i used to do this as well, but the longer videos have so much value in them its worth extending my poor brain, also sometimes i have to listen to them multiple times and thats when you get alot more out of it.
I remember when I saw Trents title and video the first time and thinking "Imagine if an atheist youtuber was equally as uncharitable, and said Theists cannot blame atheists for anything due to problems with foreknowledge (ignoring or dismissing views like molinism or simple foreknowledge)". Im glad you pointed this out in your video.
Good point but an important distinction is that many atheists will admit their view entails determinism. Whereas nearly every single Christian including Calvinists will still try to argue their view entails free will. They may have inconsistent claims in squaring this with divine foreknowledge and predestination, but it’s still important that they all argue for it.
@@bman5257 Many atheists believe determinism is true, but that doesn't mean they think that atheism entails determinism. Your point still applies either way and I agree with it but I figured I would make that correction.
@@hello-cn5nh this account left a likeless comment from 4 months ago (which I had never even seen before now) on my several-years-old video discussion between Koons and Oppy. The comment reads “45:00 moment of silence…😁”. This is an utterly inexplicable comment if this were an alternative account. You are deeply hurt; and if you continue spreading lies about me, your account will get banned (though you might just use an alternate going forward!)
@@MajestyofReason Hello Joe, do you have any video on Alvin Plantinga's EAAN? It seems pretty air tight to me Could you do a video on in pretty please?
I think this argument works only if we have an erroneous view about God and his relation to time, or time in general. Infallible comprehensive foreknowledge follows from Gods omniscience. Omniscience is often defined as knowing all true propositions. God’s relation to time is fundamentally different from ours. Boethius defines eternity as a possession of life, a possession simultaneously entire and perfect, which has no end. Similar modern definitions could be found among B theory of time. God's knowledge of events cannot really be called foreknowledge at all, because He doesn't seal the future rather He is aware of actions we freely do. What do you think about this counter argument based on different theories of time and what do you think would be best a counter argument?
I think the problem comes when to say God “knew” something in the past. God does not experience time, therefore he cannot have known somethinf “before” it happened. For God, everything happened all at once, in one eternal now per se. Since God allows us to experience time, there is no contradiction between us making a choice in time and God, being outside of time, always knowing we would do so, since God experiences all of time at once.
If you are not the sole cause of absolutely everything other than yourself, yes, knowledge would not abrogate freedom. If you are, however, then all "free choices" which were known to you are your direct responsibility, because none of them would have happened had you chosen not to create.
@Uryvichk doesnt matter whether you are the sole cause. there just has to be leeway freedom. There's no contradiction between knowing the future or being the prime mover and leeway freedom. end of story.
@@robertsaget9697 Saying "there just has to be leeway freedom" shows you've already made up your mind, you simply wish to believe it. If knowledge doesn't abrogate freedom, then I don't see how anything else does.
@@itsyaboidaniel2919 How does knowledge abrogate leeway freedom? Show the contradiction. Just asserting that it somehow does isn't an argument or anything to take seriously.
@@robertsaget9697 It's simple, perfect knowledge of someone's actions makes the actions predetermined, and thus not free. Also, just asserting it doesn't also isn't an argument.
Wonderful video. Shows reliably how freedom is incompatible with perfect foreknowledge, because if it can't be helped, then how free is it? It somewhat reminds me of what Stephen Woodford (Rationality Rules) said which I'll paraphrase by saying the universe is either random (we can't control random) or not random (we can't control not random), which then extends to our choices, and there isn't any room for the "free" option because we have no control over our inner mechanisms in either case.
Define “no control” If individual who is raped for ten years then goes out to rape an individual of their own Where they free or had “no control/choice” but to rape someone?
Argument fails on premise 4. “entails” in premise 4 is misleading. It is used to introduce a dependency from “foreknowledge” to “raise my hand action”, or the dependency only exists the other way around: God knows because I (will) raise my hand. I do not raise my hand because God knows I will do it.
_"God knows because I (will) raise my hand. I do not raise my hand because God knows I will do it."_ The dependency _must_ exist in both directions, otherwise all of the conditions aren't met. If I am going to do X, then God knows I will do (X) If (X) then k(X) If God knows I will do X, then I am going to do (X) If k(X) then (X) Which gets us (X) k(X) If the first condition isn't true, then you simply have a God that isn't omniscient as there is some possible (X) that God doesn't know. If the second condition isn't true then God's knowledge isn't infallible.
But what if God is a passive observer of what you did when you were free? Sure this god may not intervene at all, but it seems reasonable that a person's free actions could be recorded and God could go back in time with the knowledge of them. Such is the advantage of not being in the same time line.
Here’s another way to argue against theistic free will; If someone was determined to prove God wrong, they could ask God “what will I make for dinner tomorrow” and plan on doing the opposite of what God says. In this situation, if God doesn’t have will over the future, then that means God cannot respond to the man without a paradox happening. So, an omniscient being must either be limited in communication, or have providence over the future.
God, being outside of time, already has free will in consideration of his foreknowledge. If God says something will occur, then He already knows this to be true on account of his timelessness. If He chooses to remain silent, He does so in relation to His sovereign will, not out of fear of paradox (or whatever you’re implying). Pretty simple stuff
@@no3339 So, your saying God can be wrong? Because if he can say whatever he wants, then he could tell the hypothetical person what they will do in the future, and they won’t do it.
@@no3339 so if God were to tell this hypothetical person what they will do in the future, and they wanted to prove Hod wrong, they wouldn’t be able to prove God wrong. This could only be possible if God had full control over future events.
Ya I'm a Open Theist, I would say mankind has Limited Free Will and God has Present Tense Foreknowledge NOT Exhaustive Foreknowledge of Future Contingents
Can God's plans fail? It seems that, as an Open Theist, you are committed to the possibility that one of the unknown future contingents God lacks foreknowledge of to be an outcome resulting in the failure of God's plans (for salvation, or anything else really) based on the free choices of rational agents.
@@Uryvichk I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel.... But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God. God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God. GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
@Uryvichk I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel.... But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God. God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God. GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel.... But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God. God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God. GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
This argument is excellent, if P1 is true. I think even Molinism is incapable of getting past this, while still affirming freedom. However, I deny premise 1, and recommend other theists do too, in favor of models of God that do not include exhaustive foreknowledge. The issue that we could know something God doesn't seems to me to be a non-issue twice over. In the first place there are various models of God that already have this consequence (such as when people deny omnisubjectivity, so God doesn't know how it feels to lust, but your mom does...I kid, I kid). But, more importantly, I only know what I am going to do under certain conditions in which God could very well also know what I will do (as could an experienced psychiatrist who has been working with me for years). If I have a strong inclination or addiction, or if I am resolutely determined to accomplish something, then I know I will do it and God could know on a similar basis. But, no such basis could exist before I was born, or before I developed the addiction/inclination/determination in question.
I like the mom joke🤣 Thanks for the comment. I definitely think the sub-argument for P1 need a *lot* more work if they are to succeed, and in particular they need to address the respectable concerns you raise🙂
Hi joe, I am Mohammed Saif and I am a agnostic, why does diversity in religious experience considered a defeater, but not in ethics and political philosophy because these areas also bottom out in seemings and intuition which are also diverse among people?
Forgive me if I'm wrong or being ignorant of the argumentation, but if someone raised their hand at t, is it not because they wanted to? In that moment if in a possible world they chose not to raise their hand, this also would have been divinely foreknown by God. The only separating factor in each of these possible worlds seems to be the hand-raisers will; if in this moment the person is not being forced against their will to raise their arm - God's foreknowledge and man's will are in harmony. In my view (Molinism), God creates the world with the foreknowledge of every free-willed choice every person will make in every situation; crafting the circumstances such that his will is done ultimately through this leeway freedom. Premises 6 and 7 seem to be so punchy because you're right in that you're powerless to prevent what you have chosen to do by your own will. Please let me know if I'm missing something.
@MajestyofReason Ah, I see. As long as premise 4 holds, the argument is valid. I guess my next idea would be to question the, indeed, very plausible idea, that the past is fixed. If God really is timeless, then it could be the case that I'm not powerless to prevent what God believed in the past. I definitely don't know as much as you do, so I'm just throwing rudimentary ideas. Great video though 👌 with quite an interesting ending
@@franciscofont2194 thank you, and it’s wonderful you’re reflecting on these things!! If you’re curious to delve deeper, check out the discussion on Capturing Christianity between Taylor Cyr and Philip Swenson🙂❤️
The whole contradiction arises by accepting the assumption that been a perfect being entails having to know everything at all times. Bestowing privacy of intent upon the leaving beings is an attribute of devine freedom and supremacy. If that is true, the argument presented in this clip breaks a part. And theist as well as atheist would have moral responsibility from a monotheistic theological perspective.
I'd like to see this problem addressed from a Mormon perspective. Mormonism differs from standard Christianity in many ways. For one, Mormons believe in multiple gods. They believe that as a parent can have a child after their own image, so too can a god have a child in its own image. This child can develop, given proper guidance, into maturity, becoming a fully-fledged god with all the power, knowledge, and responsibility of one. It can then have children of its own, who can also develop into gods with the same reproductive and developmental capability. What's disputed is the extent of the omniscience of these gods. I had a conversation with my dad yesterday, and we came to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge consisted of an intimate familiarity with each of his children, and that he would know under any situation how we would act. Not a complete and perfect knowledge of everything.
Dependence solution solves this issue. Tho it opens new problems about whether does God know what hes going to do and does he have freedom to do otherwise, also separately it exacerbates the problem of evil, etc. Much simpler to just accept open theism..
(I acknowledge that you said there are counters, and counters to those counters, etc., but I want to write my counter here.) This argument seems to be based on a misunderstanding or lack of consideration of what/who God is. God, depending on the definition/reality, is a being which is outside of time. This is the common understanding. So when you make a premise that says "... then God believed long before I existed...", it doesn't make sense. *You* exist in time, but God cannot "believe before" a certain time or event because he is not in the realm of time. His knowledge is also outside of time. In normal speech we do indeed call it as knowing "before", but it's inaccurate when we're referring to a being outside of time. I guess what I'm trying to say is: If God is defined as a being that is not bounded by time, then we necessarily cannot accurately apply logic which relates to the temporality of God.
How God knowing that something will happen means that agents do not cause things. I don't think 3 necessary follows because of this. God knows all outcomes regardless of what plays out so agents are not restricted by foreknowledge.
can you do a short video on deliberation incompatibalism? Or the idea that it impossible or unreasonable to deliberate on what to do while believing that everything is predetermined
@@MajestyofReasonHi Joe: ¿ Would you be kind enough to explain to us how theistic philosophers (like Enric F. Gel) support the idea that if theism is true, there must be such a thing as "divine judgment"? ¿ What do you understand by "divine judgment" and what scenarios can be expected if that proposition were true? ¿ Why should a god judge not only the actions, but also the beliefs of finite and limited creatures? Finally, regarding discussions about the fundamental nature of reality: ¿ Is Believing different from Knowing? ¿ Can you believe that a proposition is true and know that it is true? ¿ If our biases and experiences influence our beliefs and apparent certainties (or de facto certainties) which then influence our actions, is "divine judgment" fair?
I’m not convinced by this argument because there’s no such thing as “preventing a fact”. It’s logically impossible (since it would mean bringing it about that a fact is not the case, which makes no sense). I can’t prevent the _fact_ that I will raise my arm at t (if it is a fact), purely as a matter of logic. But that doesn’t mean I can’t refrain from raising my arm at t, it just means I won’t.
To say that one can prevent a fact is *not* to say that one can bring it about that: a fact is not a fact. That would, indeed, be impossible. Instead, it’s to say that one can do something such that, were one to do it, there wouldn’t be such a fact at all. And this is clearly true: I can do something such that, were I to do it, it would not have been a fact that I raise my arm at t. For instance, I could have taken a paralytic drug before t. Had I done that, then it wouldn’t have been a fact that raise my arm at t. This is all that is meant by preventing a fact. What is *not* meant is that one has the ability to bring it about that: a fact is not a fact. So there is no issue here🙂
Just wondering about the basic setup of this argument. Is it standard Christian doctrine that God has foreknowledge? This implies an assumption about God's temporal relationship to historical reality. If God created time and space then, unless you're assuming (like WLC) that it changed it's nature somehow after creation, then it seems wrong to describe this relationship as "foreknowledge" or even knowledge. God would just look at the universe and see every point in it's history as "now"--the same way that we might look at a historical timeline and see everything laid out all at once.
Psalm 139:16 Your eyes saw my unformed substance; in your book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them.
Hello Joe, do you have any video on Alving Plantinga's EAAN? I'd like to know how Naturalists deal with it, I certainly don't know how Also, your rigorous methodology would certainly help
There are 4 possible environments or scenarios in which Alvin is making his argument, either: 1. his cognitive faculties are attributable to naturalism and evolution, and are reliable 2. his cognitive faculties are attributable to naturalism and evolution, and are not reliable 3. his cognitive faculties are attributable to a supernatural agent and are reliable -- a benevolent god 4. his cognitive faculties are *attributable to a supernatural agent and are not reliable* -- a malevolent god The first two are the one's Alvin is considering. And that's usually where it ends, the assumption is that if naturalism generates a paradox, we have to default to "god did it" and this solves the problem. But there's still one more scenario Plantinga's argument has to rule out to succeed: option 4. A theist might rule out #4 with "but the supernatural agent I believe in wouldn't do that. I belive in the type of supernatural agent who would give us reliable cognitive faculties". But notice how thin the EAAN really is here. How does Alvin come to presume his own argument, his own cognitive faculties are sound? By making an assumption about God. That's no different to the atheist saying "the kind of evolution I believe in would only give us reliable cognitive faculties". Plantinga assumes that we will grant him the premise that our cognitive faculties are reliable, but they aren't. We know they aren't. There's no magical reliability to explain. Our brains take shortcuts and misinterpret the world all the time. You can google illusions that trick your brain, and shows how our brains suck at being reliable. This is expected on naturalism, but Plantinga seems unable to account for, especially under condition 3, the benevolent god. Plantinga lives in a fantasy, seemingly unread and uninformed on where cognitive science is at. Given that our cognitives faculties can be shown to be unreliable in some spheres, it raises the question if god could give us slightly unrelaible cognitive faculties, then how does Alvin know he didn't give us wholly unreliable cognitive faculties? How exactly does Plantinga know he's in scenario 3, not scenario 4? He doesn't. In other words, lurking in the background of the EAAN is an appeal to global scepticism. Plantinga wants to pull the rug out from under the atheist using that. But he's digging a hole for himself, because consisnteny requires that same scepticism must be applied to cognitive faculties attributable to a god. The EAAN is a pitiful argument.
I increased your utility by 1 point. Brevity may not be the soul of wit, but if you combine it with caffeine you at least have the rest of your morning to look forward to.
Hey, can I ask a quick question. If the necessary being/existence is consciousness (not assuming ADS here), then if your consciousness were to survive after death, would it be possible to somehow in some way join and merge with this necessary being consciousness? Or is it impossible because your own consciousness emerged as a totally contingent thing and you can't go from fully contingent and unnecessary to becoming necessary and eternal (even as a part, or as something that becomes eternally contingent on this necessary being)?
yeah. I'm not convinced by this one. I think there's some semantic shenanigans going on that makes it seem like a solid argument. I think God believes P because I choose to P. It's not that I cannot choose otherwise, it's that I will not choose otherwise. I don't think my leeway is affected. If I chose to not P, then God would not have believed I would P in the first place. Is this just some excuse to get people to talk about P-ing?
@@Daniel-cz9gt I think that's called compatibilism, isn't it? I do wonder about determinism - if God determines everything, then free will is absent, but in this argument - unless I've misunderstood it - it's about what God knows, not what God determines. I think there's a subtle difference. So I think that theists who claim God has a 'plan' have a problem with free will, but theists who don't hold that God has a plan aren't affected by this issue. So in short - 'knowing' is not 'causing'. The argument makes it seem as if God is causing P, but I'm not sure he is. He just knows that P will occur.
I think this is a sensible reply; it’s similar to the dependence response to the argument. Although I don’t think semantic tricks at issue! The dependence response rejects the premise about the fixity of the past - in this case, premise (3). They say that sometimes, the past *is* under our control, in the sense that we currently have the ability to do things that would require the past to be different. This might seem implausible on its face; after all, surely I don’t have the ability to do something that would require the Andromeda galaxy to have formed in a different way. But they respond that it’s plausible in cases wherein a certain past occurrence *depends* on our future actions. Justin Capes, for instance, argues that we should embrace the fixity of the independent rather than the fixity of the past - ie, we should only think that we have no control over facts that are explanatorily independent of our actions. And if we say that God’s past beliefs depend on our future actions, then we can reject premise (3). This is actually the response I would take if I were a theist, and I think it’s quite plausible. Admittedly, there are some really interesting objections to the dependence response (eg, from Taylor Cyr), but that’s a topic for another day!
@@bengreen171 “The argument makes it seem as if God is causing P” I never get that impression from these kinds of arguments, for me the main point is the fact that there is a fixed way things are going to be regardless if it's God that is causing them.
@@MajestyofReason I wonder if that implies B theory of time - if so, WLC will have to think twice before adopting that defence. Yeah - I was being a bit florid by saying 'semantic trick' - I just meant that it inclines you to assume one thing is happening, when that's not really the case. The old 'assumed premises' problem that often creeps into these discussions - you hear one thing and a whole load of other things that aren't really entailed, pile in through the open door. cheers.
P4 feels like it might be begging the question to me it feels like the premise i would want to reject. But i am having troible formulating my objection this philosophy stuff is hard man😢😢😢😢.
Does this argument was ever tackled: everything we conceive, we need a sensorial (vision, touch..) source from (unicorn= horse with horn, fairy= little being with power), so we would need something to be able to conceive the three omnis and god=> god exist. I think that the omni are simply human powers extrapolated as we see various scales for everything. And it would follow that we cannot conceive inconcevable things, but i can conceive an inconcevable cat, or a god-eating cat.
I used to make this argument a long time ago and I still haven't really heard any refutation of it. In the longer video does he go on to give any refutation of it?
Nothing in the argument provided assumes anything about God _causing_ any action. So no, it doesn't assume that, nor is it necessary for the argument to work.
1) If God knows P then P is necessary 2) God knows P 3) therefore P is necessary the above is fallacious. If you understand the modal fallacy you understand why its fallacious.
Presumably you're referring to the illicit modal operator shift in attempting to infer (2) from (1): 1. Necessarily, everything God believes is true. Formally, letting 'g' be God and 'Bxy' be x believes that y: □∀p(Bgp → p) 2. Everything God believes is necessarily true. Formally, ∀p(Bgp → □p) Now, the inference from (1) to (2) is certainly invalid. But, crucially, nothing in the argument rests on this illicit shift from (1) to (2). Instead, the threat to leeway freedom comes from the fixity of the past: the past is over and done with, and we have no control over it. In other words, we have no power to prevent what’s already occurred. But if we could do otherwise, then *do* have power to prevent what’s already occurred - namely, we have the power to prevent God from having a particular belief millions of years ago. So, since we don't have such a power over the past, it follows that we can’t do otherwise. Or so the argument goes! My sole point here is that there is no illicit modal operator shift here. The argument in the video is valid, and the truth (and justification) of its premises nowhere requires moving from a wide scope necessity operator to a narrow scope necessity operator.
@@robertsaget9697 Just saw your new comment. Yeah, the argument simply doesn't rest on that reasoning at all. Nowhere does the argument or any of its premises infer from God knowing P that P is necessary. That is nowhere to be found in the video.
@@MajestyofReason For the argument to have any power we must say we can't do otherwise which is implicitly to claim a necessity. If its not a necessity then it must be conceded we can do otherwise... in which case the argument fails. If we "cannot do otherwise" in some non necessary sense (and its false that necessarily we can't do otherwise) then I fail to see how anything of value can be derived from that which is a threat to leeway freedom. In short, the only way to be successful is to argue a necessity (which entails a modal fallacy) or to argue that somehow possibilities aren't actually possible but somehow are actually fixed and necessary, which again is to argue a necessity.
@@robertsaget9697 The argument only 'says' that we can't do otherwise in the sense that it's a conclusion of the argument. It's not an assumption or premise which commits the modal operator shift fallacy; it's the validly inferred conclusion from the premises in the video. And as I explained, none of those premises infers from the fact that God knows p that p is necessary. If you listen back through the video, that is nowhere to be found :)
Still trying to digest everything but I don’t think I agree. God obviously has foreknowledge of every decision we make but I don’t think that takes away the responsibility we have for our decisions. Essentially it’s not that we couldn’t choose anything contrary to Gods foreknowledge but rather we wouldn’t choose anything contrary to Gods foreknowledge, which is a big difference.
@@Nexus-jg7ev Well I would say it’s because Gods foreknowledge is contingent on our decisions, not that our decisions are contingent on Gods foreknowledge.
@@samsmith4902 If it is contingent on our decisions, do you mean that he learns about them as we make them rather than knowing them in advance? This is the only way in which I can make sense of this contingency. If that's the case, you'd probably go for open theism accordung to which God doesn't know the future because this is metaphsycally impossible and God is omnipotent as far as metaphysical possibilities go. You could take this view and make the existence of an all-knowing God compatible with free will, however I am not sure if this will approach will work with the Abrahamic all-knwoing God for one important reason: central to Abrahamic religions is a robust and long prophetic tradition. Prophets and oracles usually foretell the future with the help of divine providence. But how can God reveal the future to these people if God himself can't know the future? If open theism is true, the Hebrew prophets are charlatans. If open theism is false, there's no free will, God can't be both just and unjust, so Hebrew prophets, again, are charlatans. Your options, unless I had made a mistake somewhere in my line of reasoning, seem to be the followng: 1. Keep God and free will but renounce Abrahamic religions. 2. Keep Abrahamic religions, but renounce free will, although you'd still have to renounce Abrahamic religions because post mortem judgement can't be just and God is supposed to be just. That's a serious dilemma.
But we couldn't choose anything at all if God chose not to create. God isn't a very knowledgeable bystander, but is instead the direct cause of absolutely everything else. Unless God himself lacked the freedom to create anything other than what he did, then he directly chose every choice made by creatures. He didn't merely foreknow them, he foreordained them, preselected them, elected to make them happen when he might have done otherwise. If God is the only one whose choices could have led to a different result (either a different choice made or no choice at all), then God is the only responsible agent.
How can god's foreknowledge be contingent upon your decision? In order for x to be contingent upon y, y must be logically prior to x. In virtue of being foreknowledge then your decision cannot be logically prior. I have troubles understanding that.@@samsmith4902
If he knows in advance you won't do it by your freewill. You are free if you can decide otherwise but if someone always knows how you decide you can't decide otherwise.
I’ve stated this previously, but again I disagree with using “believed”, for God rather than “knows” God knows you will do x at T In my view there are two instances of T, T1 Gods view (Birds Eye view let’s say) T2 the individuals real time ( 1st person view) While God knows T1 will be instantiated by you at x event it is only when T2 is acted upon that T1 is affirmed because T1+T2 are two sides of the same coin, the only difference being one is you committing the event in real time while the other is through God’s eternal perception of all instances of time
@@itsyaboidaniel2919sure but what dictates it must happen is that the Individual made it happen when he actualized it. I think there’s only a problem if you separate T1 from T2, but I consider both to be connected hence not a problem for my worldview
@@itsyaboidaniel2919so if I could explain to you it would be like an RPG where you have both a Birds Eye view of the real time map and a zoomed in (first person view) both are intertwined, the map is (past/present/future) so in order for x event to be in Gods timeline (Birds Eye view) x event must occur in real time. Thus one isn’t separate from the other but are the same thing via separate lenses
@@japexican007 Because God knows it will happen, there's no alternative. God's knowing of an event forced the event to actualize, otherwise God lacks knowledge. Going with the RPG analogy, those things will happen, but only once you turn on the game, and God as the creator of the universe has turned on the game so to speak. They could've "not happened" if you didn't turn on the game, but the game is in on, and we're helpless but to go forward with the script.
@@itsyaboidaniel2919that’s irrelevant, the fact that it will happen. It’s whether it was freely done or not that’s relevant and by my view and how I showed you that it only actualizes in Gods eternal view when it’s actualized in real time that allows for freedom of the will. Sorry but agree to disagree
@@shassett79 Foreknowledge yes, full determenism no. We don't know how God knows without forcing all things, but He knows. Maybe existing in and out of time as he chooses.
How does P3 not beg the question? It seems to assume that what God knows determines what we do but why not think it’s the other way around? What we do determines what God knows?
Great question! First, P3 does not assume that what God knows determines what we do; instead, P3 is just a particular instance of the claim that the past is outside our control -- it's over and done with, and we have no ability to prevent what's already happened. Take the assassination of Lincoln. This is a past occurrence. And it seems like it's currently out of your control -- there's nothing you can now do that would prevent it from happening. This seems to be a more general feature of the past: it's over and done with, and there's nothing we can do *now* that would prevent it from happening. We're powerless right *now* to do something that would result in there never having been the Holocaust, for instance. If this is a more general feature of the past, as proponents of the argument say is intuitively very plausible, then it likewise applies to whatever happened in God's mind billions of years ago. Those past states are just as out of your control as the assassination of Lincoln -- they're over and done with, and there's nothing you can now do that would prevent them from obtaining. Notice that none of this assumes that the past beliefs *determine* our actions. Even if they don't, they're still over and done with and out of our control, and that's all the argument needs. It's like the Lincoln assassination: that certainly doesn't determine your current actions, but it's still true that you're currently powerless to prevent it from happening! And that is all the argument needs. But, second, this does open the argument up to what's called the dependence response. The dependence response rejects the fixity of the past -- some aspects of the past actually *are* under our control, and there *is* something we can do that would prevent it from happening. This is a serious response defended by philosophers like Justin Capes, Philip Swensen, and Trenton Merricks. It also has its detractors, such as Taylor Cyr. (Check out the debate between Swensen and Cyr on Capturing Christianity for some of Cyr's pushback on the dependence response!)
@@MajestyofReason I agree with the fixity of the past. I think that absurdity follows if it were possible for even God to have power over it. God’s beliefs about future choices made by creatures endowed with leeway freedom are never mistaken but they are contingent. What is necessary is that God infallibly knows them but it is not necessary that they are what he knows they will be. I like the analogy by WLC to God’s knowledge of future contingent events to be to free will choices what an infallible barometer is to future weather systems.
The story of David saving Keilah addresses the argument of divine foreknowledge vs human freedom in a mind blowing, almost comical way. To preface for any who haven't read it, in Samuel 1:23, future king of Israel, David, is on the run from the current king Saul, who seeks his death out of fear that David will replace him as king some day soon. The beginning of the chapter details David and his men coming up to the walled town of Keilah, where some marauding Philistines are looting their threshing floors and besieging the town. David asks God if he should attack the Philistines and save Keilah from their raiding, which God expediently tells him to go do. David is scared at first, as he's currently on the run from Saul, and not particularly wanting to start beef with their biggest enemy in the south, but God tells him He shall give the Philistines into his hand. So David and company went, beat the Philistines, took their cattle, and retired into Keilah for a short while. Saul, being king, caught wind of this shortly after and says, "God's given David to me on a silver platter! He's as good as dead in that town, there's nowhere for him to run while he's surrounded by all those walls!" Saul then summons *all* of his forces for battle, where he would go down to Keilah, besiege it, and smoke David out like a rat in a trap. David had also soon learned that Saul was plotting to seek him out there, and asked his priest to bring him the ephod they brought with them (its basically just a priestly garb). David then asks, "Hey God, I hear from good sources that Saul is plotting to pay Keilah a visit on my behalf. Are the people here going to give me up if he comes? Will Saul actually come down here as I've heard?" God plainly says, *"He will."* So flabbergasted was David by God's straightforward answer to his question, he asks God *AGAIN* if the citizens of Keilah would give him and his men up if Saul came. And again, with the bluntness of a river stone, God says to David, *"They will."* David, being the future king of Israel and all, was a sensible man; quick witted, some might say. Upon God telling him that Saul *will* come down to Keilah and the citizens *will* give him and his whole warband up to Saul when they do... *They hightailed it the hell out of there!* David took all of his men and gunned it for the wilderness, not even bothering to look back. When word got back to Saul that David had indeed fled Keilah, Saul disbanded his effort to capture David in that town entirely, and did not go to Keilah. Why am I telling you all of this? Because God said *Himself* that Saul was going to Keilah and Keilah was going to give David up to him. But because David ran away, absolutely *none* of what God said was going to happen came to pass. Surely, if David *had* stayed in Keilah, the exact events God foresaw would have happened, and the OT would have been a very different story from that point on. *But it didn't.* TLDR: God is sovereign in his foreknowledge; He foresees every single outcome that our human freedom entails in our day to day life, just because he knows something *can* happen, or even if he says it *will* happen, this by no means indicates it is now fated for that thing to be. Hope this helps!
@@bloodtalon2189 the questions and answers aren't about what will actually happen in the future, they're a hypothetical. He always knew they would run. And if he "knows all paths equally" then he doesn't really know anything, just basic cause and effect
Pardon me if I’m missing something here, but the claim of entailment is simply bc of perfect foreknowledge, isn’t it? Ie there’s no claim of control or planning in that, or is there?
Probably the theist just denies foreknowledge of events as being an aspect of perfection. Really the whole idea that certain qualities must or must not be part of a perfect entity was always kind of strange and a bit arbitrary. Is an aspect of perfection knowing everything? Why? Who defines what properties belong to a perfect entity? Does perfect mean maximally great in all respects? If so, then who says that maximal greatness entails complete foreknowledge? Maybe God can only know what is most probable, and that's the best anyone can do, even a perfect being. Because I really do agree with the logic of your position. But what it entails is more that you can't have free will and perfect knowledge at the same time. So rather than ask God to make a square circle, something that not even a perfect being can overcome (logical contradictions), I think it makes way more sense to just dismiss complete foreknowledge of all events. Because otherwise it really is a contradiction, especially when you ask about whether God knows what God will do in the future! If he does, then God has no free will, which is even stranger. And to be honest I don't think its that absurd. If God doesn't know what choice you're going to make, then neither do you, even if you think you do. People change their minds all the time. I think God might have a pretty good idea of what you'll probably do, just as we might, but its not like we know with greater certainty than God that we will or won't raise our hands tomorrow. I think it is permanently up in the air for everyone. If it weren't, then you wouldn't truly have free will.
We are also a bunch of folks who are philosophy enthusiasts and critique ideologies (read organized religions) using rational and philosophical arguments, especially Islam. There are not too many channels that do it and we might be a refreshing change.
no one goes to hell for believing or not believing in God, you will be separated from he that is Holy by the pain and suffering you’ve brought forth into the world. Scripture says the wages of sin is death aka the payment given for the pain and suffering you’ve brought forth is separation from he that is Life( God) thus separation from Life ultimately leads to death. You also don’t go to hell for not accepting Jesus, he merely offers to pay your sin debt, aka he offers his sacrifice on the cross ( his death) to pay the penalty you’ve incurred, to release you from your obligation so that you won’t have to die, rejecting his free gift isn’t what sends you to hell, your sins do that, you just refuse the forgiveness he offers to not have to go there. Christ died (FOR YOUR SINS) Was buried Rose again (the third day) Accept this truth and you shall not perish but have everlasting life by he who is The Life, Jesus The Christ! “Jesus said to her, “I am the resurrection and the life. He who believes in Me, though he may die, he shall live. And whoever lives and believes in Me shall never die. Do you believe this?” John 11:25-26 NKJV
If you were to not raise your hand at t, God's foreknowledge would have been different. On a Molinistic account, God possesses knowledge of contingently true counterfactual propositions logically prior to his creative decree. Meaning that we do have freedom. This is just a summary of Molinism, but wouldn't this be a valid answer to the problem you posed? William Lane Craig addressed something like this in 'Only Wise God'. And I like philosophy so yes your videos are fun.
Excellent question! Importantly, molinism *in itself* doesn't challenge any of the premises of the argument; in fact, a molinist could accept all the premises, and some molinists do actually deny that have leeway freedom (and so accept the conclusion that we lack leeway freedom). But molinists could try opt for one of the main responses to the argument on offer: the dependence response. This response rejects premise (3) and says that some aspects of the past actually aren't fixed or beyond our control -- namely, those parts of the past which depend on our future actions. Of course, there are some challenges to the dependence response; but whether they succeed is a topic for another day! (If you're curious, see Taylor Cyr's pushback to Philip Swensen on Capturing Christianity when they discussed it!)
@@MajestyofReasonHello Joe, do you have any video on Alvin Plantinga's EAAN? To me it seems like a pretty solid solid argument against naturalism Is the argument fairly air tight?
@@muhammadhassanaliiqbal1117 I haven’t made a video on it (though I briefly respond to it in my 12 hour video - see the pinned comment underneath it for timestamps). But here’s a document containing a small sample of respectable published criticisms: docs.google.com/document/d/1SJyeaMK1iYyExt065bJT-nGC92XBNkXhQ5kyvtI1L30/edit?usp=sharing
If I plan to raise my hand, it doesn't mean I will raise my hand, so I don't know for sure will I raise my hand or not, God can know what I think but also not be sure if I will succeed in raising my hand, so I don't know more than God
Depends which argument you're talking about, but most boil down to question begging (A being exists necessarily, therefor a necessary being exists) or a triviality ( _If_ A being exists necessarily, then a necessary being exists) But if you have a version that's some derivation of one of those, I'd be interested in seeing it.
Here's the way I've explained the problem to non-philosophers without even mentioning God. Imagine that somewhere in the universe there is a book which accurately foretells everything a particular person (call him Jones) will do from the moment he's born. Now the question is, if everything the book foretells is true, does Jones' have the power to do anything _other_ than what the book foretells? The answer is yes, because the book is nothing more than an accurate record of what Jones freely chooses to do. Jones has the power to do something other than what the book foretells, it's just that it's a power he chooses not to exercise. Now consider the same example, but this time assume that the book is infallible. This new assumption changes the picture entirely. Now it's no longer possible for Jones to do something other than what the book foretells, for if the book is infallible, then by logical necessity, everything it foretells must happen. To sum things up, in the first example, the book is not infallible. Because it's not infallible, Jones has the power to do something other than what the book foretells, and if he were to do so, then at least one thing the book foretells would be false. But if the book is infallible, then it cannot be within Jones' power to make anything it foretells false. Putting this into a theistic context, if God is infallible and he knows all our future actions, then we cannot have the freedom to do something other than what God foreknows we will do. Therefore, none of our actions are free. Following the same logic, we would have to conclude that God isn't free with respect to his own actions, all of which he infallibly foreknows.
Explain this point to me: If I know for sure that John will go to the theater with his girlfriend tomorrow, that John will kill her in the theater. How does it follow that he loses responsibility, because if there is a substance (soul) John, then she is the primary effective reason in the act of intending to kill a friend, and not a series of dominoes before the big bang or into the endless past. That is, if I know X, how does it follow that X is not an actualizer, but I am. In fact, here is a symmetrical example: I know for sure that it's going to rain tomorrow, but obviously I'm not the cause of the rain, why it's happening. The very fact of knowing about an event, even an infallible one, should not entail denying the responsibility and primacy of the actor of intention - John, because he is the actor of intention, not God, God does not control John, otherwise John = the actions of God, but we are not talking about this, we are not talking about theological determinism.
@@ВладиславНемакин-ч2е You want to know why God is responsible for what John does in the example you've outlined above. The answer to that is fairly straightforward, given the assumptions that (a) God has free will, and (b) that his knowledge of the future is infallible. If (a) and (b) are both true, then prior to creating the universe, God knew with certainty that John would murder his girlfriend. God could have prevented that in several ways: (1) he could have chosen not to create the universe at all, (2) he could have chosen to create a universe in which John and/or his girlfriend do not exist, or (3) he could have chosen to prevent John from murdering his girlfriend. But in your example, God chose to do none of these things. To the contrary, he deliberately chose to create the universe in which John murders his girlfriend, and that makes God both causally and morally responsible for John murdering his girlfriend. This of course doesn't mean that John bears _no_ responsibility for his actions, as you imply above. John is responsible for murdering his girlfriend, but so is God, because God deliberately set in motion the chain of events that he knew with certainty would lead to John murdering his girlfriend.
Rather than future events being casually dependent on God's foreknowledge, isn't another notion that God's foreknowledge is counterfactually dependent on future events?
@@krzyszwojciech True, but God can imagine Joe raising his hand at time (T) or not, and as an eternal being his acts are timeless, meaning what is true at any instant is true at all instances. Thus, God has eternally known that Joe will raise his hand at time (T), if that how events would have naturally unfolded. If Joe was not going to raise his hand at time (T), God would have known that instead for all eternity. That fact of whether Joe would raise his hand is external to God, and does not change God's nature either.
Why is it necessary that God have a belief about every single decision that we make? Couldn't he suspend belief, or alternatively have beliefs for every possible outcome of our decisions as moral agents without impacting our actual decisions? I hope Trent responds. I feel like I have a rebuttal brewing but im too drunk/scatterbrained right now to put it together.
If we ask God question "What will happen to me next month?", He will answer with: Your first case, "I don't know" In second case, "Here goes my hours long monologue about EVERY SINGLE possible outcome you will find yourself in". So he wouldn't be able to make concrete answer, because there's no concrete future.
_"Why is it necessary that God have a belief about every single decision that we make?"_ It _isn't_ necessary... If God isn't omniscient, or you're using some watered-down concept of omniscience.
@@ajhieb Why is it necessary IF God is omniscient? Aren't you the guy who ran from every other conversation you had with me because you don't have a coherent worldview?
@@harlowcj _"Why is it necessary IF God is omniscient?"_ Because that's what it _means_ to be omniscient. (Unless you're using a watered-down concept of omniscience)
Confusing certainty with necessity. Different things. It's just non sequitur. It's conflating two different things: 1. being powerless to prevent God from knowing the choice and 2. being powerless to have chosen differently.
You seem to have failed to follow Joe. The video explains neatly why the view you take is wrong, because they're not "different things"; the one necessarily entails the other. Per your theology, God *does* know the choices you will make, no? Grant Joe that, and everything in the clip follows. No freedom.
@@stephengalanis No, it doesn't follow. Certainty does not mean necessity, they are different concepts. Would could have been does not necessarily have to be what is.
@@Dizerner Only because your are compartmentalising your knowledge. There's no seeing-the-whole at once. How convenient of you to forget God's properties. If omnimax God knows p will be chosen, either 1) God can be wrong and you can freely chose not-p, or 2) God is right and you can't. Joe talks about this in this very video you chose to comment on, yet there's precious little engamgent with that from you, only ipse dixit table thumping that it's not so. Show us why. Would / could / have been doesn't apply to your God. Bad comparison. God doesn't deal in uncertainty, he knows. When God knows you will choose p, it's not "could", or "maybe". It is necessarily going to happen. You tried to insert uncertainty here, but I am slamming that shut by pointing at your own beliefs about God. There's no wiggle room without gutting core theology about God. God is always right about what he knows, and this entails that you must, in a fatalistic sense, choose p. (This doesn't remove the will. You may genuinely will p to be the case and willing choose p. It's just not a free will.) Christians are in the logically and empirically wrong position of saying we choose what we think. It's easily demonstrated that this is not the case. Think of a city. At random. Pause for a few seconds. I majored in philosophy, so has / does Joe. And I know you're wrong. I know how your logic, in the technical sense, is breaking down. I know how professors and grad students would try to correct you. Your word game is not philosophy. It's a post-hoc bandaid to enable you to hang on to a belief already established. I was there. I was a devout Christian. I won Bible quizzes. I memorised Proverbs (from the KJV!) as a teen at my religious school. Also, notice that insiting on your ability to begin a causal chain weakens the cosmological argument. It seems we already have billions of examples of an unmoved mover that are not God. That's what libertarian free will is. It's a causal chain that begins with you, no prior causes, no determinism. What city did you think of? Was it Durban, South Africa? Hands up any reader who had Durban. You absolutely know Durban is a real city that exists, but it likely wasn't coming up for you. It wasn't on the cards. You couldn't choose what to think. I wasn't coercing you in any possible way. You were free to choose any city, and yet the various cities around the world were not equally weighted. It was constrained and coerced by your life experience. Where you've been on holiday, where friends or family live etc. You did not have the free will to choose something you didn't think of.
@@stephengalanis You need to examine some table thumping from yourself, not just others, lol. You make constant assertions with no backing. Classic Theism does entail "middle knowledge," God knowing hypothetical scenarios. God knows all possible worlds, and all alternate and possible choices. This is not some "niche" thing I came up with, as you seem to be implying. I did interact with the video by claiming it holds a non sequitur, and it does. The reason is, it is confusing categories. They call this a modal scope fallacy. Certainty does not deal with necessity, because something can be unnecessarily certain (from, as you point out, the timeless perspective). It is incumbent upon the video and you to somehow prove that something being certain always and only means being necessarily certain, above the bald assertion that you both are making. You cannot do this, because it does not logically follow.
Oh, my. So God knows everything I will ever do, so I have no freedom. That's what you boil it down to?? You have heard of God's Middle Knowledge, right?
God having middle knowledge challenges no premise in the argument. This point has been made extensively in the literature on the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will, and it’s granted by many molinists specializing on the problem.
@@makaveli2.03 _"You have heard of God's Middle Knowledge, right?"_ That's a quip, not a rebuttal. If you want to challenge Alex's argument, it's on YOU to show how God's Middle Knowledge DOES address the argument.
Wait this wasn’t a troll of Trent, you actually think this is a good argument? 😂 Might have to do a full rebuttal of this like I did for your position on existential interia
God exists outside of time. He can know what we will do without directly causing or preventing us from doing it. I watched this video, now I know what you will say in the video with perfect foreknowledge. Yet I didnt cause you to say what was said in this video. I think it would be the same way with God. Someone will argue that, yes, but that's because this video happened in the past and cannot be changed. I argue from Gods perspective he has perfect knowledge of history all at once, outside of time. We might not be able to comprehend what that's like, but that's not evidence against it. So God could have foreknowledge and also allow free will.
In reply: leeway freedom is not to be understood in a modal sense. Jonathan Edwards rightly pointed out long ago that when someone says, "I could have done x", they usually mean that there was no external barrier to my doing x. That is to say that no external determinant made me do x, and no external barrier prevented me from doing not-x. To illustrate that knowledge--even infallible foreknowledge--does not do this, consider: suppose a teacher got a blast of foreknowledge in which she knew that, upon giving some pop quiz, Little Timmy will cheat. Maybe she gets a prophecy from God or something. Or suppose God creates a teacher who shares his infallible foreknowledge of the future. That infallible foreknowledge isn't an external determinant of Timmy's course of action. Timmy cannot say "you knew I would cheat? You made me cheat!"
I think the factor that makes your scenario fundamentally different is that a God is typically a creator. So the creator that created Little Timmy, knowing that Little Timmy would cheat in the test, made Little Timmy cheat by deciding to create Little Timmy in a way that would make him cheat.
Thanks for the response! However, philosophers working on free will have almost unanimously come to reject the 'no external barriers' analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Counterexamples include, e.g., (i) Brain tumors: Someone might have a brain tumor that completely overrides heir behavior, in such a way that they clearly cannot do otherwise. But there is no external barrier to them doing otherwise. (ii) Extreme phobia: Suppose that Danielle is psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a blond-haired dog due to an extreme phobia. Now imagine that, on her sixteenth birthday, unaware of her condition, her father brings to her two puppies to choose between, one being a blond labrador, the other a black labrador. He tells Danielle just to pick up whichever of the two she pleases and that he will return the other puppy to the pet store. Danielle happily and unencumberedly -- without any external barrier to doing otherwise -- does what she wants and picks up the black lab. When Danielle picked up the black lab, she was not able to do otherwise, but yet there was no external barrier to her doing otherwise.
@@phill234 That assumes that Timmy's nature is what causes him to cheat. But why think this? That seems to beg the question against the claim of freedom
@MajestyofReason I should be clear: by external determinant I mean causal determinant. For instance, having a brain tumor *is* something that's external to the will of the person that then places certain strictures on the will. So by external determinant, I mean determinant external to the will. I actually flesh this out in my article in the Heythrop Journal, but in effect--I mean that free will requires that there be nothing that externally determines it's motions (the will's), and no barrier to its doing x (else it's not free to do x).
@@anglicanaesthetics Thanks for the clarification! Here's a remaining worry though. Even if nothing causally determines me to do X and there are no external barriers to me doing not-X, it still seems like I can't now do not-X if, say, my doing not-X requires that the Aztec empire never existed. To threaten my ability to do other than X, the Aztec empire's existence need not causally determine me to do X; in fact, maybe *nothing* causally determines me to do X. Even still, it seems like it's enough to remove my ability to do other than X that (i) my doing other than X would require that the Aztec empire never existed, and (ii) the Aztec empire is over and done with and out of my current control. But it's the same thing that proponents of the incompatibility argument say is happening in the case of foreknowledge. Even though God's past belief (like the Aztec empire) is not causally determining my actions -- indeed, even if *nothing* is causally determining my actions -- it's still enough to remove my ability to do otherwise. For (iii) my doing otherwise would require that some past belief in God's mind never existed, and (iv) like the Aztec empire and anything else that already obtained in the past, God's having that belief billions of years ago is over and done with and out of my current control. Just as (i) and (ii) were enough to threaten my ability to do otherwise in the Aztec empire case *even if* I'm not causally determined and *even if* there are no external barriers in place, (iii) and (iv) seem enough to threaten my ability to do otherwise in the divine foreknowledge case *even if* I'm not causally determined and *even if* there are no external barriers in place. Or so the argument goes! Of course, you might think that the very existence of the Aztec empire is a kind of external barrier to your doing otherwise in the case described. But then the same can be said about God's past belief billions of years ago: its very existence is a kind of external barrier to your doing otherwise. Or you might say that we actually do have a kind of control over some aspects of the past (maybe those aspects thereof that depend on our future actions -- and perhaps God's past belief is among those aspects). This is a respectable move, but it's a different rejoinder than the one you're offering. The move here is the dependence response and amounts to a rejection of P3. Hope this makes sense! :)
@@davidddd2001 Too often theists just assert things without any reasons whatsoever. I get it that this is just a YT comment section, but that's still too lame. Either provide a few sentences to tell why you assert whatever you assert or don't bother posting anything, right?
God doesn’t _believe_ I will do such-and-such at time T. Rather, He infallibly _knows_ what I will do. And no matter what I choose to do, it is impossible for Him not to have infallibly known it from all eternity. But His foreknowledge does not _cause_ my free actions, for there is no causal link between what I ultimately choose to do and Him simply knowing it. Rather, my freely chosen actions are what constitute His foreknowledge, which inform His decision sans the universe which world He will actualize. How can we know we have libertarian free will? No free will = no moral accountability. Moral accountability = free will. Anybody (including Joe) willing to argue that the N*zis couldn’t help themselves?
I know you like accuracy so when you say "no human is ever morally responsible" what you really mean is "morality according to theists", because we ALL know that you can both have no leeway freedom and still be morally responsible because we are still agents in this world that can affect those around us and so according to NON-THEISTIC definitions of morality we are still responsible
![Felix "Unfair" | [Stray Kids : SKZ-PLAYER]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/Oswujxm2Ag0/mqdefault.jpg)
please do more of these shorter clips
i typically avoid hour long (or more) videos
Same here. My ADHD brain can’t really handle more than a 20 minute video.
i used to do this as well, but the longer videos have so much value in them its worth extending my poor brain, also sometimes i have to listen to them multiple times and thats when you get alot more out of it.
Some variety in duration would be nice. Don't always have an hr.
He’ll make them only if he’s been determined to.
I remember when I saw Trents title and video the first time and thinking "Imagine if an atheist youtuber was equally as uncharitable, and said Theists cannot blame atheists for anything due to problems with foreknowledge (ignoring or dismissing views like molinism or simple foreknowledge)". Im glad you pointed this out in your video.
Good point but an important distinction is that many atheists will admit their view entails determinism. Whereas nearly every single Christian including Calvinists will still try to argue their view entails free will. They may have inconsistent claims in squaring this with divine foreknowledge and predestination, but it’s still important that they all argue for it.
@@bman5257 Many atheists believe determinism is true, but that doesn't mean they think that atheism entails determinism. Your point still applies either way and I agree with it but I figured I would make that correction.
I am always in awe of how intelligent Joe is. I feel very lucky that I have found this channel. I liked this video and found it very useful!!
Joe, you're incredible man. Smart and funny. Keep up the work. Love from India.
@@hello-cn5nh why would you think I'm Joe's alt account? 😂😂
@@hello-cn5nhwho hurt you? Lol. I have no clue who this person is
@@hello-cn5nh this account left a likeless comment from 4 months ago (which I had never even seen before now) on my several-years-old video discussion between Koons and Oppy. The comment reads “45:00 moment of silence…😁”. This is an utterly inexplicable comment if this were an alternative account. You are deeply hurt; and if you continue spreading lies about me, your account will get banned (though you might just use an alternate going forward!)
@@MajestyofReason Hello Joe, do you have any video on Alvin Plantinga's EAAN?
It seems pretty air tight to me
Could you do a video on in
pretty please?
My mother enjoyed it. So, I smashed the like button.
I think this argument works only if we have an erroneous view about God and his relation to time, or time in general.
Infallible comprehensive foreknowledge follows from Gods omniscience. Omniscience is often defined as knowing all true propositions.
God’s relation to time is fundamentally different from ours. Boethius defines eternity as a possession of life, a possession simultaneously entire and perfect, which has no end. Similar modern definitions could be found among B theory of time.
God's knowledge of events cannot really be called foreknowledge at all, because He doesn't seal the future rather He is aware of actions we freely do.
What do you think about this counter argument based on different theories of time and what do you think would be best a counter argument?
This was fun! It was a little like watching the Sicilian rant on the Princess Bride just before he drank the chalice with the iocaine powder in it😂
I think the problem comes when to say God “knew” something in the past. God does not experience time, therefore he cannot have known somethinf “before” it happened. For God, everything happened all at once, in one eternal now per se. Since God allows us to experience time, there is no contradiction between us making a choice in time and God, being outside of time, always knowing we would do so, since God experiences all of time at once.
Like the short form video!
Sir, I DEMAND that you post more of your delightful classical music on your channel!
The most majestic thing about this video is the angle of your eyebrows when you raise them. Oh, what a beautiful slope.
Bros a menace for that last part 💀
knowledge doesn't abrogate freedom.
If you are not the sole cause of absolutely everything other than yourself, yes, knowledge would not abrogate freedom. If you are, however, then all "free choices" which were known to you are your direct responsibility, because none of them would have happened had you chosen not to create.
@Uryvichk doesnt matter whether you are the sole cause. there just has to be leeway freedom. There's no contradiction between knowing the future or being the prime mover and leeway freedom. end of story.
@@robertsaget9697 Saying "there just has to be leeway freedom" shows you've already made up your mind, you simply wish to believe it. If knowledge doesn't abrogate freedom, then I don't see how anything else does.
@@itsyaboidaniel2919
How does knowledge abrogate leeway freedom?
Show the contradiction. Just asserting that it somehow does isn't an argument or anything to take seriously.
@@robertsaget9697 It's simple, perfect knowledge of someone's actions makes the actions predetermined, and thus not free. Also, just asserting it doesn't also isn't an argument.
Wonderful video. Shows reliably how freedom is incompatible with perfect foreknowledge, because if it can't be helped, then how free is it? It somewhat reminds me of what Stephen Woodford (Rationality Rules) said which I'll paraphrase by saying the universe is either random (we can't control random) or not random (we can't control not random), which then extends to our choices, and there isn't any room for the "free" option because we have no control over our inner mechanisms in either case.
Define “no control”
If individual who is raped for ten years then goes out to rape an individual of their own
Where they free or had “no control/choice” but to rape someone?
Argument fails on premise 4. “entails” in premise 4 is misleading. It is used to introduce a dependency from “foreknowledge” to “raise my hand action”, or the dependency only exists the other way around: God knows because I (will) raise my hand. I do not raise my hand because God knows I will do it.
_"God knows because I (will) raise my hand. I do not raise my hand because God knows I will do it."_ The dependency _must_ exist in both directions, otherwise all of the conditions aren't met.
If I am going to do X, then God knows I will do (X) If (X) then k(X)
If God knows I will do X, then I am going to do (X) If k(X) then (X)
Which gets us (X) k(X)
If the first condition isn't true, then you simply have a God that isn't omniscient as there is some possible (X) that God doesn't know.
If the second condition isn't true then God's knowledge isn't infallible.
But what if God is a passive observer of what you did when you were free? Sure this god may not intervene at all, but it seems reasonable that a person's free actions could be recorded and God could go back in time with the knowledge of them. Such is the advantage of not being in the same time line.
You had me discombobulated for a second there, but only until recombobulation occurred via an insult to my mother.
Knowing the future is not to determine the future.
Here’s another way to argue against theistic free will; If someone was determined to prove God wrong, they could ask God “what will I make for dinner tomorrow” and plan on doing the opposite of what God says. In this situation, if God doesn’t have will over the future, then that means God cannot respond to the man without a paradox happening. So, an omniscient being must either be limited in communication, or have providence over the future.
God, being outside of time, already has free will in consideration of his foreknowledge. If God says something will occur, then He already knows this to be true on account of his timelessness. If He chooses to remain silent, He does so in relation to His sovereign will, not out of fear of paradox (or whatever you’re implying). Pretty simple stuff
@@no3339 So, your saying God can be wrong? Because if he can say whatever he wants, then he could tell the hypothetical person what they will do in the future, and they won’t do it.
@@charles21137 You’re*
If God says something will happen, then that thing will happen. I don’t think I can’t make that more clear
@@no3339 so if God were to tell this hypothetical person what they will do in the future, and they wanted to prove Hod wrong, they wouldn’t be able to prove God wrong. This could only be possible if God had full control over future events.
@@charles21137 First sentence: correct
Second sentence: incorrect
A timeless being’s foreknowledge does not imply control (or no free will)
For me, P being true doesn't need to entail Q. At least not in the causative sense, but yes in the "we can be certain Q will happen at time t"
I lol'ed at the end. Serious question: If God exists, aren't I (or anything else) co-eternal with them from their perspective?
Yes
What ? Explain yourself pretty please 🥺🥺🥺
a good argument, though I think the dependence response is also a good one
Ya I'm a Open Theist, I would say mankind has Limited Free Will and God has Present Tense Foreknowledge NOT Exhaustive Foreknowledge of Future Contingents
Can God's plans fail? It seems that, as an Open Theist, you are committed to the possibility that one of the unknown future contingents God lacks foreknowledge of to be an outcome resulting in the failure of God's plans (for salvation, or anything else really) based on the free choices of rational agents.
@@Uryvichk I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel....
But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God.
God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God.
GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
@@UryvichkThat assumes that some creature is more powerful than God in order to ruin His plans. That's what you believe?
@Uryvichk I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel....
But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God.
God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God.
GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
I could name multiple events in the Bible that were not part of God's plan, the Sin of Adam, Noah Flood, Tower of Babel....
But God has provided Grace for Man to REPENT and get right with God.
God's aultimate plan of Redemption for mankind was accomplished at the Cross, No Man, Satan or Hell could stop the power and love of God.
GODS plan has been Finished by the Resurrection of Jesus and God wants mankind to Freely accept the Gospel of Grace by Faith, just because people reject the Gospel does mean God failed on his plan?
This argument is excellent, if P1 is true. I think even Molinism is incapable of getting past this, while still affirming freedom. However, I deny premise 1, and recommend other theists do too, in favor of models of God that do not include exhaustive foreknowledge.
The issue that we could know something God doesn't seems to me to be a non-issue twice over. In the first place there are various models of God that already have this consequence (such as when people deny omnisubjectivity, so God doesn't know how it feels to lust, but your mom does...I kid, I kid). But, more importantly, I only know what I am going to do under certain conditions in which God could very well also know what I will do (as could an experienced psychiatrist who has been working with me for years). If I have a strong inclination or addiction, or if I am resolutely determined to accomplish something, then I know I will do it and God could know on a similar basis. But, no such basis could exist before I was born, or before I developed the addiction/inclination/determination in question.
I like the mom joke🤣
Thanks for the comment. I definitely think the sub-argument for P1 need a *lot* more work if they are to succeed, and in particular they need to address the respectable concerns you raise🙂
Last few seconds of this video was wild.
Hi joe, I am Mohammed Saif and I am a agnostic, why does diversity in religious experience considered a defeater, but not in ethics and political philosophy because these areas also bottom out in seemings and intuition which are also diverse among people?
Forgive me if I'm wrong or being ignorant of the argumentation, but if someone raised their hand at t, is it not because they wanted to? In that moment if in a possible world they chose not to raise their hand, this also would have been divinely foreknown by God. The only separating factor in each of these possible worlds seems to be the hand-raisers will; if in this moment the person is not being forced against their will to raise their arm - God's foreknowledge and man's will are in harmony. In my view (Molinism), God creates the world with the foreknowledge of every free-willed choice every person will make in every situation; crafting the circumstances such that his will is done ultimately through this leeway freedom. Premises 6 and 7 seem to be so punchy because you're right in that you're powerless to prevent what you have chosen to do by your own will. Please let me know if I'm missing something.
I struggle to see, given God's timelessness, why premise 4 could not be the other way around. That is, entails
Both entailment claims hold
@MajestyofReason Ah, I see. As long as premise 4 holds, the argument is valid. I guess my next idea would be to question the, indeed, very plausible idea, that the past is fixed. If God really is timeless, then it could be the case that I'm not powerless to prevent what God believed in the past. I definitely don't know as much as you do, so I'm just throwing rudimentary ideas. Great video though 👌 with quite an interesting ending
@@franciscofont2194 thank you, and it’s wonderful you’re reflecting on these things!! If you’re curious to delve deeper, check out the discussion on Capturing Christianity between Taylor Cyr and Philip Swenson🙂❤️
@@MajestyofReason Now I definitely will!
The whole contradiction arises by accepting the assumption that been a perfect being entails having to know everything at all times.
Bestowing privacy of intent upon the leaving beings is an attribute of devine freedom and supremacy.
If that is true, the argument presented in this clip breaks a part. And theist as well as atheist would have moral responsibility from a monotheistic theological perspective.
I'd like to see this problem addressed from a Mormon perspective. Mormonism differs from standard Christianity in many ways. For one, Mormons believe in multiple gods. They believe that as a parent can have a child after their own image, so too can a god have a child in its own image. This child can develop, given proper guidance, into maturity, becoming a fully-fledged god with all the power, knowledge, and responsibility of one. It can then have children of its own, who can also develop into gods with the same reproductive and developmental capability. What's disputed is the extent of the omniscience of these gods. I had a conversation with my dad yesterday, and we came to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge consisted of an intimate familiarity with each of his children, and that he would know under any situation how we would act. Not a complete and perfect knowledge of everything.
You smashed my WHAT!?!!?? 💢💪
Dependence solution solves this issue. Tho it opens new problems about whether does God know what hes going to do and does he have freedom to do otherwise, also separately it exacerbates the problem of evil, etc. Much simpler to just accept open theism..
Yeah and even ppl like Swenson have responses to this as well.
@@ryanbrown9833 To what, open theism?
@@zelenisok no not that, it sorta depends on your theory of time as well. Matthew grant has something on DUC as well.
Calvinists be like, yep, well said, preach!
As a Calvinist, you’re right 😂
(I acknowledge that you said there are counters, and counters to those counters, etc., but I want to write my counter here.)
This argument seems to be based on a misunderstanding or lack of consideration of what/who God is.
God, depending on the definition/reality, is a being which is outside of time. This is the common understanding.
So when you make a premise that says "... then God believed long before I existed...", it doesn't make sense. *You* exist in time, but God cannot "believe before" a certain time or event because he is not in the realm of time. His knowledge is also outside of time. In normal speech we do indeed call it as knowing "before", but it's inaccurate when we're referring to a being outside of time.
I guess what I'm trying to say is: If God is defined as a being that is not bounded by time, then we necessarily cannot accurately apply logic which relates to the temporality of God.
This argument may seem convincing at first, but have you considered the infinite silly word games I could come up with to counter it?
Love it! Thanks so much!!!
How God knowing that something will happen means that agents do not cause things. I don't think 3 necessary follows because of this. God knows all outcomes regardless of what plays out so agents are not restricted by foreknowledge.
can you do a short video on deliberation incompatibalism? Or the idea that it impossible or unreasonable to deliberate on what to do while believing that everything is predetermined
If I recall correctly, we *might* cover this in my video with Taylor Cyr!
@@MajestyofReasonHi Joe: ¿ Would you be kind enough to explain to us how theistic philosophers (like Enric F. Gel) support the idea that if theism is true, there must be such a thing as "divine judgment"? ¿ What do you understand by "divine judgment" and what scenarios can be expected if that proposition were true? ¿ Why should a god judge not only the actions, but also the beliefs of finite and limited creatures? Finally, regarding discussions about the fundamental nature of reality: ¿ Is Believing different from Knowing? ¿ Can you believe that a proposition is true and know that it is true? ¿ If our biases and experiences influence our beliefs and apparent certainties (or de facto certainties) which then influence our actions, is "divine judgment" fair?
I’m not convinced by this argument because there’s no such thing as “preventing a fact”. It’s logically impossible (since it would mean bringing it about that a fact is not the case, which makes no sense).
I can’t prevent the _fact_ that I will raise my arm at t (if it is a fact), purely as a matter of logic. But that doesn’t mean I can’t refrain from raising my arm at t, it just means I won’t.
To say that one can prevent a fact is *not* to say that one can bring it about that: a fact is not a fact. That would, indeed, be impossible. Instead, it’s to say that one can do something such that, were one to do it, there wouldn’t be such a fact at all. And this is clearly true: I can do something such that, were I to do it, it would not have been a fact that I raise my arm at t. For instance, I could have taken a paralytic drug before t. Had I done that, then it wouldn’t have been a fact that raise my arm at t. This is all that is meant by preventing a fact. What is *not* meant is that one has the ability to bring it about that: a fact is not a fact. So there is no issue here🙂
Just wondering about the basic setup of this argument. Is it standard Christian doctrine that God has foreknowledge? This implies an assumption about God's temporal relationship to historical reality. If God created time and space then, unless you're assuming (like WLC) that it changed it's nature somehow after creation, then it seems wrong to describe this relationship as "foreknowledge" or even knowledge. God would just look at the universe and see every point in it's history as "now"--the same way that we might look at a historical timeline and see everything laid out all at once.
Psalm 139:16 Your eyes saw my unformed substance; in your book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them.
Hello Joe, do you have any video on Alving Plantinga's EAAN?
I'd like to know how Naturalists deal with it, I certainly don't know how
Also, your rigorous methodology would certainly help
There are 4 possible environments or scenarios in which Alvin is making his argument, either:
1. his cognitive faculties are attributable to naturalism and evolution, and are reliable
2. his cognitive faculties are attributable to naturalism and evolution, and are not reliable
3. his cognitive faculties are attributable to a supernatural agent and are reliable -- a benevolent god
4. his cognitive faculties are *attributable to a supernatural agent and are not reliable* -- a malevolent god
The first two are the one's Alvin is considering. And that's usually where it ends, the assumption is that if naturalism generates a paradox, we have to default to "god did it" and this solves the problem. But there's still one more scenario Plantinga's argument has to rule out to succeed: option 4.
A theist might rule out #4 with "but the supernatural agent I believe in wouldn't do that. I belive in the type of supernatural agent who would give us reliable cognitive faculties". But notice how thin the EAAN really is here. How does Alvin come to presume his own argument, his own cognitive faculties are sound? By making an assumption about God. That's no different to the atheist saying "the kind of evolution I believe in would only give us reliable cognitive faculties".
Plantinga assumes that we will grant him the premise that our cognitive faculties are reliable, but they aren't. We know they aren't. There's no magical reliability to explain. Our brains take shortcuts and misinterpret the world all the time. You can google illusions that trick your brain, and shows how our brains suck at being reliable. This is expected on naturalism, but Plantinga seems unable to account for, especially under condition 3, the benevolent god. Plantinga lives in a fantasy, seemingly unread and uninformed on where cognitive science is at.
Given that our cognitives faculties can be shown to be unreliable in some spheres, it raises the question if god could give us slightly unrelaible cognitive faculties, then how does Alvin know he didn't give us wholly unreliable cognitive faculties? How exactly does Plantinga know he's in scenario 3, not scenario 4? He doesn't.
In other words, lurking in the background of the EAAN is an appeal to global scepticism. Plantinga wants to pull the rug out from under the atheist using that. But he's digging a hole for himself, because consisnteny requires that same scepticism must be applied to cognitive faculties attributable to a god.
The EAAN is a pitiful argument.
5:26 YOU GOT TIMING PERFECT AGAIN, JUST THEN I DID SMASH
Freely though?
This is the first time I ever liked one of his videos, on grounds that he was asking nicely.
Then he tells me he did what... 💀
I increased your utility by 1 point. Brevity may not be the soul of wit, but if you combine it with caffeine you at least have the rest of your morning to look forward to.
What do you think of Professor Dave’s philosophy series? Is it reliable to learn from?
Why not just read a book?
His videos are short so he probably won't get too deep into the topics he's covering.
@@slashmonkey8545 great idea! Thing is, I hate reading.
Hey, can I ask a quick question. If the necessary being/existence is consciousness (not assuming ADS here), then if your consciousness were to survive after death, would it be possible to somehow in some way join and merge with this necessary being consciousness? Or is it impossible because your own consciousness emerged as a totally contingent thing and you can't go from fully contingent and unnecessary to becoming necessary and eternal (even as a part, or as something that becomes eternally contingent on this necessary being)?
You can find out if this is possible, empirically :)
@@whelperw Are you telling me to pursue enlightenment? :)
@@bonbon__candy__1
Enlightenment? More like enflightenment from third (at list) floor.
@@whelperw Reported.
@@bonbon__candy__1 what? Your question is basically "What happens when I die", and I said, "Find out empirically"
yeah. I'm not convinced by this one. I think there's some semantic shenanigans going on that makes it seem like a solid argument.
I think God believes P because I choose to P. It's not that I cannot choose otherwise, it's that I will not choose otherwise. I don't think my leeway is affected. If I chose to not P, then God would not have believed I would P in the first place.
Is this just some excuse to get people to talk about P-ing?
Do you believe that determinism is compatible with free will?
@@Daniel-cz9gt
I think that's called compatibilism, isn't it?
I do wonder about determinism - if God determines everything, then free will is absent, but in this argument - unless I've misunderstood it - it's about what God knows, not what God determines. I think there's a subtle difference. So I think that theists who claim God has a 'plan' have a problem with free will, but theists who don't hold that God has a plan aren't affected by this issue.
So in short - 'knowing' is not 'causing'. The argument makes it seem as if God is causing P, but I'm not sure he is. He just knows that P will occur.
I think this is a sensible reply; it’s similar to the dependence response to the argument. Although I don’t think semantic tricks at issue!
The dependence response rejects the premise about the fixity of the past - in this case, premise (3). They say that sometimes, the past *is* under our control, in the sense that we currently have the ability to do things that would require the past to be different. This might seem implausible on its face; after all, surely I don’t have the ability to do something that would require the Andromeda galaxy to have formed in a different way. But they respond that it’s plausible in cases wherein a certain past occurrence *depends* on our future actions. Justin Capes, for instance, argues that we should embrace the fixity of the independent rather than the fixity of the past - ie, we should only think that we have no control over facts that are explanatorily independent of our actions. And if we say that God’s past beliefs depend on our future actions, then we can reject premise (3).
This is actually the response I would take if I were a theist, and I think it’s quite plausible. Admittedly, there are some really interesting objections to the dependence response (eg, from Taylor Cyr), but that’s a topic for another day!
@@bengreen171 “The argument makes it seem as if God is causing P”
I never get that impression from these kinds of arguments, for me the main point is the fact that there is a fixed way things are going to be regardless if it's God that is causing them.
@@MajestyofReason
I wonder if that implies B theory of time - if so, WLC will have to think twice before adopting that defence.
Yeah - I was being a bit florid by saying 'semantic trick' - I just meant that it inclines you to assume one thing is happening, when that's not really the case. The old 'assumed premises' problem that often creeps into these discussions - you hear one thing and a whole load of other things that aren't really entailed, pile in through the open door.
cheers.
P4 feels like it might be begging the question to me it feels like the premise i would want to reject. But i am having troible formulating my objection this philosophy stuff is hard man😢😢😢😢.
Does this argument was ever tackled: everything we conceive, we need a sensorial (vision, touch..) source from (unicorn= horse with horn, fairy= little being with power), so we would need something to be able to conceive the three omnis and god=> god exist.
I think that the omni are simply human powers extrapolated as we see various scales for everything. And it would follow that we cannot conceive inconcevable things, but i can conceive an inconcevable cat, or a god-eating cat.
I smashed the like button.
I used to make this argument a long time ago and I still haven't really heard any refutation of it. In the longer video does he go on to give any refutation of it?
As someone else said please do more of these short clips!
Edit: Any books you recommend to a beginner when understanding the problem of foreknowledge?
Hi MoR. Have you done any videos in the Philosophy of Time? I ask because I am interested in getting more into this branch of philosophy
Isn’t this essentially assuming that God’s knowledge of an action is also the cause of the action?
Nothing in the argument provided assumes anything about God _causing_ any action. So no, it doesn't assume that, nor is it necessary for the argument to work.
If you understand the modal fallacy you'll understand why this argument fails.
1) If God knows P then P is necessary
2) God knows P
3) therefore P is necessary
the above is fallacious. If you understand the modal fallacy you understand why its fallacious.
Presumably you're referring to the illicit modal operator shift in attempting to infer (2) from (1):
1. Necessarily, everything God believes is true. Formally, letting 'g' be God and 'Bxy' be x believes that y: □∀p(Bgp → p)
2. Everything God believes is necessarily true. Formally, ∀p(Bgp → □p)
Now, the inference from (1) to (2) is certainly invalid. But, crucially, nothing in the argument rests on this illicit shift from (1) to (2). Instead, the threat to leeway freedom comes from the fixity of the past: the past is over and done with, and we have no control over it. In other words, we have no power to prevent what’s already occurred. But if we could do otherwise, then *do* have power to prevent what’s already occurred - namely, we have the power to prevent God from having a particular belief millions of years ago. So, since we don't have such a power over the past, it follows that we can’t do otherwise.
Or so the argument goes! My sole point here is that there is no illicit modal operator shift here. The argument in the video is valid, and the truth (and justification) of its premises nowhere requires moving from a wide scope necessity operator to a narrow scope necessity operator.
@@robertsaget9697 Just saw your new comment. Yeah, the argument simply doesn't rest on that reasoning at all. Nowhere does the argument or any of its premises infer from God knowing P that P is necessary. That is nowhere to be found in the video.
@@MajestyofReason
For the argument to have any power we must say we can't do otherwise which is implicitly to claim a necessity. If its not a necessity then it must be conceded we can do otherwise... in which case the argument fails.
If we "cannot do otherwise" in some non necessary sense (and its false that necessarily we can't do otherwise) then I fail to see how anything of value can be derived from that which is a threat to leeway freedom.
In short, the only way to be successful is to argue a necessity (which entails a modal fallacy) or to argue that somehow possibilities aren't actually possible but somehow are actually fixed and necessary, which again is to argue a necessity.
@@robertsaget9697 The argument only 'says' that we can't do otherwise in the sense that it's a conclusion of the argument. It's not an assumption or premise which commits the modal operator shift fallacy; it's the validly inferred conclusion from the premises in the video. And as I explained, none of those premises infers from the fact that God knows p that p is necessary. If you listen back through the video, that is nowhere to be found :)
Still trying to digest everything but I don’t think I agree. God obviously has foreknowledge of every decision we make but I don’t think that takes away the responsibility we have for our decisions. Essentially it’s not that we couldn’t choose anything contrary to Gods foreknowledge but rather we wouldn’t choose anything contrary to Gods foreknowledge, which is a big difference.
Why wouldn't we choose anything contrary to God's foreknowledge? If we could do it, why wouldn't we do it from time to time?
@@Nexus-jg7ev Well I would say it’s because Gods foreknowledge is contingent on our decisions, not that our decisions are contingent on Gods foreknowledge.
@@samsmith4902 If it is contingent on our decisions, do you mean that he learns about them as we make them rather than knowing them in advance? This is the only way in which I can make sense of this contingency. If that's the case, you'd probably go for open theism accordung to which God doesn't know the future because this is metaphsycally impossible and God is omnipotent as far as metaphysical possibilities go. You could take this view and make the existence of an all-knowing God compatible with free will, however I am not sure if this will approach will work with the Abrahamic all-knwoing God for one important reason: central to Abrahamic religions is a robust and long prophetic tradition. Prophets and oracles usually foretell the future with the help of divine providence. But how can God reveal the future to these people if God himself can't know the future? If open theism is true, the Hebrew prophets are charlatans. If open theism is false, there's no free will, God can't be both just and unjust, so Hebrew prophets, again, are charlatans.
Your options, unless I had made a mistake somewhere in my line of reasoning, seem to be the followng:
1. Keep God and free will but renounce Abrahamic religions.
2. Keep Abrahamic religions, but renounce free will, although you'd still have to renounce Abrahamic religions because post mortem judgement can't be just and God is supposed to be just.
That's a serious dilemma.
But we couldn't choose anything at all if God chose not to create. God isn't a very knowledgeable bystander, but is instead the direct cause of absolutely everything else. Unless God himself lacked the freedom to create anything other than what he did, then he directly chose every choice made by creatures. He didn't merely foreknow them, he foreordained them, preselected them, elected to make them happen when he might have done otherwise. If God is the only one whose choices could have led to a different result (either a different choice made or no choice at all), then God is the only responsible agent.
How can god's foreknowledge be contingent upon your decision? In order for x to be contingent upon y, y must be logically prior to x. In virtue of being foreknowledge then your decision cannot be logically prior.
I have troubles understanding that.@@samsmith4902
this might be a stupid but what if god knows i will do x by my freewill
If he knows in advance you won't do it by your freewill. You are free if you can decide otherwise but if someone always knows how you decide you can't decide otherwise.
I’ve stated this previously, but again I disagree with using “believed”, for God rather than “knows”
God knows you will do x at T
In my view there are two instances of T,
T1 Gods view (Birds Eye view let’s say)
T2 the individuals real time ( 1st person view)
While God knows T1 will be instantiated by you at x event it is only when T2 is acted upon that T1 is affirmed because T1+T2 are two sides of the same coin, the only difference being one is you committing the event in real time while the other is through God’s eternal perception of all instances of time
I think the same problem applies, which is that God knowing it will happen dictates it must happen, so there's no freedom to do otherwise.
@@itsyaboidaniel2919sure but what dictates it must happen is that the Individual made it happen when he actualized it. I think there’s only a problem if you separate T1 from T2, but I consider both to be connected hence not a problem for my worldview
@@itsyaboidaniel2919so if I could explain to you it would be like an RPG where you have both a Birds Eye view of the real time map and a zoomed in (first person view) both are intertwined, the map is (past/present/future) so in order for x event to be in Gods timeline (Birds Eye view) x event must occur in real time. Thus one isn’t separate from the other but are the same thing via separate lenses
@@japexican007 Because God knows it will happen, there's no alternative. God's knowing of an event forced the event to actualize, otherwise God lacks knowledge. Going with the RPG analogy, those things will happen, but only once you turn on the game, and God as the creator of the universe has turned on the game so to speak. They could've "not happened" if you didn't turn on the game, but the game is in on, and we're helpless but to go forward with the script.
@@itsyaboidaniel2919that’s irrelevant, the fact that it will happen.
It’s whether it was freely done or not that’s relevant and by my view and how I showed you that it only actualizes in Gods eternal view when it’s actualized in real time that allows for freedom of the will. Sorry but agree to disagree
I have free will skip this. You force your assumptions.
The joke being that a God with divine foreknowledge has always believed that you would skip this video.
@@shassett79 Foreknowledge yes, full determenism no. We don't know how God knows without forcing all things, but He knows. Maybe existing in and out of time as he chooses.
@@Yaas_ok123 "Mysterious ways" is more a rationale than an argument, but whatever does it for you.
@@shassett79 Tricky stuff, blessings from Finland.
@@shassett79god had foreknowledge of my father's murder. God loves death and suffering, he wanted to see it come to fruition. God is evil.
The end is gold 😂
The problem of divine foreknowledge renders the concept of prayer utterly absurd.
Only if you think the problem succeeds. 😎😎😎😎
Depends on what you think prayer accomplishes
How does P3 not beg the question? It seems to assume that what God knows determines what we do but why not think it’s the other way around? What we do determines what God knows?
Great question! First, P3 does not assume that what God knows determines what we do; instead, P3 is just a particular instance of the claim that the past is outside our control -- it's over and done with, and we have no ability to prevent what's already happened. Take the assassination of Lincoln. This is a past occurrence. And it seems like it's currently out of your control -- there's nothing you can now do that would prevent it from happening. This seems to be a more general feature of the past: it's over and done with, and there's nothing we can do *now* that would prevent it from happening. We're powerless right *now* to do something that would result in there never having been the Holocaust, for instance. If this is a more general feature of the past, as proponents of the argument say is intuitively very plausible, then it likewise applies to whatever happened in God's mind billions of years ago. Those past states are just as out of your control as the assassination of Lincoln -- they're over and done with, and there's nothing you can now do that would prevent them from obtaining. Notice that none of this assumes that the past beliefs *determine* our actions. Even if they don't, they're still over and done with and out of our control, and that's all the argument needs. It's like the Lincoln assassination: that certainly doesn't determine your current actions, but it's still true that you're currently powerless to prevent it from happening! And that is all the argument needs.
But, second, this does open the argument up to what's called the dependence response. The dependence response rejects the fixity of the past -- some aspects of the past actually *are* under our control, and there *is* something we can do that would prevent it from happening. This is a serious response defended by philosophers like Justin Capes, Philip Swensen, and Trenton Merricks. It also has its detractors, such as Taylor Cyr. (Check out the debate between Swensen and Cyr on Capturing Christianity for some of Cyr's pushback on the dependence response!)
@@MajestyofReason I agree with the fixity of the past. I think that absurdity follows if it were possible for even God to have power over it.
God’s beliefs about future choices made by creatures endowed with leeway freedom are never mistaken but they are contingent. What is necessary is that God infallibly knows them but it is not necessary that they are what he knows they will be. I like the analogy by WLC to God’s knowledge of future contingent events to be to free will choices what an infallible barometer is to future weather systems.
The story of David saving Keilah addresses the argument of divine foreknowledge vs human freedom in a mind blowing, almost comical way. To preface for any who haven't read it, in Samuel 1:23, future king of Israel, David, is on the run from the current king Saul, who seeks his death out of fear that David will replace him as king some day soon.
The beginning of the chapter details David and his men coming up to the walled town of Keilah, where some marauding Philistines are looting their threshing floors and besieging the town. David asks God if he should attack the Philistines and save Keilah from their raiding, which God expediently tells him to go do. David is scared at first, as he's currently on the run from Saul, and not particularly wanting to start beef with their biggest enemy in the south, but God tells him He shall give the Philistines into his hand. So David and company went, beat the Philistines, took their cattle, and retired into Keilah for a short while.
Saul, being king, caught wind of this shortly after and says, "God's given David to me on a silver platter! He's as good as dead in that town, there's nowhere for him to run while he's surrounded by all those walls!" Saul then summons *all* of his forces for battle, where he would go down to Keilah, besiege it, and smoke David out like a rat in a trap.
David had also soon learned that Saul was plotting to seek him out there, and asked his priest to bring him the ephod they brought with them (its basically just a priestly garb). David then asks, "Hey God, I hear from good sources that Saul is plotting to pay Keilah a visit on my behalf. Are the people here going to give me up if he comes? Will Saul actually come down here as I've heard?"
God plainly says, *"He will."*
So flabbergasted was David by God's straightforward answer to his question, he asks God *AGAIN* if the citizens of Keilah would give him and his men up if Saul came.
And again, with the bluntness of a river stone, God says to David, *"They will."*
David, being the future king of Israel and all, was a sensible man; quick witted, some might say. Upon God telling him that Saul *will* come down to Keilah and the citizens *will* give him and his whole warband up to Saul when they do... *They hightailed it the hell out of there!* David took all of his men and gunned it for the wilderness, not even bothering to look back. When word got back to Saul that David had indeed fled Keilah, Saul disbanded his effort to capture David in that town entirely, and did not go to Keilah.
Why am I telling you all of this? Because God said *Himself* that Saul was going to Keilah and Keilah was going to give David up to him. But because David ran away, absolutely *none* of what God said was going to happen came to pass.
Surely, if David *had* stayed in Keilah, the exact events God foresaw would have happened, and the OT would have been a very different story from that point on. *But it didn't.*
TLDR: God is sovereign in his foreknowledge; He foresees every single outcome that our human freedom entails in our day to day life, just because he knows something *can* happen, or even if he says it *will* happen, this by no means indicates it is now fated for that thing to be. Hope this helps!
that didn't help at all
@@Opno A penny for your thoughts? What do you think my comment is missing?
@@bloodtalon2189 it's just really unconvincing
@@Opno How so?
@@bloodtalon2189 the questions and answers aren't about what will actually happen in the future, they're a hypothetical. He always knew they would run. And if he "knows all paths equally" then he doesn't really know anything, just basic cause and effect
Pardon me if I’m missing something here, but the claim of entailment is simply bc of perfect foreknowledge, isn’t it? Ie there’s no claim of control or planning in that, or is there?
Alex sent me over.
does this argument presuppose that the B theory of time is true? i always get confused about this
Yeah it sorta does presuppose a certain theory of time and a dependence theory could solve this problem, Philip Swenson has a paper on this as well.
Probably the theist just denies foreknowledge of events as being an aspect of perfection. Really the whole idea that certain qualities must or must not be part of a perfect entity was always kind of strange and a bit arbitrary. Is an aspect of perfection knowing everything? Why? Who defines what properties belong to a perfect entity? Does perfect mean maximally great in all respects? If so, then who says that maximal greatness entails complete foreknowledge? Maybe God can only know what is most probable, and that's the best anyone can do, even a perfect being. Because I really do agree with the logic of your position. But what it entails is more that you can't have free will and perfect knowledge at the same time. So rather than ask God to make a square circle, something that not even a perfect being can overcome (logical contradictions), I think it makes way more sense to just dismiss complete foreknowledge of all events. Because otherwise it really is a contradiction, especially when you ask about whether God knows what God will do in the future! If he does, then God has no free will, which is even stranger.
And to be honest I don't think its that absurd. If God doesn't know what choice you're going to make, then neither do you, even if you think you do. People change their minds all the time. I think God might have a pretty good idea of what you'll probably do, just as we might, but its not like we know with greater certainty than God that we will or won't raise our hands tomorrow. I think it is permanently up in the air for everyone. If it weren't, then you wouldn't truly have free will.
If God exists then wouldn't you think your intuitions about him, are a good defeasible guide to what he is?😅😅😅
We are also a bunch of folks who are philosophy enthusiasts and critique ideologies (read organized religions) using rational and philosophical arguments, especially Islam. There are not too many channels that do it and we might be a refreshing change.
no one goes to hell for believing or not believing in God, you will be separated from he that is Holy by the pain and suffering you’ve brought forth into the world. Scripture says the wages of sin is death aka the payment given for the pain and suffering you’ve brought forth is separation from he that is Life( God) thus separation from Life ultimately leads to death. You also don’t go to hell for not accepting Jesus, he merely offers to pay your sin debt, aka he offers his sacrifice on the cross ( his death) to pay the penalty you’ve incurred, to release you from your obligation so that you won’t have to die, rejecting his free gift isn’t what sends you to hell, your sins do that, you just refuse the forgiveness he offers to not have to go there.
Christ died (FOR YOUR SINS)
Was buried
Rose again (the third day)
Accept this truth and you shall not perish but have everlasting life by he who is The Life, Jesus The Christ!
“Jesus said to her, “I am the resurrection and the life. He who believes in Me, though he may die, he shall live. And whoever lives and believes in Me shall never die. Do you believe this?”
John 11:25-26 NKJV
+1 to utility
Read plantinga free will defense homie
If you were to not raise your hand at t, God's foreknowledge would have been different. On a Molinistic account, God possesses knowledge of contingently true counterfactual propositions logically prior to his creative decree. Meaning that we do have freedom. This is just a summary of Molinism, but wouldn't this be a valid answer to the problem you posed? William Lane Craig addressed something like this in 'Only Wise God'.
And I like philosophy so yes your videos are fun.
Excellent question! Importantly, molinism *in itself* doesn't challenge any of the premises of the argument; in fact, a molinist could accept all the premises, and some molinists do actually deny that have leeway freedom (and so accept the conclusion that we lack leeway freedom). But molinists could try opt for one of the main responses to the argument on offer: the dependence response. This response rejects premise (3) and says that some aspects of the past actually aren't fixed or beyond our control -- namely, those parts of the past which depend on our future actions. Of course, there are some challenges to the dependence response; but whether they succeed is a topic for another day! (If you're curious, see Taylor Cyr's pushback to Philip Swensen on Capturing Christianity when they discussed it!)
@@MajestyofReason thanks for your reply. I'll look into this more.
@@philamras3732 And thank *you* for the interaction!
@@MajestyofReasonHello Joe, do you have any video on Alvin Plantinga's EAAN?
To me it seems like a pretty solid solid argument against naturalism
Is the argument fairly air tight?
@@muhammadhassanaliiqbal1117 I haven’t made a video on it (though I briefly respond to it in my 12 hour video - see the pinned comment underneath it for timestamps). But here’s a document containing a small sample of respectable published criticisms: docs.google.com/document/d/1SJyeaMK1iYyExt065bJT-nGC92XBNkXhQ5kyvtI1L30/edit?usp=sharing
If I plan to raise my hand, it doesn't mean I will raise my hand, so I don't know for sure will I raise my hand or not, God can know what I think but also not be sure if I will succeed in raising my hand, so I don't know more than God
Can you debunk the claim that said : ontological argument beg the question?
Depends which argument you're talking about, but most boil down to question begging (A being exists necessarily, therefor a necessary being exists) or a triviality ( _If_ A being exists necessarily, then a necessary being exists) But if you have a version that's some derivation of one of those, I'd be interested in seeing it.
Here's the way I've explained the problem to non-philosophers without even mentioning God.
Imagine that somewhere in the universe there is a book which accurately foretells everything a particular person (call him Jones) will do from the moment he's born. Now the question is, if everything the book foretells is true, does Jones' have the power to do anything _other_ than what the book foretells? The answer is yes, because the book is nothing more than an accurate record of what Jones freely chooses to do. Jones has the power to do something other than what the book foretells, it's just that it's a power he chooses not to exercise.
Now consider the same example, but this time assume that the book is infallible. This new assumption changes the picture entirely. Now it's no longer possible for Jones to do something other than what the book foretells, for if the book is infallible, then by logical necessity, everything it foretells must happen.
To sum things up, in the first example, the book is not infallible. Because it's not infallible, Jones has the power to do something other than what the book foretells, and if he were to do so, then at least one thing the book foretells would be false. But if the book is infallible, then it cannot be within Jones' power to make anything it foretells false.
Putting this into a theistic context, if God is infallible and he knows all our future actions, then we cannot have the freedom to do something other than what God foreknows we will do. Therefore, none of our actions are free. Following the same logic, we would have to conclude that God isn't free with respect to his own actions, all of which he infallibly foreknows.
Explain this point to me:
If I know for sure that John will go to the theater with his girlfriend tomorrow, that John will kill her in the theater.
How does it follow that he loses responsibility, because if there is a substance (soul) John, then she is the primary effective reason in the act of intending to kill a friend, and not a series of dominoes before the big bang or into the endless past. That is, if I know X, how does it follow that X is not an actualizer, but I am. In fact, here is a symmetrical example: I know for sure that it's going to rain tomorrow, but obviously I'm not the cause of the rain, why it's happening. The very fact of knowing about an event, even an infallible one, should not entail denying the responsibility and primacy of the actor of intention - John, because he is the actor of intention, not God, God does not control John, otherwise John = the actions of God, but we are not talking about this, we are not talking about theological determinism.
@@ВладиславНемакин-ч2е You want to know why God is responsible for what John does in the example you've outlined above. The answer to that is fairly straightforward, given the assumptions that (a) God has free will, and (b) that his knowledge of the future is infallible. If (a) and (b) are both true, then prior to creating the universe, God knew with certainty that John would murder his girlfriend. God could have prevented that in several ways: (1) he could have chosen not to create the universe at all, (2) he could have chosen to create a universe in which John and/or his girlfriend do not exist, or (3) he could have chosen to prevent John from murdering his girlfriend. But in your example, God chose to do none of these things. To the contrary, he deliberately chose to create the universe in which John murders his girlfriend, and that makes God both causally and morally responsible for John murdering his girlfriend. This of course doesn't mean that John bears _no_ responsibility for his actions, as you imply above. John is responsible for murdering his girlfriend, but so is God, because God deliberately set in motion the chain of events that he knew with certainty would lead to John murdering his girlfriend.
Rather than future events being casually dependent on God's foreknowledge, isn't another notion that God's foreknowledge is counterfactually dependent on future events?
This is similar to the dependence response, which would probably be my response if I were a theist!
“dependent on God's foreknowledge”
Does the argument depends on this, it never seemed the case for me.
Isn't God supposed to be unchanging (because he's already perfect) and non-contingent on any other factors (cuz he's already perfect) though?
bingo
@@krzyszwojciech True, but God can imagine Joe raising his hand at time (T) or not, and as an eternal being his acts are timeless, meaning what is true at any instant is true at all instances. Thus, God has eternally known that Joe will raise his hand at time (T), if that how events would have naturally unfolded. If Joe was not going to raise his hand at time (T), God would have known that instead for all eternity. That fact of whether Joe would raise his hand is external to God, and does not change God's nature either.
Why is it necessary that God have a belief about every single decision that we make? Couldn't he suspend belief, or alternatively have beliefs for every possible outcome of our decisions as moral agents without impacting our actual decisions?
I hope Trent responds. I feel like I have a rebuttal brewing but im too drunk/scatterbrained right now to put it together.
If we ask God question "What will happen to me next month?", He will answer with:
Your first case, "I don't know"
In second case, "Here goes my hours long monologue about EVERY SINGLE possible outcome you will find yourself in". So he wouldn't be able to make concrete answer, because there's no concrete future.
_"Why is it necessary that God have a belief about every single decision that we make?"_ It _isn't_ necessary... If God isn't omniscient, or you're using some watered-down concept of omniscience.
@@ajhieb Why is it necessary IF God is omniscient? Aren't you the guy who ran from every other conversation you had with me because you don't have a coherent worldview?
@@harlowcj _"Why is it necessary IF God is omniscient?"_ Because that's what it _means_ to be omniscient. (Unless you're using a watered-down concept of omniscience)
@ajhieb Wouldn't that be a contradiction to God's omnipotence to claim it's necessary? Or are you using a watered down version of omnipotence?
Confusing certainty with necessity. Different things. It's just non sequitur. It's conflating two different things: 1. being powerless to prevent God from knowing the choice and 2. being powerless to have chosen differently.
You seem to have failed to follow Joe. The video explains neatly why the view you take is wrong, because they're not "different things"; the one necessarily entails the other. Per your theology, God *does* know the choices you will make, no?
Grant Joe that, and everything in the clip follows. No freedom.
@@stephengalanis No, it doesn't follow. Certainty does not mean necessity, they are different concepts. Would could have been does not necessarily have to be what is.
@@Dizerner Only because your are compartmentalising your knowledge. There's no seeing-the-whole at once. How convenient of you to forget God's properties. If omnimax God knows p will be chosen, either 1) God can be wrong and you can freely chose not-p, or 2) God is right and you can't. Joe talks about this in this very video you chose to comment on, yet there's precious little engamgent with that from you, only ipse dixit table thumping that it's not so. Show us why.
Would / could / have been doesn't apply to your God. Bad comparison. God doesn't deal in uncertainty, he knows. When God knows you will choose p, it's not "could", or "maybe". It is necessarily going to happen. You tried to insert uncertainty here, but I am slamming that shut by pointing at your own beliefs about God. There's no wiggle room without gutting core theology about God. God is always right about what he knows, and this entails that you must, in a fatalistic sense, choose p. (This doesn't remove the will. You may genuinely will p to be the case and willing choose p. It's just not a free will.)
Christians are in the logically and empirically wrong position of saying we choose what we think. It's easily demonstrated that this is not the case. Think of a city. At random. Pause for a few seconds.
I majored in philosophy, so has / does Joe. And I know you're wrong. I know how your logic, in the technical sense, is breaking down. I know how professors and grad students would try to correct you. Your word game is not philosophy. It's a post-hoc bandaid to enable you to hang on to a belief already established. I was there. I was a devout Christian. I won Bible quizzes. I memorised Proverbs (from the KJV!) as a teen at my religious school.
Also, notice that insiting on your ability to begin a causal chain weakens the cosmological argument. It seems we already have billions of examples of an unmoved mover that are not God. That's what libertarian free will is. It's a causal chain that begins with you, no prior causes, no determinism.
What city did you think of? Was it Durban, South Africa? Hands up any reader who had Durban. You absolutely know Durban is a real city that exists, but it likely wasn't coming up for you. It wasn't on the cards. You couldn't choose what to think. I wasn't coercing you in any possible way. You were free to choose any city, and yet the various cities around the world were not equally weighted. It was constrained and coerced by your life experience. Where you've been on holiday, where friends or family live etc. You did not have the free will to choose something you didn't think of.
@@stephengalanis You need to examine some table thumping from yourself, not just others, lol. You make constant assertions with no backing.
Classic Theism does entail "middle knowledge," God knowing hypothetical scenarios. God knows all possible worlds, and all alternate and possible choices. This is not some "niche" thing I came up with, as you seem to be implying.
I did interact with the video by claiming it holds a non sequitur, and it does. The reason is, it is confusing categories. They call this a modal scope fallacy. Certainty does not deal with necessity, because something can be unnecessarily certain (from, as you point out, the timeless perspective).
It is incumbent upon the video and you to somehow prove that something being certain always and only means being necessarily certain, above the bald assertion that you both are making. You cannot do this, because it does not logically follow.
You did nooootttttttt
Oh, my. So God knows everything I will ever do, so I have no freedom. That's what you boil it down to??
You have heard of God's Middle Knowledge, right?
God having middle knowledge challenges no premise in the argument. This point has been made extensively in the literature on the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will, and it’s granted by many molinists specializing on the problem.
@@MajestyofReasonThat's an assertion, not an answer.
@@MajestyofReasonThat's an assertion, not an answer. If you're going to make a claim, then explain why Middle Knowledge doesn't have an effect.
@@thecloudtherapist Why don’t you just read some of the literature? These arguments are treated in depth there.
@@makaveli2.03 _"You have heard of God's Middle Knowledge, right?"_ That's a quip, not a rebuttal. If you want to challenge Alex's argument, it's on YOU to show how God's Middle Knowledge DOES address the argument.
I like your intellectual virtue from Iran 🇮🇷 (the enemy of your country😅).
Wait this wasn’t a troll of Trent, you actually think this is a good argument? 😂
Might have to do a full rebuttal of this like I did for your position on existential interia
God exists outside of time. He can know what we will do without directly causing or preventing us from doing it.
I watched this video, now I know what you will say in the video with perfect foreknowledge. Yet I didnt cause you to say what was said in this video. I think it would be the same way with God.
Someone will argue that, yes, but that's because this video happened in the past and cannot be changed. I argue from Gods perspective he has perfect knowledge of history all at once, outside of time. We might not be able to comprehend what that's like, but that's not evidence against it.
So God could have foreknowledge and also allow free will.
In reply: leeway freedom is not to be understood in a modal sense. Jonathan Edwards rightly pointed out long ago that when someone says, "I could have done x", they usually mean that there was no external barrier to my doing x. That is to say that no external determinant made me do x, and no external barrier prevented me from doing not-x.
To illustrate that knowledge--even infallible foreknowledge--does not do this, consider: suppose a teacher got a blast of foreknowledge in which she knew that, upon giving some pop quiz, Little Timmy will cheat. Maybe she gets a prophecy from God or something. Or suppose God creates a teacher who shares his infallible foreknowledge of the future. That infallible foreknowledge isn't an external determinant of Timmy's course of action. Timmy cannot say "you knew I would cheat? You made me cheat!"
I think the factor that makes your scenario fundamentally different is that a God is typically a creator. So the creator that created Little Timmy, knowing that Little Timmy would cheat in the test, made Little Timmy cheat by deciding to create Little Timmy in a way that would make him cheat.
Thanks for the response! However, philosophers working on free will have almost unanimously come to reject the 'no external barriers' analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Counterexamples include, e.g.,
(i) Brain tumors: Someone might have a brain tumor that completely overrides heir behavior, in such a way that they clearly cannot do otherwise. But there is no external barrier to them doing otherwise.
(ii) Extreme phobia: Suppose that Danielle is psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a
blond-haired dog due to an extreme phobia. Now imagine that, on her sixteenth birthday, unaware of her
condition, her father brings to her two puppies to choose between, one being
a blond labrador, the other a black labrador. He tells Danielle just to pick up
whichever of the two she pleases and that he will return the other puppy to
the pet store. Danielle happily and unencumberedly -- without any external barrier to doing otherwise -- does what she wants and
picks up the black lab.
When Danielle picked up the black lab, she was not able to do otherwise, but yet there was no external barrier to her doing otherwise.
@@phill234 That assumes that Timmy's nature is what causes him to cheat. But why think this? That seems to beg the question against the claim of freedom
@MajestyofReason I should be clear: by external determinant I mean causal determinant. For instance, having a brain tumor *is* something that's external to the will of the person that then places certain strictures on the will. So by external determinant, I mean determinant external to the will. I actually flesh this out in my article in the Heythrop Journal, but in effect--I mean that free will requires that there be nothing that externally determines it's motions (the will's), and no barrier to its doing x (else it's not free to do x).
@@anglicanaesthetics Thanks for the clarification!
Here's a remaining worry though. Even if nothing causally determines me to do X and there are no external barriers to me doing not-X, it still seems like I can't now do not-X if, say, my doing not-X requires that the Aztec empire never existed. To threaten my ability to do other than X, the Aztec empire's existence need not causally determine me to do X; in fact, maybe *nothing* causally determines me to do X. Even still, it seems like it's enough to remove my ability to do other than X that (i) my doing other than X would require that the Aztec empire never existed, and (ii) the Aztec empire is over and done with and out of my current control. But it's the same thing that proponents of the incompatibility argument say is happening in the case of foreknowledge. Even though God's past belief (like the Aztec empire) is not causally determining my actions -- indeed, even if *nothing* is causally determining my actions -- it's still enough to remove my ability to do otherwise. For (iii) my doing otherwise would require that some past belief in God's mind never existed, and (iv) like the Aztec empire and anything else that already obtained in the past, God's having that belief billions of years ago is over and done with and out of my current control. Just as (i) and (ii) were enough to threaten my ability to do otherwise in the Aztec empire case *even if* I'm not causally determined and *even if* there are no external barriers in place, (iii) and (iv) seem enough to threaten my ability to do otherwise in the divine foreknowledge case *even if* I'm not causally determined and *even if* there are no external barriers in place. Or so the argument goes!
Of course, you might think that the very existence of the Aztec empire is a kind of external barrier to your doing otherwise in the case described. But then the same can be said about God's past belief billions of years ago: its very existence is a kind of external barrier to your doing otherwise. Or you might say that we actually do have a kind of control over some aspects of the past (maybe those aspects thereof that depend on our future actions -- and perhaps God's past belief is among those aspects). This is a respectable move, but it's a different rejoinder than the one you're offering. The move here is the dependence response and amounts to a rejection of P3.
Hope this makes sense! :)
Your understanding of the divine knowledge and free-will is wrong.
Because?
asserting a claim without any justification is not an argument
Please illuminate us with your correct understanding
@@davidddd2001 Too often theists just assert things without any reasons whatsoever. I get it that this is just a YT comment section, but that's still too lame. Either provide a few sentences to tell why you assert whatever you assert or don't bother posting anything, right?
God doesn’t _believe_ I will do such-and-such at time T. Rather, He infallibly _knows_ what I will do.
And no matter what I choose to do, it is impossible for Him not to have infallibly known it from all eternity.
But His foreknowledge does not _cause_ my free actions, for there is no causal link between what I ultimately choose to do and Him simply knowing it.
Rather, my freely chosen actions are what constitute His foreknowledge, which inform His decision sans the universe which world He will actualize.
How can we know we have libertarian free will?
No free will = no moral accountability.
Moral accountability = free will.
Anybody (including Joe) willing to argue that the N*zis couldn’t help themselves?
I know you like accuracy so when you say "no human is ever morally responsible" what you really mean is "morality according to theists", because we ALL know that you can both have no leeway freedom and still be morally responsible because we are still agents in this world that can affect those around us and so according to NON-THEISTIC definitions of morality we are still responsible