Germany planned for a short war. What went wrong?
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- Опубликовано: 7 мар 2023
- When the First World War broke out, Germany had a massive problem. The alliance between France and Russia left them totally surrounded, with only Austria Hungary on their side. Outnumbered, Germany's chances in a long war were slim.
And yet the German Army of 1914 was still confident of victory. In August, they launched a huge enveloping attack through Belgium, smashing the Allied forces in battle after battle, and Germany seemed to be on the brink of victory.
But just as Paris hoved into view, the tide of the battle, and arguably the whole war, changed. French and British forces counterattacked at the Battle of the Marne and forced the Germans back. Leaving their plan for a short war in tatters. So, what went wrong? Why did the German plan fail? And how close did it come to succeeding?
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'War Map of Europe' Courtesy of University of Illinois Library.
Bataille de la Marne - Intitulée Route de Varredes by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
Bataille de la Marne, Combat D'Etrepilly - canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 tirant sur une ferme occupée par les Allemand by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
Lee Enfield SMLE n°1 MKIII firing by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
Bataille de la Marne - Attente avant la charge en plaine de Chaintrix by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
Bataille de la Marne - Septembre 1914, Plateau d'Etrepilly aux abords du cimetière-charge à la baionnette by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
Bataille de la Marne , Combat D'Etrepilly, Artillerie de Campagne en position à l'entrée du village by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
En face du village d'Ambleny, un pont de bateaux avait été, pendant la nuit, établi par le Génie by Antoine Vasse Nicolas. (CC BY 2.0). creativecommons.org/licenses/...
I find it funny that the German and French were both thinking of outflanking each other by invading Belgium
For centuries the (later) Belgium had been the favourite battlefield of Europe's great powers.
Which makes me think, would Britain had joined the Central Powers If France invaded Belgium before Germany could?
@@Akkise No. They were a member of the entente, and had long feared the rising power of Germany. A German victory would have been a nightmare situation for the British. The invasion of Belgium was only part of the reason Britain declared war.
@@nickiorio4487 It was the only reason Britain declared war. The government would have fallen if they tried to go to war without the violation of Belgium neutrality.
Welcome to Belgium... gateway to war for over a century
The original schlieffen plan had a much stronger German right flank. And the German left flank was weak in order for it to be pushed back. This would have meant that French forces would move farther east into the trap formed by the German right flank.
It’s strategically inconsistent for the German High Command to plan simultaneously for a swift capture of French coal-rich areas and vehemently defend their own, never understood that.
Great, save for the part where the "Schlieffen Plan" wasnt actually a plan, it was a memo... written by a retired general... for a war just against France.... using more troops than Germany actually had... and that was never even delivered to the German army and was found by his daughter years after the war.
@@_Beamish It's my understanding that von Schlieffen's plan called for the absolute minimum of force for the defense of Germany itself. Everything was to be put into the offensive and Germany was to be prepared to lose territory, especially in the east, in order to gain a swift victory over France. von Schlieffen's thought was that any lost territory could swiftly be regained once France had been defeated.
But, von Moltke wasn't quite the gambler that von Schlieffen had been, so he reworked the plan to provide more defenses for vulnerable parts of Germany.
Another point that I didn't see mentioned in the video was that the two corps which were transferred from the west to the east to deal with the threat to E. Prussia from the Russians were the two corps which were slated to pass west of Paris, enveloping the city. Had those two corps actually managed to get around Paris and cut the rail lines, it would have been far more difficult, if not impossible, for the French to launch their counter attack at the Marne.
So, between the general weakening of the offensive against France in pre-war planning, combined with the further weakening in response to the Russian attack on E. Prussia, it really wasn't von Schlieffen's plan any longer.
It's as you suggest, inconsistent. One might think von Moltke didn't really understand that the von Schlieffen plan was intended to be a knock-out blow and that the force concentration needed to achieve that knockout was to be assembled by accepting the risk of territorial losses elsewhere.
the original plan would is even worse in a political ( add 1 ennemy ) logistical ( more troupe to suply) and strategicaly ( rusian would take berlin with so low troupe to defence like they almost do in 1914 just barely stop this time they would not stop with so low troupe and french would still hold because how better defence work in ww1)
The original plan was not feasible logistically. Even the revised plan wasn't.
Reading into the history of the S plan shows it was only a concept under Count von Schlieffen which he dismissed for two reasons prior to retirement in 1906. One- It could not be supported logistically at its furthest advance due to rail line orientation in France (they radiated out from Paris). Two- The German Army did not have the resources to carry it out, principally because the Imperial Navy was making heavy demands both on the armament industries and on manpower allocation.
No, the German army actively supported the navy... because that allowed the army to hide behind the navy and claim there was no money for expansion, something the Prussian army wanted to avoid AT ALL COSTS because it would dilute the army's political reliability by having to accept more "German", as in non-Prussian, officers.
Good point. The kaiser was obsessed with defeating the RN.
John Keegan's book on the war describes von Moltke as worried about Paris("Paris is a fortress "), wishing for two more corps, but constrained by what the available roads could carry.
Oops! Schlieffen, not von Moltke!
There were other reasons, like the realities of having to either march on foot, or pull by beasts of burden, just about everything from railheads.
There was the paradox of if the Germans did have sufficient troops for such an ambitious plan (the requirements of which supposedly exceeded the troops that the Germans could mobilize and invest in the campaign, even after the expansion of German forces), road constraints of the time made it very difficult to deploy such forces effectively.
The schedules for the advances were optimistic, unless Belgium just rolled over and allowed forces to pass through with little resistance (like in Luxembourg).
The far right spearhead/advance was more aspirational, even if they supersized the manpower committed to that wing. Little is know about how realistic it was to avoid another extended Siege of Paris like that of 1871 (19 Sept 1870 to 28 Jan 1871).
No one in Germany was going to tolerate such a downsizing of the blocking force in the east that Schlieffen contemplated after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905.
It is also worth remembering how low the war of 1870 took to end, even after it was militarily decided. The Schlieffen plan seems very optimistic in this regard
Great, save for the part where the "Schlieffen Plan" wasnt actually a plan, it was a memo... written by a retired general... for a war just against France.... using more troops than Germany actually had... and that was never even delivered to the German army and was found by his daughter years after the war.
The plan over all was genius, it was un-till it was weakened by changing it.................
That, is simply untrue
The plan was rather pessimistic, it acknowledged that Germany couldn't realistically fight and win a two front war and thus had to achieve a quick win on one front, realistically the vastness of Russia prevented any decisive win against them so France was the much plausible target
But the plan was undermined repeatedly by Moltke the younger (and reportedly Wilhelm II) who reassigned troops from the critical German northwestern front to the eastern and southwestern fronts
-First of all there was no von Schliefen Plan. There was only a military plan for a military exercise. It was a plan for a 'what if' 1905 military exercise, a what if simulation completed just before on Anthony von Schiefen's retirement in 1905. von Schiefen died in January 1913 over a year before the great war.
-When the war broke out there were no War Plans filed in the German war office for a two front war, there was nothing. Officers had to go to von Schliefens daughter and have her help them find the plans for the exercise from his personal files.
-The "von Schliefen plan" is really to some extent British propaganda as its painted Germany as commuted to world conquest thereby justifying the war and American involvement.
-The German High Command was embarrassed they actually had not plans and had to resort to a military exercise they hadn't filed and had in fact lost went along with the claims that they had a plan.
-The Actual exercise and plan was discovered in East Germany (then under Soviet Rule) and revealed after the reunification of Germany.
-"The Real Schlieffen Plan" by Terance Zubehor explains this in depth.
@@Truth4thetrue What plan?
I heard that another big reason why Von Kluck decided to change (and greatly shorten) the direction of the Right Wing of the German advance was also due to the fact that the soldiers on this flank had to march so much further than the other German Armies in order to go around and encircle Paris (and were already becoming completely exhausted as a result). The Schlieffen Plan appeared to deny the definite possibility as to how much exhaustion could result from the exceptionally greater distance that the right wing of the German Armies would have to march in order to actually go around and encircle Paris. I read about this in a thoroughly detailed classic book called "The Guns of August" by Barbara W. Tuchman.
I know the book. My dad was obsessed by it. I read it (and many, many other books about it) and visited the ww1 front sites for a lot of years. Verdun is my obsession.
That version is nonsense. If you really want to understand the issue you should read Zuber's "The Mons Myth".
I had heard he had tinkered with the original plan as the right flank had a much greater distance to travel to perform an arc and if they set off at the same time as a war began what looks logical on a map won't work on the ground, also terrain and transport links the land towards the coast is flatter and quicker to cover but that means an opponent can do the same
that book is phenomenal, i read it earlier this year and i'm looking forward to rereading it soon
"At the Battle of the Marne, the British and the French...". Ok, technically you can say that, but it is really pushing it. The French sent 64 divisions into the battle, the Britts....6. So, if you are honest, you just say..."the French with some British help".
Blackadder's analysis is also very true of the Schlieffen plan: "There was tiny flaw in the plan: It was bollocks."
No, he was talking about deterrence. "It was just too much trouble not to have a war."
Very interesting and clear explanation about the beginnings of WW1! Fascinating to see the switch from almost Napoleonic tactics to the trenches that we more commonly associate with WW1.
The tactics of 1914 bore no resemblance at all to Napoleonic warfare, that's just silly.
@@patavinity1262 maybe they meant Napoleon the Third, but yes, it is too far to be considered (the original) Napoleonic War tactics
@@patavinity1262 Sorry, Im no history buff, the video just reminded me of the depictions of armies standing in line in fields firing at each other. Youre probably right that these things don't have much to do with each other
@@patavinity1262 The actual tactics of course bore no resemblance but the mindset of the French was still very much that of Napoleonic (the first) warfare. In such warfare the way you destroyed was to close with the enemy and use the bayonet because the rifles of Napoleon's time took so long to reload you couldn't kill many soldiers with them. That's why there were so many casualties, the French kept believing that the élan of the French troops would win the day by closing with the enemy. But no amount of élan can make up for a stream of bullets coming from machine guns and shrapnel from artillery.
@@qornopiratu Actually, I think you gave up your argument too easily. I've read in several books that one of the reasons there were so many losses in WWI is that most of the generals, and especially the French, still had a Napoleonic mindset. As the saying goes, generals are always fighting the last war and that was never truer than in WWI, at least for the Russian and French. Of course they weren't doing cavalry charges but the French generals still believed that the way to win was to close with the enemy and use the bayonet as was true with the far more primitive weapons in Napoleon's era but led to slaughter in modern warfare.
The German field marshal, known as Moltke the Elder, believed in developing a series of options for battle instead of a single plan, saying “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength.”
The Russians invaded East Prussia earlier than the Germans thought possible. One Corps was withrawn and sent east from the Liege area and although it arrived too late to have any affect on the battle of Tannenburg, it was sorely missed on the western front.
They did send 2 corps which both was 2 late east and would be needed West
From what I understand, a lot of the German army were Reservists who were not used to 30 days of hard marching non-stop only to be met by battle after battle. The Schlieffen Plan was on a tight deadline with no allowance for things to go wrong.
Rather German
Your maps, narration, animation and the additional explanation from the guest speaker makes this the best doc on the opening months of the Great War so easy to understand. Thanks Ever So Much for this video!
no plan survives first contact with the enemy. curious to see how Moltke Senior would have done it.
Yeah, it was way to rigid.
He propably would have noticed the impact of artillery in modern warfare. Due to its industrial base, Germany had more artillery guns than all its enemies combined. Germany most certainly would have won a war against France and Russia alone. The problem the Schlieffen plan was supposed to solve didn't exist.
@@doppelwaffen The Schlieffen Plan was an exercise, a thought experiment in how to put it all on the line for the maximum chance of a quick total victory. It was okay as a thought experiment but stupid as a plan.
Germany needed only a modest successful thrust to the west, and then it could maul the French Army and get Paris to accept peace in return for restoration of the French borders. That would leave Russia at Germany's mercy, and Moscow would be induced to sue for peace in return for real territorial concessions.
The Schlieffen Plan was the worst possible strategy, as it committed the fate of the German nation to total victory. Having paid such a high price in blood to seize 1/6th of France, the Kaiser was not interested in giving back such valuable large swaths of territory for peace. It was physically possible, but the German political imagination became more and more focused on how defeating France and Britain would yield control of the Middle East and even possibly India. They looked for the pie in the sky scenario that could justify the horrid bloodbath as actually serving German interests.
You think Moltke and Schlieffen weren't aware of the tag that Moltke's uncle invented?
Neither had a "plan" in the way the word is normally used.
They had schedules for deployment and they had staff doctrine about how units should fight and move.
My takeaway from this video is that never expect a short victory. Always prepare for a long war, if you have to wage a war. A short victory only comes as a bi-product of a determined protracted war.
In the second ww France thought it would be a long war. And look what happend......
@@ulfosterberg1979 but french organisation was a mess. unwilling to fight. hell the saaroffensive was stopped,troops pulled back and they refused to shell german positions because they fears retaliatory strikes...IN A WAR!
if france and briten would have gone all in when germany attacked polan they could have probaly seized the ruhrarea or severaly threatened it.
but they just sat there,doing nothing while germany was working out the problems they faces when attacking poland.
Why is that your takeaway, what do you base that on? How would your plan look like? The allies had more divisions (even without the US), twice the population and Germany had to fight on two fronts. Why would your strategy be a long war of attrition when you are outnumbered, under blocade and have somewhat fewer ressources? Would you not make use of prussian maneuver warfare?
When Russia invaded Ukraine hoping to take it in a week or two, they certainly forgot to look at history!
You can still achieve fast victories if done right.
But going all in with that kinda plan and that kinda risk is almost suicidal.
Its like
"Dont worry,i only need 25 minutes to court if every light is green,no slow traffic and nothing slows me down AT ALL. I only need to consider 26 minutes driving time. That should be plenty! If i, by some micracle fail do make it in that time i get thrown into jail the second im late but HOW REALISTIC WOULD THAT BE!?"
Nobody should ever consider such plans and try to enact them with such stakes.
The taxi thing played no role in French victory, what made the difference was that France, thanks to the way its rail network was developed, could move troops from Paris right to the front (that is from west to east)
The Germans on the other hand not only were slowed down by the Belgium resistance (as mentioned, against all expectations, even the mightiest forts felt immediatly as soon as the German big guns arrived but each lost day counted), by the flooded fields and by the sabotage to the rail tracks (they repaired them quickly but, again, time was not on their favour), but the Belgium railnetwork developed mostly south to north along the French border and not east to west into France.
That meant they couldn't move supplies and reinforcements as quickly as the French and the more they advanced the worse it got (it didn't also help the fact that many their tracks soon broke down due to this overwork and they lacked the rubber to replace the tires, something that exacerbated their wear even more)
The taxi thing as you call it become a large propaganda symbol exactly like the little ships during the Dunkirk evacuation.
The Plan failed because the Kaiser didn't expect a contemptible little army to intervene and slow its advance to a crawl. The British Army had been modernised since the Boer War, and arrived very swiftly. In an era before radio, German soldiers didn't realise they were at war with the British and didn't know who was shooting at them. Without British intervention, the Kaiser would've reached Paris as planned.
@@tonyz7216 What rubbish. My Grandfather was at Dunkirk, and he got away on one of those civilian boats. And he told me that there were hundreds of them, and without them a lot more soldiers would not have gotten away.
@@raypurchase801 source : trust me bro
@@TheFrenchscot Every book about the German advance covers this. Lacking heavy weapons and being smaller than its German counterpart, the British could only mount a fighting retreat. This delayed the German advance and both sides decided to dig in. The Kaiser had always assumed the British wouldn't intervene and that their Army would be slow to mobilise. He was mistaken.
Thanks for this bit of history.
It's interesting to have watched history repeat itself in Ukraine last year. The Russian army took their 150,000 "Professionals" and split them up into five or so smaller, weaker arms meant to encircle, Those arms were stopped in the North, the arms sent to encircle Kviv failed to achieve their objectives and in the ensuing months, a static line formed in the Southeast where the Russians dug into trench systems, like its 1915 again.
Don’t forget it also had to end in about 72 hours, and evenutally streched out for more than a year and still ongoing
@@Cigmacica And Russia also finds itself under an economic blockade that is slowly, but surely eroding their economy.
150,000 wasnt anywhere near enough for such an operation, which leads me to think they really did believe their own BS about being greeted as liberators.
@@Ukraineaissance2014 true although I don't don't know the numbers of the Russian army as at 24 February but their number at arms wasn't like a million or so to staff an occupation. Although less spectacular on the eve of the invasion of Iraq Baghdad was supposed to fall in 4-5 days the time it would have taken to reach without obstruction, and the Iraqis all welcome their "liberators" didn't exactly go to plan either despite the balance of forces being nothing like as even as Russia Vs Ukraine+NATO . Obviously Russia must have felt things had got so critical they had to invade, that's an expensive endeavour just in itself and disruption to trade etc. People wonder why Russia missed a trick in 2014 after its Crimea grab, there was the murky circumstances of how Crimea was assigned to Ukraine in 1954 which was supposed to be confirmed by a referendum but the Soviet authorities didn't as they knew that the majority of the people wouldn't support it. Russia gained Crimea easily and didn't want to antagonise further unlike the USA and it's hangers on who bombed Serbia for 79 days to force them to give up Kosovo Russia in 2014 did nothing of the sort. Also at the time Russia wanted to keep the broadly positive relationship with the west invading Ukraine which was in disarray would have ruined it indeed there's a reason people forget why nations do or don't go to war; reputation if the relationship is positive why wreck it if negative there's less to loose. Also financial Russia at the time used swift for electronic payments if they invaded Ukraine in 2014 like they did in '22 it would have been cut off the ability to buy anything without cash or barter would have stopped and there would have been nothing they could do about it. Also Belarus which opposed the takeover of Crimea but urged acceptance of the reality and at the time didn't allow Russian deployments in the country allowed it's territory to be used to assist the Russian invasion something that would have been impossible in 2014. In the years since a strong sense of Ukrainian identity developed and a desire to differentiate from Russia when previously it was more of a practical jog along relationship not best buddies but not antagonists either and between 1991 and 2014 military links between the two nations was active with both nations supplying parts and munitions to eachother.
@@charlesburgoyne-probyn6044 I live in Canada. I'm 67 years old and I have known many ... I mean a lot of Ukrainian Canadians over my life. Ukrainians have a big diaspora here that has accumulated since the 19th century (They were even interred by the Canadians in 1914 because Ukraine was Austro-Hungarian at the time.) I can tell you for sure that they ALL had a passionate sense of being Ukrainian, a deep dislike of Russia and that clearly stretched back for generations. It is a strong culture that I have seen expressed here throughout my life. This propagandist idea that Ukrainian identity suddenly emerged in 2014 is Russian justification to themselves for yet one more genocidal invasion of a neighbour. They've done it so many times before to so many nations around them that there is a lineup of their victims wanting to join NATO for protection from them as soon as possible.
Love your work 👍
I'd say there was a catastrophic underestimation of the enemy forces plus once one country started the mobilisation process it snowballed out of control.
Hello Julian, how are you doing?
Terrific video!
The plan failed for one reason and one reason only. And that reason is that the plan had the flexibility of 10 year old concrete. It was written as if the enemy would just let the German army stick to it's time table and not interfere with it in Any Way whatsoever. Wars don't work that way. Your enemy's #1 job in any war is to screw with your plans as much as possible in every way humanly possible.
Well if von Moltke hadn't diverted those two army corps to East Prussia (were they weren't needed, as even before Tannenberg von Hindenburg told von Moltke that he required no reinforcements) the British and French would have never been able to cross the Marne on von Kluck's left.
@@sync9847 We know that now but von Moltke had no way of knowing that at the time.
@@raybarry4307 Not quite, Hindenburg explicitly told him that they needed no reinforcements and that they could hold the Russians with their then present resources but Moltke nonetheless panicked at the prospect of the Russians advancing into Eastern Germany (however likely that was) and diverted troops anyway.
@@sync9847 Hindenburg assumed the Russians would attempt to capture Koenigsburg. If there had been a thrust for Berlin from Warsaw (a distinct possibility) all bets were off
Probably that inflexibility was a normal aspect of old warfare. Very few people knew at the time how much war has been changed thanks to technology
Thanks for the succinct overview. "The Guns of August" (1962) (published in the UK as "August 1914") by Barbara Tuchman is still the definitive history of this period. Cheers from AKL, NZL.
Dated now
Why is it dated ? Is it inaccurate ?
It showed the inadequacy of many of the French and British commanders . BEF commander John French moved at a snails pace , and despite being beseeched, almost didn't make it to the Marne . He was , rightly so, relieved , shortly afterwards.
The original Schlieffen plan had the German army reaching the coast before turning, In WW II, the Germans went straight to the coast and it proved very effective.
In WW2 the germans had tanks. Plenty of stories there how the panzers that broke through steamed ahead, and then had to wait for the infantry to arrive. But the mere presene of the tanks that far in created a lot of disarray for the allied lines. WW1 Germany did not have tanks, it only went as fast as the infantry could march.
@@benwilliamson6503 Although the Entente also got caught off guard with Germanys Operation Michael, over 72 divisions came crashing down on them out of no where.
In WW2 the Germans had tanks, and they made all the difference.
They had the element of surprise on their side. Plus the probably most modern army at the time. Against a prepared and equally equipped enemy they probably would have failed once again.
@@andreasmartin7942 There should never be an element of surprise when you are already at war. Further, in terms of equipment, the Germans were not more advanced than the British and French. The Germans won the Battle of France through superior tactics and absolute ineptitude by the British and French.
Recommended book: Guns of August by Barabara S Tuchmann. It was so engrossingly written that I still remember the history as well as the feeling of reading it.
Thanks for the recommendation, I'll be sure to pick it up.
She wrote another book on the politics pre 1914. I believe it was called Proud Tower. That started my interest in all things about the Great War.
JFK really loved that book. I've always wanted to read it.
Good version on Audible if you’ve a long journey coming up.
@@657449 That is a great book, I have read that many times. March of Folly is another great one of hers.
Thank you this was very informative. Will you make a sequel (please) ?
What is the sequel - the Germans attacking Belgium in WW2? :)
@@minsapint8007 - no, amongst other things the rest of the war ...
To me, the best short documentary which explains in minutes the video subject, i.e so clearly the difference between Schlieffen and Molke's plan, 👍
The Russians mobilizing so quickly was what caused the disaster. There is a great book August 1914 by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. He describes the abysmal tactics of the Russians. Their two main generals hated each others guts and didn't communicate. They didn't have code books nor wired communication so they broadcast via wireless in uncoded messages which the Germans of course listened to intently. They had virtually no usable planes for scouting while the Germans had their eyes on them from the beginning. It's not an exaggeration to say that the Germans had a better understanding of where the Russians were than the Russians did as they got more and more dispersed and cut off from communication as they hastily advanced. They advanced so fast and in such disarray that they outpaced their food and ammunition and units would move one way for half the day then the other the rest of the day ending up exhausted and starving just from marching.
The book is excellent although the original is better than the revision Solzhenitsyn made years later where he added a bunch of essays and stories about various Russian historical political figures including a small chapter on Lenin which he probably couldn't publish until he was out of Russia. Actually, I loved the whole book because I'm a history nut but the best part by far are the descriptions of battles and military life. One of the best historical novels I've ever read and the behavior of the corrupt Russian army then reminds me quite a bit of the present situation.
Except that they didn't need those troops they sent east for tannesberg
@@leonpaelinck Isn’t the point though that they had already been detached before the battle of Tannenberg?
Funny how history repeats itself.
@@geordiedog1749 It really is.
@@leonpaelinck Sorry, I don't get your point. My understanding of the battle is there were 2 forces: Rennenkampf in the North and Samsonov in the South (those are the two who hated each other). The plan was a pincer movement where they would both drive West and encircle the forces in East Prussia. Besides all the tactical things the Russians did wrong the strategic error, at least according to Solzhenitsyn, was that Samsonov kept pushing further west (prodded by his superiors) while Rennenkampf just found excuses to essentially stay where he was. Thus, rather than two armies supporting each other and encircling the Germans, Samsonov's army was out on its own with no support and they were the ones who were encircled and destroyed. Then the Germans turned and attacked Rennenkampf and also destroyed much of his army. The Germans btw, were IMO brilliant and audacious. On paper they had no hope at the start of the war because the Russians alone had more men but by superb strategy and tactics their smaller army managed to defeat two larger Russian armies. But with that context I don't see what you mean by "they didn't need those troops they sent east for tannesberg". I mean for one thing the Russians were moving West not East.
Excellent overall strategic analysis from the IWM!
There is some elements that had not been said in this video unfortunately. Way before the marne battle, the french had won a decisive battle at the troué de charmes by stopping the 6th and 7th army. Castelnau and his 2cnd army had délivred such a decisive blow on the Rupprecht armies that Von Moltke transfered divisions in Lorraine by fearing a breakthrought in the area. And by doing so, Von Moltke offered the opportunity at Joffre to launch a decisive attack. So this is particularly because of the battle of the Trouée de charmes and later the russian offensive that rebalance the front and put a end to the Schlieffen plan.
They didn't have a plan "B", and, as such, they didn't have a plan.
One thing the Germans learned from the 1914 campaign was that they - instead of 100+ roughly uniform divisions - needed a relatively small number of highly trained elite divisons which could spearhead the advance, move swiftly, breaking through enemy lines and creating chaos in the enemy rear - while the regular divisions came after and mopped up the resistance. The standstill at Marne was at least partly to exhaustion of the many reservists called up in the mobilisation.
This notion of German elite divisions proved wrong in 1918. They were extremely efficient to break the British and French front, but once they went out of steam after a few weeks of fight, the bulk of German divisions were too weak to resist the counter attack of Allies forces.
French drew the opposite conclusion, they tried to make their divisions roughly on par, so that the continuous front had no weakness.
In WW2 this resulted in Germans betting all on breakthrough forces while French still reasoned in patching a continuous front that could not be drawn anywhere fast enough.
But with a few less strategical blunders Allies could still have isolated the spearhead of German mechanized divisions from the infantry divisions two or three days march behind.
@@gengis737 Those elite divisions were eventually stopped outside Amiens
@@gengis737 I think he's talking about elite divisions at the beginning of the war, to win or create a decisive advantage like in 1940.
Indeed, Sturmtruppen elite divisions were a losing bet on the long term, as we saw in 1918, especially in summer until november.
How were the elite troops a losing bet? Didn't Axis lose the war for a completely different reasons?
@@InspiriumESOO elite troops in WWI were a losing bet, because once spent, the rest of the army was crap and couldn't resist a single offensive. This is why western front crumbled at the end of WWI, whereas it holds during years. The fronts held by France and UK never crumbled anywhere, western front or elsewhere.
During WWII, elite troops allowed Germany to win against France mainly bc they were far more mobile, and more prepared than during WWI, also France had a crappy strategy (Dyle Breda plan).
It didn't work against soviet union, bc soviets union couldn't be crushed by few huge battles like France, it had far more strategic reserves and depth.
Contrary to what people think, Germany wasn't that prepared for its war against USSR, on a strategic level.
Now I know what that plan was all about. Thanks for that WW I history lesson. Good video.👍
I understood that the plan was not even a plan: it was not intended as one. The point of the plan was to show that the German army was too small. They needed another couple of corps for the flank.
The perception is that Germany was highly militaristic at that time.
But, the French had an Army of 680.000 Soldiers in Franch and 200.000 in the Colonies. The Population of France was about 39 Mio People.
Germany had a population of 65 Mio people, and the Army had a strength of 700.000 Soldiers.
The French had a draft of 3 years and almost all man were drafted.
The Germans had a draft of 2 years and only 50% of the male population where drafted.
The Russian Army had around 1.3 Mio Soldiers in 1914.
So, Germany had not raised their Army strength sufficiently to fight a war against France and Russia. They were not prepared.
France was prepared. They had an aging population in 1914, almost no population grow since 1840. But, the had a field army which was stronger than the German army.
Germany had a much bigger population and industrial base, but compared to France a small army.
Germany and Austria-Hungary weren't prepared for a war.
It would have been better for them to either increase their Army size, or play a defensive policy.
@@lisanalgaib555 One plausible explanation is the German generals were positively pushing for a war immediately because they perceived the German Army was falling behind. As you noted, it was not lack of manpower or industry that held it back. The problem was a decrepit political system.
The Kaiser was in charge of foreign policy and military affairs, but he lacked direct influence on economic planning and taxation. Without a man like Bismarck to achieve his usual miracles and somehow bullying the parliament into supporting the Kaiser, the Kaiser did not even have solid domestic political support within Prussia itself. The hodgepodge of principalities made the politics even more difficult. The bottom line is Germany could not effectively make long term plans and commitments for the expansion of its military.
France, having been reformed in the wake of collapses from earlier wars/crises, had a prime minister with control over parliament. Long term planning in a democracy is not easy, but it was possible. France had effectively reformed its military and political system with lessons learned from 1870. Germany was ossified and its military was falling behind as a result.
@@lisanalgaib555
I seem to remember Bethmann said that the best thing to do was trust in God and pray for another revolution in Russia.
That would definitely have been the wisest policy.
@@lisanalgaib555 they could just switch focus after battle of Marne to Eastern front and destroy Russian armies... Which would keep Italy and Romania out of war and Austria-Hungary would feel much better. With Ukrainian wheat Germany won't suffer from hunger.
Yet another Short Victorious War plan that wasn’t.
@@TheCoolCucumber well it worked great in 1940.
@@traubengott9783 thanks to the incompetence of French High Command.
As a Belgian, my province fortunately only borders Limburg (NL) to the East and Brabant to the North so here we've been relatively safe asides from Nazi occupation. Glad we're all friends now though lol. Please stay chill to eachother forever @France & Germany..😅
Give us Walloniiaaaaaaa
JK
Germany wasnt totally surrounded. It's southern flank was adjoined by Austria/Hungary. % It's northern flank was bound by the sea. The real question is...should Germany have invaded Belgium knowing it would draw the English Empire into the war.
Because it was needed to outflank the french armies. A frontal attack throught France will end in failure and if they were quick enough british armies would arrive to late.
For anyone interested in the era, I highly recommend It Was the War of the Trenches and Goddamn This War by the great French comics creator Jacques Tardi. The latter graphic novel ranges from these very early days, with the French troops in their red trousers, through to the end of the Great War, and is suffused with anger at the suffering it all caused, very powerful read.
Thanks. I have a dislike for the apologist comment made by the historian on this topic, let's not forget.
I think it's interesting that in WW1 you would have had a much better time being stationed on the German East front but then the very next war that's the last place you wanted to be sent.
To think there were soldiers who lived through both is mind-boggling.
That was a very good presentation. There is one question I'd like to ask. Is it true the Germans asked for permission from Belgium to just 'pass through' and were refused this permission, or is this just a myth?
You can Google it. It was more like an ultimatum: Let us move our troops through Belgium, otherwise we will do it anyway by force.
@@nils9853 I understand that whatever 'suggestion' the Germans made to Belgium was an ultimatum, and not really open to discussion. I was wondering quite what the creators of this episode had to say on the subject as it wasn't mentioned.
It is indeed true. The German government requested permission to move troops through Belgium on August 3rd and were refused. The Belgian king announced his government's refusal to this request on the 4th and the Germans invaded on the 5th.
The Belgian king even wrote a letter to his cousin Wilhelm I to avoid war. He never got an answer. The draft of this letter is conserved in the Belgian royal archive.
@@GnomaPhobic Belgium requested the British should uphold their treaty obligations. The contemptible little British Army had been immensely improved following the Boer War. The BEF arrived very swiftly and threw a spanner in the German machine, which the Germans had never anticipated.
Oh the it gets worse than that. The German high command evaluated the risk Britain would stand up for Belgium and eventually decided the answer was "no"
I think it was more like,
"We don't care.
Their army is very small and their navy isn't our problem."
@@alanpennie8013 How wrong they were on both counts!
@@heycidskyja4668
Not one of the best judgement calls in history.
The main failure was that the Schlieffen plan was not executed as planned. When the German Army attacked France not enough forces were engaged on the right flank. The Kaiser was afraid that the French would go and occupy parts of Germany protected by the left flank, so more German forces were used on the left flank (viewed from the German side). Schlieffen wanted to take that risk. It is not sure that the first battle of the Marne would have gone the same way with more German troops on the right flank.
Schlieffen on his deathbed reportedly admonished his fellow officers to make sure to keep the right flank strong enough for the job. Don't know if that's true or apocryphal, but it underscores the importance of that aspect of his plan.
@@211steelman " keep the right wing strong ".
And I seem to remember that they sent troops from the West to the East to help at Tannenberg which was just a waste and maybe also contributed to them not getting as far in France as they hoped
It's also a fantastically impossible plan to carry out no matter the weight of the right flank. They had to march troops to the coast before turning back to encircle Paris, that is more than 300 km of marching as they exhausted the rail lines and beasts of burden. Von Kluck would've been truly insane to try to actually carry this out, as success would've meant a trail of bodies dead from exhaustion all the way to Paris. It succeeded in WW2 only because they had tanks, they didn't have that option in 1914.
great video, could you please recommend any bibliography about the artillery support and desconsideration of machineguns by the french that you mentioned?
Another critical issue dragging down the plan was that technology of the time just didn’t allow for swift, decisive victories. Even when you did succeed in forcing a retreat, cavalry could no longer harass or run the enemy down. Meanwhile air forces were in their infancy and tanks had not been invented yet, so the only way to run down a fleeing enemy was on foot, which is why the German forces were exhausted by the Marne.
I live in Liege and i visited the old forts one. They are huge and one of them have a giant hole right in the middle. We can still feel the violence of the past fight.
Germany: Aight we gonna beat the frenchies quick, franco-prussian style
Also Germany few years after: Daymn... this exhausting af
I think what was shocking everyone in those early days was the casualty rate. Using tactics relevant for a previous century against the industrialized slaughter of the machine gun. Other instances included cavalry charges faltering at a single line of barbed wire. The battlefield of old no longer was.
They forgot to ask the other side their opinion. That, and the usual case of General’s Disease; arrogance, self-delusion and mountains of wishful thinking.
4:50 In regard to the outdated French uniform there is an important additional story which is told in this video here on RUclips channel Paper Skies: "The Shocking Impact of a Little-Known Airplane Crash in Paris". Uniform change should have been done years before, incompetence is not innocence.
Not realy most of death in ww1 was artilary red uniform have almost no impact it just a legend that french bashing keep using the uniform was not so important in the end
Thank You for the Video . At 3;24 I see were St Mihiel is Located . I had no Idea it was this Far east . At the Cemetery In the W W 1 section I saw references to that Name . I have seen photos of a field Hospital There . Now i know more . I like the Photos .
My grandpa was there in 1918.
There was - kicked off by Terence Zuber - a Schlieffenplan discussion 2000-2015 and one important result was, that the operation in France were not the plan decribed in Schlieffen's memorandum. The operations were modeled after a war game directed by General Beseler.
So we should really be talking about The Beseler Plan.
@@alanpennie8013 The German general staff, esp. Schlieffen, was not so single minded as depicted in most comments.
The forces that were required in the Große Denkschrift did not exist neither in 1905 nor in 1914 in reality.
Short answer. Von Moltke wasn't the man capable of completing the Schlieffen plan.
The French were fanatical offensive. But they failed to learn the lessons of 1871 during the Franco-Prussian war. Then the French already had mitrailleuses (Maxim), and then the tactical advantages of artillery and co-ordination by the Prussians were already clear advantage on French tactical and strategic failures. However French doctrine was clouded by Revanche (Revenge) and the lessons of their defeat in 1871 were never learned. It took till 1917 and the mutiny to finally learn the lessons of static trench warfare.
actually the lessons were learned. you can find in the french doctrine that no assault has to be made without a proper fire preparation etc. you can find it in Saint-Cyr for instance.
However, most of sous-officer only read introduction which clearly insist on offensive spirit.
General Castelnau and the bataille of the trouee de charme is a perfect exemplethat prove my point.
Most of french sources says that some fails were due to doctrine in order to cover the incompetence of officers (like gamelin for instance).
note that in history a lot of informations are written by generals. the context in which they write it is more important that what they write. most on the time tey say it is not their fault if they fails. for instance some frenchs leader will explain you it is because of doctrine at the beginning of ww1 like some germans says they lost to ussr in ww2 only because of their number. see my point?
No, not really. The French did learn lessons from the Franco-Prussian War, the problem is that these lessons were outdated by 1914. It took *all* the armies several years to learn how to overcome the specific set of problems presented by trench warfare, the French were no different in this respect to any other.
@@patavinity1262 once again doctrine were not really outdated from both sides.
what I say that saying it is outdated because both armies failed is a wrong analysis. both generals were pushed by political interests that make you fail whatever the doctrine you have (for instance make a short war or decisive battle/manoeuvre)
Where did I speak of trench warfare? i am speaking of the begining of the war untill the end of the marne. where did I say they were differents?
Remember that by the time the front became static, the German army occupied a large part of north-eastern France. While the French doctrine was really agressive (as a counterbalance of the supposed apathy of the French army in 1870-1871), the Entente had to achieve a very different objective in the western front compared to the Germans. It is completely false to say they learnt nothing until 1917, Michel Goya has published an excellent book about that.
That’s absolutely not true. The lessons were learned rapidly by the French. The logistic management was totally changed and it worked. What did not work during the first 3 weeks of the war, were the offensives uncovered. The lessons were learned. Bad and old officiers were fired and replaced by Joffre.
It worked the second time
Much different situation however. The French no longer had the spirit for the fight and the British were not nearly enough prepared on the Continent.
@@alexarmstrong2019I always found it funny that everyone, including Germany, was shocked France fell that quickly. The Germans even stockpiled extra provisions for the civilians as they expected the fight with France to go into 41.
In an ironic twist, Hitler probably wouldn’t have attacked the Soviets if France had been difficult to defeat.
@@priatalat It would only have delayed the invasion of the USSR. That war was inevitable and both sides knew it. I don’t buy into the whole “preemptive strike” nonesense that the Soviets were about to attack. But the massive buildup of military forces in the West does show they knew the Germans would be coming. The German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe benefited extremely from Stalins purges based on mere paranoia. In fact, Hitler had no true desire to even fight France and Britain. Ribbentrop had assured him prior to the invasion of Poland that they would not honour their guarantee of Polish independence. Allegedly after learning they both declared war on Germany he went to Ribbentrop and said “Now what?”. Hindsight is 20/20. If the French had committed more to their Saar offensive in 1939 and not got cold feet they would have made tremendous gains into the industrial heartland of Germany. The West was extremely poorly defended while the invasion of Poland was underway. However, the French believed it would be wiser to fall back upon their established defensive lines.
@@alexarmstrong2019 I absolutely agree, I don’t think Stalin had any plans to invade Western Europe. He was happy with getting the eastern half and simply wanted to consolidate his gains. Hence his utter surprise to Germany attacking since they had a pretty good deal going. But let’s assume for a second that Stalin did attack. Then all of Europe and America would come to Germany’s aid since Soviet victory would mean the spread of communism.
As for the Saar offensive. I thought the same thing, but you have to remember that the French and British were not ready for war and had to mobilize their troops. Not to mention they really had no desire to fight, especially on German soil. And I don’t blame them, WW1 practically neutered France forever.
What is the first background song name? i've heard it from multiple history videos but can't find it!
Darude Sandstorm.
I've always wanted to do that! 😁
A mistake I found in this video is you referring to the Netherlands as «Holland» on several occasions. Besides that great video.
Its intended for a British audience (its the British Imperial War Museum after all) and its still quite common to use Holland aa a catch all for the whole country of the Netherlands in the UK as they have down for centuries.
I guess it's a bit like Britain being referred to as England, or America meaning just the USA. It's not correct, but we're stuck with it.
They thought Britain wouldn't honour it's promise to Belgium.
as in most plans for a speedy victory, their opponents failed to follow the plan
Excellent documentary about a very crucial point in 20 Century history. I have always enjoyed listening to the narration in these documentaries. One of truly tragic aspects of this war was so much of the High Command on both sides ( especially the French) using 19th Century tactics against 20th Century weapons, with results of terrible casualties.
Love this video keep up the good work 😂😂😂😂 I ❤❤❤❤🎉😢😮😮😅😢🎉😂
Worth mentioning that the men of the far right flank were marching and fighting nonstop for six weeks and would have had to march even further than they did if they stuck to the plan. The cavalry's horses were dropping dead from exhaustion and starvation. Makes you wonder if Schlieffen just looked at pieces on a map or actually realized that flesh and blood would have to physically pull that off.
The speed of The German march was extraordinary.
I've often wondered if The Germans saw strange dreams and visions, corresponding to the famous Angels of Mons, as a result of their exhaustion.
@@alanpennie8013sounds plausible
Seems like a ‘bridge too far’ type of plan. Overly dependent on securing Liege and overcoming Belgian resistance, and on efficient logistical supply by rail which wasn’t capable of the volume of support demanded. And then they had the British to contend with which was also not a part of the Plan.
You are VERY right!
It had the same flaw that it had to be executed perfectly, with no surprises or delays as otherwise the whole thing would have ended in debacle.
The 1940 "Fall Gelb" plan was also design such that every single step had to work, or the plan would fail ... and it succeeded. This case, the Allies made exactly the errors that the German needed to make the plan work, and the French High Command was incredibly too slow to react in order to make a kind of "Battle of the Marne" and restore the situation.
5:10 the traditional uniform was used by territorial units in the backlines even in 1915-16.
Germany never had the troops to defeat France in one go and Moltke tried to use parts of at least two Aufmarschplanungen in 1914 when things had changed since 1905, the revival of the Russian state and army made Schlieffen's plan (if there ever was one) impractical. Germany made some preparations for a long war, importing lots of aluminum and copper, leaving the Netherlands out of an invasion and equipping the army for siege warfare. No serious analyst before 1914 took a short war seriously.
And yet everyone behaved as if the war would be short. It was assumed that the ghastliness of the new weapons would cause a rapid collapse in morale in a weaker opponent, so everything had to be upfront. It was also assumed a combatant's economy would collapse in a prolonged conflict, so peace talks would rapidly conclude any stalemate. Unfortunately ambition outweighed common sense and it went on to destroy three of the Great Powers.
Great vidro
I'm going by memory here, but I recall that the equivalent of an entire Army- perhaps 200,000 men- were transferred from the "right hook" force in France to reinforce eastern front forces. Not only did the eastern front commander attempt to refuse the reinforcements, saying he didn't need him- and high command persisted in the transfer- the forces arrived in the east too late to make any sort of impact. Had 200,000 more troops been available for that "right hook", the only thing I could see preventing a German victory would have been a massive logistical bottleneck.
Not mentioned in this film is that the German plan assumed that the Belgians would offer NO military resistance. Germany assumed (bizarrely) that Belgium would send Germany a diplomatic protest at being invaded (!) but keep their army in barracks. The fact that the Belgians fought set back the German plan by about ten days, giving the French more time to mobilize. This is why the Germans were (irrationally) so furious at the Belgians, though the Belgians were only doing what any reasonable person would expect them to do.
I think this was more a hope than an expectation.
They had made those huge siege guns for the express purpose of conquering Liege.
I think the German plan in WW1 didn‘t work out, because it was a plan almost a decade old and during this time all major powers had build up their armys by quite a lot. No side was really prepared for the start of WW1. Everyone had build up his army to deter everyone else from attacking, but they were far from ready for war.
That is nonsense.
@@olafkunert3714 the initial chaos and disarray on both sides outline by the video says otherwise
It wasn't a decade old, it was a couple decade ahead of time.
The supplies couldn't keep up with the troops. Supply distances was too short, army should stay close to railways. It was the main reason of 1st army movement, for example.
Case Yellow became possible only because of tanks, radio and, most important, trucks.
I was reading a 1st world War book . That said the was not a schlieffen plan there was a plan that was updated each year . My favourite was the Italian army in Alsace Lorraine on the German side . That did not work out .
Nobody really knew which side Italy would join or whether it would fight at all.
The war was hardly over after the Marne. Germany still probably would have won if the Italians had honored their role in the alliance, or at the very least, stayed neutral. Likewise, they probably would have won if the US had stayed neutral.
Von Kluck's turn; a forgotten piece of military history that set in motion an improbable series of events that changed world history.
Belgium. That detestable speedbump.
Well presented short history on the initial offences in August/September 1914. I think the two key pieces briefly mentioned but sadly not expanded on are the professionalism of the British BEF which suffered horrendous losses in this period but who’s rate of fire overwhelmed the German advance. These were the only professional troops at the time. And the Russian mobilisation was much quicker than expected and frightened the German high command into transferring troops from the western front to the eastern front even though they won the battle of Tannenburg. Thank you. 😊😊😊
Yes. And the siege of Antwerp. And the occupation troops in Belgium. And the troops the Kronprinz kept to attack the gap of Charmes.
Also , the Belgians proved unsportingly unco- operative, and slowed down the initial offensive considerably. Much to the Germans outrage .
Very true, I forget the quote exactly but after mobilization it was said something like 'the fate of the war is in the hands of conductors and signalmen now'
Schlieffen overestimated German capabilities and underestimated French capabilities. More importantly, he underestimated logistics and railroad for France...
The Schliefflin plan called for swift encirlement around right flank. Belgium resistance, plus officers of the broad front did not stay in place and also advanced, causing the relative static front eventual 4 yr stalemate?
background song 11:00 ???
No communications between the German Army commanders or with their HQ. Too many rivers to cross. The roads ran the wrong way to march faster than the French. The French Rail road system had been expanded since 1906. Too much Belgian resistance. No way to resupply their artillery. It's amazing they got as far as they did.
Considering the number of short wars that were in reality quite long, leaders ought to plan for long wars.
Like so many TV shows this video plays music underneath the narrative and to my old ears it almost completely obscures his voice. Maddening.
Does anyone know the background music starting at around 1:00?
One thing the video does not mention is that the German army was not mechanized, and had to advance on foot mainly because railroads were sabotaged. The roads in 1914 were only capable of supporting very long columns so the German infantry was never able to really fight full strength when their supply lines and reserve troops were quite a way back. This is one reason that von Kluck decided the encirclement of Paris was impossible. Furthermore, the von Schlieffen plan was doomed to fail as soon as the BEF landed.
The General Staff greatly overestimated the ability of its infantry to march. August was hot. They "ran out off gas."
Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Russia under Nicholas II could have stayed neutral and let Austria-Hungary and Serbia fight among themselves. Instead of a global First World War breaking out in Europe, the conflict could have been a smaller regional Third Balkan War.
Good point but I’d argue that a major European war was inevitable at some point because the German military industrial complex (the worlds first? Rome, maybe?) was always going to go to war at some point as war was it’s reason d’être. The kaiser was utterly obsessed with defeating the RN for one thing.
The sad irony is that nobody wanted war, but if one should break out, nobody would want to stay out of the fight. Everybody expected it to become a kind of "reset moment" and make gains. It became a far greater reset than many had dared to think.
Except it couldn't. Russia felt that if it remained neutral it would lose all prestige and influence in the Balkans and this assesment was quite correct. Also, Russians had hoped that they could either stop Austro Hungarian Empire from starting the war, or hit it hard while Germans would be busy fighting the French.
In essence, one of the interesting part about WWI is that all the parties had their war plans, meticulously planned during peace, often making accurate predictions of the enemy movements, strengh and counter plans.
And yet ALL these plans failed one after another. Arguably only plan that worked was Serbian one as Serbia managed to stop and then completely rout invading Austrian troops.
@geordiedog1749 The naval arms race had already ended in 1914, and while Germany feared the up and coming Russians just like the British.Their fear was far overshadowed by the hate the french had for them. And since France allied itself with Russia and more loosely with Britain, they felt confident in beating Germany that had only the two sick men of Europe and Italy as allies and thus the French were burning with a desired for war that they rightly believed they could win with their allies.
Correct me please: 1) Too few German troops 2) atrocities stiffening resistance 3) seeking to destroy French army rather than put the French out of supply by encirclement. 4) lack of supply -- Is that a correct summary?
This is common misconception. Schlieffen plan wasn't about encircling or taking Paris. Main goal was encircling and destruction of French armies. Thats why it should be much faster than Franco- Prussian war.
"Logistics"
Done
Southern Holland is called Limburg and is a provincie of the Netherlands.
"No plan survives contact with the enemy."
-Helmuth von Moltke
The German army was too small for the plan to work - they needed another 20-25 divisions that were not there. Also, they did not have enough motorised transport and what they did have broke down. The whole idea was badly planned and they underestimated the strength of the French army.
It is most interesting to me that no one ever plans for a long war.
The french really put up a fight
Little known fact: French losses counted month to month have never been higher than in August and September of 1914. None of the later battles were THAT bloody for them.
They're really did. I don't think people really give them enough credit.
@@joeyjojojrshabadoo7462 Verdun was a terrible thing but the french stuck it out
@@xxi7511
There was a reason why everyone quickly began digging trenches.
Modern hydraulic - recoil artillery was murderous against infantry without hard cover.
@@xxi7511 Nope . What about Verdun?
Reverse Schlieffen had more chances of success; Germany would stand on the defensive against France and attack Russia on the East. Once Russia knocked out of war, Germany would turn to France. This way, the war would be limited to a few belligerents with England and others being out of the war.
The General Staff spent 20 years working out the railroad timetables down to the minute for how they'd mobilize the army for a western offensive. Wilhelm asked Von Moltke "what if France delays and we need to attack Russia first?" and Moltke nearly had a nervous breakdown.
@@tbeller80
Yep.
There was a major failure of planning here.
The question German planners should have been asking was:
How do we keep The Brits out of the war?
Once they accepted that they couldn't defeat France quickly it was much more sensible to attack Russia and stay on the defensive in The West.
@@tbeller80 Moltke reportedly really suffered a mild stroke during that argument with Wilhelm. Wilhelm wanted to attack Russia but was offered plan to invade France with no other option possible. Even Austria-Hungary had various plans. Moltke's health quickly deteriorated following that stroke.
Russia could retreat and make victory imposible. German armies couldnt supply, like in WW2, an army as big so far. Worse logistics than in the west were german armies were so close to home and with better railways.
Wow! Imagine if Von Kluck had stuck with his orders…
Hello Emiliano, how are you doing?
Can we have a video on the Italian frogman submarines please 🙏 Thank you 😊
Schlieffen didn't realize how far the army would have to be Schleppen.
The Schlieffen Plan imperative was to put much of the weight of the attack on the right wing .It was summed up by let last German solider on right brush the channel with his sleeve. A contributing factor of Von Kluck's left wheel towards Paris was the six divisions pulled out line to be sent East to stop tge Russian steamroller. They did not arrive in time to be part of battles that annihilated the Russian armies. Their absence was felt in the West.
Those Germans and their rightwing focus
Von Kluck's move to the east, north of Paris was spotted by a BEF aeroplane, giving Joffre his opportunity.
When explaining why The Great War played out the way it did, I feel like too much emphasis has been put on the machine gun and not on the artillery or even the lack of mobility.
How far can a new army march in one day?
How many miles would it take to produce blisters on every man's feet?
Generals tend to dismiss small problems like that.
Aproximately 30km while carrying 30kg. Almost as if the "Experts" in the Generalstab missed a few crucial Details.
Germany assumed that the reserves would be able to march just as fast as the regular army. But the reserves were a bunch of out-of-shape factory workers, shopkeepers, and clerks. They fell farther behind the regular army every day.
@@JPKnapp-ro6xm if by out of shape you mean: not exceding the 30km rule of thumb anyone from the Romans to NATO would use for the war plan.
The fortress complex of Liege was woefully obsolescent by 1914. None of the forts had any machine guns, the concrete of the forts wasn't reinforced with steel or iron rebar and most of the defenses didn't have secure O.P. posts, which the Germans captured or knocked out easily. The Belgian artillery in the forts were black-powder weapons dating from the late 1880's to the early 1890's; none of them had ever been fired before the war let alone ranged in on their surrounding terrain. Most of the damage done to the Belgian forts by the Germans was accomplished by 150 mm and 210 mm howitzers and mortars attached to the "Handstreich" units of the six brigades that initially attacked Liege. The combination of dust from shell impacts and the stench from the poorly designed latrines are what brought about the surrender of most of the forts. The massive 420 mm mortar of KMK 3[Kurz Marine Kanonen]did hit Fort Loncin and cause a massive detonation of it's main magazine, but that was the only contribution of the fabled German Super-Heavy artillery at Liege.
It is true the Germans got close to Paris but the German army was spentand France still had ample forces to defend itself. Although it's sometimes characterized as a near run thing, the plan was pretty much doomed to fail