My deepest sympathies for your loss Madame Soulas. Caroline was a beautiful young woman who had her whole life ahead of her. You must have been very proud of her. I hope time has healed some of the pain you must have felt 🙏
@@korynet92 sincere condolences madame.cest tres dur de ladmettre ca se voit sur le visage de votre mari.votre fille est au paradis et veille sur vous deux
En réalité il n'y avait rien à modifier sur les paramètres du vol. Il y avait simplement un "bug" dans les indications de vol. Les copilotes en faisant cabrer l'avion ont favorisé son décrochage et en quelques minutes l'appareil à perdu de l'altitude pour aller amèrir à une vitesse démesurée qui a disloqué A320. J'ai perdu un ami qui habitait Rihac-Rancon en Haute Vienne son épouse n'avait pas voulu partir avec lui. Elle avait préféré garder ses jeunes enfants à la maison qui étaient scolarisés à l'école Ozaname à Limoges. Nous avons plusieurs vidéo de cette catastrophe grâce à Corinne Soulas qui a perdu dans cette accident sa fille et son gendre qui avaient malheureusement toute la vie devant eux. Quelle cauchemars à vivre pour elle et son mari qui chaque jour pense à ces deux amours qui étaient vivants et joyeux. Je vous embrasse très fort Corinne.(hélas ça me fait très mal aussi pour mon ami décédé qui a laissé toute sa famille dans la douleur, victime de bêtises humaines). J'ai lu le rapport d'enquête- accident, le commandant de bord avait abusé avec sa nouvelle compagne de plusieurs sorties arrosées à Rio. Il ne devait plus être en état de voler au moment de cet incident et de donner des ordres en 3 mn aux deux copilotes qui avaient pris les commandes.
Je partage votre point de vue. Les destins sont parfois bienveillants, parfois, non.... Caroline et Sébastien s'étaient réveillés en retard pour l'aller..... Pas assez tard pour éviter le pire..... Destins brisés.... Quant à la lecture du rapport, il est clair que certains faits sont choquants..... et peu évoqués.... Merci pour votre message.
Look at that! In the deep stall, whenever there is an actual attempt to bury the nose with forward stick the stall warning starts barking at him again. After the pitot blockage clears, it is only above 60kts that he was receiving valid airspeed indications. It is only when he is below 60kts and in deep stall when the warning is silenced. Must have been so confusing. Pull up and the stall warning stops. Push over and the stall warning commences even though that is what you should be doing. Fatigue also played a roll in this accident. All I can gather is that PF attempted a low altitude stall recovery at high altitude and when it dIdn't work then convinced himself he must have been in a high speed stall...with unreliable pitot and remnant doubt. But, how did he not realize that he had induced a stall with the intense pull back after AP disconnect?Lessons to be learned here. God bless all of those people for their unwilling sacrifice so that others may learn.
Very good points. theres a lot going on in this accident, wasn't just Bonin pulling back like he has never flown before. I wonder if Bonin actually realized they lost stall protection, Robert mentioned it tho
To be honest, pulling back that hard for so long, you'd have thought he realised he wasn't in a high speed stall, but maybe fatigue and just confusion made it worse
You really got it ! Blaming all on the pilots while watching peacefully behind a screen knowing exactly what is happening is easy. Without taking away their responsabilities, the design of Airbus Warning system really helped to the confusion and is a factor to be taken in account in this accident to prevent any kind of things like this happening again. There is way more in this story than many internet's moralists and armchair pilots want to see. Once again I'm not ignoring that the pilots made terrible mistakes. But 3 airliners pilots make mistakes for a reason and if it's important to not deny the human factor, it's also important to look at the wicked points in the system. It also seems that the Company disregarded important informations at the time of the accident. It's a story of many factors. The only story of 3 people doing mistakes does not explain this crash. Their mistakes are one of the factors. Sadly, the thing was setting up way before the crash.... As in many accidents. Fatigue due to lack of sleep deteriorated their performance and played a big role since the very beginning of the flight preparation.
@@janipt many specialists clearly wonder the same. Does the training or the culture of interaction with the machine in this company and or for this plane make the pilots to rely on automated protection, not able to realize when it shuts off or to get back in total manual mode as they are so much not trained to do ? It has been asked a lot in this accident. Some pilots even said that the logic of such complex automated machines goes against the basics of manual flying. They were complaining that it was almost to "delearn" to fly.
3:54 That's the *exact* point when Bonin finally seals their fate. Robert was in the middle of recovering from the stall, but then Bonehead Bonin grabs the stick and pulls back *again* even after being specifically told _not_ to do that and puts them right back into the stall. After that, there wasn't enough time or altitude to recover.
I disagree, honestly at 5000 feet in a very low speed stall (IAS < 100kts) the plane was doomed anyways at that time, even if Bonin didn't intervene they would have crashed. It's a A330 we're talking about here, it weighs more than 150 tons We know that the plane crashed 30 seconds later. So, in 5000 feet, or during this fall, 30 seconds, the plane had to regain a good speed (> 200 kts), and pull back up to a positive angle of attack. That's possible, but hard. But even that wouldn't be enough, because the plane was in free fall, even with lift, the plane would still be losing altitude, because the lift needs to absorb that vertical speed induced by the minutes long stall (5000ft in 30s is 2500fts/min, or 184km/h heading straight towards the ground, imagine the energy needed to absorb 150tons heading at 184km/h towards the ground ...) No, that plane was probably lost way before that point in time
39 deg aoa, no chance of recovering from that at fl4, they had to tail slide out of the deep stall in the updraft at fl370, maybe then they could have saved it, but i don't know if an a330 can actually pull the stunt off
icemachine79 yeahhh You hear the computer says Priority right as when robert was trying to get out of stall, bonin pushed the button on his stick to take controls from Robert and again pulls back like he did during the entire stall :/ :/
They were doomed after 16,000 feet, at that point only the best of crews could've executed the maneuver required to keep the plane from crashing. After that point, there simply wasn't enough altitude below them.
I’m very sorry for the loss of your daughter and son-in-law aboard this flight, Ms. Soulas. I believe that I recognize your lovely daughter Caroline’s face from a documentary about this needless loss of human life and feel terribly sad for her and the victims. No credible pilot should have flown into that storm to begin with, period-may this safety lesson be learned!
I'd seen this video before but had no idea this was uploaded by a relative of a victim and this makes it even more devastating.. I can't claim to know what you're going through because I obviously dont but all I can say is this accident should never have happened and I'm truly and awfully sorry for such a tragic loss like this.
I can understand. Caroline, my daughter, will always be in my heart, with her husband. True, that this accident should never have happened. Thank you for your message.
I'm very sorry Mrs Soulas. I will pray for the soul of your daughter to rest in peace. This was a totally avoidable incident and it makes me upset that mistakes like this costs lives.
@@aviation-zr2ln it is what happened based on the CVR and BlackBox. But the French authorities refused to release the actual voice recorder so we can only go on interpretation. What's maddening is hearing dual input, which shows both pilots were countering each other. Its quite frightening to think there can be pilots like that,
Comme l'a très bien expliqué ce professionnel, beaucoup de facteur rentre en jeux et permis eux le stress... Et même en étant compétant personne ne sait comment un humain réagira face à une telle situation même si ils sont formés pour ça...
+C Gollum Bonin était trop occupé à contrôler le roulis de l'avion pour s'occuper de l'horizon artificiel. C'était Robert qui était normalement chargé de contrôler la trajectoire, ce qu'il n'a pas fait, ou insuffisamment. Au reste, avec l'avion qui ralentit, la perte des indications de vitesse et sans repères visuels extérieurs (n'oublions pas que l'accident se produit en pleine nuit au cœur d'un épais cumulonimbus), Bonin a pu être victime d'une illusion somatogravique, où le cerveau humain peut croire à un piqué lors d'une décélération, ce qui pourrait expliquer son acharnement à tirer sur le manche. Ce biais cognitif a pu être corroboré par le flight director ordonnant un ordre à cabrer, et le fonctionnement paradoxal de l'alarme stall qui s'inhibe en deçà de 60 kts (et qui se réactivait donc lorsque le pilote poussait sur le manche). Notons aussi que l'avion subit plusieurs violentes abattées pendant la chute, très difficilement récupéré par Bonin ; et cela a pu l'effrayer suffisamment pour qu'il refuse psychologiquement de rendre la main. Il est vrai que l'alarme stall s'est activée en continu pendant 54 secondes à 75 occurrences à partir de 2h 10mn 52s ; et les pilotes l'ont bien entendu puisque quelques secondes après son activation, Bonin affiche la poussée TO/GA et Robert lui conseille de "toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral" ; il suive donc la procédure qu'ils ont apprise lors de leur formation lors de l'approche du décrochage (à basse altitude, cependant). Reste que Bonin n'essaie pas immédiatement de réduire l'incidence, sans doute parce qu'il n'a pas conscience qu'elle augmente rapidement à chaque seconde (rappelons qu'elle n'est pas montrée au pilote), et qu'il est d'abord concentré à niveler les ailes (il serait ardu de récupérer d'un décrochage avec une aile penchant sur un côté). Lorsqu'il réussit à contrôler l'avion, l'alarme stall ne sonne plus, l'avion est en piqué (ou semble l'être), et le FD ordonne de cabrer. Pourrait-il s'agir d'une survitesse ? Bonin veut le croire. Il réduit la poussée au minimum (2h 11mn 46s) et sort même les aérofreins une vingtaine de secondes plus tard, aussitôt rentrés par Robert, qui manifestement ne partage pas l'avis de son collègue. Le badin lui indique que la vitesse air est trop lente, et qui pourrait s'agir d'un décrochage. Sur ses exhortations et celui du capitaine ("ta vitesse ? Tu montes ! Descend, descend, descend, descend !"), Bonin consent à pousser sur le manche à 2h 12mn 33s. La vitesse augmente et est de nouveau considérée par les ordinateurs, et l'alarme stall, qui était silencieuse jusqu'alors se remet sonner. Situation incompréhensible pour des pilotes qui ne comprennent pas cette situation perverse. "Merde, s'exclame Dubois incrédule, c'est pas possible !". Les pilotes ont abandonné l’hypothèse de la survitesse et celle du décrochage, les moteurs fonctionnent normalement ; et pourtant l'appareil continue sa chute vertigineuse. "Qu'est-ce qui se passe ?" criera Robert peu avant de mourir. Nous on le sait, mais gageons que plongés dans l'enfer du stress et de la saturation mentale, confrontés à un environnement paradoxal, et aussi abrutis par la fatigue (il était 2h du matin, là où l'organisme est le plus faible ; et en sachant que Dubois et Bonin n'avaient pas dormi de la journée précédente), cela ne devait pas leur être aussi évident. RIP aux pilotes, au personnel de cabine et à tous les passagers.
+@Bugmy Admin.......Etant pilote je ne voudrais pas vous écrire des bêtises,car moi je ne le suis pas.Mes connaissances sont théoriques.Le fait de cabrer serait le fait de compenser la perte fictive d'altitude après désengagement du PA.Mais en cabrant il a fait monter l'avion de 35.000 à 38.000 pieds et à cette altitude la densité de l'air et la vitesse de l'avion,qui a du diminuer pendant cette phase,ont du mettre l'avion dans l'impossibilité de voler d'ou décrochage inévitable et le drame c'est qu'ils n'ont pas perçu les avertissements (bufeting,alarme "stall")pourquoi ? bruit extérieur ?,turbulences,?.Peut-être ne savaient-ils pas sortir d'un décrochage à haute altitude.J'ai vu dans un autre message que c'était trés délicat.A vous de juger!!
Dear Madame Soulas...I just can't believe what your daughter and everyone else on board went through due to the sheer incompetence of these three pilots, especially Bonin. I'm a commercial pilot myself and no matter how many times I watch this video, I simply can't work out how it is possible that they acted this way. Any loss of life is tragic, but when it's completely avoidable then it's even worse. The whole thing is just so sad. I'll never understand how Bonin managed to achieve his flight licences with such an obvious lack of basic knowledge. Best regards from Ecosse
@@lukezhang3017 it is often those who know nothing who speak the most. You do not fly an airliner and have no knowledge of aviation in all its generality. The 3 pilots of flight AF447 died fighting to the end to save each of the passengers and crew members, they (except Cpt Dubois who was on rest) doing what they were trained to do. It is clear that there is not only one problem in this tragedy, but in reality a succession of events having led to the crash, namely that the electronic systems making it possible to avoid the aircraft from stalling were not working at the time of the accident. keep your hatred to yourself, and don't waste the comment space with things as futile as they are useless. my name is Louis, I am not an airline pilot but a tourist plane pilot. I too lost someone in this accident and I spend a lot of my time trying to make people understand the sad reality. do not hesitate to let me know if you want to know some things that are not stated in the various more or less interesting reports on RUclips. good evening to you, Louis.
Je suis instructeur de vol depuis 10 ans maintenant au Canada et pilote professionnel, formé à la base du pilotage en France sur Jodel 112 pour le brevet de base par des anciens pilotes de l'Armée de l'Air. J'ai appris beaucoup avec eux autres. J'ai poursuivi tout le reste de ma formation au Canada. Je forme aussi les futurs instructeurs de vol. Certains de mes anciens étudiants pilotent pour des airlines maintenant. Cet accident fait souvent partie, malheureusement, de mes cours de facteurs humains avec mes étudiants. Je les incite à visionner la reconstitution du cockpit du vol 447 quand nous abordons le décrochage. Les conclusions ne sont pas si simples à tirer. Un accident n'est pas la cause d'un seul évènement, une suite bien alignée de facteurs. Si un de ces facteurs est supprimé, la chaîne se brise, et l'accident peu être évité. Le fonctionnement humain est imprévisible, la réaction face à un stresseur brutal (son, odeur, vibration...) peut occasionner une réaction disproportionnée, chaque personne étant différente face à cela. L'instinct de survie rempli alors tout l'espace, l'aquis semble oublié, les "vieux" mauvais réflexes de l'étudiant pilote resurgissent, tirer sur le manche quand le nez de l'avion descend vers le sol, alors qu'il faut faire l'inverse...Revenir aux choses simples quand tout va mal... Le début de la formation consistant à apprendre à ne pas agir selon ses instincts de survie. Les décrochages sont des exercices essentiels, la physique du vol doit être bien assimilée, et surtout, il faut montrer de nombreuses situations de décrochage: montée-virage, descente, avec ou sans puissance...Tout avion vole selon les mêmes règles de la physique. Ce long message pour expliquer que la facilité voudrait cibler de suite l'équipage, ce n'est malheureusement pas si simple. La science des facteurs humains devra progresser pour aider l'humain à devenir meilleur, à améliorer les postes de pilotage, l'intelligence artificielle pourra dans quelques années peut-être nous donner des pistes... Toutes mes pensées aux disparus, mes sincères condoléances à tous.
Un grand merci pour ce témoignage non jugeant et humain. Ça change et on on en a gravement besoin. Sans enlever la responsabilité aux pilotes, c'est facile de blâmer en sachant ce qui allait se passer, assis derrière un écran. Comme vous le dites personne ne sait quelle réaction inadaptée il pourrait avoir en situation de stress. L'équipage était fatigué je crois savoir. Cela a du joué fortement sur la dégradation de leur performance et de leur jugement. Effectivement les gens en général veulent résumer ce crash à 3 imbéciles qui ne font pas ce qu'il faut. Ça n'explique clairement pas comment 3 professionnels en sont arrivés à cette situation. Il y a clairement une chaîne qui s'est mise place. Il semble que d'emblée ils se sont fait une mauvaise représentation de ce qui se passait. Après une trentaine de secondes à avoir construit une idée de la situation, cela devient très difficile de déconstruire cela et de réévaluer la situation surtout dans une situation de crise ou le stress limite la réflexion. Ce crash est parfois incompréhensible et difficilement accepté car cela montre quelque chose qui ne plaît pas mais qui est pourtant une réalité : 3 professionnels qui n'ont pourtant pas volé leur métier, peuvent commettrent à 3 une chaîne d'erreurs fatales qui semble pourtant la base à éviter. C'est dur à admettre mais certaines situations peuvent amener à ça. Il faut avant tout savoir les reconnaître car à mon avis si on se retrouve dedans au bout de la chaîne on peut être comme eux et les dés sont jetés. Ce crash a commencé à mon avis bien plus tôt avec le manque de sommeil déjà. Le scénario qui emmenait sur un mauvais fil des évènements était déjà en place. Que tous reposent en paix et une pensée pour tous les proches de cet effroyable drame. En espérant que toutes les leçons auront pu être tirées de ce drame. Cordialement.
I'm sorry for the loss of your daughter and son-in-law, I still remember being 13-14 years old and first hearing about the crash and also I remember how much time and resources were spent trying to locate the black box and Flight recorder of the plane. But you are doing a good thing by posting the animation of this crash. It serves as a reminder and lesson to current and upcoming pilots of what not to do in a deep stall. We only hope that something like this doesn't happen again.
Penso che questo incidente, come pochi altri, sia nel cuore di molte persone nel mondo. Per la incredibile dinamica e sopratutto perché in qualche modo evitabile se non si fossero sommati un cosi gran numero di negligenze e sfortuna da non lasciare scampo a questi poveri passeggeri e membri dell'equipaggio. Sono tanti anni che continuo a commuovermi ogni volta che mi imbatto in questa triste storia.
@@korynet92 questa tragedia è stata resa molto più umana grazie alla vostra testimonianza. In questo modo abbiamo vissuto in prima persona il dolore e la drammaticità del fatto, altrimenti per molti sarebbe stato solo un'ennesimo incidente dovuto alla negligenza umana da confinare ad un evento nella storia dell'aeronautica civile. Con questo non voglio dire che gli altri incidenti siano meno tristi e dolorosi per chi ne è estraneo, ma quando si conoscono le storie delle vittime, questi assumono una realtà più concreta. La voglia di vivere che il sorriso è gli occhi di sua figlia trasmettevano, sono uno dei motivi che mi hanno spinto a scrivere questo commento. Senza dimenticare che ci furono centinaia di altre storie simili alla sua a bordo di quel velivolo. Possiamo solo consolarci nell'accettare che questo incidente abbia creato un precedente per evitarne altri simili. Un'anbraccio sincero.
@@vangelosecondomarco7549 Hai assolutamente ragione e apprezzo il tuo messaggio. Sappi anche che la condivisione mi ha fatto progredire molto. Tanto dalle esplosioni di simpatia di persone come te, tanto dal fatto che vediamo intorno a noi drammi che ci fanno pensare che non siamo soli nella sventura, anche se le circostanze sono abbastanza diverse. Grazie ancora a te
The airbus a330 can’t be stalled in normal law. As soon as the pitot tubes iced up and they lost airspeed indications the airplane switched to alternate law, where it clearly can be stalled. Did the pilots not understand the implications of being in alternate law? I think so. In normal law, if you are in trouble (egpws warning, windshear) the pilots go full back on the control stick, and the airplane will fly maximum aoa for best performance. I think the PF was attempting that, not realizing the implications of being in alternate law. It’s as if the pilots forgot that stalls are a thing, which is actually true in normal law.
I like your comment. I don't believe either of the pilots at the controls that night understood the airplane was now in Alternate Law. And even of they did, I don't believe they understood what that meant. I also believe that PF over time had developed a bad habit of just pulling back on the control stick whenever he got into a jam because he knew the airplane couldn't stall in Normal Law.
la panique et la confusion ont été les maitres du jeux dans le cockpit en ce moment et encore une fois je vous adresse mes sincères condoléances madame.
+Luke Hague He couldn't, the computer was missing one of it's vital inputs...AIRSPEED. Mess with that and it's downhill from there in terms of your instruments. However, the stall warning was poorly managed and that's what caused this crash. 5 degrees nose down and about 80 to 85% N1 would have recovered the plane and maybe unfroze the pitot tubes.
@@opus4rv from cruise to a sudden stall? These passengers entrusted their lives in these pilots, and the pilots failed. Plain and simple. I have no doubt that they did the best they could, but it simply was not good enough. These mistakes cannot happen. Ever.
@@opus4rv Uhm, did you even read the final investigation report? The pitot tubes froze, and stood frozen for about 20 seconds, then the captain's pitot tube came back online, shortly after, Bonin's came back online also. The airspeed indicators were only frozen for at most 30 seconds. This also however, does not reconcile Bonin pulling his flight control stick 100% nose up. It still befalls me to this day, he had no reason to do such a thing, even holding it in the nose up position for the remainder of the flight is beyond me. That man had no place in that cockpit, with that amount of panic response to such a simple problem. Shame.
Dear Madame Soulas, My deepest condolances for your dougther and son in law. I hope they are in a good places now. I was searching, reading and watching documantaries for years about AF447, I couldnt understand why this disaster happened until I watch this video, unfortunately continueusly worng inputs by FO. It is lesson to all commercial pilots, not to happen such tragic any more.
Even after 6 years, it must be hard to forget what the passengers and the pilots felt during the deep stall and until the brutal impact. And I hope you have watched the documentaries on this crash for further analysis. Sorry for your loss :(
+Tyger Voods could never forger... 6 years, but it is now.... According to Robert, I think it was too late to do something ; It takes too much time to try to understand what happened
+Corinne Soulas Right, I believe they were too tired and were disorientated by the pitch black sky. Robert did seem to realize what was happening at the end but it was too late. He might have miraculously saved the plane, had Bonin not been pulling back on the side-stick. Anyways, I like how you always respond to your viewers and we hope to ease the pain you are still going through :(
+Tyger Voods I agree with you excepting the fact that the captain should have been in the cockpit at this time knowing that the plane was flying througt hard clouds. (sorry for my english) ; Quite normal to answer to my viewer if I can. Pain will never end..... But life goes on.
C'est très grave, car les pilotes n'ont pas tenu compte de cette alerte " STALL STALL", Cédric Bonnin a continué de tirer le manche à braquer, alors qu'il ne fallait rien faire, pour laisser l'avion sortir du décrochage. Il y a eu 74 alertes " STALL STALL "
@@korynet92 Bonsoir madame, je tenais à dire que j'admire beaucoup votre courage. Et concernant ce drame, je pense qu'il est le résultat d'une série de dysfonctionnements de la compagnie air France. Je ne comprends pas que la compagnie aérienne ait pris un pilote de 32 ans qui n'avait que 3000 heures de vol, c'est beaucoup trop juste pour assurer un vol long courrier.
I'll never understand why they would ignore a continous stall warning. Its so frustrating to watch that. You find yourself willing them just to pitch the nose down. The hardest part for the families must be the fact that this accident was so avoidable and needless.
The amount of pitch up inputs probably comes down to instinct, something unintentional while PF is trying to level the wings in bad weather, but there are other contributing factors. The pitch up trend commences when there's an apparent loss of altitude, PF "regains" altitude but actually climbs beyond their flight level. Everything is sort of fine at this point and they stabilize the situation for a moment. They push thrust levers to TOGA which reinforces the pitch up trend, AOA is increasing and they're reaching their altitude ceiling. For some reason the flight director comes back on, commanding a series of pitch up inputs. The pitch up trend leads to the THS trimming the nose up, which I don't think either pilot noticed, and PF with stress levels climbing has his hands full with keeping the wings level while feverishly trying to think of a solution. They're reaching 38,000 feet with engines still on TOGA, moderate pitch up inputs and THS trimming nose up and the flight director still commanding pitch up, AOA shoots up beyond 40 degrees and the stall warning cuts out because the values go beyond the programmed limits. It must have been really confusing for the pilots when they try to recover from the stall and have the warning come back, and to have it disappear again when they pitch up increasing the AOA. I can't say the pilots aren't at fault, but everything happened really fast, in bad weather, with a situation they hadn't trained for with the captain taking his rest and everyone in a slightly degraded mental state.
Indeed. Having read practically every scrap of info I could find about this tragedy, that is the one thing I'll never understand: How the crew completely ignored the almost continuous blare of the stall warning. They never acknowledged it; They never even considered the possibility that they might be in a stall; They never even mentioned the word "stall" during their plunge toward the Atlantic.
@@kennedytaylor4783exactly. All CRM went out of the window. They didn't even confirm their roles. All those dual inputs and to completely ignore the stall warning seems crazy to me. I'm not saying circumstances didn't creep up on them and that it wasn't confusing but there's still some glaring failings there. It's just so frustrating because it was a needless accident and so many people died who really didn't have to and that must be even more difficult for the victims families. It would almost be easier to accept if the plane had a critical failure and there was nothing they could do but the pilots essentially controlled the plane into a crash when all they had to do was pitch down and add speed. I guess hindsight is a great thing but if my relative had been on there, that feeling of needlessness would kill me. Knowing that it didn't have to happen.
Pourquoi le copilote Bonnin tire t'il autant sur ce manche, pourquoi l'autre Robert qui a compris le décrochage ne lui a pas repris les commande pour pousser et reprendre de la vitesse... Un cas d'école ce crash triste pour les personnes disparu cet avion etait en parfait état malgré l'incident des sondes...
@korynet92 Dear Mrs Soulas You may remember we spoke on another video, I am reading another book on AF447 which I bought the other day. Do you mind me asking how is the latest legal case going? I am still studying everything regarding AF447. I hope everything is well.
It's amazing that a pilot can get something so relatively simple to overcome so horribly wrong. Basic airmanship 101: You increase power to a known setting to maintain speed at the alt you are at and you keep the nose level and fly out of the situation. But for some reason, Bonin held that nose up for pretty much the entire event. And whats more, the very design of the Airbus meant the pilot next to him had no idea that Bonin was making the wrong inputs. I cannot see how the exact same incident would lead to a crash if it were a Boeing or MD aircraft. The control column being pulled back would have been a vital indication to the other pilot the Bonin was doing something disastrously stupid. Alas, it was only when it was too late to recover that Bonin decided to tell the other pilots what he was doing. His sheer incompetence killed them all.
Cela fait un moment que je lis les commentaires et Madame Soulas, je dois vous dire que vous affrontez cette terrible epreuve avec classe et dignite. Bon nombres de personnes auraient directement accable une personne ou une entite, mais vous prenez le temps d’essayer de comprendre ce qui s’est reellement passer, malgre la douleur que vous devez ressentir. Je ne peux que vous accompagner des mes pensees les plus sinceres. Repose en paix Caroline, la vie est injuste :(
Dear Mrs Soulas, I am very sorry for your loss. Im a young aviation enthusiast/general aviation pilot which is why this tragedy resonates so much with me and I keep going back at it every now and then. Everytime I re-watch documentaries or re-read the transcripts, I fall silent in utter disbelief. I hope that time has healed or at least alleviated your pain. Stay strong.
@@korynet92 I understand. Hope it brings a glimmer of relief especially regarding Air France’s lack of appropriate training, especially in high altitude situations. All the best.
I really wonder what Bonin was thinking when the auto pilot cut out and he pulled up. All he had to do was keep the wings level with the horizon. The Computer was telling them what was happening yet neither understood.
He was in panick mode. Having read a detailed report the guy was eager to fligh at a higher level the moment they crossed the Intertropical Convergence Zone. It's possible that his nervousness and eagerness to fligh at max height made him decide to pitch up. He was also a rookie pilot, the experience he had was of low quality, meaning that almost all of his flight time was in fly-by-wire Airbuses running on autopilot. Bonin was also inexperienced with handling the Airbus in Alternate Law which is noticable in the high-amplitude inputs to the joystick, acting like a panicked driver over-controlling a car. Robert likewise was a rookie but with double the flight hours of Bonin. But he had just moved to a managing position at the AF operations center. This was his first flight in 3 months, he only opted to do this flight so he wouldn't lose his currency as a pilot. Robert's role as the pilot not flying should have been to monitor Bonin’s actions. Instead he was reading aloud from the message screen not paying much attention to Bonin's actions. So we have inexperienced pilots who are deskilled because of automation. Captain Dubois had logged a respectable 346 hours over the previous six months but had made merely 15 takeoffs and 18 landings. Allowing a generous four minutes at the controls for each takeoff and landing, that meant that Dubois was directly manipulating the side-stick for at most only about four hours a year. The numbers for Bonin were close to the same, and for Robert they were smaller. For all three of them, most of their experience had consisted of sitting in a cockpit seat and watching the machine work. This is such a tragic event that could have been diverted if the pilots were skilled enough to deal with a situation like this.
I’ll never understand why the PF was making so many erratic control and power adjustments, I hope lessons have been learned in terms of teaching basic flying skills, from this tragic event. Thoughts are with those who passed, their families and friends.
- La preparation des co-pilotes était déja pauvre avant l'initation du vol 447, puisque ils n'ont pas montré avoir connaissance au niveau de la possibilité de givrage des sondes dans cet environement climatique. A partir de ca, la gestion de l'avion était totalement compromise des que les sondes ne donnaient plus les bons indices.
I’m so sorry for your loss and watching this with experience of glider and light aircraft flying is truly shocking. What this shows is a true breakdown in the understanding of aviation. The fact the wings are rotating left and right in a mushed stall is horrendous. And I’m not trying to be a know all, because this is obvious to anyone with knowledge of aviation and the well reported reports since. What it really shows is a lack of training and unpreparedness. Pilots ought to know everything about the failure of their aircraft and what that means. They didn’t. Airbus is at fault too because someone should have come in remotely to stop this. I hope you have peace hopefully knowing of assurances it won’t happen again. Love to you.
The opportunity at 2:01 to power it down and out of its stalled condition - in hindsight - is chilling. It’s right there.. in an instant they would’ve been out of it all and on their way 😟
Corinne Soulas I cannot put in words how sad and sorry I am for your loss, but I imagine it to be utterly unbearable 😔 .. ..I mean, even as the years go by and u learn to somehow live and function with that unfathomable pain of loosing your only daughter - I believe it still stays with you to the end of ur life, because when that plane went down, a part of you died too 🙏🏻 But for what it’s worth: seeing you speak and stand your ground in those interviews & tv programs, was a humbling experience for me and I admire your courage and emotional strength.. If your daughter could see you (which I believe to an extent she can), dear goodness, she would be extremely proud and rightfully so. Do you feel Air France has been supportive and accommodating enough by the way? And do you feel satisfied in terms of how the industry has LEARNED from this tragedy? My boyfriend as well as my brother both fly for British Airways, so if you ever wanna tell or ask them something, let me know. Now, thank you so so much for all the uploads and responses, and lots of love 💕 from England 🏴
@@doktorwho880 the worst drama that can be, is that of the loss of a child, which is in full destiny. A dramatic accident, made of unexpected and incomprehensible cicumstances. Sad situation that has destroyed many families, and whose scars will never close. Can this drama make react the air world, so that it does not happen again. Thank you for your message.
Doktor Who look at 2:40 Juste 4-5 sec away from understanding their situation :/ if he just continued to push down for more sec the captain would have realized what’s happening because the Airbus would have started to regain its speed 😰😰😰😰
@Ricco Delestaque Cette reconstitution montre les actions des pilotes qui ont conduit au crash de l'avion. Il est évident que la suite, nous la connaissons a emporté 228 personnes.
@Ricco Delestaque Je ne comprends pas non plus votre attitude et votre réflexion quant à mes réponses soit-disant pas agréables. J'ai simplement souligné, que cette vidéo était axée sur le comportement des pilotes pendant les 4 minutes précédant le crash. Où est le problème ? Cette vidéo a été soumise par la Justice et je l'ai postée. Quant à moi, sachez que j'ai perdu ma fille et mon gendre dans cet avion. Alors, restons en là comme vous le dites.
Je ne suis pas pilote,mais j'ai pris quelques leçons de pilotage dans les années 50 sur stampe à Esbli,et à Nangis en 1968 sur Rallye.Dans les deux cas j'ai été invité très rapidement par l'instructeur à sortir d'un décrochage.La situation est assez simple.vous volez à une altitude moyenne et un régime moteur également moyen.insensiblement vou perdez de l'altitude.Instinctivement vous tirez sur le manche pou retrouver votre altitude.Ca marche jusqu'à un certain point puis subitement vous sentez l'avion s'affaisser de l'avant.C'est le décrohage,la voilure ne porte plus mais la gouverne de profondeur conserve une petiite efficacité vous exploitez ce fait en poussant sur le manche pour mettre l'avion en piqué pendant quelques secondes pour retrouver de la vitesse,Puis vous redressez,le problème est résolu.Sur un avion de tourisme,vous ressentez physiquement le phènomène pas d'alerte sonore .je ne me souviens pas si on ressent le"bufeting"
Difficile de faire le lien entre un avion de ligne et un avion de tourisme. Qui plus est dans les mêmes conditions. Mais le manque de formation est une évidence.
En mon sens il y a plusieurs responsable et c'est une combinaison multifactoriel et clairement airbus et thalès sont en partie coupable de ce crash lié à une panne non annoncé. Je rappelle juste que la panne de sonde pitot a été anoncer largement en retard 1 à 2 min après la panne et donc au moment ou les sonde pitot sont en réalité fonctionnelle. Je pense qu'elle a contribué fortement à l'incompréhension du copilote Gonin qui est clairement en mon sens malgré tout responsable malgrè sont état de panique évident (ce serait d'ailleurs intéressant d'écouter la vrais radio avec l'intonation de voix, avez vous pus l'écouter car Gonin me semble très paniquer ?) David robert lui dit clairement de ne pas toucher trop au commande latéral de tout faire pour pas trop les toucher (il fait l'inverse du début à la fin) , Gonin veut sortir les freins, heureusement David lui en en empêche... Et enfin david et le capitaine lui dise à plusieurs reprise pique du nez descend descend il fait exactement l'inverse .... Sans compter le faite qu'il remonte de manière brutale l'avion au début de la panne ... Quand l'autre copilote david décide de reprendre le contôle je pense qu'il fait ce qu'il faut faire mais c'est juste trop tard il aurait reprise une minutes 30 avant je pense qu'il aurait sauver la situation ou en tout cas c'est possible. Command le commandant peut ne pas dormir avant une nuit de vol et être au bord de l'épuisement pour son vol... et command il quitte son bord avant une tempête tropical importante sans dire a son copilote de détourner le nuage et même en lui disant c'est pas grave passe dessus... et laisser bonin le pilote le moins expérimenter au commande et pas l'autre copilote David 2 fois plus expérimenté.. d'ailleurs l'autre copilote david demande a gonin de contourner le nuage mais c'est trop tard. J'ai consulter les log de discussion radio et c'est franchement accablant. Je pense également que les passager ce sont rendu compte qu'il y avais quelques chose de grave. Ah plusieurs reprises l'equipière hotesse de l'air... appelle les commandant d'un ton inquiète.. Et on vois clairement l'avions bouger dans tout les sens avec une vitesse de chute quand même très importante. Dire qu'il n'ont rien sentit est juste une manière de rassurer les famille mais oui il ce sont forcément rendu compte qu'il y avait quelques chose de grave mais ça a durer que 2 minutes et sans savoir qu'il y aurait crash non plus, d'ailleurs le commandant alors qu'il dormer est surement réveiller par les turbulence importante et par l'appelle du copilote.
il y a un procès en appel prévu fin 2025. La Justice déterminera les responsables. AirBus et AirFrance déclarés responsables mais non coupables lors du dernier procès. Ce qui nous a anéantis.....
@@korynet92 Je comprend votre désarroi et en mon sens la culpabilité de airbus est claire dans le crash mais elle est un peu moins évidente pour airfrance d'un point de vue juridique en tout cas je le pense. La culpabilité d'airbus pour moi ne fait aucun doute car la panne de sonde Pitot est claire et est combiné d'un bug d'alerte, l'alerte de vérifier vos vitesse survient beaucoup trop tard et conduit à l'incompréhension des pilotes. d'un point de vue technique j'avoue avoir du mal sur la non culpabilité d'airbus et il serait intéressant de vérifier sur les (30, 31 ) fois ou la pannes c'est produit sur d'autres voles, si les pilotes avait eu des repaire visuelle et si le bug de l'alerte vérifier vos vitesse c'est produit. La on est dans la pire situation bug d'alerte + aucun repaire visuelle. Ensuite pour la culpabilité d'airfrance je ne suis pas un spécialiste mais elle n'est pas forcément évidente pour moi, la question est déjà de savoir si les pilotes sont coupable (pour moi oui) mais il est délicat de juger des morts, et est ce que air France est responsable que le commandant de bord ne dorment presque pas avant une nuit de pilotage, de la mauvaise réactions du copilote suite à une panne … Bref tellement complexe. Après pour la formation des pilotes c'est difficile à dire, car les situations sont tellement complexes et ici on à la pire situation le capitaine épuisé qui n'a pas de rigueur sur le vol et laisse son copilote navigué sur les nuages. Le copilote le moins expérimenté au commande, et une panne complexe et rare dans la pire situation possible. Il est facile de dire après que Bonin a été mal former après mais bon… D'un point de vue juridique j'aurais tendance à nommer airbus et le commandant coupable mais c'est dur d'attribué le crash de tellement de vie comme ça a une personne. Espérons que la justice française fasse sont travail et sois impartiale en tout cas.
If they really had the AOA indicator available to them as shown on this reconstitution and, with all the seemingly conflicting indications they were getting still failed to understand they were in a deep stall, then really their training left a lot to be desired. A deep stall was the only thing that made sense with the indications they were getting. It seems they ruled that out somehow, partly because they applied TOGA power at some poitn. They responded to the initial stall indication with only part of what they should have done and then proceeded with what seems to be complete confidence that this problem had been solved. At no point does anyone mention the possibility of being in a stalled condition, even when the AOA shows over 45 deg. That's incredible
Corinne Soulas Agreed. From searching more, I found that pilots were not trained on procedures for faulty IAS at high altitude, and that they also were not trained on stall recovery, deemed too unlikely to warrant being in the syllabus for either recurrent or initial training. It seems this crew had been so drilled to believe that the plane could not stall that, combined with the suspicion that the stall warning may be inaccurate due to faulty IAS, they never took the stall warning as an indication of a possible stall.
+pchantreau Faulty IAS or not; at FL370 during a stall warning you just don't pull up. That's basic and it's where these whole automated systems have taken away from basic flying skills. I feel really sorry for Bonin and the crew but his constant nose up pitch just made it worse.
C Gollum I'm not sure it's that simple. Part of the problem came from their training. It included a/s indicator malfunctions in cruise and I believe the sim drills put emphasis on overspeed conditions, hence Bonnin's anxiety about it: "une vitesse de fou." Furthermore, they also learned that a/s indicator malfunctions can lead to false stall warnings. It appears that they thought the likelihood of a stall from a cruise flight condition so remote that they simply ruled it out no matter what the airplane was telling them, through warnings and other signs. All pilots should be keenly aware of how narrow their a/s window is at altitude and that both stall and overspeed are never too far. Sad story.
Le plus terrifiant dans cette vidéo c'est que les pilotes n'ont pas l'air de savoir piloter, on voit qu'ils suivent des procédures, ce qui est la bonne chose à faire quand on ne comprend pas la situation. Mais tirer le manche pendant 4 minutes ça aurait dû lui mettre la puce à l'oreille vis à vis du décrochage. Même en n'ayant rien touché le crash n'aurait pas eu lieu aussi vite, peut-être même pas du tout.
Personne n'a jamais compris pourquoi le copilote avait agi ainsi..... Informations erronées, Stress, etc.... Il ne fallait rien faire puisque les PItots se seraient débouchées rapidement et les instruments seraient revenus à la normale. Faute de Formation de la part d'AF et Faute d'Airbus qui avait dit que son avion ne pouvait pas décrocher. Attendons le procès en appel 1er semestre 2025, sans grosse illusion.
It's so upsetting with all the respect for pilots and flying in no light condition. It is hard to believe that a pilot would have difficulty understanding the situation they were in. Smh.
Does anyone know the significance of Dubois suddenly telling everyone to look at the standby horizon? After that Robert and Dubois suddenly seem to think Bonin is "climbing" or pitching up, and he makes strong nose down inputs. What was the standby horizon showing that was different from the PFD?
No, the pitot tubes froze but the horizons are not dependant on the pitots. All were correct the full duration of the accident. The pilots were confused as to which indications to trust.
@@vinx3373 yes but why at that moment , that specific moment does Dubois suddenly tell them to look at the standby horizon...I can't work out what he thought he saq
Terribles les mouvements de joystick de Bonin...ils disent tout. Quel malheur que Robert ne lui ai pas demander de lâcher le manche en continuant à descendre.
This guy's side stick input was all over the place but is it just me or does it look like sometimes the plane was uncontrollable? Like the plane wasn't responding to his inputs much
the pilot should not have pulled back on the control column. The data was distorted because the pitot probes were clogged. A "usual" phenomenon when crossing a turbulent zone. He shouldn't have done anything.
je viens de découvrir un ensemble de tristes détails à travers un reportage, les passagers se sont réveillés lors du décrochage, car l'hôtesse de l'air a essayé à maintes fois de contacter les pilotes. encore plus les sondes pitot ont recommencé à fonctionner correctement mais dommage à ce stade là les pilotes ont perdu toute confiance à leurs instruments. un désarroi et la confudion ont été les maitres du jeu. navré madame. aussi je ne peux reprocher à mes collègues eux aussi ne voulaient pas mourir cette nuit. et enfin je me pose tjrs une question pourquoi ils n'ont pas changé de trajectoire pour éviter l'orage car tous les vols cette nuit l'ont fais.
Pourquoi ils n'ont pas jugé bon d'éviter le CB ? Mais mon cher monsieur, vous avez affaire à des pilotes Air France !! Vous savez, ces mêmes pilotes qui apprennent à voler aux oiseaux....Le CDB d'Iberia et quelques autres, qui volaient dans le même périmètre cette fatidique nuit, n'avaient pas cette prétention. Ils sont aujourd'hui toujours vivants.
Ernest, did a good analysis below. Also, I would add other significant facts. At the moment of autopilot disconnect the aircraft encountered strong lateral gust and a slight drop in altitude, Bonin was suddenly tunneled on lateral control. The video is clear, if watched several times, only first 1.5 minute, that's all that matters. At 0:11 the vario was at ~0ft/min, Bonin had large lateral inputs or maybe PIO (pilot induced oscillation). Also, I guess he inadvertently pulled a little. But the aircraft entered a zoom climbing > 6000 ft/min in matter of seconds. Then between 0:22 to 0:52, the side-stick command average around"0" or a slight down pitch, let's say neutral for this period of time. Any conventional aircraft will drop the nose naturally at low speed. But by design, the Airbus FBW will maintain the last commanded flight path for a pitch command around "0" or neutral axis. Therefore, the ascending flight path was kept for 30 seconds, again the pitch command was about "neutral". The aircraft entered the coffin corner and a continuously degraded state of energy. Then obviously, at 0:52, the stall warning blared in the cockpit, for real. Now, at 1:11, the stall warning still active (that's important to mention), the THS - trimmable horizontal stabilizer (or STAB in video ) was "stabbing" them from the back. In seconds, FBW logic moved THS at max nose up position. THS is a very big command surface, with THS at max nose up, it really doesn't matter the side-stick position anymore. At 37000 ft, with all sky under them and at only 1.5 minutes after autopilot disconnect, they were doomed, that's quite clear. Anyone that will continue trashing Bonin is just an ignorant.
I agree with your last sentence : Bonin is not responsible for this accident; the Airbus designers are! The Airbus design philosophy is being denunciated by a former pilot named Norbert Jacquet since thirty years and precisely because of this, he has been persecuted by the French state and is now forced to live abroad!
I disagree your opinion. Bonin is definitely responsible for what had happened. He alone took all the actions, which led to the crash. If you would have left Airbus alone, most probably with some minor inputs it would have kept the flight path. There is too much to discuss. Your cruising altitude is 35000ft. He reaches after some time 37000ft and at that moment still had large lateral inputs. Robert says go back down, and he says OK but he never does. Maybe in his mind but not in his real actions. Above all when you hear STALL! there is no procedure which tells you to pull the nose up or even! keep the nose up! position. As you all know stall is not a speed problem so it is not the key if you go on full power or not. You have to reduce the angle of attack of your wings no matter what, so you go down. It comes to me the actions of Bonin is exactly like what someone would do who has no experience in flying. If you would have put a normal passenger in that cockpit, he would also try to keep! the nose up and go on full power. But you got point with your THS opinion. Once it is at max nose up, then there is a little to do. Use man pitch trim...
When we first learn to swim, with air bubbles stappled on each arm, our first reaction is to pull head up in the air and shake arms in water. It's an instinct, we don't want to dive. We fear lack of oxygen that is water. Later, we understand that relaxing and laying down the body, enables to stand oneself on the water -float). I feel like Bonin experienced a similar primal fear: I don't want gravity to pull me down, I don't want to hit the ground. So I head up the plane nose, to keep it over the surface. Under a normal brain control, he would have known he was up in the sky, known that he could dive in the air a bit in order to recover good contact on air plus momentum: to float on it There was height-room for that. But from start to end, I feel he got frightened, nosing up to resist gravity. I don't know how pilots learning and habits win over it. I've zero experience in the air, and just suppose flying a whale like Airbus/Boeing big ones, makes you loose much perception, especially at night. You don't know where the nose is heading to vertically, you think you're flat but you're climbing, and so on. Maybe in little non-jet planes, you feel the air contact much better, can detect and recover a stall like a breeze. Sorry for my awfull english language, still you should get the idea.
Florin M thank you so much. Glad to see people having a realistic discussion on this topic. It’s very aggravating when people cannot see past their own two feet. I think this would have been a situation that would challenge any pilot. Because we’re human! Bonin may have been the primary cause but it wasn’t just him. yet airbus and the technology companies continue to be praised. The ones who die because of their failures take the fall. Very unfair system.
If you look closely, at the beginning, before the stall occured, you can see that Bonin's actions on the stick are coordinated with the indications provided by the Flight Director (indications that were obviously not appropriate) . Bonin was just trying to follow the FD, and he focused on that instead of focusing on the other instruments and good indications provided by the other copilot. And then with the THS, FBW design and the fact that the Stall Alarm is shutting down below 60kts... Airbus philosophy turned against them. However if Bonin would have let the aircraft to the other copilot who was applying the good actions on the stick, the crash may had been avoided.
C'est tragique, et aussi pathétique de les voir à plusieurs reprises, tenter de plonger pour reprendre de la portance, mais jamais assez longtemps ! La dernière tentative a lieu à quelques centaines de mètres de l'eau.... Et il re-cabre à nouveau.
This accident still hits me to the core! AT 37500 FEET ! PUTTING ENGINES TO FULL POWER AND CONTINUE TO PULLS BACK ?? WHERE THE HELL ARE YOU GOING ? ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO FLY 😯😯😯😯😯
This doesn't tell u the whole story. At 37ft their pito tubes were closed so they had no speed reading and altitude indication. At some point bonnin reading had the plane over speeding and flying to low hence nose up to reduce speed and climb. I am not sure if u ever heard of suttle incapacitation. That's my gut feeling.
@@terryvarta9306 it was one pitot tube. Regardless, the second they heard the stall warning they should have attempted an escape maneuver. They didn't.
Yaaaa when the computer says 0 input, just do it. It realizes both pilots don't know what they are doing and is trying to correctly configure the plane to fly normally.
@@korynet92 I'm sorry this event has taken Your loved one. Things are not fair in this world. But i hope you are doing okay and living a wonderful life.
I'm sorry buy the inputs from 1:42 to 2:18 by the PF are absolutely criminal... It's totally nonsense. The airplane ASKS for taking speed and descent, you just have to push and you will regain speed and lift in a few seconds.. Just imagine how much you have to insist to pull up as he did. This is unbeliable, I just can't believe it, and I think this will remain a mistery...
@@korynet92 Tout le monde est avec vous. Je sais ce que ça fait que de s'endormir le soir et se réveiller le matin pendant des années en pensant constamment à l'être perdu. Tout mon soutien le plus sincère.
Le copilote qui veut sortir les aérofreins témoigne de l'incompréhension qui règne a l'avant de l'avion. J'ai régardé hier soir le documentaire sur ce crash aérien et en effet, la perte des sondes pitots qui fausse les informations concernant la vitesse est le déclanchement de toute une série d'autres problèmes. Pourtant l'action du copilote sur le manche qui consiste à reprendre de l'altitude semble normal à première vue mais paraît bizarre lorsque l'alarme de décrochage se déclenche. Les pilotes situés a l'avant de l'avion ne semble pas ressentir physiquement le décrochage mais peut-être que si un des pilotes était allé a l'arrière de l'avion (ce qui est évidemment impossible), je pense qu'il aurait clairement ressenti le décrochage a cause de l'empennage qui n'est pas conçu pour traverser verticalement l'air. J'écrit ce commentaire en tant que passionés d'aéronautique de 16 ans mais je sais que vous en savez beaucoup plus que moi sur les causes de l'accident et je suis évidemment désolé pour vous.
i know a lot of avionics and i dont know why he pull nose up while stall.....i cant understat this....they got a lot of time for reaction, so please dont say he dont have tome to react....i cant agree with this
+18Mortus18 There is a misunderstanding.... I mean they couldn't react about their feelings at the moment. not about what they have to do. Of course they could have saved the plane with a normal reaction ! difficult to explain in english
Stall warning= NOSE DOWN, TOGA,(!) most simple thing in the world and Bonin seemed to fail that, apart from that captains joystick is NOT MECHANICALLY linked to co-pilots joystick, that is AIRBUS design fault, in BOEING control columns are MECHANICALLY linked to one another so it´s impossible to have this type of accident with Boeing aircraft, but however R.I.P all innocent victims.
Ernest Chabert -In the Birgenair 301 accident pilots got confusing warnings, they got both OVERSPEED and STALL warning at the same time and they got very confused, they couldn´t trust the flight computers because constant conflicting warnings including: Rudder Ratio, Mach Airspeed, Overspeed and Stall warnings at the same time.. But under NORMAL operational circumstances i think it´s impossible to have this type of an accident in a Boeing aircraft. Reason for Birgenair crash was a wasp nest inside pitotube and crew unable to recover to plane.
You say but you do not know ... If you put the throttle at the bottom you will have a couple nose up. You have to reduce then push down and after that push the thrust gently. Also on a 747 (the only one I know a bit) with a strong action on both yoke you can break the mechanism and only one yoke will work after.
Depuis l'A320, tous les airbus ont un programme qui corrige automatiquement l'assiette de l'appareil afin qu'il reste toujours dans son domaine de vol. Pourquoi le programme n'a-t-il donc pas redresser automatiquement l'airbus?
Bonjour, Trois secondes après la déconnexion du PA, le système de l'avion est passé en mode loi alternate 2B, avec notamment la perte de la protection d'incidence. Il y a d'ailleurs un message qui s'affiche à l'ECAM : "F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)". Le pilote pouvait donc bien tenter de faire un looping, les ordinateurs ne l'ont en auraient pas empêché.
Mr Chabert me corrigera si je me trompe, mais l'avion passe en Alternate justement lorsque l'ordinateur note une incohérence des données en entrée, telle que la vitesse. Du coup, passage de la loi normale (avec les protection, entre autres) à une loi "Alternate".
+@Calmax Film....Cette fonction n'existe que lorsque l'assistance electronique est intacte,ce qui ne pouvait plus être le cas quand le PA s'est désengagé (plus d'indication de vitesse)
Precision, ce n'est pas la coupure du PA qui a fait passer l'avion en alternate law mais les calculateurs qui se sont basé sur un desordre dans les indications vitesses. On peut deconecter le PA et voler en loi normale bien sur.
@@korynet92 i'am a pilot if they would have let the joystick alone the jet would have corrected it self the a330 computers would have taken over but the co pilot was pulling back on the stick they unknowingly disabled the computer
Je ne sais pas si vous êtes impliqué dans ce drame, mais je vous remercie pour votre empathie. Moi-même, maman de Caroline, je ne pourrais JAMAIS oublier....
@@korynet92 Mon grand père est retraité de l'aérospatial et à indirectement aidé les équipes de recherche, je me repasse souvent les différents reportages sur ce drame et cela me brise vraiment le coeur pour vous et toutes les familles de victimes j'admire votre force car moi je ne pourrais pas avoir cet force de tenir, pour moi les seules responsables son bien entendu la compagnie et non les pilotes cela est trop facile de rejeter la responsabilité sur le cockpit, donc indirectement via mon grand père je me sent très concerner et très en colère Bien à vous.
@@korynet92 oui je le sais je suis ça de très près malheureusement je pense que la compagnie va s’en sortir sans problème ne faite pas confiance à la justice mais espère de tout cœur me tromper
Corinne Soulas bonjour corrine je regarde en ce moment même le reportage et je suis désolé de ce qui est arrivée à Caroline et son mari. Je reste sans voix
Ça fait froid dans le dos mais l’année 2017 y’a eu 0 accident. Une première dans l’histoire de l’aviation. L’être humain apprends pour ne plus commettre d’erreurs.
Comment ont t’ils pu ne pas rattraper ce décrochage à 3 dans un cockpit… ? Ils devaient être drogués ou alcoolisés ! Toutes mes condoléances 💐. Pour toutes les victimes de ce vol et les pilotes.
Situation complexe qui a déstabilisé les réactions des pilotes. Le commandant de bord est arrivé trop tard pour comprendre et rectifier la situation.... 228 victimes et tant de dommages collatéraux.... 2009-2023 14 ans de procédures pour reconnaitre les responsabilités, et nouveau procès à venir suite à appel du procureur......
Je vois beaucoup, erreur des pilotes, erreur des pilotes, stresse des pilotes, ah oui mais vous seriez pas stressé vous quand vous poussez le manche vers l'avant et que l'alarme continue à dire STALL STALL!?????? Y a de quoi rien comprendre aussi !!
Piloter n'est pas jouer avec un joystick pour faire taire une voix synthétique. Quand l'avion est cabré, l'angle empêche une prise d'air fiable. L'ordinateur de bord n'a pas d'information cohérente et donc ne sonne pas l'alarme. Quand l'angle diminue, les paramètres redeviennent correctes et l'ordinateur sonne l'alarme. C'est au pilote de connaitre le fonctionnement de son appareil. Mais clairement l'expérience manquait aux commandes ce jour là.
This is a tragic loss Madam Soulas and I am so deeply sorry for your loss. Air France has been warned of multiple safety violations in various flights and you would hope they would take this seriously. We can't plan our destiny, albeit some might disagree. This is an airline that I actively avoid at all costs.
Thank you for your message. It is indeed a huge loss. The loss of a child remains inconsolable. Currently, the trial is ongoing. We will see at its end, who are responsible for this tragic accident.
@@korynet92 That is true, but after BEA reports that came out recently with multiple safety violations, I don't feel comfortable on flying them. But yes, like with every airline, there must be some very good people working at Air France.
@@korynet92sorry to ask but were the remains if your child recovered? I have heard many bodies were never recovered along with many parts of the aircraft and are still sitting under the ocean near the waypoint Tasil where the plains debris were found. Again sorry for your loss and yes bonins actions are crazy and incomprehensible.
Flight yokes and a stick shaker would have gone a long way to help Robert and the Captain see that Bonin was holding the nose up in a panic much, much sooner.
@@korynet92 he was in a state of startled shock. He hadn’t been trained to cope with this. That was the real issue. He was overloaded and could not hear or maybe interpret the stall warning or could not make the necessary action happen. In those circumstances, your promise brain takes over and it is not possible to be rational.
Des facteurs divers sont venus entravés un appareil en parfait état de marche, c'est ca qui est terrible...Avant tout certainement une forme de dépendance et de routine à l'automatisme et de "routes" toutes tracées...Un moindre rouage, finalement quelque peu anodin, rendant des paramètres incohérents et ininterprétable à un jeune équipage manquant certainement de repos et d'inexpérience à réagir avec mesure et sérénité, et notamment aux alarmes primordiales à tous pilotes d'avertissement sonore faisant fi de tout, et d'autant un manque total de repères visuel...Je n'oublierai pas Caroline, ni les 227 autres passagers...Nous ne les oublierons pas...
Je me souviens de l’annonce de la disparition d’un avion d’air france sur BFMTV comme si c’était hier… Tout le monde espérait qu’il se soit posé sur les cotes africaines. Je vous souhaite beaucoup de courage Mme Corinne Soulas Par contre le copilote a vraiment été con sur ce coup ! Procédure de sortie de décrochage, on coupe la puissance, on rend le manche ou manche a piqué, on reprend de la vitesse, on effectue une ressource souple, quand la vitesse est controlée on remet la puissance. L’avion est déjà en second régime (forte inclinaison et faible vitesse) en aucun cas on ne tire sur le manche pour ne pas faire un décrochage secondaire. A tirer le manche comme un bourrin il ne s’est jamais posé la question du plafond pratique ? Il pense qu’on peut tirer le manche aussi longtemps sur un avion sans conséquences… Des vies perdues inutilement.
personne n'a jamais compris la réaction du pilote. On attend le second procès qui devrait avoir lieu 1er semestre 2025. Bien que je n'en attende rien, on verra si des responsabilités tripartites sont engagées. Merci pour votre message. La douleur sera présente éternellement. 🙏🙏
@@korynet92 Nous savons tous ce qui s’est passé. Ce qui me dégoûte, c’est de voir tout ce théâtre judiciaire qui a pour seul but de dédouaner le fabricant et l’exploitant pour préserver des intérêts financiers. Lors d’un crash aérien il y a 3 niveaux de responsabilités : 1) Le constructeur 2) L’exploitant (pilotes, maintenance) 3) La météo Faut donc pas s’étonner si dès les premières heures nous avons été baladés vers la météo, (Le « pot-au-noir ») Quand l’épave et les boites noirs n’avaient pas été retrouvées. J’espère que vous aurez gain de cause mes si cela ne réparera votre préjudice.
@@geraldcharbonier6313 traumatisme vous voulez dire. L'issue du procès, dont je ne me fais aucune illusion, nous donnera prochainement la réponse. Mais je suis d'accord avec vos propos.
What I don't understand: What happened between 02:11:00 - 02:11:33? . It's so bizzare to see how the plane is dropping like a rock out of the sky but nobody is saying anything. They're clearly agitated but at the same time there is like zero sense of urgency associated with their actions. You gotta wonder: After like how many seconds of mindlessly following the flight directors, and the stall alarm still sounding when does that realization kick in "wait, this is stupid, I should level the wings first"? Where the fuck was PNF in all of this? Clearly not looking at his displays, so what the fuck was he doing, what captured his attention? Maybe he was facing backwards, trying to get the captain into the cockpit but after asking "We still have the engines, do you understand what's going on?" and not getting a valid answer from his colleague twice, you'd expect him to turn around slightly, glimse at his PFD, see the plane at 20 degree nose up and then having like an "oh sh*t" moment, right? But nothing! It doesn't make any sense at all.
c’était un catlogue d’erreurs, à commencer par des capteurs en panne et un cockpit / systèmes / procédures / supervision laissant beaucoup à désirer. Tragique. Je vous encourage à regarder de plus amples investigations avant de sauter à la conclusion, même si le pilote aux commandes manquait aussi d'expérience. Il n'était pas formé pour faire face à la situation qui se présentait à lui.
Alarme décrochage = Assiette à piquer + puissance, faut pas chercher à comprendre, c'est valable quelque soit l'avion. Bonin s'est fait des nœuds au cerveau en voulant analyser la situation.
C est un malheureux et triste accident d avion qui m a marqué.les pilotes n ont pas ressenti qu ils étaient en situation de décrochage que l avion chutait.je ne sais pas si a ce moment là l avion était toujours sur les écrans radars du Brésil je ne pense pas parce que les opérateurs de tour de contrôle auraient pu voir sur leurs écrans que l avion chutait et en avertir immédiatement les pilotes qui auraient pu peut être sauver l avion et surtout les personnes à bord 🥲
L'avion a disparu des écrans radar avant que l'on ne sache qu'un drame se jouait. 228 victimes et combien de familles meurtries ? On oublie trop souvent l'impact que cela a eu à leur égard.
Je suis un novice en aviation... quelqu'un peut m'expliquer où sur cette animation on voit la vitesse et l'altitude à laquelle se déplace l'avion ? Merci
@@korynet92 wat i don't understand is how can a captain leave the cockpit during the most taxing part of the flight. They were about to hit bad weather. He then leaves it to the most junior pilot. When he got called back, it took him a minute to come back which in aviation is ages. Where was he then if he was supposed to be sleeping behind the crew. Air France refused to admit he was with his girlfriend wen he got called back. To think that airlines are just employing dimwits like these three makes think twice. I almost took the one that crashed on the 29th October 2018 in Indonesia. I went by boat instead to java
@Sunamer Z but still wouldn't rather have the experienced captain making the decision to change course rather than leave 2 junior pilots with no proper crew management system to decide who was to take charge. We will never know what those pilots were experiencing trully because airlines manufacturers also have a habit of blaming pilot error
My deepest sympathies for your loss Madame Soulas. Caroline was a beautiful young woman who had her whole life ahead of her. You must have been very proud of her. I hope time has healed some of the pain you must have felt 🙏
Thank you
@@korynet92 sincere condolences madame.cest tres dur de ladmettre ca se voit sur le visage de votre mari.votre fille est au paradis et veille sur vous deux
En réalité il n'y avait rien à modifier sur les paramètres du vol. Il y avait simplement un "bug" dans les indications de vol. Les copilotes en faisant cabrer l'avion ont favorisé son décrochage et en quelques minutes l'appareil à perdu de l'altitude pour aller amèrir à une vitesse démesurée qui a disloqué A320. J'ai perdu un ami qui habitait Rihac-Rancon en Haute Vienne son épouse n'avait pas voulu partir avec lui. Elle avait préféré garder ses jeunes enfants à la maison qui étaient scolarisés à l'école Ozaname à Limoges.
Nous avons plusieurs vidéo de cette catastrophe grâce à Corinne Soulas qui a perdu dans cette accident sa fille et son gendre qui avaient malheureusement toute la vie devant eux. Quelle cauchemars à vivre pour elle et son mari qui chaque jour pense à ces deux amours qui étaient vivants et joyeux. Je vous embrasse très fort Corinne.(hélas ça me fait très mal aussi pour mon ami décédé qui a laissé toute sa famille dans la douleur, victime de bêtises humaines).
J'ai lu le rapport d'enquête- accident, le commandant de bord avait abusé avec sa nouvelle compagne de plusieurs sorties arrosées à Rio. Il ne devait plus être en état de voler au moment de cet incident et de donner des ordres en 3 mn aux deux copilotes qui avaient pris les commandes.
Je partage votre point de vue. Les destins sont parfois bienveillants, parfois, non.... Caroline et Sébastien s'étaient réveillés en retard pour l'aller..... Pas assez tard pour éviter le pire..... Destins brisés.... Quant à la lecture du rapport, il est clair que certains faits sont choquants..... et peu évoqués.... Merci pour votre message.
Look at that! In the deep stall, whenever there is an actual attempt to bury the nose with forward stick the stall warning starts barking at him again. After the pitot blockage clears, it is only above 60kts that he was receiving valid airspeed indications. It is only when he is below 60kts and in deep stall when the warning is silenced. Must have been so confusing. Pull up and the stall warning stops. Push over and the stall warning commences even though that is what you should be doing. Fatigue also played a roll in this accident. All I can gather is that PF attempted a low altitude stall recovery at high altitude and when it dIdn't work then convinced himself he must have been in a high speed stall...with unreliable pitot and remnant doubt. But, how did he not realize that he had induced a stall with the intense pull back after AP disconnect?Lessons to be learned here. God bless all of those people for their unwilling sacrifice so that others may learn.
Very good points. theres a lot going on in this accident, wasn't just Bonin pulling back like he has never flown before. I wonder if Bonin actually realized they lost stall protection, Robert mentioned it tho
Wow I never picked up on this. So obvious now that I see it!
To be honest, pulling back that hard for so long, you'd have thought he realised he wasn't in a high speed stall, but maybe fatigue and just confusion made it worse
You really got it !
Blaming all on the pilots while watching peacefully behind a screen knowing exactly what is happening is easy.
Without taking away their responsabilities, the design of Airbus Warning system really helped to the confusion and is a factor to be taken in account in this accident to prevent any kind of things like this happening again.
There is way more in this story than many internet's moralists and armchair pilots want to see.
Once again I'm not ignoring that the pilots made terrible mistakes.
But 3 airliners pilots make mistakes for a reason and if it's important to not deny the human factor, it's also important to look at the wicked points in the system. It also seems that the Company disregarded important informations at the time of the accident.
It's a story of many factors. The only story of 3 people doing mistakes does not explain this crash. Their mistakes are one of the factors.
Sadly, the thing was setting up way before the crash.... As in many accidents. Fatigue due to lack of sleep deteriorated their performance and played a big role since the very beginning of the flight preparation.
@@janipt many specialists clearly wonder the same. Does the training or the culture of interaction with the machine in this company and or for this plane make the pilots to rely on automated protection, not able to realize when it shuts off or to get back in total manual mode as they are so much not trained to do ?
It has been asked a lot in this accident.
Some pilots even said that the logic of such complex automated machines goes against the basics of manual flying. They were complaining that it was almost to "delearn" to fly.
3:54 That's the *exact* point when Bonin finally seals their fate. Robert was in the middle of recovering from the stall, but then Bonehead Bonin grabs the stick and pulls back *again* even after being specifically told _not_ to do that and puts them right back into the stall. After that, there wasn't enough time or altitude to recover.
I disagree, honestly at 5000 feet in a very low speed stall (IAS < 100kts) the plane was doomed anyways at that time, even if Bonin didn't intervene they would have crashed.
It's a A330 we're talking about here, it weighs more than 150 tons
We know that the plane crashed 30 seconds later.
So, in 5000 feet, or during this fall, 30 seconds, the plane had to regain a good speed (> 200 kts), and pull back up to a positive angle of attack. That's possible, but hard.
But even that wouldn't be enough, because the plane was in free fall, even with lift, the plane would still be losing altitude, because the lift needs to absorb that vertical speed induced by the minutes long stall (5000ft in 30s is 2500fts/min, or 184km/h heading straight towards the ground, imagine the energy needed to absorb 150tons heading at 184km/h towards the ground ...)
No, that plane was probably lost way before that point in time
39 deg aoa, no chance of recovering from that at fl4, they had to tail slide out of the deep stall in the updraft at fl370, maybe then they could have saved it, but i don't know if an a330 can actually pull the stunt off
icemachine79 yeahhh You hear the computer says Priority right as when robert was trying to get out of stall, bonin pushed the button on his stick to take controls from Robert and again pulls back like he did during the entire stall :/ :/
At that altitude it is too late..for an A330-300. They ran out of altitude 10k ft ago.
They were doomed after 16,000 feet, at that point only the best of crews could've executed the maneuver required to keep the plane from crashing. After that point, there simply wasn't enough altitude below them.
I’m very sorry for the loss of your daughter and son-in-law aboard this flight, Ms. Soulas. I believe that I recognize your lovely daughter Caroline’s face from a documentary about this needless loss of human life and feel terribly sad for her and the victims. No credible pilot should have flown into that storm to begin with, period-may this safety lesson be learned!
Thank you very much. Hope you're right. Some measures have been taken since the tragedy. (especially on training) But too late for the 228 victims.
I'd seen this video before but had no idea this was uploaded by a relative of a victim and this makes it even more devastating.. I can't claim to know what you're going through because I obviously dont but all I can say is this accident should never have happened and I'm truly and awfully sorry for such a tragic loss like this.
I can understand. Caroline, my daughter, will always be in my heart, with her husband. True, that this accident should never have happened. Thank you for your message.
@@korynet92 c est la faute au pilote desolé.
@@elieli2155 pas seulement. Le procès en cours définira les responsabilités.
@@korynet92sending my condolences to you 🙏
@@kellymac2404 Thank you so much
I'm very sorry Mrs Soulas. I will pray for the soul of your daughter to rest in peace. This was a totally avoidable incident and it makes me upset that mistakes like this costs lives.
thank you.
So sorry Mrs Soulas x
@@joekiddyshaw5757 Thank you
Is this exactly what happened or is it what they think happened, sort of like a recreation?
@@aviation-zr2ln it is what happened based on the CVR and BlackBox. But the French authorities refused to release the actual voice recorder so we can only go on interpretation. What's maddening is hearing dual input, which shows both pilots were countering each other. Its quite frightening to think there can be pilots like that,
15 degree d'assiette alors que l'avion decroche. Incompetence totale d'Air France. Rien d'autre a dire.
Comme l'a très bien expliqué ce professionnel, beaucoup de facteur rentre en jeux et permis eux le stress... Et même en étant compétant personne ne sait comment un humain réagira face à une telle situation même si ils sont formés pour ça...
Je me demandais, c'est où on voit la position du manche? (Là quand il tire à fond)?
@@micropods PF A droite ( le point noir manche du co pilot ) PNF a gauche ( le point noir manche de commandant )
Your attitude indicator is saying NOSE UP during and stall and you continue to NOSE UP!! WTF!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+C Gollum Bonin était trop occupé à contrôler le roulis de l'avion pour s'occuper de l'horizon artificiel. C'était Robert qui était normalement chargé de contrôler la trajectoire, ce qu'il n'a pas fait, ou insuffisamment. Au reste, avec l'avion qui ralentit, la perte des indications de vitesse et sans repères visuels extérieurs (n'oublions pas que l'accident se produit en pleine nuit au cœur d'un épais cumulonimbus), Bonin a pu être victime d'une illusion somatogravique, où le cerveau humain peut croire à un piqué lors d'une décélération, ce qui pourrait expliquer son acharnement à tirer sur le manche. Ce biais cognitif a pu être corroboré par le flight director ordonnant un ordre à cabrer, et le fonctionnement paradoxal de l'alarme stall qui s'inhibe en deçà de 60 kts (et qui se réactivait donc lorsque le pilote poussait sur le manche). Notons aussi que l'avion subit plusieurs violentes abattées pendant la chute, très difficilement récupéré par Bonin ; et cela a pu l'effrayer suffisamment pour qu'il refuse psychologiquement de rendre la main.
Il est vrai que l'alarme stall s'est activée en continu pendant 54 secondes à 75 occurrences à partir de 2h 10mn 52s ; et les pilotes l'ont bien entendu puisque quelques secondes après son activation, Bonin affiche la poussée TO/GA et Robert lui conseille de "toucher le moins possible les commandes en latéral" ; il suive donc la procédure qu'ils ont apprise lors de leur formation lors de l'approche du décrochage (à basse altitude, cependant). Reste que Bonin n'essaie pas immédiatement de réduire l'incidence, sans doute parce qu'il n'a pas conscience qu'elle augmente rapidement à chaque seconde (rappelons qu'elle n'est pas montrée au pilote), et qu'il est d'abord concentré à niveler les ailes (il serait ardu de récupérer d'un décrochage avec une aile penchant sur un côté).
Lorsqu'il réussit à contrôler l'avion, l'alarme stall ne sonne plus, l'avion est en piqué (ou semble l'être), et le FD ordonne de cabrer. Pourrait-il s'agir d'une survitesse ? Bonin veut le croire. Il réduit la poussée au minimum (2h 11mn 46s) et sort même les aérofreins une vingtaine de secondes plus tard, aussitôt rentrés par Robert, qui manifestement ne partage pas l'avis de son collègue. Le badin lui indique que la vitesse air est trop lente, et qui pourrait s'agir d'un décrochage. Sur ses exhortations et celui du capitaine ("ta vitesse ? Tu montes ! Descend, descend, descend, descend !"), Bonin consent à pousser sur le manche à 2h 12mn 33s. La vitesse augmente et est de nouveau considérée par les ordinateurs, et l'alarme stall, qui était silencieuse jusqu'alors se remet sonner. Situation incompréhensible pour des pilotes qui ne comprennent pas cette situation perverse. "Merde, s'exclame Dubois incrédule, c'est pas possible !". Les pilotes ont abandonné l’hypothèse de la survitesse et celle du décrochage, les moteurs fonctionnent normalement ; et pourtant l'appareil continue sa chute vertigineuse. "Qu'est-ce qui se passe ?" criera Robert peu avant de mourir. Nous on le sait, mais gageons que plongés dans l'enfer du stress et de la saturation mentale, confrontés à un environnement paradoxal, et aussi abrutis par la fatigue (il était 2h du matin, là où l'organisme est le plus faible ; et en sachant que Dubois et Bonin n'avaient pas dormi de la journée précédente), cela ne devait pas leur être aussi évident.
RIP aux pilotes, au personnel de cabine et à tous les passagers.
Très belle analyse, vous êtes pilote?
Ernest Chaber.......N'étant pas un intellectuel,serait-il possible d'avoir en clair la signification du mot "somatogravique" ?
je suis d'accord.
+@Bugmy Admin.......Etant pilote je ne voudrais pas vous écrire des bêtises,car moi je ne le suis pas.Mes connaissances sont théoriques.Le fait de cabrer serait le fait de compenser la perte fictive d'altitude après désengagement du PA.Mais en cabrant il a fait monter l'avion de 35.000 à 38.000 pieds et à cette altitude la densité de l'air et la vitesse de l'avion,qui a du diminuer pendant cette phase,ont du mettre l'avion dans l'impossibilité de voler d'ou décrochage inévitable et le drame c'est qu'ils n'ont pas perçu les avertissements (bufeting,alarme "stall")pourquoi ? bruit extérieur ?,turbulences,?.Peut-être ne savaient-ils pas sortir d'un décrochage à haute altitude.J'ai vu dans un autre message que c'était trés délicat.A vous de juger!!
Dear Madame Soulas...I just can't believe what your daughter and everyone else on board went through due to the sheer incompetence of these three pilots, especially Bonin. I'm a commercial pilot myself and no matter how many times I watch this video, I simply can't work out how it is possible that they acted this way. Any loss of life is tragic, but when it's completely avoidable then it's even worse. The whole thing is just so sad. I'll never understand how Bonin managed to achieve his flight licences with such an obvious lack of basic knowledge. Best regards from Ecosse
so many questions without answers..... but unfortunately a real disaster and indelible trauma.
Unfortunately, it was only the incompetency of one that killed her daughter.
@@lukezhang3017 it is often those who know nothing who speak the most. You do not fly an airliner and have no knowledge of aviation in all its generality. The 3 pilots of flight AF447 died fighting to the end to save each of the passengers and crew members, they (except Cpt Dubois who was on rest) doing what they were trained to do. It is clear that there is not only one problem in this tragedy, but in reality a succession of events having led to the crash, namely that the electronic systems making it possible to avoid the aircraft from stalling were not working at the time of the accident.
keep your hatred to yourself, and don't waste the comment space with things as futile as they are useless.
my name is Louis, I am not an airline pilot but a tourist plane pilot. I too lost someone in this accident and I spend a lot of my time trying to make people understand the sad reality.
do not hesitate to let me know if you want to know some things that are not stated in the various more or less interesting reports on RUclips.
good evening to you,
Louis.
Why didn't they look at the altimeter?
Je suis instructeur de vol depuis 10 ans maintenant au Canada et pilote professionnel, formé à la base du pilotage en France sur Jodel 112 pour le brevet de base par des anciens pilotes de l'Armée de l'Air. J'ai appris beaucoup avec eux autres. J'ai poursuivi tout le reste de ma formation au Canada. Je forme aussi les futurs instructeurs de vol. Certains de mes anciens étudiants pilotent pour des airlines maintenant. Cet accident fait souvent partie, malheureusement, de mes cours de facteurs humains avec mes étudiants. Je les incite à visionner la reconstitution du cockpit du vol 447 quand nous abordons le décrochage. Les conclusions ne sont pas si simples à tirer. Un accident n'est pas la cause d'un seul évènement, une suite bien alignée de facteurs. Si un de ces facteurs est supprimé, la chaîne se brise, et l'accident peu être évité.
Le fonctionnement humain est imprévisible, la réaction face à un stresseur brutal (son, odeur, vibration...) peut occasionner une réaction disproportionnée, chaque personne étant différente face à cela. L'instinct de survie rempli alors tout l'espace, l'aquis semble oublié, les "vieux" mauvais réflexes de l'étudiant pilote resurgissent, tirer sur le manche quand le nez de l'avion descend vers le sol, alors qu'il faut faire l'inverse...Revenir aux choses simples quand tout va mal...
Le début de la formation consistant à apprendre à ne pas agir selon ses instincts de survie. Les décrochages sont des exercices essentiels, la physique du vol doit être bien assimilée, et surtout, il faut montrer de nombreuses situations de décrochage: montée-virage, descente, avec ou sans puissance...Tout avion vole selon les mêmes règles de la physique.
Ce long message pour expliquer que la facilité voudrait cibler de suite l'équipage, ce n'est malheureusement pas si simple. La science des facteurs humains devra progresser pour aider l'humain à devenir meilleur, à améliorer les postes de pilotage, l'intelligence artificielle pourra dans quelques années peut-être nous donner des pistes...
Toutes mes pensées aux disparus, mes sincères condoléances à tous.
Richthofen d’accord avec vous. Merci.
La base du decrochage est tres simple. Ce con de Bonin tire sur le manche pendant 4 minutes.
@@_pjd t'apprend ça au 2 EME cours de pilotage vrmt
Un grand merci pour ce témoignage non jugeant et humain.
Ça change et on on en a gravement besoin.
Sans enlever la responsabilité aux pilotes, c'est facile de blâmer en sachant ce qui allait se passer, assis derrière un écran.
Comme vous le dites personne ne sait quelle réaction inadaptée il pourrait avoir en situation de stress.
L'équipage était fatigué je crois savoir. Cela a du joué fortement sur la dégradation de leur performance et de leur jugement.
Effectivement les gens en général veulent résumer ce crash à 3 imbéciles qui ne font pas ce qu'il faut. Ça n'explique clairement pas comment 3 professionnels en sont arrivés à cette situation. Il y a clairement une chaîne qui s'est mise place. Il semble que d'emblée ils se sont fait une mauvaise représentation de ce qui se passait. Après une trentaine de secondes à avoir construit une idée de la situation, cela devient très difficile de déconstruire cela et de réévaluer la situation surtout dans une situation de crise ou le stress limite la réflexion.
Ce crash est parfois incompréhensible et difficilement accepté car cela montre quelque chose qui ne plaît pas mais qui est pourtant une réalité : 3 professionnels qui n'ont pourtant pas volé leur métier, peuvent commettrent à 3 une chaîne d'erreurs fatales qui semble pourtant la base à éviter. C'est dur à admettre mais certaines situations peuvent amener à ça. Il faut avant tout savoir les reconnaître car à mon avis si on se retrouve dedans au bout de la chaîne on peut être comme eux et les dés sont jetés.
Ce crash a commencé à mon avis bien plus tôt avec le manque de sommeil déjà. Le scénario qui emmenait sur un mauvais fil des évènements était déjà en place.
Que tous reposent en paix et une pensée pour tous les proches de cet effroyable drame.
En espérant que toutes les leçons auront pu être tirées de ce drame.
Cordialement.
@@bonbondesel très pertinent. Merci.
Thank you for making this video, it really shows what happened. My condolences on your loss.
Thank you.
Mis mas sentidas condolencias Sra. Soulas.
El criterio y una optima comunicacion son la herramienta # 1 de todo piloto, cosa que aquí faltó.
merci beaucoup.
I am so sorry ms.soulas. I still pray for you and Caroline 💕
Thanks a lot.
Aviation needs a new rule.
Call it the AF447 rule.
IF A CAPTAIN IS ON REST AND AN EMERGENCY STARTS, HE HAS 30 SECONDS
TO BE IN HIS SEAT
it could have been, but.................
I'm sorry for the loss of your daughter and son-in-law, I still remember being 13-14 years old and first hearing about the crash and also I remember how much time and resources were spent trying to locate the black box and Flight recorder of the plane.
But you are doing a good thing by posting the animation of this crash. It serves as a reminder and lesson to current and upcoming pilots of what not to do in a deep stall. We only hope that something like this doesn't happen again.
Hope so. Thank you for your message.
Penso che questo incidente, come pochi altri, sia nel cuore di molte persone nel mondo. Per la incredibile dinamica e sopratutto perché in qualche modo evitabile se non si fossero sommati un cosi gran numero di negligenze e sfortuna da non lasciare scampo a questi poveri passeggeri e membri dell'equipaggio. Sono tanti anni che continuo a commuovermi ogni volta che mi imbatto in questa triste storia.
Merci.
@@korynet92 questa tragedia è stata resa molto più umana grazie alla vostra testimonianza. In questo modo abbiamo vissuto in prima persona il dolore e la drammaticità del fatto, altrimenti per molti sarebbe stato solo un'ennesimo incidente dovuto alla negligenza umana da confinare ad un evento nella storia dell'aeronautica civile. Con questo non voglio dire che gli altri incidenti siano meno tristi e dolorosi per chi ne è estraneo, ma quando si conoscono le storie delle vittime, questi assumono una realtà più concreta. La voglia di vivere che il sorriso è gli occhi di sua figlia trasmettevano, sono uno dei motivi che mi hanno spinto a scrivere questo commento. Senza dimenticare che ci furono centinaia di altre storie simili alla sua a bordo di quel velivolo. Possiamo solo consolarci nell'accettare che questo incidente abbia creato un precedente per evitarne altri simili. Un'anbraccio sincero.
@@vangelosecondomarco7549 Hai assolutamente ragione e apprezzo il tuo messaggio. Sappi anche che la condivisione mi ha fatto progredire molto. Tanto dalle esplosioni di simpatia di persone come te, tanto dal fatto che vediamo intorno a noi drammi che ci fanno pensare che non siamo soli nella sventura, anche se le circostanze sono abbastanza diverse. Grazie ancora a te
The airbus a330 can’t be stalled in normal law. As soon as the pitot tubes iced up and they lost airspeed indications the airplane switched to alternate law, where it clearly can be stalled. Did the pilots not understand the implications of being in alternate law? I think so.
In normal law, if you are in trouble (egpws warning, windshear) the pilots go full back on the control stick, and the airplane will fly maximum aoa for best performance. I think the PF was attempting that, not realizing the implications of being in alternate law.
It’s as if the pilots forgot that stalls are a thing, which is actually true in normal law.
lack of training....
I like your comment. I don't believe either of the pilots at the controls that night understood the airplane was now in Alternate Law. And even of they did, I don't believe they understood what that meant. I also believe that PF over time had developed a bad habit of just pulling back on the control stick whenever he got into a jam because he knew the airplane couldn't stall in Normal Law.
ECAM should deal with typical warnings like stall, pull up, windshear, etc.
la panique et la confusion ont été les maitres du jeux dans le cockpit en ce moment et encore une fois je vous adresse mes sincères condoléances madame.
Merci.
I'm really sorry for your loss Mrs Soulas. This accident was so avoidable and absurd.
So true... thank you very much for your message.
This is why the sidestick config is scary.
yes
Why didn't the Captain order "my controls" when he re-entered cockpit?
He didn't realize what happens ! he was asleep !
this accident still baffles me. we are taught as pilots right from the start in IFR training to trust your instruments
+Luke Hague He couldn't, the computer was missing one of it's vital inputs...AIRSPEED. Mess with that and it's downhill from there in terms of your instruments. However, the stall warning was poorly managed and that's what caused this crash. 5 degrees nose down and about 80 to 85% N1 would have recovered the plane and maybe unfroze the pitot tubes.
@@opus4rv from cruise to a sudden stall?
These passengers entrusted their lives in these pilots, and the pilots failed. Plain and simple. I have no doubt that they did the best they could, but it simply was not good enough. These mistakes cannot happen. Ever.
@@opus4rv Uhm, did you even read the final investigation report? The pitot tubes froze, and stood frozen for about 20 seconds, then the captain's pitot tube came back online, shortly after, Bonin's came back online also. The airspeed indicators were only frozen for at most 30 seconds.
This also however, does not reconcile Bonin pulling his flight control stick 100% nose up. It still befalls me to this day, he had no reason to do such a thing, even holding it in the nose up position for the remainder of the flight is beyond me.
That man had no place in that cockpit, with that amount of panic response to such a simple problem.
Shame.
Dear Madame Soulas, My deepest condolances for your dougther and son in law. I hope they are in a good places now.
I was searching, reading and watching documantaries for years about AF447, I couldnt understand why this disaster happened until I watch this video, unfortunately continueusly worng inputs by FO. It is lesson to all commercial pilots, not to happen such tragic any more.
I hope so. Thank you for your message. The trial begins next oktober. Perhaps we'll have answers to our many questions.
Even after 6 years, it must be hard to forget what the passengers and the pilots felt during the deep stall and until the brutal impact. And I hope you have watched the documentaries on this crash for further analysis. Sorry for your loss :(
+Tyger Voods So sad... so incredible....
+Corinne Soulas yea :( btw, what do you think of the actions made by the other pilot, Robert?
+Tyger Voods could never forger... 6 years, but it is now.... According to Robert, I think it was too late to do something ; It takes too much time to try to understand what happened
+Corinne Soulas Right, I believe they were too tired and were disorientated by the pitch black sky. Robert did seem to realize what was happening at the end but it was too late. He might have miraculously saved the plane, had Bonin not been pulling back on the side-stick. Anyways, I like how you always respond to your viewers and we hope to ease the pain you are still going through :(
+Tyger Voods I agree with you excepting the fact that the captain should have been in the cockpit at this time knowing that the plane was flying througt hard clouds. (sorry for my english) ; Quite normal to answer to my viewer if I can. Pain will never end..... But life goes on.
C'est très grave, car les pilotes n'ont pas tenu compte de cette alerte " STALL STALL", Cédric Bonnin a continué de tirer le manche à braquer, alors qu'il ne fallait rien faire, pour laisser l'avion sortir du décrochage. Il y a eu 74 alertes " STALL STALL "
OUi, c'est grave et toujours incompréhensible.
@@korynet92
Bonsoir madame, je tenais à dire que j'admire beaucoup votre courage. Et concernant ce drame, je pense qu'il est le résultat d'une série de dysfonctionnements de la compagnie air France. Je ne comprends pas que la compagnie aérienne ait pris un pilote de 32 ans qui n'avait que 3000 heures de vol, c'est beaucoup trop juste pour assurer un vol long courrier.
@@melande-ru7ro Beaucoup de questions sans réponses, hélas.
I'll never understand why they would ignore a continous stall warning. Its so frustrating to watch that. You find yourself willing them just to pitch the nose down.
The hardest part for the families must be the fact that this accident was so avoidable and needless.
You are right.
The amount of pitch up inputs probably comes down to instinct, something unintentional while PF is trying to level the wings in bad weather, but there are other contributing factors.
The pitch up trend commences when there's an apparent loss of altitude, PF "regains" altitude but actually climbs beyond their flight level.
Everything is sort of fine at this point and they stabilize the situation for a moment. They push thrust levers to TOGA which reinforces the pitch up trend, AOA is increasing and they're reaching their altitude ceiling. For some reason the flight director comes back on, commanding a series of pitch up inputs. The pitch up trend leads to the THS trimming the nose up, which I don't think either pilot noticed, and PF with stress levels climbing has his hands full with keeping the wings level while feverishly trying to think of a solution.
They're reaching 38,000 feet with engines still on TOGA, moderate pitch up inputs and THS trimming nose up and the flight director still commanding pitch up, AOA shoots up beyond 40 degrees and the stall warning cuts out because the values go beyond the programmed limits. It must have been really confusing for the pilots when they try to recover from the stall and have the warning come back, and to have it disappear again when they pitch up increasing the AOA.
I can't say the pilots aren't at fault, but everything happened really fast, in bad weather, with a situation they hadn't trained for with the captain taking his rest and everyone in a slightly degraded mental state.
Indeed. Having read practically every scrap of info I could find about this tragedy, that is the one thing I'll never understand: How the crew completely ignored the almost continuous blare of the stall warning. They never acknowledged it; They never even considered the possibility that they might be in a stall; They never even mentioned the word "stall" during their plunge toward the Atlantic.
@@kennedytaylor4783exactly. All CRM went out of the window. They didn't even confirm their roles. All those dual inputs and to completely ignore the stall warning seems crazy to me. I'm not saying circumstances didn't creep up on them and that it wasn't confusing but there's still some glaring failings there.
It's just so frustrating because it was a needless accident and so many people died who really didn't have to and that must be even more difficult for the victims families. It would almost be easier to accept if the plane had a critical failure and there was nothing they could do but the pilots essentially controlled the plane into a crash when all they had to do was pitch down and add speed. I guess hindsight is a great thing but if my relative had been on there, that feeling of needlessness would kill me. Knowing that it didn't have to happen.
Olhem os movimentos do avião antes da queda.... é ÓBVIO que os passageiros sentiram a queda......
Infelizmente, tenho certeza, embora nos digam o contrário. Mas a turbulência sentida certamente não foi imaginada como uma queda iminente.
Pourquoi le copilote Bonnin tire t'il autant sur ce manche, pourquoi l'autre Robert qui a compris le décrochage ne lui a pas repris les commande pour pousser et reprendre de la vitesse... Un cas d'école ce crash triste pour les personnes disparu cet avion etait en parfait état malgré l'incident des sondes...
Tant de pourquoi qui restent sans réponses.
@korynet92
Dear Mrs Soulas
You may remember we spoke on another video, I am reading another book on AF447 which I bought the other day.
Do you mind me asking how is the latest legal case going?
I am still studying everything regarding AF447.
I hope everything is well.
It's amazing that a pilot can get something so relatively simple to overcome so horribly wrong.
Basic airmanship 101: You increase power to a known setting to maintain speed at the alt you are at and you keep the nose level and fly out of the situation.
But for some reason, Bonin held that nose up for pretty much the entire event. And whats more, the very design of the Airbus meant the pilot next to him had no idea that Bonin was making the wrong inputs.
I cannot see how the exact same incident would lead to a crash if it were a Boeing or MD aircraft. The control column being pulled back would have been a vital indication to the other pilot the Bonin was doing something disastrously stupid.
Alas, it was only when it was too late to recover that Bonin decided to tell the other pilots what he was doing. His sheer incompetence killed them all.
not amazing at all, unfortunately,
Wrong U need to unstall the wing
Cela fait un moment que je lis les commentaires et Madame Soulas, je dois vous dire que vous affrontez cette terrible epreuve avec classe et dignite. Bon nombres de personnes auraient directement accable une personne ou une entite, mais vous prenez le temps d’essayer de comprendre ce qui s’est reellement passer, malgre la douleur que vous devez ressentir. Je ne peux que vous accompagner des mes pensees les plus sinceres. Repose en paix Caroline, la vie est injuste :(
J'ai été très émue en lisant votre message. Je vous remercie. Et comme vous le dites, la vie est injuste.
Dear Mrs Soulas, I am very sorry for your loss. Im a young aviation enthusiast/general aviation pilot which is why this tragedy resonates so much with me and I keep going back at it every now and then. Everytime I re-watch documentaries or re-read the transcripts, I fall silent in utter disbelief. I hope that time has healed or at least alleviated your pain. Stay strong.
It's a difficult way. But no choice, looking forward and I hope that the judgment of April 17 will be positive for the civil parties.
@@korynet92 I understand. Hope it brings a glimmer of relief especially regarding Air France’s lack of appropriate training, especially in high altitude situations. All the best.
@@stefanocozzi8188
I really wonder what Bonin was thinking when the auto pilot cut out and he pulled up. All he had to do was keep the wings level with the horizon. The Computer was telling them what was happening yet neither understood.
Unfortunately, Nobody can understand
He was in panick mode. Having read a detailed report the guy was eager to fligh at a higher level the moment they crossed the Intertropical Convergence Zone. It's possible that his nervousness and eagerness to fligh at max height made him decide to pitch up. He was also a rookie pilot, the experience he had was of low quality, meaning that almost all of his flight time was in fly-by-wire Airbuses running on autopilot. Bonin was also inexperienced with handling the Airbus in Alternate Law which is noticable in the high-amplitude inputs to the joystick, acting like a panicked driver over-controlling a car.
Robert likewise was a rookie but with double the flight hours of Bonin. But he had just moved to a managing position at the AF operations center. This was his first flight in 3 months, he only opted to do this flight so he wouldn't lose his currency as a pilot. Robert's role as the pilot not flying should have been to monitor Bonin’s actions. Instead he was reading aloud from the message screen not paying much attention to Bonin's actions.
So we have inexperienced pilots who are deskilled because of automation. Captain Dubois had logged a respectable 346 hours over the previous six months but had made merely 15 takeoffs and 18 landings. Allowing a generous four minutes at the controls for each takeoff and landing, that meant that Dubois was directly manipulating the side-stick for at most only about four hours a year. The numbers for Bonin were close to the same, and for Robert they were smaller. For all three of them, most of their experience had consisted of sitting in a cockpit seat and watching the machine work.
This is such a tragic event that could have been diverted if the pilots were skilled enough to deal with a situation like this.
@@fzb5383 so true !
Cette video me donne des frissons maman!
C’est certain que si l’on se met à la place des passagers, on ne peut qu’imaginer leur angoisse.
Instruction video on how not to pilot the plane.
This is so easy to figure out . Fuck !! The altimeter was decreasing along with the airspeed .I could have gotten that thing out of a stall.
Toutes mes condoléances. Ça fait mal au cœur
Merci
Plane: "Stall, Stall, Stall"
Bonin: *constantly pulls up*
Plane: " *Do you think I'm a joke?* "
dramatic
You should not make meme with this situation
@@EmanoelLucas8552 Snowflake.
It was a "deep stall" situation. Wing and stab.
p.s. that means his inputs had little effect.
@@EmanoelLucas8552 I agree, it's not funny
Tous les spécialistes de l'aviation dans les commentaires.
Les Monsieurs parfaits qui gardent absolument la tête froide en TOUTES CIRCONSTANCES
Chacun y va à sa manière.... Le procès éclaicira les zones d'ombre. Espérons !
I’ll never understand why the PF was making so many erratic control and power adjustments, I hope lessons have been learned in terms of teaching basic flying skills, from this tragic event. Thoughts are with those who passed, their families and friends.
Thank you
L alarme stall se déclenche avant la perte réelle d'altitude. Je ne savais pas
elle se déclenche près du danger.
- La preparation des co-pilotes était déja pauvre avant l'initation du vol 447, puisque ils n'ont pas montré avoir connaissance au niveau de la possibilité de givrage des sondes dans cet environement climatique. A partir de ca, la gestion de l'avion était totalement compromise des que les sondes ne donnaient plus les bons indices.
réaction incompréhensible
I’m so sorry for your loss and watching this with experience of glider and light aircraft flying is truly shocking. What this shows is a true breakdown in the understanding of aviation. The fact the wings are rotating left and right in a mushed stall is horrendous. And I’m not trying to be a know all, because this is obvious to anyone with knowledge of aviation and the well reported reports since. What it really shows is a lack of training and unpreparedness. Pilots ought to know everything about the failure of their aircraft and what that means. They didn’t. Airbus is at fault too because someone should have come in remotely to stop this. I hope you have peace hopefully knowing of assurances it won’t happen again. Love to you.
I totally agree with you. Awaiting a trial in court to have the accused parties recognized.
Seems to me like Bonin didn't know basic aerodynamics or how to manually fly a plane. Very scary.
The opportunity at 2:01 to power it down and out of its stalled condition - in hindsight - is chilling. It’s right there.. in an instant they would’ve been out of it all and on their way 😟
their behavior is incomprehensible
Corinne Soulas I cannot put in words how sad and sorry I am for your loss, but I imagine it to be utterly unbearable 😔 ..
..I mean, even as the years go by and u learn to somehow live and function with that unfathomable pain of loosing your only daughter - I believe it still stays with you to the end of ur life, because when that plane went down, a part of you died too 🙏🏻
But for what it’s worth: seeing you speak and stand your ground in those interviews & tv programs, was a humbling experience for me and I admire your courage and emotional strength.. If your daughter could see you (which I believe to an extent she can), dear goodness, she would be extremely proud and rightfully so.
Do you feel Air France has been supportive and accommodating enough by the way? And do you feel satisfied in terms of how the industry has LEARNED from this tragedy? My boyfriend as well as my brother both fly for British Airways, so if you ever wanna tell or ask them something, let me know.
Now, thank you so so much for all the uploads and responses, and lots of love 💕 from England 🏴
@@doktorwho880 the worst drama that can be, is that of the loss of a child, which is in full destiny. A dramatic accident, made of unexpected and incomprehensible cicumstances. Sad situation that has destroyed many families, and whose scars will never close. Can this drama make react the air world, so that it does not happen again. Thank you for your message.
Doktor Who look at 2:40 Juste 4-5 sec away from understanding their situation :/ if he just continued to push down for more sec the captain would have realized what’s happening because the Airbus would have started to regain its speed 😰😰😰😰
Les personnes qui osent mettre des dislikes sont des personnes sans cœur qui ne savent pas ce que c’est de perdre sa fille !!! C’est honteux !!!!
Vous savez, il y aura toujours des détracteurs à tous les niveaux, il suffit de les ignorer. Mais vous avez raison. Merci.
@Ricco Delestaque Evidemment !
@Ricco Delestaque Cette reconstitution montre les actions des pilotes qui ont conduit au crash de l'avion. Il est évident que la suite, nous la connaissons a emporté 228 personnes.
@Ricco Delestaque je ne comprends pas où vous voulez en venir.
@Ricco Delestaque Je ne comprends pas non plus votre attitude et votre réflexion quant à mes réponses soit-disant pas agréables. J'ai simplement souligné, que cette vidéo était axée sur le comportement des pilotes pendant les 4 minutes précédant le crash. Où est le problème ? Cette vidéo a été soumise par la Justice et je l'ai postée. Quant à moi, sachez que j'ai perdu ma fille et mon gendre dans cet avion. Alors, restons en là comme vous le dites.
I'm sorry you had to go through this horrible experience, I cannot imagine loosing my daughter, stay strong. ❤️
An injustice from which we cannot recover. Take care.
Why when the autopilot disconnects the speed sudenly drops
Because the co-pilot pulled back on the stick because of the wrong indications
Je ne suis pas pilote,mais j'ai pris quelques leçons de pilotage dans les années 50 sur stampe à Esbli,et à Nangis en 1968 sur Rallye.Dans les deux cas j'ai été invité très rapidement par l'instructeur à sortir d'un décrochage.La situation est assez simple.vous volez à une altitude moyenne et un régime moteur également moyen.insensiblement vou perdez de l'altitude.Instinctivement vous tirez sur le manche pou retrouver votre altitude.Ca marche jusqu'à un certain point puis subitement vous sentez l'avion s'affaisser de l'avant.C'est le décrohage,la voilure ne porte plus mais la gouverne de profondeur conserve une petiite efficacité vous exploitez ce fait en poussant sur le manche pour mettre l'avion en piqué pendant quelques secondes pour retrouver de la vitesse,Puis vous redressez,le problème est résolu.Sur un avion de tourisme,vous ressentez physiquement le phènomène pas d'alerte sonore .je ne me souviens pas si on ressent le"bufeting"
Difficile de faire le lien entre un avion de ligne et un avion de tourisme. Qui plus est dans les mêmes conditions. Mais le manque de formation est une évidence.
En mon sens il y a plusieurs responsable et c'est une combinaison multifactoriel et clairement airbus et thalès sont en partie coupable de ce crash lié à une panne non annoncé. Je rappelle juste que la panne de sonde pitot a été anoncer largement en retard 1 à 2 min après la panne et donc au moment ou les sonde pitot sont en réalité fonctionnelle. Je pense qu'elle a contribué fortement à l'incompréhension du copilote Gonin qui est clairement en mon sens malgré tout responsable malgrè sont état de panique évident (ce serait d'ailleurs intéressant d'écouter la vrais radio avec l'intonation de voix, avez vous pus l'écouter car Gonin me semble très paniquer ?)
David robert lui dit clairement de ne pas toucher trop au commande latéral de tout faire pour pas trop les toucher (il fait l'inverse du début à la fin) , Gonin veut sortir les freins, heureusement David lui en en empêche... Et enfin david et le capitaine lui dise à plusieurs reprise pique du nez descend descend il fait exactement l'inverse .... Sans compter le faite qu'il remonte de manière brutale l'avion au début de la panne ... Quand l'autre copilote david décide de reprendre le contôle je pense qu'il fait ce qu'il faut faire mais c'est juste trop tard il aurait reprise une minutes 30 avant je pense qu'il aurait sauver la situation ou en tout cas c'est possible. Command le commandant peut ne pas dormir avant une nuit de vol et être au bord de l'épuisement pour son vol... et command il quitte son bord avant une tempête tropical importante sans dire a son copilote de détourner le nuage et même en lui disant c'est pas grave passe dessus... et laisser bonin le pilote le moins expérimenter au commande et pas l'autre copilote David 2 fois plus expérimenté.. d'ailleurs l'autre copilote david demande a gonin de contourner le nuage mais c'est trop tard. J'ai consulter les log de discussion radio et c'est franchement accablant.
Je pense également que les passager ce sont rendu compte qu'il y avais quelques chose de grave. Ah plusieurs reprises l'equipière hotesse de l'air... appelle les commandant d'un ton inquiète.. Et on vois clairement l'avions bouger dans tout les sens avec une vitesse de chute quand même très importante. Dire qu'il n'ont rien sentit est juste une manière de rassurer les famille mais oui il ce sont forcément rendu compte qu'il y avait quelques chose de grave mais ça a durer que 2 minutes et sans savoir qu'il y aurait crash non plus, d'ailleurs le commandant alors qu'il dormer est surement réveiller par les turbulence importante et par l'appelle du copilote.
il y a un procès en appel prévu fin 2025. La Justice déterminera les responsables. AirBus et AirFrance déclarés responsables mais non coupables lors du dernier procès. Ce qui nous a anéantis.....
@@korynet92 Je comprend votre désarroi et en mon sens la culpabilité de airbus est claire dans le crash mais elle est un peu moins évidente pour airfrance d'un point de vue juridique en tout cas je le pense.
La culpabilité d'airbus pour moi ne fait aucun doute car la panne de sonde Pitot est claire et est combiné d'un bug d'alerte, l'alerte de vérifier vos vitesse survient beaucoup trop tard et conduit à l'incompréhension des pilotes. d'un point de vue technique j'avoue avoir du mal sur la non culpabilité d'airbus et il serait intéressant de vérifier sur les (30, 31 ) fois ou la pannes c'est produit sur d'autres voles, si les pilotes avait eu des repaire visuelle et si le bug de l'alerte vérifier vos vitesse c'est produit. La on est dans la pire situation bug d'alerte + aucun repaire visuelle.
Ensuite pour la culpabilité d'airfrance je ne suis pas un spécialiste mais elle n'est pas forcément évidente pour moi, la question est déjà de savoir si les pilotes sont coupable (pour moi oui) mais il est délicat de juger des morts, et est ce que air France est responsable que le commandant de bord ne dorment presque pas avant une nuit de pilotage, de la mauvaise réactions du copilote suite à une panne … Bref tellement complexe. Après pour la formation des pilotes c'est difficile à dire, car les situations sont tellement complexes et ici on à la pire situation le capitaine épuisé qui n'a pas de rigueur sur le vol et laisse son copilote navigué sur les nuages. Le copilote le moins expérimenté au commande, et une panne complexe et rare dans la pire situation possible.
Il est facile de dire après que Bonin a été mal former après mais bon… D'un point de vue juridique j'aurais tendance à nommer airbus et le commandant coupable mais c'est dur d'attribué le crash de tellement de vie comme ça a une personne. Espérons que la justice française fasse sont travail et sois impartiale en tout cas.
@@kisame5898 A suivre prochainement, mais c'est clair que la responsabilité est tripartite.
Si seulement ils savait que l'avion décroché, c'est vraiment triste j'y pense souvent mes pensées à toutes les victimes.
merci
C'est le facteur stress qui a fait qu'ils ne savaient pas! Pourtant l'alarme de décrochage avait sonnée plus de 80 fois.
If they really had the AOA indicator available to them as shown on this reconstitution and, with all the seemingly conflicting indications they were getting still failed to understand they were in a deep stall, then really their training left a lot to be desired. A deep stall was the only thing that made sense with the indications they were getting. It seems they ruled that out somehow, partly because they applied TOGA power at some poitn. They responded to the initial stall indication with only part of what they should have done and then proceeded with what seems to be complete confidence that this problem had been solved. At no point does anyone mention the possibility of being in a stalled condition, even when the AOA shows over 45 deg. That's incredible
Sure that the training is a problem in this case.
Corinne Soulas Agreed. From searching more, I found that pilots were not trained on procedures for faulty IAS at high altitude, and that they also were not trained on stall recovery, deemed too unlikely to warrant being in the syllabus for either recurrent or initial training. It seems this crew had been so drilled to believe that the plane could not stall that, combined with the suspicion that the stall warning may be inaccurate due to faulty IAS, they never took the stall warning as an indication of a possible stall.
It turns out also that they do not have an AOA display to look at. Perhaps that could change too.
+pchantreau Faulty IAS or not; at FL370 during a stall warning you just don't pull up. That's basic and it's where these whole automated systems have taken away from basic flying skills. I feel really sorry for Bonin and the crew but his constant nose up pitch just made it worse.
C Gollum I'm not sure it's that simple. Part of the problem came from their training. It included a/s indicator malfunctions in cruise and I believe the sim drills put emphasis on overspeed conditions, hence Bonnin's anxiety about it: "une vitesse de fou." Furthermore, they also learned that a/s indicator malfunctions can lead to false stall warnings. It appears that they thought the likelihood of a stall from a cruise flight condition so remote that they simply ruled it out no matter what the airplane was telling them, through warnings and other signs. All pilots should be keenly aware of how narrow their a/s window is at altitude and that both stall and overspeed are never too far. Sad story.
Why does the horizontal stabiliser automatically goes to -13°??? That's why the aircraft felt weird to the pilots and caused the stall.
too difficult to explain, too technical for me. Read the BEA report ; you can find it on internet
Gabriel The pilot immediately pulled up its not automatically :/ check out his stick movement 🤭🤭🤭
Le plus terrifiant dans cette vidéo c'est que les pilotes n'ont pas l'air de savoir piloter, on voit qu'ils suivent des procédures, ce qui est la bonne chose à faire quand on ne comprend pas la situation. Mais tirer le manche pendant 4 minutes ça aurait dû lui mettre la puce à l'oreille vis à vis du décrochage. Même en n'ayant rien touché le crash n'aurait pas eu lieu aussi vite, peut-être même pas du tout.
Personne n'a jamais compris pourquoi le copilote avait agi ainsi..... Informations erronées, Stress, etc.... Il ne fallait rien faire puisque les PItots se seraient débouchées rapidement et les instruments seraient revenus à la normale. Faute de Formation de la part d'AF et Faute d'Airbus qui avait dit que son avion ne pouvait pas décrocher. Attendons le procès en appel 1er semestre 2025, sans grosse illusion.
I’m not a pilot, but wouldn’t a reference to the GPS speed have been worth checking? I appreciate that’s ground speed, but just as a basic reference?
don't understand what you mean.
It's so upsetting with all the respect for pilots and flying in no light condition. It is hard to believe that a pilot would have difficulty understanding the situation they were in. Smh.
You're right.
Does anyone know the significance of Dubois suddenly telling everyone to look at the standby horizon? After that Robert and Dubois suddenly seem to think Bonin is "climbing" or pitching up, and he makes strong nose down inputs. What was the standby horizon showing that was different from the PFD?
Too technical for me, cant' give an answer about that.
No, the pitot tubes froze but the horizons are not dependant on the pitots. All were correct the full duration of the accident. The pilots were confused as to which indications to trust.
@@vinx3373 yes but why at that moment , that specific moment does Dubois suddenly tell them to look at the standby horizon...I can't work out what he thought he saq
Terribles les mouvements de joystick de Bonin...ils disent tout.
Quel malheur que Robert ne lui ai pas demander de lâcher le manche en continuant à descendre.
Comme vous dites ! mais les actions de l'un, ne sont pas visibles de l'autre, c'est assez ahurissant.
This guy's side stick input was all over the place but is it just me or does it look like sometimes the plane was uncontrollable? Like the plane wasn't responding to his inputs much
the pilot should not have pulled back on the control column. The data was distorted because the pitot probes were clogged. A "usual" phenomenon when crossing a turbulent zone. He shouldn't have done anything.
je viens de découvrir un ensemble de tristes détails à travers un reportage, les passagers se sont réveillés lors du décrochage, car l'hôtesse de l'air a essayé à maintes fois de contacter les pilotes. encore plus les sondes pitot ont recommencé à fonctionner correctement mais dommage à ce stade là les pilotes ont perdu toute confiance à leurs instruments. un désarroi et la confudion ont été les maitres du jeu. navré madame. aussi je ne peux reprocher à mes collègues eux aussi ne voulaient pas mourir cette nuit. et enfin je me pose tjrs une question pourquoi ils n'ont pas changé de trajectoire pour éviter l'orage car tous les vols cette nuit l'ont fais.
nizar adil beaucoup de pourquoi sans réponses 😥
Pourquoi ils n'ont pas jugé bon d'éviter le CB ?
Mais mon cher monsieur, vous avez affaire à des pilotes Air France !! Vous savez, ces mêmes pilotes qui apprennent à voler aux oiseaux....Le CDB d'Iberia et quelques autres, qui volaient dans le même périmètre cette fatidique nuit, n'avaient pas cette prétention.
Ils sont aujourd'hui toujours vivants.
Ernest, did a good analysis below. Also, I would add other significant facts.
At the moment of autopilot disconnect the aircraft encountered strong lateral gust and a slight drop in altitude, Bonin was suddenly tunneled on lateral control. The video is clear, if watched several times, only first 1.5 minute, that's all that matters.
At 0:11 the vario was at ~0ft/min, Bonin had large lateral inputs or maybe PIO (pilot induced oscillation). Also, I guess he inadvertently pulled a little. But the aircraft entered a zoom climbing > 6000 ft/min in matter of seconds. Then between 0:22 to 0:52, the side-stick command average around"0" or a slight down pitch, let's say neutral for this period of time. Any conventional aircraft will drop the nose naturally at low speed. But by design, the Airbus FBW will maintain the last commanded flight path for a pitch command around "0" or neutral axis. Therefore, the ascending flight path was kept for 30 seconds, again the pitch command was about "neutral". The aircraft entered the coffin corner and a continuously degraded state of energy. Then obviously, at 0:52, the stall warning blared in the cockpit, for real.
Now, at 1:11, the stall warning still active (that's important to mention), the THS - trimmable horizontal stabilizer (or STAB in video ) was "stabbing" them from the back. In seconds, FBW logic moved THS at max nose up position. THS is a very big command surface, with THS at max nose up, it really doesn't matter the side-stick position anymore. At 37000 ft, with all sky under them and at only 1.5 minutes after autopilot disconnect, they were doomed, that's quite clear.
Anyone that will continue trashing Bonin is just an ignorant.
I agree with your last sentence : Bonin is not responsible for this accident; the Airbus designers are!
The Airbus design philosophy is being denunciated by a former pilot named Norbert Jacquet since thirty years and precisely because of this, he has been persecuted by the French state and is now forced to live abroad!
I disagree your opinion. Bonin is definitely responsible for what had happened. He alone took all the actions, which led to the crash. If you would have left Airbus alone, most probably with some minor inputs it would have kept the flight path. There is too much to discuss. Your cruising altitude is 35000ft. He reaches after some time 37000ft and at that moment still had large lateral inputs. Robert says go back down, and he says OK but he never does. Maybe in his mind but not in his real actions. Above all when you hear STALL! there is no procedure which tells you to pull the nose up or even! keep the nose up! position. As you all know stall is not a speed problem so it is not the key if you go on full power or not. You have to reduce the angle of attack of your wings no matter what, so you go down.
It comes to me the actions of Bonin is exactly like what someone would do who has no experience in flying. If you would have put a normal passenger in that cockpit, he would also try to keep! the nose up and go on full power.
But you got point with your THS opinion. Once it is at max nose up, then there is a little to do. Use man pitch trim...
When we first learn to swim, with air bubbles stappled on each arm, our first reaction is to pull head up in the air and shake arms in water. It's an instinct, we don't want to dive. We fear lack of oxygen that is water. Later, we understand that relaxing and laying down the body, enables to stand oneself on the water -float).
I feel like Bonin experienced a similar primal fear: I don't want gravity to pull me down, I don't want to hit the ground. So I head up the plane nose, to keep it over the surface.
Under a normal brain control, he would have known he was up in the sky, known that he could dive in the air a bit in order to recover good contact on air plus momentum: to float on it There was height-room for that.
But from start to end, I feel he got frightened, nosing up to resist gravity. I don't know how pilots learning and habits win over it. I've zero experience in the air, and just suppose flying a whale like Airbus/Boeing big ones, makes you loose much perception, especially at night. You don't know where the nose is heading to vertically, you think you're flat but you're climbing, and so on. Maybe in little non-jet planes, you feel the air contact much better, can detect and recover a stall like a breeze.
Sorry for my awfull english language, still you should get the idea.
Florin M thank you so much. Glad to see people having a realistic discussion on this topic. It’s very aggravating when people cannot see past their own two feet. I think this would have been a situation that would challenge any pilot. Because we’re human! Bonin may have been the primary cause but it wasn’t just him. yet airbus and the technology companies continue to be praised. The ones who die because of their failures take the fall. Very unfair system.
If you look closely, at the beginning, before the stall occured, you can see that Bonin's actions on the stick are coordinated with the indications provided by the Flight Director (indications that were obviously not appropriate) . Bonin was just trying to follow the FD, and he focused on that instead of focusing on the other instruments and good indications provided by the other copilot. And then with the THS, FBW design and the fact that the Stall Alarm is shutting down below 60kts... Airbus philosophy turned against them. However if Bonin would have let the aircraft to the other copilot who was applying the good actions on the stick, the crash may had been avoided.
C'est tragique, et aussi pathétique de les voir à plusieurs reprises, tenter de plonger pour reprendre de la portance, mais jamais assez longtemps !
La dernière tentative a lieu à quelques centaines de mètres de l'eau.... Et il re-cabre à nouveau.
La panique des derniers moments, et l’incompréhension de la situation de départ.... Destin tragique.
I still dont get it why he pulled back on the sidestick at 15° pitch angle and a stall warning - and kept it that way???
Nobody can understand that !
The altimeter froze near the end.
+Sean Luo Yes cause after the FINAL stall warning, the computer is basically telling the pilots that it's out of options.
This accident still hits me to the core! AT 37500 FEET ! PUTTING ENGINES TO FULL POWER AND CONTINUE TO PULLS BACK ?? WHERE THE HELL ARE YOU GOING ? ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO FLY 😯😯😯😯😯
so dramatic
This doesn't tell u the whole story. At 37ft their pito tubes were closed so they had no speed reading and altitude indication. At some point bonnin reading had the plane over speeding and flying to low hence nose up to reduce speed and climb. I am not sure if u ever heard of suttle incapacitation. That's my gut feeling.
@@terryvarta9306 it was one pitot tube. Regardless, the second they heard the stall warning they should have attempted an escape maneuver. They didn't.
@@schmal911 U cant cant attempty anything when u are being told overspeed and too slow. but something is fishy about this accident
Yaaaa when the computer says 0 input, just do it. It realizes both pilots don't know what they are doing and is trying to correctly configure the plane to fly normally.
Uncontrolled situation
@@korynet92 I'm sorry this event has taken Your loved one. Things are not fair in this world. But i hope you are doing okay and living a wonderful life.
@@ZeroSpawn I try, but it's not so easy. I miss Caroline and Life is very different now. Anyway, thanks for your empathy
How many times do you have to hear stall to take action.
so incomprehensible, that there were no reactions, nor reactivity!
When he tried to recorder another warning said pull up and when he did it it said stall. It was like a loop
@@partrik4568 He was panicked and lost.
I'm sorry buy the inputs from 1:42 to 2:18 by the PF are absolutely criminal... It's totally nonsense. The airplane ASKS for taking speed and descent, you just have to push and you will regain speed and lift in a few seconds.. Just imagine how much you have to insist to pull up as he did. This is unbeliable, I just can't believe it, and I think this will remain a mistery...
No one could explain why the co-pilot did this. just incomprehensible
@@korynet92 Tout le monde est avec vous. Je sais ce que ça fait que de s'endormir le soir et se réveiller le matin pendant des années en pensant constamment à l'être perdu. Tout mon soutien le plus sincère.
@@calixtecharles merci à vous. 🙏
Le copilote qui veut sortir les aérofreins témoigne de l'incompréhension qui règne a l'avant de l'avion. J'ai régardé hier soir le documentaire sur ce crash aérien et en effet, la perte des sondes pitots qui fausse les informations concernant la vitesse est le déclanchement de toute une série d'autres problèmes. Pourtant l'action du copilote sur le manche qui consiste à reprendre de l'altitude semble normal à première vue mais paraît bizarre lorsque l'alarme de décrochage se déclenche. Les pilotes situés a l'avant de l'avion ne semble pas ressentir physiquement le décrochage mais peut-être que si un des pilotes était allé a l'arrière de l'avion (ce qui est évidemment impossible), je pense qu'il aurait clairement ressenti le décrochage a cause de l'empennage qui n'est pas conçu pour traverser verticalement l'air.
J'écrit ce commentaire en tant que passionés d'aéronautique de 16 ans mais je sais que vous en savez beaucoup plus que moi sur les causes de l'accident et je suis évidemment désolé pour vous.
Merci.
why he was getting nose up while stall ?
+18Mortus18 Very big question. Why !
+Corinne Soulas this is very sad. I dont want to think what pilots felt even when they make a mistake
+18Mortus18 Impossible to know and don't believe they had time to think of that.
i know a lot of avionics and i dont know why he pull nose up while stall.....i cant understat this....they got a lot of time for reaction, so please dont say he dont have tome to react....i cant agree with this
+18Mortus18 There is a misunderstanding.... I mean they couldn't react about their feelings at the moment. not about what they have to do. Of course they could have saved the plane with a normal reaction ! difficult to explain in english
Stall warning= NOSE DOWN, TOGA,(!) most simple thing in the world and Bonin seemed to fail that, apart from that captains joystick is NOT MECHANICALLY linked to co-pilots joystick, that is AIRBUS design fault, in BOEING control columns are MECHANICALLY linked to one another so it´s impossible to have this type of accident with Boeing aircraft, but however R.I.P all innocent victims.
Hope so.
"so it´s impossible to have this type of accident with Boeing aircraft"
Birgenair 301 ?
not sure at all
Ernest Chabert
-In the Birgenair 301 accident pilots got confusing warnings, they got both OVERSPEED and STALL warning at the same time and they got very confused, they couldn´t trust the flight computers because constant conflicting warnings including: Rudder Ratio, Mach Airspeed, Overspeed and Stall warnings at the same time.. But under NORMAL operational circumstances i think it´s impossible to have this type of an accident in a Boeing aircraft. Reason for Birgenair crash was a wasp nest inside pitotube and crew unable to recover to plane.
You say but you do not know ... If you put the throttle at the bottom you will have a couple nose up. You have to reduce then push down and after that push the thrust gently. Also on a 747 (the only one I know a bit) with a strong action on both yoke you can break the mechanism and only one yoke will work after.
Depuis l'A320, tous les airbus ont un programme qui corrige automatiquement l'assiette de l'appareil afin qu'il reste toujours dans son domaine de vol. Pourquoi le programme n'a-t-il donc pas redresser automatiquement l'airbus?
Bonjour,
Trois secondes après la déconnexion du PA, le système de l'avion est passé en mode loi alternate 2B, avec notamment la perte de la protection d'incidence. Il y a d'ailleurs un message qui s'affiche à l'ECAM : "F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)". Le pilote pouvait donc bien tenter de faire un looping, les ordinateurs ne l'ont en auraient pas empêché.
Merci de l'information. Mais pourquoi alors est-il passé en mode alternate 2B?
Mr Chabert me corrigera si je me trompe, mais l'avion passe en Alternate justement lorsque l'ordinateur note une incohérence des données en entrée, telle que la vitesse. Du coup, passage de la loi normale (avec les protection, entre autres) à une loi "Alternate".
+@Calmax Film....Cette fonction n'existe que lorsque l'assistance electronique est intacte,ce qui ne pouvait plus être le cas quand le PA s'est désengagé (plus d'indication de vitesse)
Precision, ce n'est pas la coupure du PA qui a fait passer l'avion en alternate law mais les calculateurs qui se sont basé sur un desordre dans les indications vitesses. On peut deconecter le PA et voler en loi normale bien sur.
Why did the pilots keep the nose up in the air too long and slow down which caused the stall
Why ! that's the question ! Why !!!!
@@korynet92 i'am a pilot if they would have let the joystick alone the jet would have corrected it self the a330 computers would have taken over but the co pilot was pulling back on the stick they unknowingly disabled the computer
@@SuperAgentman007 Yes I know. No one can understand what happened.
je n'oublierais jamais ce jour et je suis de tous coeur avec les familles des victimes
Je ne sais pas si vous êtes impliqué dans ce drame, mais je vous remercie pour votre empathie. Moi-même, maman de Caroline, je ne pourrais JAMAIS oublier....
@@korynet92 Mon grand père est retraité de l'aérospatial et à indirectement aidé les équipes de recherche, je me repasse souvent les différents reportages sur ce drame et cela me brise vraiment le coeur pour vous et toutes les familles de victimes j'admire votre force car moi je ne pourrais pas avoir cet force de tenir, pour moi les seules responsables son bien entendu la compagnie et non les pilotes cela est trop facile de rejeter la responsabilité sur le cockpit, donc indirectement via mon grand père je me sent très concerner et très en colère
Bien à vous.
@@bmwworld3300 Merci pour votre message. Le verdict est attendu le 17 avril. Espérons que les réquisitions des procureurs ne seront pas suivies.
@@korynet92 oui je le sais je suis ça de très près malheureusement je pense que la compagnie va s’en sortir sans problème ne faite pas confiance à la justice mais espère de tout cœur me tromper
@@bmwworld3300 effectivement, rien n’est moins sûr. Mais il y a eu tellement de rebondissements que l’on peut s’attendre à tout. 🙏
Je suis triste c’est flippant pour les familles et surtout pour les passagers et personnel de bord
la réalité est très traumatisante en effet.
Corinne Soulas bonjour corrine je regarde en ce moment même le reportage et je suis désolé de ce qui est arrivée à Caroline et son mari. Je reste sans voix
@@yonibendavid414 Merci à vous. C'est très dur de perdre son enfant. Qui plus est, dans des circonstances pareilles.
Corinne Soulas Je comprends très bien J’ai vu qu’apparemment l’accident est dû à une erreur d’appréciation des outils de mesure de vol
Et vous comment ça va aujourd’hui je veux dire depuis tout ça ?
Ça fait froid dans le dos mais l’année 2017 y’a eu 0 accident. Une première dans l’histoire de l’aviation. L’être humain apprends pour ne plus commettre d’erreurs.
Si vous pouviez dire juste........................;
Corinne Soulas bien sur c’est extrêmement triste pour toutes les victimes. Mes condoléances madame
Comment ont t’ils pu ne pas rattraper ce décrochage à 3 dans un cockpit… ? Ils devaient être drogués ou alcoolisés !
Toutes mes condoléances 💐. Pour toutes les victimes de ce vol et les pilotes.
Situation complexe qui a déstabilisé les réactions des pilotes. Le commandant de bord est arrivé trop tard pour comprendre et rectifier la situation.... 228 victimes et tant de dommages collatéraux.... 2009-2023 14 ans de procédures pour reconnaitre les responsabilités, et nouveau procès à venir suite à appel du procureur......
The pitot tubes where wrong according to my information that's why it crashed
They are indeed at the origin of the tragedy, but the pilots did not react as they should have done, other technical anomalies appeared.
Je vois beaucoup, erreur des pilotes, erreur des pilotes, stresse des pilotes, ah oui mais vous seriez pas stressé vous quand vous poussez le manche vers l'avant et que l'alarme continue à dire STALL STALL!?????? Y a de quoi rien comprendre aussi !!
Piloter n'est pas jouer avec un joystick pour faire taire une voix synthétique.
Quand l'avion est cabré, l'angle empêche une prise d'air fiable. L'ordinateur de bord n'a pas d'information cohérente et donc ne sonne pas l'alarme. Quand l'angle diminue, les paramètres redeviennent correctes et l'ordinateur sonne l'alarme. C'est au pilote de connaitre le fonctionnement de son appareil. Mais clairement l'expérience manquait aux commandes ce jour là.
This is a tragic loss Madam Soulas and I am so deeply sorry for your loss. Air France has been warned of multiple safety violations in various flights and you would hope they would take this seriously. We can't plan our destiny, albeit some might disagree. This is an airline that I actively avoid at all costs.
Thank you for your message. It is indeed a huge loss. The loss of a child remains inconsolable. Currently, the trial is ongoing. We will see at its end, who are responsible for this tragic accident.
@@korynet92 I hope Air France is held accountable. And as a fellow citizen, I will not fly them. Never have and never will.
@@amc6508 I don't think it should be generalized.
@@korynet92 That is true, but after BEA reports that came out recently with multiple safety violations, I don't feel comfortable on flying them. But yes, like with every airline, there must be some very good people working at Air France.
@@korynet92sorry to ask but were the remains if your child recovered? I have heard many bodies were never recovered along with many parts of the aircraft and are still sitting under the ocean near the waypoint Tasil where the plains debris were found. Again sorry for your loss and yes bonins actions are crazy and incomprehensible.
Thanks corrine your nice
Si seulement Bonin n'avait pas tiré comme un malade sur le manche!
Si seulement....................Hélas !
Flight yokes and a stick shaker would have gone a long way to help Robert and the Captain see that Bonin was holding the nose up in a panic much, much sooner.
Difficult to understand what happened....
They had a very loud stall warning. Stick shakers have been ignored since time immemorial.
@@peteconrad2077 We could not understand the reaction of the co-pilot
@@korynet92 he was in a state of startled shock. He hadn’t been trained to cope with this. That was the real issue. He was overloaded and could not hear or maybe interpret the stall warning or could not make the necessary action happen. In those circumstances, your promise brain takes over and it is not possible to be rational.
@@peteconrad2077 I totally agree with you. Lack of training.
Des facteurs divers sont venus entravés un appareil en parfait état de marche, c'est ca qui est terrible...Avant tout certainement une forme de dépendance et de routine à l'automatisme et de "routes" toutes tracées...Un moindre rouage, finalement quelque peu anodin, rendant des paramètres incohérents et ininterprétable à un jeune équipage manquant certainement de repos et d'inexpérience à réagir avec mesure et sérénité, et notamment aux alarmes primordiales à tous pilotes d'avertissement sonore faisant fi de tout, et d'autant un manque total de repères visuel...Je n'oublierai pas Caroline, ni les 227 autres passagers...Nous ne les oublierons pas...
Vous avez entièrement raison. Merci pour Caroline et les autres passagers. Bien à vous.
Une tragédie qui aurait pu être évitée, je suis désolé d'apprendre la disparition de votre fille Mme Soulas et suis de tout cœur avec vous.
Je vous remercie. Les années passent et pourtant, c'était hier...
Je me souviens de l’annonce de la disparition d’un avion d’air france sur BFMTV comme si c’était hier… Tout le monde espérait qu’il se soit posé sur les cotes africaines.
Je vous souhaite beaucoup de courage Mme Corinne Soulas
Par contre le copilote a vraiment été con sur ce coup ! Procédure de sortie de décrochage, on coupe la puissance, on rend le manche ou manche a piqué, on reprend de la vitesse, on effectue une ressource souple, quand la vitesse est controlée on remet la puissance. L’avion est déjà en second régime (forte inclinaison et faible vitesse) en aucun cas on ne tire sur le manche pour ne pas faire un décrochage secondaire.
A tirer le manche comme un bourrin il ne s’est jamais posé la question du plafond pratique ? Il pense qu’on peut tirer le manche aussi longtemps sur un avion sans conséquences…
Des vies perdues inutilement.
personne n'a jamais compris la réaction du pilote. On attend le second procès qui devrait avoir lieu 1er semestre 2025. Bien que je n'en attende rien, on verra si des responsabilités tripartites sont engagées. Merci pour votre message. La douleur sera présente éternellement. 🙏🙏
@@korynet92 Nous savons tous ce qui s’est passé. Ce qui me dégoûte, c’est de voir tout ce théâtre judiciaire qui a pour seul but de dédouaner le fabricant et l’exploitant pour préserver des intérêts financiers.
Lors d’un crash aérien il y a 3 niveaux de responsabilités :
1) Le constructeur
2) L’exploitant (pilotes, maintenance)
3) La météo
Faut donc pas s’étonner si dès les premières heures nous avons été baladés vers la météo, (Le « pot-au-noir ») Quand l’épave et les boites noirs n’avaient pas été retrouvées.
J’espère que vous aurez gain de cause mes si cela ne réparera votre préjudice.
@@geraldcharbonier6313 traumatisme vous voulez dire. L'issue du procès, dont je ne me fais aucune illusion, nous donnera prochainement la réponse. Mais je suis d'accord avec vos propos.
why the flight crew acted the way the did beats me they all had a part to play one more than the others sad real sad
A tragedy. So many mistakes. Prays for you and your family, Mrs. Soulas.
Many thanks.
Bonjour,
Sur la video c'est où qu'on voit le manche tirer à fond pour la faire cabrer ? J'essai de voir où? Merci!
Au milieu à droite de l'écran, il un a carré blanc PF avec un point noir qui bouge en représentant l'action du manche copilote.
What I don't understand: What happened between 02:11:00 - 02:11:33? . It's so bizzare to see how the plane is dropping like a rock out of the sky but nobody is saying anything. They're clearly agitated but at the same time there is like zero sense of urgency associated with their actions.
You gotta wonder: After like how many seconds of mindlessly following the flight directors, and the stall alarm still sounding when does that realization kick in "wait, this is stupid, I should level the wings first"?
Where the fuck was PNF in all of this? Clearly not looking at his displays, so what the fuck was he doing, what captured his attention? Maybe he was facing backwards, trying to get the captain into the cockpit but after asking "We still have the engines, do you understand what's going on?" and not getting a valid answer from his colleague twice, you'd expect him to turn around slightly, glimse at his PFD, see the plane at 20 degree nose up and then having like an "oh sh*t" moment, right? But nothing!
It doesn't make any sense at all.
The trial, which begins in October, may provide answers to all these questions.
@@korynet92 Hopefully so! After ten years of "investigating".
@@neambustastaturtv8545 hope so. Thank you
c’était un catlogue d’erreurs, à commencer par des capteurs en panne et un cockpit / systèmes / procédures / supervision laissant beaucoup à désirer. Tragique. Je vous encourage à regarder de plus amples investigations avant de sauter à la conclusion, même si le pilote aux commandes manquait aussi d'expérience. Il n'était pas formé pour faire face à la situation qui se présentait à lui.
C'est clair !
Alarme décrochage = Assiette à piquer + puissance, faut pas chercher à comprendre, c'est valable quelque soit l'avion.
Bonin s'est fait des nœuds au cerveau en voulant analyser la situation.
le stress et les mauvais indicateurs n'ont pas favorisé ses réactions, hélas.
Paix aux ames des victimes...🙏
C est un malheureux et triste accident d avion qui m a marqué.les pilotes n ont pas ressenti qu ils étaient en situation de décrochage que l avion chutait.je ne sais pas si a ce moment là l avion était toujours sur les écrans radars du Brésil je ne pense pas parce que les opérateurs de tour de contrôle auraient pu voir sur leurs écrans que l avion chutait et en avertir immédiatement les pilotes qui auraient pu peut être sauver l avion et surtout les personnes à bord 🥲
L'avion a disparu des écrans radar avant que l'on ne sache qu'un drame se jouait. 228 victimes et combien de familles meurtries ? On oublie trop souvent l'impact que cela a eu à leur égard.
Where were those pilots hired ? In the street ? 😑
difficult to understand why
@Sunamer Z there isnt just air france, there are other companies that did dangerous mistakes.
Je suis un novice en aviation... quelqu'un peut m'expliquer où sur cette animation on voit la vitesse et l'altitude à laquelle se déplace l'avion ? Merci
This was negligence beyond imagination.
beyond imagination as you said....
@@korynet92 wat i don't understand is how can a captain leave the cockpit during the most taxing part of the flight. They were about to hit bad weather. He then leaves it to the most junior pilot. When he got called back, it took him a minute to come back which in aviation is ages. Where was he then if he was supposed to be sleeping behind the crew. Air France refused to admit he was with his girlfriend wen he got called back. To think that airlines are just employing dimwits like these three makes think twice. I almost took the one that crashed on the 29th October 2018 in Indonesia. I went by boat instead to java
so many questions waiting answers... Nothing normal in this situation. I totaly agree with you. and for your trip, you were lucky.....
@Sunamer Z but still wouldn't rather have the experienced captain making the decision to change course rather than leave 2 junior pilots with no proper crew management system to decide who was to take charge. We will never know what those pilots were experiencing trully because airlines manufacturers also have a habit of blaming pilot error
He loved a bit of back pressure !!!!!
what do you mean ?
@@korynet92 Back pressure means pulling up on the sidestick
@@yassm don't understand what you mean
Shouldn't an airplane have such a visual depiction of the airplane in real time?
should be, but the screens give same information even if the visual is not the same
Jesus, what a nightmare!