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That presupposes that you know immaterial and timeless things can’t exist. You also used physical existence which doesn’t apply to God

We could consider here something like the question of if numbers exist. If so, do they exist physically or non physically? If they don’t exist physically in a place, do they exist in time? There are certainly various views here, some of which will claim that numbers do not exist as independent things and are merely human constructs of the mind (and so exist within the mind whilst the mind exists), but my point is that it does seem plausible that we could conceive of something which exists outside of space and time, so I’m not sure this is the strongest objection.

@@CorneliusCorndogJr Ah, the old Get Out of Jail Free Card. . . So if you presuppose that something logically impossible and incoherent is the property of something undefinable, undescribable and unknowable, then you can make any logically impossible or incoherent, self-contradictory claim about anything. Everything just becomes a gigantic short circuit. All you are saying is "MAGIC!!! TAHDAAAH!!!!" If there's magic, you can claim anything. If there's magic, you can claim that the universe exists because an enchanted mushroom makes 2+2=5 and Richard Simmons wrote all of Shakespeare's plays. This is not reasoning. It isn't even thinking. It's just schizophrenic hallucination.

He’s certainly someone I admire and take inspiration from, although I think a lot of the overlap between our views has more to do with having similar inspirations growing up. Both of us were brought into philosophy by way of the new atheists, with particularly Hitchens being a primary inspiration. I think though that our key difference is that my interests are more towards metaphysics whilst Alex is more interested in ethics from my understanding. I also have a huge interest in political philosophy and discuss politics more openly than Alex (which is probably wise on his part)

Can you explain where I went wrong in saying these things? Also, I have no doubt I wouldn’t last a minute against Craig. He’s been a professional philosopher for quite a long time and I’m just a student at this point. This is just my attempt at discussing his argument, I think any good philosopher would not be insulted by someone discussing their work, even if that means it is criticised.

I do that because if we don’t say that, we’re talking about things external to the universe and the premise becomes less clearly true. I do it to be charitable to the argument

@@ethanbenson But the whole point of the argument (or at least the theistic conclusion) is that an uncaused entity created the universe and so is necessarily outside of it. Limiting the refutation to only things in the universe seems to miss the point of the original argument.

@@bdpgarage no, my entire point is that we know causality to be a principle of that which is within the universe, the universe itself is not within the universe and so perhaps the universe itself is not caused. My point is that assuming this means God caused the universe is not necessarily true, as if we say the universe must have a cause, we are then applying a principle of that which is within the universe to the universe itself and that may or may not be the case.

@@ethanbenson I think I get what your saying. Restating: Because we humans can only confirm the law of causality within our own universe, we cannot confirm causaility outside of the universe. Therefore things outside the universe could exist eternally? (Assuming you’re not arguing that universe could cause itself)

I would restate the conclusion to be that we should be agnostic as to if the universe has a cause. Supposing it does have a cause, we also should be agnostic about what that cause is. To put it plainly, I don’t think we can know anything about things which are not within the universe.

@@hackinggamerxd it didn’t seem to be awfully popular the first time around, but I’m definitely keen to have a chat with you. I’m just quite busy at the moment with the uni semester about to start back up and with work. So I doubt it’ll be in the next week. But I appreciate the fact you’ve followed up and are keen as well

Thank you!

Well, I think I probably should have been more charitable in this video towards the argument, however, I do stand by my position 100% Simultaneously, I’m always interested in what others think because maybe they’ve thought of something I haven’t and I can learn from them.

@@ethanbenson OK, be a bit more forceful. I'm trying to be kind because I've been an atheist for all my seventy two years. I was born one.

@@toni4729 I find it a tough balance between being forceful and giving the opposing argument a fair shake. It seems that if I simply take something like the idea that ethics come from God and say this is obviously false that people will latch onto that and deride me for it to no end as shown in the comments section to this video

@@ethanbenson OK, I'm definitely on the side of "There is no god and there is no devil' but I get the feeling from some of the things you said that you're not so sure. I got a nervous feeling from you. Perhaps you didn't want to offend people.

Yeah. This must be one of the worst arguments for God. Especially if you remind theists there is Euthyphro-problem they still fail to answer.

So do you have a response to anything I said in the video you supremely enlightened being? Or are you only capable of insults? And on that, it’s pathetic that the only insult you could come up with is the most done to death insult we atheists get - being called a “reddit atheist”. You call me unintelligent yet you can’t even think of an original insult.

@@Betweoxwitegan certainly that’s something I’d be interested in covering. As to your question of if low level inequality is ethical, I’m torn. Intuitively I think that a small degree of inequality is warranted as a ratio of effort to reward whereby some people will work harder than others and should be rewarded for that. Perhaps there is some threshold of inequality that can be justified, but then, I’m not sure what that threshold would be or how it would be quantified. I think I’d need to consider it further to have a more concrete argument.

@@ethanbenson That would assume people work harder through some sort of superior characteristic, if person A works harder than person B (whatever working harder actually constitutes) then we have to ask ourselves why? Can we as a society assume that some people are just superior in a respect or can we say that they work harder because that's how they've been taught through their unique personal experience, not to mention that "working hard" increases the burnout rate and in the long run you may be less productive than person B. The concept of hard work is quite unique to capitalism, it acts as a rationale for inequality. Perhaps hard work doesn't actually exist, "to ones ability" does an increased productive capacity of an individual entitled them to more of the share of output? Like if someone is more productive than another due to a generic advantage or socio-economic advantage then should they be rewarded from privilege to privilege? My instinctual reaction is no, productive capacity should not determine one's value of labour or worth, this extenuates inequality and induces inefficiency in my view. In my opinion right wing economics is about the self, one's ability to procreate private capital whereas as left wing economics is about the group of humanity, one's ability to perpetuate human experience. It's an interesting topic

It’s just a stock image from powerpoint, it has no bearing on the point made 🤷‍♂️

You know, I’m inclined to agree. As noted in the pinned comment, on reflection, I’m pretty dissatisfied with this video as I know I could have and should have done a better job.

Yeah I agree I should have been more clear in my definitions. I did a livestream where I responded to comments where I clarified some of the problems I have with this video, which included defining terms like “objective” although I didn’t define ethics and morals, which, in hindsight perhaps I should have.

@@bobmiller5009 cheers mate!

@@ethanbenson would you be willing to tell me what you think of any of my philosophy videos?

@@bobmiller5009 sure, I’ll check them out when I get some time

@@ethanbenson thank you it would mean a lot to me!

@@bobmiller5009 so, I think your content is fantastic, but you should probably aim to deliver it in a more clear manner. I like that you’re brief, I wish I could make videos that short, but you need to consider what terms need to be defined for the audience to understand what you mean. I think given it seems like your target is people who either study philosophy or are philosophers, perhaps this isn’t as big an issue, but at the same time, I at least think it can be valuable to try to make things as accessible as possible by explaining them for a lay educated person. I think slowing down a bit might also help to make things more easily digestible. Overall though, I’m very impressed by what you’re saying in the videos

Why do you think this?

Absolutely agree. Better objections exist, but I think the strength of the problem of evil is in its simplicity and the fact that anybody can understand it even without knowing a lot about philosophy

@@ethanbenson agreed. Though we have different ways of objecting to free will my way is to grant free will exists for the sake of my argument. the objection is more like this: Let’s imagine two possible worlds: World 1: all of gods actions are in this set: {X, Y, Z}. And the total set of all actions in this world is {X, Y, Z, A, B, C} where C is a bad action. World 2: in this world, the set of all of gods actions is {X, Y, Z} but the set of total actions taken in the entire world is {X, Y, Z, A, B, K} where K is good. So the two worlds are different, but not because of something god did. In both worlds god did the same things. It’s different because some human chose to do action K instead of C This means there is a world that logically exists where humans freely can choose to do the good action instead of the bad/evil action. The evil action logically could still be actualized but a human freely chooses not to. So free will is not a relevant objection to the problem of evil.

Thanks for your contribution!

@@ethanbenson thank you for the video :)

I think it’s also interesting to consider that animals have ethics of sorts. Think about chickens having a pecking order or pack animals which have some kind of social order. This further implies a naturalistic formation of morality as we see simplistic forms of moral decision making in these animals

@@ethanbenson yup, chimps rarely k1ll one of their own group but have no problem picking up sticks and stones to k1ll members of other groups.

Eeehm, your statement doesn't make sense. Even if you try to claim you need god when you are god yourself, you don't need a higher being since you are that highest being. Next to that: didn't you read the OT in which god condoned owning people and gr4p3? So according to your reasoning that's (still) moral. Sorry, but not in my book.

​​@@KasperKatjeYou're not, though. Ultimately, if you f**k up, act imorally, or stray from the metaphorical path, something will pull you back into line. And that is what god is.

@jim-es8qk yet bad people are able to get ahead in the world. People who wage war, exploit children, utilise sweatshop labour are able to be successful and enjoy a seemingly pleasant life. I mean, even people who unknowingly benefit from things like sweatshops and child labour (i.e. a large portion of the western world) live perfectly happy lives.

​@@ethanbensonI'd argue bad people don't get ahead. Karma (Or god) bites them eventually. No one ever gets away with anything!!

@@jim-es8qk another quote from Nietzsche: “I have a terrible fear that one day I shall be pronounced holy. You will guess why I publish this book before; it shall prevent people from doing mischief with me. I do not want to be a saint, rather even a buffoon. Perhaps I am a buffoon.” I do not think his initial point in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is at all that people need something spiritual. It is that people need some sort of meaning to their life, and through killing traditional religion, we can transcend it and create new values which allow us to go beyond what faith has created. But then, as alluded to in my initial quote, perhaps Nietzsche is just wrong. Just quoting the man does not provide proof of the validity of his claims.

​@@ethanbenson Evidence? Look at early 20th century Europe. War, mass purges and ge*ocide. It didn't happen in England, religion is incorporated in to the state.

​@@ethanbensonMost people live very short lives. They simply don't have the time to create an entire new value structure from scratch. It's nonsense. Modern lifestyles are lonely depressing and often pointless. Why is that? They are lost because they listen to people like you. The bible is perfect for wisdom and at providing general direction for a person's life. Which is what people are missing. It's historically the most popular book in the world for a reason.

If this is your position, why quote Nietzsche who holds a completely opposing view then?

​@@ethanbensonEvidence? Early 20th century Europe.

Nope, since there is no objective/absolute morality and the bible shows this. Didn't you read the OT? God condoned owning people and gr@p3... If morality would be absolute/objective, those things should still be moral but are not.

@KasperKatje holly damn, you are tarded. What kind of "god allowed it because people were sinful" didn't you understand?

@@lloydgush yes, I heard that lame 4ss excuse before...after the same people claiming we are all sinners...🤡

@KasperKatje but you are. Morality is infrastructure, like all intellectual structure.

Surely at the least this thought experiment is meaningful in seeking supreme certainty in knowledge. Perhaps the skeptic would doubt said meaning, but, to further think on this, perhaps meaning doesn’t matter.

I mean, it depends on the specific transcendental argument, but broadly I don’t think the premise that God is necessary for any particular phenomena is stronger than a naturalistic or pragmatic explanation simply because it seems to me to be an extra unnecessary proposition. I’m not familiar with Dyer’s way of arguing it, I’d need to look into him further to have an opinion

@@ethanbenson from what I understand, he argues that in order to have grounding for logic, knowledge, free will, morality, meaning, language, etc., that we need to presuppose God bc these are transcendental categories and God would be the ultimate foundation and the only version of God that can ground those things is supposedly the Christian version and in his case, I don't know how he arrives at that, the Orthodox conception. Bc in atheism, especially if you are consistent with your skepticism, there is no meaning, no free will, morality is just your emotions, language has no meaning and then you arrive at solipsism. And he says that it's not a problem that the argument is circular bc ar the foundation, you need to have circularity. E.g., you use words to explain words, numbers to explain numbers, etc.

@@bilal535the argument is horrendously bad on pretty much every level. For starters, appealing to God doesn’t actually solve the problem it purports to be addressing, it simply pushes the epistemic problem (if it even IS a problem) back a step. But even if we grant everything that they say, at best that only ends up being an argument against metaphysical naturalism/materialism. It doesn’t get you anywhere NEAR any specific religion.

It’s a garbage circular argument. And Dyer is a dishonest creep

@@bilal535absolutely dishonest, straw man garbage. Where do you get this junk? Lies and slander. Shame on you

So owning people and gr4p3 are lawful??? Please explain.

@@KasperKatje Paul was generally talking to the lowest class of people who wouldn't have much opportunity to own people or get away with much so it was easy for him to make big promises about the hereafter which never materializes.

@@11kravitzn thanks for clearing that up.

Yeah, but if it IS beneficial for a non-believer, even though it's detrimental to those around a non-believer, then what?

This Ethan Benson is so dumb that he does not even know how badly wrong are his criticisms. For something serious try something like the paper "Why the Big Bang Singularity Does Not Help the Kalām Cosmological Argument for Theism".

Virtual particles are mathematical concepts not physical entities.

@@TBOTSS No, they are theoretical physical entities.

You should debate someone some time I bet youd be good

Definitely would be interested in that

How late will your livestream go for? I get off of work at 1:30 on monday and would be happy to debate you on these topics

I’d say for a couple of hours. I’d be happy to have you on

@@hian this is a really interesting comment. I’ll have to think on it further. Massively appreciate you taking the time to post it!

@@ethanbenson Np. Not expecting any lengthy replies or anything. Might as well add the context though, if you find it interesting: I do consider myself both a Moral Nihilist, and an Expressivist, and I think ethics and "morality" are just language games we play in service of getting others to go along with our preferences/values, which are downstream from our biological predispositions as a species. There's a very interesting thought experiment that asks us to consider what would happen if we came across a sentient species of giant emerald wasps from space. The emerald wasp, if you're not familiar, has reproductive cycle that's predicated on paralyzing a victim from another species, planting its egg in it, and thereby killing it(much like the Xenomorph from Alien). Now, is it likely, even if we imagine these creatures were intelligent like us, that they'd develop similar ethics to us? Would they hold that "murder" is intrinsically wrong? Would they be conscientious about bodily autonomy? If our species could not co-exist due to their inherently predatory nature, would we be morally justified in destroying them? Would they be justified in enslaving us to their reproductive cycle? What would a conversation between us look like in trying to solve our mutually exclusive interests? I guess my point is that "morality" as an idea, and its associated systems of ethics would be entirely superfluous. Fundamentally, we would either have to hash it out in a conversation over subjective and pragmatic give and takes, or we'd have to duke it out until one side loses. And, incidentally, this is what all "moral" conflict looks like at the end of the day anyways. You don't have to look further than the end of the transpacific slave-trade. It didn't end because humanity stumbled on some new objective moral fact, or because some system of ethics won out in an intellectual debate. It ended because enough people found it disgusting and unbearable to the point they fought a war over it. In so many words, I think you have to live in a fairly privileged bubble to worry over what "losing objective morality" looks like, because it means you've never had to grapple with legitimate unreconcilable moral values, nor spent any serious time thinking about why people do the things they do(probably sidestepping such thoughts by just thinking of others as "evil"). People don't murder because they lack a belief in murder being wrong. They murder because of extraneous circumstances and conditioning that has impressed upon them a necessity for murder. I don't fear a Nihilist who doesn't believe murder is wrong but has no motivation to do so and several good reasons not to. I fear moralists and ideologues who think murder is necessary to bring about their ideal world or society. Moralists are several orders of magnitude scarier than Nihilists. Always have, and always will be. Behind every single atrocity committed in human history, you will find fanatics who think their behavior is fundamentally moral.

​@@hian Do you know of the german philosopher Hans-George Moeller and his youtube channel Carefree Wandering? If not, I recommend checking him out. He seems right up your alley. Anyway, I have some thoughts and questions for you, if you would care to indulge me. How is subjective morals consistent with moral nihilism, and how is it not completely arbitrary in the end? Meaning: how could you, as a moral nihilist, in the end legitimately criticize a murder? How could a murderer with the same exact position as you, be wrong about murdering? Besides customs, which still must be arbitrary to a nihilist if he's consistent. (except that, in the history of mankind, murder seems to be apart of our preferred customs either way, whether you believe it to be right or not.) As I understand nihilism, you'd have to disregard the concept of morality completely, with all it entails, to be consistent as a moral nihilist. Of course, you'd then rightfully be regarded as a lunatic - and as such you seem to need, for example, the ad hoc explanation for subjective morals in the end to make it reasonable. Now, I'm not a nihilist, though I've read some of Nietzsche if that's worth anything, so I could of course be wrong in my understanding, or it could be just a question of semantics, that an ignoramus such as myself cannot wrap my head around. Either way, some type of modification seems to be needed to make nihilism of any sort, to work as a theory to base your life on. Moreover, let's say you're correct in your critique of systems based objective morals. Then I don't see how your position would be a preferred alternative, as it only works on the basis of the fact that the majority in a culture, more or less, intuitively or explicitly, believe in the morals of their culture, or at least act like they do, as if they were objective, even if they're not (If nothing else, this is a great concession that human beings are experts at make belief!) Western cultures, of which I think you're a part of (correct me if I'm wrong), are based in part on the idea that morals have an objective source, and as such it is a privilege to be able to hold onto a nihilistic position in such a culture, and completely disregard their history. I am merely trying to understand and reason with your position the best I can. Especially as there is some controversy around the concept of nihilism, of which I'm certain you're aware of. I have no problem with you calling yourself a moral nihilist, and just find it a reward in itself to get to have an exchange of thought with people of different beliefs (I hope you can accept that I use this word). And to be open with my own position, I profess myself to be a Christian, which is a belief that I've been grappling with for many years now, and only just recently have come to, and which it's not at all easy to reconcile with a modern worldview by the way. Finally, I'd like to point out a bit of flawed reasoning in this section: "If somebody stood in front of you with a gun pointed at the head of a family member, what is more likely to make him lower it: 1.) Telling him it's wrong to murder per the rules of the universe, or 2.) Appealing your shared humanity, the suffering that's being caused, the consequences in life to follow, or threatened him with punishment/retribution in this life? I think anyone who picks 1 here are lying. If not to me, then to themselves." To be and act as a believer in ultimate moral judgement, of the sort you refer to in 1), doesn't entail that it would be the thing, that is the belief in question, that you conjure up, as an act of defense in such a particularly loaded situation (no pun intended). I don't know of any moral system that would prescribe such a statement as a moral act in and of itself (maybe this, once again, is an admission of my own ignorance.) As such, it seems we are in agreement that 1) is a ridiculous option, but from my point of view it would be because this is not a likely action from any reasonable adherent to any system of morals, whether religious, objective, subjective, or none of that. 2) I reckon can only follow from your ad hoc acceptance of subjective morals, as a moral nihilist.

​​@@EatPieYes There's a lot to go through here, so I hope you'll excuse the length(I've had to split this up into parts). I'll say that I don't expect you to reply at a similar length, but given the fact that you typed out such a thoughtful response, I wished to treat your inquires with respect. I'll start with your question, "How is subjective morality consistent with moral nihilism and how is it not completely arbitrary in the end?" Moral subjectivism under my view is an incoherent idea. It's not "consistent with moral nihilism", rather it's a poor man's conceit reached for by people in a vain attempt to escape its uncomfortably stark outlook even though they, like the moral nihilist, are stuck in the exact same predicament-namely a rejection of moral truths. It's only equivalent in the sense that it's stranded with the exact same problems. The nihilist is just honest enough to face those problems rather than seek refuge in language-games. To illustrate though: If the argument of moral subjectivists is that "rights" and "wrongs" exist but are subject dependent, then you still need define a metric by which behaviors are right and wrong. And, if that metric varies from individual to individual, creature to creature, there's no meaningful distinction in this from saying morality is merely a word for any system of judgement of behavior according to preferences, which is what Expressivism is, and is congruent with moral nihilism as a position insofar moral nihilism is just another way of saying hard moral anti-realist. Moral nihilism cannot be a rejection of moral subjectivism, if by moral subjectivism all you're referring to are subjective behavioral preferences. Obviously, nobody can deny that when we all have them. However, any school of thought on the subjectivists anti-realist side don't get to use this as an argument against moral nihilism if and when they extrapolate beyond preferences, which many of them do. All I'm saying here, is that if all you mean by morality is some idea of humans working together as subjects based on shared preferences, then sure, "morality exists". However, not only is that not the idea of morality Nihilists reject. It's also not the definition used for morality outside of a very few schools of thought like Expressivism(hence why I consider myself an Expressivist Moral Nihilist). Secondly, "completely arbitrary" is a non-sequitur in relation both to subjective morality and models that explain conscientious human behavioral models. That humans have a preference not to murder is not "arbitrary" in any sense of the word. It's a feature of our biology without which we would go extinct. There are very good reasons for humans' pro-social, as well as anti-social, behaviors. There's nothing arbitrary about this. That does not imply however, these predispositions and preferences are "moral" in the classical sense of that word, since we can easily imagine creatures who, in evolving differently, have different predispositions and preferences. If you were to make a subjective moral argument that, for example, it's immoral for species A to murder because they have that preference, while it's moral for species B to murder because they have that preference, all you're doing is using "morality" as a synonym for "preferential behavior" like in Expressivism. That is still a denial of the basic project of literally all classical moral and meta-ethical frameworks, exactly the same as the moral nihilist. Describing "moral behavior" in that sense is not at all in tune with what moral philosophy was created to do. My position just further postulate that modern and post-modern moral models are vacuous as well, in this respect. They're poor attempts at fixing something that isn't fixable. They recognize that the old-world philosophers' conception of objective morality is incoherent, but instead of scrapping the idea altogether, they've created this contrived monstrosity in its place that is just as incoherent, though less obviously so. Your questions after that point, I think, demonstrate a failure to fully immerse yourself in the position of the moral nihilist. You ask how could I "legitimately criticize a murder"? But that's an incoherent question which reflects a blind-spot, an inability to truly take off your moral goggles to indulge the position of the nihilist fully. Under moral nihilism, there's no such thing as "legitimate criticism" of behavior in moral terms the way you asked that question. Rather all criticisms of all behaviors are equally legitimate in spirit, but only as functional as they make sense to the target of the criticism. Hence, it does not mean there aren't "legitimate reasons" of an amoral character to want someone to cease a behavior, and the only reason one would assume the opposite is if you're already presuming that all behavior is tied to moral judgements in the first place. Remember-the nihilist and hard anti-realists don't believe this, nor is there any reason to assume that. We humans have deep emotional preferences we desire to see respected and realized, and it makes complete sense for us to criticize or interfere with the actions of others when they come into conflict with said preferences. However, there simply is no reason to mask this with obtuse, and frankly speaking incoherent, moral language. Furthermore, it is not the case that they "must be arbitrary for the nihilist to be consistent". That, is pure nonsense. If I go to a restaurant and decline to eat one of the seafood dishes because I don't like salmon, or am allergic to lobster, those are "legitimate reasons", but they are not moral reasons. When I wake up and eat breakfast in the morning because I'm hungry, that too is a legitimate reason albeit not a moral one. I don't eat because it's "morally good" for me eat, nor do I abstain from eating food that's dangerous to me because it's "morally wrong" to do so. I just do because that's my preference. And, if I were to theorize why I have that preference, I'd say it's because of my evolved brain chemistry. Now, sometimes people's preferences come into conflict. Maybe someone wants to steal what I have, or wants to see me in pain because they hate my guts. If you're asking me how could I "legitimately ask them to abstain from doing either" in a moral sense, the answer is still, "that's an incoherent question whose answer would be irrelevant even if it weren't". If a person wants to murder me, then my preference not to be murdered by that person is reason enough to deny them, and, whatever reason would be necessary to dissuade them is going to be whatever reason it is relative to their preferences and fears etc. It could be an appeal to their empathy. It could be an appeal to practical consequences. It could be crushing their skull with a crowbar. Whichever it is though, it is unlikely to have anything to do with an ethical discussion about moral values. This should be made abundantly clear the moment you swap any transgressor on your preferences out for a unconscious or lower-sentience material threat like a Tsunami, bear or hedge-trimmer-wielding gardening robot. Non of these are ammendable to moral discourse, yet no-one would cede their life to any of them simply because non of them can be convinced to not murder you with a compelling moral argument.

Moving on: Yes, I do disregard morality, thinking it an incoherent concept. My only additional stipulation is that so do Moral Subjectivists-they just don't recognize it because they've settled for tortured terminology and reasoning in pursuit of what they consider the terrifying "implications" of Nihilism(likely due to struggling with the same questions you just asked me). Again, it's founded in the conceit that if you cannot feed behaviors into some sort of system and get neat moral judgements out on the other end, people will just start murdering each other indiscriminately for no other reason than, "well, it isn't wrong", which of course, completely ignores millions of years of human evolution in groups as a social ape, and the basic fact that people act for positive reasons, not in the absence of them. The idea that I'd be regarded as a lunatic for rejection the sheer idiocy of moral language, to me, speaks volumes more of the naive and childish mind of a person who'd say such a thing than it does about the Nihilist, and let's make it abundantly clear why: Moral statements are empty, the words "right" and "wrong", empty signifiers waiting to be filled by their speakers though they seldom if ever are when uttered. When I categorically reject the statement, "murder is wrong", I'm rejecting it because it's an incomplete statement, likely made in ignorance by a person whose metacognition is insufficient to recognize what the words coming out of their mouths are even supposed to mean, not because I don't have objections to murder. It's therefore the moral presuppositionalist who's acting like a lunatic here, not me, insofar they confuse my refusal to accept the statement, "murder is wrong," with "acceptance of murder," despite lacking the intelligence to recognize that the statement, "murder is wrong," doesn't actually mean anything. After all, what does "wrong" even mean? It means whatever the speaker's moral system decrees it to be, if the speaker even has one. Most of the time, it's just a feeling though, one resulting from a combination of evolutionary instincts and inherited social values. If you're talking to a Utilitarianist, he or she are using "wrong" to mean "unnecessary suffering". If you're talking to a Deontologist, they're using it to mean, "unvirtuous". If you're talking to a run of the mill Christian, they're using it to mean, "against the will of god". In all cases though, unequivocally, it expresses, "don't murder because I don't like it". Moreover, seeing as I think all those other meanings are either logically flawed or incoherent, it's the only genuine meaning of the term if it has one at all. Hence, when I reject the statement "murder is wrong", I am not rejecting things that can be said about murder which most people, myself included, don't like. Yes, murder causes suffering. Yes, murder is anti-social. Yes, if we generally permit murder, society will collapse. These are all true and good reasons to not murder. However, the statement, "murder is wrong," is still vacuous and impotent. Not only does it obfuscate the actual traits humans care about when it comes to behavior and judgements. You indulge that asinine use of language at your own and others' very real risk by propagating moralist culture, which again, is the number one factor in giving "moral lisencing" to human tragedies like war, discrimination, cruel punishments, child-abuse, and so forth. Suppose we were to say that, "wrong" refers the traits I just described, and that morality is about designating behaviors that embody those traits. Well, now you've just committed to a view in which being anti-social is somehow "wrong", wherein suffering is always "wrong", and wherein sociatal collapse is always "wrong". But, anti-social behahior is adapted for to allow individuals the faculties to fight the group oppressions that stem from the fiat of social cohesion. Suffering is a necessary condition for growth through adverse stimuli. And, presumably, we would want certain regressive and dangerous societies to collapse rather than threaten their neighbors. What I'm really getting at here is that morality and moralisms cannot be divorced from the burdens of "right" and "wrong", which are dysfunctional linguistic terms with respects to behavior in the sense with which they're applied. You can have the wrong key to a door. You can have the right answer to a question. You can have the wrong behavior for the purposes of making your parents happy. You can have the right behavior for the purposes of making your village prosper. You cannot, however, have right and wrong behavior in a moral sense- because the moral sense, is a conceit predicated on the human desire to elevate their preferences into something more than they are. The project of moral philosophy only exists in the first place because humans want their preferences to be respected yet lack confidence in their ability to make that happen on the individual merits of the preferences themselves. The word's "right/good" and "wrong/evil" are therefore purposefully and obtusely linked to a feeling moreso than their actual definitions inside any moral system. In reality, I contend, morality is inexplicably tied to the practice of, and desire for, efficiently and cheaply applying the labels "good" and "evil" to things, behaviors, and peoples. And, that the moral systems which try hard not do, either suffer in irrelevance for not providing that service, or run the risk of not being seen as moral systems at all. All of this becomes abundantly apparent the moment you demand a moralist justify why they've defined their terms the way they do. Ask the Utilitarian why it's wrong to murder, and he'll say because it causes unnecessary suffering. Ask him why unnecessary suffering is wrong though, how he determines what suffering is truly unnecessary, and insist you enjoy visiting suffering upon others - that it's necessary for your flourishing - and watch him have nowhere left to go in terms of argumentation. This is true for all moralists, regardless their system or school of thought. In face of reductive scrutiny, all they can say is, "well, that's just my definition, and by my definition, you're evil," and that takes me full circle back to my initial point: Firstly, that's a meaningless tautology, which betrays your need and desire for the terms instinctual power rather than actual meaning. And two, how is this distinct from living in a nihilist's reality. How is this any less arbitrary than an impartial Expressivist understanding of reality? *You* define. By *your* arbitration. By *your* preferences. So what? What if I don't agree? What if others don't agree? You're right back where you started, because it's all smoke and mirrors, and that's what it was all along-pretentious sophistry in pursuit of preferential hegemony through obfuscating language.

The problem with this argument is that theists will claim God always existed

The point he’s making is about logical priority not temporal priority.

I’m not sure that is the point he was making, but if that is the case then I agree

​​​​@@ethanbenson I think the formulation is a bit confused, but what he's probably getting at is that ideas like murder being wrong predate the invention of the Abrahamic faiths, which begs the question how those peoples came upon their conclusions without god's revelation. Yahweh does not exist in the historical record prior to some 800 years BCE. Yet, the Canaanites had laws forbidding murder and theft. Hence, while it could still be the case that "god is the author of moral facts", it cannot be the fact that god is necessary for humans to recognize them, which then further begs the question: If humans can recognize moral facts without awareness of god's decrees, then by what metric do we do so, and, if such a metric exists, then why does god need to exist in the first place? The moral argument cannot just account for God's necessity for moral facts, it must do so in a way that satisfies human moral behavioral predispositions in his absence given humans have been acting "morally" before any of them knew he even existed, much less having heard his moral demands.

@@hian this was my initial reading, and I generally agree that this is a strong objection

Not necessarily. Deontologists would argue that these rights would be reasoned to, therefore, they are still objective so long as we agree on an initial set of “objective” premises which can lead to these rights. In my opinion though, you’re exactly right and that’s part of why I don’t think objective morality can exist

@@ethanbenson Ahh I see, thanks! One question though, what are your thoughts on Euthyphro's dilemma?

It’s definitely interesting and has some merit, I’ll perhaps talk about it in a video

Thanks!

I tend to agree with you on this point

I think that’s definitely somewhat the case, however, I think Camus would argue that perhaps the complete detachment of a psychopath is a coherent response to taking the world in honestly

Sociopath* Sociopaths tend to ascribe meaning to things too, perceived meaning although intertwined with emotion is not inherent to emotion. For example sociopaths are more likely to pursue material endeavours and act narcissistic as instead of inheriting meaning from emotional connection they envelop the meaning of status, power, control, security, etc. I ask you this, if you have person A (a sociopath) and a bear in a cage and the bear attempts to eat person A but person A can kill the bear with just a word, would they do it? The answer is almost certainly yes however a truly Absurd man would not, as they would not ascribe any meaning or value to their lives and thus their life would be equal to the bears life and death is not to be feared. It is basically impossible for one to be truly absurd and it's probably not desired either, this is why existentialism is better in practice, living contrary to nature and our fabrication will only cause mayhem. The meaning paradox is also an important thing to note in this philosophy, to be meaningless is to have the meaning of meaninglessness.