Physicalism can be stated as the position that the human body is a physical system acting the way physical systems act. So the human body is made of the same fundamental particles acting according to the physical laws they are observed to act according to in all known cases. If humans are normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way, then physicalism is true. The anti-physicalist must hold that the human body is not merely normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way. If so, then a careful study of the human body should reveal either non-normal stuff or normal stuff acting non-normally. These would totally overturn our current physics, and would amount to small miracles happening all the time. If the "soul" has no way of interacting with the body so that the body doesn't just do what a physical system acting in the normal physical way, then the body would simply act in the normal physical way, making physicalism true. But we can be highly confident that no small frequent miracles are happening in the human body (why only human?), and so physicalism is extremely plausibly true. Let me know when you have some evidence that the human body isn't just physical stuff acting in the usual way physical stuff acts. Find some miracles happening in the brain or accept that you are not a tiny god temporarily trapped inside an animal body. It's just too obvious that the dualists simply want to find some way to retain the absurdly outdated idea of a human soul. Maybe spiders and trees and pigs and also have these immortal souls, why not? Anthropocentrism and supernaturalism had a baby and it was the cute but ridiculous idea of an immortal soul.
"Physicalism can be stated as the position that the human body is a physical system acting the way physical systems act." Hardly. The substance dualist would readily agree that the human *body* is a physical system. Physicalism is a thesis about the mind which, for substance dualists, is not the same thing as the body. "If humans are normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way, then physicalism is true." This is too vague. If you mean that the human *body* is physical stuff acting in a physical way, then this belief is held in common between dualists and physicalists. If instead you mean that human beings are completely physical stuff acting in a physical way, then you are correct that physicalism is true. As stated, this sentence can be read either way. "The anti-physicalist must hold that the human body is not merely normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way." Hardly. Substance dualists affirm that this is exactly what the human *body* is. We deny that this is what the human mind is. "If so, then a careful study of the human body should reveal either non-normal stuff or normal stuff acting non-normally." Why should it reveal that? You might be able to argue that interactionist dualism would reveal non-physical causal entities (although even then, I would challenge why a study of the physical body would be expected to reveal such a thing). But substance dualists don't have to be interactionists. Suppose that epiphenomenalism is true. Given epiphenomenalism, mental states could be non-physical but unable to causally affect the physical world. Given epiphenomenalism, there is no reason to think that one could discover these mental states solely by examining the body. "These would totally overturn our current physics, and would amount to small miracles happening all the time." Even on interactionism, this is false. See my video on miracles for my explanation as to why miracles don't constitute a violation of natural laws. "If the "soul" has no way of interacting with the body so that the body doesn't just do what a physical system acting in the normal physical way, then the body would simply act in the normal physical way, making physicalism true." I've already explained why this is false. You are continuing to mistake mind/body dualism for a theory of the body when it is actually a theory of the mind. "But we can be highly confident that no small frequent miracles are happening in the human body (why only human?), and so physicalism is extremely plausibly true." What gives rise to this confidence? What is the evidence that there isn't any immaterial interaction between the mind and the body? "Let me know when you have some evidence that the human body isn't just physical stuff acting in the usual way physical stuff acts." Again, the thesis is that the human *mind* isn't physical stuff. And evidence for this will be presented in the remainder of the series. "It's just too obvious that the dualists simply want to find some way to retain the absurdly outdated idea of a human soul." Why is it absurd? You've supplied no evidence for this. "Maybe spiders and trees and pigs and also have these immortal souls, why not?" I wouldn't be surprised if pigs (and other higher animals) have immaterial minds since they appear to have conscious experience. Trees and spiders could have souls but there is little reason to believe that spiders do and none to believe that trees do since these entities don't show the same signs of having consciousness experience. So this is nothing more than a theoretical curiosity. I've already explained in the video why substance dualism doesn't entail that souls are immortal.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Thanks for the thoughtful reply. This comes down to, effectively, the interaction problem. In substance dualism, the two substances must somehow interact. The mind of the man causes his arm to rise. But how can that happen? The second substance must in some way affect the body of the man so that it does what it wouldn't otherwise do if that second substance hadn't acted on it. But then we should be able to measure that effect on the body of which that second substance is the cause. We would see what would look like occult forced acting on material, probably in the nervous system or the brain. A particle in the brain would move in such a way that is not accountable for just using the known laws of physics, because the second substance caused it to do so. Do you really think we will someday discover such occult forces in the (first substance) brain caused by the second substance? There's a Novel prize in that for sure. The physicalist would say there won't be found such occult forces: all the substance in the human body is acting according to the same laws of physics as anything else. So there is no way for this supposed second substance to do anything. It may as well not be there. But there is such a thing as "the mind", let's say. Then the physicalist would simply conclude that mind can happen physically, just with the one substance. How, exactly? That is to be elaborated, and certainly can be. Personally, I think it's better than punting to some occult second substance with, it so happens, just those properties that are for minds and does what minds do. How, exactly? It simply is that way, it so happens. Would the body would do the same thing whether or not it was there, presumably as some unobserved p-zombie? Good thing this second substance is here so second-substance-we can observe and enjoy what our body would do and experience whether or not second-substance-we were here, second-substance-we are just along for the ride, and second-substance-we have no agency upon the body, and thus no moral accountability. I think it was CS Lewis who compared it to a pianist at a piano, and the piano can malfunction or be destroyed without anything happening to the pianist. But pianos do not spontaneously make music, they need input from the pianist to hit the keys in the right way. In that case, the first substance body would need some input from the second substance to cause it to do what it would not otherwise do. The physicalist would say you're unnecessarily reifying what can simply be described phenomenally, multiplying entities beyond necessity. This is what it's like to be a homo sapiens. What's it like to be a bat? Do bats have souls? Do bats go to heaven? Will bats be resurrected in the eschaton? Maybe bacteria and sea sponges have souls. Do viruses? Would a self replicating proto-cell? Does a sperm cell have a soul? Or maybe some fraction of people are unfortunately unsouled p-zombies, how could you know? Rather than posit some entity, the physicalist is tentatively confident that a thorough understanding of the one substance will be enough. Also, by the by, it's pretty clear that there is a species of egoism at play here, even narcissism. I am such an amazing creature. What makes me so special? My soul/mind. Rocks and sticks and gingers don't have that. I'm willing to extend this to others, my tribe, all humans, all mammals, all vertebrates, all animals, all life, maybe, but I draw the line somewhere. Something is beneath me, and I am special. I think I might live forever, and judge angels! Do you want to take a bet of whether occult second-substance-caused forces will be found in the brain in the next 25 years? Ah, but it's hard to prove that they're NOT there, maybe they're very small or elusive. Best to keep your theory unfalsifiable, God forbid it was empirically disproven (and obviously it's not empirically grounded). The physicalist claim, by contrast, is falsifiable: find that occult force. Maybe we can get a fresh cadaver and hold a seance and their departed soul will come back and move their little finger or something. What would it take to convince you that physicalism was true, I wonder? A definitive demonstration that every smallest force in the human body, for its entire life, can be accounted for by the same laws of physics as apply in trees and rocks and lakes and empty space and anywhere in the universe. There is nothing for a second substance to do, so why posit it? The one substance is perfectly sufficient (The same reasoning would apply to God, and the same sorts of apologetics seem to come up in response)
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 fair enough! PS I am a Christian, the editor of Philosophy Now, and my playlist of consciousness videos is at ruclips.net/p/PLwaiQXAdTRa1dkiZTfUxSLBIHA6QRC7fp You might find some interesting ideas there
Although dualism is a relatively better position to take than materialism, I feel there are a few problems with it. If one wants to subscribe to a parallel substance dualism like Leibniz or Descartes, you run into the classic interaction problem. These two fundamental and irreducible substances can have no causative relationship with each other, and no correspondence outside of coincidence. Leibniz attempts to answer this problem by positing psycho-physical fine-tuning by God, saying that the only reason physical states correlate to mental states at all is because God ordained the match on purpose, but I have several issues with that proposal. 1. While I don’t object to a fine-tuning argument on principle, to suppose an arranger between these two substances where one substance suffices is not at all parsimonious. This kind of fine-tuning argument is not as explanatorily powerful as, for analogy and example, the usual cosmological fine-tuning argument theists like to use a lot. The argument for the fine-tuning of the universe for life is a successful abductive argument because it’s starting from our basic sense perception, and tries to explain how matter can organize in such a way that life is possible, but it doesn’t opine on the nature of matter itself to make its case. This psycho-physical arrangement is only needed IF dualism is true, which is not nearly as self-evident as the fact that we are alive and the universe allows for us (the life-permitting fine-tuning argument,) nor is it inherently more probable than any other interactionist model like idealist manipulation of information-with-the-appearance-of-matter for instance. 2. If matter and mind have to be arranged in advance to correlate with one another because causal relationship is impossible, then how can God, who is Spirit (according to both Scripture and philosophy,) affect matter Himself? If matter is a truly parallel substance, the mind of God should no more be able to interact with matter than we can, nevermind create it. This only pushes the problem up to God’s doorstep. 3. What even leads us to believe in matter outside our consciousness? We don’t perceive matter; we perceive our perceptions of matter. Whether that perception corresponds to a reality beyond our awareness is something we can never know because we can’t step outside of our mind to find out. We don’t know for sure whether our minds correspond with external matter, we only know for certain that our minds correspond to our perceptions. I’m not saying that everything is only our imagination, as things can obviously surprise us, but matter is only a theory to explain what we perceive. It’s the perception that is the question first. If we can’t establish the reality of matter with the same certainty that we can our minds and their perceptions, how can we posit an arrangement between them by God? 4. If substance dualism is true, then the ontological argument for God’s existence fails. If both matter and mind are fundamental substances and one can exist without the other, then it’s possibly that purely material worlds exist, or in other words: mindless worlds. But a mindless world can’t house a Maximally Great Being, because He is minded. The MGB is supposed to exist in all possible worlds (by virtue of necessity being a maximally great property,) and if the MGB can’t exist in some worlds, then He is not necessary, and by contraposition impossible. The only way you can say that God exists in all possible worlds is if mind exists in all possible worlds, but that is merely the same as saying that mind is necessary and matter is not, which is the idealist position anyway. 5. Ultimately, I find that dualists make a good argument for the reality of mind, but they don’t in turn make a case for the reality of matter. Matter is simply defined as “any substance existing independently of mind,” but that only answers what matter is not; that doesn’t explain what matter is (“independent” is a negative word, and “mind” is its referent; not a good look for materialists or dualists here.) If matter is truly something that exists without needing mind, then why does its definition need mind to relationally oppose it? If by matter one means “anything in spacetime that has mass” then matter at bottom is not material, because our most current physics describe the lowest matter best as immaterial probabilistic non-local information states (regardless of whether you think the observer has a casual relationship to such information or not is not my concern right now) and philosophically, models like bundle theory (where objects are nothing more than the sum of their perceived attributes) are also fully working models of the nature of objects. 6. Dualists have to make the case that there exists a spatiotemporal concrete reality that doesn’t need us to know about it to exist. But if we don’t need to know it exists for it to exist, then how can we know for certain? How can we know for certain our perceptions align with reality when things like illusions exist? Again, I’m not saying things can’t exist without our knowledge, or things can’t surprise us, but I am saying that positing an uncertainty as a fundamental substance seems imprudent. Matter can exist, but it can’t be fundamental if it’s only a probabilistic rationalization of our experiences, even if it’s a good rationalization, it’s not 100% perfect. 7. The fact of the matter is, mind is the only thing we know for sure. Matter is the theory to explain what we sense. From both a scientific perspective (the most recent physics) and a philosophical perspective (bundle theory,) matter can be explained immaterially, but the reverse is not true. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that mind is fundamental, rather than matter or both in coincidence. Many are concerned that this collapses to solipsism, but one need not worry about solipsism as a logical consequence. Leibniz’ law of indiscernibility of identicals renders the solipsist world indistinguishable from a realist world, but with extra assumptions that exist only to be explained away. Also a simple modus tollens render solipsism false. If my mind is necessary, then it ought to have attributes befitting of a necessary mind (immutability, perfection, omniscience, etc.) My mind does not have these attributes, therefore my mind is not necessary. So if mind as such is fundamental, but not my mind in particular, then another mind outside of myself is responsible for my existence and the existence of all contingent minds, which is the theistic idealist case.
Where would a hylemorphic theory more like Aristotle (And Plotinus) fall. If I remember correctly Plotinus has the soul as the form of the body, AND as the independent individually existent thing. The body in that case is an accident. Under Aristotle’s categories this wouldn’t be substance dualism because the body is an accident, not a substance, but I think the way the terms are being used probably shifted over time so it means something different when you use it.
Hylemorphic dualism, as I understand it, is a type of substance dualism. At least some proponents of it (i.e. J. P. Moreland and Matthew Owen) explicitly identify it as a type of substance dualism. I know there are those (especially online) who deny that it is a type of substance dualism. But I suspect a lot of that arises from the incorrect assumption that substance dualism just is Cartesian dualism.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 Yeah, I like to distinguish between the mind claim (your mind isn't identical to or a part of your brain; is immaterial) and the personal identity claim that Descartes adds (*you are* your mind).
What do 'physical' and 'material' mean here? Are they synonymous with 'composite'? Or are they suggesting some kind of deterministic mechanism? It's confusing because if the mind exists it must be a real object that can interact with matter.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Sorry, I had assumed it would be in the first half. Your definition is weird because it uses 'space' which itself requires a clear definition as much as the others; and additionally, minds do appear to have location and maybe even spacial extension, whatever that means, since a mind is attached somehow to a body.
@@petromax4849being attached somehow does not mean it must have been generated or formed by body processing...or is inseperable from body It can be like we act after wearing a jacket or shirt... And all are done together during that time
The Buddhists solved this completely over a thousand years ago Why are you still exploring this in Abrahamic terms? “As long as you’re willing to believe in magic/a soul, what I have to say makes sense…” Buddy. No. If you believe in Star Wars, I’ve got a bunch of stuff about the force to tell you. It’s in instantly self defeating proposition
THE GOAT THE GOAT THE GOAT IS BACKKKKK
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It’s about time! Was getting a little concerned 😅
Yeeeeesssssss. Been looking forward to this one
Rickabaugh's book is fantastic, and excellent video as usual.
the GOAT is back
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Excited for this and future videos, been meaning to look into this topic but didn't know where to start, thank you!
Physicalism can be stated as the position that the human body is a physical system acting the way physical systems act. So the human body is made of the same fundamental particles acting according to the physical laws they are observed to act according to in all known cases. If humans are normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way, then physicalism is true.
The anti-physicalist must hold that the human body is not merely normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way. If so, then a careful study of the human body should reveal either non-normal stuff or normal stuff acting non-normally. These would totally overturn our current physics, and would amount to small miracles happening all the time. If the "soul" has no way of interacting with the body so that the body doesn't just do what a physical system acting in the normal physical way, then the body would simply act in the normal physical way, making physicalism true. But we can be highly confident that no small frequent miracles are happening in the human body (why only human?), and so physicalism is extremely plausibly true.
Let me know when you have some evidence that the human body isn't just physical stuff acting in the usual way physical stuff acts. Find some miracles happening in the brain or accept that you are not a tiny god temporarily trapped inside an animal body. It's just too obvious that the dualists simply want to find some way to retain the absurdly outdated idea of a human soul. Maybe spiders and trees and pigs and also have these immortal souls, why not? Anthropocentrism and supernaturalism had a baby and it was the cute but ridiculous idea of an immortal soul.
"Physicalism can be stated as the position that the human body is a physical system acting the way physical systems act."
Hardly. The substance dualist would readily agree that the human *body* is a physical system. Physicalism is a thesis about the mind which, for substance dualists, is not the same thing as the body.
"If humans are normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way, then physicalism is true."
This is too vague. If you mean that the human *body* is physical stuff acting in a physical way, then this belief is held in common between dualists and physicalists. If instead you mean that human beings are completely physical stuff acting in a physical way, then you are correct that physicalism is true. As stated, this sentence can be read either way.
"The anti-physicalist must hold that the human body is not merely normal physical stuff acting in a normal physical way."
Hardly. Substance dualists affirm that this is exactly what the human *body* is. We deny that this is what the human mind is.
"If so, then a careful study of the human body should reveal either non-normal stuff or normal stuff acting non-normally."
Why should it reveal that? You might be able to argue that interactionist dualism would reveal non-physical causal entities (although even then, I would challenge why a study of the physical body would be expected to reveal such a thing). But substance dualists don't have to be interactionists. Suppose that epiphenomenalism is true. Given epiphenomenalism, mental states could be non-physical but unable to causally affect the physical world. Given epiphenomenalism, there is no reason to think that one could discover these mental states solely by examining the body.
"These would totally overturn our current physics, and would amount to small miracles happening all the time."
Even on interactionism, this is false. See my video on miracles for my explanation as to why miracles don't constitute a violation of natural laws.
"If the "soul" has no way of interacting with the body so that the body doesn't just do what a physical system acting in the normal physical way, then the body would simply act in the normal physical way, making physicalism true."
I've already explained why this is false. You are continuing to mistake mind/body dualism for a theory of the body when it is actually a theory of the mind.
"But we can be highly confident that no small frequent miracles are happening in the human body (why only human?), and so physicalism is extremely plausibly true."
What gives rise to this confidence? What is the evidence that there isn't any immaterial interaction between the mind and the body?
"Let me know when you have some evidence that the human body isn't just physical stuff acting in the usual way physical stuff acts."
Again, the thesis is that the human *mind* isn't physical stuff. And evidence for this will be presented in the remainder of the series.
"It's just too obvious that the dualists simply want to find some way to retain the absurdly outdated idea of a human soul."
Why is it absurd? You've supplied no evidence for this.
"Maybe spiders and trees and pigs and also have these immortal souls, why not?"
I wouldn't be surprised if pigs (and other higher animals) have immaterial minds since they appear to have conscious experience. Trees and spiders could have souls but there is little reason to believe that spiders do and none to believe that trees do since these entities don't show the same signs of having consciousness experience. So this is nothing more than a theoretical curiosity.
I've already explained in the video why substance dualism doesn't entail that souls are immortal.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381
Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
This comes down to, effectively, the interaction problem. In substance dualism, the two substances must somehow interact. The mind of the man causes his arm to rise. But how can that happen? The second substance must in some way affect the body of the man so that it does what it wouldn't otherwise do if that second substance hadn't acted on it. But then we should be able to measure that effect on the body of which that second substance is the cause. We would see what would look like occult forced acting on material, probably in the nervous system or the brain. A particle in the brain would move in such a way that is not accountable for just using the known laws of physics, because the second substance caused it to do so. Do you really think we will someday discover such occult forces in the (first substance) brain caused by the second substance? There's a Novel prize in that for sure. The physicalist would say there won't be found such occult forces: all the substance in the human body is acting according to the same laws of physics as anything else. So there is no way for this supposed second substance to do anything. It may as well not be there.
But there is such a thing as "the mind", let's say. Then the physicalist would simply conclude that mind can happen physically, just with the one substance. How, exactly? That is to be elaborated, and certainly can be. Personally, I think it's better than punting to some occult second substance with, it so happens, just those properties that are for minds and does what minds do. How, exactly? It simply is that way, it so happens. Would the body would do the same thing whether or not it was there, presumably as some unobserved p-zombie? Good thing this second substance is here so second-substance-we can observe and enjoy what our body would do and experience whether or not second-substance-we were here, second-substance-we are just along for the ride, and second-substance-we have no agency upon the body, and thus no moral accountability. I think it was CS Lewis who compared it to a pianist at a piano, and the piano can malfunction or be destroyed without anything happening to the pianist. But pianos do not spontaneously make music, they need input from the pianist to hit the keys in the right way. In that case, the first substance body would need some input from the second substance to cause it to do what it would not otherwise do.
The physicalist would say you're unnecessarily reifying what can simply be described phenomenally, multiplying entities beyond necessity. This is what it's like to be a homo sapiens. What's it like to be a bat? Do bats have souls? Do bats go to heaven? Will bats be resurrected in the eschaton? Maybe bacteria and sea sponges have souls. Do viruses? Would a self replicating proto-cell? Does a sperm cell have a soul? Or maybe some fraction of people are unfortunately unsouled p-zombies, how could you know? Rather than posit some entity, the physicalist is tentatively confident that a thorough understanding of the one substance will be enough.
Also, by the by, it's pretty clear that there is a species of egoism at play here, even narcissism. I am such an amazing creature. What makes me so special? My soul/mind. Rocks and sticks and gingers don't have that. I'm willing to extend this to others, my tribe, all humans, all mammals, all vertebrates, all animals, all life, maybe, but I draw the line somewhere. Something is beneath me, and I am special. I think I might live forever, and judge angels!
Do you want to take a bet of whether occult second-substance-caused forces will be found in the brain in the next 25 years? Ah, but it's hard to prove that they're NOT there, maybe they're very small or elusive. Best to keep your theory unfalsifiable, God forbid it was empirically disproven (and obviously it's not empirically grounded). The physicalist claim, by contrast, is falsifiable: find that occult force. Maybe we can get a fresh cadaver and hold a seance and their departed soul will come back and move their little finger or something. What would it take to convince you that physicalism was true, I wonder? A definitive demonstration that every smallest force in the human body, for its entire life, can be accounted for by the same laws of physics as apply in trees and rocks and lakes and empty space and anywhere in the universe. There is nothing for a second substance to do, so why posit it? The one substance is perfectly sufficient (The same reasoning would apply to God, and the same sorts of apologetics seem to come up in response)
Nice breakdowns. Think about putting some background music in occasionally.
I used to use background music. But most viewers didn't seem to like it.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 fair enough!
PS I am a Christian, the editor of Philosophy Now, and my playlist of consciousness videos is at ruclips.net/p/PLwaiQXAdTRa1dkiZTfUxSLBIHA6QRC7fp
You might find some interesting ideas there
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Based Substance Dualist 😎
Although dualism is a relatively better position to take than materialism, I feel there are a few problems with it.
If one wants to subscribe to a parallel substance dualism like Leibniz or Descartes, you run into the classic interaction problem. These two fundamental and irreducible substances can have no causative relationship with each other, and no correspondence outside of coincidence. Leibniz attempts to answer this problem by positing psycho-physical fine-tuning by God, saying that the only reason physical states correlate to mental states at all is because God ordained the match on purpose, but I have several issues with that proposal.
1. While I don’t object to a fine-tuning argument on principle, to suppose an arranger between these two substances where one substance suffices is not at all parsimonious. This kind of fine-tuning argument is not as explanatorily powerful as, for analogy and example, the usual cosmological fine-tuning argument theists like to use a lot. The argument for the fine-tuning of the universe for life is a successful abductive argument because it’s starting from our basic sense perception, and tries to explain how matter can organize in such a way that life is possible, but it doesn’t opine on the nature of matter itself to make its case. This psycho-physical arrangement is only needed IF dualism is true, which is not nearly as self-evident as the fact that we are alive and the universe allows for us (the life-permitting fine-tuning argument,) nor is it inherently more probable than any other interactionist model like idealist manipulation of information-with-the-appearance-of-matter for instance.
2. If matter and mind have to be arranged in advance to correlate with one another because causal relationship is impossible, then how can God, who is Spirit (according to both Scripture and philosophy,) affect matter Himself? If matter is a truly parallel substance, the mind of God should no more be able to interact with matter than we can, nevermind create it. This only pushes the problem up to God’s doorstep.
3. What even leads us to believe in matter outside our consciousness? We don’t perceive matter; we perceive our perceptions of matter. Whether that perception corresponds to a reality beyond our awareness is something we can never know because we can’t step outside of our mind to find out. We don’t know for sure whether our minds correspond with external matter, we only know for certain that our minds correspond to our perceptions. I’m not saying that everything is only our imagination, as things can obviously surprise us, but matter is only a theory to explain what we perceive. It’s the perception that is the question first. If we can’t establish the reality of matter with the same certainty that we can our minds and their perceptions, how can we posit an arrangement between them by God?
4. If substance dualism is true, then the ontological argument for God’s existence fails. If both matter and mind are fundamental substances and one can exist without the other, then it’s possibly that purely material worlds exist, or in other words: mindless worlds. But a mindless world can’t house a Maximally Great Being, because He is minded. The MGB is supposed to exist in all possible worlds (by virtue of necessity being a maximally great property,) and if the MGB can’t exist in some worlds, then He is not necessary, and by contraposition impossible. The only way you can say that God exists in all possible worlds is if mind exists in all possible worlds, but that is merely the same as saying that mind is necessary and matter is not, which is the idealist position anyway.
5. Ultimately, I find that dualists make a good argument for the reality of mind, but they don’t in turn make a case for the reality of matter. Matter is simply defined as “any substance existing independently of mind,” but that only answers what matter is not; that doesn’t explain what matter is (“independent” is a negative word, and “mind” is its referent; not a good look for materialists or dualists here.) If matter is truly something that exists without needing mind, then why does its definition need mind to relationally oppose it? If by matter one means “anything in spacetime that has mass” then matter at bottom is not material, because our most current physics describe the lowest matter best as immaterial probabilistic non-local information states (regardless of whether you think the observer has a casual relationship to such information or not is not my concern right now) and philosophically, models like bundle theory (where objects are nothing more than the sum of their perceived attributes) are also fully working models of the nature of objects.
6. Dualists have to make the case that there exists a spatiotemporal concrete reality that doesn’t need us to know about it to exist. But if we don’t need to know it exists for it to exist, then how can we know for certain? How can we know for certain our perceptions align with reality when things like illusions exist? Again, I’m not saying things can’t exist without our knowledge, or things can’t surprise us, but I am saying that positing an uncertainty as a fundamental substance seems imprudent. Matter can exist, but it can’t be fundamental if it’s only a probabilistic rationalization of our experiences, even if it’s a good rationalization, it’s not 100% perfect.
7. The fact of the matter is, mind is the only thing we know for sure. Matter is the theory to explain what we sense. From both a scientific perspective (the most recent physics) and a philosophical perspective (bundle theory,) matter can be explained immaterially, but the reverse is not true. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that mind is fundamental, rather than matter or both in coincidence. Many are concerned that this collapses to solipsism, but one need not worry about solipsism as a logical consequence.
Leibniz’ law of indiscernibility of identicals renders the solipsist world indistinguishable from a realist world, but with extra assumptions that exist only to be explained away. Also a simple modus tollens render solipsism false. If my mind is necessary, then it ought to have attributes befitting of a necessary mind (immutability, perfection, omniscience, etc.) My mind does not have these attributes, therefore my mind is not necessary. So if mind as such is fundamental, but not my mind in particular, then another mind outside of myself is responsible for my existence and the existence of all contingent minds, which is the theistic idealist case.
Where would a hylemorphic theory more like Aristotle (And Plotinus) fall. If I remember correctly Plotinus has the soul as the form of the body, AND as the independent individually existent thing. The body in that case is an accident.
Under Aristotle’s categories this wouldn’t be substance dualism because the body is an accident, not a substance, but I think the way the terms are being used probably shifted over time so it means something different when you use it.
Hylemorphic dualism, as I understand it, is a type of substance dualism. At least some proponents of it (i.e. J. P. Moreland and Matthew Owen) explicitly identify it as a type of substance dualism. I know there are those (especially online) who deny that it is a type of substance dualism. But I suspect a lot of that arises from the incorrect assumption that substance dualism just is Cartesian dualism.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 Yeah, I like to distinguish between the mind claim (your mind isn't identical to or a part of your brain; is immaterial) and the personal identity claim that Descartes adds (*you are* your mind).
Where would you put illusionism (Keith Frankish) and your opinion/ criticism of the same?
I have a hard time making sense of illusionism TBH.
What do 'physical' and 'material' mean here? Are they synonymous with 'composite'? Or are they suggesting some kind of deterministic mechanism? It's confusing because if the mind exists it must be a real object that can interact with matter.
I defined these terms in some detail towards the end of the video.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Sorry, I had assumed it would be in the first half. Your definition is weird because it uses 'space' which itself requires a clear definition as much as the others; and additionally, minds do appear to have location and maybe even spacial extension, whatever that means, since a mind is attached somehow to a body.
@@petromax4849being attached somehow does not mean it must have been generated or formed by body processing...or is inseperable from body
It can be like we act after wearing a jacket or shirt... And all are done together during that time
The Buddhists solved this completely over a thousand years ago
Why are you still exploring this in Abrahamic terms?
“As long as you’re willing to believe in magic/a soul, what I have to say makes sense…”
Buddy. No.
If you believe in Star Wars, I’ve got a bunch of stuff about the force to tell you.
It’s in instantly self defeating proposition
@@OfAngelsAndAnarchist Buddhists disagree with respects to characterizing anattā. Which tradition do you assume "solved" it?