cannot be the very thing that makes them distinct. Otherwise, we would be saying that the very thing that makes them common is what makes them different (C = ~C) which is of course a straight contradiction. Moreover, PC cannot account for the real distinction between A & B. Only PD can account for the distinction. If there is only PC, then A = B and they would not be distinct at all (except nominally). To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd. Thus, your account makes it clear that the divine essence (E) is what is common among the persons (PC = E). And since the PD ≠ E, on what basis are the persons distinct? Your post appears to identify the distinction in the generation and procession "as a Mind generates Word," but a word or words are not different persons from us; they are merely a means of communication which disclose our thoughts. And if that's the illustration that supports your view, then wisdom and word are just attributes of God which are distinct in themselves. If that is the case, then again, composition cannot be avoided. But this is clearly more than a man generating his own words; this is the begetting of a personality distinct from the begettor. It cannot be the same mind else the begotten would be just another mode of the begettor's existence (and I assume that you reject modalism). So, they either have the same mind or they do not. If there is an aspect of this one mind unique to a person, then the mind is composed by definition. So, again, we have the question: What makes each person distinct? Since it cannot be the divine essence, it must be in each person's unique existence---something other than the essence that distinguishes them. The appeal to human attributes doesn't work because even though a man has distinct attributes and is composed of body, soul and spirit, he is nonetheless one person. And if something other than the essence accounts for the distinction, then how is that logically different from the genus/species composition we see in nature? If the divine essence can be multiplied with acts of existence marking the difference between the persons, then God is a genus which renders Him composite and thus in need of an explanation beyond Himself.
I was born and raised Greek Orthodox(Now converting to Catholicism) and I never knew or was made aware of, that Orthodoxy believes, that God's substance is distinct from it's operations. Any source I could read further into?
"God is love." 1. John 4:16 Lover - Love - Beloved. Makes sense - since the highest commandment is to love. Perfect love, that means divine love (Agape in the Greek of the New Testament) is unconditional. In our human experience, perfect love seems to manifest itself when we give to others willing the good of the other. In its purest form it is truly unconditional. Unconditionally giving. And here is God becoming man, living the perfect - sinless - life, taking all punishment upon himself and dying the most dreadful death one can possibly imagine sothat we might be saved. What more could one give - how could one give more unconditionally? Love is who he is. True love is unconditional. We see this in our daily lives when we give unconditionally. Phrases like "Love is the only thing that grows when shared." or “Happiness is the only thing that multiplies when you share it.” try to express what is truely divine. Love, which offers itself by its very nature/essence, exists of its own, - in other words, it subsists. In Thomas Aquinas' words, God is 'ipsum esse per se subsistens'. Being itself subsisting. The sheer act of being. Love. This is what we see in the first book of the bible to our salvation in Jesus Christ. From the God who gives by creating out of 'nothing', from the burning bush which was not consumed by its flames of self-giving love, to Pentecost. Then, "what looked like flames or tongues of fire appeared and settled on their heads" - the Holy Spirit. Love. "God is love." 1. John 4:16
In Aquinas' '"Shorter Summa" he asserts that the unbegotten Father has intellect and will. Consequently, the Father's act of understanding Himself intellectually is the Son/Word (who is the exact image of God). In that the Father loves Himself in the Son/Word, the Father being the lover and the Son/Word the beloved, the love between the Father and the Son/Word is the Holy Spirit. These are consubstantial eternal relations in the Godhead.
So, the Son doesn't love the Father? Does the Holy Spirit love the Father, or is this a one-way love? Neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit have intellect and will? If not, then they are not "persons" in any real sense. They are simply labels which describe God's relating to Himself, which is indistinct from modalism. However, if the Father's act of understanding Himself produces three persons, then why doesn't the Son's act of knowing Himself (or the Father & Holy Spirit) result in multiple persons? You are capable of knowing yourself. Thus, you are the knower, you have in yourself the means of knowing, and you are the object of the knowledge (the known), _but you are still one person_ !
This was a great watch. It was concisely explained without compromising on details that might lead to controversy. I liked that you included an explanation for Gregory Palamasʼ 'essence-energies' distinction as it is somehow misconstrued in subtle ways. As a Reformed Classical Christian, I approve of this. I liked this video and will definitely subscribe to your channel. God bless you, brother!
It seems to me that it makes little sense to describe the relations as "persons" on this understanding of the Trinity. One could speak analogously of the knower as being a person, but not the object of knowledge or the act of knowing.
@@alem8100 In what sense are they personal? How can a _relation_ be personal? Aquinas thinks of the hypostases as _subsisten relations_ and I cannot see how that could involve anything personal.
If the terms of the relations are identical to the substance (as necessary due to divine simplicity), then they are substance with a rational nature, which makes them persons.
@@Tdisputations You define "persona" (Gr. prosopon; hypostasis) as a "substance with a rational nature" but is that what the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (381 AD) meant by "hypostasis"? I think that this word in Greek simply means an underlying reality or mode of being rather than a substance with a rational nature. However, I think that divine simplicity is very difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the trinity since this requires _real distinction_ of hypostasis, which appears to be compromised by the absolute oneness of divine simplicity. I realise that geniuses such as Aquinas have tried to circumvent this problem, but how successfully he and others have done this is disputable (to say the least).
@@Tdisputations If a "person" means "a substance with a rational nature", then three persons is three substances with rational natures. That, of course, contradicts the doctrine of the Trinity.
As it happens directly relates to a conversation I'm currently having. I can't begin to imagine how many tweets I might have spent trying to express this with less eloquence.
This is a pretty old video so I’m not sure if you’ll see this comment, but I wanted to start by saying that this is one of the most profound explanations of the trinity I have ever had the privilege of hearing, so good job on that. Even though I’m agnostic I’m extremely interested in theology, and it’s hard to find real metaphysical explanations like this. That being said, I’m not sure if I can fully be on board with it. It seems to me that these distinctions you made between the persons would be distinct only in the sense that, say, God’s mercy, justice, and love would be distinct. That is, they are imprinted understandings of a singular noumenon existing in the phenomenal world. There’s really no philosophical problem with this model at all, it does what it set out to do which was to create a distinction without differentiation. But I take issue with it because it seems to just be a form of subtle modalism, which you preemptively declared to be heretical. Just off the cuff, I wonder if you could at least undermine this problem by positing that the persons of the Trinity are distinctions that must necessarily be made in all possible phenomenal worlds, because of something inherent to the nature of phenomena. This doesn’t really make it no longer modalism, but perhaps you could argue that it’s only trivially so? Not really sure about it, and I’m interested to hear your thoughts
Hello! Under this video, look for the thread started by MrDoctorSchultz. There are currently 36 replies beneath it. I think you'll find some interesting analysis with respect to the metaphysical implications of the Trinity.
I don't think the Essence-Energy Distinction is incompatible with Thomism, I think they're complimentary. In ST I, Q. 19, A. 3 "Reply to Objection 6" Aquinas makes a distinction between God's will and things willed. If the things willed were identical to God then things like the universe would be identical to God leading to pantheism, and we can say that whatever happens does so according to God's will, so things like "person X being hit by a bus" would be identical to God which is unintelligible. There's a treatise on the Essence-Energy distinction which explains that it does not affect God's simplicity too if you're interested. I think the Palamas distinction keeps the transcendent-immanent doctrine of Christianity intact while Thomism kind of leans pretty far on the transcendent side. I'm still a Thomist though
Let me get this straight. In order to account for God's self-knowledge and self-relation we must invoke the Trinity or else these acts would be distinct from God, having a different essence or nature?
That is essentially it, yes. Those relations would either constitute parts of God’s essence or would be distinct from the essence altogether, in either case introducing composition into the Divine. These relations however are true consequences of self-referentiality and thus we identify them though distinct from each other as Father, Son, and Spirit are nevertheless identical with the essence and consubstantial with it
@@ClassicalTheist , great response. Recently I was in an engagement with a Modalist and he made the argument that if the Father is the Knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the knowing, but the Essence is identical to the relation, then, we can call the Son the knower, the Holy Spirit the known and the Father as the knowing. Basically, if the relation is identical to the Essence, then, (as he argues), all must be knower, all must be known, all must be knowing. Thus, he collapsed them into One Essence, no distinction. Thoughts on how best to answer this?
@@MountAthosandAquinas As a modalist, I will tell you that there is no logical answer to that question. On the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), the relations are identical with the essence. By the way, the attributes are also identical with the essence but on Catholicism, the attributes are not really distinct. Hence, what is the REAL distinction between the persons? If A & B are really distinct, then there are some things common to them and some things distinct. What is common we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC) and what is distinct we can call the Principle of Distinction (PD). From this we know that if all we have is PC, then A = B, and from this we also know that PC ≠ PD, for the very thing that makes them common cannot be the very thing that makes them distinct (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd. So, if the divine essence (E) is what makes each person common, then E cannot account for the distinction on pain of composition and/or contradiction. Thus the PD ≠ E. Recall also that Aquinas said that whatever is not of the divine essence is a creature. If the PD, therefore, is not E, then the relations (R) are creatures. Of course, we know that the DDS vigorously denies that the relations are creatures, but then we have no basis to distinguish the persons, except nominally.
What your essentially saying is God is The self referential arbitar of all self knowledge the object of all self knowledge and the spectrum of all self knowledge. Gonna listen again but nice explanation
@@user-vh3kj9ri8h Really? Aquinas adds even more difficulty to the subject with de ente et essentia. His almost complete lack of scripture proofs show him an able philosopher and a weak theologian (Isa.8.20, Col 2.6-9)
@@prob316 Aquinas wasn't giving a Bible study at that point. Moreover, the Bible doesn't pretend to be a metaphysical handbook. Romans 1:20 tells us that man is able to clearly see God's nature via His creation. Thus, creation itself, in addition to the special revelation of the Scriptures, is God's witness to mankind. Each have their place.
Hey I have some questions (feel free to direct me towards papers or books) How does God being unchanging effect the idea of him making choices. Like he seems jealous at certain parts of the Bible and not at others. Did something in God change when he sent the flood? How does God being immutable work with him reacting to human choices that are either pleasing or bring about his wrath? I don't take these as objections, I am just a theistic personalist trying to understand more about classical theism. Basically, my question is if God is perfectly simple and unchanging how do we deal with apparent changes or choices in time with God (like becoming incarnated etc)? I am sympathetic to your view but want to know how it works with Biblical passages that make it seem like God is more of a reacting divine mind rather than the ground of being. Thank you for reading and I look forward to any reading recommendations.
Okay thank you, but one question would still stand here. His retribution seems to be an act, a reactive act - how does that not constitute a change? So suppose Tom has not committed sin A at time t1. At T1 no retribution has been enacted according to God's will, yet at time t2 Tom has committed sin A and thus "provoked" or earned God's retribution. Is this not a change? What happened in the divine mind at T2? Did God 'decide' to enact retribution? If yes, was some potential actualized in God or can God act and change without going from some potential to actual?
Ferinus perhaps it would be more simple to say that it isn't God who reacts to us, but we who change in relation to God. God doesn't suddenly feel jealousy. He is a jealous God, but that jealousy only manifests when we leave Him for idols.
"Now you may find in the Hebrew Scriptures also thousands of such passages concerning God as though He were jealous, or sleeping, or angry, or subject to any other human passions, which passages are adopted for the benefit of those who need this mode of instruction." - Eusebius
Good presentation, but you cannot call "energies" of Eastern Orthodoxy "accidents" of God. Energies are just the activities of God. Whether you agree with the distinctions Easter Orthodoxy makes or not, you cannot misrepresent what they say about the energies. The activities/operations/essences are distinct but not separate. The distinction does not divide. To quote Palamas in the Triads; "Essence and energy are thus not totally identical in God, even though He is ENTIRELY manifest in every energy. His essence being indivisible." p. 96. (Emphasis added by me on God being entirely manifest in each and every one of his activites/energies). This is a real blind spot for Thomism. I should say that it is the blind spot for the for the classic theistic model in all forms, even Reformed Calvinism. As long as we use a definitional model of divine simplicity of God's essence, we get boxed in by Divine Eternity. Divine Eternity states that God does not travel through successive movements in Time He cannot acquire something He does not have and cannot lose something that He has. God's life remains the same. Therefore He cannot be Creator at a specific time because He is the Creator of time. The conclusion of this view of divine simplicity is that He must be Creator from all eternity. So what is wrong with that? Three things. 1) By focusing on the essence, contingency is introduced in God. He cannot be Creator without having to create. Creation then becomes necessary for God's very Being. 2) By defining God as Creator eternally, His freedom NOT to create is compromised. Under the classic position, God does not need to create to be God. God creates freely from his Triune eternal Love. God can do just fine without creation, otherwise He would be contingent on creation (non-God) to be God. But if He is Creator eternally, he must create; and 3) Creation itself is pulled into the essence of God. It becomes "part" of God. But that is a contradiction of divine simplicity (God has no parts), and it is not a hypostasis (not a Person). Contrast with God as eternal Father eternally generating the Son. There was never a "time" when the Father was not the Father, nor a "time" when the Son wasn't Son. That is the definition of eternal generation. Now if we apply that every definition (as we must under the classic view) to the eternal Creator; then there was never a point when God as Creator did not create, and by implication, never a time when creation was not. That is blatantly false! It contradicts Creation Ex Nihilo (creation for nothing) and denies God's freedom not to create. This is the blind spot in Classic Theism.
Another corollary of the above problem is that if creation is pulled into eternity, then so is time, resulting in the self-refuting (from the classic understanding) conclusion that God is in time. At best, we end up with a Process Theology God of a becoming God. Thus going back to the classic understanding that God is not "in" Eternity but IS Eternity, and results in the ridiculous conclusion that Eternity began with creation. BTW, I would like to believe there is a way out of this dilemna other than moving to the Eastern Orthodox view, but I haven't found one yet.
Notwithstanding what I truly believe to be the classical Thomistic blind spot, I am not sure that the Eastern Orthodox "solution" of the distinctions between essence and energies adequately addresses the problem any better. From what I can tell, the Eastern Orthodox argument and criticism of the "definitional divine simplicity" and preference for what they call the "symbolic model" of divine simplicity, doesn't work they way they want. The arguments are really against a Neoplatonism and not for the arguments actually put forth by Thomas Aquinas (although the EO argue that they are the same).
The problem is that self sameness cannot get you a Father Son relationship at best it gets you a me, myself and I "persons", where me is myself who is I - a very narcissistic and modalist trinity if one is to argue these are "real" distinctions and not mere logical distinctions. Ergo ADS is based upon some very flawed logic and a load of cleverly disguised nonsense.
It being a revealing pronoun. I believe in one God in three persons, the Father, Son and Spirit, but the Divine essence is not neutered. Mathematical explanations don't help illuminate the Godhead much.
In order to deny divine simplicity using the Trinity, you would need to say that God being triune forces him to be composed of parts. However, saying that the three persons are three parts of God is a known trinitarian heresy (partialism). If the persons of the trinity are not three different parts of God, then what is the contradiction with divine simplicity? It's not clear to me what the supposed contradiction even is.
The word "distinct" means "different." Thus, the Father (F), Son (S), and Holy Spirit (H), are each alike and different. What, then, is the difference? If the FSH are wholly identical with the Godhead, then the difference is in the divine essence which of course means that there is an aspect of the essence that is unique to a person. If that is the case, then you have composition. The divine attributes are also wholly identical with the Godhead, but they are not distinct from each other. Rather they are all one in God and the difference is logical, not actual. But on divine simplicity (DS), the persons of the Trinity are not distinct logically, but actually, but then on what basis is the identity of the attributes with the essence any different from the identity of the persons with the essence? There is no logical solution, and that's partly why there's a contradiction. Let's say you have A & B. Let us also say that A & B are alike and different. What they have in common we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC) whereas what they do not have in common we can call the Principle of Distinction (PC). We can thus readily see that PC ≠ PD for if all we have is PC, then A = B. If this were not the case, then we would be saying that what A & B have in common is equivalent to what they do not have in common (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. Moreover, to equate PC & PD is to say that there is a distinction between A & B although they do not differ in any way, which is of course absurd. So, if PC ≠ PD, and if the PC is the divine essence, what then is the PD? It cannot be the essence itself (per above), so the distinction must be outside the essence. But as Aquinas notes, whatever is not the divine essence is a creature, and that would thus render the relations as creatures. The PD then forces the relations into the essence which yields the contradiction heretofore noted. Finally, what are relations without relata? Since relata are the subjects between which a relationship can hold, is God multiple subjects? If so, then you either have three gods or clear-cut composition. Since you would of course deny that God is composed of objects, the best you can offer in order to avoid a contradiction is to state that God has relations with Himself. Indeed, the above video makes that clear. However, having a relationship with oneself is not particularly trinitarian. Indeed, even Oneness advocates (modalists) can say the same thing. And interestingly, in order to illustrate this begetting and processing, DS trinitarians often employ analogies akin to divine attributes (sending one's word from the divine mind) while denying that the persons are attributes and denying real distinction between the attributes (but affirming it in the persons which are as identified with the essence as the attributes). These objections are well known outside the trinitarian bubble.
As I understand it, your argument holds that, if God is thought-thinking-itself, and if God is absolutely simple, then this single act of self-contemplation must be trinitarian in nature, since God is subject, object, and act of judgment relating subject and object, in thought, each distinct but consubstantial. How do you reconcile this with St. Thomas's belief that the trinity can be known only through revelation, and with Catholic teaching (e.g. Vatican I) which dogmatically maintains that we cannot know the trinity through natural reason? We *can* know that God exists, is simple, and is the act of self-contemplation through natural reason, so it seems that we also know by reason that God is a trinity. Yet this contradicts Catholic teaching.
We could know that God is more than 1 person, but we couldn't know that God is 3 without God revealing to us that he loves, and that his love is selfless, meaning it does not demand an exclusive response ("love one another as I loved you"). Since God is pure act and no potential, God's love must be actively selfless outside of time, thus, the necessity of a 3rd person.
Great video. I've watched it quite a few times. I'm Orthodox Catholic and I fully accept the doctrine of absolute divine simplicity. There are other Orthodox who do too (the Orthodox philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart, for example). Its unfortunate that we've gotten a reputation for rejecting a doctrine that is so basic to Classical Monotheism.
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese I don't think that's true. It seems to me that the only people who think this are the Neo-Palamites who are, in any case, incorrect. As to your point about philosophies determining word-meanings, I guess that's true but I still believe words within a language have objective meanings. In light of this, I believe Divine Simplicity must always mean Absolute Divine Simplicity since if a thing is made up of a simple and something composite, then the unity is itself composite i.e. not simple.
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese Anyone who believes in the real distinction of essence and energies is a neo-Palamite. I'm not literalist so I have no issue denying the events at Mt. Sinai as a literal historic event. Anyone who denies Absolute Divine Simplicity is a crypto-atheist since it will necessarily reduce God to a finite and therefore created being.
If the Spirit is the act of knowing ones self, then the Spirit is an energy which ADS proclaims is indistinct from the essence, therefore the Spirit is not truely distinct. What a silly argument
What do you make of Christopher Hughes' criticism of Aquinas? In this encyclopedia article they spell out what Aquinas believed and Christopher Hughes' critique: Thomas Aquinas sets out a highly developed and difficult trinitarian theory (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.1-26, Summa Theologiae I.27-43). God is “pure act”, that is, he has no potentialities of any kind. God is also utterly simple, with no distinct parts, properties, or actions. We may truly say, though, that God understands and wills. These divine processes are reflexive relations which are the persons of the Trinity. The Word eternally generated by God is a hypostasis, what Aristotle calls a first substance, which shares the essence of God, but which is nonetheless “relationally distinct” from God. The persons of the Trinity, as they share the divine essence, are related more closely than things which are merely tokens of a kind (e.g., identical twins), but he seems to hold that none are identical to either of the others (they are truly three). Aquinas develops Augustine’s idea that the “persons” of the Trinity are individuated by their relations. For Aquinas, the relations Paternity, Sonship, and Spirithood are real and distinct things in some sense “in” God, which “constitute and distinguish” the three persons of the Trinity (Hughes 1989, 197). The persons are distinct per relationes (as to their relations) but not distinct per essentiam (as to their essence or being). In the words of one commenter, [For Aquinas,] relations both constitute and distinguish the divine persons: insofar as relations are the divine essence (secundum res) [i.e. they’re the same thing], they constitute those persons, and insofar as they are relations with converses, they distinguish those persons. (Hughes 1989, 217) But how may these relations be, constitute, or somehow give rise to three divine hypostaseis when each just is the divine essence? For if each is the divine essence, won’t it follow that each just is (i.e. is identical to) both of the others as well? Aquinas holds that it does not follow-that would amount to modalism, not orthodox trinitarianism. To show why it doesn’t follow, he distinguishes between identitas secundum rem et rationem (sameness of thing and of concepts) and mere identitas secundum rem (sameness of thing). To the preceding objection, then, Aquinas says that the alleged consequence would follow only if the persons were the same both in thing and in concept. But they are not; they are merely the same thing. This move is puzzling. Aquinas holds that the three are not merely similar or derived from the same source, but are in some strong sense the same, but not identical (i.e. numerically the same) which he appears to understand as sameness in both thing and concept. Even this last is surprising; one would think that for Aquinas “sameness in thing” just is identity, and that “sameness in concept” would mean that we apply the same concept to some apparent things (whether or not they are in fact one or many). Christopher Hughes holds that Aquinas is simply confused, his desire for orthodoxy having led him into this (and other) necessary falsehoods. On Hughes’s reading, Aquinas does think of “sameness in thing” as identity, but he incoherently holds it to be non-transitive (i.e. if A and B are identical, and B and C are identical, it doesn’t follow that A and C are identical), while in some contexts assuming (correctly) that it is transitive (Hughes 1989, 217-40).
Classical Theist, this video is very helpful, but I have two questions (maybe you already plan to address the second one in your series but still). Firstly, if a man tries to know or understand himself only and not humanity as a whole, what stops three persons from appearing there? Is it that it is only part of him, namely, his intellect, that does the understanding or what? Secondly, what does it mean that the Son is 'begotten' and the Spirit 'proceeds'? That seems to introduce some sort of hierarchy, at least relational, between the Persons. And does that mean that the Known and the Knowledge in a way originate from the Knower?
Those are good questions, it seems there's something about being maximally simple that necessitates a tri-personal relationship but it is hard to understand why. There must be something we're missing. Johanan Raatz actually gives a good explanation using an analogy of quantum entanglement and semantic loops to show that maximum simplicity necessitates "three-ness" in his Integrated Triad video. I'd say there is a hierarchy but not in the sense of authority, they are all equal. It's an equal/circular relationship. Since the Knower (the Father) has always existed, so the Known and act of Knowledge have always existed. Where ever the Father exists the two must also, so they can "originate" from the Father in analogy only, but they don't have any supremacy or authority over each other and equally need one another. Scriptures refer to the Father being the head honcho only analogously. Edit: I figured it out, a maximally simple mind must have a trinatarian relationship because as the fundamental mind God is self-conscious and therefore self-referential. Take God's knowledge, there are THREE necessary conditions of knowledge: the one who knows, the act of knowing, and the object of the knowledge. Since a maximally simple being is identical to his attributes, he is identical to the knower (Father), the act of knowledge (Holy Spirit), and object of the knowledge (Son). That is how a maximally simple being requires a Triune relationship!
@@TheBrunarr There are so many problems with this last paragraph. Does the Son not also know? If so, does the Son's act of knowledge constitute another distinction? Can the Father then also be considered the object of the Son's knowledge, and is He then identical with the Son? How is an act a Person, capable of relation, knowledge, of offence?
@@prob316 In addition to your good objections, a triune relationship does not entail multiple personal relationships. You can know yourself, but you are not three persons. There are three principles of thought itself (identity, contradiction & excluded middle), but we are one person. I think the trinitarian mindset gets so caught up in justifying the doctrine that some fail to see how logically at odds it is with itself.
@@prob316 No, I'm not a Unitarian. And the Scriptures cannot teach the Trinity because the doctrine of the Trinity entails logical contractions. All contractions are untrue by definition.
Hello! I have been thinking starting a yt chanell similar to something like yours(i admire your content a lot, you are definitely a big inspiration!) Btw what backround music did you use?
@@ClassicalTheistThis is no proof. Is love also God? Otherwise there is a fallacy in your claim of simple, non-composite identity between the attribute and Deity.
@@ob4161 Thanks precious verses, but none assert simplicity, certainly not as Plotinus defined it and Augustine and Aquinas reasserted it. Strateias dot org slash simplicitas
How do you go from composite to contingent? I see no problem in maintaining that X is a being which possesses parts A, B, and C, but X possesses them necessarily, and they are instantiated together necessarily. I don't see a problem with maintaining that X is identical to the sum of ABC, and that ABC exists necessarily both with respect to its constituent parts and the relations between those parts.
Because the parts of which a composite thing is composed of precedes the thing, and nothing precedes God. Even if God was composed from eternity past and never began to be composite, that still means that God relies on those parts for actualization, but this is opposed to divine aseity where God is purely self-existent. If He is composed He is not self-existent. Think of Kant's example of a ball resting on a pillow since eternity. The ball makes a concave depression in the pillow. The depression in the pillow never _began_ and has always existed, but its existence is dependent upon the ball and the pillow. In your scenario God is the depression in the pillow, which is a contingent property of the interaction between the ball and pillow. In conclusion, if God is composite then it doesn't matter if He never began to exist because He would still be dependent upon something else, which contradicts Christian doctrine.
A good question. There is semantic gymnastics here that the founding fathers of simplicity would reject out of hand, so would many other advocates of simplicity like the Eunomians. If the Father is not the Son, the Son not the Spirit, yet all God's essence is simple, each Person wholly inheres in that essence and even His existence, acts and words are identical with His essence, the distinction between composition and contingency looks illusory to say the least. I maintain Simplicity leads inexorably to modalism in reality, nor does it aid the defence against polytheism, henotheism or pantheism as is often claimed, there being good evidence for this.
It may not seem reasonable to you, but where is the scriptural evidence that 'God relies on those parts for actualization' if He is always was and remains complex and compound, He has never needed actualising. He has always been actual. I suggest you're injecting Aristotelian assumptions into Christian theology, without warrant.
@@prob316 The instant you use the word "parts," you import its implications. And if you do not like its implications, then you need to use another word. A composite is by definition an assemblage of parts, and as Jacob points out, time is irrelevant. Thus, if G = FSH, then F ≠ G, S ≠ G, and H ≠ G. G is thus explained and defined by something less than G which renders G logically posterior to something that isn't G. And if G is logically explained by FSH, then G logically exists because of FSH which renders G dependent on FSH (G ---->FSH). If G~---->FSH (if G is not dependent on FSH), then FSH is accidental to G which means that you can have G without FSH. And that of course kicks FSH out of G (because G remains G without FSH).
Distinction is not always separation. The divine persons are not seperate but distinct. Orthodox deny that they are separate. I sometimes hear that they are different simultaneous modes of God's being and have heard that they overlap eachother within the divine nature.
The real question, with Divine Simplicity, is are they identical and if they are not, in what way is a distinction real, in a way that does not violate consistent simplicity, as its philosophical advocates taught it?
This seems incoherent. You stated that "...since God is simple, and since God IS his own act of self-understanding, these differing relations are NOT different aspects of God, but each share utterly and substantially in the divine essence itself in perfect unity. Paradoxically, in a way it is precisely because God is simple that he is three on one. This is to say that these relations of divine self-referentiality, WHILE REALLY DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER, ARE NOT REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE DIVINE ESSENCE..." If there is this thing, the divine essence, and you say that A is identical to it, and B is also identical to it, then by logical necessity A is identical to B also. However, you flatly say that this is not the case, and A and B must be really distinct. This denies the law of non-contradiction, as you say that A = the divine essence = B (from which it follows that A = B), and yet you also say that A =/= B. Could someone please explain where I went wrong, or is this an accurate representation of what he is saying? A better way to understand how God can contain distinction in himself whilst still maintaining divine simplicity is to say that divine simplicity does not preclude distinctions, only parts, and parts would be two attributes which are united together contingently, such that they did not have to be united together. Something that forms an indivisible whole, and is therefore simple (not composite) is something whose attributes are mutually co-extensive, such that it cannot have one attribute without having them all. Take God: As soon as you consider what it means for god to be good, you know he is also wise, and as soon as you know he is wise you know he is omnipotent he must be omniscient, and so on and so forth. I believe you actually would agree with this idea, but you would say that omniscience = omnipotence = goodness = the divine essence, ultimately, and what we perceive as distinct is God's condescension to our limited intellect. But I propose that you embrace the idea that they really are distinct attributes, just that they cannot exist without each other, thus maintaining the simplicity of God and also the coherence of the trinity.
so here's the way I see the way distinct yet the same exist God: father, God:son, God: holy spirit if we were to represent this it would be a (1:1),(1:1),(1:1) relationship they are independent of one another there are 3 distinct case but all 3 person are of 1 being. That said its doesnt mean it has 0 flaws because we cant observe God from a magnifying lens.
Please be careful, Classical Theist. If I say that the divine Persons share the divine nature, that may suggest that each divine person has a third of it when he's fully divine. Suppose my brothers Dave and Michael pool our money to buy a car. Dave pays a third of the price, Michael chips in another one, and I add the last one. But doesn't each of us owns a third of the car. The whole car belongs to us.
This solution is just mental gymnastics!! Your thomism also clearly falls into modalism as no reasonable person espicially not the earlier church fathers much before aquinas, when they condemned modalism would understand God's self knowledge to be another person or the Holy Spirit being the relationship of love between God's self-knowledge and the father himself. They would still view this as a sly way to attempt to avoid modalism which is still modalistic!! You have created more problems than you have solved! Also guess what, the LPT still applies with the way your sematics are phrased! p1: The Father is God p2: The son is God p3: The Father is not identical to the son p4: therefore either you have 2 things predicated with being god (2 gods) or the son and the father are both identical to God or the Divine Essence. If you take the 2nd option, you have left classical logic and are appealing to pure relative identity which I refute down here,. Also to deny distict indexical knowledge between the father and the son, but still avoid modalism isnt possible!! Using non leibnizian models to avoid classical identity sounds very " philosophical" and "sophisticated", but it is ultimately bullcrap!! You have yet to have given an example where X can be identical to Z, Y can be identical to Z, but X is not identical to Y. By logical defintion, to be identical means that every proposition for X is ontologically the same for Y with absolutely no distinction to the point that mentioning 2 variables is redundant. The moment you resort to saying that everything true of X is not true of Y where the is of identity is not possible, you create a logical contridiction between both premises. Clearly relative identity doesn't work and Peter van inwagen states that this has no utility outside christian theology!! Also how can you have a relational reality between X and Y without pre-supposing the existence of a concrete ontology for both X and Y which makes them borh disntict and not identical according to classical identity?? It is like me being a father to my son (relational identity) to a son that does not " exist " in the sense of not having a concrete ontogy ontologically distinct from me. Face it bud, there is no way to defend the trinity!! Come to islam and the haqq (truth) inshallah!!
No Christ assumes a human nature however that human nature is distinct whilst His divine nature remains simple and separate (though hypostatically united) from the human nature.
God is not a trinity, he's most fundamentally ONE. Now is this ONE the source of all plurality?..yes. But what makes 3 such a special number? It can be 3, or 4, 17, or 7 quintillion.
Arch Hades Well hold on there, does God know Himself? Yes... So, the act of God's knowing Himself is inherently different from the relation of God's being known by Himself. Finally, that act of knowledge must also be God. There ya go.
Creation is not an emanation of God. Creation is an emanation of God iff God creates in all possible worlds. Suppose for reductio Divine Simplicity is true. Then God's activities are identical to God's essence. God's act of creation is an activity of God. So God's essence is identical to God's act of creating. Since God's essence is the same in all possible worlds and Gods act of creation creation is his essence God creates in all possible worlds So God creates in all possible worlds. So creation is an emanation of God. This contradicts the Christian doctrine that creation free and not an emanation of God. So Absolute Divine Simllicity is false.
Abu Qurrah - It’s not that God’s activities are identical to God’s essence. It’s that God’s attributes are identical to his essence. Hence, the saying “All that is in God is God”.
@Watapon Watapon because jesus possessed two wills since He was both human and divine, which implies that the Son did not become consubstantial with the human body and therefore remained simple while jesus's body was composite. I think that's on the right track.
@@TheBrunarr that would be saying Jesus wasn't fully God and fully man. He'd be partially God and partially man. His nature is supposed to hypostatic but you're proposing a dual nature for Jesus. That is an old heresy. It makes God's crucifixion a question entirely. The body was crucified and man has a body but God does not. Therefore God was never crucified. Assuming the duality you are proposing.
@@MrSpectralfire that's why reasonable people won't subscribe to the erroneous doctrine of Trinity. John messed up when he said that Logos was God, and that is the genesis of Christianity.
The fullness of divinity (pleroma theotes) is in Christ. Obviously the Father too has the fullness of divinity. So this is the same divinity. They are of one essence. The bible also says that the saints are called to partake of the divine nature. In the Greek of holy scripture it says that God has energy (energeia energeo, dynamis, etc) Scripture also says that his energy is in the believer energizing them and working in them. According to the doctrine of Divine simplicity God's essence is identical to God's energy because there are no distinctions in God. But if this true then when God's energy is infused in us it is the divine essence the fullness of divinity in us. In which case the saints are members of the Godhead and it's not a Trinity anymore because the Saints become equal to the Father Son and Holy Spirit. But the saints are not members of the Godhead and there is a Trinity. So Absolute Divine Simplicity is false.
I suspect you either didn't watch the video, or didn't pay very close attention. Divine simplicity allows for distinction. What is denied is composition. If there's any confusion about that, it's because there's some overlap; all composition involves distinction, but not vice versa. Any distinction which entails composition is necessarily excluded. All the same, yes, we can reasonably say God's activity is His essence. However, it doesn't follow that if His holy ones participate in the Divine Nature, then they "become part of" the Godhead. Don't confuse God dwelling within us with our being constituted by His Divinity. Those are two different things, and you've failed to establish any connection between them. Now, addressing your argument that Divine simplicity denies the free creation of the world, we know that the First Cause must be absolutely simple. For clearly, if God is composed in any way, then He is dependent on something else for His existence, and to admit that is to say there is something superior to God, which no Christian can admit. Thus, if your argument succeeded, we would just have to conclude that Christianity is false and be done with the religion. Fortunately for all Christians, this modal collapse argument is flawed. Your claim that "God's essence is identical to God's act of creating" is false, and without that, your argument fails. In fact, the entire edifice rests on a misunderstanding of Divine simplicity. At its core, the doctrine only holds that God is His essence, which is the (uncomposed) self-subsistent act of existence. Now consider your statement "God's activities are identical to God's essence." This is only qualifiedly true. As said above, God is identical to the subsistent act of existing, but this does not mean that everything we call a Divine act is identical to God. Whatever we may say is 'contained within' this act of existing, one thing is certain: specific kinds of relational properties are not among these proverbial contents. *If it is not a reflexive relation God exhibits with Himself, then it is not 'contained within' God's essence.* Obviously, the act of creation is a relation God stands in with the created order, and so is not part of God's essence.
Parádoxo I’m a baby Thomist who doesn’t understand as much about these two topics as possible , I only have a small grasp at what you’re. Saying so may you mind condensing it for me or send me a source that explains it to beginners , thank you in advance
We are a trinity. We are our Father, our Mother, yet we are our own being. Occultists already KNOW what the trinity is and how it’s reflected in the material world. This endless, empty babble is unnecessary.
broke: listening to classical theist for the high quality content
woke: listening to classical theist for the dank spyro soundtrack
I have watched your videos and you are the only person who has answered my questions on the side of reason. You have single handedly brought me back to the faith. I dont know what to do now... can I communicate with God...I feel lied to by the new wave of atheism...
God bless you brother
@@ClassicalTheist Same here. Atheists for people that are supposedly of facts and logic, are surprisingly reliant on rhetoric
Pray the Rosary
You can totally communicate with God. Prayer is the No. one thing you should do.
But as well, you need to be open to letting God answer you as it's fitting. This may mean in subtle ways, a "feeling" or anything else.
God bless you brother
@@ClassicalTheist dont confuse divine simplicity with absolute divine simplicity they are not the same
As someone heavily influenced by oneness pentecostalism, and whose main struggle is with the trinity, this makes a lot of sense and was very helpful. Thank you
I'm a Oneness Pentecostal. How does this make any sense at all?
For starters, I'll elaborate. I, too, affirm divine simplicity and see it as wholly incompatible with all forms of the trinitarian doctrine, except those which are trinitarian in name only (e.g., Swedenborgianism). This presentation alleges that the distinction in persons is in God's relations (knower, known & act of self-understanding) and that these relations are NOT distinct from the divine essence and that the distinction is not logical or notional.
First, what are relations without relata (objects between which a relation is said to hold)? Since pursuant to simplicity, God cannot be "objects," there can therefore be no relations in God except that which God has with Himself. You will note that the presenter calls God "he" throughout his argument which in the most straightforward, common sense meaning refers to one person, not three (e.g., "God knows Himself"). Thus, all that appears to be said here is that God relates to Himself which is not, in itself, particularly trinitarian. Any Oneness advocate can say the same thing.
Second, since the relations are wholly identical with the essence, on what basis are they really distinct from each other? According to Catholicism and the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), God's attributes (love, justice, mercy, etc.) are also wholly identical with the essence too. Each attribute is real and not merely logical, yet they are one in God. In other words, there is not one attribute of love and another attribute of justice. We (DDS advocates) say rather that something analogous to love and something analogous to mercy is one and undivided in God so that God is love and God is mercy. The distinction between the two IN GOD is logical even though the attributes are real (they are neither imaginary nor accidental). Thus, on what basis is there a difference between the persons of the Trinity?
To explain, what each person has in common is the divine essence. According to Catholic trinitarianism, each person is fully identical with the Godhead. Thus, their distinction is in their relations, not in the divine essence. But here we have an obvious contradiction. Since there is no distinction between the relations and the essence, the essence cannot then be the basis of the distinction. Let's say we have A and B and that A and B are really distinct from each other. Each would have some things in common and somethings not common. We can call what they have in common the Principle of Commonality (PC), and we can call what they do not have in common the Principle of Distinction (PD). Two things follow from this. First, PC ≠ PD because if they were equivalent, then we would be saying that what A & B have in common is identical to what they do not have in common (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. Consequently, PC ≠ PD.
Moreover, PC cannot account for the real distinction between A & B. Only PD can account for the distinction. If there is only PC, then A = B and they would not be distinct at all (except nominally) but rather identical. To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd.
So, based on the presentation here, there is no basis for the distinction between the persons. If the Godhead is absolutely one and undivided and if there is no real distinction between the essence and the relations, there is therefore no rational basis for asserting a real distinction between the persons. Recall that on Catholicism, the attributes are wholly identical with the Godhead too, yet Catholics claim no real distinction between them. Rather, the attributes are wholly and completely the one supreme Godhead without real distinction. Thus, if the persons (relations) are also wholly and completely the one supreme Godhead, there cannot be any real distinction between them either. We thus, as shown above, have a logical contradiction which renders the doctrine false on its face.
@@davidcoleman5860 So the Son is the Father? Do you agree with that? If you do, then how do you intepret John 8:54?
@@fredrikjohansson2743 Hi, Fredrik. Thanks for the question, and I'll directly answer it in a moment. However, you begin your post with, "So..." which of course implies that you read my post. If that is the case, then the contradiction remains whether or not I can adequately answer your question. A contradiction does not become true because somebody else doesn't have an explanation. For example, if your vacuum cleaner cannot pick up dirt, it doesn't help matters to point out that my vacuum is also defective. Your vacuum cleaner remains inadequate regardless my inability to do anything about it.
Now, with respect to your question, let's look at the verse:
_Joh __8:54__ Jesus answered, If I honour myself, my honour is nothing: it is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say, that he is your God_
The first counter-question I'd ask is why does Jesus' honor amount to nothing? If Jesus is God, then it would follow that His personal honor is just as effective as the Father's honor, no? If divine simplicity is true, there is no divine attribute that the Father has that the Son lacks. So, whatever honor the Father can give can be equally given by the Son. And this is of course the first clue that Jesus isn't speaking as God; He is speaking as a man. It is the divinity that legitimizes the ministry of the man (the Son), but lest there be any confusion as to the actual identity of the person in the Son, He states:
_Joh __8:58__ ...Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am_
We thus see Jesus fulfilling two roles: Servant and Sovereign. As to the Spirit, He fills all of heaven, and as to the flesh, He fulfills the role of a subordinate sacrifice. We see two modes of revelation, not two persons.
@@davidcoleman5860 Thanks for the informative answer sir!=)
At the present I'm not a Christian, but just strolling around the web asking people in an attempt to find a viable position.
Found this channel minutes ago... its already my new favourite youtube channel
The problem is that strict Plotinian divine simplicity makes identity claims 1) The Father is identical to the Divine Essence 2) The Son is identical to the Divine Essence 3) Therefore, the Son is identical to the Father, but your dogma states that the Father and Son are not identical. Even if a subject knows an object, then there are three distinctions here, the knower, the knowing and the known. How are the three persons of the Trinity distinct? Is the distinction a rational one? If that is true, then the distinction is just in the mind of the believer, and thus you have modalism. Is the distinction a real one, if that is the case, then the substances exist independent and separable of each other, and you would have polytheism. Is the distinction a modal one, in that case the separability is one way in which one member exists independent of the others, whereas the others depend on him, this would result in subordinationism. You seem to be arguing that because the Christian God is simple, all of these distinctions do not compromise his simplicity, even though you don't explain how these distinctions do not compromise his simplicity, you just assert he is simple. This seems to be your argument. 1) The Christian deity is simple 2) Therefore whatever distinctions exist amongst the members of the Trinity do not compromise this deity's simplicity, and the explanation for that is the Christian deity is simple.
When you say that the Father is identical to the Divine Essence, and the Son is identical to the Divine Essence, yet the Father and Son are not identical, I don’t see how that is any different from the dogma of the Holy Trinity.
@@@gregoryvess7183
The problem is that the dogma is incoherent. Without using terms like reflexivity or transitivity, just think of what it means for a to be identical to b. They would be the same thing, without differing in either their formal intelligibility or some type of material instantiation. The distinction would just be a rational one, with no distinction of any kind in reality. So, if the Father is identical to the Divine Essence, and the Son is identical to the Divine Essence it would follow that the Father is identical to the Son. If A is identical to C, and B is identical to C, then A is identical to B. The problem is that Divine Simplicity will force identity, since the Divine Essence must not be distinct from any of its attributes. May I ask you a question, how are the Father and Son distinct? Is the distinction between "Unbegotten" and "Begotten" just in the mind the believer, or is the distinction actually in the Godhead, with the Father having the attribute of being "Unbegotten", and the Son having the attribute of being "Begotten", which are distinct attributes.
@@Nyklot439 I'm on my phone so I can't address your questions point by point. However, I'm wondering who are the figures you've read exactly in regards to Catholic divine simplicity? Because every single one of your points is answer (some of them even by a popular level video of Bishop Barron). I might be able to address them when I get home, later in the night.
I'm assuming you're a Platonist, right? I'll be curious to see if you can hold your position when I release my developed absolute simplicity demonstration and refute Platonism's argument for "The One", along his current day defenders like Lloyd Gerson and the other contributors in his volume of The Enneads (2017). Not that Platonism was the intended target (it was always Non-Trinitarian theism & Jungianism). It seems however that Platonism also falls into that group.
Moses Maimonides (Rambam) that great Jewish Plotinian advocate makes a similar point about inconsistency in the Guide to the Perplexed. 'If one believes Him to be One and to possess a number of attributes, one in fact says he is One but thinks He is many.
This is the same as the Christians say: He is One, but He is three, and the three are One. There is no difference between saying this and saying: He is One but has many attributes..' MN Book 1 Ch.50
The divine Persons are subsisting relations in the Godhead. The Father is paternity, the Son is filiality, the Spirit is spiration. So I guess the only way the Persons are distinct from each other is by the law of identity: paternity is not filiality, filiality is not spiration, etc. It coheres with the simplicity of the Godhead due to the law of noncontradiction: as long as one relation specifically doesn't exist within God alone, then the Godhead can have as many relations as necessary intrinsic to it.
Also, those relations exist in relation to each other. For example, the presence of paternity entails that there is an object of paternity subsequent to the principle of paternity. That object of paternity would be filial in relation to its principle. Therefore, filiality exists alongside paternity. *Therefore, Father and Son exist together*.
Criminally underrated channel!!!
In question 39 of the Summa Aquinas says, "the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person."
Me and most others who have read this take it to mean that each subsistence or person in the Trinity is identical to God's essence. So, Father = essence, Son = essence, and Spirit = essence. But under the classical identity relation this means that Father = Son. That's just inconsistent unless we are niave modalists.
I've listened to this a few times and will listen again. I don't understand how this point is addressed in the video. Maybe i am being dense and missed it. If so please correct me. Maybe you hold a view different from Aquinas?
If I actually held to Aquinas' view of simplicity I would try to show that Aquinas had some sort of relative identity or constitution relation in mind instead (don't think that's the case. Then I would try to give a meaningful account of relative identity that is both internally consistent and consistent with my version of simplicity.
Or else I would try and show that divine simplicity does not entail that each person = essence.
Then which ever route I took I would represent it in first order logic and find a model. This would prove consistency. If a theory is inconsistent then it has no model.
Frankly I dont think any of this is needed. The Cappadoccians and John Damascene have a coherent and adequate conception of the Trinity. The subsistence of the Father is the one uncaused cause. (This is Roman Catholic Dogma too the Father is the only uncaused cause and cause of Son and Spirit) In this sense there is one God. The subsistence of the Son just is God's Logos and Wisdom eternally caused by generation from the Father as a Mind generates Word. He is not the Father because the Father is not generated or begotten. The Spirit is just His Spirit who eternally proceeds from Him. Each subsistence is fully divine with the same divinity. While linguistic convention might allow us to call them three gods, We do not say this because there is one power one will and a concord of mind, and activities shared by them, not similar but one and the same. If they did not share the same will and power or if there was a divergence of divine Mind then we would really have 3 Gods. This is why I reject most forms of social trinitarianism as false.
It's odd that I have come to the exact same conclusion from my reading of St. John and the Cappadocians. I think the latin accounts, in attempting to avoid polytheism, lend themselves to incoherence, and so the best trinitarian models are found in the East amongst the aforementioned Doctors.
Since God by definition is uncaused, to say that the Son and the Spirit are caused renders the term "God" equivocal. If this is somehow an internal generation or procession, then you'll ultimately end up with the same problem you criticize---that to maintain simplicity, A = B = C. Otherwise, there must be an aspect of the essence unique to a person which makes composition unavoidable. Indeed, your "concord of mind" is directly compositional. And if it's an external generation and procession, not only are we still saddled with an equivocal term (God), we also have outright tritheism.
Moreover, if you insist that there is one mind in the Trinity and that the one mind is not composed, then on what basis are the persons distinct (different)? Let's say that A and B are really alike and really distinct. What they have in common is what we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC), and what they do not have in common is what we can call the Principle of Distinction (PD). We can thus see that PC ≠ PD for what makes A & B alike cannot be the very thing that makes them distinct. Otherwise, we would be saying that the very thing that makes them common is what makes them different (C = ~C) which is of course a straight contradiction. Moreover, PC cannot account for the real distinction between A & B. Only PD can account for the distinction. If there is only PC, then A = B and they would not be distinct at all (except nominally). To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd. Thus, your account makes it clear that the divine essence (E) is what is common among the persons (PC = E). And since the PD ≠ E, on what basis are the persons distinct?
Your post appears to identify the distinction in the generation and procession "as a Mind generates Word," but a word or words are not different persons from us; they are merely a means of communication which disclose our thoughts. And if that's the illustration that supports your view, then wisdom and word are just attributes of God which are distinct in themselves. If that is the case, then again, composition cannot be avoided. But this is clearly more than a man generating his own words; this is the begetting of a personality distinct from the begettor. It cannot be the same mind else the begotten would be just another mode of the begettor's existence (and I assume that you reject modalism). So, they either have the same mind or they do not. If there is an aspect of this one mind unique to a person, then the mind is composed by definition.
So, again, we have the question: What makes each person distinct? Since it cannot be the divine essence, it must be in each person's unique existence---something other than the essence that distinguishes them. The appeal to human attributes doesn't work because even though a man has distinct attributes and is composed of body, soul and spirit, he is nonetheless one person. And if something other than the essence accounts for the distinction, then how is that logically different from the genus/species composition we see in nature? If the divine essence can be multiplied with acts of existence marking the difference between the persons, then God is a genus which renders Him composite and thus in need of an explanation beyond Himself.
@@davidcoleman5860 If the Son is not God he is an Idol
@@gustavmahler1466 Hi, Scott. I most certainly believe that Jesus is God. I am a Oneness Pentecostal, so there's no doubt about that whatsoever.
I think it would be beneficial to attempt to reconcile the essence-energy distinction
How could that be possible?
What unites the essence and energies to be one God?
I was born and raised Greek Orthodox(Now converting to Catholicism) and I never knew or was made aware of, that Orthodoxy believes, that God's substance is distinct from it's operations. Any source I could read further into?
Or in other words: Whether the distinction is virtual or actual.
Watch jay dyers videos on it before converting my friend, you are making a mistake
Spiri D thank god someone mentioned Dyer. That dude is a beast.
@Eric Gabriel Madrid who do you speak to?
@@dioscoros if the distinction is virtual, why bother making it? ;-)
Shiz fam gotta ring the ding dong bell.
"God is love." 1. John 4:16
Lover - Love - Beloved.
Makes sense - since the highest commandment is to love.
Perfect love, that means divine love (Agape in the Greek of the New Testament) is unconditional.
In our human experience, perfect love seems to manifest itself when we give to others willing the good of the other.
In its purest form it is truly unconditional. Unconditionally giving.
And here is God becoming man, living the perfect - sinless - life, taking all punishment upon himself and dying the most dreadful death one can possibly imagine
sothat we might be saved. What more could one give - how could one give more unconditionally?
Love is who he is.
True love is unconditional.
We see this in our daily lives when we give unconditionally. Phrases like "Love is the only thing that grows when shared." or “Happiness is the only thing that multiplies when you share it.” try to express what is truely divine.
Love, which offers itself by its very nature/essence, exists of its own, - in other words, it subsists.
In Thomas Aquinas' words, God is 'ipsum esse per se subsistens'. Being itself subsisting. The sheer act of being. Love.
This is what we see in the first book of the bible to our salvation in Jesus Christ.
From the God who gives by creating out of 'nothing', from the burning bush which was not consumed by its flames of self-giving love, to Pentecost.
Then, "what looked like flames or tongues of fire appeared and settled on their heads" - the Holy Spirit. Love.
"God is love." 1. John 4:16
I enjoyed reading your comment. Very interesting. But one part was hard for me. You believe humans can express love unconditionally ?
No we cannot but by Gods grace we do that more and more until in heaven we can no longer stop it @@saidesimon3144
YAAASSSSSSSS!!!! NEW VIDEO!
your greatest video yet.
Bro, this explanation is sooooooooooooo good. Wow! Great job!
In Aquinas' '"Shorter Summa" he asserts that the unbegotten Father has intellect and will. Consequently, the Father's act of understanding Himself intellectually is the Son/Word (who is the exact image of God). In that the Father loves Himself in the Son/Word, the Father being the lover and the Son/Word the beloved, the love between the Father and the Son/Word is the Holy Spirit. These are consubstantial eternal relations in the Godhead.
Hahaha, I just read this comment and thought--wow, great insight! Then I realized this was a comnent I wrote months ago. Good job!
So, the Son doesn't love the Father? Does the Holy Spirit love the Father, or is this a one-way love? Neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit have intellect and will? If not, then they are not "persons" in any real sense. They are simply labels which describe God's relating to Himself, which is indistinct from modalism. However, if the Father's act of understanding Himself produces three persons, then why doesn't the Son's act of knowing Himself (or the Father & Holy Spirit) result in multiple persons?
You are capable of knowing yourself. Thus, you are the knower, you have in yourself the means of knowing, and you are the object of the knowledge (the known), _but you are still one person_ !
This was a great watch. It was concisely explained without compromising on details that might lead to controversy.
I liked that you included an explanation for Gregory Palamasʼ 'essence-energies' distinction as it is somehow misconstrued in subtle ways.
As a Reformed Classical Christian, I approve of this. I liked this video and will definitely subscribe to your channel.
God bless you, brother!
It seems to me that it makes little sense to describe the relations as "persons" on this understanding of the Trinity. One could speak analogously of the knower as being a person, but not the object of knowledge or the act of knowing.
Agreed, it sounds like a casual and modalistic explanation.
@@alem8100 In what sense are they personal? How can a _relation_ be personal? Aquinas thinks of the hypostases as _subsisten relations_ and I cannot see how that could involve anything personal.
If the terms of the relations are identical to the substance (as necessary due to divine simplicity), then they are substance with a rational nature, which makes them persons.
@@Tdisputations You define "persona" (Gr. prosopon; hypostasis) as a "substance with a rational nature" but is that what the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (381 AD) meant by "hypostasis"? I think that this word in Greek simply means an underlying reality or mode of being rather than a substance with a rational nature. However, I think that divine simplicity is very difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the trinity since this requires _real distinction_ of hypostasis, which appears to be compromised by the absolute oneness of divine simplicity. I realise that geniuses such as Aquinas have tried to circumvent this problem, but how successfully he and others have done this is disputable (to say the least).
@@Tdisputations
If a "person" means "a substance with a rational nature", then three persons is three substances with rational natures. That, of course, contradicts the doctrine of the Trinity.
As it happens directly relates to a conversation I'm currently having. I can't begin to imagine how many tweets I might have spent trying to express this with less eloquence.
This is a pretty old video so I’m not sure if you’ll see this comment, but I wanted to start by saying that this is one of the most profound explanations of the trinity I have ever had the privilege of hearing, so good job on that. Even though I’m agnostic I’m extremely interested in theology, and it’s hard to find real metaphysical explanations like this.
That being said, I’m not sure if I can fully be on board with it. It seems to me that these distinctions you made between the persons would be distinct only in the sense that, say, God’s mercy, justice, and love would be distinct. That is, they are imprinted understandings of a singular noumenon existing in the phenomenal world.
There’s really no philosophical problem with this model at all, it does what it set out to do which was to create a distinction without differentiation. But I take issue with it because it seems to just be a form of subtle modalism, which you preemptively declared to be heretical.
Just off the cuff, I wonder if you could at least undermine this problem by positing that the persons of the Trinity are distinctions that must necessarily be made in all possible phenomenal worlds, because of something inherent to the nature of phenomena. This doesn’t really make it no longer modalism, but perhaps you could argue that it’s only trivially so?
Not really sure about it, and I’m interested to hear your thoughts
Hello! Under this video, look for the thread started by MrDoctorSchultz. There are currently 36 replies beneath it. I think you'll find some interesting analysis with respect to the metaphysical implications of the Trinity.
I don't think the Essence-Energy Distinction is incompatible with Thomism, I think they're complimentary. In ST I, Q. 19, A. 3 "Reply to Objection 6" Aquinas makes a distinction between God's will and things willed. If the things willed were identical to God then things like the universe would be identical to God leading to pantheism, and we can say that whatever happens does so according to God's will, so things like "person X being hit by a bus" would be identical to God which is unintelligible. There's a treatise on the Essence-Energy distinction which explains that it does not affect God's simplicity too if you're interested. I think the Palamas distinction keeps the transcendent-immanent doctrine of Christianity intact while Thomism kind of leans pretty far on the transcendent side. I'm still a Thomist though
In A. 2 he also says that God wills things apart from Himself.
What's that soundtrack in the beginning? Can you tell, please.
Excellent video, great explanation! I think it also helps to clarify the difference between begotten and created.
Let me get this straight. In order to account for God's self-knowledge and self-relation we must invoke the Trinity or else these acts would be distinct from God, having a different essence or nature?
Correct me if I got anything wrong.
That is essentially it, yes. Those relations would either constitute parts of God’s essence or would be distinct from the essence altogether, in either case introducing composition into the Divine. These relations however are true consequences of self-referentiality and thus we identify them though distinct from each other as Father, Son, and Spirit are nevertheless identical with the essence and consubstantial with it
@@ClassicalTheist , great response. Recently I was in an engagement with a Modalist and he made the argument that if the Father is the Knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the knowing, but the Essence is identical to the relation, then, we can call the Son the knower, the Holy Spirit the known and the Father as the knowing. Basically, if the relation is identical to the Essence, then, (as he argues), all must be knower, all must be known, all must be knowing. Thus, he collapsed them into One Essence, no distinction. Thoughts on how best to answer this?
@@MountAthosandAquinas As a modalist, I will tell you that there is no logical answer to that question. On the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), the relations are identical with the essence. By the way, the attributes are also identical with the essence but on Catholicism, the attributes are not really distinct. Hence, what is the REAL distinction between the persons? If A & B are really distinct, then there are some things common to them and some things distinct. What is common we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC) and what is distinct we can call the Principle of Distinction (PD). From this we know that if all we have is PC, then A = B, and from this we also know that PC ≠ PD, for the very thing that makes them common cannot be the very thing that makes them distinct (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. To reject that would mean that it is possible for A to be distinct from B and yet not differ in any way which is of course absurd. So, if the divine essence (E) is what makes each person common, then E cannot account for the distinction on pain of composition and/or contradiction. Thus the PD ≠ E.
Recall also that Aquinas said that whatever is not of the divine essence is a creature. If the PD, therefore, is not E, then the relations (R) are creatures. Of course, we know that the DDS vigorously denies that the relations are creatures, but then we have no basis to distinguish the persons, except nominally.
What your essentially saying is God is The self referential arbitar of all self knowledge the object of all self knowledge and the spectrum of all self knowledge.
Gonna listen again but nice explanation
What do you have to say about the points against divine simplicity that Jay Dyer is bringing up?
@@user-vh3kj9ri8h Really? Aquinas adds even more difficulty to the subject with de ente et essentia. His almost complete lack of scripture proofs show him an able philosopher and a weak theologian (Isa.8.20, Col 2.6-9)
@@prob316 Aquinas wasn't giving a Bible study at that point. Moreover, the Bible doesn't pretend to be a metaphysical handbook. Romans 1:20 tells us that man is able to clearly see God's nature via His creation. Thus, creation itself, in addition to the special revelation of the Scriptures, is God's witness to mankind. Each have their place.
Hey I have some questions (feel free to direct me towards papers or books)
How does God being unchanging effect the idea of him making choices. Like he seems jealous at certain parts of the Bible and not at others. Did something in God change when he sent the flood? How does God being immutable work with him reacting to human choices that are either pleasing or bring about his wrath? I don't take these as objections, I am just a theistic personalist trying to understand more about classical theism. Basically, my question is if God is perfectly simple and unchanging how do we deal with apparent changes or choices in time with God (like becoming incarnated etc)? I am sympathetic to your view but want to know how it works with Biblical passages that make it seem like God is more of a reacting divine mind rather than the ground of being. Thank you for reading and I look forward to any reading recommendations.
Okay thank you, but one question would still stand here. His retribution seems to be an act, a reactive act - how does that not constitute a change? So suppose Tom has not committed sin A at time t1. At T1 no retribution has been enacted according to God's will, yet at time t2 Tom has committed sin A and thus "provoked" or earned God's retribution. Is this not a change? What happened in the divine mind at T2? Did God 'decide' to enact retribution? If yes, was some potential actualized in God or can God act and change without going from some potential to actual?
Ferinus perhaps it would be more simple to say that it isn't God who reacts to us, but we who change in relation to God. God doesn't suddenly feel jealousy. He is a jealous God, but that jealousy only manifests when we leave Him for idols.
"Now you may find in the Hebrew Scriptures also
thousands of such passages concerning God as though
He were jealous, or sleeping, or angry, or subject to any
other human passions, which passages are adopted for the
benefit of those who need this mode of instruction." - Eusebius
This is a great question! That i have had for a while.
Good presentation, but you cannot call "energies" of Eastern Orthodoxy "accidents" of God. Energies are just the activities of God. Whether you agree with the distinctions Easter Orthodoxy makes or not, you cannot misrepresent what they say about the energies. The activities/operations/essences are distinct but not separate. The distinction does not divide. To quote Palamas in the Triads; "Essence and energy are thus not totally identical in God, even though He is ENTIRELY manifest in every energy. His essence being indivisible." p. 96. (Emphasis added by me on God being entirely manifest in each and every one of his activites/energies). This is a real blind spot for Thomism. I should say that it is the blind spot for the for the classic theistic model in all forms, even Reformed Calvinism. As long as we use a definitional model of divine simplicity of God's essence, we get boxed in by Divine Eternity. Divine Eternity states that God does not travel through successive movements in Time He cannot acquire something He does not have and cannot lose something that He has. God's life remains the same. Therefore He cannot be Creator at a specific time because He is the Creator of time. The conclusion of this view of divine simplicity is that He must be Creator from all eternity. So what is wrong with that? Three things. 1) By focusing on the essence, contingency is introduced in God. He cannot be Creator without having to create. Creation then becomes necessary for God's very Being. 2) By defining God as Creator eternally, His freedom NOT to create is compromised. Under the classic position, God does not need to create to be God. God creates freely from his Triune eternal Love. God can do just fine without creation, otherwise He would be contingent on creation (non-God) to be God. But if He is Creator eternally, he must create; and 3) Creation itself is pulled into the essence of God. It becomes "part" of God. But that is a contradiction of divine simplicity (God has no parts), and it is not a hypostasis (not a Person). Contrast with God as eternal Father eternally generating the Son. There was never a "time" when the Father was not the Father, nor a "time" when the Son wasn't Son. That is the definition of eternal generation. Now if we apply that every definition (as we must under the classic view) to the eternal Creator; then there was never a point when God as Creator did not create, and by implication, never a time when creation was not. That is blatantly false! It contradicts Creation Ex Nihilo (creation for nothing) and denies God's freedom not to create. This is the blind spot in Classic Theism.
Another corollary of the above problem is that if creation is pulled into eternity, then so is time, resulting in the self-refuting (from the classic understanding) conclusion that God is in time. At best, we end up with a Process Theology God of a becoming God. Thus going back to the classic understanding that God is not "in" Eternity but IS Eternity, and results in the ridiculous conclusion that Eternity began with creation. BTW, I would like to believe there is a way out of this dilemna other than moving to the Eastern Orthodox view, but I haven't found one yet.
Notwithstanding what I truly believe to be the classical Thomistic blind spot, I am not sure that the Eastern Orthodox "solution" of the distinctions between essence and energies adequately addresses the problem any better. From what I can tell, the Eastern Orthodox argument and criticism of the "definitional divine simplicity" and preference for what they call the "symbolic model" of divine simplicity, doesn't work they way they want. The arguments are really against a Neoplatonism and not for the arguments actually put forth by Thomas Aquinas (although the EO argue that they are the same).
Personhood is part of ones substance.
The problem is that self sameness cannot get you a Father Son relationship at best it gets you a me, myself and I "persons", where me is myself who is I - a very narcissistic and modalist trinity if one is to argue these are "real" distinctions and not mere logical distinctions.
Ergo ADS is based upon some very flawed logic and a load of cleverly disguised nonsense.
Easiest way to explain Trinity: 1 to the third power
Why not the second or 4th?
Because its a TRINITY@@prob316
It being a revealing pronoun. I believe in one God in three persons, the Father, Son and Spirit, but the Divine essence is not neutered. Mathematical explanations don't help illuminate the Godhead much.
In order to deny divine simplicity using the Trinity, you would need to say that God being triune forces him to be composed of parts. However, saying that the three persons are three parts of God is a known trinitarian heresy (partialism). If the persons of the trinity are not three different parts of God, then what is the contradiction with divine simplicity? It's not clear to me what the supposed contradiction even is.
The word "distinct" means "different." Thus, the Father (F), Son (S), and Holy Spirit (H), are each alike and different. What, then, is the difference? If the FSH are wholly identical with the Godhead, then the difference is in the divine essence which of course means that there is an aspect of the essence that is unique to a person. If that is the case, then you have composition.
The divine attributes are also wholly identical with the Godhead, but they are not distinct from each other. Rather they are all one in God and the difference is logical, not actual. But on divine simplicity (DS), the persons of the Trinity are not distinct logically, but actually, but then on what basis is the identity of the attributes with the essence any different from the identity of the persons with the essence? There is no logical solution, and that's partly why there's a contradiction.
Let's say you have A & B. Let us also say that A & B are alike and different. What they have in common we can call the Principle of Commonality (PC) whereas what they do not have in common we can call the Principle of Distinction (PC). We can thus readily see that PC ≠ PD for if all we have is PC, then A = B. If this were not the case, then we would be saying that what A & B have in common is equivalent to what they do not have in common (C = ~C) which is a straight logical contradiction. Moreover, to equate PC & PD is to say that there is a distinction between A & B although they do not differ in any way, which is of course absurd.
So, if PC ≠ PD, and if the PC is the divine essence, what then is the PD? It cannot be the essence itself (per above), so the distinction must be outside the essence. But as Aquinas notes, whatever is not the divine essence is a creature, and that would thus render the relations as creatures. The PD then forces the relations into the essence which yields the contradiction heretofore noted.
Finally, what are relations without relata? Since relata are the subjects between which a relationship can hold, is God multiple subjects? If so, then you either have three gods or clear-cut composition. Since you would of course deny that God is composed of objects, the best you can offer in order to avoid a contradiction is to state that God has relations with Himself. Indeed, the above video makes that clear. However, having a relationship with oneself is not particularly trinitarian. Indeed, even Oneness advocates (modalists) can say the same thing. And interestingly, in order to illustrate this begetting and processing, DS trinitarians often employ analogies akin to divine attributes (sending one's word from the divine mind) while denying that the persons are attributes and denying real distinction between the attributes (but affirming it in the persons which are as identified with the essence as the attributes).
These objections are well known outside the trinitarian bubble.
As I understand it, your argument holds that, if God is thought-thinking-itself, and if God is absolutely simple, then this single act of self-contemplation must be trinitarian in nature, since God is subject, object, and act of judgment relating subject and object, in thought, each distinct but consubstantial.
How do you reconcile this with St. Thomas's belief that the trinity can be known only through revelation, and with Catholic teaching (e.g. Vatican I) which dogmatically maintains that we cannot know the trinity through natural reason? We *can* know that God exists, is simple, and is the act of self-contemplation through natural reason, so it seems that we also know by reason that God is a trinity. Yet this contradicts Catholic teaching.
We could know that God is more than 1 person, but we couldn't know that God is 3 without God revealing to us that he loves, and that his love is selfless, meaning it does not demand an exclusive response ("love one another as I loved you"). Since God is pure act and no potential, God's love must be actively selfless outside of time, thus, the necessity of a 3rd person.
Great video. I've watched it quite a few times. I'm Orthodox Catholic and I fully accept the doctrine of absolute divine simplicity. There are other Orthodox who do too (the Orthodox philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart, for example). Its unfortunate that we've gotten a reputation for rejecting a doctrine that is so basic to Classical Monotheism.
@JL-CptAtom Does that mean its untrue?
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese There is no "Latin" simplicity. There is simplicity.
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese I don't think that's true. It seems to me that the only people who think this are the Neo-Palamites who are, in any case, incorrect. As to your point about philosophies determining word-meanings, I guess that's true but I still believe words within a language have objective meanings. In light of this, I believe Divine Simplicity must always mean Absolute Divine Simplicity since if a thing is made up of a simple and something composite, then the unity is itself composite i.e. not simple.
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese See, you just proved my point about Neo-Palamites being incorrect. Hope you abandon your crypto-atheism in the near future, nerd.
@JL-XrtaMayoNoCheese Anyone who believes in the real distinction of essence and energies is a neo-Palamite.
I'm not literalist so I have no issue denying the events at Mt. Sinai as a literal historic event.
Anyone who denies Absolute Divine Simplicity is a crypto-atheist since it will necessarily reduce God to a finite and therefore created being.
Do confuse divine simplicity with absolute divine simplicity they are not the same???
What is the music in the background called ?
If the Spirit is the act of knowing ones self, then the Spirit is an energy which ADS proclaims is indistinct from the essence, therefore the Spirit is not truely distinct. What a silly argument
is there an orthodox way to have the E/E distinction w/o it leading to substances and accidents in God?
What do you make of Christopher Hughes' criticism of Aquinas?
In this encyclopedia article they spell out what Aquinas believed and Christopher Hughes' critique:
Thomas Aquinas sets out a highly developed and difficult trinitarian theory (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.1-26, Summa Theologiae I.27-43). God is “pure act”, that is, he has no potentialities of any kind. God is also utterly simple, with no distinct parts, properties, or actions. We may truly say, though, that God understands and wills. These divine processes are reflexive relations which are the persons of the Trinity. The Word eternally generated by God is a hypostasis, what Aristotle calls a first substance, which shares the essence of God, but which is nonetheless “relationally distinct” from God. The persons of the Trinity, as they share the divine essence, are related more closely than things which are merely tokens of a kind (e.g., identical twins), but he seems to hold that none are identical to either of the others (they are truly three). Aquinas develops Augustine’s idea that the “persons” of the Trinity are individuated by their relations. For Aquinas, the relations Paternity, Sonship, and Spirithood are real and distinct things in some sense “in” God, which “constitute and distinguish” the three persons of the Trinity (Hughes 1989, 197). The persons are distinct per relationes (as to their relations) but not distinct per essentiam (as to their essence or being). In the words of one commenter,
[For Aquinas,] relations both constitute and distinguish the divine persons: insofar as relations are the divine essence (secundum res) [i.e. they’re the same thing], they constitute those persons, and insofar as they are relations with converses, they distinguish those persons. (Hughes 1989, 217)
But how may these relations be, constitute, or somehow give rise to three divine hypostaseis when each just is the divine essence? For if each is the divine essence, won’t it follow that each just is (i.e. is identical to) both of the others as well? Aquinas holds that it does not follow-that would amount to modalism, not orthodox trinitarianism. To show why it doesn’t follow, he distinguishes between identitas secundum rem et rationem (sameness of thing and of concepts) and mere identitas secundum rem (sameness of thing). To the preceding objection, then, Aquinas says that the alleged consequence would follow only if the persons were the same both in thing and in concept. But they are not; they are merely the same thing.
This move is puzzling. Aquinas holds that the three are not merely similar or derived from the same source, but are in some strong sense the same, but not identical (i.e. numerically the same) which he appears to understand as sameness in both thing and concept. Even this last is surprising; one would think that for Aquinas “sameness in thing” just is identity, and that “sameness in concept” would mean that we apply the same concept to some apparent things (whether or not they are in fact one or many). Christopher Hughes holds that Aquinas is simply confused, his desire for orthodoxy having led him into this (and other) necessary falsehoods. On Hughes’s reading, Aquinas does think of “sameness in thing” as identity, but he incoherently holds it to be non-transitive (i.e. if A and B are identical, and B and C are identical, it doesn’t follow that A and C are identical), while in some contexts assuming (correctly) that it is transitive (Hughes 1989, 217-40).
Classical Theist, this video is very helpful, but I have two questions (maybe you already plan to address the second one in your series but still).
Firstly, if a man tries to know or understand himself only and not humanity as a whole, what stops three persons from appearing there? Is it that it is only part of him, namely, his intellect, that does the understanding or what?
Secondly, what does it mean that the Son is 'begotten' and the Spirit 'proceeds'? That seems to introduce some sort of hierarchy, at least relational, between the Persons. And does that mean that the Known and the Knowledge in a way originate from the Knower?
Those are good questions, it seems there's something about being maximally simple that necessitates a tri-personal relationship but it is hard to understand why. There must be something we're missing. Johanan Raatz actually gives a good explanation using an analogy of quantum entanglement and semantic loops to show that maximum simplicity necessitates "three-ness" in his Integrated Triad video.
I'd say there is a hierarchy but not in the sense of authority, they are all equal. It's an equal/circular relationship. Since the Knower (the Father) has always existed, so the Known and act of Knowledge have always existed. Where ever the Father exists the two must also, so they can "originate" from the Father in analogy only, but they don't have any supremacy or authority over each other and equally need one another. Scriptures refer to the Father being the head honcho only analogously.
Edit: I figured it out, a maximally simple mind must have a trinatarian relationship because as the fundamental mind God is self-conscious and therefore self-referential. Take God's knowledge, there are THREE necessary conditions of knowledge: the one who knows, the act of knowing, and the object of the knowledge. Since a maximally simple being is identical to his attributes, he is identical to the knower (Father), the act of knowledge (Holy Spirit), and object of the knowledge (Son). That is how a maximally simple being requires a Triune relationship!
@@TheBrunarr There are so many problems with this last paragraph. Does the Son not also know? If so, does the Son's act of knowledge constitute another distinction? Can the Father then also be considered the object of the Son's knowledge, and is He then identical with the Son? How is an act a Person, capable of relation, knowledge, of offence?
@@prob316 In addition to your good objections, a triune relationship does not entail multiple personal relationships. You can know yourself, but you are not three persons. There are three principles of thought itself (identity, contradiction & excluded middle), but we are one person. I think the trinitarian mindset gets so caught up in justifying the doctrine that some fail to see how logically at odds it is with itself.
@@davidcoleman5860 you're unitarian? The scripture clearly indicates multiple personality within Deity, Jn.8.17.
@@prob316 No, I'm not a Unitarian. And the Scriptures cannot teach the Trinity because the doctrine of the Trinity entails logical contractions. All contractions are untrue by definition.
What's the name of the melody in the intro?
Are the persons of the trinity dependant on each other?
Hello! I have been thinking starting a yt chanell similar to something like yours(i admire your content a lot, you are definitely a big inspiration!) Btw what backround music did you use?
It would be nice to hear some scriptural backup for this verbiage. Sadly with DS there is almost never any!
“deus caritas *est*” 1 John 4:8
@@ClassicalTheistThis is no proof. Is love also God? Otherwise there is a fallacy in your claim of simple, non-composite identity between the attribute and Deity.
@JL-CptAtom Thank you will study, you write as Eastern Orthodox?
@@ob4161 Thanks precious verses, but none assert simplicity, certainly not as Plotinus defined it and Augustine and Aquinas reasserted it. Strateias dot org slash simplicitas
How do you go from composite to contingent? I see no problem in maintaining that X is a being which possesses parts A, B, and C, but X possesses them necessarily, and they are instantiated together necessarily. I don't see a problem with maintaining that X is identical to the sum of ABC, and that ABC exists necessarily both with respect to its constituent parts and the relations between those parts.
Because the parts of which a composite thing is composed of precedes the thing, and nothing precedes God. Even if God was composed from eternity past and never began to be composite, that still means that God relies on those parts for actualization, but this is opposed to divine aseity where God is purely self-existent. If He is composed He is not self-existent. Think of Kant's example of a ball resting on a pillow since eternity. The ball makes a concave depression in the pillow. The depression in the pillow never _began_ and has always existed, but its existence is dependent upon the ball and the pillow. In your scenario God is the depression in the pillow, which is a contingent property of the interaction between the ball and pillow. In conclusion, if God is composite then it doesn't matter if He never began to exist because He would still be dependent upon something else, which contradicts Christian doctrine.
A good question. There is semantic gymnastics here that the founding fathers of simplicity would reject out of hand, so would many other advocates of simplicity like the Eunomians. If the Father is not the Son, the Son not the Spirit, yet all God's essence is simple, each Person wholly inheres in that essence and even His existence, acts and words are identical with His essence, the distinction between composition and contingency looks illusory to say the least. I maintain Simplicity leads inexorably to modalism in reality, nor does it aid the defence against polytheism, henotheism or pantheism as is often claimed, there being good evidence for this.
It may not seem reasonable to you, but where is the scriptural evidence that 'God relies on those parts for actualization' if He is always was and remains complex and compound, He has never needed actualising. He has always been actual. I suggest you're injecting Aristotelian assumptions into Christian theology, without warrant.
@@prob316 The instant you use the word "parts," you import its implications. And if you do not like its implications, then you need to use another word. A composite is by definition an assemblage of parts, and as Jacob points out, time is irrelevant. Thus, if G = FSH, then F ≠ G, S ≠ G, and H ≠ G. G is thus explained and defined by something less than G which renders G logically posterior to something that isn't G. And if G is logically explained by FSH, then G logically exists because of FSH which renders G dependent on FSH (G ---->FSH). If G~---->FSH (if G is not dependent on FSH), then FSH is accidental to G which means that you can have G without FSH. And that of course kicks FSH out of G (because G remains G without FSH).
Distinction is not always separation. The divine persons are not seperate but distinct. Orthodox deny that they are separate. I sometimes hear that they are different simultaneous modes of God's being and have heard that they overlap eachother within the divine nature.
The real question, with Divine Simplicity, is are they identical and if they are not, in what way is a distinction real, in a way that does not violate consistent simplicity, as its philosophical advocates taught it?
This seems incoherent. You stated that "...since God is simple, and since God IS his own act of self-understanding, these differing relations are NOT different aspects of God, but each share utterly and substantially in the divine essence itself in perfect unity. Paradoxically, in a way it is precisely because God is simple that he is three on one. This is to say that these relations of divine self-referentiality, WHILE REALLY DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER, ARE NOT REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE DIVINE ESSENCE..." If there is this thing, the divine essence, and you say that A is identical to it, and B is also identical to it, then by logical necessity A is identical to B also. However, you flatly say that this is not the case, and A and B must be really distinct. This denies the law of non-contradiction, as you say that A = the divine essence = B (from which it follows that A = B), and yet you also say that A =/= B. Could someone please explain where I went wrong, or is this an accurate representation of what he is saying?
A better way to understand how God can contain distinction in himself whilst still maintaining divine simplicity is to say that divine simplicity does not preclude distinctions, only parts, and parts would be two attributes which are united together contingently, such that they did not have to be united together. Something that forms an indivisible whole, and is therefore simple (not composite) is something whose attributes are mutually co-extensive, such that it cannot have one attribute without having them all. Take God: As soon as you consider what it means for god to be good, you know he is also wise, and as soon as you know he is wise you know he is omnipotent he must be omniscient, and so on and so forth. I believe you actually would agree with this idea, but you would say that omniscience = omnipotence = goodness = the divine essence, ultimately, and what we perceive as distinct is God's condescension to our limited intellect. But I propose that you embrace the idea that they really are distinct attributes, just that they cannot exist without each other, thus maintaining the simplicity of God and also the coherence of the trinity.
so here's the way I see the way distinct yet the same exist God: father, God:son, God: holy spirit if we were to represent this it would be a (1:1),(1:1),(1:1) relationship they are independent of one another there are 3 distinct case but all 3 person are of 1 being. That said its doesnt mean it has 0 flaws because we cant observe God from a magnifying lens.
It depends who you are talking to
Please be careful, Classical Theist. If I say that the divine Persons share the divine nature, that may suggest that each divine person has a third of it when he's fully divine.
Suppose my brothers Dave and Michael pool our money to buy a car. Dave pays a third of the price, Michael chips in another one, and I add the last one. But doesn't each of us owns a third of the car. The whole car belongs to us.
So do you believe jesus god or no
Watch out for the gay muslim Paul
To think about, he really does have a gayest way 😆
This solution is just mental gymnastics!!
Your thomism also clearly falls into modalism as no reasonable person espicially not the earlier church fathers much before aquinas, when they condemned modalism would understand God's self knowledge to be another person or the Holy Spirit being the relationship of love between God's self-knowledge and the father himself.
They would still view this as a sly way to attempt to avoid modalism which is still modalistic!! You have created more problems than you have solved!
Also guess what, the LPT still applies with the way your sematics are phrased!
p1: The Father is God
p2: The son is God
p3: The Father is not identical to the son
p4: therefore either you have 2 things predicated with being god (2 gods) or the son and the father are both identical to God or the Divine Essence.
If you take the 2nd option, you have left classical logic and are appealing to pure relative identity which I refute down here,.
Also to deny distict indexical knowledge between the father and the son, but still avoid modalism isnt possible!!
Using non leibnizian models to avoid classical identity sounds very " philosophical" and "sophisticated", but it is ultimately bullcrap!!
You have yet to have given an example where X can be identical to Z, Y can be identical to Z, but X is not identical to Y.
By logical defintion, to be identical means that every proposition for X is ontologically the same for Y with absolutely no distinction to the point that mentioning 2 variables is redundant.
The moment you resort to saying that everything true of X is not true of Y where the is of identity is not possible, you create a logical contridiction between both premises.
Clearly relative identity doesn't work and Peter van inwagen states that this has no utility outside christian theology!!
Also how can you have a relational reality between X and Y without pre-supposing the existence of a concrete ontology for both X and Y which makes them borh disntict and not identical according to classical identity??
It is like me being a father to my son (relational identity) to a son that does not " exist " in the sense of not having a concrete ontogy ontologically distinct from me.
Face it bud, there is no way to defend the trinity!!
Come to islam and the haqq (truth) inshallah!!
What?
@@carlhenry6223 The Orthodox are Crypto-Arians. They barely hold on to the Trinity and imply that the glory of The Father and The Son is not equal.
ruclips.net/video/_Rrzo55G364/видео.html
Does this mean that by the Incarnation God became a (composite) person? People are composite beings, right? And Christ became a man…
No Christ assumes a human nature however that human nature is distinct whilst His divine nature remains simple and separate (though hypostatically united) from the human nature.
It does
Great rebuttal!
@@TheBrunarr Thanks!
Lol
God is not a trinity, he's most fundamentally ONE. Now is this ONE the source of all plurality?..yes. But what makes 3 such a special number? It can be 3, or 4, 17, or 7 quintillion.
@@EatScrabbleGoo yep
Arch Hades
Well hold on there, does God know Himself? Yes...
So, the act of God's knowing Himself is inherently different from the relation of God's being known by Himself. Finally, that act of knowledge must also be God. There ya go.
that makes no sense@@tomthetominatorftw4106
DEBATE JAY!
Creation is not an emanation of God.
Creation is an emanation of God iff God creates in all possible worlds.
Suppose for reductio Divine Simplicity is true.
Then God's activities are identical to God's essence.
God's act of creation is an activity of God.
So God's essence is identical to God's act of creating.
Since God's essence is the same in all possible worlds and Gods act of creation creation is his essence God creates in all possible worlds
So God creates in all possible worlds.
So creation is an emanation of God.
This contradicts the Christian doctrine that creation free and not an emanation of God.
So Absolute Divine Simllicity is false.
Abu Qurrah - It’s not that God’s activities are identical to God’s essence. It’s that God’s attributes are identical to his essence. Hence, the saying “All that is in God is God”.
Was Jesus composed of no parts? Is the historical Jesus God?
@Watapon Watapon because jesus possessed two wills since He was both human and divine, which implies that the Son did not become consubstantial with the human body and therefore remained simple while jesus's body was composite. I think that's on the right track.
@@TheBrunarr that would be saying Jesus wasn't fully God and fully man. He'd be partially God and partially man. His nature is supposed to hypostatic but you're proposing a dual nature for Jesus. That is an old heresy. It makes God's crucifixion a question entirely. The body was crucified and man has a body but God does not. Therefore God was never crucified. Assuming the duality you are proposing.
@@MrSpectralfire that's why reasonable people won't subscribe to the erroneous doctrine of Trinity. John messed up when he said that Logos was God, and that is the genesis of Christianity.
The Trinity is an incoherent invention.
@JL-CptAtom Do tell
The fullness of divinity (pleroma theotes) is in Christ. Obviously the Father too has the fullness of divinity. So this is the same divinity. They are of one essence.
The bible also says that the saints are called to partake of the divine nature. In the Greek of holy scripture it says that God has energy (energeia energeo, dynamis, etc) Scripture also says that his energy is in the believer energizing them and working in them.
According to the doctrine of Divine simplicity God's essence is identical to God's energy because there are no distinctions in God.
But if this true then when God's energy is infused in us it is the divine essence the fullness of divinity in us. In which case the saints are members of the Godhead and it's not a Trinity anymore because the Saints become equal to the Father Son and Holy Spirit.
But the saints are not members of the Godhead and there is a Trinity.
So Absolute Divine Simplicity is false.
I suspect you either didn't watch the video, or didn't pay very close attention.
Divine simplicity allows for distinction. What is denied is composition. If there's any confusion about that, it's because there's some overlap; all composition involves distinction, but not vice versa. Any distinction which entails composition is necessarily excluded.
All the same, yes, we can reasonably say God's activity is His essence. However, it doesn't follow that if His holy ones participate in the Divine Nature, then they "become part of" the Godhead. Don't confuse God dwelling within us with our being constituted by His Divinity. Those are two different things, and you've failed to establish any connection between them.
Now, addressing your argument that Divine simplicity denies the free creation of the world, we know that the First Cause must be absolutely simple. For clearly, if God is composed in any way, then He is dependent on something else for His existence, and to admit that is to say there is something superior to God, which no Christian can admit. Thus, if your argument succeeded, we would just have to conclude that Christianity is false and be done with the religion.
Fortunately for all Christians, this modal collapse argument is flawed. Your claim that "God's essence is identical to God's act of creating" is false, and without that, your argument fails. In fact, the entire edifice rests on a misunderstanding of Divine simplicity. At its core, the doctrine only holds that God is His essence, which is the (uncomposed) self-subsistent act of existence.
Now consider your statement "God's activities are identical to God's essence." This is only qualifiedly true. As said above, God is identical to the subsistent act of existing, but this does not mean that everything we call a Divine act is identical to God. Whatever we may say is 'contained within' this act of existing, one thing is certain: specific kinds of relational properties are not among these proverbial contents. *If it is not a reflexive relation God exhibits with Himself, then it is not 'contained within' God's essence.* Obviously, the act of creation is a relation God stands in with the created order, and so is not part of God's essence.
Parádoxo I’m a baby Thomist who doesn’t understand as much about these two topics as possible , I only have a small grasp at what you’re. Saying so may you mind condensing it for me or send me a source that explains it to beginners , thank you in advance
We are a trinity. We are our Father, our Mother, yet we are our own being.
Occultists already KNOW what the trinity is and how it’s reflected in the material world. This endless, empty babble is unnecessary.
Can you save yourself from death and the dread consequences after?
Idiot
No