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I can help with that. Gavin did not know anything about the 9 and 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions because nobody below Montgomery and Dempsey were cleared for the 'Ultra' intelligence that the II.SS-Panzerkorps were ordered to the eastern Netherlands to refit. Lower formations were given 'sanitised' information stripped of unit identifications, so for example Major Arnold of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery supporting 1st Parachute Brigade at Arnhem was told to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, including Panthers and Tigers - this is a steer to expect a Type-1944 panzer division and even a heavy panzer battalion, which was a Panzerkorps asset. In his correspondence with A Bridge Too Far author Cornelius Ryan, Gavin says in a covering letter enclosing some papers by Dutch researcher TA Boeree, that he had only just realised (in 1966) that the reports of armour in the Reichswald was the Hohenstaufen in transit to Arnhem, as Boeree had researched the division's withdrawal from Belgium into the Netherlands, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September to assemble near Sittard, then they were ordered north to Arnhem on 7 September, apparently making a stop in the Reichswald before passing through Nijmegen and Arnhem on their way to billets around the Veluwe region between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Zutphen. Gavin said that after the British/Polish operation COMET was cancelled and he was given a warning order by Brereton on 10 September that he was now assigned to Nijmegen, he went immediately to the 1st Airborne Division HQ to study their plans and intelligence for their own drop on the Nijmegen area for COMET and saw the reports that he could expect "a regiment of SS" in Nijmegen (the reduced condition of each SS division) and that they may be drawing new tanks from a tank storage area in the Reichswald belonging to a depot thought to be near Kleve. By 13/14 September there were now Dutch reports of SS troops movng into the Veluwe and Achterhoek regions on both banks of the River Ijssel, but only vehicle insignia for the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen' had been positively identified by the Dutch. It was speculated the heavy armour in the Reichwald and SS troops in Nijmegen were the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', which had not been positively located. The intelligence certainly affected the British planning for COMET, who were planning to land the Airlanding Brigade and Division HQ units (with the most anti-tanks guns) south of Nijmegen, and Gavin would have taken that on board when devising his own divisional plan for the 82nd, although it's surprising he took much fewer AT guns on his first lift - only eight - divided equally between the three regiments and a Division HQ reserve. He prioritised the Grave bridge with his best regiment (504th PIR), and the Groesbeek area facing the Reichswald with his other more aggressive and experienced unit (505th). This left the 508th and Colonel Lindquist (who had not performed well in Normandy on his first combat operation) with the critical Nijmegen mission and initially ordered defensive positions to be established on the Groesbeek ridge, and then 48 hours before the jump felt confident enough to order Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the highway bridge via the open flatlands to the east immediately on landing, hoping to snatch the bridge quickly. All the Dutch reports were accurate, but it wasn't appreciated the units were only in transit in the Nijmegen area (they mostly moved at night or in bad weather and laagered under cover during the day to avoid aerial reconnaissance). Sources (online at the Cornelius Ryan Collection of WWII Papers, Ohio State University): box 101 folder 09 page 48 - Gavin letter 18 November 1966 re Boeree papers box 101 folder 10 - Gavin meeting 20 January 1967 re Lindquist and objectives

His tank held the far end of the bridge on his own until more tanks (actually M10 tank destroyers of 21st Anti-Tank Regiment) arrived to consolidate the bridgehead. Robinson, who with Pacey, had gone half a mile up the road to the rail overpass at the far end of Lent before making contact with American paratroopers, received the higher award of a DCM.

It was thought everybody did know their jobs, except Colonel Lindquist of the 508th PIR did not seem to understand his. Phil Nordyke's regimental history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) - is illuminating not just for Nijmegen but also for Lindquist's poor performance in Normandy on the 508th's first combat operation.

Another episode of Jim interrupting Al!

Gavin did not "have to protect Browning's HQ". Both 82nd and Browning's Corps HQs were located between the 505th and 508th PIRs. Browning had a Flight and Regiment HQ of the Glider Pilot Regiment for close protection and Gavin had Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th and his Engineer Battalion in reserve near his HQ. Browning did not steal much needed resoures from 1st Airborne Division. His Corps HQ was moved from second to first airlift, switching places in the schedule with 1st Anti-Tank Battery's second line ammunition Jeeps and Trailers, the four anti-tank guns of Z-Troop for Division HQ defence, and 1st Parachute Brigades Jeeps - hardly essential in the first 24 hours. Browning's attempts to have the first two airlifts carried out on the first day, major bridges seized by dawn glider coup de main, drop zones between Valkenswaard and Son all frustrated by USAF officers Brereton and Williams, and a suggetion to Gavin to drop a battalion on the north end of t he Nijmegen bridge was also discarded. Gavin compounded this error by assigning Lindquist to the Nijmegen mission aafter he had not performed well in Normandy. Gavin stole his own impetus with his own bad judgement. This was all ignored by Cornelius Ryan and Richard Attenborough Stop inventing your nonsense.

Where did Browning end up after this? Buried in Southeast Asia.

"Browning's appalling leadership"??? Explain, and give examples. If you have any.

How about this…the MG plan was terribly flawed. Instead of blaming Gavin or anyone else why not blame Montgomery and the plan itself. I see a lot of hate on Gavin but very little on Urquart who abandoned his division HQ for almost two days.

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d - "Instead of blaming Gavin or anyone else why not blame Montgomery" - which is blaming someone else, "and the plan itself" - which did not invent itself but was drawn up by people - namely Brereton and Williams, because Browning and Dempsey's outline approved by Montgomery and Eisenhower was changed by Brereton and Williams. Gavin is also reponsible for his own divisional plan, which rejected a British suggestion for a drop on the Nijmegen bridge (I presume from Browning) and assigned his worst commander to the critical Nijmegen mission, so Gavin has to own that. Which part do you not understand?

Ok then with your logic we can then blame Urquhart for his division’s failure at Arnhem. Brits love to attacks Americans. The reality is this comes from pure envy. The US makes history where as the UK IS history. The British military of 2024 is irrelevant and surpassed-yes officially- by Italy! So enjoy the past while east Asia and 🇺🇸 eat your lunch.

Thank you for sharing! 👍

The landing zone at Arnhem was the same as the cancelled Operation Comet, which was decided by RAF, with no input by Brereton.

@ that does not make it any better

@@marcel-y8c You right but it's does make it any better, but explain you actually make the decision.

Browning wanted the bridge taken by a dawn glider coup de main along with the Arnhem and Grave bridges - this was removed by Brereton and Williams' decision to fly daylight flights in the middle of the day. He then suggested to Gavin he drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge, but aafter toying with the idea he discarded it because of his experience in sicily with a scattered srop disorganising the division for days. Gavin thought it would be alright to instruct Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the brdge after landing and even showed him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to ataake to t he bridge. Lindquist and Gavin let everyone down. Gavin's concern about the Reichswald stemmed from intelligence reports at 1st Airborne HQ Gavin saw after COMET was cancelled and he was given the Nijmegen assignment for MARKET. He only realised in 1966 when he passed some papers of Dutch researcher TA Boeree to Cornelius Ryan that the reports of armour in the rechswald was the Hohenstaufen Division in transit to Arnhem, since Boeree had studied the Hohenstaufen's withdrawal from Belgium into the Netherlands between 4 and 7 September.

Not exactly, as few of them were stationed in Arnhem (only SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 and the medical unit at Velp), and they did not get sent to Nijmegen: SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 - unloaded from flat cars at Beekbergen station, near Apeldoorn, sent south to Nijmegen via Arnhem bridge. II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 (Kampfgruppe Reinhold) HQ staff - from Klooster Kranenburg, near Vorden, via Arnhem bridge. II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 (Kampfgruppe Euling) - from Rheden, east of Arnhem, tried to cross Arnhem bridge after taken by Frost and then diverted via Huissen ferry. 1./SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 10 (Kompanie Baumgärtel) - from Wilp, near Deventer, diverted via the Pannerden ferry after the Huissen ferry was scuttled by the Dutch ferryman.

Keizer Karelplein. The ground plan is still the same, but only 1 mayor building is still there : Concertgebouw De Vereeniging.

It’s not that hard to be nicer to people when pointing out an inaccuracy either

None of the betrayal stories, even if true, were acted on. The evidence is that the Hohenstaufen division was in the final stages of being entrained for Germany when the attack began and this process was reversed after the landings. I think a report from a Russian agent in England was on someone's desk in German intelligence and not read until after the landings. A book by Dutch researcher Colonel TA Boeree and Cornelius Bauer - The Battle of Arnhem (1963, English edition 1966) researched the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen's movements and debunked the myths, but it still seems to persist. The operation was compromised in the air planning by 1st Allied Airborne Army and fatally at Nijmegen on D-Day.

Don't you think it would have easier for the Germans to stop Market garden at Eindhoven? Don't you think the Germans would have surrounded the landing zones in Groesbeek, Heumen, Son and so on? Very quickly after the start of Market Garden plans were found by the Germans and the experienced officers Bittrich and Model would know what to do.

@@jandenijmegen5842 Why are you so mad? I was genuinely asking a question. "Don't you!" fucking hell.

@@davemac1197 thank you

@@jandenijmegen5842 decaf, mate.

"It's quite likely that the Germans would have recaptured it on D+1 or D+2" - how? And with what? The force ratio between the attacker and defender usually has to be in excess of 3:1 to succeed, particularly if the defender is in a good defensive position. The Germans would have to reverse the ratio they had at Nijmegen to retake the bridge(s). On 5 October they tried with II.SS-Panzerkorps (10.SS-Panzer, 9.Panzer and 116.Panzer-Divisions under command) from the northeast, and XII.SS-Armeekorps with 363.Volksgrenadier-Division from the west at Opheusden-Dodewaard, and diversionary attacks across the Rijn at Opheusden, Renkum and Doorwerth by Division von Tettau... and got nowhere. In the first two days of MARKET the best they hope to do would be to build a blocking line at Elst and hope to stop the XXX Corps advance along the Linge-Wettering canal. It's interesting that in the proposed plan before it became MARKET the intention was to land a brigade of 1st Airborne at Elst as part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, but the shortage of transport aircraft reduced the division's first lift to two brigades, both of which were needed at Arnhem.

When you look at the WW2 history of targets being captured by airborne forces one thing stands out. If the airborne force gets to the target and has a short time to prepare defences then it’s very difficult to shift them. They might eventually be pushed off as with Primasole and Arnhem but it takes a concerted effort. With this in mind if the 82nd had captured the Nijmegen end of the road bridge on D0 it’s hard to see how they’d have been dislodged. If they’d reinforced and managed to occupy the far end quickly then it could have relieved pressure at Arnhem by giving the Germans a further headache. Everything could have been different.

Childish and ignorant.

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d 3 thumbs up though knobhead

It really is not that good. There a much better guide books out there.

The brits got the north half of the Rhine bridge. Never had control of the north and southern part. Getting the northern part and holding it was a big achievement.

The difference was the difference in experience and quality between Frost at Arnhem and Lindquist at Nijmegen. The geography is virtually identical, but reversed in mirror image. Both divisions had similar problems in having bridge objectives, with a major urban area and high ground between the bridge and the drop zone. The British solution was to assign one battalion to secure roadblocks on the high ground and two battalions to go by different routes to the bridge - only one battalion got through to their objective at the bridge. The American solution was to initially assign all three battalions to defensive positions on the high ground, then a late order two days before the jump to send one of the battalions directly to the bridge, and the instruction wasn't followed until the division commander found out too late.

I think that was one of the issues with the landing plan. Half the force had to stay and try to hold the landing grounds for the second drop. Frost’s party managed to find a way through on the first day and were then cut off for the remainder of the battle. Al and James talked about in We Have Ways the podcast how they’re essentially planning to fail based upon past experiences in Sicily and Normandy. They should have gathered everyone possible and made for the bridge and damn the torpedoes.

Frost certainly did not hesitate. However another battalion did spending the night at oosterbeek just a few miles west. They could have reached the bridge easily making the force twice in size. They could also have made a decisive difference.

@@marcel-y8c yes, I think Frost took the southernmost of the 3 routes into town. If he’d communicated better they may have been able to get the next group through and avoid the German blocking lines. As always, it’s another “what if?” question

Fyi the waal is far too wide to make a bailey bridge which can span around 60m. The crux of market garden’s failure is complex. One of them surely was the delay of capturing this bridge. But 1st airborne made critical failures as well getting just 1/3 of the planned troops at the bridge in Arnhem what let them only to be able to take the north side so no troops could go south to connect. If they would hebben been droppes altogether at day 1 they could have gone to the bridge with a major force instead of a battalion.

Agree with your first two paragraphs, but a study of Browning's role in the operation reveals that he was not responsible for the bad decisions made in the planning. He was continually frustrated by USAAF commanders Brereton and Williams of 1st Allied Airborne Army and US IX Troops Carrier Command, who removed his proposed double airlift, dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave, and drop zones for the 101st between Valkenswaard-Eindhoven-Son and 1st Airborne at Elst. Gavin also discarded a suggestion to drop a battalion on the northrn end of the Nijmegen bridge and Browning had no authority to object or he would lose his job. That political reality was established when he threatened to resign over Brereton's earlier LINNET II plan and he was only saved by the operation being cancelled. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was also notified of the changes only after Brereton's 14 September cut-off date for any further amendments, so the Americans completely dictated the air plan, and it was either do it their way or cancel 2nd Army's Rhine crossing. Not a very satisfactory situation.

@@davemac1197it surely looks as if the Americans looked after themselves pretty well. Splitting drops from for instance the 101 would have been far more lo given if that choice had to be made. They were to be relieved much sooner anyway

@@marcel-y8c - just seen your first reply which was made at the same time as mine. The Waal is not too wide for bridging - they built a Bailey across the Waal between the old ferry ramps located between the highwy and rail bridges. They used Rhine barges instead of pontoons, which I believe makes it a Class 70 bridge instead of Class 40 (tons). There's a picture of the "barge bridge" in Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021). I think it was built as an insurance against the many attempts the Germans made to bomb or demolish the Waal bridges. Kriegsmarine frogmen succeeded in drop a span of the rail bridge and the highway bridge sustained hits from aerial bombs that required two sections of Bailey bridging to be placed across the hole. The planned troops sent to the bridges at Arnhem is more complex. Dobie's 1st Battalion was not to go to the bridge at all but to high ground to the north and secure Company strongpoints and roadblocks at Warnsborn on the Amsterdam highway and on the Apeldoorn road north of the Saksen-Weimar barracks. Frost's 2nd Battalion was to take the Oosterbeek rail bridge with 'C' Company and the Company would then pass across to attack the pontoon and highway bridges from the south, while 'B' Company secures the pontoon bridge and 'A' Company the highway bridge from the north side. In the event the rail bridge is demolished, and 'C' Company's secondary objective was the Ortskommandantur in Willemsplein near the rail station. Fitch's 3rd Battalion was to support Frost by going directly to the highway bridge and secure the eastern sector of the town, with only 'C' Company getting through. I don't know how 3rd Battalion was intended to be deployed had it arrived complete, but it was not the intention to have nine rifle companies sitting on the one bridge, there was a brigade perimeter planned, and only 'A' Company of 2nd battalion reached the bridge at first, and Frost then pulled 'B' Company in from the dismantled and damaged pontoon bridge to reinforce him at the highway bridge. Contact with 'C' Company at the Ortskommandantur was lost, so 'C' Company of 3rd Battalion was a welcome arrival. I've only just learned that it was proposed a third brigade be landed at Elst, presumably to secure the town and the road and rail bridges over the Linge-Wettering canal as part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, but this drop was removed by Brereton because of insufficient transport aircraft.

@@marcel-y8c - the drop zones between Valkenswaard-Eindhoven-Son were to effect quicker seizure of the bridges at Aalst, Eindhoven and Son on D-Day. Since the Aalst bridge was only 4 km beyond Valkenswaard, where the Guards actually stopped with an hour of daylight remaining on D-Day, you can see the advantage of an early linkup with the 101st Airborne would have created. If the Son bridge was still demolished, then bridging equipment could have reached the site on the first night instead of the second, and the tanks would be in Nijmegen 24 hours earlier on 18 September and potentially in Arnhem in 24 hours if the Nijmegen bridge were in American hands. General Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command objected to these drop zones because of the Flak around Eindhoven, and it was four 8.8cm Flak guns and two StuG III assault guns covering the bridge at Aalst that held up the Guards for most of D+1 (18 September) while they tried to find an alternative route. The Germans abandoned the position in the late afternoon when they heard that American paratroopers were in Eindhoven, which is a common German reaction when they know their supply lines are cut. This reaction might well have been prompted immediately if they had seen paratroopers dropped close to their rear on D-Day. The conflict in the planning was that Browning was prepared to accept 33% casualties going in, if it meant that the troops would be landed close to their objectives, and COMET had been planned on that basis and the proposed upgrade operation SIXTEEN carried over the same features as COMET, but adding the two US divisions at Nijmegen and to secure the corridor. Brereton and Williams on the other hand had been appointed to their positions in 1st Allied Airborne Army by Eisenhower and charged with addressing the problems with navigation and drop accuracy that had plagued the operations in Sicily and Normandy. Brereton and Williams' solution was to conduct all flights in broad daylight with no night flying, and to drop the troops as far from Flak as possible to minimise aircraft losses, but it was at the expense of the requirements of the airborne troops to seize their objectives quickly, and of the ground forces to make rapid progress.

8:19 - photograph of many different units represented and often used in books on MARKET GARDEN, it has now been positively identified as Nijmegen with the overhead cables for the electric trams visible in the Keizer Lodwijkplein. The SS officer on the extreme left is almost certainly SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling of the former II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 (9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen'), now transferred to 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg' as temporarily IV./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 21, and later became I./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 22 when that regiment was reformed. It was also known as "the ghost battalion" as its identity was a continually changing mystery and they disappeared at the end of the battle for Nijmegen, Euling having sucessfully led about 60 survivors of his original reduced unit of 200 men to safety on the other side of the Waal by using the Haalderen ferry to the east, and they later turned up in the battles on the Nijmegen 'island' in October. 23:50 - Burriss and Carington incident did not happen, according to Carington. Peter Robinson commanding the first two tanks across the Waal (with Cyril Pacey) said he had to go back to a house near the bridge on the far side to pick up an American Colonel (Tucker), and this Colonel's first words were "I have to surrender. I can’t carry on. I’ve lost nearly all my men. I haven’t got many left." Robinson had to persuade him to come out to his tank and talk to Horrocks on the radio and they agreed the 504th would form a perimeter around Lent and protect the tanks on the far side, because Robinson had orders "to hold this bridge to the last man and the last round." This is quite different to the accounts the Americans like to claim. (Sergeant Peter Robinson, Market Garden Veterans Association)

Motormouth for sure.

@davemac W H E N will your own book come out ? This is Sandhurst cal. But here it only gets lost in the shuffle, due to forum form-limitations. Brilliant minds do mind = require perfection. Don t be modest. Viel Glück !! O er n naut

Who cares about Sandhurst? The British military in 2024 is irrelevant. I read his books and they are average at BEST. This could have been much more interesting if he showed more and talked less.

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d READ AGAIN mine. Wasn t talkin bout/to these fellowzz. But to codename DAVEMAC. Eton ideals can still be located @ Sandhurst, but in theory only, not in practice, excl the SSS (=the satanic super soldiers ....).

Glad you enjoyed it!

Magnificent? You are rather easily pleased.

LZ Z 4 miles/6km from Arnhem rail bridge, bridge destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed

The failure was a command failure. Gavin for selecting the 508th for the critical Nijmegen mission instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th, and Colonel Lindquist was not a good field commander, having not performed well in Normandy on the 508th's first combat operation. Lindquist had drawn up his Field Order No.1 on 13 September to establish defensive positions along the Groesbeek ridge and was prepared to move on the bridge in Nijmegen "on division order". Gavin then instructed him during the final divisional briefing on 15 September to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and even showed him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to take to the bridge. Lindquist didn't seem to appreciate he was now receiving the "division order" his own instructions stated he was to receive, before sending in the battalion, and that was why he only sent the pre-planned patrol under Lt Robert Weaver of 'C' Company to check on the condition of the bridge, despite being met on the initial objective by a Dutch resistance leader, Geert van Hees, who told him the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men to guard the highway bridge. Lindquist just wasn't a good field officer. Gavin was quite open about this in his interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far (1974), but Ryan just didn't include this in his book or do any further digging into the story. The film omits the entire episode altogether, not surprising since it was made for the American market. Sources: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)

@@nickdanger3802 - and if you had wheels you would be a wagon, but that's not relevant to this video either.

​@@davemac1197 LindEqvist !

@@sulevisydanmaa9981 - he spelt it "Lindquist". He was American, and it's just how they do.

Not something I've heard of before, but it may be some obscure minor arcane historical technical anomalous hereditary quirk in the Army's "simple job name description allocation system basis" (Al Murray - Why The British Are Undefeated World War Champions, RUclips).

I read somewhere that the Guards had a separate recruitment process, effectively selecting the best recruits, min hight etc. There’s no doubt they encouraged loyalty to the regiment above all else. It might be a stretch to say the SS modelled themselves on the Guards, but the similarities in recruitment is obvious.

What does Guards anything mean today? Living off the past as the UKs military is irrelevant today.

​@@user-mc4sq3fk5dchildish and ignorant

Really?