I wonder what the effect of childhood trauma on predictive processing is. In that early developmental stage something disrupts the development of the predictive processing device in our minds and changes how we predict the present for life… something like that. Thoughts?
The Experience Machine is the wrong title. This is not a theory of Conscious Experience, but it is a theory of Brain function and therefore it is only about the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Please, will someone show me how this theory Explains any Conscious Experience? What is the Experience of the Redness of Red, the Sound of the Standard A Tone, the Taste of Salt, the Smell of Bleach, the Touch of a Rough Surface, etc.?
Nested intelligence - Robots made of robots made of robots - by Dan D. IMO we have not fully realized the significance of Dan's thinking. Global workspace - fame in the brain and so many.
I'm always confused by what Phillip Goff finds salient. Does he not know the difference between psychological concepts and culturally transmitted language? We can't build predictive concepts without learned data and then connect it to how other people are using words (with some Bayesian blurring because it would be impossible to only work with specific instances). Like the multimodal compressions that Lisa Feldman Barrett or Lawrence Barsalou talks about.
Re a theory not being an instantiation of itself, source code isn't an instance of a running program; for that, you need a physical device, about which there is a *ton* of other information! So that argument seems to fail. Surprised that Andy didn't mention the work of John Vervaeke re relevance realization as a core function of mind...
Quantitative descriptions of the contents of experience simply do not provide any of the qualitative descriptions of experience. And regardless of what the nature of those qualitative descriptions might be, there is no explanation of how we could get from the quantitative to the qualitative.
If you only had the quantitative descriptions, then you wouldn’t even be able to conceive of the possibility that there were also qualitative descriptions. We only know of them because there is the experience of them.
Or if they see green as I see red and visa versa. I have often pondered that everyone experiences a wildly different reality with agreed labelling in the middle.
Predictive processing fails to explain why there are mistakes in estimations. What happens when predictative processing does not solve a problem? A new set of predictions are made? How do we use the errors in predictions? Are prediction errors useful experiences as well?
Uh oh...Philip brings up knowledge argument - which Frank Jackson himself has disavowed. The knowing has two meanings - know = understand is not same as knows = experience. I cannot believe Philip still keeps bringing it up. General relativity does not need to know about every orbit of every planet, but it is enough that it predicts correctly how planets will orbit a star. If it does not enumerate orbits every planets - that have existed, exist and will exist that the theory is incomplete.
Philip and Keith talk to Jackson about the argument in a different episode, and Philip gives his reasons for accepting the argument. Plenty of philosophers still accept the argument, even though Jackson no longer does. And in fact, Jackson never created the argument to begin with! It's perfectly respectable to endorse the knowledge argument. You should be a bit more charitable.
@@ryanhauger4639 The knowledge argument is trivial. We do not have to set up some elaborate scenario. If you had a sweet mango and then had another even sweeter mango, there is a difference in what you experience. Science of consciousness is not meant to encapsulate every possible experience which any one has had, is having or will have. Science is always about compressed knowledge. Talking the example of sweet mango again. If I can make you taste a less sweet mango, and then predict that you will call the next sweeter mango more sweet and do the prediction based on the patterns in your brain, then that is good enough. That is why I mentioned the example of GR. If this is not understood about science, I do not know what to say. In case of Mary, who knows how a person's brain distinguishes lighter an darker shade of red (say!) and then predicts by seeing the wavelength of lighter and darker shade of another color - blue (say!) and predicts what that person will call each i.e. lighter or darker then that is good enough. Her experience of something does not change the scientific knowledge (in the sense of understanding - not experiencing). This distinction between know = understand vs know = experience has been made by several people e.g. Pat Chruchland. You may want to (please) watch this video about how much we know about perception of light - The Amazing Math behind Colors! on Kuvina Saydaki channel. BTW I am aware of the MindChat episode with Frank Jackson and have commented on it to the same effect. Thanks!
@@ryanhauger4639 @ryanhauger4639 The knowledge argument is trivial. We do not have to set up some elaborate scenario. If you had a sweet mango and then had another even sweeter mango, there is a difference in what you experience. Science of consciousness is not meant to encapsulate every possible experience which any one has had, is having or will have. Science is always about compressed knowledge. Talking the example of sweet mango again. If I can make you taste a less sweet mango, and then predict that you will call the next sweeter mango more sweet and do the prediction based on the patterns in your brain, then that is good enough. That is why I mentioned the example of GR. If this is not understood about science, I do not know what to say. In case of Mary, who knows how a person's brain distinguishes lighter an darker shade of red (say!) and then predicts by seeing the wavelength of lighter and darker shade of another color - blue (say!) and predicts what that person will call each i.e. lighter or darker then that is good enough. Her experience of something does not change the scientific knowledge (in the sense of understanding - not experiencing). This distinction between know = understand vs know = experience has been made by several people e.g. Pat Chruchland. You may want to (please) watch this video about how much we know about perception of light - The Amazing Math behind Colors! on Kuvina Saydaki channel. BTW I am aware of the MindChat episode with Frank Jackson and have commented on it to the same effect. Thanks!
"Experience is not what happens to you; it's what you do with what happens to you."
Aldous Huxley
Great video really enjoyed his perspective
The real meta-hard problem of consciousness: why some people still think that we can get the qualitative landscape out of the quantitative map.
Great episode!!!
Nice one guys! Great cast. Rock L 😉 x
I wonder what the effect of childhood trauma on predictive processing is. In that early developmental stage something disrupts the development of the predictive processing device in our minds and changes how we predict the present for life… something like that. Thoughts?
For a more elaborate account of the Self, please refer to the book named - Emergence of Levels of Self
The Experience Machine is the wrong title. This is not a theory of Conscious Experience, but it is a theory of Brain function and therefore it is only about the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Please, will someone show me how this theory Explains any Conscious Experience? What is the Experience of the Redness of Red, the Sound of the Standard A Tone, the Taste of Salt, the Smell of Bleach, the Touch of a Rough Surface, etc.?
Nested intelligence - Robots made of robots made of robots - by Dan D. IMO we have not fully realized the significance of Dan's thinking. Global workspace - fame in the brain and so many.
I'm always confused by what Phillip Goff finds salient. Does he not know the difference between psychological concepts and culturally transmitted language? We can't build predictive concepts without learned data and then connect it to how other people are using words (with some Bayesian blurring because it would be impossible to only work with specific instances). Like the multimodal compressions that Lisa Feldman Barrett or Lawrence Barsalou talks about.
AI without neural nets. Right now trying to debug machine consciousness. Still in the process.
Re a theory not being an instantiation of itself, source code isn't an instance of a running program; for that, you need a physical device, about which there is a *ton* of other information! So that argument seems to fail.
Surprised that Andy didn't mention the work of John Vervaeke re relevance realization as a core function of mind...
Brains don't "predict" or "guess" anything. Minds predict and guess.
Quantitative descriptions of the contents of experience simply do not provide any of the qualitative descriptions of experience. And regardless of what the nature of those qualitative descriptions might be, there is no explanation of how we could get from the quantitative to the qualitative.
If you only had the quantitative descriptions, then you wouldn’t even be able to conceive of the possibility that there were also qualitative descriptions. We only know of them because there is the experience of them.
The knowledge argument tells us that when you say 'green' I cannot infer which shade of green you are referring to.
Or if they see green as I see red and visa versa. I have often pondered that everyone experiences a wildly different reality with agreed labelling in the middle.
@barrypickford1443 Yes
Predictive processing fails to explain why there are mistakes in estimations. What happens when predictative processing does not solve a problem? A new set of predictions are made? How do we use the errors in predictions? Are prediction errors useful experiences as well?
Question - Does Andy support the OOO (Object Oriented Ontology) theory?
Uh oh...Philip brings up knowledge argument - which Frank Jackson himself has disavowed. The knowing has two meanings - know = understand is not same as knows = experience. I cannot believe Philip still keeps bringing it up.
General relativity does not need to know about every orbit of every planet, but it is enough that it predicts correctly how planets will orbit a star. If it does not enumerate orbits every planets - that have existed, exist and will exist that the theory is incomplete.
Philip and Keith talk to Jackson about the argument in a different episode, and Philip gives his reasons for accepting the argument. Plenty of philosophers still accept the argument, even though Jackson no longer does. And in fact, Jackson never created the argument to begin with!
It's perfectly respectable to endorse the knowledge argument. You should be a bit more charitable.
@@ryanhauger4639 The knowledge argument is trivial. We do not have to set up some elaborate scenario. If you had a sweet mango and then had another even sweeter mango, there is a difference in what you experience. Science of consciousness is not meant to encapsulate every possible experience which any one has had, is having or will have. Science is always about compressed knowledge. Talking the example of sweet mango again. If I can make you taste a less sweet mango, and then predict that you will call the next sweeter mango more sweet and do the prediction based on the patterns in your brain, then that is good enough. That is why I mentioned the example of GR. If this is not understood about science, I do not know what to say. In case of Mary, who knows how a person's brain distinguishes lighter an darker shade of red (say!) and then predicts by seeing the wavelength of lighter and darker shade of another color - blue (say!) and predicts what that person will call each i.e. lighter or darker then that is good enough. Her experience of something does not change the scientific knowledge (in the sense of understanding - not experiencing). This distinction between know = understand vs know = experience has been made by several people e.g. Pat Chruchland.
You may want to (please) watch this video about how much we know about perception of light - The Amazing Math behind Colors! on Kuvina Saydaki channel.
BTW I am aware of the MindChat episode with Frank Jackson and have commented on it to the same effect.
Thanks!
@@ryanhauger4639 @ryanhauger4639 The knowledge argument is trivial. We do not have to set up some elaborate scenario. If you had a sweet mango and then had another even sweeter mango, there is a difference in what you experience. Science of consciousness is not meant to encapsulate every possible experience which any one has had, is having or will have. Science is always about compressed knowledge. Talking the example of sweet mango again. If I can make you taste a less sweet mango, and then predict that you will call the next sweeter mango more sweet and do the prediction based on the patterns in your brain, then that is good enough. That is why I mentioned the example of GR. If this is not understood about science, I do not know what to say. In case of Mary, who knows how a person's brain distinguishes lighter an darker shade of red (say!) and then predicts by seeing the wavelength of lighter and darker shade of another color - blue (say!) and predicts what that person will call each i.e. lighter or darker then that is good enough. Her experience of something does not change the scientific knowledge (in the sense of understanding - not experiencing). This distinction between know = understand vs know = experience has been made by several people e.g. Pat Chruchland. You may want to (please) watch this video about how much we know about perception of light - The Amazing Math behind Colors! on Kuvina Saydaki channel. BTW I am aware of the MindChat episode with Frank Jackson and have commented on it to the same effect. Thanks!