Achtung Tiger! How The Allies Defeated Germany's Heavy Tank - in Italy and Beyond
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 9 май 2024
- Achtung Tiger! How The Allies Defeated Germany's Heavy Tank - in Italy and Beyond
With Peter Samsonov
Part of our Italy 1944 - Monte Cassino and Beyond series
• Monte Cassino and Beyond
Using Italy as a case study, in today's show we look at the mysteries surrounding the Tiger tank’s famed survivability. From analysing the Tiger’s formidable armor protection and distinctive characteristics, over to describing its first combat operations against Allied forces and ultimately the test trials assessing the tank's capabilities. This will be an unparalleled exploration of the Tiger, drawing on a wealth of primary sources.
Peter Samsonov is a Russian-Canadian military history author specializing in World War II-era armoured vehicles of the Soviet Union, United States and British Commonwealth. In addition to writing books and articles, he brings Russian primary documents to English-speaking audiences through the Tank Archives blog. www.tankarchives.ca/p/christo...
Buy the book at a discounted price - valid until May 11th 2024
www.lulu.com/shop/peter-samso...
You can become a RUclips Member and support us here / @ww2tv
You can become a Patron here / ww2tv
Please click subscribe for updates also "like" the video - it really helps!
Social Media links -
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
WW2TV Merchandise ww2tv.creator-spring.com/
WW2TV Bookshop - where you can purchase copies of books featured in my RUclips shows. Any book listed here comes with the personal recommendation of Paul Woodadge, the host of WW2TV. For full disclosure, if you do buy a book through a link from this page WW2TV will earn a commission.
UK - uk.bookshop.org/shop/WW2TV
USA - bookshop.org/shop/WW2TV
Patreon Brigadiers: Susan Yu, David Keahey and Tom Mullen
Become a WW2TV Brigadier and become part of this Hall of Fame
/ ww2tv 
Развлечения
For more Tank content on WW2TV ruclips.net/p/PLDG3XyxGI5lAAxI1dtlL7TKo1VTW1kWVw&si=DUzQSWCIn8pLV2yA
A good one tonight, very interesting, Peter knows his stuff. I loved all the stuff on his shelves too. Cheers woody and team and Peter.
I wonder if the use of the Tiger tank as a fire brigade tank increased it's mythology because it was a tough nut to crack (when working) but often Tigers weren't necessarily in the same sector long enough for the opposing units to really develop the skill level to feel comfortable on how to deal with a Tiger effectively and efficiently. That and the Tiger being on the defensive probably gave it the advantage of being able to see its target first which a lot of the time is a deciding factor in tank combat.
Peter is becoming a favourite of mine in the tanky community
What a fascinating talk! Thank you Peter and thank you very much Paul for hosting this deep dive.
God show Paul and Peter! Like the nitty gritty detail on this issue.
I’m usually not as interested in tech details except maybe in small arms but the most telling statistic of the Tiger in my opinion is that 1300 and change Tiger l’s and 500 Tiger II’s were produced over the entirety of the war. In that time period nearly 50,000 Shermans and 57,000 T34’s were produced. Even if the Tigers were somewhat more capable vehicles the differences in production numbers is staggering.
This is another fascinating episode which leaves the burning question unanswered, “How many innocent British nuns were mistaken for Fallschirmjager and shot by Dad’s Army?”
It is not entirely correct to compare a specialized heavy tank and medium tanks. During the entire war, the Germans produced 8696 Pz IV, 5574 Pz III, 5500+ Pz V Panthers. If we also take into account the Stug III assault guns, which were often used as tanks since 1943 and more than 10,000 of them were produced, then in total we get almost 30,000 units of armored vehicles, comparable in quality to the Shermans and T-34s. 30,000 is not so much (in comparing to Allies) but let's not forget that the Germans had a shortage of fuel, steel and other things for the production and maintenance of tanks. Bombing also had an impact
Opportunity cost question; if they’d built more Panzer IV (or Panther) with the materials and labor used for Panzer VI, would they have been better off?
@@dexterscott7824 no they wouldnt, Germany couldnt afford to lose men and material as the Allies did, if you dont have raw resource and manpower advantage going for quantity is nonsnse...also as ppl mentioned, lack of fuel.
Germany already back in 42 had tons of tanks that were in storages because if they sent all of them to the front there would be no fuel to run those.
Also a Panther was not even 30 % harder to produce than a Panzer 4, in fact the Late war Sherman after all the Upgrades was closing on the cost of the Panther while still being easy to penetrate from all sides by Guns Germany had as standard issue back in late 42.
Your not accounting for Stug. Germany used stug more than tigers bc the cost to produce a turret less tank killer was way cheaper and faster than building tigers. When they went defensive the stug was also more suited for that kind of battle.
Tiger is specialized vehicle for hevy companies leading the way when facing heavy anti tank fronts and as a counter breach vehicle, ofc its numbers are small compared to a main tank of either Allied Nations with stly bigger production capacity.
Also Both Sherman and T-34 were produced through the whole war , Tiger ones production lasted only 2 and KTs a year and few months in the worst part of the war for German production.
Apples and oranges.
Germany produced over 30 k AFV (Tanks and TDs/assault guns) with Stug, panzer 4, panzer3 and Panther being the most numerous.
For me, the most interesting themes in World War II are the Western Desert, Tunisia, Italy and a little bit of Normandy. And in 70% of books on the topics of these campaigns, I constantly see 2 clichés: “The 2-pdr gun was terrible garbage” and “At that moment (!!!) a Tiger appeared on the battlefield, which was superior to any Allied tank” (at this moment everyone will be scared ). I don't want to accuse anyone of plagiarism, but...)
Woody/Peter, I never thought that presentation with photographs or maps could be so interesting. Thanks, Bob
One of the most interesting books I have concerning the Tiger E is Repairing the Tigers. I got interested because here was this massive vehicle in the Soviet Union that is bogged down on primitive dirt roads, so how did they do it? It not only includes actual extractions and repairs in Hide repair shops, what they could repair and what had to be shipped back to Germany, but also the training of how to get Tigers unstuck by its own crew.
Reading the book Tank Destroyer which starts out with the makeshift 75mm guns mounted on a halftrack, and ends in NW Europe, is told in first person interviews only. When they got their M10s with the 3 inch gun, based on a naval gun, and landed at Anzio, the crews learned how to destroy Tigers and the one rule to avoid was not go head to head with a Tiger but to ambush them from the sides. The key was to spot the Tiger soon enough to get into ambush positions. They may have respected the Tiger but they did not fear it. Of course, in Normandy, the Americans did not run into Tigers until months after Normandy but they used those same techniques on the Panther, and they paid off when Panzer Lehr around St. Lo.
Also, there were not many GIs who knew the different tanks like we do today, and they called everything a Tiger. It is amazing how much a Panzer 4 with side skirts does look like a Tiger, even up close.
Germany always seemed to tend to over-engineer their equipment. One only need to look at modern German cars such as the BMW, Volkswagen, etc. I work in the car parts industry and can verify that this is a fact. The Tiger was such an example, as were the Panther and the various tank killer variants as well. Too complex for what they were worth. Should have concentrated on the Mark IV and improved on it instead. Interesting talk.
Another excellent presentation- thank you!👍
Tigers main advantage was not its armor but the range of its main gun and it had the best optical sighting system and rangefinder of then war that gave it a superior stand off capability.
A modest advantage; other countries' sights while not as technically good, were perfectly capable of hitting the target at the typical ranges.
Besides, the Tiger's original mission was as a breakthrough tank in the old-school fashion, as the tip of a panzer spear (similar to the doctrine for KV-1s). As the tip of that spear, its ability to fight at range is not important. But because after Kursk (where they were the spear point of the advance) there's few opportunities to use the Tiger I that way, so they were used defensively (where range could be more important).
@@stewartmillen7708The Tiger’s mass, fuel consumption & lousy drivetrain limited its capabilities as a “breakthrough tank” pretty heavily. As a mobile defensive fortification, on the other hand, it was pretty useful.
@@GrahamCStrouse Maybe so, but that was its intended usage. And indeed, that is the way Tigers were used at Kursk, which is why so many were 'lost' (mostly due to repairable damage) in the Kursk offensive, due to minefields and anti-tank defenses, as the 'spear point' of the German advance flanked by medium tanks. By Prokhorovka, only 15 or 16 of the 503rd's (I believe) Tigers were still working, because of such damage and breakdowns.
Incidentally, the doctrine for using KV-1s was similar on the Soviet side.
In late war, the offensive role for heavy 'breakthrough' tanks changed. Instead of them being a the tip of the armored spear, so to speak, the doctrine was to hold them well back from the action as mobile long-rain guns, at ranges where their armor would be close to impervious against counter-fire, supporting advances by medium tanks and with their flanks protected. While I don't think Tiger IIs had many such opportunities to used as breakthrough tanks this way, often Soviet rifle corps and divisions understandably mis-used IS-2 tanks by using them in the same way they previously had used KVs--as battering rams, in opposition to the new doctrine. This was the cause of most IS-2 losses.
Great stuff! I do enjoy tank tech talk, and Peter is one of the best. Added his latest book to the others on my shelf
Very interesting video.. but the biggest issue the allies had was having the right weapon in the right place to kill the Tiger, in the earlier years of the war.. this was very tricky... late war not so much
Hi from New Zealand, my dad said they used to fire smoke at the tigers it made then retreat as the smoke overwhelmed their extractor fans in the turret
Was it a Tiger or Just over excited Tank rookies spotting a Panzer IV ?
If you're a green trooper, it was Tigers all the way down.
The post war German tank mythos that impacted nato nations might be largely attributed to the son of Hans Guderians son, Heinz who was the Inspector General of Panzer troops in the German Bundeswehr in Nato. His conferences had to be quite interesting to say the least.
I got their first names reversed.
I really enjoyed Peters presentation extremely informative, thank you Peter and Woody. I always think the Germans over engineered their equipment. Great to be back after a vacation, loads of shows to catch up. Bring Peter back if you can
Thanks Peter & Paul für those technical insights.
And it always comes down to infantry and artillery to win.
I have a theory that Belton Cooper had little to do with the final product that was ‘Deathtraps’. His Editor was a maker of Board Game rule books named Michael Bennighof.
Bennighof has a blog that promotes his company where he writes about History and how his game manuals reflect his understanding of history. He signs off on all his posts with: Michael Bennighof, PhD and ‘NASA Journalist in Space Finalist’.
There’s a problem. There are lists on the internet with the names on this list. His ain’t there.
I could go on for hours about the reality of Cooper/Bennighof’s work. In a nutshell- a lot of that shit is so fabulous that hard core combat veterans would be hard pressed to top it.
It reads like Forrest Gump-Cooper always seemed to be at the center of events.
Did I miss this? Time 14:19 CST (USA) now. Thanks, Woody. Thanks, Peter.
Interesting show.
Great vid. I always think of Kursk as the battle for which the Tiger was designed, and recent accounts of that battle suggest it very nearly fulfilled the ambitions the Germans had for it. One other point about German tank production worth keeping in mind is Germany's fuel situation--after mid-43 the Germans were always running short of fuel. Even when they upped production of tanks in late 1944 they had no gas to put in them. So the answer for the Germans was never just "build more tanks" or "standardize on one or two designs."
Great chat fellows but you guys are looking at it from the big picture but if you were one of the people who were on the end of seeing a tiger ace destroying whole columns that would be talked about
RIP Capt Douglas Norton RA died on 15/05/1944, 14 anti tank regiment, and is buried at Monte Cassino cemetery. Fought for King and country as British subject ….but his sisters would lose their nationality later due tovacts of parliament. As would he if he have lived. His brother, a paratrooper officer died in the Tunisian campaign. Both Not forgotten by their Portuguese and British family
Oddball: It’s a wasted trip babe. Nobody said anything about locking horn with Tigers.
Kelly: You just keep those Tigers busy and we’ll take care of the rest.
Oddball: The only way I got to keep those Tigers busy is to let them shoot holes in me.
A good all around discussion on WW2 Armour used in Europe/ North Africa. I would like to get more about the comment made stating German Steel Armour plater quality deteriorated and how that affected the effectiveness of German Armour at end of War.
German tank recovery and repair units accompanied their tank companies into combat. They were not rear echelon units.
Great show?
❤
Peter's Internet is crap . He is losing data packets in transmission. Its got some upload faults on his link
Yep, not the best
ExCellent comment re NATO!!!
I really like the deep dives with the experts on this channel and I am a subscriber. However, I really hate the rotten audio and video that a lot your guests put out. The glitches in this video made it unwatchable and it's not the first time that's happened. If you want to get to the big time these technical difficulties must me minimized. Carry on.
If you want that, frankly go elsewhere. The best thing about live shows is the interaction, but sometimes the Internet plays up
How can the Tigers not be a threat.... maybe if your not in another tank being tasked to kill it.... Yes not every tank was a Tiger, but I guarantee any allied tanker knowing they had to try and take it out would be shitting bricks.. it had a very good gun, and excellent range and optics... and it was not until late in the war the Allies has enough of the larger calibre guns required to take them out at range,
Yes any tank is a threat but when preparing to deal with it you must ask how much of a threat is it. Everything is evaluated, rated on a scale because priorities must be set since there are not infinite resources. Was the Tiger "the threat" that many thought? During the war analysis and post-war analysis determined that due to lack of numbers, lack of reliability and hence lack of availability the "OMG its a Tiger and we are all doomed" threat is and was not there. The gun range, optics are of no use if are unable to field them reliably in numbers on the battlefield. Therefore there is no need to radically alter your tank force with the production of bigger tanks, with bigger guns to counter a "threat" that really wasn't there. Yes, I know the Allies built bigger tanks with bigger guns but there were improvements in all weapons systems throughout the war. You always desire to outgun your enemy if possible. Panther tanks with there high velocity 75mm could make short work of a Sherman, however my father's regiment with old 75mm Shermans made short work of many Panthers and Mk IVs. The Sherman was faster, more maneuverable with a faster rate of fire. As stated in this presentation, the reliability and availability of the Tiger tank was horribly lacking and the Panther was not much better.
The same can be said for the German jet, the Me262, innovative, fast and deadly WHEN it could fly. Many times they had to change engines after every flight and only a few pilots lived long enough to master it and become proficient with it, IF one was available to fly. Were they a threat - yes. Do you stop the production of P-51s and P-47s and put all your efforts in the production of equal or better aircraft? The answer is NO, you learn how to deal with the new threat with the weapon systems you have on hand. Go online and watch the USAF gun camera films of P51s and P47s shooting down ME262s.
@@PaulScott_ yep... You know most ME262s were either lost on the ground, or when trying to land or take off.... All I'm saying is, yes it was a threat, especially to tank crews.. if you have to get within 500 yards or less to knock it out with your 75mm gun... Then that's not great. Eastern front, great tank... On the western front or Italy where it doesn't have the range to use... Not so great.
Answer is very simple, in the same way all other German weapons and armed forces were defeated. With overwhelming supplies and logistics. The German economy was vastly outperformed and thoroughly destroyed. It wasn't a war Germany could win, with or without superior weapons. Those weapons were possibly making a difference in the length of the war but even this is questionable. I'd say the ability to keep production up with hidden production lines and not to forget huge numbers of slave labour had a bigger impact on the duration of the war than the quality of the weapons. But for weapon nerds that's rather boring.
The Allies had 'overwhelming numbers' only because of Nazi mismanagement of the German economy, not mobilizing quickly and not poor overall direction of the war economy. The Germans outproduced the Soviets in steel but the Soviets use their steel to make far more weapons. While the Soviets focused on simplifying production to mass-produce a relatively few designs (and also, when a better design was approved, quickly shifted from producing the obsoleted design to the new one) the Germans simultaneously produced multiple tanks and SP guns at the same time, old designs and new ones alike. Like, how many German TDs and SP guns were being produced at the same time, while the Soviets only produced the SU-76 light, the SU-85 (upgraded to the SU-100) , and the SU-152 (upgraded to the ISU-152/ISU-122).
@@stewartmillen7708 The Allies had overwhelming numbers in everything, that includes personnel and fuel. Even if Germany would have concentrated on fewer models or earlier total war economy they wouldn't have stand a chance in the longer run. There wasn't enough personnel to man additional equipment, there wasn't enough fuel and other resources to equip those vehicles. It also would have led to inferior quality or capabilities and in return bigger losses in men and material which then had to be replaced again.
And there are a few reasons why so many different models existed. As an example, the tanks produced in Czechia, it was simply more economically feasible to keep production of the Pz38(t) and later its chassis for Marder and Hetzer tank destroyers than swapping to German models, because the tools and supply chain (engines, etc.) were already there. Swapping would have caused interruptions. Regarding steel production, Germany might have out produced the Soviets but that doesn't take into account the vast amounts of steel delivered by the US and the British empire. The only chance Germany had was to cut the naval lifelines from the US to Britain and the SU. But Germany never had enough submarines to do so. Again it was out-produced by the Allies producing more tonnage than Germany was able to sink.
@@wanderschlosser1857 One, in the campaigns they won, the Germans didn't face 'overwhelming numbers'--they had a 2:1 manpower advantage against the Poles, plus superiority in everything else, they had slightly better than parity against the Norwegians and Allies in 1940, they had about parity in France and a almost a 2:1 superiority in planes, and against the Soviets they enjoyed a numerical advantage in manpower until the end of 1941 and after that, a possible numerical advantage in hardware.
It's true that after 1941, they were outnumbered in Russia but not decisively-about a 1.6:1 to mid-1943, hardly 'overwhelming'. After that, it grew to a 2:1 + advantage until 1945. An aphorism in warfare is that a 3:1 force ratio is necessary to win an offensive victory, and since most people making your argument also stridently claim that the Germans were the best in tactics and (usually) hardware, it seems hard to fathom why defeat was so certain.
Oil was a vital factor, I have to agree. But the biggest reason why German lost is the Nazi leadership, whose war aims were driven by ideology instead of sober assessment, and who mismanaged the economy and Germany's resources. Because of Hitler's tendency to divide up power between subordinates, there was too-much overlapping spheres, too many turf wars, unclear lines of responsibility, and too much self-seeking by everyone (which Hitler encouraged as his attitude was 'let them fight it out between themselves and let 'the strongest' come out the winner).
And, I might add---wasn't the Holocaust itself a massive waste of resources? Yet trains carrying Jews to the death camps had priority over those of the German army. How can that be anything else but a massive waste of resources?
@@stewartmillen7708 this revisionism is tiring, the only part correct was in regards to the polish Campaign, everything else you cherrypicked.
Norway was a spectacular win right in front of RN noses, then the most powerful Navy at least in the Atlantic, if not the world. Campaign lasted 2 months with parity in loses that should have ended in a German defeat considering it was a naval invasion. Imo this campaign is even more impressive than the Fall of France.
Fall of Franc/low countries
France and the Allies in the west had roughly the same amount of men (Axis technically had more by counting additional 300 k italians which did nothing),the Maginot line, almost double the tanks, almost double the guns/arty.
The only part Germany had a quantitative/material advantage was the Airforce (almost two to one)that should have been nullified by French forts and fighting a defensive war from prepared positions.
And yet Germany won in just 40 days
"and against the Soviets they enjoyed a numerical advantage in manpower until the end of 1941"
lol what kind of "numerical advantage", the Reds had vastly more planes arty and practically everything,...
The idea Germany (correction the Axis) had numerical advantage at the start of Barbarossa is again done by cherrypicking info and counting only the utmost frontline Soveit troops while ignoring the support ones and all of the mobilized during the Campaign, while counting literally everything walking on the Axis side.
The only reason the Red army didnt become a juggernaut in numbers of troops in 41 was because the Axis were obliterating entire Soviet armies in literal millions and the USSRs mobilization barely kept up with the losses until after 41. You cant lose 3 million just as POWs and 20 k tanks in mere months without having a numerical advantage bud.
@@DD-qw4fz "this revisionism is tiring,"
The only 'revisionism' at work is the "Germans were the best" Cold War revisionism done post-WWII that exalted German arms. The Allies actually fighting the war weren't always awed by German weaponry or leadership. Even when they acknowledged that what the Germans were doing was technologically novel (like the Me-262) the attitude exhibited in the documentation was "but we can still fight them and win" which they did.
"Norway was a spectacular win right in front of RN noses, then the most powerful Navy at least in the Atlantic, if not the world. Campaign lasted 2 months with parity in loses that should have ended in a German defeat considering it was a naval invasion. Imo this campaign is even more impressive than the Fall of France."
Overcoming an enemy who doesn't have much in the way (if any) of an air force or tank arm or even ANTI-AIRCRAFT guns is "impressive"? Whoa.
The victory in Norway was solely due to the fact the Germans had hardware, and the bulk of their opponents (the Norwegians) didn't, and also that the Germans achieved near-complete *operational* surprise.
"Fall of Franc/low countries France and the Allies in the west had roughly the same amount of men (Axis technically had more by counting additional 300 k italians which did nothing)"
Did 'nothing' but tied down 150,000 French troops in southern France, you mean.
",the Maginot line, almost double the tanks"
Yep, the bulk of which were obsolete, like in Soviet Russia in 1941. Yep, you have some Char B1s standing up to anything the Germans could hit them with, like KV-1s in 1941, but neither the numbers or the organization nor doctrine to make them decisive.
"almost double the guns/arty. The only part Germany had a quantitative/material advantage was the Airforce (almost two to one)that should have been nullified by French forts and fighting a defensive war from prepared positions. And yet Germany won in just 40 days"
The Maginot Line nullifies an air force? Was the Luftwaffe really focused on Maginot line (answer is 'no').
You've left out the salient fact of the France 1940 campaign--that the Allied command made a fatal operational blunder. It is that, more than any German prowess, that lost the Battle of France. Like in chess, even a better player can lose to an inferior one if he/she blunders away his/her queen, and it's questionable if the Allies were the better player.
"and against the Soviets they enjoyed a numerical advantage in manpower until the end of 1941" lol what kind of "numerical advantage",
I suggest you take a peek at Glantz's figures. I could dig up a graph that shows you this fact, but RUclips doesn't allow hyperlinks in their comments. The Soviets were outnumbered by the Germans until the very end of 1941. The great German victories in the summer/fall of 1941 were achieved against a numerically inferior foe. And at the end of 1941, when the Soviets pull even or slightly ahead, by that time the Germans probably had superior numbers of hardware like tanks and planes.
"the Reds had vastly more planes arty and practically everything,... "
Operationally, probably not true, if talking about non-obsolete equipment. Even less true when one includes the logistical support for even modern equipment. (Like some KV-1s, unquestionably a modern tank at the time, were force to try to flatten German AT guns with their tracks, as they had NO AMMUNITION WHATSOEVER for their main gun).
And then there's that 'sneak attack' bit. By analogy, the Japanese navy was better than the US Navy because just look at what they did at Pearl Harbor!!
"The idea Germany (correction the Axis) had numerical advantage at the start of Barbarossa is again done by cherrypicking info and counting only the utmost frontline Soveit troops while ignoring the support ones and all of the mobilized during the Campaign, while counting literally everything walking on the Axis side."
It's counting the number of men in uniform at any given time for the whole theater.
If you're protesting that the Soviets could draft millions of men more--fine, ok, then also count future Axis mobilization manpower, right?? Didn't the Germans and other Axis partners always draft millions of men more? But you want to only count CURRENT German manpower against any FUTURE Soviet manpower. Talk about 'cherrypicking' the numbers!!
The point is, that armies can't fight battles with future mobilization. They have to fight them with the men they have in uniform at any given time. The Soviet command had fewer men to fight their battles in 1941 at any given time than did the Germans. Given time, the Norwegians might have been able to put up a much stiffer fight against the Germans if given enough time to mobilize their whole manpower. The French undoubtedly could have as well.
AND, I should remind you--those battles of 1941 denied the USSR much of its manpower, as well as much of its industrial capacity as well as raw materials. All that passed into German hands in 1941. PLUS the Germans had most of Europe occupied and its resources and population. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the Germans had about 150 million people in occupied Europe, contrasted to 200 million in the USSR. Moreover, since German-occupied Europe was more industrially and technologically advanced than the USSR, that means that a larger fraction of that 150 million population could be mobilized too. To drive this point home, the Pentagon calculated shortly after WWII that Western Europe by itself would have a larger population base and industrial capacity than the USSR and its Warsaw pact allies, and thus would have the military advantage in a future conflict.
In 1942, the Germans had the advantage in potential manpower too, in the areas they controlled versus the USSR (238 million to 120 million). So--why didn't the Germans use this sizable advantage? Well, they were too busy mistreating about 50 % of the 'non-Aryan' occupied population, with plans to murder about 25 % of the rest. That's why. Oh, I'll concede that they used some of them as essentially SLAVES, working them until death, while German businesses profited off that labor.
Finally, going back to equipping armies--James Dunnigan and Al Nofi, I believe, showed how it could have been possible for the Wehrmacht to have seized enough trucks and other transport in occupied Europe to have completely motorized some 36 German infantry divisions. Assuming that they had the petrol to fuel these (maybe questionable, but then again those trucks were being driven around Europe burning petrol during the same time frame) this might have resulted in an overwhelming Wehrmacht advantage. So why didn't the Germans do something like this? It's what you get you don't have any clear lines of organization/control in war mobilization because Hitler prefers that everyone duke it out organizationally between each other, and in addition most of those in charge are Nazi incompetents who think that things like the eye and hair color and nose features of one's soldiers are more important qualities in war than what you equip them with. That's why.
"The only reason the Red army didnt become a juggernaut in numbers of troops in 41 was because the Axis were obliterating entire Soviet armies in literal millions and the USSRs mobilization barely kept up with the losses until after 41. You cant lose 3 million just as POWs and 20 k tanks in mere months without having a numerical advantage bud."
That's due to both something called "preparation" and "resolve" on the Soviet side.
And actually, factually, the USSR's mobilization didn't keep up with the 1941 losses. Red Army strength fell until November 1941. The mobilization was important, but it really didn't fill the manpower needs until the Battle of Moscow was won. Moreover, you can't just throw divisions of conscripts, ill-trained and without much in the way of weaponry, into battle and have them be worth much as military units.
There is an incredible story here. That is all about the Soviet survival. Victim of a sneak attack, caught in a state of military unpreparedness, at the very time their armed forces were in the midst of a re-organization, the Soviet command was able to survive the attack and recover. They were able to move much of their industrial plant and re-site it to the relative safety of the Urals to begin the production of weapons that would prove good enough, and in some cases 'best in the world' quality, to win despite having fewer raw materials. Lend-Lease later did help with some of that, true.
I would say more important than the potential manpower reserve for the Soviets was *space*--even though they didn't plan or want to trade space for time and survival, they essentially were forced to do so. France lacked that kind of strategic depth.
But then again, that's the problem with invading the USSR isn't it? One is punching into space; space that eats up armies and extends frontages to paper-thin lines. Wiser heads than the Nazi leadership (and, no, it's just not Hitler) knew this problem. It's not just Russia; the reason why George Marshal and the US military leadership decided on the 'island hopping' strategy against Japan and against involvement in a land war against China was that they knew that China too, being a large country, would 'eat' up armies due to the huge frontages required. Marshall had decided that Germany should be the focus of the US's ground war commitment, and didn't need a theater that consumed bodies just to fill space like China.
(Although the Pacific War, even as it played out, ate up a huge fraction of manpower on all sides just due to the logistical requirements).