It is often said that no one knows what exactly happened to Custer's immediate command after Private Martini/Martin rode off. The outstanding forensics comprehensively and clearly set forth in this series provide the soundest and most tactically likely narrative of the Custer battle that I have ever seen. This is War College material, in my opinion.
I just came across these videos last week. I have watched them all several times and being a student of the battle I find your work commendable. I especially like the maps showing the flow of Indian and Trooper movements. Excellent work on your part!!!
In 2009 I visited the LBH battle site, a dream trip since childhood. Walking over the terrain and reviewing the different actions that took place really helps understand many "why's" and "how's". One thing that really stood out was how steep and tall the hills are where Reno's crew came back across the river. It would an exhausting climb for man or horse on a normal day today. Another terrain feature is how rolling it is but it looks deceptively flat. A relatively tiny dip in terrain could conceal a lot of people who could spring up from nowhere. At the time I visited I hadn't studied any of Professor Fox's archeology work on the battle site. If I went again I'd have Fox's work to consider while surveying the land.
You have made the best documentary and maps of this battle of all the books and TV shows I have seen. As I was reading the archeological findings from the excellent Richard Fox book, I had trouble understanding some of the actions and terrain. Your videos and maps made everything so much clearer. I finally think I understand what happened much more clearly than ever before. Thanks so much for your incredible work and insight!
Thanks for watching. I am a big fan of Fox and much of my interpretation of this battle comes from his findings. Other notable authors that helped bring about my documentaries, besides my own research, are Richard G. Hardorff, John S. Gray and Roger Darling.
@Gary Daniel I agree. The most overlooked aspect of the Custer battle itself is how the battlefield came about entirely by chance. Custer had no intention of fighting up on the bluffs. The terrain was totally unsuitable for the cavalry and gave many advantages to the warriors. The right wing deployment on Calhoun Hill was to act as a facilitation point for the recalled units. Once Benteen had arrived the bluffs would have served no purpose whatsoever. Custer's objective was in the valley and the terrain was far more suitable for the cavalry to operate there.
Wow, I commend you Sir! I've always had an amateur interest in this battle ever since visiting the battlefield in the 80's as a teenager. I've always enjoyed reading account's from both sides and learning new facts as they've come to light. I even had the good fortune to be assigned to the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry during my time in the Army. This is the first time I've seen an account this thorough and understandable and I come away with a sense of awe as to how the battle unfolded as well as a sense of dread imagining the thoughts and emotions that must have occurred that day. Thank you for the time and effort you spent on putting this series together. I will recommend this to anyone I come across in the future with similar interests.
Thank you for the kind words. I just got back from the battlefield myself after touring visitors, doing interpretation, etc. It was a good time. I always enjoy teaching people about the battle. And thank you for your service to this country as as well Sir. My great-grandfather and grandfather served in the Army as well. WWI and WWII. Without you and others like you this country would not be great. As much work as I have done doing these documentaries, you have done the really hard work of keeping all of us safe. I have dvd copies of both of my documentaries. If you would like copies of them just send me an email or private message and I will send them to you. Its the least I can do for a true hero from this county.
Just the best recount of the battle I have come across. Superlative research clearly from a number of sources and especially Native American accounts which, with the excellent maps, puts movement and ground into perspective. It provides an excellent understanding of the Battle which, I for one, had difficulty in comprehending. It certainly answers for me the many whys and how did this happen questions I had. Brilliant Well done
+nikcsdad1 I thought the whole map series put everything into perspective. The only thing I would have liked is the names of the hills etc to have been left on the maps, also a distance indicator. The clear thing that kept on me thinking was the constant splitting of his command. Custer,Reno & Benteen seemed guilty of it.
I think they just had to continue to stretch themselves thin to do the job because of the immense size of the village. It was the size of a small city. Also, had the regiment remained united, many of the Indians probably would have scattered and gotten away.
Great job. Very impressive. You really put the battle together. My father was Hunkpapa Sioux from Standing Rock. My dad used to roam around the battle ground as a young boy.
I'm travelling from Australia in September to walk that battlefield and I needed a step-by step geographic representation as a basis for understanding/appreciation. Your program did that admirably. Thank you.
Thanks for watching. Feel free to watch my 39 part Little Bighorn Documentary from 2010 as well. It is over 6 hours long and covers Custer from birth to death.
Superlative job ! ! After visiting the battle site first in 1978 and 6 times since, this map puts the sites to mind like never before. I've even walked on some of the areas with a Crow as his guest. Thank you, the length & breadth of this battle and your map surely whets my appetite to go back one more time, if I'm able to. Kudos to you sir for a job well done.
I really enjoyed your map video. I especially appreciate the mention of Sgt. Edward Botzer (Batzer), as he is my Great-Great-Uncle. I have been to the battlefield many times, and the next time I visit I will certainly be referencing your videos before and after (and perhaps during). What a fascinating part of American History. Thank you for your contributions!
Thanks Tony. Appreciate the feedback. If you ever have the chance to go out to the battlefield I highly recommend it. Nothing beats the real thing. I also made a documentary on Custer's entire life back in 2010. It is on my playlists on my page. If you have not watched it feel free to do so. It is over 6 hours long and more in depth than the 2013 Map Battle documentary.
When I was fourteen years old (in 1968) I was drawn to a little book in our school library titled "The Battle at the Little Big Horn" by Mari Sandoz. I had this strange feeling of affinity to the battle as if (reincarnation were true) I might have been there when it happened. In later years, in 1990, I took a job in Seattle and drove there from South Carolina. Made it a point to stop in on the Devil's Tower, the Black Hills, Crazy Horse Monument, Mount Rushmore - AND - driving all night through absolute wilderness - the Custer Battlefield. After a few hours sleep in my car I made an early morning drive across what I think is Battle Ridge and over to Reno Hill - and then back to the monument. I didn't get to explore it so well but it was moving (to me) just being there, imagining what had happened, and taking in the scenery on a winter morning in Montana, on a bleak, blustery, snow covered ridge. I am going back- hopefully bringing the family with me. This is what makes your work so cool. I'm gonna know a lot more about it when I go this time. T
Marvellous work, outstanding. Your research is detailed and thought provoking. Congratulations, if not allready done I see a thesis for a doctorate here. One final point if I may. If it was good enough for Custer to expect Reno with 120-150 men to occupy/hold the attention of 1,000-1,500 plus warriors and survive, then Benteen can be excused for expecting Custers 210 men to hold/survive against such a horde. Mistakes were made by everyone (including higher command) from assumptions (reasonable) that the Indians wouldn't be so aggressive, Custer's refusal of the four 2nd Cavalry companies, to Reno/Benteen's lack of action when firing was heard on Reno Hill. To me the overwhelming reason for the defeat was the totally unexpected ferocity and aggressiveness of the Indian warriors. Thank you again for all your effort/work and sharing such with us.
Thanks for the feedback. I agree mistakes were made by all the battalion commanders. Refusing the 2nd Cavalry was a huge mistake by Custer in my eyes. That extra 140 men would have given Custer 9 companies to accomplish his objective of capturing the non-combatants. Benteen can finish his scout and McDougall can bring the pack train up and reinforce Reno. Reno would then have over 345 men even after the retreat to the bluffs. The battle can still be won with little bloodshed.
Great job! Really ties it in for me. Especially the early movements and approach to the battlefield. I've read plenty about the battle and I live in montana so have visited a few times but this provides a visual that really helps understand the totality. Also love the walking tour as well.
I am honored to have been among the first to see this as I only started to look at this subject last week. I was frustrated until now by the lack of mapping of the battlefield.
Hey Allen. The major reason I actually did this project was because many people requested maps on the battle. So I am glad that you enjoyed the documentary. All the hard work pays off when my subscribers post feedback on my videos. Thanks for watching.
Thanks again Bill, Ive watched the original documentary dozens of times and drove the route myself , this new work really shows the collapse of the Keough companies in a way that has always been hard to visualize in one's mind. Really great, and the last slide or map showing the locations of the soldier dead is fantastic as well.. Thanks very much thes two documentaries are some of the best wokr ever done on the subject
Thank you. My conclusions are based on my own research combined with the works of Richard Fox, Roger Darling, Richard Hardorff and John Gray. All great Custer authors and historians.
I agree absolutely! Custer made a lot of mistakes that day, especially depending on two officers that he did not have much respect for. Benteen had no love for Custer especially since the Elliot affair. My thinking is that when he found Reno he believed that Custer abandoned Reno like he did Elliott and was not going to let it happen again. I think he felt Custer wanted all the glory so he was on his own.
Thank you the outstanding presentation of the Little Bighorn Battle. From your first video to the last one, the details of situations which led to why Custer and his troops performed that day in Montana. It makes you wonder that Boston Custer's report that Benteen received his report and order to move up. If not, would Custer had position his troops such as Keogh and Calhoun in a different position or just moved out of harm's way. Either way, thank you for tireless and excellent work.
This was outstanding........................Now I really understand the whole battle from start to finish....................I tell anyone I know that has an interest in this battle to watch this....
+Larry Hervey Thanks for watching. I am glad you liked it. Fell free to watch my 39 part Little Bighorn 2010 documentary as well. The thing is over 6 hours long, but really shows the battle sectors well. I actually recorded in Montana and walk you through the each sector and show the local terrain from the Rosebud all the way to Deep Ravine.
Dust covered the battle field from start to finish! The eye witness accounts had to have some bearing on this research, soldiers, trail, Indian stories.. Exciting narration.
To defend a force or position you have to be able to generate sufficient firepower to deter the enemy from closing and using their superior close-range firepower. The 7th's repeated splitting of their force into smaller and smaller sub-units was what caused the defeat. I suspect this was due to Custer commanding far more men in the Civil war and treating his single regiment as if it were a larger force. But a few dozen men spread far apart cannot generate the firepower to suppress enemy maneuver or fire. Had they remained as a single mailed fist they could have done whatever they wanted given the Indians' restrictions of having to protect non-combatants and pony herds. Actually, merely attacking and killing, capturing, or scattering the pony herds would have effectively defeated the Indians on this day, and led to reduced mobility that would have allowed reinforcements to join in for a final victory.
This is so fascinating work. We could see it in slow motion Second per Second and Meter per Meter advance. The combination with the site videos makes it real and haunting. In 150 Minutes total Desaster. Peckinpah stuff...
@@CusterApollo As a German Scientist I watched intensely ALl your excellent work! It is a metaphor for the other disasters of this kind. Like Stalingrad in 1942. Battle of Takur Ghar is an eerie reminder. We all should study that more carefully. And the Best are sacrificed...
Excellent! While Richard Fox's book can give you info of the battlefield this puts in better perspective. I think Reno gets a bad wrap. Whether being incompetent or drunk, there was no way his mission could have been a success. He was promised the full support of the regiment but Custer failed to deliver. When Benteen found him, he asked "where is Custer" I think Reno truthfully answered "I don't know." Whether Benteen and Reno could have saved Custer is open to debate. Due to to the overwhelming number of warriors I doubt they could. I think Custer had underestimated the depth of Benteen's hatred of him.
Hey Frank. Good remarks. I believe Reno could have succeeded had he attacked as ordered. Forming the skirmish line allowed the non-combatants to escape and gave the warriors time and a static target to shoot at. Support does not have to come from the rear. Custer's intention to attack the village at another point can be looked upon as support for Reno. A second front would have drawn warriors away fro Reno and toward Custer. This eventually did happen in the real event. Had Benteen moved quickly as ordered he would have been in a position to support either Custer or Reno. His slow progress took him out of the battle when he was needed most. By the time Benteen reached Reno Hill, Custer's fate was sealed. I believe only a partial rescue could have been possible by then. I believe the battle was lost before it began with Benteen's slow movement after the scout.
Sorry for the delay. I rewrote this video several times to make sure it was as good as I could get it. It was driving me crazy. But thanks for watching. I hope you find it was worth the wait.
+CusterApollo Bill, I was doing some family history work today in a local cemetery, and what did I find that might interest you? The grave of Pvt William E. Smith who was part of Benteen's Battalion. I don't know if you've ever heard of him, but his name does sound a little familiar. lol. He was with the 7th CAV from September 1885 to abt August 1880. I took a bunch of photos - if you're interested, drop me an e-mail: shamus07@comcast.net Pete
It is pretty clear that had Benteen arrived his units would have been wiped out too. Reno was bait and would have been destroyed. The only hope would have been for Custer to have taken his whole command on a fast ride to the N and to have crossed the river to capture the fleeing families.
@@CusterApollo Therein lies part of the problem. The Lakota and Cheyenne were masters of field-craft. The "cavalry" consisted of (mostly) green troops. The psychological effect of "Indians" suddenly "appearing out of nowhere" must have contributed to the loss, as it probably did for Crook. Custer deployed the Seventh into "battalions" that were effectively under-strength companies, scattered so as to be incapable of stopping the enemy or supporting each other. He should have done better scouting, and then, when the noncombatants were "missing", gone back to find Benteen and the Packs. His famous "luck" was based on shock tactics; but Crazy Horse, Gall, and the rest got over their shock very quickly. And Custer was out-gunned. By the grace of God, Reno found the only defensible terrain for miles, Benteen disobeyed orders, McDougal arrived in time with the packs, and together they saved the rest of the regiment. Otherwise, following Custer's orders, it would have been over 600 dead. Not saying anything but "hindsight sees clearly." I am not sure I could save the Seventh in a war game, much less do as well as Custer in real life.
Excellent presentation...i'm getting a much h better understanding of what happened..curious how you find out what the troopers were thinking or attempting since they were all killed...is the information from Indians?
Hi. great stuff. I really enjoyed this. I have read a fair few books on this subject many years ago and most speculated that custer may have been wounded or at least wounded fairly early in the action. ie when he took his battalion down to the river ( you said just one comapny went down) and then pulled back.. The books I read suggested he could have been killed or wounded then. I am keen to hear your opinion on when in the action Custer was killed?
+Sheila Skelton I do not believe Custer was wounded at the river at Ford B. If he had been I do not believe the command would have performed all the actions it did after Ford B. The future movements of the battalion have Custer's fingerprints all over them. Also we know Keogh, the second in command, died with his men and his wing and not headquarters. Had Custer been wounded, the command would have been consolidated and Keogh would at least been observing and with Custer. This clearly did not happen. The right wing was given the passive blocking assignment while the left wing, with headquarters attached, moved farther north, found the non combatants and set up an offensive position on Cemetery Ridge. Feels like Custer in command and in good shape to me. I believe Custer was fine up until the Last Stand Hill episode. That is where he was found after the battle and I believe that is where he died. I do not subscribe to the theory that Custer was killed on some other part of the battlefield and dragged, taken, carried, whatever, to Last Stand Hill. Evidence on this theory is lacking.
Hello again! I mentioned before I grew up in Montana. When I was a senior in high school in 1975. Closing in on the 100 anniversary of the battle. It was said some of the dead were not mutilated. Custer himself, possibly Capt. Keogh and a lone soldier somewhere in the battle. Your thoughts?
I agree. Not all the soldiers and officers were mutilated, but a great majority were. Some men were beyond recognition. Reports stated Keogh was barely touched. Mark Kellogg was also found fully clothed. Custer had some mutilation, but for the most part was in good shape. People like Tom Custer were not so lucky. Tom was identified from the tattoo on his arm. Others also were mutilated bad. Some soldiers were decapitated making identification impossible.
+Todd Berkoff Sorry. I put the map directions on at the beginning of the video. That and not leaving the names of the features on the map have been common suggestions from viewers. The reason I leave these features off was due to the combatant movement. I did not wish the maps to be become more congested than they already were.
I've been reading History.net timeline of the battle. According to them, the pack train did not arrive at Reno Hill until 5:20. I think Benteen rationalized his actions because Custer had ordered him to bring the pack train he didn't have to leave the hill even though he heard the gunfire. I guess my question is this. According to History.net there were about 60 wounded men on Reno Hill. Could they be moved? If not, how many men would Benteen leave at the hill to protect them? Would there have been enough troopers to influence the outcome of the battle? I also think the pack train would have made no influence. Custer didn't fail because of lack of ammunition but from the superior weapons the Indians used.
I respectfully disagree. Benteen should have left the hill. The rendezvous with Reno was due to circumstance. Had Benteen followed the original orders he would have not even come in contact with Reno. Reno would have still been in the valley. As for the wounded, the total of 60 was the final number. While there were wounded men on the hill, the figure of 60 at that time in the battle is fiction. Also I find it amusing that Reno all the sudden is worried about wounded men when he had abandoned his troops in the timber, failed to set up a rear-guard or flankers at the river crossing, and was the first man to reach the hill while his troops lagged behind leaderless and demoralized. He even left his adjutant behind, who was killed on the retreat. In the end the battle, in my opinion, was lost long before Reno reached his hill. Benteen's slow movement prior to the battle as well as his rendezvous with Reno's men meant Custer's fate was sealed. Despite this some effort should have been made. Weir at least attempted to do something, against orders from Reno and Benteen I must add. Doing nothing was an unacceptable option, and Benteen meekly following the highly motivated Weir after the fact does nothing to excuse his earlier actions and inactions. As for superior weapons held by Indians I completely disagree. The weapons the cavalry had were superior to the repeating weapons of the time. Other factors, along with the weapons, came into play that caused the cavalry defeat.
@@CusterApollo The "superiority" of weapons was not as big a factor as "penny packets" of Calhoun, Keogh, and Custer "battalions" were overwhelmed by what amounted to "human wave" attacks, punctuated by the terrifying "counting coup" and then another unit breaks and the men are slaughtered. Custer's men were "no grisly old "njun fighters", they were as often as not recent immigrants (like Martini who carried the Benteen message) who enlisted to earn enough to set up a shop or buy a farm (hence the phrase). There was no strong cadre of NCOs to take over, no unit cohesion as the officers fell.
Thanks for the wonderful series that you put together. I especially liked the commentary about the advance over the Divide and down to the Little Bighorn. On your last map series (#6), I though it might be appropriate to put a mark for Mark Kellogg. He was the first AP reporter killed on duty (from what I read). Also, any idea who the two marks are for near the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee? Thank you
Hey Bob. I did not forget the marker for Kellogg. It is located on the eastern side of Battle Ridge. Clearly the wrong place as all evidence points to him being killed down by Ford D. I just followed the marker map when placing Kellogg. As for the Medicine Tail markers, the one on the right is for Cpl. John Foley of Company C and the one on the left is for 1st Sgt. James Butler of Company L.
I would disagree with your characterization of the charge/breakout of Company E. I would argue that this was a frantic breakout or escape of those men able and willing to try to escape Last Stand Hill, and not a coordinated "attack" by Company E as you describe. They didn't seem to be attacking any specific target. What evidence do you have that it was a directed movement by Custer? Those poor men were fleeing for those lives.
It is quite possible it was an unsanctioned breakout by men on their own. Indian testimony speaks of a bugle call before the maneuver. This suggests it was an ordered coordinated maneuver. It however does not rule out it was men fleeing on their own. The offensive maneuver just seems to jive with the departure of the men who fled south on the remaining horses.
I recall History Channel quoting a civil war officer who stated that a Sharp's Carbine was useful only for "scaring people and exciting the horses." If Custer's men were following a "standoff" doctrine, I see some parallels in that they were armed with 22" barrel carbines, 45-55 ammo and, above all, not practiced at all(have read some shocking reports of the amount of practice ammo). These men and their horses were exhausted and the carbine probably had a 100 fps advantage over .44 Henry. And I would question any military thinking about Native Amercans being unable to regulate ladder sights for long range shooting. People mostly focus on Custer's deployment of his forces, but there is a very important question about whether his men were even equipped to engage in effective standoff tactics. Your thoughts?
It is clear that the army was trained to fight an organized army and not Indians on the western frontier. The Springfield, while superior to Indian weapons, especially the Henry and Winchester, could only fire once before being reloaded. If stable, the army could hold an enemy at a distance. However, at the Little Bighorn, we all know the Indians broke range and got close. Once range was breached the Indian weapons achieved superiority over the Springfield as the ability to deliver vast volume fire at close range trumped the single shot capability of the soldier weapons. Add in the superior number of warriors and you have a perfect recipe for disaster.
In 1970, it was common to paint Custer as a genocidal madman and I'm seeing much change in that many now suggest he was a victim of treachery by fellow officers. Neither proposition rings true. Benteen never could have provided victory because that meant crossing the river and securing a huge band of non-combatants. Not happening with 125 extra men. If Benteen had made it to Custer, his companies would have been broken up, horses scattered and, ultimately, his men also killed--then, the Indians would have focused on Reno and the pack train, likely wiping them out. The Indian scouts were keenly aware of what was going to happen and, obviously, both Reno and Benteen had access to their intelligence. These officers had a very unenviable task that day.
The battle outcome depends on the timing of Benteen's arrival. Had Benteen arrived when Custer was still on Luce Ridge then a chance to capture the non-combatants is a very real possibility. Benteen arriving later than this does nothing to win the battle. And he may have been wiped out as well. Timing was a key.
Bill, simply fantastic work. I am currently working on my capstone paper for a b.a. history degree and would be honored to do a brief Q&A with you about key events and possible theories. Being able to directly cite your research and analysis, I think would go a long way in shaping my argument. I am a member of the LBHA and can get you my contact info if you would kindly oblige. Either way, thank you immensely for the videos and information.
CusterApollo Please check your FB messenger. I sent you a message there and we can work through details in private messages. Thank you so much and I greatly look forward to it
Its interesting how the death of Bloody Knife may have changed the outcome of the battle.Reno may have not panicked and left the woods.The warriors would have kept him pinned in the woods instead of up on Reno-Benteen hill until word of Custers men coming spread.Then they would have left just enough warriors to keep him in the trees and the rest would have went to fight Custers force to the north.He would not have suffered so many casualties.Benteen would have had no reason to stop to aid Reno on Reno-Benteen hill and would have continued on to assist Custer.Custer would then possibly have enough men to capture the non-combatants and win the battle.
You are welcome. Yes. That is true. I believe the battle would have gone differently had one of two things had happened. 1. Reno did the scout and Benteen attacked the Indian village. Or 2. Major Lewis Merrill was able to rejoin the command and thus be senior over Reno.
This map history is the most interesting and complete explanation of the battle I have seen since my Dad got me hooked on the subject when I was a young boy. I can't wait to show this to him! ...Question: What is your favorite book on Custer?
Richard A Fox's "Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle" is my favorite book on the subject and was the basis of this documentary, as well as my 2010 Little Bighorn Documentary.
Had Custer accepted the four companies of the Second Cavalry (another 160 or so men) he had been offered, the battle might have been very different. I think Custer might have been forced to retreat but not wiped out. Even if Benteen with his three companies did not move forward those four other companies would have covered his absence. Also, Reno only had three companies, around 125 men. Had he attacked with four additional companies he might have been successful in his charge.
I agree. Not taking the extra four companies really hurt on the day of the battle. Custer could have personally taken the extra four, giving him 9 companies, almost an entire full regiment. Reno could have attacked the southern end of the village as ordered with three companies. Benteen could have completed his scout and then had orders to join Reno, bolstering the Major's strength to 6 companies and almost 300 soldiers and scouts.
Based on having the extra four companies, i don't think Custer would have retreated at all. I believe your premise is based on history. That Custer would have fought the warriors up on the ridge. Had Custer had the extra four companies he never would have fought on the ridges at all. The terrain was useless and totally unsuitable for the cavalry. Also the target was in the valley, and Reno's troops had forced them from south to north away from the attack. Had Custer had 9 companies the battle would not have even been fought up on the bluffs. Custer had found Ford D for a reason. It was to find a crossing point at the river to capture the non-combatants. Had he done so with 9 companies then the cavalry would have crossed immediately and captured non-combatants in the valley, terrain more suitable and favorable to the cavalry. This would render the warriors mute and could have resulted in all Indians surrendering and returning to the reservation.
Been waiting for this to come out. Great work. And if I may ask a question. I have been reading Bruce Browns book , "Who Killed Custer '. He states in his book that Custer was wounded at Medicine Tail Coulee. Do you believe this ? From your analysis of the battle. It seems that the 7th cavalry, was still being well lead with a purpose , and on the offensive , up until the very end. I don't think it would of been so well lead with its leader injured or dying .
Hey Scott. I have heard that rumor often. And I don't believe Custer was wounded at the ford. There is no evidence to back up the rumor. The Indians say they shot a man down at the ford, but nobody knew who Custer was. Also I don't even think Custer was down by the river. I am of the opinion that Headquarters and Company F were farther away from the river and positioned up on Butler Ridge to get a better overall view of the situation. If any officer was shot down by the ford it may have been 1st Lt. Algernon E. Smith, the Company E commander. His final position up on Last Stand Hill suggests he never led the Company E deployment off the hill and into the South Skirmish Line. This suggests he was unable to, thus either killed or wounded. I think Smith makes a better candidate than Custer as the officer possibly shot at the ford. Also I believe if Custer was hit than the battle would have progressed very differently than we believe it did.
CusterApollo Thanks for answering my question Bill. Watch your videos a lot ,can't get enough of them. And another question or more of a statement. If the Native Americans scalped their fellow Indians {As you mentioned about Lame White Man ] , not knowing that they were on their side. How could any one on the Indians side know from a distance who Custer was ? My opinion is they couldn't , and was a made up story to more Immortalize the Custer name. Saying he as so important of a figure even his enemies knew who he was. . And if I may ask another. Did any one or where could I find information on what the survivors found once Terry and Gibbon arrived on the field. Did anyone write it down or take notes on what they found?
scott fornof I find it very hard to believe any Indian knew which man was Custer. Some warriors later gave testimony that they thought the soldiers they were fighting were commanded by General Crook. There are several books that contain information about the aftermath on the battlefield. The problem is the information is not all in one book. There are bits and pieces in many books. I tend to find the letters from officers and men about what they witnessed on the battlefield are the best information. But the archaeology books by Fox and Scott reveal what soldiers went through during the battle by examining the bullet and case patters, as well as the evidence found on human remains found during the digs of the 1980's.
Professor Fox works in the History Dept at the University of South Dakota. He loves to talk about the Little Big Horn being the #1 project in his career. I've got his books which in-depth and detailed to say the least. Not for those wanting Hollywood type entertainment.
The confirmed number of killed is a low number, however I am sure others were killed and were not reported. The warriors also stated a great many were wounded and later died.
I stand corrected. I thought history was a reliable source. Another Benteen excuse not to aid Custer. What is your opinion concerning Benteen's actions? I mentioned the Elliott affair in a previous post. Did that plus his hatred for Custer come into play? As far as the quality of weaponry i was using the Richard Fox book, "Archaeology, History, And Custer's Last Battle" as a reference.
I think Benteen's actions after the scout were the cause of the defeat. He disobeyed orders to join the command quickly and send word of the outcome of the scout. I do believe the Elliot affair and Benteen's hatred for Custer played a huge role in the outcome of the battle. Lastly, you picked a good book for your research. I consider the Fox book the bible of Custer battle understanding. Fox also believes the Indian weapons were inferior when compared to the soldier weapons, however, the particular situation gave the Indians the advantage. But it must be noted that the weapons themselves were not the reason why the Indians won. Other factors combined with the Indian weapons created the victory/defeat.
By the way, I was referencing History. net, not history itself. I am reading Killing Custer by James Welch, The Mystery of E Troop by Gregory Michno, A Terrible Glory by James Donovan, and Custer's Last Campaign by John Gray. Are these books worthwhile? Do you recommend any other books?
Anyone know why the cavalry went to the single shot Springfields when during the civil War they had the tube loaded seven shot Spencer? The Sioux had agency supplied fourteen round Henry repeaters and according to Kate Bighead the used plenty of non specific target arching arrow shots kind of like mortars which would be very effective on open, undulating, ravine pocked ground. These weapons would have been difficult to contend with even with an enemy in equal numbers.
Good question. The Spencer company went out of business in 1869 and the army had no choice but to choose a new weapon. Many weapons were tested, including the two main repeating rifles of the day, the Winchester and the Henry. However the army went with the Springfield for several reasons. One was cost. The army did not want a repeater because the soldiers tended to blow away their ammunition unnecessarily and too quickly. More rounds means more cost. The military was also looking for a weapon that would fight against a modern army. The Springfield was not chosen with the mindset of being a frontier weapon fighting against Indians that didn't fight tactically from a white man's perspective. When testing the weapons the army had three main categories of importance that weighed in on which weapon was ultimately chosen. The first was range. The greater the range the farther away your could keep your enemy. The second was accuracy. A more accurate weapon will more likely hit a target than a less accurate one. The third was stopping power. A weapon with superior stopping power would result in more kills per hit. It was better to kill your enemy rather than just wound him. A living soldier, although wounded, can still resist, and thus is a threat to your army. Dead enemy soldiers are no threat whatsoever. Now the repeaters of the day lacked all three of these criteria when compared to the Springfield. And that is why the Board of Officers chose the Springfield over every other rifle tested, including the repeaters. It must be noted that when Custer fought at the Little Bighorn, most of is men were wounded and then finished off by hand. The reason? Because the repeating rifles carried by the warriors did not have the stopping power to kill most of the targets they hit. War clubs and hatchets were the cause of the most deaths in Custer's command rather than the repeaters themselves.
Thanks. I figured cost and bullet wastage had something to do with it but didn't know Spencer arms went OOB in 1869. Other than Kate Bighead are there any other accounts of the warriors using a "rain of arrows" so to speak Agincourt style? BTW this series is great even if it was only the map portion.
Also the Army wanted to standardize ammunition so the rifles had to take 45-70 cartridges. The lever action rifles were not robust enough for general Army issue. The thin sheet metal magazine tube being a primary source of trouble. The Henry, Win 1866 and Win 1873 had relatively weak actions limiting them to pistol cartridges. Great for a cowboy, miner, trapper or sodbuster usage but not so much for Army purposes. Another concern would keeping remote outposts supplied and the fewer items to supply the better from a Quartermaster's view. FWIW the only lever action ever adopted by a national army was the Winchester 1895 in 7.62x54 Russian. The Czarist govt of Russia bought a limited number of these. Today they are highly prized by Win lever action collectors.
I have with great interest seen your minutely review of the battle. I have also read Pretty Shield's testimony (autobiography of Frank B Linderman) in which she tells that her husband Crow scout Goes Ahead, has told that Custer was shot of the sadle while fording the river at the end of the Medicine Tail Coulee. Her statement was a surprise for me because it was the first time I met this reading of the drama. But now - by reading Bruce Brown's ''Who Killed Custer + 100 voices'' - I came in addition to Pretty Shield on other testimonies and not least White Cow Bull's and Peter Thompson's, which clearly indicates the same conclusion: An officer on ''a sorrel horse with... four white stockings'' was shot off the sadle in the river - which can only be George A. Custer! Your review fails completely these witnesses about what happened. Why?
I did not mention these three in the Ford B episode because the testimony is not credible to the event. Goes Ahead did not witness the Ford B fighting. He was long gone heading south toward Reno Hill. The farthest the three scouts ever got to Medicine Tail Coulee was Weir Point, and I am of the opinion they never even got that far. I don't believe Custer ever went up to Weir Point, as there was no need to do so since he had a clear view of the village from the bluffs south of the high point. No need to risk being spotted by people in the village from Weir Point when the same intel could be gathered from a more secure location. It also must be noted that all three surviving scouts gave contradictory statements after the fact when compared to Curley, the one scout that actually rode with Custer's command into Medicine Tail Coulee, and was there to witness the Ford B event. So the second-hand account from Pretty Shield through an interpreter is questionable at best. White Cow Bull also lacks credibility. He claimed he was at the ford. He also claims to have led the attack on the soldiers. Neither is true. None of the warriors confirmed at the ford mentioned seeing White Cow Bull there, let alone leading an attack. Thompson also was not in a position to see the Ford B fighting. He lost contact with the command before Medicine Tail Coulee and testified that the last thing he saw was the Company F detail riding off out away from Luce Ridge. He never saw the detail reach Calhoun Hill. This occurred before the command separated at Luce Ridge and the left wing even went to the river. Also it must be noted that Custer did not ride on a Sorrel horse as referred to in today's classification. He rode on a Chestnut, which is a deeper shade of red. Now back in the 19th Century Chestnut's and Sorrel's were classified in the same group. However it must be noted Vic raced as a Chestnut and not a Sorrel. The Sorrel's in the 7th were tan and not red brown in color. Also per John Burkman, the soldier that actually personally took care of Custer's horses, stated Vic had three white stockings and not four as others have incorrectly testified. Lastly, had Custer been killed or incapacitated at the Ford then everything that happened after that would have been different. Keogh as the next most senior officer would have taken command. This did not happen. Keogh remained with his right wing and died in the southern sectors. Also Headquarters remained with the left wing and died next to Company F on Last Stand Hill. Everything that happened after Ford B has Custer's stamp and personality on it. Always the aggressive, Custer divided his command after the rendezvous at Calhoun Hill, left the right wing on the high ground to block any Indian advance and also to facilitate contact with the recalled units. Custer then took the left wing and located the non-combatants and a nearby ford to cross the river and capture them. Afterward, Custer placed his forces in an offensive posture on Cemetery Ridge and waited for the recalled units. In conclusion, like I stated earlier, I did not mention the three people you spoke of because through my own research I have determined their testimony is not credible to the event. These three examples are clear cases of Monday morning quarterbacking and making oneself more prominent to the event after the fact. This is an unfortunate, but common human action when it comes to big events in human history.
Outstanding, both in research detail and narration! I have visited this site three (3) times. The first time as a child with my grandparents and saw the reenactment. This painted the troop movement, which has been limited for me to visualize...till now. In your opinion, how could have Custer succeeded in this battle?
Thanks Bob. I think Custer could have won the battle had Benteen arrived while Custer was still in Medicine Tail Coulee. Eight companies could have captured a good portion of the non combatants forcing the warriors to stop fighting.
Lastly I think, Custer of the 3 commanders (Reno, Benteen) made the most sound decisions. Reno after being being routed was useless, and Benteen clearly showed no signs of trying to hurry in the scrape, the pack train had no chance of ever arriving.
Great videos Bill! Have you read Sergeant Charles Windolph's account "I Fought with Custer" and Benteen's testimony of 1879 -"The Custer Fight"? Very interesting. Shoot me an email if you want to discuss further.
Benteen's testimony was clearly one lie after another when it came to the battle. He almost admitted that he had disobeyed orders from Custer, as well as reveal his hated for Custer. The testimony painted a possible conspiracy among the two surviving commanders, Reno and Benteen.
@@CusterApollo I think the conspiracy was also welcomed (if not insisted) from higher up (Grant?) so Custer takes the full brunt of the failure/loss. One thing that has always bothered me is that Joel Elliott (Benteen's friend) and 19 others were abandoned at Washita. No surprise why Benteen (and others) hated Custer for that - but even so, I don't think Benteen would let 200 men die at LBG out of his hatred for Custer. Most reports of Benteen finding about about Custer's death portray a man in disbelief/shock as he thought Custer was safe and sound and had left Reno to be massacred (like Elliott). And as much as I do not like Reno (total incompetent), he had no chance attacking the south of the village without support (which he was told he would have). It's never been clear how Reno was to be supported? Great job with all the videos Bill! When's your next trip to LBH?
Benteen did complete his scout as ordered. I have no problem with Benteen there. However, Benteen failed to return quickly to the command or send word of the outcome of the scout via courier to Custer. Those failures would prove deadly to Custer's battalion.
It seems to me Custer did not make a command decision. He new Reno got stopped, he new the non-combatants were fleeing, he new the village was bigger than expected. He was slowing and waiting for his packs and Benteen. Boston told him they were coming. I think this was the critical point of the battle. The warriors were not running but fighting. At medicine tail coulee he needed to make a decisive descision now high sight we know what we would of done. But Custer should of chose either to pull back in a defensive position with horses at the ready and wait for pack and Benteen or full attack at medicine tail coulee knowing his reinforcements were coming. Now would he still have been overwhelmed probably but his decisive decision would of given his troopers a better chance and his command would of been together. As it was he was still searching, gathering hoping and he knew things were getting critical. The troopers were caught separated and confused.
www.historynet.com/could-custer-have-won.htm Bill- Are you and Paul Hutton in contact. Your narrative and his certainly share the insightful belief that Custer maintained his offensive strategy and came close to achieving his goal of coraling the village non-combatants north of the village that would have short-circuited the warrior offensive. Also, are there any prints of Michael Donahue's painting " Where the hell is Benteen? available? Thanks. Lee
No. I have never met or spoken with Paul Hutton, however, I am a big fan of his work. I have met Michael Donahue a couple of times at the Little Bighorn Battlefield, but am not aware of the painting you are referring to.
I completely agree with Fox and his interpretation of the battle which is based on archaeology, Indian testimony, marker positions, and soldier accounts after the battle.
I actually just re read section 3 of Fox's book since I posted, skipping the first part about methodology of Archaeology. I got my minor in Archaeology and have been on many digs, all oversees and never out west though, so that part I could skip. A whole lot of people don't like his book, many for lame reasons IMHO but I have seen first hand the conflict between the historian and the archaeologist, and even between archaeologists. I think his book paints a pretty accurate portrayal of the battle.
I agree with you about the Fox book. My documentaries include the archaeology, but I also used other main sources. When asked about how I came up with the documentaries I always cite Richard A. Fox, John S. Gray, Roger Darling and Richard G. Hardorff as the main backbone of my work.
Bill-- Is it possible that Frank Finkel was telling the truth...that he was a survivor..that "August Finkel" did survive. His narrative, especially considering he related it at that time in the early 1900's, seems to have a ring of truth to it. His narrative is not inconsistent with your excellent one. Kanipe may have made an honest misidentification of a mutilated, swollen corpse that he assumed was his friend. Windolph, of course said he could not find his friend's body on the battlefield. Frank's story has a ring of truth to it including the details about his fellow soldiers and Tom Custer. He related that he was obeying an order to mount his horse and engage the Warriors when he and his horse were hit, a rein was broken, and his horse bolted carrying him through the Warriors line and down Calhoun Hill through the village and out onto the plains. Rain in the Face did say that the squaws had seen a soldier on horseback go past them through the village. What is your thoughts on this? Lee
I just don't believe Frank's story. Too many holes and 20/20 hindsight. The handwriting does not match. The ages of the men don't match. The country of origin does not even match. The pre 7th career Frank makes up strains credibility. I will believe Kanipe all day on his identification of a fellow Sergeant August Finckle any day over someone who claims to be the lone survivor. Kanipe had no reason to lie, Frank had plenty.
CusterApollo -- I respect your opinion on this. However, we do not know the exact circumstances of the Custer fight nor will we ever. Kanipe had no reason to lie about his battlefield identifications but they were done hurriedly 2 days later on bodies disfigured by mutilation and 100 degree weather. But I really don't believe that Frank had a reason to lie either. He didn't change his story to fit the then known narrative and that is one of the strongest indications he was just telling the truth. Subsequently discovered documentation tends to lend credence to his story...specifically the reasons his background is so convoluted. A lot of enlisted men would have told similar mistruths in order to enlist. I don't have your knowledge of the Custer Battle and I will bow to your expertise on this matter. It is a shame that you didn't get to meet Frank and question him. It is the survivors..at least some of them..that get to tell their story. What if Frank was one of the survivors....and if not... who was he. Thank you for your dedicated research and your excellent presentations. It is humbling and greatly appreciated. And thanks for your patience with me. Lee
Anything is possible. This is almost a matter of faith. It comes down to who you believe. I tend to believe Kanipe over Frank. I find it hard to believe Frank's story. However if his story is true than you must conclude that not only was Frank a deserter, but was also a liar as well. Poor character in my taste.
There is no way Benteen or Reno could have saved his command. They too would have been intercepted and cut to pieces on less favorable defensive ground. The best laid plans can go awry.
The answer lies in the timing of Benteen's arrival. If Benteen arrives on Luce Ridge while Custer is still there then the possibility of a cavalry victory is intact.
friendslittlebighorn.com/images/reviews/donahuebennett2.jpg Bill- The picture may still be in progress but I read somewhere that prints were available Link to interview: friendslittlebighorn.com/interviewmichaeldonahue.htm
Great work. Maps are definitely the basic mean of understanding whole battle. Would be even more interesting if you overlayed it upon GE maps or topographic map. By the way what you think of this documentary: ruclips.net/video/CDxXvwJosaU/видео.html. And which documentary available on the topic would you recommend?
Did Custer make a major error by deciding NOT to cross Little Bighorn River and trying to capture at leas some of the noncombatant Indians? Yes, with about 80 men most would escape. But if he had held several hundred as a shield against the overwhelming warriors - who would not attack if the soldiers held their women and children - numbers might that not have given him enough time for Benteen and Reno to (finally) provide help?
In hindsight it is an error. Of course Custer had no idea what was about to befall him. Tactically waiting for the recalled units was the correct decision.
Why didn’t Custer keep mutual support of the right wing? Why didn’t Calhoun send a courier to Custer informing him of the massing of Indians to the south and from Ford B? Why didn’t Custer leave someone to assess Reno’s progress (or lack there of) or Benteen’s (or lack there of) mutual support before trying to flank the village......even more so after not crossing at Ford B. Didn’t Custer just underestimate the Indians will to fight and overall #s? Obviously at Ford B he should have assessed that the 800 warriors figure (plus warnings of the size of the village from his scouts) which the whole campaign was based on was way too small....,and that Reno wouldn’t be able to delay long enough .... especially given his #s and experience. I think the battle was lost when Custer pushed north of Ford B and divided his forces again....instead of getting more info on Reno and Benteen. (Given the actual size of the village).
I also think had Custer moved up to last stand hill 15 mins prior to when he did he would have been in a better position to assess the Indian movements (to incircle him) and provide actual visual mutual support of the right wing. If his battle plan was to to be fluid but rely on benteen's reinforcements...being on last stand hill (aka the high ground with a 360 degree view of the immediate battle field) earlier would have allowed the fluidity of a tactical retreat probably to the north (given the massing of Indians south, southwest and east). Custer didn't have that info as the right wing battle became more desperate. At some point he had to assess that Benteen had joined Reno and was not coming. Too much time had passed...and the tactical advantage that he thought he had had evaporated given the lack of numbers to cross the river. Instead of a delaying action from cemetery hill (Indian accounts of Custer just waiting for 20-30 mins)....he should have moved back to last stand hill to assess the right wing and to scope for Benteen to the south. This would have allowed for the proper assessment of the changing tactical picture and probably would have allowed time for break out to the south or maybe mounted retreat to the north. The delay allowed the noose to tighten with Custer not knowing how desperate the situation had become. Yes Benteen and Reno failed the battle plan...Benteen could have left some men with Reno after the fighting slowed in the south and pushed north to clear the hills and assess the situation to the north. This action happened 30 mins too late. Benteen and Reno were not acting as fluidly and aggressively as Custer intended. I have to agree that Reno's shell shock after the retreat left Benteen in an even more sticky spot....because obviously Reno was not in the right frame of mind to defend the spot. I have to wonder what Benteen was really thinking prior to Reno's charge? Mutual support to the pack train (which still had a lot of men)? I still think Custer left Reno too early...or at the very least didn't allow for someone to assess that initial battle in the south. He also obviously thought Benteen would have been much closer. To maybe be a bridge between the Custer moving north and Reno in the Valley. Benteens lack of Situational awareness of Custers movements ...due to his slow approach also contributed massively to critical delays to critical positioning for visual mutual support. Custers overall divided smaller 3/4 battalions force allowed much larger force of Indians to concentrate forces and time to move tactically to eventual surround Custers northern force. I'm very interested in the Indian movements to the north and East.....this was a very sound tactical move which, given enough time, would leave Custer no out.
I personally think poor training and leadership at the battalion/company command level. As an ex soldier you can almost feel their lack of practice in working together. Also there clearly is a lack of initiative of the officers probably as a result of Custer's dictatorial style. At no time did the companies in reserve move to support which tends to confirm that. To our eyes the way that the wings were deployed out of supporting distance makes no tactical sense, however up until this time (Battle on the Rosebud is the other exception) the Indians had never fought in this way i.e in "organised " groups rather as individuals. This was the impact of Crazy Horse who saw this was the way to beat the soldiers at their own game.
It is often said that no one knows what exactly happened to Custer's immediate command after Private Martini/Martin rode off. The outstanding forensics comprehensively and clearly set forth in this series provide the soundest and most tactically likely narrative of the Custer battle that I have ever seen. This is War College material, in my opinion.
Thank you sir.
Best description of the Custer fight I've seen in my 60 years... That final map is chilling...
Thanks for watching.
I just came across these videos last week. I have watched them all several times and being a student of the battle I find your work commendable. I especially like the maps showing the flow of Indian and Trooper movements. Excellent work on your part!!!
+MrDonnie67 Thank you for watching. I appreciate the feedback.
In 2009 I visited the LBH battle site, a dream trip since childhood. Walking over the terrain and reviewing the different actions that took place really helps understand many "why's" and "how's". One thing that really stood out was how steep and tall the hills are where Reno's crew came back across the river. It would an exhausting climb for man or horse on a normal day today.
Another terrain feature is how rolling it is but it looks deceptively flat. A relatively tiny dip in terrain could conceal a lot of people who could spring up from nowhere.
At the time I visited I hadn't studied any of Professor Fox's archeology work on the battle site. If I went again I'd have Fox's work to consider while surveying the land.
Good stuff. The Fox Book "Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle" is my bible on the Custer battle.
You have made the best documentary and maps of this battle of all the books and TV shows I have seen. As I was reading the archeological findings from the excellent Richard Fox book, I had trouble understanding some of the actions and terrain. Your videos and maps made everything so much clearer. I finally think I understand what happened much more clearly than ever before. Thanks so much for your incredible work and insight!
Thanks for watching. I am a big fan of Fox and much of my interpretation of this battle comes from his findings. Other notable authors that helped bring about my documentaries, besides my own research, are Richard G. Hardorff, John S. Gray and Roger Darling.
@Gary Daniel I agree. The most overlooked aspect of the Custer battle itself is how the battlefield came about entirely by chance. Custer had no intention of fighting up on the bluffs. The terrain was totally unsuitable for the cavalry and gave many advantages to the warriors. The right wing deployment on Calhoun Hill was to act as a facilitation point for the recalled units. Once Benteen had arrived the bluffs would have served no purpose whatsoever. Custer's objective was in the valley and the terrain was far more suitable for the cavalry to operate there.
Wow, I commend you Sir! I've always had an amateur interest in this battle ever since visiting the battlefield in the 80's as a teenager. I've always enjoyed reading account's from both sides and learning new facts as they've come to light. I even had the good fortune to be assigned to the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry during my time in the Army. This is the first time I've seen an account this thorough and understandable and I come away with a sense of awe as to how the battle unfolded as well as a sense of dread imagining the thoughts and emotions that must have occurred that day. Thank you for the time and effort you spent on putting this series together. I will recommend this to anyone I come across in the future with similar interests.
Thank you for the kind words. I just got back from the battlefield myself after touring visitors, doing interpretation, etc. It was a good time. I always enjoy teaching people about the battle. And thank you for your service to this country as as well Sir. My great-grandfather and grandfather served in the Army as well. WWI and WWII. Without you and others like you this country would not be great. As much work as I have done doing these documentaries, you have done the really hard work of keeping all of us safe. I have dvd copies of both of my documentaries. If you would like copies of them just send me an email or private message and I will send them to you. Its the least I can do for a true hero from this county.
Just the best recount of the battle I have come across. Superlative research clearly from a number of sources and especially Native American accounts which, with the excellent maps, puts movement and ground into perspective. It provides an excellent understanding of the Battle which, I for one, had difficulty in comprehending. It certainly answers for me the many whys and how did this happen questions I had. Brilliant Well done
this map series has made a lot more sense than any book ive read,,,great job.
+nikcsdad1 Thanks for the kind words. I am glad you found the documentary worth watching.
+nikcsdad1 I thought the whole map series put everything into perspective. The only thing I would have liked is the names of the hills etc to have been left on the maps, also a distance indicator. The clear thing that kept on me thinking was the constant splitting of his command. Custer,Reno & Benteen seemed guilty of it.
I think they just had to continue to stretch themselves thin to do the job because of the immense size of the village. It was the size of a small city. Also, had the regiment remained united, many of the Indians probably would have scattered and gotten away.
Great job. Very impressive. You really put the battle together. My father was Hunkpapa Sioux from Standing Rock. My dad used to roam around the battle ground as a young boy.
Thanks for watching. Hunkpapa Sioux. Very impressive tribe. The same tribe as Sitting Bull.
Outstanding rendition in the best and most concise manner I have seen. Better understanding of the battle is had with this.
I'm travelling from Australia in September to walk that battlefield and I needed a step-by step geographic representation as a basis for understanding/appreciation. Your program did that admirably. Thank you.
Thanks for watching. If you have not watched my 2010 Little Bighorn Documentary, I suggest you check it out. I film every sector of the battlefield.
Excellent series of videos. A Reno-Benteen battle would be great as well.
Great job! You can read and read but this really helps to understand....at least for me! Thanks again for this entire series!
Thanks for watching. Feel free to watch my 39 part Little Bighorn Documentary from 2010 as well. It is over 6 hours long and covers Custer from birth to death.
Superlative job ! ! After visiting the battle site first in 1978 and 6 times since, this map puts the sites to mind like never before. I've even walked on some of the areas with a Crow as his guest. Thank you, the length & breadth of this battle and your map surely whets my appetite to go back one more time, if I'm able to. Kudos to you sir for a job well done.
+Zeke Placer Very cool. Thanks for watching.
I really enjoyed your map video. I especially appreciate the mention of Sgt. Edward Botzer (Batzer), as he is my Great-Great-Uncle. I have been to the battlefield many times, and the next time I visit I will certainly be referencing your videos before and after (and perhaps during). What a fascinating part of American History. Thank you for your contributions!
Thank you for watching. Always cool to meet a family member of the battle.
Excellent work. Thank you for your efforts. Quite a special historical document.
Thanks Tony. Appreciate the feedback. If you ever have the chance to go out to the battlefield I highly recommend it. Nothing beats the real thing. I also made a documentary on Custer's entire life back in 2010. It is on my playlists on my page. If you have not watched it feel free to do so. It is over 6 hours long and more in depth than the 2013 Map Battle documentary.
When I was fourteen years old (in 1968) I was drawn to a little book in our school library titled "The Battle at the Little Big Horn" by Mari Sandoz. I had this strange feeling of affinity to the battle as if (reincarnation were true) I might have been there when it happened. In later years, in 1990, I took a job in Seattle and drove there from South Carolina. Made it a point to stop in on the Devil's Tower, the Black Hills, Crazy Horse Monument, Mount Rushmore - AND - driving all night through absolute wilderness - the Custer Battlefield. After a few hours sleep in my car I made an early morning drive across what I think is Battle Ridge and over to Reno Hill - and then back to the monument. I didn't get to explore it so well but it was moving (to me) just being there, imagining what had happened, and taking in the scenery on a winter morning in Montana, on a bleak, blustery, snow covered ridge. I am going back- hopefully bringing the family with me. This is what makes your work so cool. I'm gonna know a lot more about it when I go this time. T
Marvellous work, outstanding. Your research is detailed and thought provoking. Congratulations, if not allready done I see a thesis for a doctorate here. One final point if I may. If it was good enough for Custer to expect Reno with 120-150 men to occupy/hold the attention of 1,000-1,500 plus warriors and survive, then Benteen can be excused for expecting Custers 210 men to hold/survive against such a horde. Mistakes were made by everyone (including higher command) from assumptions (reasonable) that the Indians wouldn't be so aggressive, Custer's refusal of the four 2nd Cavalry companies, to Reno/Benteen's lack of action when firing was heard on Reno Hill. To me the overwhelming reason for the defeat was the totally unexpected ferocity and aggressiveness of the Indian warriors. Thank you again for all your effort/work and sharing such with us.
Thanks for the feedback. I agree mistakes were made by all the battalion commanders. Refusing the 2nd Cavalry was a huge mistake by Custer in my eyes. That extra 140 men would have given Custer 9 companies to accomplish his objective of capturing the non-combatants. Benteen can finish his scout and McDougall can bring the pack train up and reinforce Reno. Reno would then have over 345 men even after the retreat to the bluffs. The battle can still be won with little bloodshed.
Great job! Really ties it in for me. Especially the early movements and approach to the battlefield. I've read plenty about the battle and I live in montana so have visited a few times but this provides a visual that really helps understand the totality. Also love the walking tour as well.
I am honored to have been among the first to see this as I only started to look at this subject last week. I was frustrated until now by the lack of mapping of the battlefield.
Hey Allen. The major reason I actually did this project was because many people requested maps on the battle. So I am glad that you enjoyed the documentary. All the hard work pays off when my subscribers post feedback on my videos. Thanks for watching.
Thanks again Bill, Ive watched the original documentary dozens of times and drove the route myself , this new work really shows the collapse of the Keough companies in a way that has always been hard to visualize in one's mind. Really great, and the last slide or map showing the locations of the soldier dead is fantastic as well.. Thanks very much thes two documentaries are some of the best wokr ever done on the subject
Thanks for watching. I am glad you have found my work a good learning and entertainment tool.
Right There I totally agree. This really made everything much more clear to me.
Well done. Your conclusions are interesting and better than most.
Thank you. My conclusions are based on my own research combined with the works of Richard Fox, Roger Darling, Richard Hardorff and John Gray. All great Custer authors and historians.
Excellent presentation! Enjoyed it immensely. Thank you for all the effort. ...Wish I could give you two thumbs up.
Thanks for watching.
CusterApollo fb
Excellent. Top notch series of videos, well done!
This helped make the battle that day so clear to me, I learn faster with maps. Great job, this is beyond interesting.
Thanks Lynn. Glad you enjoyed it.
I agree absolutely! Custer made a lot of mistakes that day, especially depending on two officers that he did not have much respect for. Benteen had no love for Custer especially since the Elliot affair. My thinking is that when he found Reno he believed that Custer abandoned Reno like he did Elliott and was not going to let it happen again. I think he felt Custer wanted all the glory so he was on his own.
Thank you the outstanding presentation of the Little Bighorn Battle. From your first video to the last one, the details of situations which led to why Custer and his troops performed that day in Montana. It makes you wonder that Boston Custer's report that Benteen received his report and order to move up. If not, would Custer had position his troops such as Keogh and Calhoun in a different position or just moved out of harm's way. Either way, thank you for tireless and excellent work.
Thanks for watching. Appreciate the feedback.
This was outstanding........................Now I really understand the whole battle from start to finish....................I tell anyone I know that has an interest in this battle to watch this....
+Larry Hervey Thanks for watching. I am glad you liked it. Fell free to watch my 39 part Little Bighorn 2010 documentary as well. The thing is over 6 hours long, but really shows the battle sectors well. I actually recorded in Montana and walk you through the each sector and show the local terrain from the Rosebud all the way to Deep Ravine.
Dust covered the battle field from start to finish! The eye witness accounts had to have some bearing on this research, soldiers, trail, Indian stories.. Exciting narration.
Thanks Richard.
To defend a force or position you have to be able to generate sufficient firepower to deter the enemy from closing and using their superior close-range firepower. The 7th's repeated splitting of their force into smaller and smaller sub-units was what caused the defeat. I suspect this was due to Custer commanding far more men in the Civil war and treating his single regiment as if it were a larger force. But a few dozen men spread far apart cannot generate the firepower to suppress enemy maneuver or fire. Had they remained as a single mailed fist they could have done whatever they wanted given the Indians' restrictions of having to protect non-combatants and pony herds. Actually, merely attacking and killing, capturing, or scattering the pony herds would have effectively defeated the Indians on this day, and led to reduced mobility that would have allowed reinforcements to join in for a final victory.
This is so fascinating work. We could see it in slow motion Second per Second and Meter per Meter advance. The combination with the site videos makes it real and haunting. In 150 Minutes total Desaster. Peckinpah stuff...
Thanks for watching. Yes, when the rout began it did not take long for the entire battalion to be wiped out.
@@CusterApollo As a German Scientist I watched intensely ALl your excellent work! It is a metaphor for the other disasters of this kind. Like Stalingrad in 1942. Battle of Takur Ghar is an eerie reminder. We all should study that more carefully. And the Best are sacrificed...
@@raginald7mars408 Thanks for watching.
Excellent! While Richard Fox's book can give you info of the battlefield this puts in better perspective. I think Reno gets a bad wrap. Whether being incompetent or drunk, there was no way his mission could have been a success. He was promised the full support of the regiment but Custer failed to deliver. When Benteen found him, he asked "where is Custer" I think Reno truthfully answered "I don't know." Whether Benteen and Reno could have saved Custer is open to debate. Due to to the overwhelming number of warriors I doubt they could. I think Custer had underestimated the depth of Benteen's hatred of him.
Hey Frank. Good remarks. I believe Reno could have succeeded had he attacked as ordered. Forming the skirmish line allowed the non-combatants to escape and gave the warriors time and a static target to shoot at. Support does not have to come from the rear. Custer's intention to attack the village at another point can be looked upon as support for Reno. A second front would have drawn warriors away fro Reno and toward Custer. This eventually did happen in the real event. Had Benteen moved quickly as ordered he would have been in a position to support either Custer or Reno. His slow progress took him out of the battle when he was needed most. By the time Benteen reached Reno Hill, Custer's fate was sealed. I believe only a partial rescue could have been possible by then. I believe the battle was lost before it began with Benteen's slow movement after the scout.
By the way great presentation you make it real easy to follow
Thanks for watching.
We've been waiting for this--going to watch it right now. Thanks!
Sorry for the delay. I rewrote this video several times to make sure it was as good as I could get it. It was driving me crazy. But thanks for watching. I hope you find it was worth the wait.
+CusterApollo Bill, I was doing some family history work today in a local cemetery, and what did I find that might interest you? The grave of Pvt William E. Smith who was part of Benteen's Battalion. I don't know if you've ever heard of him, but his name does sound a little familiar. lol. He was with the 7th CAV from September 1885 to abt August 1880. I took a bunch of photos - if you're interested, drop me an e-mail: shamus07@comcast.net
Pete
+MrShamus07 ooops. That should read: he was with the 7th CAV from September 1875 to August 1880.
Great job. Very interesting and informative.
Thanks for watching.
Thanks for watching.
A fascinating video. Wish u can turn up the audio.
Great and interesting history, thank you.
Thank you for watching!
It is pretty clear that had Benteen arrived his units would have been wiped out too. Reno was bait and would have been destroyed. The only hope would have been for Custer to have taken his whole command on a fast ride to the N and to have crossed the river to capture the fleeing families.
The key is what time Benteen arrives. Arriving early could change the outcome of the battle.
@@CusterApollo Therein lies part of the problem.
The Lakota and Cheyenne were masters of field-craft. The "cavalry" consisted of (mostly) green troops. The psychological effect of "Indians" suddenly "appearing out of nowhere" must have contributed to the loss, as it probably did for Crook.
Custer deployed the Seventh into "battalions" that were effectively under-strength companies, scattered so as to be incapable of stopping the enemy or supporting each other. He should have done better scouting, and then, when the noncombatants were "missing", gone back to find Benteen and the Packs. His famous "luck" was based on shock tactics; but Crazy Horse, Gall, and the rest got over their shock very quickly. And Custer was out-gunned.
By the grace of God, Reno found the only defensible terrain for miles, Benteen disobeyed orders, McDougal arrived in time with the packs, and together they saved the rest of the regiment. Otherwise, following Custer's orders, it would have been over 600 dead.
Not saying anything but "hindsight sees clearly." I am not sure I could save the Seventh in a war game, much less do as well as Custer in real life.
Excellent presentation...i'm getting a much h better understanding of what happened..curious how you find out what the troopers were thinking or attempting since they were all killed...is the information from Indians?
Yes. Indian testimony, archaeology, marker placements and survivor testimony all were used to form this theory of the battle.
Hi. great stuff. I really enjoyed this. I have read a fair few books on this subject many years ago and most speculated that custer may have been wounded or at least wounded fairly early in the action. ie when he took his battalion down to the river ( you said just one comapny went down) and then pulled back.. The books I read suggested he could have been killed or wounded then. I am keen to hear your opinion on when in the action Custer was killed?
+Sheila Skelton I do not believe Custer was wounded at the river at Ford B. If he had been I do not believe the command would have performed all the actions it did after Ford B. The future movements of the battalion have Custer's fingerprints all over them. Also we know Keogh, the second in command, died with his men and his wing and not headquarters. Had Custer been wounded, the command would have been consolidated and Keogh would at least been observing and with Custer. This clearly did not happen. The right wing was given the passive blocking assignment while the left wing, with headquarters attached, moved farther north, found the non combatants and set up an offensive position on Cemetery Ridge. Feels like Custer in command and in good shape to me. I believe Custer was fine up until the Last Stand Hill episode. That is where he was found after the battle and I believe that is where he died. I do not subscribe to the theory that Custer was killed on some other part of the battlefield and dragged, taken, carried, whatever, to Last Stand Hill. Evidence on this theory is lacking.
Hello again! I mentioned before I grew up in Montana. When I was a senior in high school in 1975. Closing in on the 100 anniversary of the battle. It was said some of the dead were not mutilated. Custer himself, possibly Capt. Keogh and a lone soldier somewhere in the battle. Your thoughts?
I agree. Not all the soldiers and officers were mutilated, but a great majority were. Some men were beyond recognition. Reports stated Keogh was barely touched. Mark Kellogg was also found fully clothed. Custer had some mutilation, but for the most part was in good shape. People like Tom Custer were not so lucky. Tom was identified from the tattoo on his arm. Others also were mutilated bad. Some soldiers were decapitated making identification impossible.
the map needs a compose rose showing the cardinal directions since you reference the directions so often. Otherwise, well done.
+Todd Berkoff Sorry. I put the map directions on at the beginning of the video. That and not leaving the names of the features on the map have been common suggestions from viewers. The reason I leave these features off was due to the combatant movement. I did not wish the maps to be become more congested than they already were.
I've been reading History.net timeline of the battle. According to them, the pack train did not arrive at Reno Hill until 5:20. I think Benteen rationalized his actions because Custer had ordered him to bring the pack train he didn't have to leave the hill even though he heard the gunfire. I guess my question is this. According to History.net there were about 60 wounded men on Reno Hill. Could they be moved? If not, how many men would Benteen leave at the hill to protect them? Would there have been enough troopers to influence the outcome of the battle? I also think the pack train would have made no influence. Custer didn't fail because of lack of ammunition but from the superior weapons the Indians used.
I respectfully disagree. Benteen should have left the hill. The rendezvous with Reno was due to circumstance. Had Benteen followed the original orders he would have not even come in contact with Reno. Reno would have still been in the valley. As for the wounded, the total of 60 was the final number. While there were wounded men on the hill, the figure of 60 at that time in the battle is fiction. Also I find it amusing that Reno all the sudden is worried about wounded men when he had abandoned his troops in the timber, failed to set up a rear-guard or flankers at the river crossing, and was the first man to reach the hill while his troops lagged behind leaderless and demoralized. He even left his adjutant behind, who was killed on the retreat. In the end the battle, in my opinion, was lost long before Reno reached his hill. Benteen's slow movement prior to the battle as well as his rendezvous with Reno's men meant Custer's fate was sealed. Despite this some effort should have been made. Weir at least attempted to do something, against orders from Reno and Benteen I must add. Doing nothing was an unacceptable option, and Benteen meekly following the highly motivated Weir after the fact does nothing to excuse his earlier actions and inactions. As for superior weapons held by Indians I completely disagree. The weapons the cavalry had were superior to the repeating weapons of the time. Other factors, along with the weapons, came into play that caused the cavalry defeat.
Frank Durante Q
@@CusterApollo The "superiority" of weapons was not as big a factor as "penny packets" of Calhoun, Keogh, and Custer "battalions" were overwhelmed by what amounted to "human wave" attacks, punctuated by the terrifying "counting coup" and then another unit breaks and the men are slaughtered. Custer's men were "no grisly old "njun fighters", they were as often as not recent immigrants (like Martini who carried the Benteen message) who enlisted to earn enough to set up a shop or buy a farm (hence the phrase). There was no strong cadre of NCOs to take over, no unit cohesion as the officers fell.
Thanks for the wonderful series that you put together. I especially liked the commentary about the advance over the Divide and down to the Little Bighorn. On your last map series (#6), I though it might be appropriate to put a mark for Mark Kellogg. He was the first AP reporter killed on duty (from what I read). Also, any idea who the two marks are for near the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee? Thank you
Hey Bob. I did not forget the marker for Kellogg. It is located on the eastern side of Battle Ridge. Clearly the wrong place as all evidence points to him being killed down by Ford D. I just followed the marker map when placing Kellogg. As for the Medicine Tail markers, the one on the right is for Cpl. John Foley of Company C and the one on the left is for 1st Sgt. James Butler of Company L.
I would disagree with your characterization of the charge/breakout of Company E. I would argue that this was a frantic breakout or escape of those men able and willing to try to escape Last Stand Hill, and not a coordinated "attack" by Company E as you describe. They didn't seem to be attacking any specific target. What evidence do you have that it was a directed movement by Custer? Those poor men were fleeing for those lives.
It is quite possible it was an unsanctioned breakout by men on their own. Indian testimony speaks of a bugle call before the maneuver. This suggests it was an ordered coordinated maneuver. It however does not rule out it was men fleeing on their own. The offensive maneuver just seems to jive with the departure of the men who fled south on the remaining horses.
I recall History Channel quoting a civil war officer who stated that a Sharp's Carbine was useful only for "scaring people and exciting the horses." If Custer's men were following a "standoff" doctrine, I see some parallels in that they were armed with 22" barrel carbines, 45-55 ammo and, above all, not practiced at all(have read some shocking reports of the amount of practice ammo). These men and their horses were exhausted and the carbine probably had a 100 fps advantage over .44 Henry. And I would question any military thinking about Native Amercans being unable to regulate ladder sights for long range shooting. People mostly focus on Custer's deployment of his forces, but there is a very important question about whether his men were even equipped to engage in effective standoff tactics. Your thoughts?
It is clear that the army was trained to fight an organized army and not Indians on the western frontier. The Springfield, while superior to Indian weapons, especially the Henry and Winchester, could only fire once before being reloaded. If stable, the army could hold an enemy at a distance. However, at the Little Bighorn, we all know the Indians broke range and got close. Once range was breached the Indian weapons achieved superiority over the Springfield as the ability to deliver vast volume fire at close range trumped the single shot capability of the soldier weapons. Add in the superior number of warriors and you have a perfect recipe for disaster.
Excellent video!
This video was awesome! keeep em comin!!:)
+Crillionair Thanks for watching.
In 1970, it was common to paint Custer as a genocidal madman and I'm seeing much change in that many now suggest he was a victim of treachery by fellow officers. Neither proposition rings true. Benteen never could have provided victory because that meant crossing the river and securing a huge band of non-combatants. Not happening with 125 extra men. If Benteen had made it to Custer, his companies would have been broken up, horses scattered and, ultimately, his men also killed--then, the Indians would have focused on Reno and the pack train, likely wiping them out. The Indian scouts were keenly aware of what was going to happen and, obviously, both Reno and Benteen had access to their intelligence. These officers had a very unenviable task that day.
The battle outcome depends on the timing of Benteen's arrival. Had Benteen arrived when Custer was still on Luce Ridge then a chance to capture the non-combatants is a very real possibility. Benteen arriving later than this does nothing to win the battle. And he may have been wiped out as well. Timing was a key.
Bill, simply fantastic work. I am currently working on my capstone paper for a b.a. history degree and would be honored to do a brief Q&A with you about key events and possible theories. Being able to directly cite your research and analysis, I think would go a long way in shaping my argument. I am a member of the LBHA and can get you my contact info if you would kindly oblige. Either way, thank you immensely for the videos and information.
Thanks Ernest. I have no problem doing a q&a. I love talking Custer and this battle.
CusterApollo Please check your FB messenger. I sent you a message there and we can work through details in private messages. Thank you so much and I greatly look forward to it
Its interesting how the death of Bloody Knife may have changed the outcome of the battle.Reno may have not panicked and left the woods.The warriors would have kept him pinned in the woods instead of up on Reno-Benteen hill until word of Custers men coming spread.Then they would have left just enough warriors to keep him in the trees and the rest would have went to fight Custers force to the north.He would not have suffered so many casualties.Benteen would have had no reason to stop to aid Reno on Reno-Benteen hill and would have continued on to assist Custer.Custer would then possibly have enough men to capture the non-combatants and win the battle.
I have never heard this theory. I agree. Bloody Knife's death is quite pivotal to subsequent events.
Thanks for your thoughts. I subsequently learned that Reno had never fought Indians before. Is that true?
You are welcome. Yes. That is true. I believe the battle would have gone differently had one of two things had happened. 1. Reno did the scout and Benteen attacked the Indian village. Or 2. Major Lewis Merrill was able to rejoin the command and thus be senior over Reno.
like all the others videos very good detail and depth ty
Thank you! I am glad you enjoyed the series.
This map history is the most interesting and complete explanation of the battle I have seen since my Dad got me hooked on the subject when I was a young boy. I can't wait to show this to him! ...Question: What is your favorite book on Custer?
Richard A Fox's "Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle" is my favorite book on the subject and was the basis of this documentary, as well as my 2010 Little Bighorn Documentary.
Had Custer accepted the four companies of the Second Cavalry (another 160 or so men) he had been offered, the battle might have been very different. I think Custer might have been forced to retreat but not wiped out. Even if Benteen with his three companies did not move forward those four other companies would have covered his absence. Also, Reno only had three companies, around 125 men. Had he attacked with four additional companies he might have been successful in his charge.
I agree. Not taking the extra four companies really hurt on the day of the battle. Custer could have personally taken the extra four, giving him 9 companies, almost an entire full regiment. Reno could have attacked the southern end of the village as ordered with three companies. Benteen could have completed his scout and then had orders to join Reno, bolstering the Major's strength to 6 companies and almost 300 soldiers and scouts.
Based on having the extra four companies, i don't think Custer would have retreated at all. I believe your premise is based on history. That Custer would have fought the warriors up on the ridge. Had Custer had the extra four companies he never would have fought on the ridges at all. The terrain was useless and totally unsuitable for the cavalry. Also the target was in the valley, and Reno's troops had forced them from south to north away from the attack. Had Custer had 9 companies the battle would not have even been fought up on the bluffs. Custer had found Ford D for a reason. It was to find a crossing point at the river to capture the non-combatants. Had he done so with 9 companies then the cavalry would have crossed immediately and captured non-combatants in the valley, terrain more suitable and favorable to the cavalry. This would render the warriors mute and could have resulted in all Indians surrendering and returning to the reservation.
Superb!!!
Thanks for watching.
Been waiting for this to come out. Great work. And if I may ask a question. I have been reading Bruce Browns book , "Who Killed Custer '. He states in his book that Custer was wounded at Medicine Tail Coulee. Do you believe this ? From your analysis of the battle. It seems that the 7th cavalry, was still being well lead with a purpose , and on the offensive , up until the very end. I don't think it would of been so well lead with its leader injured or dying .
Hey Scott. I have heard that rumor often. And I don't believe Custer was wounded at the ford. There is no evidence to back up the rumor. The Indians say they shot a man down at the ford, but nobody knew who Custer was. Also I don't even think Custer was down by the river. I am of the opinion that Headquarters and Company F were farther away from the river and positioned up on Butler Ridge to get a better overall view of the situation. If any officer was shot down by the ford it may have been 1st Lt. Algernon E. Smith, the Company E commander. His final position up on Last Stand Hill suggests he never led the Company E deployment off the hill and into the South Skirmish Line. This suggests he was unable to, thus either killed or wounded. I think Smith makes a better candidate than Custer as the officer possibly shot at the ford. Also I believe if Custer was hit than the battle would have progressed very differently than we believe it did.
CusterApollo
Thanks for answering my question Bill. Watch your videos a lot ,can't get enough of them. And another question or more of a statement. If the Native Americans scalped their fellow Indians {As you mentioned about Lame White Man ] , not knowing that they were on their side. How could any one on the Indians side know from a distance who Custer was ? My opinion is they couldn't , and was a made up story to more Immortalize the Custer name. Saying he as so important of a figure even his enemies knew who he was. .
And if I may ask another. Did any one or where could I find information on what the survivors found once Terry and Gibbon arrived on the field. Did anyone write it down or take notes on what they found?
scott fornof I find it very hard to believe any Indian knew which man was Custer. Some warriors later gave testimony that they thought the soldiers they were fighting were commanded by General Crook.
There are several books that contain information about the aftermath on the battlefield. The problem is the information is not all in one book. There are bits and pieces in many books. I tend to find the letters from officers and men about what they witnessed on the battlefield are the best information. But the archaeology books by Fox and Scott reveal what soldiers went through during the battle by examining the bullet and case patters, as well as the evidence found on human remains found during the digs of the 1980's.
Professor Fox works in the History Dept at the University of South Dakota. He loves to talk about the Little Big Horn being the #1 project in his career. I've got his books which in-depth and detailed to say the least. Not for those wanting Hollywood type entertainment.
relatively speaking seems there so few Indians killed, what is that attributed to?
The confirmed number of killed is a low number, however I am sure others were killed and were not reported. The warriors also stated a great many were wounded and later died.
Did you draw the maps, yourself? ... I get a little confused when you switch the orientation of the map from upward-facing North to left-facing North.
I stand corrected. I thought history was a reliable source. Another Benteen excuse not to aid Custer. What is your opinion concerning Benteen's actions? I mentioned the Elliott affair in a previous post. Did that plus his hatred for Custer come into play? As far as the quality of weaponry i was using the Richard Fox book, "Archaeology, History, And Custer's Last Battle" as a reference.
I think Benteen's actions after the scout were the cause of the defeat. He disobeyed orders to join the command quickly and send word of the outcome of the scout. I do believe the Elliot affair and Benteen's hatred for Custer played a huge role in the outcome of the battle. Lastly, you picked a good book for your research. I consider the Fox book the bible of Custer battle understanding. Fox also believes the Indian weapons were inferior when compared to the soldier weapons, however, the particular situation gave the Indians the advantage. But it must be noted that the weapons themselves were not the reason why the Indians won. Other factors combined with the Indian weapons created the victory/defeat.
By the way, I was referencing History. net, not history itself. I am reading Killing Custer by James Welch, The Mystery of E Troop by Gregory Michno, A Terrible Glory by James Donovan, and Custer's Last Campaign by John Gray. Are these books worthwhile? Do you recommend any other books?
Anyone know why the cavalry went to the single shot Springfields when during the civil War they had the tube loaded seven shot Spencer? The Sioux had agency supplied fourteen round Henry repeaters and according to Kate Bighead the used plenty of non specific target arching arrow shots kind of like mortars which would be very effective on open, undulating, ravine pocked ground. These weapons would have been difficult to contend with even with an enemy in equal numbers.
Good question. The Spencer company went out of business in 1869 and the army had no choice but to choose a new weapon. Many weapons were tested, including the two main repeating rifles of the day, the Winchester and the Henry. However the army went with the Springfield for several reasons. One was cost. The army did not want a repeater because the soldiers tended to blow away their ammunition unnecessarily and too quickly. More rounds means more cost. The military was also looking for a weapon that would fight against a modern army. The Springfield was not chosen with the mindset of being a frontier weapon fighting against Indians that didn't fight tactically from a white man's perspective. When testing the weapons the army had three main categories of importance that weighed in on which weapon was ultimately chosen. The first was range. The greater the range the farther away your could keep your enemy. The second was accuracy. A more accurate weapon will more likely hit a target than a less accurate one. The third was stopping power. A weapon with superior stopping power would result in more kills per hit. It was better to kill your enemy rather than just wound him. A living soldier, although wounded, can still resist, and thus is a threat to your army. Dead enemy soldiers are no threat whatsoever. Now the repeaters of the day lacked all three of these criteria when compared to the Springfield. And that is why the Board of Officers chose the Springfield over every other rifle tested, including the repeaters. It must be noted that when Custer fought at the Little Bighorn, most of is men were wounded and then finished off by hand. The reason? Because the repeating rifles carried by the warriors did not have the stopping power to kill most of the targets they hit. War clubs and hatchets were the cause of the most deaths in Custer's command rather than the repeaters themselves.
Thanks. I figured cost and bullet wastage had something to do with it but didn't know Spencer arms went OOB in 1869. Other than Kate Bighead are there any other accounts of the warriors using a "rain of arrows" so to speak Agincourt style? BTW this series is great even if it was only the map portion.
Also the Army wanted to standardize ammunition so the rifles had to take 45-70 cartridges. The lever action rifles were not robust enough for general Army issue. The thin sheet metal magazine tube being a primary source of trouble. The Henry, Win 1866 and Win 1873 had relatively weak actions limiting them to pistol cartridges. Great for a cowboy, miner, trapper or sodbuster usage but not so much for Army purposes. Another concern would keeping remote outposts supplied and the fewer items to supply the better from a Quartermaster's view.
FWIW the only lever action ever adopted by a national army was the Winchester 1895 in 7.62x54 Russian. The Czarist govt of Russia bought a limited number of these. Today they are highly prized by Win lever action collectors.
I have with great interest seen your minutely review of the battle. I have also read Pretty Shield's testimony (autobiography of Frank B Linderman) in which she tells that her husband Crow scout Goes Ahead, has told that Custer was shot of the sadle while fording the river at the end of the Medicine Tail Coulee. Her statement was a surprise for me because it was the first time I met this reading of the drama. But now - by reading Bruce Brown's ''Who Killed Custer + 100 voices'' - I came in addition to Pretty Shield on other testimonies and not least White Cow Bull's and Peter Thompson's, which clearly indicates the same conclusion: An officer on ''a sorrel horse with... four white stockings'' was shot off the sadle in the river - which can only be George A. Custer!
Your review fails completely these witnesses about what happened. Why?
I did not mention these three in the Ford B episode because the testimony is not credible to the event. Goes Ahead did not witness the Ford B fighting. He was long gone heading south toward Reno Hill. The farthest the three scouts ever got to Medicine Tail Coulee was Weir Point, and I am of the opinion they never even got that far. I don't believe Custer ever went up to Weir Point, as there was no need to do so since he had a clear view of the village from the bluffs south of the high point. No need to risk being spotted by people in the village from Weir Point when the same intel could be gathered from a more secure location. It also must be noted that all three surviving scouts gave contradictory statements after the fact when compared to Curley, the one scout that actually rode with Custer's command into Medicine Tail Coulee, and was there to witness the Ford B event. So the second-hand account from Pretty Shield through an interpreter is questionable at best. White Cow Bull also lacks credibility. He claimed he was at the ford. He also claims to have led the attack on the soldiers. Neither is true. None of the warriors confirmed at the ford mentioned seeing White Cow Bull there, let alone leading an attack. Thompson also was not in a position to see the Ford B fighting. He lost contact with the command before Medicine Tail Coulee and testified that the last thing he saw was the Company F detail riding off out away from Luce Ridge. He never saw the detail reach Calhoun Hill. This occurred before the command separated at Luce Ridge and the left wing even went to the river. Also it must be noted that Custer did not ride on a Sorrel horse as referred to in today's classification. He rode on a Chestnut, which is a deeper shade of red. Now back in the 19th Century Chestnut's and Sorrel's were classified in the same group. However it must be noted Vic raced as a Chestnut and not a Sorrel. The Sorrel's in the 7th were tan and not red brown in color. Also per John Burkman, the soldier that actually personally took care of Custer's horses, stated Vic had three white stockings and not four as others have incorrectly testified. Lastly, had Custer been killed or incapacitated at the Ford then everything that happened after that would have been different. Keogh as the next most senior officer would have taken command. This did not happen. Keogh remained with his right wing and died in the southern sectors. Also Headquarters remained with the left wing and died next to Company F on Last Stand Hill. Everything that happened after Ford B has Custer's stamp and personality on it. Always the aggressive, Custer divided his command after the rendezvous at Calhoun Hill, left the right wing on the high ground to block any Indian advance and also to facilitate contact with the recalled units. Custer then took the left wing and located the non-combatants and a nearby ford to cross the river and capture them. Afterward, Custer placed his forces in an offensive posture on Cemetery Ridge and waited for the recalled units. In conclusion, like I stated earlier, I did not mention the three people you spoke of because through my own research I have determined their testimony is not credible to the event. These three examples are clear cases of Monday morning quarterbacking and making oneself more prominent to the event after the fact. This is an unfortunate, but common human action when it comes to big events in human history.
Outstanding, both in research detail and narration! I have visited this site three (3) times. The first time as a child with my grandparents and saw the reenactment. This painted the troop movement, which has been limited for me to visualize...till now. In your opinion, how could have Custer succeeded in this battle?
Thanks Bob. I think Custer could have won the battle had Benteen arrived while Custer was still in Medicine Tail Coulee. Eight companies could have captured a good portion of the non combatants forcing the warriors to stop fighting.
Lastly I think, Custer of the 3 commanders (Reno, Benteen) made the most sound decisions. Reno after being being routed was useless, and Benteen clearly showed no signs of trying to hurry in the scrape, the pack train had no chance of ever arriving.
Great videos Bill! Have you read Sergeant Charles Windolph's account "I Fought with Custer" and Benteen's testimony of 1879 -"The Custer Fight"? Very interesting. Shoot me an email if you want to discuss further.
Benteen's testimony was clearly one lie after another when it came to the battle. He almost admitted that he had disobeyed orders from Custer, as well as reveal his hated for Custer. The testimony painted a possible conspiracy among the two surviving commanders, Reno and Benteen.
@@CusterApollo I think the conspiracy was also welcomed (if not insisted) from higher up (Grant?) so Custer takes the full brunt of the failure/loss. One thing that has always bothered me is that Joel Elliott (Benteen's friend) and 19 others were abandoned at Washita. No surprise why Benteen (and others) hated Custer for that - but even so, I don't think Benteen would let 200 men die at LBG out of his hatred for Custer. Most reports of Benteen finding about about Custer's death portray a man in disbelief/shock as he thought Custer was safe and sound and had left Reno to be massacred (like Elliott). And as much as I do not like Reno (total incompetent), he had no chance attacking the south of the village without support (which he was told he would have). It's never been clear how Reno was to be supported? Great job with all the videos Bill! When's your next trip to LBH?
Obviously Benteen not doing as ordered foiled Custer's tactics.
Benteen did complete his scout as ordered. I have no problem with Benteen there. However, Benteen failed to return quickly to the command or send word of the outcome of the scout via courier to Custer. Those failures would prove deadly to Custer's battalion.
It seems to me Custer did not make a command decision. He new Reno got stopped, he new the non-combatants were fleeing, he new the village was bigger than expected. He was slowing and waiting for his packs and Benteen. Boston told him they were coming. I think this was the critical point of the battle. The warriors were not running but fighting. At medicine tail coulee he needed to make a decisive descision now high sight we know what we would of done. But Custer should of chose either to pull back in a defensive position with horses at the ready and wait for pack and Benteen or full attack at medicine tail coulee knowing his reinforcements were coming. Now would he still have been overwhelmed probably but his decisive decision would of given his troopers a better chance and his command would of been together. As it was he was still searching, gathering hoping and he knew things were getting critical. The troopers were caught separated and confused.
www.historynet.com/could-custer-have-won.htm
Bill- Are you and Paul Hutton in contact. Your narrative and his certainly share the insightful belief that Custer maintained his offensive strategy and came close to achieving his goal of coraling the village non-combatants north of the village that would have short-circuited the warrior offensive. Also, are there any prints of Michael Donahue's painting " Where the hell is Benteen? available? Thanks. Lee
No. I have never met or spoken with Paul Hutton, however, I am a big fan of his work. I have met Michael Donahue a couple of times at the Little Bighorn Battlefield, but am not aware of the painting you are referring to.
thanks bill
Thanks for watching.
Thanks
You are welcome.
So you generally subscribe to Fox's interpretation of the Custer Battalion battle and its battlefield collapse?
I completely agree with Fox and his interpretation of the battle which is based on archaeology, Indian testimony, marker positions, and soldier accounts after the battle.
I actually just re read section 3 of Fox's book since I posted, skipping the first part about methodology of Archaeology. I got my minor in Archaeology and have been on many digs, all oversees and never out west though, so that part I could skip. A whole lot of people don't like his book, many for lame reasons IMHO but I have seen first hand the conflict between the historian and the archaeologist, and even between archaeologists. I think his book paints a pretty accurate portrayal of the battle.
I agree with you about the Fox book. My documentaries include the archaeology, but I also used other main sources. When asked about how I came up with the documentaries I always cite Richard A. Fox, John S. Gray, Roger Darling and Richard G. Hardorff as the main backbone of my work.
Bill-- Is it possible that Frank Finkel was telling the truth...that he was a survivor..that "August Finkel" did survive. His narrative, especially considering he related it at that time in the early 1900's, seems to have a ring of truth to it. His narrative is not inconsistent with your excellent one. Kanipe may have made an honest misidentification of a mutilated, swollen corpse that he assumed was his friend. Windolph, of course said he could not find his friend's body on the battlefield. Frank's story has a ring of truth to it including the details about his fellow soldiers and Tom Custer. He related that he was obeying an order to mount his horse and engage the Warriors when he and his horse were hit, a rein was broken, and his horse bolted carrying him through the Warriors line and down Calhoun Hill through the village and out onto the plains. Rain in the Face did say that the squaws had seen a soldier on horseback go past them through the village. What is your thoughts on this? Lee
I just don't believe Frank's story. Too many holes and 20/20 hindsight. The handwriting does not match. The ages of the men don't match. The country of origin does not even match. The pre 7th career Frank makes up strains credibility. I will believe Kanipe all day on his identification of a fellow Sergeant August Finckle any day over someone who claims to be the lone survivor. Kanipe had no reason to lie, Frank had plenty.
CusterApollo -- I respect your opinion on this. However, we do not know the exact circumstances of the Custer fight nor will we ever. Kanipe had no reason to lie about his battlefield identifications but they were done hurriedly 2 days later on bodies disfigured by mutilation and 100 degree weather. But I really don't believe that Frank had a reason to lie either. He didn't change his story to fit the then known narrative and that is one of the strongest indications he was just telling the truth. Subsequently discovered documentation tends to lend credence to his story...specifically the reasons his background is so convoluted. A lot of enlisted men would have told similar mistruths in order to enlist. I don't have your knowledge of the Custer Battle and I will bow to your expertise on this matter. It is a shame that you didn't get to meet Frank and question him. It is the survivors..at least some of them..that get to tell their story. What if Frank was one of the survivors....and if not... who was he. Thank you for your dedicated research and your excellent presentations. It is humbling and greatly appreciated. And thanks for your patience with me. Lee
Anything is possible. This is almost a matter of faith. It comes down to who you believe. I tend to believe Kanipe over Frank. I find it hard to believe Frank's story. However if his story is true than you must conclude that not only was Frank a deserter, but was also a liar as well. Poor character in my taste.
There is no way Benteen or Reno could have saved his command. They too would have been intercepted and cut to pieces on less favorable defensive ground. The best laid plans can go awry.
The answer lies in the timing of Benteen's arrival. If Benteen arrives on Luce Ridge while Custer is still there then the possibility of a cavalry victory is intact.
friendslittlebighorn.com/images/reviews/donahuebennett2.jpg
Bill- The picture may still be in progress but I read somewhere that prints were available
Link to interview: friendslittlebighorn.com/interviewmichaeldonahue.htm
Thanks for the link.
Great work. Maps are definitely the basic mean of understanding whole battle. Would be even more interesting if you overlayed it upon GE maps or topographic map. By the way what you think of this documentary: ruclips.net/video/CDxXvwJosaU/видео.html. And which documentary available on the topic would you recommend?
Did Custer make a major error by deciding NOT to cross Little Bighorn River and trying to capture at leas some of the noncombatant Indians? Yes, with about 80 men most would escape. But if he had held several hundred as a shield against the overwhelming warriors - who would not attack if the soldiers held their women and children - numbers might that not have given him enough time for Benteen and Reno to (finally) provide help?
In hindsight it is an error. Of course Custer had no idea what was about to befall him. Tactically waiting for the recalled units was the correct decision.
Why didn’t Custer keep mutual support of the right wing? Why didn’t Calhoun send a courier to Custer informing him of the massing of Indians to the south and from Ford B? Why didn’t Custer leave someone to assess Reno’s progress (or lack there of) or Benteen’s (or lack there of) mutual support before trying to flank the village......even more so after not crossing at Ford B.
Didn’t Custer just underestimate the Indians will to fight and overall #s? Obviously at Ford B he should have assessed that the 800 warriors figure (plus warnings of the size of the village from his scouts) which the whole campaign was based on was way too small....,and that Reno wouldn’t be able to delay long enough .... especially given his #s and experience. I think the battle was lost when Custer pushed north of Ford B and divided his forces again....instead of getting more info on Reno and Benteen. (Given the actual size of the village).
I also think had Custer moved up to last stand hill 15 mins prior to when he did he would have been in a better position to assess the Indian movements (to incircle him) and provide actual visual mutual support of the right wing. If his battle plan was to to be fluid but rely on benteen's reinforcements...being on last stand hill (aka the high ground with a 360 degree view of the immediate battle field) earlier would have allowed the fluidity of a tactical retreat probably to the north (given the massing of Indians south, southwest and east). Custer didn't have that info as the right wing battle became more desperate. At some point he had to assess that Benteen had joined Reno and was not coming. Too much time had passed...and the tactical advantage that he thought he had had evaporated given the lack of numbers to cross the river. Instead of a delaying action from cemetery hill (Indian accounts of Custer just waiting for 20-30 mins)....he should have moved back to last stand hill to assess the right wing and to scope for Benteen to the south. This would have allowed for the proper assessment of the changing tactical picture and probably would have allowed time for break out to the south or maybe mounted retreat to the north. The delay allowed the noose to tighten with Custer not knowing how desperate the situation had become.
Yes Benteen and Reno failed the battle plan...Benteen could have left some men with Reno after the fighting slowed in the south and pushed north to clear the hills and assess the situation to the north. This action happened 30 mins too late. Benteen and Reno were not acting as fluidly and aggressively as Custer intended. I have to agree that Reno's shell shock after the retreat left Benteen in an even more sticky spot....because obviously Reno was not in the right frame of mind to defend the spot.
I have to wonder what Benteen was really thinking prior to Reno's charge? Mutual support to the pack train (which still had a lot of men)?
I still think Custer left Reno too early...or at the very least didn't allow for someone to assess that initial battle in the south. He also obviously thought Benteen would have been much closer. To maybe be a bridge between the Custer moving north and Reno in the Valley. Benteens lack of Situational awareness of Custers movements ...due to his slow approach also contributed massively to critical delays to critical positioning for visual mutual support. Custers overall divided smaller 3/4 battalions force allowed much larger force of Indians to concentrate forces and time to move tactically to eventual surround Custers northern force.
I'm very interested in the Indian movements to the north and East.....this was a very sound tactical move which, given enough time, would leave Custer no out.
I personally think poor training and leadership at the battalion/company command level. As an ex soldier you can almost feel their lack of practice in working together. Also there clearly is a lack of initiative of the officers probably as a result of Custer's dictatorial style. At no time did the companies in reserve move to support which tends to confirm that. To our eyes the way that the wings were deployed out of supporting distance makes no tactical sense, however up until this time (Battle on the Rosebud is the other exception) the Indians had never fought in this way i.e in "organised " groups rather as individuals. This was the impact of Crazy Horse who saw this was the way to beat the soldiers at their own game.
Reno fucked up.