I like where you touch on social conditioning a little after the 7:00 min mark. I know for me, Stoicism has and is helping to unpack a lot of unhealthy thinking and break bad habits.
This one truly interests me. I find that I approach choice in so many ways (even if I don't want to) that it becomes something of a crazy and multifaceted Catch-22. What do I choose, and why, and how do I know which is even the right *way* to make any choices at all. In my case it's a Gordian Knot that seems solvable only by approaching it from an opposite direction: Try *NOT* to make any choices, and watch what happens. :-)
+Anekantavad Well, how does that approach solve the problem? I can see that it would result in making some choice or choices -- but not how it would resolve the worries about whether they're the right choices or made rightly, etc.
+Gregory B. Sadler I think the issue for me was about "choice paralysis", ie making choices where all choices seemed complex and unclear. Imagining what it would be like *not* to make any choices, however, made making choices in itself a lot easier. :-)
Once again thank you for the highly insightful clarification of the concept. I was wondering about the extent to which the Stoic can judge another's prohairesis. Since external objects are considered indifferents, does this extend to other people as well insofar as the Stoic ought not to judge another's moral character/faculty of choice (prohairesis) as good or bad (only preferred or rejected)? Or can the Stoic, once he or she has ascertained that the person acted passionately, attribute some form of 'badness' to him or her (or only his or her actions)? Any perspective and/or literature on this will be greatly appreciated.
+Fritz Knauff You can judge a prohairesis by how a person chooses, what they say, and what they do, and do so on the basis of good or bad. Epictetus does this all the time in the Discourses.
+Fritz Knauff Excellent! I guess that such a judgement just as much as it can be accompanied by eupatheia, can also be accompanied by the passions. For some reason Nietzsche's ressentiment comes to mind when someone else's prohairesis is judged passionately. Do you think a case can be made for ressentiment as passion?
It sounds like prohairesis is the highest principle of practical philosophy. Could you also translate it as freedom in the stoic sense? I use a textbook atm that tries to push all practical philosophy under the principle "freedom", as Fichte proposed.
2:05- "will" is evaluated higher than "reason"? ( better use the terms provided, or all discussion will get worse than ambiguous...) proharesis is evaluated higher than hegmonikon ( the ruling aspect). I have read some commentaries that say they are not two faculites, but one. While that may mean that the person is a whole, it also blurs the function of each faculty. Our choices can sway our reason ( perhaps we reason instrumentally and perhaps to instinctual and unexamined ends), and our reason can direct our choices ( I stand back, think about the holiday of Christmas and avoid advertising and the malls), and through repeated actions, cultivate a habit. But it runs the risk of reducing one to the other, and the denial of the existence of either term. "there is a nexus in the faculty of choice, in the prohairesis". a phrase well worth understanding. you know, the word for nature used in the text is "physis", where we get physics from. The stoics seem to make morality pretty central. When they say "according to nature" we can't just say "according to physics". The stoics have a physics that everything starts with fire, and ends in fire. Assuming a Heraclitian account of fire, wouldn't living in accordance to nature be living in accordance to the balance of strife? I suppose that balance would be found is what is in our control, and what is not in our control....If I was living in the time of newton, living according to physics would be pretty deterministic. Reflexivity: when I examine my process of reasoning as an argument, I have an artifact of my thinking that my thinking faculty then works on. Using to faculty to reflect on artifacts of that faculty is both the exercise and the testing of that faculty. If habitual errors can be found, and amended, then it is a circle, as it produces more artifacts to be examined. "my will makes the good" uh oh....only "subjective goods"? (here come the sophists...) "morality is a matter of taste " Nietszche ( a connoisseur of moralities) . retort...what is nature ("physus", not physics). Good video. thank you
Your explanation reached Rio. 😉👍
Thank you for your dedication to your work.
You're welcome!
Thank you Mr. Gregory for the content you share. Have a great day and every moment? ☀️
You're welcome - and thanks!
I came to learn that which I do not know. Thank you for teaching me. Peace.
You're welcome!
I like where you touch on social conditioning a little after the 7:00 min mark. I know for me, Stoicism has and is helping to unpack a lot of unhealthy thinking and break bad habits.
+Christopher Edwards Yes -- that is really one of its strong suits, in my view
This one truly interests me. I find that I approach choice in so many ways (even if I don't want to) that it becomes something of a crazy and multifaceted Catch-22. What do I choose, and why, and how do I know which is even the right *way* to make any choices at all.
In my case it's a Gordian Knot that seems solvable only by approaching it from an opposite direction: Try *NOT* to make any choices, and watch what happens.
:-)
+Anekantavad Well, how does that approach solve the problem? I can see that it would result in making some choice or choices -- but not how it would resolve the worries about whether they're the right choices or made rightly, etc.
+Gregory B. Sadler I think the issue for me was about "choice paralysis", ie making choices where all choices seemed complex and unclear. Imagining what it would be like *not* to make any choices, however, made making choices in itself a lot easier.
:-)
Once again thank you for the highly insightful clarification of the concept.
I was wondering about the extent to which the Stoic can judge another's prohairesis. Since external objects are considered indifferents, does this extend to other people as well insofar as the Stoic ought not to judge another's moral character/faculty of choice (prohairesis) as good or bad (only preferred or rejected)? Or can the Stoic, once he or she has ascertained that the person acted passionately, attribute some form of 'badness' to him or her (or only his or her actions)? Any perspective and/or literature on this will be greatly appreciated.
+Fritz Knauff You can judge a prohairesis by how a person chooses, what they say, and what they do, and do so on the basis of good or bad. Epictetus does this all the time in the Discourses.
+Fritz Knauff Excellent! I guess that such a judgement just as much as it can be accompanied by eupatheia, can also be accompanied by the passions. For some reason Nietzsche's ressentiment comes to mind when someone else's prohairesis is judged passionately. Do you think a case can be made for ressentiment as passion?
It sounds like prohairesis is the highest principle of practical philosophy. Could you also translate it as freedom in the stoic sense? I use a textbook atm that tries to push all practical philosophy under the principle "freedom", as Fichte proposed.
+dasfabelwesen You could translate it as "faculty of choice". It is free, to be sure, but it is not freedom itself.
2:05- "will" is evaluated higher than "reason"? ( better use the terms provided, or all discussion will get worse than ambiguous...) proharesis is evaluated higher than hegmonikon ( the ruling aspect). I have read some commentaries that say they are not two faculites, but one. While that may mean that the person is a whole, it also blurs the function of each faculty. Our choices can sway our reason ( perhaps we reason instrumentally and perhaps to instinctual and unexamined ends), and our reason can direct our choices ( I stand back, think about the holiday of Christmas and avoid advertising and the malls), and through repeated actions, cultivate a habit. But it runs the risk of reducing one to the other, and the denial of the existence of either term. "there is a nexus in the faculty of choice, in the prohairesis". a phrase well worth understanding. you know, the word for nature used in the text is "physis", where we get physics from. The stoics seem to make morality pretty central. When they say "according to nature" we can't just say "according to physics". The stoics have a physics that everything starts with fire, and ends in fire. Assuming a Heraclitian account of fire, wouldn't living in accordance to nature be living in accordance to the balance of strife? I suppose that balance would be found is what is in our control, and what is not in our control....If I was living in the time of newton, living according to physics would be pretty deterministic. Reflexivity: when I examine my process of reasoning as an argument, I have an artifact of my thinking that my thinking faculty then works on. Using to faculty to reflect on artifacts of that faculty is both the exercise and the testing of that faculty. If habitual errors can be found, and amended, then it is a circle, as it produces more artifacts to be examined. "my will makes the good" uh oh....only "subjective goods"? (here come the sophists...) "morality is a matter of taste " Nietszche ( a connoisseur of moralities) . retort...what is nature ("physus", not physics). Good video. thank you
No. The faculty of choice is also the rational faculty, and both are the ruling faculty. No priority of will over reason in Epictetus
thank you again.
You're welcome!
I imagine this lecture must have been a good one for your time teaching prisoners.
I taught prisoners long before this lecture