I was going to talk more about squad tactics (which is why I said I would at the beginning of the video). However, when I dived into the editing, I decided that it would be better to do this in another video. So this video will lead onto a video about squads and platoons, and possibly companies. Then I can answer a Patreon question regarding the ability of the Allies and the Axis to coordinate all arms in an attack. As always, if you guys have book recommendations regarding these topics, let me know!
Hi Tik. For the British Army in 1944 to 1945, I would point this out. Buckley, John. "Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe." London: Yale University Press, 2013.
Dear TIK In your option was the German's MGs high rate of fire a good thing or a hindrance. The German squad need two people to assisted the MG (which seem wasted full) while the British, Americans and Soviet squad need just one person. Would a rate of fire 400ish be better for a German squad also do you think the German squad relied to much on their MG.
yeah, no mention of forward air controllers either. a german innovation, later taken up by the u.s.a. idk how if at all the sovs had them or british for that matter. tac air was something the Germans excelled at and the U.S. got really good at.
TIK, growing up I knew my godfather had been a paratrooper during the second world war. He never would talk to me about his experiences during the war until as a young man I returned home after enlisting in the United States Marine Corps. He volunteered for the army the day he heard of the Japanese Bombing of Pearl Harbor. Almost a year later he was in the 509th and jumped into North Africa during operation Torch. There he suffered wounds and was evacuated. After recovery he was transferred to the 505th and jumped into Sicily during operation Husky. There he served until he was transferred to England after being wounded again later in the Sicilian campaign. Upon his recovery he was to be sent back to the US to serve as an instructor, but he refused and asked for another combat assignment. His final combat jump was with the 101st into Normandy. He said they were dropped several miles away from where they were supposed to be and he and others tried to fight their way back to Allied Forces by moving north east. They didn't make it. He and five others that he was with were captured after being ambushed. He said they had about a dozen when they were ambushed and that something knocked him unconscious. He thought it was a grenade because he had a few grenade fragments in him when he awoke as a prisoner of the Germans. He remained a prisoner until the end of the war. He was wounded twice more in escape attempts. What he told me about the German squad based firepower was simply this: "The bastards would set up one MG in a strong position where they could 'pound hell' out of us. That damned thing put out more fire by itself than one of our squads combined. They always had plenty of ammo for it .... I guess every man in their squad carried a lot of ammo for it. We learned to look for ways to flank the damned things because to go straight at it was suicide. The bastards knew we would do this so they would have another MG (or two) set up so that the flanking approaches were all beaten zones for the other MGs. They were very good at setting this up. We would have to work at it to find something they missed (which was rare) or go on long looping flanking movements which slowed us down and ran a huge risk of finding more Jerry positions. Usually the best thing to do was to find the damned MGs mark them and request mortar or artillery fire to knock them out. Then as soon as the mortars (or arty) finished, rush the bastards and finish them off before any survivors could take over the MGs. That didn't always work as well as we hoped. The bastards always had good cover and concealment. You had to go in as fast as you could. So fast that you risked getting blown up by our own fire. It was the only good way. We couldn't find a better one." I'm fairly sure the only reason he started talking to me was that he was trying to tell me how to survive.... but once he started talking it was like the floodgates opened and he couldn't stop. For years I would go visit he and my godmother and after dinner he would always motion for me to follow him and he would collect a bottle of something or other and we would sip and swap stories in his study or on the porch. He told me of specific actions he was involved in and it always ended with him quiet with tears in his eyes but never openly crying. I think I was the only person he ever talked to about it that wasn't there. His wife later told me that she used to go sit in the next room and quietly listen to us. She said he had never been able to talk to her about his experiences. He only ever told her that it was horrible and not for women.
I’m so happy that he was able to share it with you. Hopefully you can share it with your children and so on. Stories from Vets need to be told no matter how tough it may be. I’m 19 yrs old and never got to hear my grandpa tell his stories when he fought for the south Vietnamese Army. He died when I was 7-8. So whatever I hear about him now is basically folklore. I absolutely despise war and the devastation it causes but have the utmost respect for our service members and military history. I really appreciate you for telling us this story.
@@Agt.Orange I understand how you feel. My father died when I was three. He fought the Japanese in China in WWII, The Communists at a little place called Chosin in Korea, and did two tours in Vietnam. I never got to hear any of his stories either. You are correct war is nothing to desire experiencing. Best of luck to you!
Well, they were shooting so many bullets, they couldn't supply enough of them. (And yes, its Ironic they got something right, but forget the other side of things.)
A factor that perhaps be included in the firepower assessment. A ten man German squad would be expending 91 rounds per man per minute, the squad would be getting through a *lot* of ammo in any firefight; exploiting their advantage to the full would mean having huge pile particularly of MG ammunition, much easier in defence than attack.
@@andrewholdaway813 combine with mortar squads once the enemy is suppressed. That's going to be knocking out a lot of guys if you only have light support with you.
1:45 - 500 rpm is a VERY generous ROF for an MG 34/42 being used as a light machine gun. Consider the limiting factors: 1) Ammunition. When used as light machine guns, the MG 34 and MG 42 usually used 50-round belts (the MG 34 also had a 75-round saddle drum), which had to be reloaded after every 7-10 bursts. Longer belts could be used when in static positions, of course. 2) Barrel changes. The MG 34/42's high rate of fire required frequent barrel changes. In general, barrels had to be swapped out every 250 rounds, although this could be pushed to 400 rounds in an emergency. In other words, barrels had to be changed every 1.5 to 2.5 minutes when at the max effective ROF, with each barrel change taking 5-15 seconds (and possibly more if the crew was green, had cold fingers, etc.) 3) Controlability. Even when fired from a bipod, the MG 34/42 could be difficult to control during longer bursts. Some squads apparently carried tripods, but their use would obviously have been restricted to certain situations. A 1944 report in the Intelligence Bulletin stated (www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/mg42-firing-data.html): "Trials under battle conditions have shown that the best results [with the MG 42] are obtained from bursts of 5 to 7 rounds, as it is not possible to keep the gun on the target for a longer period. ... Under battle conditions the firer can get off approximately 22 bursts in a minute, or approximately 154 rounds. Comparative trials under the same conditions with the MG-34 showed that the best results in this case were obtained with 15 bursts in the minute, each of 7 to 10 rounds, i.e. approximately 150 rounds." This ROF is actually comparable to the BAR's max effective rate of fire. See FM 23-15, the June 1943 field manual for the M1918A2: "The most effective rate of fire for this weapon is from 120 to 150 rounds-per minute. The sustained rate, however, is from 40 to 60 rounds per minute." The MG 34/42's advantage didn't really lie it its rate of fire, but in the inherent advantages of a belt-fed design with interchangeable barrels. In an extended firefight or at the crescendo of an assault, those features came in handy, allowing for short periods of very intense fire or longer, more measured engagements. And even then, German squads in the East sometimes supplemented their firepower with liberated LMGs like the DP 28. Even with the MG 34/42, they still felt they needed more automatic firepower! 8:10 - 30 rounds per minute is a reasonable figure for the M1 (it's the one quoted in Bond's 1943 Infantry Basic Course). But it's the highest reasonable figure. The 1940 M1 manual, for example, gives the lower figure of 25 rounds per minute as the maximum effective rate of aimed fire. The M1's real advantage over the Mauser was arguably not ROF. Rather, it was that the M1 was significantly more accurate (lower felt recoil and no need to risk losing sight picture by working the bolt). The head-to-head test between the Mauser-action M1903 and the M1 published in the September-October 1940 edition of Army Ordnance showed this. M1 shooters took about 15% fewer shots to hit their targets and they did it faster! Carrying two BARs wasn't just a product of scrounging. It was effectively doctrine. June 1944, most American rifle squads actually had TWO BARs! Each company HQ had a pool of 6 spare BARs it could dole out (enough for 2/3 squads to get a second BAR). In a similar vein, Thompsons also weren't formally issued to squad leaders. Indeed, it wasn't until June 1944 that non-Ranger infantry were formally issued submachine guns at all! Like the extra BARs, these SMGs were officially kept at Company HQ and doled out as company leadership saw fit. A lot of squad leaders had to (or chose to) carry M1s. Don't forget the two M7 grenade launchers issued to each squad, either! Starting in mid-1943, these gave GIs more long-range explosive firepower than any other squad-sized formation of the war (the Germans typically only had one per squad). The M7 could fire HE, frag, or HEAT grenades 200+ yards. And some GIs even rigged them up to fire 60mm mortar bombs! 10:50 - Prior to 1944, the Soviets did have classic LMG + rifle squads (in addition to all/mostly SMG units). However, by the late war, the Soviets no longer had all-rifle (and LMG) squads. They usually mixed SMGs and longer-ranged weapons at a roughly 1:2 or 1:3 ratio. For example, a mid-1944 rifle platoon had 9-13 SMGs to complement its 17-21 rifles, 2 sniper rifles, and 6 LMGs. 14:20 - How much of this effective "machine gun fire" was from squad-level LMGs using bipods and how much of it is from HMGs on tripods? A quarter (12/48) of the MGs in a German infantry battalion c. Jan 1944 were HMGs in the company MG section or the battalion's 4th company (www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/german-infantry-regiment.html).
In regards to the closing point about Soviet close-range firepower: 1) Many SMG-armed units were tankodesantniki units. Medium tank regiments each had an organic SMG company and heavy tank regiments had an organic SMG platoon, for example. When they went into battle, it wasn’t a case of Mauser and MG 42 vs. PPSh; it was a case of German small arms (and whatever AT weapons they could muster) vs. T-34s and SMG-armed tank riders. 2) Many SMG-armed units also had longer-range weapons like sniper rifles and DP-27 LMGs (Guards SMG companies being a notable exception to this). For example, by 1945, the SMG company of a tank regiment had 66 SMGs and 9 LMGs. By mid-1944, the SMG platoon of a rifle company had two snipers in the platoon HQ, as well as six LMGs between the four 9-man squads. So SMG-armed units still had some long- and medium-range firepower. 3) Many SMG units were also organic to formations with medium- and long-range firepower. Rifle Companies c. 1944, for example had an SMG platoon and two rifle platoons, a 1-gun MG section, and two 50mm mortars. Even all-SMG formations like the 200-man Guards SMG companies could expect support from their regiment’s organic howitzers and mortar batteries and their three sister rifle companies. So I'm not sure I buy the analysis that all-SMG units were a counter to German long-range firepower. Rather, they filled a specific need (ex. protecting tanks from German tank-hunters) or to fulfill a particular mission (ex. assaults) in conjunction with supporting arms like machine guns and mortars.
@@flashbackhistory8989 also, germans adopted the russian assault platoon tactic, dividing their panzergrenadier companies in two rifle and one stg sturm platoon. Rifle squads were armed with 2-3 mg-42, while assault squads were issued exclusively stg-44
Mg 34/42 used 50 rounds Belt Links, the 50 ammo Box was used for the assault and for the march, in a proper firefirght the bigger 250 to 300 round Box would be used
I agree with your basic conclusion, in a max rounds down range in a minute competition the German section wins, but I think some some of the fire rates you've gone with are wrong. The only one I can speak directly to is the Bren, in the early 1980's I played soldiers in the OTC (Officer Training Corps) at university and our section LMG was a Bren re-chambered for 7.62 NATO. The number two on the Bren would not be firing his rifle, but observing and dropping fresh magazines in when the gunner knocks the empty one out, very easy on a Bren. Six magazines a minute is achievable, seven is possible with a well drilled team. So, drop the number two's 15 rounds from the total and add 56 or 84 to the Bren total. Just a point from personal experience, I enjoyed the video :-)
10:29 They were a lot of changes on Soviet squads during WW2. I thing the closest one you could choose is the 1941 model, which is similar to the German. Here is the most common display: -1 Squad leader (PPSh-41). -2 Submachinegunners (PPSh-41) -1 Machinegunner (DP-27) -1 Assistant (MN-91/30) -5 Riflemen (MN-91/30) The MN-91/30 could be switched with the SVT-40, though only guards, airborne and motor rifle units used the SVT-40. If we keep the MN-91/30 we have: 1x200 (Machinegunner) 3x150 (PPSh-41) 5x10 (MN-91/30) That´s 700 rounds per minute, so not so far from the Germans if we go with a 1941 rifle squad. If we go with a 1941 motor rifle squad, then it's SVT-40 which was a semiautomatic rifle like the American M1, with a 10-round magazine, so it could be around 20 to 30 rounds per minute. Going by maximum, it would be a total of 800 rounds per minute, so not bad. In 1942 2 more soldiers were added, plus the unit's equipment was no longer fixed (except for the MG). The "payback" is that they went from 4 squads per platoon to 3. As for tactics, what they did was "human wave" done right: in order to attack a position defended by an enemy unit, another unit of higher order would be sent (for instance, if a squad is defending, a platoon is sent), with the sub-units turning for fire and maneuvre (the Germans did the same thing of fire and maneuvre). Edit: I found an error in the comment: Soviet squads by 1941 template were 11 men, not 10. Here are the numbers of firepower: With MN-91/30: 710 With SVT-40: 830 Also, please note that the version of the MN is the MN-91/30, and the tests shown are for the MN-91/24 (Finnish version), so there would be differences.
Soldiers with PPSh had much more rounds than 150. So the PPSh rpm is not 150 but 200-300. The PPSh had a rate of fire of 1000 rounds per minute, almost like the MG-42. Powered by 71 rounds drum magazines and 35 rounds magazines.
Podemos URSS The SMG troops may be the origin of the “human wave” myth. The soviets had to close the distance to use their sub machine guns, and combine this with the fact that 5 soldiers armed with PPsH sub machine guns would create the illusion of there being a lot more men than there were due to the amount of firepower they could put out. So basically combining the fact that the Soviets had to close the distance, plus their sub machine guns creating the illusion of there being more men in the assault, may have created the basis for the idea that the Soviets sent “human waves” against their targets.
@@thecanadiankiwibirb4512 , In general, the number of submachine guns in the troops was not constant. Do you know that stereotype that the Soviets in Stalingrad had 1 rifle for 3 soldiers?)) It really was so, but because the other 2 out of 3 were with PPSh. When the soldiers had to fight in cities, their rifles could be massively replaced with PPSh. And "human waves" are really, by and large, a myth. The assault group tactics were more frequent.
@@thecanadiankiwibirb4512 Also, the fact that they concentrated forces: their doctrine was that they would only attack with enough numerical superiority.
For the Russian squad, it is more complicated. As far as I know, we had whole squads armed with PPShs and PPSs for room/trench clearing and "field" squads armed as described in this video. The PPSh has twice the rate of fire as MP-40 does. Also, many of our riflemen had the Tokarev auto-rifle similar to US Garand one.
Hahaha to be fair, the Bren was more accurate. Combined with the sniper-rifle that was (supposedly) added into the rifle squad, I get the impression that British squads tended to go for accurate fire rather than suppression fire like the Germans and Americans. But I could be wrong.
should check out Ians vids at Forgotten weapons about the Bren gun he highly rates it as a light machine gun. I would much prefer to operate a Bren rather than a mg 34 or 42. as one man can operate it on its own no awkward belt changing and barrel changeing. + you could fire it from the shoulder much more effectively. but agree Lindybeing Bren vs MG42 was well of the mark and he kept on calling it the "spandau" which realy wound me up.
This reminds me of a book my brother read and I started called "Monty's Men." by John Buckley. It focuses on the British Army in Europe from 1944 to 1945. I believe the argument was that the British used set piece battles with artillery as the key factor to cut down on casualties. My brother mentioned the theme as, "Make enough of an impact to have a place at the political table when war is over, but for gods sake don't bleed the army white." I've only read the first 50 pages, but I believe Buckley mentions about the German small arms firepower. If I recall correctly, it came at a price with other elements of the German army suffering from supply and production problems. Artillery I think took a hit. I'll see if I can't find the passage and quote it in a follow up post. Hope all is well Tik!
Stalin called artillery "The God of War"... A two-three hour artillery barrage and a salvo of BM-13 Katyushas.. a bunch of IL-2 Sorties and only then tanks and infantry.
Reading accounts of the British Army in 1944-1945 shows why the British used set piece battles and overwhelming artillery support. They were running out of troops. By early 1945 the British Army was so pressed for manpower that they actually disbanded divisions to bring other frontline units up to strength. Essentially Montgomery had the last field army Britain could muster, so he had to husband his strength and avoid needless casualties as much as possible.
And the British platoons each had a mortar section attached, so if a squad hit pinned down, in theory they could call on their 2 inch mortar and surpress, lay smoke on the German squads
However, I have studied the Caen offensive by Montomery in the Normandy campaign. He was still wedded to WWII tactics that placed emphasis on attrition through superior firepower, not mobility. Doesn't seem a defensible policy given the tight manpower limits imposed on the Brits.
As an American Soldier (this is a mid-1980s snapshot), I was qualified expert on the M16, the M60 machine gun, and the M1911(.45) / Baretta(9mm) weapons. During my training with Fernspähkompanie 100, I also qualified for the Schützenschnur in Gold (German Marksmanship Badge). Area suppression note: The "3-round burst" (vs. full auto), introduced on the M16A2, was to reduce "spray and pray" ammunition waste. I found the German rifle less capable than the M16 and the pistol sloppy (I don't remember the rifle or pistol model numbers), but I really enjoyed the MG3. Assigned at the time as the primary gunner for an M60 team, I was impressed by the overall firepower and feel of the MG3. I was "told" that the cyclic rate was double what I was used to, and it certainly felt like it. Forty years after WWII ended, the continued contrast between the the American and German infantry squad weapons remain. Tactically, in the attack the Americans hold the overall firepower advantage (my experience is only with these American and German weapons). I found that the M16 and M60 could be fired accurately on the move, whereas their rifle was a bit clunky and the MG3 could only be fired from non-mobile (bipod, tripod, or fixed) positions. Brief mobile attempts at firing the MG3 were neither accurate nor able to be prolonged. However, in a defensive posture, I would have preferred the MG3. Source: Me, and only for the weapons covered/compared at that moment in time.
I heard that the Army has gone back to full-auto on their current M4. Supposedly because of the inconsistent trigger, but I think it's probably for the psychological boost more than anything. Wasting ammo isn't really that big of a concern if the people using it know what they're doing. I carried an M16A1 in Iraq in 1991 because our unit hadn't upgraded to the A2s yet, and was glad to have it.
The rifle you're referring to would be the G3 which is actually based of a late WW2 prototype assault rifle rechambered for 7.62 NATO. The pistol would be the P1, which is, safe for some additions to the grip area, IIRC, the same as the P38 the Wehrmacht used. In a sense, you were very much fighting with the latest in WW2 technology some 40 years later and by your own admission you didn't think they did too badly, if I'm interpreting your words right. ;) Now, imagine(just for argument's sake), not having either an AK or an M16 to go up against capable infantrymen carrying StG 44s or MG42s.
@@FrontlinerCdV I was training with the Germans (not fighting), and it included an opportunity to qualify for their marksmanship badge. Once I received authorization to wear it on my uniform in the States, it turned a lot of heads. I looked the G3 and P1 up and you are right, they are what I trained with. Its kind of funny how little their weapons have changed. I have fired a friends M1 at the range before, and aside from the weight and "thumb issues", it was solid and very accurate. Most servicemen (gender neutral use of the term) only know the weapons they are provided, and rarely have enough experience to imagine alternatives. I was fortunate to train with weapons from several different countries. My personal preferences are the M16s and the AK-74, depending on which ammo I have more access to.
Hi. Having the luck to talk with WW2 veterans I was told one of the great things about the BAR was that on single fire it was able to blend into the squad then when a target showed itself they would go to auto fire thus causing the enemy the problem of locating the squad strongpoint
One thing these euros can't grasp is that we also carry at platoon level motars. That as soon at a fight lights up, we are dropping plunging fire on them in seconds with the direct fire pinning them down. We carry their kill box to battle and put them inside it. We need very little communication to coordinate it all. It happens almost organically. They will rarely admit that the German tactics against americans was based around hardened positions like machine gun nests and pull boxes.... That the crew served weapons laid down covering fire for the retreat which would happen almost as soon as the first shots were fired .. then the German would rely on artillery to blanket the field and cover them to next fall back position. That was what the war on the western front and Italy really was.... At least the Japanese stood and fought when cornerd on each island. Never once did the Germans win a battle.... They only fell back and back further.. I see nothing about them that makes them super warriors, they only beat up on the innocent and the weak other nations.
@@dhardy6654 I think you are completely wrong, the German stood and fought the majority of the time against the Western Allies and there are many Veterans that talk about this. There were many cases later on in which the Germans would surrender in larger numbers but this does not suddenly mean that the Germans never put of a fight against the Western Troops they fought. The Germans would fall back against the Americans so much because of the American ability to completely and utterly dominate an area with superior volume of Artillery fire and Air power, couple this with the fact that the Western Allies rarely faced the best German units. They fell back further and further because at the Operational and Strategic level that was all they were in a position to realistically do but the German units and the Soldiers within these units fought just as hard as their Allied Counterparts.
I believe the comparison needs to be done at the Company level. Most nations held their machine-guns in dedicated squads/platoons not in the standard infantry squad like the Germans. Comparing standard squads misses this firepower and gives an inaccurate impression of overwhelming advantage laying with the Germans.
As I have said before, the small arms equivalent of “amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.” is “amateurs talk rate of fire, professionals study ammunition supply.” Section level tactics emphasise controlling the section's fire, i.e. not everybody shoots at once in order to conserve ammunition. If your section is backed by a good logistics system to keep them supplied, they can fire more. The US probably had the best logistics and the Soviets the worst, however circumstances vary. Looking at your rates of fire from automatic weapons your numbers seem a bit odd. You have SMG gunners firing 6 magazines a minute, but the Bren can only fire 4 despite having an assistant and a convenient top mounted magazine. While the BAR only manages 3. Note cyclic rate is virtually irrelevant, the important times are changing the magazines and selecting targets. I suspect the Bren is the realistic number and the SMG are likely to be 3 magazines a minute, like the BAR. You also need to look at the number of magazines, the MP40 issue is 6 magazines, so even if he could fire all 6 in the first minute he would then have a long pause while he reloaded the magazines. Conversely the Bren and BAR would have a large number. While an MG42 could fire 500 rpm if it had enough ammunition and long enough belts and the gunner was not spending any time selecting targets. Using 50 round belts one would be struggling to manage 10 belt changes. Also firing at that rate the barrel would overheat in the first minute, requiring a barrel change, assuming they are carrying a spare. Overall you would be better looking at how much ammunition the section carries, that how fast it could fire it, if it were crazy enough.
Fairly safe to assume that the MG42 team would have a spare barrel. In terms of changing belts, no, they wouldn't have. The no2 on the gun would just progressively link them all together. I always thought the cyclic rate of fire for the MG42 was 1200 RPM, though in practice that would never be achieved due to the barrel change requirement. Having changed a barrel or two in my time I can tell anyone reading it is a bitch of a job often leaving the person doing it with burnt hands despite the protective issued glove.
@@martyreinhold4927 yeah every 200 rnds you had to change the barrel due to massive heating issues alot of people fail to take this into consideration.
@@martyreinhold4927 That is the benefit of continuous nondisingrating belts, usually to the ksp58 it was 250 rounds per box belted. As someone calculated long time agoo 1 in 50 000 rounds was deliberately aimed at an enemy. The rest was sent in the way where the enemy was known to bee. Suppressing so that the guys with rifle could advance into grenade distance. The Russians fought from mid 41 the English from sept 39 the US from 43 in the ETO. North Africa US from november 42, English from 40. From sept 1939 until Januari 1942 the US could study all the fifgting in Europe and North Africa and the gear up. Then with a head start of preparing in peace, the would go to war, with all their might.
Firstly, great channel and I enjoy your content immensely. However, I do have some feedback for this video based on my own research and experiences working with rifles, rifle squads and machine guns both recreationally and as a US Marine. 1. Rates of fire for squad leaders shouldn't count. The squad leader of any squad is using his weapon only when personally required to such as during the final stages of an assault, or in self defense. At all other times his role is to direct the fire of the squad. This is why the squad leader is usually armed with a submachine gun. It is handier and more compact which allows the leader to be more mobile running around and directing the actions of his squad. Submachine guns are also ideal for close-in work such as self defense and in the final stages of an assault or defense where the squad leader is most likely to be needing to personally engage the enemy. It's a win-win, since the leader has the worst weapon for long range, but is expected to be directing fire and maneuver when the squad is engaged at longer ranges (ranges greater than 100 yards/meters) and has the best weapon for close range when he is actually going to use it. 1b. US Army squad leaders would've carried an M1 rifle, not a submachine gun. US Marines were different during different times in the war, but still usually would've also had an M1 rifle by the mid-late war period. 2. Rate of fire values for the bolt action and semi-automatic rifles seems reasonable, but the values for the light machine guns and automatic rifles is all over the place. From a practical use perspective, rate of fire of a support weapon is a function of how fast the gun actually fires, how easy it is to reload, how much ammunition is available and how often the weapon needs to have it's barrel changed due to overheating. 2b. Guns don't exactly jam when they overheat like they do in some video games, but they do tend to destroy their barrel by basically melting it. After a certain point the barrel will no longer shoot anywhere near the point of aim and eventually warp so badly that it won't shoot any kind of a group at all and becomes only as accurate as a smooth bore musket. 2c. Cyclic rate of fire, rapid rate of fire and sustained rate of fire are often confused, and lead to many contradictions. The short version of the story is, that although different automatic weapons have different cyclic rates of fire (how many rounds per minute the gun could theoretically fire if it were fired in one long, uninterrupted burst for 60 seconds) the practical sustained rate of fire is usually around 100 rounds per minute and the practical rapid rate of fire is around 200 rounds per minute. Basically, the faster the cyclic rate of fire is, the more time you end up wasting letting the gun cool off, change barrels and spend reloading. This is why after WWII, most light/medium/general purpose machine guns have a cyclic rate of fire between 500 and 700 rounds per minute. 3. Doctrinally the US had a very different view on how to arm a rifle squad and stand out as different than all other squads of the era. A standard squad of the era is a gun team that the squad is based around while the US had a flipped approach where the rifle was the focus and had an automatic rifle in the team in order to give the squad a bit of a boost in firepower, without limiting mobility. The debate on this is still a hot topic for a lot of people, but considering how little each warring nation actually changed their rifle squads during the war, it is safe to say that each side was more or less satisfied with their performance. Conclusions: Under most circumstances each squad had fairly even performance, with the best "standard squad" being a tie between the British and the Germans, where it mostly came down to a duel between the BREN and the MG34 or MG42, with the British riflemen having a slightly better rifle and the Germans a slightly better light machine gun. The US squad was at least equally as effective as the British and German squads, but isn't as easy to compare because it was fundamentally different in design and purpose. The Soviets are unfortunately the losers having the worst rifle and worst light machine gun. The M91/30 Mosin-Nagant is easily the worst bolt action rifle of the main powers due to it's sticky action and the DP-28 is about on par with the US BAR since both suffer from not having a quick change barrel, which limits the time that a rapid rate of fire can be sustained. Below are my estimates of more realistic rates of fire for individual weapons. All Submachine Guns NA (see point 1) US BAR 100 rpm M1 Rifle 30 rpm German MG34 or MG42 200 rpm German Kar98k 10 rpm British BREN 150 rpm British Lee-Enfield 15 rpm (No1MkIII or No4MkI) Soviet DP-28 100 rpm Soviet M91/30 Mosin-Nagant 10 rpm Keep up the great work on the channel and don't take this as an attack on yourself or your work. I invite you to visit me in the US someday ( Fall of 2022 when I get back from Okinawa? :) ) and we can go shooting from my collection and you can get some hands on time with some historical firearms. I'll even pay for all your ammo. ;)
Agreed on all counts! If you take the German squad leader out of the equation, the German's realistic rate of fire drops to about 240 rounds a minute (appx. 100 from the rifles and 150 from the LMG) Contrast that with a full-strength U.S. Army rifle squad with 480 rounds a minute for the Americans (330 from the rifles, 150 from the BAR). Even if you have the two grenadiers firing grenades, the Americans still come out ahead (and they have grenades coming down, too). The German system has some real advantages, but the German edge in ROF is often significantly overstated.
Flashback History What is also often understated, and even harder to measure, is the spread out nature of fire from a US style squad vs a standard style light machinegun centric squad. Once the location of the light machinegun is known, fire can be focused on it, neutralizing it or forcing it to cease fire and reposition. This decentralization of firepower means that a squad with two light machineguns is more than twice as effective as a squad with only a single machinegun. This same principle applies to a squad with lots of fast firing rifles. A US squad is hurt less by losing its BAR compared to any other light machinegun focused squad because of its decentralized nature. Perhaps the most important factor in a realistic rate of fire is ammunition expenditure. A German squad only carries around 900-1000 rounds of ammunition for the MG34/MG42, so the rate of fire MUST be limited to the rapid rate of about 200 rpm or else you will simply run out of ammunition.
@@jonathanbirkeland1085 And a good chunk of those 900-1,000 rounds weren't always accessible either. According to the wartime publication, "The German Squad in Combat" (Jan 1943), German MG teams held back 200-250 rounds as a reserve for "as long as possible."
@@flashbackhistory8989 And a barrel change of an MG34 or 42 with a hot barrel requires the donning of a large asbestos glove and, in the case of the 34, a lot of moving around as the barrel comes out of the gun towards where the gunner is laid down. The BREN guns barrel is a work of genius in comparison and can be done in seconds.
You forgot the .30 and .50 cal Brownings...which the axis had no equal..ask Audey Murphy..he got his medal of honor by obliterating 37 nazis with 1 by himself..look it up
A few things: 1) According to 1942-44 TO&Es the squad leader was assigned an M1. 2) Maybe this goes into your next video, but training and doctrine was greatly different, at least between the US and German squad. Paul Melody's "The American and German Infantry Battalion" (which you can probably find on-line) details the major differences between the US and German doctrine, both in the offense and defense. It's a good two hundred pages so even a brief outline would be impossible here. But one this that is of note is that in the attack, the German assault element did not try and achieve fire superiority over the objective, that was, by doctrine the job of the next higher echelon. So, in the case of a German "Gruppe" assaulting an objective the German squad would not fire until the last phase of the assault, infiltrating forward, using cover and concealment and attempting to remain invisible until being within rushing distance. And, only opening fire when absolutely necessary. Fire suppression of the objective would be from the machine guns of the platoon and/or heavy machine guns of the company, and other support weapons of the next higher echelon. A continuous advance was accomplished by alternate bounding of smaller units (squads, platoons, or companies) always relying on the next higher echelon to provide fire suppression to cover the bounds. So, while the German squad could produce a massive amount of firepower, due to the enormous ammunition appetite of the squad's machine gun, this firepower was withheld until the last minute of the attack. US doctrine had the squad provide its own fire support and was assisted by higher echelon weapons, not dependent on them. The squad, divided into an A team and a B team, with each team bounding forward until covering fire from the other team, but theoretically keeping up continuous fire all the while. Each of these doctrines have their strengths and weaknesses. Further, the doctrine is designed around the weapons available, to make maximum effect possible. Just counting the number of bullets that could be sent down range is very misleading. The rifleman (all nations) carried about 100 rounds per man, and if each German squadmember carried a 50 round Gurtttrommel (a full 300 round box would make using the rifle impossible), the maximum length of time they could shoot that theoretical 900 rounds per minutes would be two minutes, nine seconds (the total practical ammo load would be around 250 rounds for the MG by the riflemen, and 1200 rounds from the MG assistantsin two 300 round boxes, 50 rounds for the MG gunner, one Gurttrommel, plus 90 each rifleman: total 1950 rounds). Similar firing times can be calculated for the thr US, British and Soviet Squads, and are also in the two to three minute range. A squad attack, or defense, is going to last longer than two to three minutes...
There may be a tangible advantage to having a more evenly distributed firepower, a-la US platoon or SMG squads. Having 90% of firepower in the hands of a single man leads to obvious risks (may explain a sniper soldier in British sections - he would almost certainly be aiming to knock out the German MG).
I think the gradual Soviet transition to increasing more submachineguns for its infantry makes a lot of sense once the Soviets gained the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. Oftentimes, the Soviets faced the unenvious task of overcoming German defensive lines and strongpoints. Of course, the Soviets tried to neutralize them as best as they could with artillery barrages. However, once the artillery barrages were lifted, surviving German troops returned to their positions which posed a major dilemma. The Soviets partially compensated by designating lanes for infantry assault while artillery barrage was still ongoing, creating an illusion that the Soviet artillery offensive was still in session, but in reality, the Soviet infantry assault had begun. Now, the Soviet infantry faced two tasks: (1) advance to German positions as quickly as possible; (2) neutralize surviving Germans in close range, in which submachineguns were well-suited for this purpose.
Also an often overlooked fact is that the Soviets had to fight through much more numerous and bigger cities than other Allies. Thus the need for individual firepower was much larger.
I wonder what the German fire rate would be if the whole squad was issued with StG 44's as well as their machine guns. That would truly be a frightening amount of accurate firepower to face. But I also accept that the StG 44 was not produced in sufficient numbers to be really factored in during an average squad engagement.
There were whole regiments and battalions armed exclusively with stg-44. And there were some elite ss panzergrenadier units armed with stgs and 3 mg-42s per squad. Didn't help them much
It probably would have made a difference in an assault, similar to how the Red Army used units equipped with the PPSh to make the final push into an enemy position. Or in an FPF situation in the defense where the increased rate could be used to suppress an enemy wave. Not sure how it would have changed their overall tactics though - the US Army was already using semi-auto rifles with higher rates of fire and it didn't seem to revolutionize anything - not the way widespread issue of M16/AK47 type rifles did in the following decades.
There actually were a couple of experimental squads formations that outfitted most if not all of their rifleman with StG 44s in both Russia and on the Western Front during Market Garden. You're right that the StG 44 saw only limited production due to it being sort of kept secret from Hitler and being introduced in the middle of the war(if you're counting the MKb42 in this as well). These units reported on the effectiveness and while of course it's not surprising to note how much better the StG 44 is than your typical bolt action rifle in terms of fire power, one facet of the latter - which might not necessarily get the most attention in modern times anymore - is that it's actually physical "labour" to work the bolt and to feed the clips into the weapon when reloading. This screws up your point of aim and/or your rifle's resting position, it takes time to properly shoulder the weapon again when cycling, you'll become noticeably more fatigued in prolonged firefights and so on. The StG eliminates all of that and works as an SMG, a personal LMG and - since typical engagement ranges were under 300-400m - as a semi automatic rifle in one package. To paraphrase the findings of these squads: "When on the offense, the StG allows a single rifleman to continue giving suppressive pretty much by himself without worry," - since he has rounds to spare in each magazine and doesn't need to work the bolt after every shot. "which allows other men to continue advancing closer and closer onto the enemy." - which is where the weapon severely outperforms a bolt action rifle. Though to be fair, back then assaults were conducted with the weapon you had, regardless of whether or not it was a bolt action, an SMG or a spade.
@@FrontlinerCdV Thanks for the comment, that is very interesting to know, especially about bolt-action fatigue. The Russians definitely knew of how effective the StG was, hence why they quickly decided to make an assault rifle of their own. Whereas NATO decided to go with semi automatic rifles instead.
There are some considerations to be made which was not explored in a video: 1) Range. Rifle fire can effectively suppress targets who are farther away than a sub-machine gun. Sub-machine guns were good at few hundred meters only. The major strength of machine gun is it being able to suppress enemies at greater ranges than normal weaponary. 2) Firepower comparison is quite useless. In all these comparisons Germans come out of top solely on a basis of their machine gun and not firepower of the rest of their squad. 3) Such firepower calculations based on rate of fire are meaningless. They do not show effective firepower, this number is only good at determining how potentially good one squad was supressing the other. 4) Ammo concerns. MG machine guns might have vastly superior fire rate, however that might not be the optimal machine gun for German troops on the eastern front. Machine gun demanded massive quantities of ammunition and had logistically burdened entire network and most importantly, people on foot. If fire rate was everything, squads could had easily achieved thousands RPM across the board. 5) Machine guns were great at suppressing enemy infantry, but higher rate of fire means that machine gun will be running lower on ammunition. This in return means that MG is likely to be firing less overall than other machine guns due to this reason, bringing its RPM due to logistical attrition. In general, soldiers at that time needed to have gun shields. That would had enabled riflemen to return fire under suppressive fire and it would ''entrench'' machine gunner.
Battles between infantry only took place at a few hundred yards. With an iron sighted rifle, which in most cases would have been a bolt action rifle, good luck hitting moving targets past 200 meters. At distanced past 300 meters, good luck even seeing the enemy if they're trying to conceal themselves.
@@LUR1FAX Not true, you are speaking about a fact which describes most frequent ranges for battles. This discovery however did appeared until after WW2. Furthermore, it is not just sights problem, smgs and assault rifles simply do not perform well at long ranges as rifles.
The m1 carbine was also a common weapon on the front lines in the American military, and was actually produced more than the garand. From what I’ve heard anecdotally it was fairly common for soldiers to trade their rifles for carbines. It would provide a significantly higher rate of fire than the Garand.
The Stg44 was never available in sufficient numbers to replace the 98k and neither was the needed ammunition for it. Remember that by the time that the Stg44 emerged (Having fought Hitler's aversion of it all the way.) Germany was already on the backfoot and lost its air superiority. This meant that their already shoddy state of logistics was subject to further attrition and decay ,even when their logistic depth (distance) grew shorter.
@@fko1 Granted. My question was indeed more theoretical. IIrc Hitler didn´t like the idea of giving up the K98 although the soldiers liked the gun a lot. And for sure this gun had a huge impact. But I´m not sure if the reason for this was the rate of fire (according to wiki 500-600 rpm). My thought it was the flexibilty and it fitted well for most purposes.
@@Centurion101B3C You´re completely right. I rather wanted to know (more theoretically) if the introduction was more of an evolution or revolution in group firepower
@@Bambor Well, history answered that question, now didn't it? The post WWII explosion of development into assault-weapons with or without intermediate ammunition etc. and the settlement into ammunition-standardization (eventually, mind you!). The Soviet bloc (and their clients) got the SKS and AKM, The Western world (Minus the US) got the FAL (Yay! Right arm of the Free World.) . Ammunition got standardized into NATO and WP standards and all was well up until the end of the Cold War. We prolly overshot with going .223 as the 'new' standard, so now we'll be navigating back to 6.8mm before we'll eventually returning to something around 7.62 which seems to be the sweet spot for impact and range.
A word about Sub-machine guns. The Thompson came in three iterations. The 50 rd drum, used briefly at the start of the wear, was usually only issued with 2 drums, so 100 RPM. The 20 rd magazine came with a 5 mag pouch, for a total of 100-120 rds, depending on if an extra mag was carried in the gun.. Sometimes you can see an airborne soldier carrying two such pouches. The later 30 rd mags came with a single pouch holding 3 mags. That is also 90-120 rounds depending on a 4th mag being carried in the weapon. A second pouch is rarely seen in photographs, and may not have been issued. The STEN had 30 rd mags, but no special mag pouches were developed until late in the war, a 7 mag shoulder bandoleer, most commonly seen carried by Airborne troops. This gives a max of 210 RPM. The 37 pattern pouches wouldn't close properly when using the STEN mags, which is why the Thompson with 20 rd mags were preferred (About 6 20-rd mags could be stuffed into the 37 pat pouch, 180 rpm). Since one pouch was always carrying spare Bren mags, this left 4 mags sticking out of the other 37 pat pouch, 5 if an extra was kept in the weapon. ROF 120-150 RPM. The Thompson was seldom used by Commonwealth forces outside of Italy. When the 1st Canadian Corp was transferred to Northwest Europe, they complained about having to give up their Thompsons for the hated STEN, but they had no choice as there was no provision made for supplying 45 cal ammo. The Russian PPsH was only produced with 2 drums per weapon. The Germans who captured them noted that you just couldn't pick up any spare drum you came across and expect it you work without modifications, something an armourer would usually have to perform. As these drums were slow and clumsy to reload, this effectively limited their ROF to 140 RPM. The Germans were issued 6 mags in two 3-mag pouches, so 180 RPM is correct.
One factor not mentioned was effective range of the squad weapons. At best, the SMG was good for 100 meters--but usually around half of that. The light machine gun had the best range. Rifle fire slows down as range increases. So if the fire fight took place at 150 meters, soldiers armed with submachine guns are hosed by light machine gun teams before they can effectively sprinkle the LMG positions with pistol bullets.
I think 500 rounds per minute for the MG42 is a bit optimistic. Yes, it had a stupidly high cyclic rate. But in its light machinegun configuration (which it would be in while supporting a regular rifle squad) it ammunition comes in 50 round units. It takes time to change out the belt on a belt fed weapon, longer than it takes to swap out a magazine. In order to fire 500 rounds in a minute they would have to load and fire a new 50 round belt every six seconds. That means they aren't firing in bursts, but expending all 50 rounds in a continuous 2 second stream (assuming a cyclic rate of 1500rpm), then speed loading the next belt in 4 seconds flat, then expending another 50 round belt in another 2 seconds. Somehow going through ten 50 round belts in a minute without melting all of their barrels. 500 rounds may be about right for the MG42 in its heavy machinegun configuration (mounted on a tripod, with the belt held in a 250 round box, and with a whopping six spare barrels on hand (meaning that you can afford to overheat each barrel much faster, since it will take longer to cycle back to the first barrel)). But for an MG42 in the LMG configuration (mounted on a bipod with the belt held in a 50 round drum attached to the gun) I think about 200 rounds in a minute might be more realistic. I vaguely recall a source somewhere suggesting 250 rounds in a minute as the practical rate of fire for an MG42 in an LMG configuration, which passes a sanity check. 250 rounds would mean going through each 50 round drum in about 12 seconds. If we assume half of that is firing and half of that is loading we get a much more reasonable 6 seconds to open the feed tray, detach the old drum, attach the new drum, pull the new belt into the feed tray, close the feed tray, and charge the bolt. And you expend each 50 round drum in a more reasonable 6 seconds (firing bursts rather than a continuous stream). 250 rounds per minute still doesn't leave much time for barrel changes, so I still think 200 rounds is probably more practical. Having seen British, American, and German infantry firepower for myself in simulated combat (Combat Mission series) I have my own opinions on them. The British are definitely at the bottom of the firepower ladder here. The MG42 clearly has more firepower than the Bren, and the marginal superiority of the SMLE over the Kar98k is not enough to make up the difference. But they aren't at the full 1:2 disadvantage you estimated here. The Bren makes up some of its disadvantage in sheer rate of fire by being able to keep up a more continuous and sustained fire (magazine swaps (especially with the assistant gunner helping) are much faster than replacing belts, and the slower rate of fire doesn't overheat the barrel as quickly, meaning there are fewer barrel changes (overall there are just fewer and shorter interruptions in the fire)). It is possible for the British to gain the upper hand with sound tactics and by concentrating two or more Brens on each MG42. In practical terms I'd say that the German infantry squad is only perhaps 20% to 30% better than the British infantry squad. I have to put the Germans in the middle. The German infantry squad is certainly more powerful than the British infantry squad, but it doesn't feel as powerful as the American infantry squad. The issue for them is that all of that firepower is concentrated in a single weapon. If the machinegun is in a bad position, that compromises the effectiveness of the entire squad. When the machinegun needs to move, the entire squad is effectively out of the fight until it reaches its new position. If the machinegunner gets hit, the entire squad is rendered combat ineffective unless/until someone is able to retrieve the machinegun. The machinegun is a single point of failure for the Germans that makes their squad less flexible and more brittle overall. I really have to put the American squad on top. I think the overall firepower of a German and American squad may be about the same. I can't quite tell if the American squad as slightly more firepower overall, or if the German squad has slightly more firepower overall (yes the Germans are probably firing a greater number of bullets per minute, but one bullet from a rifle seems to be worth more than one bullet from a machinegun). But since the American firepower is (mostly) evenly distributed among the riflemen, there is no single point of failure like on the German squad. No single casualty can render the squad combat ineffective. Any part of the squad has enough firepower to transition smoothly from being a maneuver element to being a base of fire. Overall, it is just more flexible and resilient than the German squad. And frankly, it's pretty hard to argue with universally issued semi-automatic rifles in an era in which most armies are still equipped with bolt-action rifles. Again though, I think the American squad's advantage is marginal. It is probably only about 10-20% better than the German squad. Overall I think the three armies are a more or less even match for each other in terms of equipment. If the Germans had a significant advantage, it was in the fact that they were on the defensive on most fronts by the time American troops get stuck in. Edit: Oh yes, and I have to call out the American airborne infantry squad as probably being the most powerful in the world. On top of having universal semi-automatic rifles like the regular infantry, they also had a decent light machinegun at the squad level in the M1919. The M1919 may not quite be the equal to the MG42, but it closes the gap in automatic firepower by enough that the semi-automatic firepower of the M1 Garand has a very easy time pushing the US airborne infantry squad over the threshold of having far more firepower than any other infantry squad in the world. The late-war Marine infantry squad, with three BARs to a squad, is also pretty damn powerful. A single BAR provides pretty meager firepower compared to either the Bren or MG42. But three BARs is much more intimidating.
RPM is a statistic that is overrated. More importantly, what is the sustained fire duration an MG can do before overheating? That's a stat that the soldiers need to know.
This is true. I trained on the M60 in the US Army, and even though it was sometimes issued with an extra barrel to be switched out for sustained fire, the way we were taught was to fire short bursts with a pause in between in order to not overheat it in the first place. You can't just lean on the trigger the whole time or you'll have an inoperative MG in about a minute.
Appx. 250 rounds for the MG 34/42, but this could be pushed to 400 rounds in emergencies. For perspective, that's 5 to 8 50-round belts and 1.5 to 2.5 minutes of firing (at the typical 150 rpm ROF) before a barrel change was required.
I once read in one of russian articles, that machine gun was the cornerstone of a German squad, because nothing could compete with German MGs. Unfortunately, i can't remember the article's name or author.
finally some tactical stuff! don´t get me wrong, the logistical, economic and political aspects of war are interesting and extremely important, but after dealing all day with that stuff at work, I do prefer some tank and infantry talk. of course, the Battlestorm ones are simply a masterpiece. keep up the good work! greetings from Berlin
Yeah I don't think you can just say that one guy with a submachine gun has the firepower of 18 men with rifles. In practice things simply don't work like that.
It's hard to add the squad leaders SMG into the mix as he is usually doing his job of leading. And being a close support weapon it would only come into play in situations of close combat. Also, what about the firepower of rifle grenades?
Yeah. The SMGs probably shouldn't be factored in for anything over 100 yards. The US used rifle grenades extensively. And the British had a mortar organic to their platoon.
the fire potential of a squad is an interesting, but meaningless topic on its own. the practical challenge presented to a squad with more than half its firepower in one weapon is the effect of any stoppage, movement, or enemy movement out of the MG field of fire. the german squad is at a major disadvantage when facing a mobile enemy.
your point of movement fails to take into account there are never just 1 squad in the field, and thus isn't really relavent for 90% of engagements as moveing out of 1 field of fire will put you into another. what is more important is stoppages and suppression/killing of the gunner's position. and the MG42 is described as "supremely reliable", there is a reason a relatively minor modification is still being used by the germans (the MG3, which while in the process of being replaced is still in service. replacement only started 2015). meaning suppression is the main issue.
Seems like belt-fed light machine guns (BF LMG) and submachine guns (SMG) give the best "bang for your buck". The Soviets used submachine guns much more, overall about 8x as much as the Germans (less than 1 million MP40 submachine guns vs 6 million PPSh-41 + 2 million PPS-43), entire companies of SMG armed infantry were common. If they could get within effective range then multiple SMGs would massively overwhelm the Germans, it's hard to easily tell what the effective range was but the 7.62x25mm round shot by the PPSh-41 and PPS-43 would transition from supersonic to subsonic at around 150m, generally when bullets go "transonic" their accuracy gets exponentially worse and the "suppression effect" drops off like a cliff as the bullets are no longer crack overhead. But how much of a downside is this when considering other factors such as artillery. Artillery wasn't that accurate in WW2 but much beyond 150m was enough clearance to call in a very heavy bombardment without exposing your own (dug in) position to friendly fire. So even if you could fight from 200-300m away, would you want to? If you got into a firefight at 300m then so what if you win the firefight forcing the enemy to duck into cover? They will have called in an artillery bombardment on you, you need to get too close for them to use their artillery. I remember reading accounts from US soldiers in the Battle of Ia Drang how they saw North Vietnamese infantry sprinting towards them with their Kalashnikov rifles slung over their backs as he shot at them, he wondered why they weren't returning fire when in hindsight they were trying to get as close to the American forces as possible so they were too close for artillery to be useful. The AK rifle and variants were all quite effective at 300m but if they stopped when the took fire at around 300m to return fire then they'd be annihilated by artillery. So maybe submachine guns are the right choice if you don't have artillery supremacy but if you do have responsive artillery it's better to pin down the enemy at long range then pour in the shells and mortar bombs.
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь How were they used? I didn't say much about how exactly they were used except that they were used at closer range. Their mortars can be a sufficient substitute for small arms fire in suppressing the enemy to allow maneuver. I think the Soviets were ahead of the curve with their very heavy use of mortar companies. When the British finally replaced their heavy machine guns (Vickers type) after the war they replaced the .303 machine guns with 81mm mortars filling essentially the same role. Those heavy machine guns were being used in full defilade anyway, mortars are cheaper in every way and have greater suppression effect for a given weight of materiel. I think the only way that the Soviets were really lacking in the final stages of WW2 was a really robust fire control infrastructure for their artillery. But if you're on the offensive and stick to a plan then you can make the best use of what you've got. It helped that the Germans were starved of fuel so they were hardly moving around constantly, you had a long time to locate German positions and send runners to plan and coordinate combined arms attacks.
@@Treblaine basically, in an offence submachine gunners infiltrated close to enemy positions prior to the main attack, not just charge MGs straight through like poor vietnamese had to do in fear of long range fires. There is a really good video about soviet submachine gun units: ruclips.net/video/jSiTohahL7k/видео.html
@@Treblaine and on artillery. Germans wasn't moving all the time even then they got enough fuel, as the bulk of their divisions were infantry divisions. By that time digging trenches was the thing (even nowadays that's the thing in local conflicts). Plus, runners were rarely employed for coordination with artillery. If artillery lacked intelligence and radio link with forward troops they either estimated the probable position of enemy forces using maps (as defence lines are usually tied to terrain features and infrastructure) or just keep pace with advancing forces to have a direct line of sight from CP at the enemy, keep a telephone line communication with friendly forces or at least use flare signals to communicate with a combined arms commander (in the latter case it would look like 'one green and one red means enemy at reference point 1' and so on). That's true for tactical scope of things, up to battalion or may be regiment artillery group level. In case of divisional or higher echelon artillery, artillery commander would have a radio or telephone link with at least some forward observers, direct or via friendly forces CP in the area.
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь That is NOT what I remotely implied. All I said was the NVA would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid getting into long range firefights even though they were armed with an AK-rifle variant which certainly had the effective range. Just because they had to make a dangerous dash doesn't mean they DIDN'T use infiltration tactics. The NVA certainly did use infiltration tactics but that doesn't illustrate the importance getting close. This running towards riflemen was not part of the plan, they were caught out by the US soldiers advancing to an unexpected position... but it was still better to charge than stand and fight. If those NVA soldiers had done as was expected and responded to single rifleman by stopping to get into a firefight then they'd be at far greater risk from artillery. They weren't charging a machine gun, you can't charge a machine gun. As it was the NVA ground forces did exceptionally well, only ever fighting the Americans at very close range despite having weapons of theoretically far greater range. This paid off by greatly mitigating the US advantage in artillery. The battle was won by the Americans from other factors, for starters the Americans were trapped a cornered tiger is far more dangerous than one that tries to flee. Also the Americans had air power which could carpet bomb such huge areas that you just couldn't out maneuver it.
US BAR assistant had and used his M1, US soldiers were taught and could pick out individual targets. Suppressing fire was done as area fire. So that should be discussed in tactics.
It is worth noting that British sections were extremely adaptable because of the BREN gun (although the adoption at section level of the GPMG shows that belt-fed wins out), which is able to be deployed and sustained in the main line of the attack. This was good in close combat like in Normandy, but not enough to offset the advantage that a belt-fed GPMG could provide in prepared areas.
Maybe a constant 500 rpm is a bit over the top for sustained fire, but they could (relatively quickly) change the barrels on the Bren and the MG34/42, so either way, it was high. And every side would suffer from overheating weapons, meaning that the overall firepower of a German Gruppe would still be higher than a British section, or American or Soviets squads
Yeah, those barrels wouldnt be happy keeping that r.o.f prolonged. I presume the truth is alike today as in WW2, the machine-guns lead the infantry battle, the rest is personal safety weaponry. Air support and artillery does the trick, the rest is close up clearing and you "rpm" wont matter if your command chain doesnt work. German infantry tactics is still used today, fast order chains and initiative wins the battle.
Anyone know the standard number of spare barrels a german squad carried around in pictures you usually only see like 1 or 2 at max on the back of the mg gunner
According to Weale in his book on the British Free Corps…the small unit was entirely equipped with STG 44s…a seemingly clear indication of trying to maximise such a small unit’s firepower.
From a few sources I’ve picked up the standard British 10 man Section that saw combat throughout the war (8 on the book 10 in practicality) was: Corporal (Squad Leader): armed with a Rifle (39-early/mid 41 - pretty much around the battle of France and some early fighting in Africa) or a SMG (early/mid war you’d see British Squad Leaders use Thompson machine guns, however late war you’d see said replaced with the Sten instead) Lance Corporal (Squad 2ic): armed with a Rifle through the war however depending on squads and their veterancy and experience throughly the war you’d see the 2ic potentially armed with a SMG as well. Bren Gunner (Bren Team) - primary gunner for the Bren Gun, trained to fire the weapon a single round at a time - the practicality in this was 1. Ammo conservation (you may have a squads worth of ammo but unknown logistics may prove worse as such you don’t want to be nicking your mates rifle ammo after you burned through all your magazines - to those unaware the Lee and Bren used the same round meaning a rifle could legitimately give up a clip of his own ammo to be fed into a Bren magazine). 2. Accuracy - the Bren was designed to be an accurate and precise weapon, not to be sprayed but used to plink away at an enemy (it’s the old common question what’s more scary, seeing everywhere around you being sprayed with bullets or having them accurately chipping away at the position you just were.) 3. Disguise the weapon as a rifle - it was saw as a valuable trick for a British squad to slowly plink away at ones enemy with what seemed accurate rifle fire, however in times where an enemy would feel confident to attack or exploit what seemed a weakness in firepower by charging or getting close to use more deadly close quarter weapons such as grenades or submachine guns, the Bren could open up with full automatic fire and surprise/drive off an enemy. How practical this was varies heavily depending on sources and shooters. Besides single round shooting Bren Gunners also taught to shoot in burst and with full auto mag dumps. Rare to do because ammo but did prove useful for elements being attacked vs attacking. Bren Assistant (Loader) - would reload the weapon and carry a full bag of spare magazines. However was trained just as equally as a Rifleman. Bren 2nd Assistant (Loader/Spotter) - the 2nd Bren assistant would also carry a bag ammo for the Bren gun. During combat they would act as a spotter for the weapon helping to direct fire towards targets as well as acting as a secondary loader - 2 notes. Both loaders were trained to spot and load (in actuality every member of a British section was trained to fire and reload a Bren as either a single gunner or as part of a team - either as the gunner or loader) 2. The 2nd loader would not shove magazines in like the first instead he would be the one to remove them instead of requiring the gunner to do so. This allowed the gunner to keep in his posture and firing state the entire time without having to move to take the magazine out and slide it under him. The second loader would then keep all used magazines for use later. Designated Marksman - while listed as a “sniper” the Designated Marksman is very different from a sniper. He was trained like a sniper to take more time with his shots and aim for important members of a German Squad such as leaders, MG gunners and Assistants or other priority targets. However, it was beyond rare to see said Marksman equipped with telescopic sights instead like everyone he’d rely on his iron sights. In function he acted as any other rifleman however if required could split off with a spare man to act as a spotter/assistant to find a nicer position to engage from and target priority enemies. 4 Riflemen - from your guess these men were all just standard riflemen. Trained with the Lee to fire accurately however with speed. One problem I do see when watching American Rifle shooters vs British or Australian or Canadian shooters (or those form other commonwealth countries who used Lee Enfields) that when shooting the American shooters will usually bob their head back when drawing the bolt back. Why is this a problem? Because the Lee Enfield was designed to not required said head motion. One can happily keep their cheek to the stock and fire, bolt, fire, bolt, fire, bolt; without having to move ones head or firing posture. This was what made British Marksmanship so accurate and deadly. The same can be said for the Bren. American shooters will use the standard modern day leg spread and weapon to shoulder stance as if firing any other weapon. This is actually WRONG when using a Bren. To shoot a Bren one lies straight with both legs and feet together. Plant them into the ground and dig the weapon into your shoulder and surprisingly the weapon has very little kick compared to yeh modern firing positions and also improves its accuracy 10 fold. This is something that Britain excelled in. Having strange ways to shoot, load and bolt ones weapon that actually kept the weapon accurate and gave it a surprisingly high fire rate. However, when doing such in a modern shooting style, it actually takes away from the weapon and what made it so accurate and deadly. Funny enough it’s one of those on Paper this off paper this type situations (and also a this type of style vs that older style of shooting situation). And If you want another interesting one from Britain. You don’t bolt with your thumb and pointy finger, not your thumb, pointy and middle finger. You bolt entirely with your middle and thumb. Knock up and back with your middle and if you couldn’t do the bolt back and down with your middle you could use a thumb tho it was preferred that soldiers learn to do such entirely with their middle fingers - this is also one of the reasons the Lee didn’t require one to heavily change their firing positions, keeping the weapon on sight with ones target and allowing for shorter time between shots (not having to re aline each shot) As for additional squad variety and members: Grenadier - armed with the Rifle Grenade attachment, however was primarily equipped with smoke rounds over HE rounds. The reason was that it follows British battlefield doctrine of fire and manoeuvre. While one team (primarily the Bren) would engage the enemy, the rifle team would bound forward, stop and hit the deck and begin laying down their own suppressive fire. The Bren would then get up, bound forward to meet the rifle team and would the begin to repeat said process. Rifle Grenadiers just made this more practical as having a rifleman able to pop smoke for the Bren team to run through or even for his own team to move behind helped alleviate some of the fire superiority problems the Rifle Team would face. 2nd Bren Team - you’d primarily find this later into the war as more veteran division began compensating for firepower problems when facing the MG42. As such squads would equip themselves with a second Bren if possible. How did this effect the Section layout? 8 man Section - SL + 3 man Bren group. 2IC + 3 man Bren group. 10 man Section - SL + 3 man Bren group and a Rifleman. 2IC + 3 man Bren group and a Rifleman. If you have odd number of men. Spread evenly between section teams whey spares going to the Lance Corporals section.
The machinegun, the Auftragstaktik, the leading from the front, the excellent officer corps. Also Germanic peoples are generally good soldiers. For instance the Germanic tribes that populated the region of nowadays Germany and their ancestors were never conquered until WW2.
From the time I was a child and watched every “army movie” that was shown on tv, I was always interested in comparing firepower of US vs. German units in WWII. One thing I was struck by early on was that the Germans were almost always shown having more machine guns than the GI’s had. (Actually, this was true of WWI movies and books, too). This always seemed to me to be a big advantage. What I didn’t appreciate back then was that although the Americans had fewer machine guns and less mobile machine guns, this was offset by BAR’s, and having everyone else carrying semi-auto rifles and carbines. One thing that puzzles me is that these days the BAR is not very highly regarded. My dad was in the army in Korea. He and everyone else I ever talked to who served in WWII and Korea had nothing but praise for the BAR. Yes it is heavy, yes it only has 20 round magazines, and no you can’t quick change barrels… but vets from back then never mentioned that. They loved it for its firepower.
I was told back in 1976 by someone that fought on the Eastern Front that the problem with the MG 42 was that it performed well on the range but in combat it jammed very easily. He said that the Red Army would try and mortar their positions to kick up dust to jam their guns- as well as to kill them by mortar bomb fragments. He said that they had to keep the guns under tarpaulins and hoped that the dust had settled before the Red Army had got too close- and he mentioned that despite the rate of fire, they were often going to be overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
US also used many M1 carbines that were also semi automatic and used 20 round magazines. They are also pretty darn accurate when compared to sub machine guns
I remember reading that a lot of US soldiers in WWII and Korea preferred those because they were a lot lighter and had higher rates of fire, even if the rounds weren't as effective. When the Army botched the next service rifle (the M14) they were criticized for completely ignoring that experience and going with a heavy, overpowered and almost uncontrollable (on full-auto) rifle instead of a lighter weapon.
they were not frontline infantry weapons, though, so shouldn't really factor in to this equation. at best the assistant BAR gunner may have had one for emergency self defense, but in a pitched battle he's not using it, he's assisting the BAR gunner.
@@petriew2018 Audie Murphy always used an M1 carbine as a front line weapon whenever he could get his hands on one. They were intended to replace the pistol for support troops, but many front line soldiers used them.
Sorry, TIK, but I fail to understand the purpose of this video. It's kinda... well, childish maybe? Who has a bigger/better gun and similar? I mean, in theory, you can compare different rates of fire between different weapons, but then there are so many variables which you should take into consideration when comparing fire power of average squad... and then it gets complicated, really complicated... because you should check usability of different weapons regarding to attacking or defending actions, different roles of those weapons, maneuverability of soldiers with different weapons, different ammo calibers, different needs for maintenance, different reliability/shortcomings of particular weapons, availability of ammo in different situations, precision of those weapons... the list can go on and on... With all due respect, but this video, to put it gently, is almost a total waste of time. It's good only for mentioning organization of average squad and a bit shallow retrospective of different weapons, but we already have that explained in much greater details on some other, more specialized YT channels.
Bro love your videos. You go against what is generally accepted by many and support your claims with real sources and take a more unbiased approach between the motivations of the axis and the allies
Hey TIK. Interesting topic, interesting video. Frankly, it never occurred to me to compare the rate of fire per squad of different armies. I always thought that to be roughly on par across major armies (with Germans having a slight advantage over others (MGs, right)), and only being differently distributed within the squad. It was only after your video i have realised that the difference was substantial, and that multiple M1s or PPShs do not even nearly compensate for single MG. Though the individual numbers can be disputed (as they are) there is an indisputably clear point here. Well done!👏 The importance of MG for the German squad tactics have always been well known, now it is visually supported through numbers. I am not neglecting the tactics and training, contrary... the numbers just come on top of that. Few points: - Doubling the MGs. The apparent downside of German squad doctrine was that 'all the eggs were in one basket" - when MG is down the firepower is gone. Which might be the case in theory. But in practice Germans made sure to compensate for this by organising an the engagement in such way that there are always more than one MG in use. Either through 'borrowing' another MG from the neighbour squad or from the MG platoon (or from the 251/1 Halftrack). For instance, when a squad would go to rest, they would leave their MG upfront, either to be manned by one of them or to be borrowed to a squad left behind on watch duty. The same with attack, there was always a squad in reserve, but its MG was not in reserve, it was deployed from the start. This ensured that there is always more than one MG ready to spray the lead out while the other changed barrel or belt. In German army MGs never rested. This concept is not dissimilar to a bishop pair in chess, where a pair of bishops, who compensate for each others weaknesses, is much more than a sum of their individual strengths. In one episode in Rzhev battle, when after atrocious casualties Red Army finally captured a platoon sized strong-point, they were shocked when they counted twelve MGs in their trophy count. - Feeding the beast. In a very interesting book on comparative strengths of Wehrmacht and Red army infantry companies (cant' quote the author and exact title, the book is packed and sent back home, to make space for new books) the shocking revelation was that the Wehrmacht platoon had 3 times as many rounds with the platoon then their Red Army equivalent. whereas Red Army platoon had to rely on the supplies from the company, the Wehrmacht platoon was carrying with them the number of rounds approaching the number the Soviet company had. The reason is obvious: German squads had to feed the MG beasts. The majority of this ammo count was designated for MGs. - PPSH rate of fire. In some Russian encyclopedias I found that the practical rpm for PPSh is even lower than what you stated, ranging from "up to 100 rpm" ( V.N.Shukov "Red Army" Harvest, Minsk, 2016, page 72) to as low as 70 rpm (Merenkov "The Weapons of GPW -75 anniversary of victory", ACE, Moscow 2019, page 43). Possibly, there were issues when reloading the drum into the PPSh. Cheers!
Is there really anybody on earth left, who claims "superiority" in warfare is due to "race"? Besides this there are many things to take into account: The development of selfloading rifles and assault guns, the distribution of machine-guns at the company-level and.... ...the capability of moving the squats around. That's why in my opinion the American squat is far superior. All the others have the standart layout around the machine-gun. The Americans rely on selfloading rifles and assigned the machine-guns from the company-level downwards to the spots on the battlefield.
There probably are. But more to the point: what if actual soldiers believed they are better fighters due to race? Follow me... SchutzStaffeln Totenkopf was an SS Division that fought in Barbarossa. This was a combat unit formed from members of SSTV (SS Totenkopf Verbande) which was infamous unit guarding KZLs. They were rather substandard soldier material initially, but they were mostly ideologically brainwashed and "true believers" (which was for them the faith of them being of superior race). So they fought fanatically and this had serious impact on the fighting. Of course, they were mostly wiped out - as such units tend to suffer such fate - but before that happened they really showed some zeal. PS. It's squad, not squat. But not bothered - I tend to make grammar mistakes as well.
I advise you to read about the Soviet rifle squad before the Nazi invasion. 8 SVT -38/40, 2 submashingan PPDs, and DP. Sounds like American, doesn't it?
@@Scrap_Lootaz I am fully aware of the development of the selfloading rifles in the Red Army. However these were not in the slightest standart equipment - unlike the M1. To these terms even the G43 or the STG44 weren't. And the American Infantry-Division was fully motorised - every Division. That's the gamechanger.
@@dointh4198 , SVT was produced 1.6 million. On June 22, 1941, it was the main armament of the "Combat" units of the red army in the army was almost a million pieces. Unfortunately, the war began earlier and they did not have time to re-equip everyone.
I always hear people (mostly Wehraboos) boast about how much of a better fighter the German soldier was despite being hopelessly outgunned and outnumbered, but on a tactical level it was usually the Germans that had these advantages. When the 29th Infantry Division (US) landed in Normandy, it was only equipped with 157 machine guns + 243 BARs, whereas the 352nd Infanterie Division (the unit tasked with containing the Omaha beachhead) had 718 machine guns + 1,500 MP40s. That gave the Germans a huge edge, especially considering that they were fighting defensively. I think it's also worth mentioning that the biggest tactical advantage German units usually had, albeit beyond the squad level, was that their support troops (engineers, signalmen, and even artillery) were often trained to serve as infantry and were given the same kind of equipment as rifle squads. Whereas, support troops in Allied units were almost always relegated to their intended roles in rear areas. So while German troops nominally committed less men to battle than US or British units (I can't speak for the Soviets), they could very well have had an effective combat strength greater than that of an opposing Allied unit of equal or greater overall strength. Of course, this system of organization left the Wehrmacht desperately understaffed in other areas needed to support the front line infantry, but nonetheless it goes to show that the Germans weren't these cornered lions fighting off endless hordes of Allied hyenas that Wehraboos seem to imagine.
Wait wait wait. So we (Americans) didn’t send every squad with more shotguns, garands, BARs, Browning 30 cal, and Browning 50 cals than they could carry. WHAT MADNESS IS THIS!!!!!
@Based & Redpilled Department Logistics are prime targets for bombing, this isn't first world war where people behind the line would be safe. In Barbarossa munition depots were prime targets for bombing and that probably affected heavily in early victories just destroy enemy logistical system and units in the front will loose relatively quickly because lack of ammunition.
THe thing with soviet rifle squads is that they varied a lot in manpower and equipment depending on the specific year of the war. A typical squad at 1941 was better equipped in terms of weapons than another squad from 1943 (because by 1941 stuff like the SVT automatic rifle was standard issue but its production was drastically reduced in favor if the older and much simpler and cheaper Mosin). Furthermore, different squads were issued entirely different weapons for specific battles. For example for city fighting (but not only city fighting) usually the entire squad was issued with submachine guns.
Again you’ve got this narrative in your head that the Wehrmacht wasn’t a superior trained force. You then take a stance of either “you’re for or against me” . You do this by saying that anyone who claims otherwise is a proponent of the “aryan Rambo” theory . This is what spoils your videos . Again do some readings on other conflicts and you’ll see that fire power doesn’t equate to battlefield superiority. Libya had way more fire power than Chad, but was roundly defeated thanks to the latters NCOs and aggressive junior officers . The Wehrmacht was a super force not only because it had fire power but also a solid core of sergeants / corporals. Aside from the ending a good video!
Excellent observation of TIKs prejudices and his often choosen German officiers' statements from after the war, which bias the normal situation during the war (e.g. the normal German soldier had no masterrace mindset but high fighting spirit).
YES!! I got into this a little a couple years ago, but I was mostly interested in my own country's units (my country being the only important participant in the war, of course). This is going to be sweeeet!
They only made 2 million SVT's and a number were 'award' prizes. If a squad had them, it was used by a 'designated marksman' or sniper. However, most Soviet snipers disliked the SVT and preferred the Mosin-Nagant sniper rifle. A good reference for Soviet snipers: "Lady Death" by Ludmilla Pavlichenko
Some inconsistency. You conclude a 500 RPM practical RoF for an MG42 with a 250 round belt, but that would mean instantaneous reload. However you limit the Kar98k to 10 RPM citing the reload time as a limiting factor.
TIKs videos are always biased with the "German masterrace mindset" which makes him prejudicedly refuse all German superior fighting spirit. In reality the normal German soldier and officer had no masterrace mindset at all. The other way round the normal Soviet soldier just fought because of fear for its officers. Once the officers were taken out of action the Soviets surrendered.
@@СергейРублев-т7я This information I got of numerous German veterans. Once the officers and commisars were out of action they usually not only ceased fire and retreated but usually raised hands and surrendered. This was even true until 1945. From late 1942 onwards furthermore Soviet prisoners were mainly not sent back to prison camps but kept at the German rear units where they in general were reliable comrades and treated equal (food, accomodation). That history negelcts this fact is clear: 1.) it does not fit to Soviet propaganda of an heroic war and 2.) each Soviet prisoner would have stated after the war that he was forced by the Germans in order not to get in real trouble in the USSR.
Do you agree that when a person is very scared, they cannot act effectively? Now you are telling me that the USSR had many resources, but did not have patriotism, but only fear of officers. But to defeat a country as strong as Germany, you need to act effectively. How can you explain this contradiction?
Not the soviets though,or the russians today.They still hang on to the RPK,despite the fact that the PKM is lightweight enough to be used at squad level without problems,unlike the MG3 or the FN MAG.
@@Red-jl7jj Im talking more about how they are employed, not the design details. They are deployed to suppress enemy's with large volumes of fire. The earlier guns like the BAR and Bren were more about accurate fire. The US marines seem to be moving back to this however with the M27.
@@Red-jl7jj i agree,compatibility within squad and mobility due to less weight of weapon and ammunition are big factors for the infantry.For more firepower at farther than handgrenade distance the answer is mortars,modern radios are small,lightweight and reliable.
American squads were well (perhaps over) supplied with hand grenades. All sides had them but a single american infantryman may have carried as many as other nations had in the squad. At least 2 per man was common, so the early stages of contact could see a lot of explosive suppression. My sources are from various biographies and photos as the T.O.E was merely a suggestion to most American units.
"... the T.O.E was merely a suggestion to most American units." That appears to have been the case from my reading too. Particularly the M1 carbine, originally intended to rear echelon troops, found it's way to rifle units in staggering numbers. Curiously, I keep coming across photographs of Canadians equipped with them, too. They shouldn't even have had them at all anywhere!
No mention of grenades or other weapons available to the section, such as anti personnel and anti tank mines, flares, light mortars, flamethrowers,rifle grenades and so on. In addition, the British section carried a box of twelve Bren mags in a metal box as a basic load,with each other man carrying a mag in his pouch. In the field, the mags were given to the Bren crew as soon as possible. Loaded mags in boxes were brought up by men detailed as runners. GIs often ditched the BAR or kept it as a back up gun, if they got an M1919 either by issue or taking it from a broken down vehicle or knocked out tank. The Germans found that the basic TOE of the gruppe needed revising after the hard learning curve of Warsaw in 1939 and subsequent urban warfare in France and Russia, so that the assault group was heavily reinforced with submachine guns and plenty of grenades and as many MGs as could be found. In addition, the widespread use of the Panzerfaust and other hand held antitank weapons was carried on by the Germans to an extent never matched by the Allies.
My oh my, how I love the Quality of your Work: the clarity, structure, research and presentation in spoken word and imagery. Every time again I'm (still!) surprised by what we almost expect by now and what has almost become 'normal'. Well, it's "normal" in the sense of being a benchmark. You must have a Great Team
Fun fact about British sections. The rounds used for both the brengun and lee enfield? .303. So if you happened to be carrying an extra 30 round magezine intended for your bren-gun, you could still, given time, load the bullets into enfield stripper clips, or load them one at a time if desperate. The same goes for most nations lmgs and rifles to be fair, but it is worth mentioning regardless.
Another great video the Germans literally built their squads around their machine guns, Your squad based tactics were solely based around the positioning of the MG34/42 And when they started building sturmgewehr armed squads which I'm not sure if was fully implemented but that would have up their firepower as well though the Americans definitely had the advantage because of their communications for artillery tank and air support
I have been very short on time lately and have missed most of the non-audible content. Now I have an entire week free, and I get to watch all the Battlestorms from the past 2 months that I have been postponing because they are too good for only listening, and require the visual aspect. I'm basically like a kid in a candy shop.
More on guns please! What about range/falloff, bullet speed? Ability to penetrate certain materials? Or jamming? What about reliability under bad conditions (hot/cold weather, water, mud, sand)? (The AK-47 was built after MP-44s at last.)
The low rate of fire with the ppsh could also be that these sub guns were not known for interchangeable drums they were kinda fitted to the gun so I don’t know if they were issued multiple drums but if they were it would probably be one. Or stick mags possibly.
The main difference between military marksmen and snipers is that marksmen are usually considered an organic part of a fireteam of soldiers and are never expected to operate independently away from the main force, whereas snipers are special ops troops who usually work alone or in very small teams with independent mission objectives.
I really enjoyed the video but I really think you cannot understate the ability a semi-automatic rifle gives you just from a shooters perspective. The ability to have a second round ready to go in the chamber the split second you can pull the trigger again is so much easier than having to break check weld, crank the bolt, than re acquire the target and make an aimed shot. While the actual rate of fire in an engagement is probably not very high if it is of a prolonged nature because most troops could probably blow through all of their ammunition in 5 minutes, the ability of a soldier carrying a semiautomatic rifle to fire 2-3 shots in a situation where in that same situation a soldier with a bolt action gun could only get off one shot would be massive psychologically and tactically. I know as an American I am obviously pretty biased and do not even wish to make the case that the Americans had the best unit of the 4 identified here, but I wanted to state that as someone who’s lucky enough to have fired an M1 Garand and Mauser-action rifles that the difference there is unbelievably huge. Obviously the same argument is true when comparing machine guns/assault rifles to semiautos, but at least in the US army they had plenty of M1 (rifle and carbines) to go around where semiautos would have been rarer in the German and Soviet militaries. Keep up the good work, I am very much looking forward to the next episode in the Stalingrad series
![Natanael Cano - Amor Eterno [Official Video]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/EO4prCs6WpM/mqdefault.jpg)
I was going to talk more about squad tactics (which is why I said I would at the beginning of the video). However, when I dived into the editing, I decided that it would be better to do this in another video. So this video will lead onto a video about squads and platoons, and possibly companies. Then I can answer a Patreon question regarding the ability of the Allies and the Axis to coordinate all arms in an attack.
As always, if you guys have book recommendations regarding these topics, let me know!
Wahoo! I was looking forward to something like this at some point. This should be juicy.
Hi Tik. For the British Army in 1944 to 1945, I would point this out. Buckley, John. "Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe." London: Yale University Press, 2013.
ruclips.net/video/q2qD_P10paA/видео.html This video may give you an idea of the PPSh's RPM.
Dear TIK
In your option was the German's MGs high rate of fire a good thing or a hindrance. The German squad need two people to assisted the MG (which seem wasted full) while the British, Americans and Soviet squad need just one person. Would a rate of fire 400ish be better for a German squad also do you think the German squad relied to much on their MG.
yeah, no mention of forward air controllers either. a german innovation, later taken up by the u.s.a. idk how if at all the sovs had them or british for that matter. tac air was something the Germans excelled at and the U.S. got really good at.
TIK, growing up I knew my godfather had been a paratrooper during the second world war. He never would talk to me about his experiences during the war until as a young man I returned home after enlisting in the United States Marine Corps. He volunteered for the army the day he heard of the Japanese Bombing of Pearl Harbor. Almost a year later he was in the 509th and jumped into North Africa during operation Torch. There he suffered wounds and was evacuated. After recovery he was transferred to the 505th and jumped into Sicily during operation Husky. There he served until he was transferred to England after being wounded again later in the Sicilian campaign. Upon his recovery he was to be sent back to the US to serve as an instructor, but he refused and asked for another combat assignment. His final combat jump was with the 101st into Normandy. He said they were dropped several miles away from where they were supposed to be and he and others tried to fight their way back to Allied Forces by moving north east. They didn't make it. He and five others that he was with were captured after being ambushed. He said they had about a dozen when they were ambushed and that something knocked him unconscious. He thought it was a grenade because he had a few grenade fragments in him when he awoke as a prisoner of the Germans. He remained a prisoner until the end of the war. He was wounded twice more in escape attempts.
What he told me about the German squad based firepower was simply this:
"The bastards would set up one MG in a strong position where they could 'pound hell' out of us. That damned thing put out more fire by itself than one of our squads combined. They always had plenty of ammo for it .... I guess every man in their squad carried a lot of ammo for it. We learned to look for ways to flank the damned things because to go straight at it was suicide. The bastards knew we would do this so they would have another MG (or two) set up so that the flanking approaches were all beaten zones for the other MGs. They were very good at setting this up. We would have to work at it to find something they missed (which was rare) or go on long looping flanking movements which slowed us down and ran a huge risk of finding more Jerry positions. Usually the best thing to do was to find the damned MGs mark them and request mortar or artillery fire to knock them out. Then as soon as the mortars (or arty) finished, rush the bastards and finish them off before any survivors could take over the MGs. That didn't always work as well as we hoped. The bastards always had good cover and concealment. You had to go in as fast as you could. So fast that you risked getting blown up by our own fire. It was the only good way. We couldn't find a better one."
I'm fairly sure the only reason he started talking to me was that he was trying to tell me how to survive.... but once he started talking it was like the floodgates opened and he couldn't stop. For years I would go visit he and my godmother and after dinner he would always motion for me to follow him and he would collect a bottle of something or other and we would sip and swap stories in his study or on the porch. He told me of specific actions he was involved in and it always ended with him quiet with tears in his eyes but never openly crying. I think I was the only person he ever talked to about it that wasn't there. His wife later told me that she used to go sit in the next room and quietly listen to us. She said he had never been able to talk to her about his experiences. He only ever told her that it was horrible and not for women.
I’m so happy that he was able to share it with you. Hopefully you can share it with your children and so on. Stories from Vets need to be told no matter how tough it may be. I’m 19 yrs old and never got to hear my grandpa tell his stories when he fought for the south Vietnamese Army. He died when I was 7-8. So whatever I hear about him now is basically folklore. I absolutely despise war and the devastation it causes but have the utmost respect for our service members and military history. I really appreciate you for telling us this story.
@@Agt.Orange Cheers!
@@Agt.Orange I understand how you feel. My father died when I was three. He fought the Japanese in China in WWII, The Communists at a little place called Chosin in Korea, and did two tours in Vietnam. I never got to hear any of his stories either.
You are correct war is nothing to desire experiencing. Best of luck to you!
>TIK mentions the MG-42
>immediately suffer PTSD flashbacks to having both barrels on my '42 melt while playing Red Orchestra
Funny how the side with the fastest firing MG had the worst logistics.
The original spray and pray.
Well, they were shooting so many bullets, they couldn't supply enough of them.
(And yes, its Ironic they got something right, but forget the other side of things.)
@@Edax_Royeaux Well technically the british invented the jet engine first but were second to putting it on a plane.
A factor that perhaps be included in the firepower assessment.
A ten man German squad would be expending 91 rounds per man per minute, the squad would be getting through a *lot* of ammo in any firefight; exploiting their advantage to the full would mean having huge pile particularly of MG ammunition, much easier in defence than attack.
@@andrewholdaway813 combine with mortar squads once the enemy is suppressed. That's going to be knocking out a lot of guys if you only have light support with you.
1:45 - 500 rpm is a VERY generous ROF for an MG 34/42 being used as a light machine gun. Consider the limiting factors:
1) Ammunition. When used as light machine guns, the MG 34 and MG 42 usually used 50-round belts (the MG 34 also had a 75-round saddle drum), which had to be reloaded after every 7-10 bursts. Longer belts could be used when in static positions, of course.
2) Barrel changes. The MG 34/42's high rate of fire required frequent barrel changes. In general, barrels had to be swapped out every 250 rounds, although this could be pushed to 400 rounds in an emergency. In other words, barrels had to be changed every 1.5 to 2.5 minutes when at the max effective ROF, with each barrel change taking 5-15 seconds (and possibly more if the crew was green, had cold fingers, etc.)
3) Controlability. Even when fired from a bipod, the MG 34/42 could be difficult to control during longer bursts. Some squads apparently carried tripods, but their use would obviously have been restricted to certain situations.
A 1944 report in the Intelligence Bulletin stated (www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/mg42-firing-data.html): "Trials under battle conditions have shown that the best results [with the MG 42] are obtained from bursts of 5 to 7 rounds, as it is not possible to keep the gun on the target for a longer period. ... Under battle conditions the firer can get off approximately 22 bursts in a minute, or approximately 154 rounds. Comparative trials under the same conditions with the MG-34 showed that the best results in this case were obtained with 15 bursts in the minute, each of 7 to 10 rounds, i.e. approximately 150 rounds."
This ROF is actually comparable to the BAR's max effective rate of fire. See FM 23-15, the June 1943 field manual for the M1918A2: "The most effective rate of fire for this weapon is from 120 to 150 rounds-per minute. The sustained rate, however, is from 40 to 60 rounds per minute."
The MG 34/42's advantage didn't really lie it its rate of fire, but in the inherent advantages of a belt-fed design with interchangeable barrels. In an extended firefight or at the crescendo of an assault, those features came in handy, allowing for short periods of very intense fire or longer, more measured engagements. And even then, German squads in the East sometimes supplemented their firepower with liberated LMGs like the DP 28. Even with the MG 34/42, they still felt they needed more automatic firepower!
8:10 - 30 rounds per minute is a reasonable figure for the M1 (it's the one quoted in Bond's 1943 Infantry Basic Course). But it's the highest reasonable figure. The 1940 M1 manual, for example, gives the lower figure of 25 rounds per minute as the maximum effective rate of aimed fire.
The M1's real advantage over the Mauser was arguably not ROF. Rather, it was that the M1 was significantly more accurate (lower felt recoil and no need to risk losing sight picture by working the bolt). The head-to-head test between the Mauser-action M1903 and the M1 published in the September-October 1940 edition of Army Ordnance showed this. M1 shooters took about 15% fewer shots to hit their targets and they did it faster!
Carrying two BARs wasn't just a product of scrounging. It was effectively doctrine. June 1944, most American rifle squads actually had TWO BARs! Each company HQ had a pool of 6 spare BARs it could dole out (enough for 2/3 squads to get a second BAR).
In a similar vein, Thompsons also weren't formally issued to squad leaders. Indeed, it wasn't until June 1944 that non-Ranger infantry were formally issued submachine guns at all! Like the extra BARs, these SMGs were officially kept at Company HQ and doled out as company leadership saw fit. A lot of squad leaders had to (or chose to) carry M1s.
Don't forget the two M7 grenade launchers issued to each squad, either! Starting in mid-1943, these gave GIs more long-range explosive firepower than any other squad-sized formation of the war (the Germans typically only had one per squad). The M7 could fire HE, frag, or HEAT grenades 200+ yards. And some GIs even rigged them up to fire 60mm mortar bombs!
10:50 - Prior to 1944, the Soviets did have classic LMG + rifle squads (in addition to all/mostly SMG units). However, by the late war, the Soviets no longer had all-rifle (and LMG) squads. They usually mixed SMGs and longer-ranged weapons at a roughly 1:2 or 1:3 ratio. For example, a mid-1944 rifle platoon had 9-13 SMGs to complement its 17-21 rifles, 2 sniper rifles, and 6 LMGs.
14:20 - How much of this effective "machine gun fire" was from squad-level LMGs using bipods and how much of it is from HMGs on tripods? A quarter (12/48) of the MGs in a German infantry battalion c. Jan 1944 were HMGs in the company MG section or the battalion's 4th company (www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt09/german-infantry-regiment.html).
In regards to the closing point about Soviet close-range firepower:
1) Many SMG-armed units were tankodesantniki units. Medium tank regiments each had an organic SMG company and heavy tank regiments had an organic SMG platoon, for example. When they went into battle, it wasn’t a case of Mauser and MG 42 vs. PPSh; it was a case of German small arms (and whatever AT weapons they could muster) vs. T-34s and SMG-armed tank riders.
2) Many SMG-armed units also had longer-range weapons like sniper rifles and DP-27 LMGs (Guards SMG companies being a notable exception to this). For example, by 1945, the SMG company of a tank regiment had 66 SMGs and 9 LMGs. By mid-1944, the SMG platoon of a rifle company had two snipers in the platoon HQ, as well as six LMGs between the four 9-man squads. So SMG-armed units still had some long- and medium-range firepower.
3) Many SMG units were also organic to formations with medium- and long-range firepower. Rifle Companies c. 1944, for example had an SMG platoon and two rifle platoons, a 1-gun MG section, and two 50mm mortars. Even all-SMG formations like the 200-man Guards SMG companies could expect support from their regiment’s organic howitzers and mortar batteries and their three sister rifle companies.
So I'm not sure I buy the analysis that all-SMG units were a counter to German long-range firepower. Rather, they filled a specific need (ex. protecting tanks from German tank-hunters) or to fulfill a particular mission (ex. assaults) in conjunction with supporting arms like machine guns and mortars.
@@flashbackhistory8989 also, germans adopted the russian assault platoon tactic, dividing their panzergrenadier companies in two rifle and one stg sturm platoon. Rifle squads were armed with 2-3 mg-42, while assault squads were issued exclusively stg-44
Mg 34/42 used 50 rounds Belt Links, the 50 ammo Box was used for the assault and for the march, in a proper firefirght the bigger 250 to 300 round Box would be used
I agree with your basic conclusion, in a max rounds down range in a minute competition the German section wins, but I think some some of the fire rates you've gone with are wrong. The only one I can speak directly to is the Bren, in the early 1980's I played soldiers in the OTC (Officer Training Corps) at university and our section LMG was a Bren re-chambered for 7.62 NATO. The number two on the Bren would not be firing his rifle, but observing and dropping fresh magazines in when the gunner knocks the empty one out, very easy on a Bren. Six magazines a minute is achievable, seven is possible with a well drilled team. So, drop the number two's 15 rounds from the total and add 56 or 84 to the Bren total. Just a point from personal experience, I enjoyed the video :-)
10:29 They were a lot of changes on Soviet squads during WW2. I thing the closest one you could choose is the 1941 model, which is similar to the German. Here is the most common display:
-1 Squad leader (PPSh-41).
-2 Submachinegunners (PPSh-41)
-1 Machinegunner (DP-27)
-1 Assistant (MN-91/30)
-5 Riflemen (MN-91/30)
The MN-91/30 could be switched with the SVT-40, though only guards, airborne and motor rifle units used the SVT-40. If we keep the MN-91/30 we have:
1x200 (Machinegunner)
3x150 (PPSh-41)
5x10 (MN-91/30)
That´s 700 rounds per minute, so not so far from the Germans if we go with a 1941 rifle squad. If we go with a 1941 motor rifle squad, then it's SVT-40 which was a semiautomatic rifle like the American M1, with a 10-round magazine, so it could be around 20 to 30 rounds per minute. Going by maximum, it would be a total of 800 rounds per minute, so not bad.
In 1942 2 more soldiers were added, plus the unit's equipment was no longer fixed (except for the MG). The "payback" is that they went from 4 squads per platoon to 3.
As for tactics, what they did was "human wave" done right: in order to attack a position defended by an enemy unit, another unit of higher order would be sent (for instance, if a squad is defending, a platoon is sent), with the sub-units turning for fire and maneuvre (the Germans did the same thing of fire and maneuvre).
Edit: I found an error in the comment: Soviet squads by 1941 template were 11 men, not 10. Here are the numbers of firepower:
With MN-91/30: 710
With SVT-40: 830
Also, please note that the version of the MN is the MN-91/30, and the tests shown are for the MN-91/24 (Finnish version), so there would be differences.
Soldiers with PPSh had much more rounds than 150. So the PPSh rpm is not 150 but 200-300. The PPSh had a rate of fire of 1000 rounds per minute, almost like the MG-42. Powered by 71 rounds drum magazines and 35 rounds magazines.
Podemos URSS The SMG troops may be the origin of the “human wave” myth.
The soviets had to close the distance to use their sub machine guns, and combine this with the fact that 5 soldiers armed with PPsH sub machine guns would create the illusion of there being a lot more men than there were due to the amount of firepower they could put out.
So basically combining the fact that the Soviets had to close the distance, plus their sub machine guns creating the illusion of there being more men in the assault, may have created the basis for the idea that the Soviets sent “human waves” against their targets.
@@thecanadiankiwibirb4512 , In general, the number of submachine guns in the troops was not constant. Do you know that stereotype that the Soviets in Stalingrad had 1 rifle for 3 soldiers?)) It really was so, but because the other 2 out of 3 were with PPSh. When the soldiers had to fight in cities, their rifles could be massively replaced with PPSh. And "human waves" are really, by and large, a myth. The assault group tactics were more frequent.
@@Scrap_Lootaz I'm sticking to the numbers TIK uses...
@@thecanadiankiwibirb4512 Also, the fact that they concentrated forces: their doctrine was that they would only attack with enough numerical superiority.
For the Russian squad, it is more complicated. As far as I know, we had whole squads armed with PPShs and PPSs for room/trench clearing and "field" squads armed as described in this video. The PPSh has twice the rate of fire as MP-40 does. Also, many of our riflemen had the Tokarev auto-rifle similar to US Garand one.
Unfortunate that the Italians and Japanese are missing.
The Italians are not there anymore. They all ran away.
Does TIK talk about the Pacific War? I don't think it's his thing. Montemayor is (for me) the current king of RUclips Pacific War content.
@@PieterBreda the Italians used the Breda 30 which was probably the worst light machine gun ever made.
i'd image that's exactly how most German units felt during the war...
The japanese had at least 260 cuts per minute per squad during a Banzai Katana charge or 475 stabs during a bajonett charge, if all of them survived.
Please don't tell Lindybeige about the superiority of the MG42 over the BREN. ;-)
Hahaha to be fair, the Bren was more accurate. Combined with the sniper-rifle that was (supposedly) added into the rifle squad, I get the impression that British squads tended to go for accurate fire rather than suppression fire like the Germans and Americans. But I could be wrong.
@@TheImperatorKnight With at least the MG 34 you could hit pretty accurate. But it was pretty expensive so Germany switched to mg 42 for infantry
should check out Ians vids at Forgotten weapons about the Bren gun he highly rates it as a light machine gun. I would much prefer to operate a Bren rather than a mg 34 or 42. as one man can operate it on its own no awkward belt changing and barrel changeing. + you could fire it from the shoulder much more effectively. but agree Lindybeing Bren vs MG42 was well of the mark and he kept on calling it the "spandau" which realy wound me up.
@Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Division reminds me of this nutty teacher i had at school
@Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Division said the person who goes by @Das Reich 2nd SS Panzer Div...
I am a simple man, when I see TIK, I prepare my Halder hate.
...or Manstein ridicule!
"I hate Halder"
-TIK, 2020
Halder had reservations.. but loved the Limelight basking in it early on..and he was self serving in his Diary..
Where would history be without the allmighty St. Halder?
>Halder isn't even mentioned once in this video
Has TIK finally gotten over it?
This reminds me of a book my brother read and I started called "Monty's Men." by John Buckley. It focuses on the British Army in Europe from 1944 to 1945. I believe the argument was that the British used set piece battles with artillery as the key factor to cut down on casualties. My brother mentioned the theme as, "Make enough of an impact to have a place at the political table when war is over, but for gods sake don't bleed the army white." I've only read the first 50 pages, but I believe Buckley mentions about the German small arms firepower. If I recall correctly, it came at a price with other elements of the German army suffering from supply and production problems. Artillery I think took a hit. I'll see if I can't find the passage and quote it in a follow up post. Hope all is well Tik!
Stalin called artillery "The God of War"... A two-three hour artillery barrage and a salvo of BM-13 Katyushas.. a bunch of IL-2 Sorties and only then tanks and infantry.
Reading accounts of the British Army in 1944-1945 shows why the British used set piece battles and overwhelming artillery support. They were running out of troops. By early 1945 the British Army was so pressed for manpower that they actually disbanded divisions to bring other frontline units up to strength. Essentially Montgomery had the last field army Britain could muster, so he had to husband his strength and avoid needless casualties as much as possible.
And the British platoons each had a mortar section attached, so if a squad hit pinned down, in theory they could call on their 2 inch mortar and surpress, lay smoke on the German squads
@@CODRD yes and the Americans used riffle grenades a lot to.
However, I have studied the Caen offensive by Montomery in the Normandy campaign. He was still wedded to WWII tactics that placed emphasis on attrition through superior firepower, not mobility. Doesn't seem a defensible policy given the tight manpower limits imposed on the Brits.
Ok, just home for lunch here on the East coast US, and get to see another interesting video from TIK !
As an American Soldier (this is a mid-1980s snapshot), I was qualified expert on the M16, the M60 machine gun, and the M1911(.45) / Baretta(9mm) weapons. During my training with Fernspähkompanie 100, I also qualified for the Schützenschnur in Gold (German Marksmanship Badge).
Area suppression note: The "3-round burst" (vs. full auto), introduced on the M16A2, was to reduce "spray and pray" ammunition waste.
I found the German rifle less capable than the M16 and the pistol sloppy (I don't remember the rifle or pistol model numbers), but I really enjoyed the MG3. Assigned at the time as the primary gunner for an M60 team, I was impressed by the overall firepower and feel of the MG3. I was "told" that the cyclic rate was double what I was used to, and it certainly felt like it.
Forty years after WWII ended, the continued contrast between the the American and German infantry squad weapons remain. Tactically, in the attack the Americans hold the overall firepower advantage (my experience is only with these American and German weapons). I found that the M16 and M60 could be fired accurately on the move, whereas their rifle was a bit clunky and the MG3 could only be fired from non-mobile (bipod, tripod, or fixed) positions. Brief mobile attempts at firing the MG3 were neither accurate nor able to be prolonged. However, in a defensive posture, I would have preferred the MG3.
Source: Me, and only for the weapons covered/compared at that moment in time.
I heard that the Army has gone back to full-auto on their current M4. Supposedly because of the inconsistent trigger, but I think it's probably for the psychological boost more than anything. Wasting ammo isn't really that big of a concern if the people using it know what they're doing. I carried an M16A1 in Iraq in 1991 because our unit hadn't upgraded to the A2s yet, and was glad to have it.
The rifle you're referring to would be the G3 which is actually based of a late WW2 prototype assault rifle rechambered for 7.62 NATO.
The pistol would be the P1, which is, safe for some additions to the grip area, IIRC, the same as the P38 the Wehrmacht used.
In a sense, you were very much fighting with the latest in WW2 technology some 40 years later and by your own admission you didn't think they did too badly, if I'm interpreting your words right. ;) Now, imagine(just for argument's sake), not having either an AK or an M16 to go up against capable infantrymen carrying StG 44s or MG42s.
@@Raskolnikov70 I believe you are correct about having full auto again. Not sure, they came out after my time.
@@FrontlinerCdV I was training with the Germans (not fighting), and it included an opportunity to qualify for their marksmanship badge. Once I received authorization to wear it on my uniform in the States, it turned a lot of heads.
I looked the G3 and P1 up and you are right, they are what I trained with. Its kind of funny how little their weapons have changed. I have fired a friends M1 at the range before, and aside from the weight and "thumb issues", it was solid and very accurate. Most servicemen (gender neutral use of the term) only know the weapons they are provided, and rarely have enough experience to imagine alternatives. I was fortunate to train with weapons from several different countries. My personal preferences are the M16s and the AK-74, depending on which ammo I have more access to.
You forgot the 30. And .50 Browning....if your gonna add the mg43...you have to add these 2
Hi. Having the luck to talk with WW2 veterans I was told one of the great things about the BAR was that on single fire it was able to blend into the squad then when a target showed itself they would go to auto fire thus causing the enemy the problem of locating the squad strongpoint
One thing these euros can't grasp is that we also carry at platoon level motars. That as soon at a fight lights up, we are dropping plunging fire on them in seconds with the direct fire pinning them down. We carry their kill box to battle and put them inside it. We need very little communication to coordinate it all. It happens almost organically.
They will rarely admit that the German tactics against americans was based around hardened positions like machine gun nests and pull boxes.... That the crew served weapons laid down covering fire for the retreat which would happen almost as soon as the first shots were fired .. then the German would rely on artillery to blanket the field and cover them to next fall back position. That was what the war on the western front and Italy really was.... At least the Japanese stood and fought when cornerd on each island.
Never once did the Germans win a battle.... They only fell back and back further.. I see nothing about them that makes them super warriors, they only beat up on the innocent and the weak other nations.
@@dhardy6654 I think you are completely wrong, the German stood and fought the majority of the time against the Western Allies and there are many Veterans that talk about this. There were many cases later on in which the Germans would surrender in larger numbers but this does not suddenly mean that the Germans never put of a fight against the Western Troops they fought. The Germans would fall back against the Americans so much because of the American ability to completely and utterly dominate an area with superior volume of Artillery fire and Air power, couple this with the fact that the Western Allies rarely faced the best German units. They fell back further and further because at the Operational and Strategic level that was all they were in a position to realistically do but the German units and the Soldiers within these units fought just as hard as their Allied Counterparts.
@@dhardy6654Comically bad take.
@@DPRK_Best_Korea try fighting us Marines.
@@dhardy6654 No one comes out of a scuffle with crayon-eaters unscathed, everyone knows that.
I believe the comparison needs to be done at the Company level. Most nations held their machine-guns in dedicated squads/platoons not in the standard infantry squad like the Germans.
Comparing standard squads misses this firepower and gives an inaccurate impression of overwhelming advantage laying with the Germans.
Yes.
But then you can get away with reductionism such as - german soldier was mediocre, he just happened to have better gun out of blue.
As I have said before, the small arms equivalent of “amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.” is “amateurs talk rate of fire, professionals study ammunition supply.” Section level tactics emphasise controlling the section's fire, i.e. not everybody shoots at once in order to conserve ammunition. If your section is backed by a good logistics system to keep them supplied, they can fire more. The US probably had the best logistics and the Soviets the worst, however circumstances vary.
Looking at your rates of fire from automatic weapons your numbers seem a bit odd. You have SMG gunners firing 6 magazines a minute, but the Bren can only fire 4 despite having an assistant and a convenient top mounted magazine. While the BAR only manages 3. Note cyclic rate is virtually irrelevant, the important times are changing the magazines and selecting targets. I suspect the Bren is the realistic number and the SMG are likely to be 3 magazines a minute, like the BAR.
You also need to look at the number of magazines, the MP40 issue is 6 magazines, so even if he could fire all 6 in the first minute he would then have a long pause while he reloaded the magazines. Conversely the Bren and BAR would have a large number.
While an MG42 could fire 500 rpm if it had enough ammunition and long enough belts and the gunner was not spending any time selecting targets. Using 50 round belts one would be struggling to manage 10 belt changes. Also firing at that rate the barrel would overheat in the first minute, requiring a barrel change, assuming they are carrying a spare.
Overall you would be better looking at how much ammunition the section carries, that how fast it could fire it, if it were crazy enough.
Thank you for pointing this out as it was something that stood out immediately that should be elaborated on.
plus, a US squad would just make contact and then call in stupendous amounts of artillery and air support
Fairly safe to assume that the MG42 team would have a spare barrel. In terms of changing belts, no, they wouldn't have. The no2 on the gun would just progressively link them all together. I always thought the cyclic rate of fire for the MG42 was 1200 RPM, though in practice that would never be achieved due to the barrel change requirement. Having changed a barrel or two in my time I can tell anyone reading it is a bitch of a job often leaving the person doing it with burnt hands despite the protective issued glove.
@@martyreinhold4927 yeah every 200 rnds you had to change the barrel due to massive heating issues alot of people fail to take this into consideration.
@@martyreinhold4927 That is the benefit of continuous nondisingrating belts, usually to the ksp58 it was 250 rounds per box belted. As someone calculated long time agoo 1 in 50 000 rounds was deliberately aimed at an enemy. The rest was sent in the way where the enemy was known to bee. Suppressing so that the guys with rifle could advance into grenade distance. The Russians fought from mid 41 the English from sept 39 the US from 43 in the ETO. North Africa US from november 42, English from 40. From sept 1939 until Januari 1942 the US could study all the fifgting in Europe and North Africa and the gear up. Then with a head start of preparing in peace, the would go to war, with all their might.
Firstly, great channel and I enjoy your content immensely. However, I do have some feedback for this video based on my own research and experiences working with rifles, rifle squads and machine guns both recreationally and as a US Marine.
1. Rates of fire for squad leaders shouldn't count. The squad leader of any squad is using his weapon only when personally required to such as during the final stages of an assault, or in self defense. At all other times his role is to direct the fire of the squad. This is why the squad leader is usually armed with a submachine gun. It is handier and more compact which allows the leader to be more mobile running around and directing the actions of his squad. Submachine guns are also ideal for close-in work such as self defense and in the final stages of an assault or defense where the squad leader is most likely to be needing to personally engage the enemy. It's a win-win, since the leader has the worst weapon for long range, but is expected to be directing fire and maneuver when the squad is engaged at longer ranges (ranges greater than 100 yards/meters) and has the best weapon for close range when he is actually going to use it.
1b. US Army squad leaders would've carried an M1 rifle, not a submachine gun. US Marines were different during different times in the war, but still usually would've also had an M1 rifle by the mid-late war period.
2. Rate of fire values for the bolt action and semi-automatic rifles seems reasonable, but the values for the light machine guns and automatic rifles is all over the place. From a practical use perspective, rate of fire of a support weapon is a function of how fast the gun actually fires, how easy it is to reload, how much ammunition is available and how often the weapon needs to have it's barrel changed due to overheating.
2b. Guns don't exactly jam when they overheat like they do in some video games, but they do tend to destroy their barrel by basically melting it. After a certain point the barrel will no longer shoot anywhere near the point of aim and eventually warp so badly that it won't shoot any kind of a group at all and becomes only as accurate as a smooth bore musket.
2c. Cyclic rate of fire, rapid rate of fire and sustained rate of fire are often confused, and lead to many contradictions. The short version of the story is, that although different automatic weapons have different cyclic rates of fire (how many rounds per minute the gun could theoretically fire if it were fired in one long, uninterrupted burst for 60 seconds) the practical sustained rate of fire is usually around 100 rounds per minute and the practical rapid rate of fire is around 200 rounds per minute. Basically, the faster the cyclic rate of fire is, the more time you end up wasting letting the gun cool off, change barrels and spend reloading. This is why after WWII, most light/medium/general purpose machine guns have a cyclic rate of fire between 500 and 700 rounds per minute.
3. Doctrinally the US had a very different view on how to arm a rifle squad and stand out as different than all other squads of the era. A standard squad of the era is a gun team that the squad is based around while the US had a flipped approach where the rifle was the focus and had an automatic rifle in the team in order to give the squad a bit of a boost in firepower, without limiting mobility. The debate on this is still a hot topic for a lot of people, but considering how little each warring nation actually changed their rifle squads during the war, it is safe to say that each side was more or less satisfied with their performance.
Conclusions:
Under most circumstances each squad had fairly even performance, with the best "standard squad" being a tie between the British and the Germans, where it mostly came down to a duel between the BREN and the MG34 or MG42, with the British riflemen having a slightly better rifle and the Germans a slightly better light machine gun. The US squad was at least equally as effective as the British and German squads, but isn't as easy to compare because it was fundamentally different in design and purpose. The Soviets are unfortunately the losers having the worst rifle and worst light machine gun. The M91/30 Mosin-Nagant is easily the worst bolt action rifle of the main powers due to it's sticky action and the DP-28 is about on par with the US BAR since both suffer from not having a quick change barrel, which limits the time that a rapid rate of fire can be sustained.
Below are my estimates of more realistic rates of fire for individual weapons.
All Submachine Guns NA (see point 1)
US BAR 100 rpm
M1 Rifle 30 rpm
German MG34 or MG42 200 rpm
German Kar98k 10 rpm
British BREN 150 rpm
British Lee-Enfield 15 rpm (No1MkIII or No4MkI)
Soviet DP-28 100 rpm
Soviet M91/30 Mosin-Nagant 10 rpm
Keep up the great work on the channel and don't take this as an attack on yourself or your work. I invite you to visit me in the US someday ( Fall of 2022 when I get back from Okinawa? :) ) and we can go shooting from my collection and you can get some hands on time with some historical firearms.
I'll even pay for all your ammo. ;)
Agreed on all counts!
If you take the German squad leader out of the equation, the German's realistic rate of fire drops to about 240 rounds a minute (appx. 100 from the rifles and 150 from the LMG)
Contrast that with a full-strength U.S. Army rifle squad with 480 rounds a minute for the Americans (330 from the rifles, 150 from the BAR). Even if you have the two grenadiers firing grenades, the Americans still come out ahead (and they have grenades coming down, too).
The German system has some real advantages, but the German edge in ROF is often significantly overstated.
Flashback History
What is also often understated, and even harder to measure, is the spread out nature of fire from a US style squad vs a standard style light machinegun centric squad. Once the location of the light machinegun is known, fire can be focused on it, neutralizing it or forcing it to cease fire and reposition. This decentralization of firepower means that a squad with two light machineguns is more than twice as effective as a squad with only a single machinegun. This same principle applies to a squad with lots of fast firing rifles. A US squad is hurt less by losing its BAR compared to any other light machinegun focused squad because of its decentralized nature.
Perhaps the most important factor in a realistic rate of fire is ammunition expenditure. A German squad only carries around 900-1000 rounds of ammunition for the MG34/MG42, so the rate of fire MUST be limited to the rapid rate of about 200 rpm or else you will simply run out of ammunition.
@@jonathanbirkeland1085 And a good chunk of those 900-1,000 rounds weren't always accessible either. According to the wartime publication, "The German Squad in Combat" (Jan 1943), German MG teams held back 200-250 rounds as a reserve for "as long as possible."
@@flashbackhistory8989 And a barrel change of an MG34 or 42 with a hot barrel requires the donning of a large asbestos glove and, in the case of the 34, a lot of moving around as the barrel comes out of the gun towards where the gunner is laid down. The BREN guns barrel is a work of genius in comparison and can be done in seconds.
I am sure Lindybeige would love this video.
Spandau!
You forgot the .30 and .50 cal Brownings...which the axis had no equal..ask Audey Murphy..he got his medal of honor by obliterating 37 nazis with 1 by himself..look it up
A few things:
1) According to 1942-44 TO&Es the squad leader was assigned an M1.
2) Maybe this goes into your next video, but training and doctrine was greatly different, at least between the US and German squad. Paul Melody's "The American and German Infantry Battalion" (which you can probably find on-line) details the major differences between the US and German doctrine, both in the offense and defense. It's a good two hundred pages so even a brief outline would be impossible here. But one this that is of note is that in the attack, the German assault element did not try and achieve fire superiority over the objective, that was, by doctrine the job of the next higher echelon. So, in the case of a German "Gruppe" assaulting an objective the German squad would not fire until the last phase of the assault, infiltrating forward, using cover and concealment and attempting to remain invisible until being within rushing distance. And, only opening fire when absolutely necessary. Fire suppression of the objective would be from the machine guns of the platoon and/or heavy machine guns of the company, and other support weapons of the next higher echelon. A continuous advance was accomplished by alternate bounding of smaller units (squads, platoons, or companies) always relying on the next higher echelon to provide fire suppression to cover the bounds. So, while the German squad could produce a massive amount of firepower, due to the enormous ammunition appetite of the squad's machine gun, this firepower was withheld until the last minute of the attack.
US doctrine had the squad provide its own fire support and was assisted by higher echelon weapons, not dependent on them. The squad, divided into an A team and a B team, with each team bounding forward until covering fire from the other team, but theoretically keeping up continuous fire all the while.
Each of these doctrines have their strengths and weaknesses. Further, the doctrine is designed around the weapons available, to make maximum effect possible.
Just counting the number of bullets that could be sent down range is very misleading. The rifleman (all nations) carried about 100 rounds per man, and if each German squadmember carried a 50 round Gurtttrommel (a full 300 round box would make using the rifle impossible), the maximum length of time they could shoot that theoretical 900 rounds per minutes would be two minutes, nine seconds (the total practical ammo load would be around 250 rounds for the MG by the riflemen, and 1200 rounds from the MG assistantsin two 300 round boxes, 50 rounds for the MG gunner, one Gurttrommel, plus 90 each rifleman: total 1950 rounds). Similar firing times can be calculated for the thr US, British and Soviet Squads, and are also in the two to three minute range. A squad attack, or defense, is going to last longer than two to three minutes...
There may be a tangible advantage to having a more evenly distributed firepower, a-la US platoon or SMG squads. Having 90% of firepower in the hands of a single man leads to obvious risks (may explain a sniper soldier in British sections - he would almost certainly be aiming to knock out the German MG).
I think the gradual Soviet transition to increasing more submachineguns for its infantry makes a lot of sense once the Soviets gained the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. Oftentimes, the Soviets faced the unenvious task of overcoming German defensive lines and strongpoints. Of course, the Soviets tried to neutralize them as best as they could with artillery barrages. However, once the artillery barrages were lifted, surviving German troops returned to their positions which posed a major dilemma. The Soviets partially compensated by designating lanes for infantry assault while artillery barrage was still ongoing, creating an illusion that the Soviet artillery offensive was still in session, but in reality, the Soviet infantry assault had begun. Now, the Soviet infantry faced two tasks: (1) advance to German positions as quickly as possible; (2) neutralize surviving Germans in close range, in which submachineguns were well-suited for this purpose.
Also an often overlooked fact is that the Soviets had to fight through much more numerous and bigger cities than other Allies. Thus the need for individual firepower was much larger.
I wonder what the German fire rate would be if the whole squad was issued with StG 44's as well as their machine guns. That would truly be a frightening amount of accurate firepower to face. But I also accept that the StG 44 was not produced in sufficient numbers to be really factored in during an average squad engagement.
There were whole regiments and battalions armed exclusively with stg-44. And there were some elite ss panzergrenadier units armed with stgs and 3 mg-42s per squad. Didn't help them much
@@tedarcher9120 Those guns wouldnt have turned the tide but I am just curious if it increased the effectiveness of German squads at all.
It probably would have made a difference in an assault, similar to how the Red Army used units equipped with the PPSh to make the final push into an enemy position. Or in an FPF situation in the defense where the increased rate could be used to suppress an enemy wave. Not sure how it would have changed their overall tactics though - the US Army was already using semi-auto rifles with higher rates of fire and it didn't seem to revolutionize anything - not the way widespread issue of M16/AK47 type rifles did in the following decades.
There actually were a couple of experimental squads formations that outfitted most if not all of their rifleman with StG 44s in both Russia and on the Western Front during Market Garden. You're right that the StG 44 saw only limited production due to it being sort of kept secret from Hitler and being introduced in the middle of the war(if you're counting the MKb42 in this as well). These units reported on the effectiveness and while of course it's not surprising to note how much better the StG 44 is than your typical bolt action rifle in terms of fire power, one facet of the latter - which might not necessarily get the most attention in modern times anymore - is that it's actually physical "labour" to work the bolt and to feed the clips into the weapon when reloading. This screws up your point of aim and/or your rifle's resting position, it takes time to properly shoulder the weapon again when cycling, you'll become noticeably more fatigued in prolonged firefights and so on. The StG eliminates all of that and works as an SMG, a personal LMG and - since typical engagement ranges were under 300-400m - as a semi automatic rifle in one package.
To paraphrase the findings of these squads:
"When on the offense, the StG allows a single rifleman to continue giving suppressive pretty much by himself without worry," - since he has rounds to spare in each magazine and doesn't need to work the bolt after every shot.
"which allows other men to continue advancing closer and closer onto the enemy." - which is where the weapon severely outperforms a bolt action rifle. Though to be fair, back then assaults were conducted with the weapon you had, regardless of whether or not it was a bolt action, an SMG or a spade.
@@FrontlinerCdV Thanks for the comment, that is very interesting to know, especially about bolt-action fatigue. The Russians definitely knew of how effective the StG was, hence why they quickly decided to make an assault rifle of their own. Whereas NATO decided to go with semi automatic rifles instead.
Excellent presentation/comparison.......interesting/thought provoking as hell. Great work.
There are some considerations to be made which was not explored in a video:
1) Range. Rifle fire can effectively suppress targets who are farther away than a sub-machine gun. Sub-machine guns were good at few hundred meters only. The major strength of machine gun is it being able to suppress enemies at greater ranges than normal weaponary.
2) Firepower comparison is quite useless. In all these comparisons Germans come out of top solely on a basis of their machine gun and not firepower of the rest of their squad.
3) Such firepower calculations based on rate of fire are meaningless. They do not show effective firepower, this number is only good at determining how potentially good one squad was supressing the other.
4) Ammo concerns. MG machine guns might have vastly superior fire rate, however that might not be the optimal machine gun for German troops on the eastern front. Machine gun demanded massive quantities of ammunition and had logistically burdened entire network and most importantly, people on foot. If fire rate was everything, squads could had easily achieved thousands RPM across the board.
5) Machine guns were great at suppressing enemy infantry, but higher rate of fire means that machine gun will be running lower on ammunition. This in return means that MG is likely to be firing less overall than other machine guns due to this reason, bringing its RPM due to logistical attrition.
In general, soldiers at that time needed to have gun shields. That would had enabled riflemen to return fire under suppressive fire and it would ''entrench'' machine gunner.
Battles between infantry only took place at a few hundred yards. With an iron sighted rifle, which in most cases would have been a bolt action rifle, good luck hitting moving targets past 200 meters. At distanced past 300 meters, good luck even seeing the enemy if they're trying to conceal themselves.
@@LUR1FAX Not true, you are speaking about a fact which describes most frequent ranges for battles. This discovery however did appeared until after WW2. Furthermore, it is not just sights problem, smgs and assault rifles simply do not perform well at long ranges as rifles.
The m1 carbine was also a common weapon on the front lines in the American military, and was actually produced more than the garand. From what I’ve heard anecdotally it was fairly common for soldiers to trade their rifles for carbines. It would provide a significantly higher rate of fire than the Garand.
It would be interesting to know how this changed with the introduction of the StG 44
I was thinking the same thing. Although it came late in the war. If it was in soldiers hands in 1942 things would have been interesting
The Stg44 was never available in sufficient numbers to replace the 98k and neither was the needed ammunition for it. Remember that by the time that the Stg44 emerged (Having fought Hitler's aversion of it all the way.) Germany was already on the backfoot and lost its air superiority. This meant that their already shoddy state of logistics was subject to further attrition and decay ,even when their logistic depth (distance) grew shorter.
@@fko1 Granted. My question was indeed more theoretical. IIrc Hitler didn´t like the idea of giving up the K98 although the soldiers liked the gun a lot. And for sure this gun had a huge impact. But I´m not sure if the reason for this was the rate of fire (according to wiki 500-600 rpm). My thought it was the flexibilty and it fitted well for most purposes.
@@Centurion101B3C You´re completely right. I rather wanted to know (more theoretically) if the introduction was more of an evolution or revolution in group firepower
@@Bambor Well, history answered that question, now didn't it? The post WWII explosion of development into assault-weapons with or without intermediate ammunition etc. and the settlement into ammunition-standardization (eventually, mind you!). The Soviet bloc (and their clients) got the SKS and AKM, The Western world (Minus the US) got the FAL (Yay! Right arm of the Free World.) . Ammunition got standardized into NATO and WP standards and all was well up until the end of the Cold War. We prolly overshot with going .223 as the 'new' standard, so now we'll be navigating back to 6.8mm before we'll eventually returning to something around 7.62 which seems to be the sweet spot for impact and range.
A word about Sub-machine guns. The Thompson came in three iterations. The 50 rd drum, used briefly at the start of the wear, was usually only issued with 2 drums, so 100 RPM. The 20 rd magazine came with a 5 mag pouch, for a total of 100-120 rds, depending on if an extra mag was carried in the gun.. Sometimes you can see an airborne soldier carrying two such pouches. The later 30 rd mags came with a single pouch holding 3 mags. That is also 90-120 rounds depending on a 4th mag being carried in the weapon. A second pouch is rarely seen in photographs, and may not have been issued.
The STEN had 30 rd mags, but no special mag pouches were developed until late in the war, a 7 mag shoulder bandoleer, most commonly seen carried by Airborne troops. This gives a max of 210 RPM. The 37 pattern pouches wouldn't close properly when using the STEN mags, which is why the Thompson with 20 rd mags were preferred (About 6 20-rd mags could be stuffed into the 37 pat pouch, 180 rpm). Since one pouch was always carrying spare Bren mags, this left 4 mags sticking out of the other 37 pat pouch, 5 if an extra was kept in the weapon. ROF 120-150 RPM.
The Thompson was seldom used by Commonwealth forces outside of Italy. When the 1st Canadian Corp was transferred to Northwest Europe, they complained about having to give up their Thompsons for the hated STEN, but they had no choice as there was no provision made for supplying 45 cal ammo.
The Russian PPsH was only produced with 2 drums per weapon. The Germans who captured them noted that you just couldn't pick up any spare drum you came across and expect it you work without modifications, something an armourer would usually have to perform. As these drums were slow and clumsy to reload, this effectively limited their ROF to 140 RPM.
The Germans were issued 6 mags in two 3-mag pouches, so 180 RPM is correct.
You should do more videos on the pacific, I’d like to see a video like this but pacific based comparing USMC, Australian and Japanese squad fire power
Indeed, "Japanese Platoon in Defence, Bulletin 182-45" is a good read about that.
One factor not mentioned was effective range of the squad weapons. At best, the SMG was good for 100 meters--but usually around half of that. The light machine gun had the best range. Rifle fire slows down as range increases. So if the fire fight took place at 150 meters, soldiers armed with submachine guns are hosed by light machine gun teams before they can effectively sprinkle the LMG positions with pistol bullets.
also the abysmal quality of the Breda 30 was one of the cause of the italian army poor performance
Was it?
I think 500 rounds per minute for the MG42 is a bit optimistic. Yes, it had a stupidly high cyclic rate. But in its light machinegun configuration (which it would be in while supporting a regular rifle squad) it ammunition comes in 50 round units. It takes time to change out the belt on a belt fed weapon, longer than it takes to swap out a magazine. In order to fire 500 rounds in a minute they would have to load and fire a new 50 round belt every six seconds. That means they aren't firing in bursts, but expending all 50 rounds in a continuous 2 second stream (assuming a cyclic rate of 1500rpm), then speed loading the next belt in 4 seconds flat, then expending another 50 round belt in another 2 seconds. Somehow going through ten 50 round belts in a minute without melting all of their barrels.
500 rounds may be about right for the MG42 in its heavy machinegun configuration (mounted on a tripod, with the belt held in a 250 round box, and with a whopping six spare barrels on hand (meaning that you can afford to overheat each barrel much faster, since it will take longer to cycle back to the first barrel)). But for an MG42 in the LMG configuration (mounted on a bipod with the belt held in a 50 round drum attached to the gun) I think about 200 rounds in a minute might be more realistic. I vaguely recall a source somewhere suggesting 250 rounds in a minute as the practical rate of fire for an MG42 in an LMG configuration, which passes a sanity check. 250 rounds would mean going through each 50 round drum in about 12 seconds. If we assume half of that is firing and half of that is loading we get a much more reasonable 6 seconds to open the feed tray, detach the old drum, attach the new drum, pull the new belt into the feed tray, close the feed tray, and charge the bolt. And you expend each 50 round drum in a more reasonable 6 seconds (firing bursts rather than a continuous stream). 250 rounds per minute still doesn't leave much time for barrel changes, so I still think 200 rounds is probably more practical.
Having seen British, American, and German infantry firepower for myself in simulated combat (Combat Mission series) I have my own opinions on them. The British are definitely at the bottom of the firepower ladder here. The MG42 clearly has more firepower than the Bren, and the marginal superiority of the SMLE over the Kar98k is not enough to make up the difference. But they aren't at the full 1:2 disadvantage you estimated here. The Bren makes up some of its disadvantage in sheer rate of fire by being able to keep up a more continuous and sustained fire (magazine swaps (especially with the assistant gunner helping) are much faster than replacing belts, and the slower rate of fire doesn't overheat the barrel as quickly, meaning there are fewer barrel changes (overall there are just fewer and shorter interruptions in the fire)). It is possible for the British to gain the upper hand with sound tactics and by concentrating two or more Brens on each MG42. In practical terms I'd say that the German infantry squad is only perhaps 20% to 30% better than the British infantry squad.
I have to put the Germans in the middle. The German infantry squad is certainly more powerful than the British infantry squad, but it doesn't feel as powerful as the American infantry squad. The issue for them is that all of that firepower is concentrated in a single weapon. If the machinegun is in a bad position, that compromises the effectiveness of the entire squad. When the machinegun needs to move, the entire squad is effectively out of the fight until it reaches its new position. If the machinegunner gets hit, the entire squad is rendered combat ineffective unless/until someone is able to retrieve the machinegun. The machinegun is a single point of failure for the Germans that makes their squad less flexible and more brittle overall.
I really have to put the American squad on top. I think the overall firepower of a German and American squad may be about the same. I can't quite tell if the American squad as slightly more firepower overall, or if the German squad has slightly more firepower overall (yes the Germans are probably firing a greater number of bullets per minute, but one bullet from a rifle seems to be worth more than one bullet from a machinegun). But since the American firepower is (mostly) evenly distributed among the riflemen, there is no single point of failure like on the German squad. No single casualty can render the squad combat ineffective. Any part of the squad has enough firepower to transition smoothly from being a maneuver element to being a base of fire. Overall, it is just more flexible and resilient than the German squad. And frankly, it's pretty hard to argue with universally issued semi-automatic rifles in an era in which most armies are still equipped with bolt-action rifles.
Again though, I think the American squad's advantage is marginal. It is probably only about 10-20% better than the German squad. Overall I think the three armies are a more or less even match for each other in terms of equipment. If the Germans had a significant advantage, it was in the fact that they were on the defensive on most fronts by the time American troops get stuck in.
Edit: Oh yes, and I have to call out the American airborne infantry squad as probably being the most powerful in the world. On top of having universal semi-automatic rifles like the regular infantry, they also had a decent light machinegun at the squad level in the M1919. The M1919 may not quite be the equal to the MG42, but it closes the gap in automatic firepower by enough that the semi-automatic firepower of the M1 Garand has a very easy time pushing the US airborne infantry squad over the threshold of having far more firepower than any other infantry squad in the world. The late-war Marine infantry squad, with three BARs to a squad, is also pretty damn powerful. A single BAR provides pretty meager firepower compared to either the Bren or MG42. But three BARs is much more intimidating.
I totally agree. And US Marine Corps 13 man 1944-45 squads had 3 BAR teams to make them number one in average firepower during WWII.
RPM is a statistic that is overrated. More importantly, what is the sustained fire duration an MG can do before overheating? That's a stat that the soldiers need to know.
Or for how long can a squad lay suppressive fire on an enemy
This is true. I trained on the M60 in the US Army, and even though it was sometimes issued with an extra barrel to be switched out for sustained fire, the way we were taught was to fire short bursts with a pause in between in order to not overheat it in the first place. You can't just lean on the trigger the whole time or you'll have an inoperative MG in about a minute.
Appx. 250 rounds for the MG 34/42, but this could be pushed to 400 rounds in emergencies. For perspective, that's 5 to 8 50-round belts and 1.5 to 2.5 minutes of firing (at the typical 150 rpm ROF) before a barrel change was required.
@@flashbackhistory8989 did german squads carry spare barrels while advancing or were they left behind to save weight?
@@tedarcher9120 They always had at least two barrels with them. And during defensive operations even more since those wouldn't need to be hauled.
AWESOME video 👍 👍 👍 👍
Fascinating info.
I once read in one of russian articles, that machine gun was the cornerstone of a German squad, because nothing could compete with German MGs. Unfortunately, i can't remember the article's name or author.
finally some tactical stuff! don´t get me wrong, the logistical, economic and political aspects of war are interesting and extremely important, but after dealing all day with that stuff at work, I do prefer some tank and infantry talk.
of course, the Battlestorm ones are simply a masterpiece. keep up the good work!
greetings from Berlin
Yeah I don't think you can just say that one guy with a submachine gun has the firepower of 18 men with rifles. In practice things simply don't work like that.
Really like this. You should do a grand serial on this. From squad to division! Must be epic!
It's hard to add the squad leaders SMG into the mix as he is usually doing his job of leading. And being a close support weapon it would only come into play in situations of close combat. Also, what about the firepower of rifle grenades?
Yeah. The SMGs probably shouldn't be factored in for anything over 100 yards.
The US used rifle grenades extensively. And the British had a mortar organic to their platoon.
I believe the US had two grenade rifles per squad
TIK, not sure where you're getting your numbers, MP-38/40= 500 rpm, Sten= 500-600 rpm, Thompson M1= 700-800 rpm
the fire potential of a squad is an interesting, but meaningless topic on its own. the practical challenge presented to a squad with more than half its firepower in one weapon is the effect of any stoppage, movement, or enemy movement out of the MG field of fire. the german squad is at a major disadvantage when facing a mobile enemy.
your point of movement fails to take into account there are never just 1 squad in the field, and thus isn't really relavent for 90% of engagements as moveing out of 1 field of fire will put you into another.
what is more important is stoppages and suppression/killing of the gunner's position.
and the MG42 is described as "supremely reliable", there is a reason a relatively minor modification is still being used by the germans (the MG3, which while in the process of being replaced is still in service. replacement only started 2015). meaning suppression is the main issue.
Excellent analysis.
Seems like belt-fed light machine guns (BF LMG) and submachine guns (SMG) give the best "bang for your buck".
The Soviets used submachine guns much more, overall about 8x as much as the Germans (less than 1 million MP40 submachine guns vs 6 million PPSh-41 + 2 million PPS-43), entire companies of SMG armed infantry were common. If they could get within effective range then multiple SMGs would massively overwhelm the Germans, it's hard to easily tell what the effective range was but the 7.62x25mm round shot by the PPSh-41 and PPS-43 would transition from supersonic to subsonic at around 150m, generally when bullets go "transonic" their accuracy gets exponentially worse and the "suppression effect" drops off like a cliff as the bullets are no longer crack overhead.
But how much of a downside is this when considering other factors such as artillery.
Artillery wasn't that accurate in WW2 but much beyond 150m was enough clearance to call in a very heavy bombardment without exposing your own (dug in) position to friendly fire. So even if you could fight from 200-300m away, would you want to? If you got into a firefight at 300m then so what if you win the firefight forcing the enemy to duck into cover? They will have called in an artillery bombardment on you, you need to get too close for them to use their artillery.
I remember reading accounts from US soldiers in the Battle of Ia Drang how they saw North Vietnamese infantry sprinting towards them with their Kalashnikov rifles slung over their backs as he shot at them, he wondered why they weren't returning fire when in hindsight they were trying to get as close to the American forces as possible so they were too close for artillery to be useful. The AK rifle and variants were all quite effective at 300m but if they stopped when the took fire at around 300m to return fire then they'd be annihilated by artillery. So maybe submachine guns are the right choice if you don't have artillery supremacy but if you do have responsive artillery it's better to pin down the enemy at long range then pour in the shells and mortar bombs.
Interesting idea, but that's not how smg companies were usually employed
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь How were they used? I didn't say much about how exactly they were used except that they were used at closer range.
Their mortars can be a sufficient substitute for small arms fire in suppressing the enemy to allow maneuver.
I think the Soviets were ahead of the curve with their very heavy use of mortar companies. When the British finally replaced their heavy machine guns (Vickers type) after the war they replaced the .303 machine guns with 81mm mortars filling essentially the same role.
Those heavy machine guns were being used in full defilade anyway, mortars are cheaper in every way and have greater suppression effect for a given weight of materiel.
I think the only way that the Soviets were really lacking in the final stages of WW2 was a really robust fire control infrastructure for their artillery. But if you're on the offensive and stick to a plan then you can make the best use of what you've got. It helped that the Germans were starved of fuel so they were hardly moving around constantly, you had a long time to locate German positions and send runners to plan and coordinate combined arms attacks.
@@Treblaine basically, in an offence submachine gunners infiltrated close to enemy positions prior to the main attack, not just charge MGs straight through like poor vietnamese had to do in fear of long range fires. There is a really good video about soviet submachine gun units: ruclips.net/video/jSiTohahL7k/видео.html
@@Treblaine and on artillery. Germans wasn't moving all the time even then they got enough fuel, as the bulk of their divisions were infantry divisions. By that time digging trenches was the thing (even nowadays that's the thing in local conflicts). Plus, runners were rarely employed for coordination with artillery. If artillery lacked intelligence and radio link with forward troops they either estimated the probable position of enemy forces using maps (as defence lines are usually tied to terrain features and infrastructure) or just keep pace with advancing forces to have a direct line of sight from CP at the enemy, keep a telephone line communication with friendly forces or at least use flare signals to communicate with a combined arms commander (in the latter case it would look like 'one green and one red means enemy at reference point 1' and so on). That's true for tactical scope of things, up to battalion or may be regiment artillery group level. In case of divisional or higher echelon artillery, artillery commander would have a radio or telephone link with at least some forward observers, direct or via friendly forces CP in the area.
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь That is NOT what I remotely implied.
All I said was the NVA would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid getting into long range firefights even though they were armed with an AK-rifle variant which certainly had the effective range.
Just because they had to make a dangerous dash doesn't mean they DIDN'T use infiltration tactics.
The NVA certainly did use infiltration tactics but that doesn't illustrate the importance getting close. This running towards riflemen was not part of the plan, they were caught out by the US soldiers advancing to an unexpected position... but it was still better to charge than stand and fight.
If those NVA soldiers had done as was expected and responded to single rifleman by stopping to get into a firefight then they'd be at far greater risk from artillery. They weren't charging a machine gun, you can't charge a machine gun.
As it was the NVA ground forces did exceptionally well, only ever fighting the Americans at very close range despite having weapons of theoretically far greater range. This paid off by greatly mitigating the US advantage in artillery.
The battle was won by the Americans from other factors, for starters the Americans were trapped a cornered tiger is far more dangerous than one that tries to flee. Also the Americans had air power which could carpet bomb such huge areas that you just couldn't out maneuver it.
I'm just pleased you used the correct name for the Papasha
Excellent Research “TIK” “ignore the grandstanders” Lol 😂
US BAR assistant had and used his M1, US soldiers were taught and could pick out individual targets. Suppressing fire was done as area fire. So that should be discussed in tactics.
It is worth noting that British sections were extremely adaptable because of the BREN gun (although the adoption at section level of the GPMG shows that belt-fed wins out), which is able to be deployed and sustained in the main line of the attack. This was good in close combat like in Normandy, but not enough to offset the advantage that a belt-fed GPMG could provide in prepared areas.
500 rounds doesn't seem reasonable accounting for overheating at such a rate. Practical rate would be about 150, 3 round drums per minute
Maybe a constant 500 rpm is a bit over the top for sustained fire, but they could (relatively quickly) change the barrels on the Bren and the MG34/42, so either way, it was high. And every side would suffer from overheating weapons, meaning that the overall firepower of a German Gruppe would still be higher than a British section, or American or Soviets squads
Yeah, those barrels wouldnt be happy keeping that r.o.f prolonged.
I presume the truth is alike today as in WW2, the machine-guns lead the infantry battle, the rest is personal safety weaponry. Air support and artillery does the trick, the rest is close up clearing and you "rpm" wont matter if your command chain doesnt work. German infantry tactics is still used today, fast order chains and initiative wins the battle.
@@zaccoste8510 depends on the unit and army of course.
Anyone know the standard number of spare barrels a german squad carried around in pictures you usually only see like 1 or 2 at max on the back of the mg gunner
@@TheImperatorKnight 150 is still higher than 112 or 80 of british and russians, but your 500 figure is completely ludicrous
According to Weale in his book on the British Free Corps…the small unit was entirely equipped with STG 44s…a seemingly clear indication of trying to maximise such a small unit’s firepower.
From a few sources I’ve picked up the standard British 10 man Section that saw combat throughout the war (8 on the book 10 in practicality) was:
Corporal (Squad Leader): armed with a Rifle (39-early/mid 41 - pretty much around the battle of France and some early fighting in Africa) or a SMG (early/mid war you’d see British Squad Leaders use Thompson machine guns, however late war you’d see said replaced with the Sten instead)
Lance Corporal (Squad 2ic): armed with a Rifle through the war however depending on squads and their veterancy and experience throughly the war you’d see the 2ic potentially armed with a SMG as well.
Bren Gunner (Bren Team) - primary gunner for the Bren Gun, trained to fire the weapon a single round at a time - the practicality in this was 1. Ammo conservation (you may have a squads worth of ammo but unknown logistics may prove worse as such you don’t want to be nicking your mates rifle ammo after you burned through all your magazines - to those unaware the Lee and Bren used the same round meaning a rifle could legitimately give up a clip of his own ammo to be fed into a Bren magazine). 2. Accuracy - the Bren was designed to be an accurate and precise weapon, not to be sprayed but used to plink away at an enemy (it’s the old common question what’s more scary, seeing everywhere around you being sprayed with bullets or having them accurately chipping away at the position you just were.) 3. Disguise the weapon as a rifle - it was saw as a valuable trick for a British squad to slowly plink away at ones enemy with what seemed accurate rifle fire, however in times where an enemy would feel confident to attack or exploit what seemed a weakness in firepower by charging or getting close to use more deadly close quarter weapons such as grenades or submachine guns, the Bren could open up with full automatic fire and surprise/drive off an enemy. How practical this was varies heavily depending on sources and shooters.
Besides single round shooting Bren Gunners also taught to shoot in burst and with full auto mag dumps. Rare to do because ammo but did prove useful for elements being attacked vs attacking.
Bren Assistant (Loader) - would reload the weapon and carry a full bag of spare magazines. However was trained just as equally as a Rifleman.
Bren 2nd Assistant (Loader/Spotter) - the 2nd Bren assistant would also carry a bag ammo for the Bren gun. During combat they would act as a spotter for the weapon helping to direct fire towards targets as well as acting as a secondary loader - 2 notes. Both loaders were trained to spot and load (in actuality every member of a British section was trained to fire and reload a Bren as either a single gunner or as part of a team - either as the gunner or loader) 2. The 2nd loader would not shove magazines in like the first instead he would be the one to remove them instead of requiring the gunner to do so. This allowed the gunner to keep in his posture and firing state the entire time without having to move to take the magazine out and slide it under him. The second loader would then keep all used magazines for use later.
Designated Marksman - while listed as a “sniper” the Designated Marksman is very different from a sniper. He was trained like a sniper to take more time with his shots and aim for important members of a German Squad such as leaders, MG gunners and Assistants or other priority targets. However, it was beyond rare to see said Marksman equipped with telescopic sights instead like everyone he’d rely on his iron sights. In function he acted as any other rifleman however if required could split off with a spare man to act as a spotter/assistant to find a nicer position to engage from and target priority enemies.
4 Riflemen - from your guess these men were all just standard riflemen. Trained with the Lee to fire accurately however with speed. One problem I do see when watching American Rifle shooters vs British or Australian or Canadian shooters (or those form other commonwealth countries who used Lee Enfields) that when shooting the American shooters will usually bob their head back when drawing the bolt back. Why is this a problem? Because the Lee Enfield was designed to not required said head motion. One can happily keep their cheek to the stock and fire, bolt, fire, bolt, fire, bolt; without having to move ones head or firing posture. This was what made British Marksmanship so accurate and deadly.
The same can be said for the Bren. American shooters will use the standard modern day leg spread and weapon to shoulder stance as if firing any other weapon. This is actually WRONG when using a Bren. To shoot a Bren one lies straight with both legs and feet together. Plant them into the ground and dig the weapon into your shoulder and surprisingly the weapon has very little kick compared to yeh modern firing positions and also improves its accuracy 10 fold.
This is something that Britain excelled in. Having strange ways to shoot, load and bolt ones weapon that actually kept the weapon accurate and gave it a surprisingly high fire rate. However, when doing such in a modern shooting style, it actually takes away from the weapon and what made it so accurate and deadly. Funny enough it’s one of those on Paper this off paper this type situations (and also a this type of style vs that older style of shooting situation).
And If you want another interesting one from Britain. You don’t bolt with your thumb and pointy finger, not your thumb, pointy and middle finger. You bolt entirely with your middle and thumb. Knock up and back with your middle and if you couldn’t do the bolt back and down with your middle you could use a thumb tho it was preferred that soldiers learn to do such entirely with their middle fingers - this is also one of the reasons the Lee didn’t require one to heavily change their firing positions, keeping the weapon on sight with ones target and allowing for shorter time between shots (not having to re aline each shot)
As for additional squad variety and members:
Grenadier - armed with the Rifle Grenade attachment, however was primarily equipped with smoke rounds over HE rounds. The reason was that it follows British battlefield doctrine of fire and manoeuvre. While one team (primarily the Bren) would engage the enemy, the rifle team would bound forward, stop and hit the deck and begin laying down their own suppressive fire. The Bren would then get up, bound forward to meet the rifle team and would the begin to repeat said process. Rifle Grenadiers just made this more practical as having a rifleman able to pop smoke for the Bren team to run through or even for his own team to move behind helped alleviate some of the fire superiority problems the Rifle Team would face.
2nd Bren Team - you’d primarily find this later into the war as more veteran division began compensating for firepower problems when facing the MG42. As such squads would equip themselves with a second Bren if possible. How did this effect the Section layout?
8 man Section - SL + 3 man Bren group. 2IC + 3 man Bren group.
10 man Section - SL + 3 man Bren group and a Rifleman. 2IC + 3 man Bren group and a Rifleman.
If you have odd number of men. Spread evenly between section teams whey spares going to the Lance Corporals section.
The machinegun, the Auftragstaktik, the leading from the front, the excellent officer corps. Also Germanic peoples are generally good soldiers. For instance the Germanic tribes that populated the region of nowadays Germany and their ancestors were never conquered until WW2.
Because everyone is just firing at max RPM at all times, without considering ammunition supplies and melting barrels.
It's not the point. The point is about who could have more volume of fire when needed
From the time I was a child and watched every “army movie” that was shown on tv, I was always interested in comparing firepower of US vs. German units in WWII. One thing I was struck by early on was that the Germans were almost always shown having more machine guns than the GI’s had. (Actually, this was true of WWI movies and books, too). This always seemed to me to be a big advantage. What I didn’t appreciate back then was that although the Americans had fewer machine guns and less mobile machine guns, this was offset by BAR’s, and having everyone else carrying semi-auto rifles and carbines.
One thing that puzzles me is that these days the BAR is not very highly regarded. My dad was in the army in Korea. He and everyone else I ever talked to who served in WWII and Korea had nothing but praise for the BAR. Yes it is heavy, yes it only has 20 round magazines, and no you can’t quick change barrels… but vets from back then never mentioned that. They loved it for its firepower.
I was told back in 1976 by someone that fought on the Eastern Front that the problem with the MG 42 was that it performed well on the range but in combat it jammed very easily. He said that the Red Army would try and mortar their positions to kick up dust to jam their guns- as well as to kill them by mortar bomb fragments. He said that they had to keep the guns under tarpaulins and hoped that the dust had settled before the Red Army had got too close- and he mentioned that despite the rate of fire, they were often going to be overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
US also used many M1 carbines that were also semi automatic and used 20 round magazines. They are also pretty darn accurate when compared to sub machine guns
I remember reading that a lot of US soldiers in WWII and Korea preferred those because they were a lot lighter and had higher rates of fire, even if the rounds weren't as effective. When the Army botched the next service rifle (the M14) they were criticized for completely ignoring that experience and going with a heavy, overpowered and almost uncontrollable (on full-auto) rifle instead of a lighter weapon.
@@Raskolnikov70 Paul Harrell has a really good video on the M1 carbine and busting its myths.
they were not frontline infantry weapons, though, so shouldn't really factor in to this equation. at best the assistant BAR gunner may have had one for emergency self defense, but in a pitched battle he's not using it, he's assisting the BAR gunner.
@@petriew2018 Audie Murphy always used an M1 carbine as a front line weapon whenever he could get his hands on one. They were intended to replace the pistol for support troops, but many front line soldiers used them.
Sorry, TIK, but I fail to understand the purpose of this video. It's kinda... well, childish maybe? Who has a bigger/better gun and similar?
I mean, in theory, you can compare different rates of fire between different weapons, but then there are so many variables which you should take into consideration when comparing fire power of average squad... and then it gets complicated, really complicated... because you should check usability of different weapons regarding to attacking or defending actions, different roles of those weapons, maneuverability of soldiers with different weapons, different ammo calibers, different needs for maintenance, different reliability/shortcomings of particular weapons, availability of ammo in different situations, precision of those weapons... the list can go on and on...
With all due respect, but this video, to put it gently, is almost a total waste of time. It's good only for mentioning organization of average squad and a bit shallow retrospective of different weapons, but we already have that explained in much greater details on some other, more specialized YT channels.
Bro love your videos. You go against what is generally accepted by many and support your claims with real sources and take a more unbiased approach between the motivations of the axis and the allies
Yugoslav partisans of course. 1 Yugoslav partisan armed with MP40 can kill, no WILL kill 1000 Germans in 5 min. NO RELOAD REQUIRED!
the bullets are just for style points.
Tito alone was capable to delete entire German brigade with his bare hands and his trusty dog... who btw was a German shepherd. :)
@@damyr brigade? Division at list! His dog Luks could handle a brigade alone!
@@connannbarbarin3033 LOL
Hey TIK. Interesting topic, interesting video. Frankly, it never occurred to me to compare the rate of fire per squad of different armies. I always thought that to be roughly on par across major armies (with Germans having a slight advantage over others (MGs, right)), and only being differently distributed within the squad. It was only after your video i have realised that the difference was substantial, and that multiple M1s or PPShs do not even nearly compensate for single MG. Though the individual numbers can be disputed (as they are) there is an indisputably clear point here. Well done!👏
The importance of MG for the German squad tactics have always been well known, now it is visually supported through numbers. I am not neglecting the tactics and training, contrary... the numbers just come on top of that.
Few points:
- Doubling the MGs. The apparent downside of German squad doctrine was that 'all the eggs were in one basket" - when MG is down the firepower is gone. Which might be the case in theory. But in practice Germans made sure to compensate for this by organising an the engagement in such way that there are always more than one MG in use. Either through 'borrowing' another MG from the neighbour squad or from the MG platoon (or from the 251/1 Halftrack). For instance, when a squad would go to rest, they would leave their MG upfront, either to be manned by one of them or to be borrowed to a squad left behind on watch duty. The same with attack, there was always a squad in reserve, but its MG was not in reserve, it was deployed from the start. This ensured that there is always more than one MG ready to spray the lead out while the other changed barrel or belt. In German army MGs never rested. This concept is not dissimilar to a bishop pair in chess, where a pair of bishops, who compensate for each others weaknesses, is much more than a sum of their individual strengths.
In one episode in Rzhev battle, when after atrocious casualties Red Army finally captured a platoon sized strong-point, they were shocked when they counted twelve MGs in their trophy count.
- Feeding the beast. In a very interesting book on comparative strengths of Wehrmacht and Red army infantry companies (cant' quote the author and exact title, the book is packed and sent back home, to make space for new books) the shocking revelation was that the Wehrmacht platoon had 3 times as many rounds with the platoon then their Red Army equivalent. whereas Red Army platoon had to rely on the supplies from the company, the Wehrmacht platoon was carrying with them the number of rounds approaching the number the Soviet company had. The reason is obvious: German squads had to feed the MG beasts. The majority of this ammo count was designated for MGs.
- PPSH rate of fire. In some Russian encyclopedias I found that the practical rpm for PPSh is even lower than what you stated, ranging from "up to 100 rpm" ( V.N.Shukov "Red Army" Harvest, Minsk, 2016, page 72) to as low as 70 rpm (Merenkov "The Weapons of GPW -75 anniversary of victory", ACE, Moscow 2019, page 43). Possibly, there were issues when reloading the drum into the PPSh.
Cheers!
Is there really anybody on earth left, who claims "superiority" in warfare is due to "race"?
Besides this there are many things to take into account: The development of selfloading rifles and assault guns, the distribution of machine-guns at the company-level and....
...the capability of moving the squats around. That's why in my opinion the American squat is far superior. All the others have the standart layout around the machine-gun. The Americans rely on selfloading rifles and assigned the machine-guns from the company-level downwards to the spots on the battlefield.
There probably are. But more to the point: what if actual soldiers believed they are better fighters due to race? Follow me...
SchutzStaffeln Totenkopf was an SS Division that fought in Barbarossa. This was a combat unit formed from members of SSTV (SS Totenkopf Verbande) which was infamous unit guarding KZLs. They were rather substandard soldier material initially, but they were mostly ideologically brainwashed and "true believers" (which was for them the faith of them being of superior race). So they fought fanatically and this had serious impact on the fighting. Of course, they were mostly wiped out - as such units tend to suffer such fate - but before that happened they really showed some zeal.
PS. It's squad, not squat. But not bothered - I tend to make grammar mistakes as well.
I advise you to read about the Soviet rifle squad before the Nazi invasion. 8 SVT -38/40, 2 submashingan PPDs, and DP. Sounds like American, doesn't it?
@@Scrap_Lootaz I am fully aware of the development of the selfloading rifles in the Red Army. However these were not in the slightest standart equipment - unlike the M1. To these terms even the G43 or the STG44 weren't. And the American Infantry-Division was fully motorised - every Division. That's the gamechanger.
@@dointh4198 , SVT was produced 1.6 million. On June 22, 1941, it was the main armament of the "Combat" units of the red army in the army was almost a million pieces. Unfortunately, the war began earlier and they did not have time to re-equip everyone.
Zulus
I always hear people (mostly Wehraboos) boast about how much of a better fighter the German soldier was despite being hopelessly outgunned and outnumbered, but on a tactical level it was usually the Germans that had these advantages. When the 29th Infantry Division (US) landed in Normandy, it was only equipped with 157 machine guns + 243 BARs, whereas the 352nd Infanterie Division (the unit tasked with containing the Omaha beachhead) had 718 machine guns + 1,500 MP40s. That gave the Germans a huge edge, especially considering that they were fighting defensively.
I think it's also worth mentioning that the biggest tactical advantage German units usually had, albeit beyond the squad level, was that their support troops (engineers, signalmen, and even artillery) were often trained to serve as infantry and were given the same kind of equipment as rifle squads. Whereas, support troops in Allied units were almost always relegated to their intended roles in rear areas. So while German troops nominally committed less men to battle than US or British units (I can't speak for the Soviets), they could very well have had an effective combat strength greater than that of an opposing Allied unit of equal or greater overall strength. Of course, this system of organization left the Wehrmacht desperately understaffed in other areas needed to support the front line infantry, but nonetheless it goes to show that the Germans weren't these cornered lions fighting off endless hordes of Allied hyenas that Wehraboos seem to imagine.
Wait wait wait. So we (Americans) didn’t send every squad with more shotguns, garands, BARs, Browning 30 cal, and Browning 50 cals than they could carry. WHAT MADNESS IS THIS!!!!!
Lovecraft “Here is your bayonet.”
“I’m a tanker, I don’t need one.”
“Here you go”
Great for reflection. Again so many variables. Training, motivation, expertise, tks TIK .
TIK if you had to go to the army where would you like to work at. Artillery, infantry tanks?
@Based & Redpilled Department Logistics are prime targets for bombing, this isn't first world war where people behind the line would be safe. In Barbarossa munition depots were prime targets for bombing and that probably affected heavily in early victories just destroy enemy logistical system and units in the front will loose relatively quickly because lack of ammunition.
Catering corps 👍
Clearly TIK would work in intelligence.
In the proxy wars we fight nowadays I say artillery is probably the safest full out war with counter artillery involved definitely not the safest
he will be the first......target....and on...
THe thing with soviet rifle squads is that they varied a lot in manpower and equipment depending on the specific year of the war. A typical squad at 1941 was better equipped in terms of weapons than another squad from 1943 (because by 1941 stuff like the SVT automatic rifle was standard issue but its production was drastically reduced in favor if the older and much simpler and cheaper Mosin). Furthermore, different squads were issued entirely different weapons for specific battles. For example for city fighting (but not only city fighting) usually the entire squad was issued with submachine guns.
Nazis fired lots of lead
Nazis had weak logistics
Nazis, all tactics and anger but no strategy or economics.
Great video! Looking forward to more videos.
Again you’ve got this narrative in your head that the Wehrmacht wasn’t a superior trained force. You then take a stance of either “you’re for or against me” . You do this by saying that anyone who claims otherwise is a proponent of the “aryan Rambo” theory . This is what spoils your videos . Again do some readings on other conflicts and you’ll see that fire power doesn’t equate to battlefield superiority. Libya had way more fire power than Chad, but was roundly defeated thanks to the latters NCOs and aggressive junior officers . The Wehrmacht was a super force not only because it had fire power but also a solid core of sergeants / corporals. Aside from the ending a good video!
Excellent observation of TIKs prejudices and his often choosen German officiers' statements from after the war, which bias the normal situation during the war (e.g. the normal German soldier had no masterrace mindset but high fighting spirit).
YES!! I got into this a little a couple years ago, but I was mostly interested in my own country's units (my country being the only important participant in the war, of course). This is going to be sweeeet!
The typical soviet squad should include one or two SVT's.
They only made 2 million SVT's and a number were 'award' prizes. If a squad had them, it was used by a 'designated marksman' or sniper. However, most Soviet snipers disliked the SVT and preferred the Mosin-Nagant sniper rifle. A good reference for Soviet snipers: "Lady Death" by Ludmilla Pavlichenko
Some inconsistency. You conclude a 500 RPM practical RoF for an MG42 with a 250 round belt, but that would mean instantaneous reload. However you limit the Kar98k to 10 RPM citing the reload time as a limiting factor.
German rifle squads also did not have 250 round belts... So he is comparing an hmg with lmgs like bren
TIKs videos are always biased with the "German masterrace mindset" which makes him prejudicedly refuse all German superior fighting spirit. In reality the normal German soldier and officer had no masterrace mindset at all. The other way round the normal Soviet soldier just fought because of fear for its officers. Once the officers were taken out of action the Soviets surrendered.
Where do you get the information that Soviet soldiers were afraid of their officers? I think this is a myth.
@@СергейРублев-т7я This information I got of numerous German veterans. Once the officers and commisars were out of action they usually not only ceased fire and retreated but usually raised hands and surrendered. This was even true until 1945. From late 1942 onwards furthermore Soviet prisoners were mainly not sent back to prison camps but kept at the German rear units where they in general were reliable comrades and treated equal (food, accomodation). That history negelcts this fact is clear: 1.) it does not fit to Soviet propaganda of an heroic war and 2.) each Soviet prisoner would have stated after the war that he was forced by the Germans in order not to get in real trouble in the USSR.
Hmm. Why do you think the USSR won this war? Was Soviet fear stronger than German patriotism?
@@СергейРублев-т7я Very strange question as you know the resource, ally and war-industry situation certainly very well.
Do you agree that when a person is very scared, they cannot act effectively? Now you are telling me that the USSR had many resources, but did not have patriotism, but only fear of officers. But to defeat a country as strong as Germany, you need to act effectively. How can you explain this contradiction?
Thanks for an objective presentation. Compliments!
A lot of post war militaries, adopted german style machine gun and still use them to this day. Examples like the M60, MG3 and SAW come to mind.
Not the soviets though,or the russians today.They still hang on to the RPK,despite the fact that the PKM is lightweight enough to be used at squad level without problems,unlike the MG3 or the FN MAG.
@@Panos-xo9rc yeah that is true. I'm not super knowledgeable about the russians but I'm sure they use different doctrine than their nato counterparts.
@@Red-jl7jj Im talking more about how they are employed, not the design details. They are deployed to suppress enemy's with large volumes of fire. The earlier guns like the BAR and Bren were more about accurate fire. The US marines seem to be moving back to this however with the M27.
@@Red-jl7jj i agree,compatibility within squad and mobility due to less weight of weapon and ammunition are big factors for the infantry.For more firepower at farther than handgrenade distance the answer is mortars,modern radios are small,lightweight and reliable.
American squads were well (perhaps over) supplied with hand grenades. All sides had them but a single american infantryman may have carried as many as other nations had in the squad. At least 2 per man was common, so the early stages of contact could see a lot of explosive suppression. My sources are from various biographies and photos as the T.O.E was merely a suggestion to most American units.
"... the T.O.E was merely a suggestion to most American units."
That appears to have been the case from my reading too. Particularly the M1 carbine, originally intended to rear echelon troops, found it's way to rifle units in staggering numbers.
Curiously, I keep coming across photographs of Canadians equipped with them, too. They shouldn't even have had them at all anywhere!
Will you do a similar video on Italy and the other countries that fought?
Good vid! Food for thought.... Tactics and morale and overall situation are important too!
No mention of grenades or other weapons available to the section, such as anti personnel and anti tank mines, flares, light mortars, flamethrowers,rifle grenades and so on. In addition, the British section carried a box of twelve Bren mags in a metal box as a basic load,with each other man carrying a mag in his pouch. In the field, the mags were given to the Bren crew as soon as possible. Loaded mags in boxes were brought up by men detailed as runners. GIs often ditched the BAR or kept it as a back up gun, if they got an M1919 either by issue or taking it from a broken down vehicle or knocked out tank. The Germans found that the basic TOE of the gruppe needed revising after the hard learning curve of Warsaw in 1939 and subsequent urban warfare in France and Russia, so that the assault group was heavily reinforced with submachine guns and plenty of grenades and as many MGs as could be found. In addition, the widespread use of the Panzerfaust and other hand held antitank weapons was carried on by the Germans to an extent never matched by the Allies.
As a guy who owns a Mosin-Nagant about 1/3rd of firing the rifle is smacking the action around like it made my dinner the wrong way
My oh my, how I love the Quality of your Work: the clarity, structure, research and presentation in spoken word and imagery. Every time again I'm (still!) surprised by what we almost expect by now and what has almost become 'normal'. Well, it's "normal" in the sense of being a benchmark. You must have a Great Team
Fun fact about British sections. The rounds used for both the brengun and lee enfield? .303. So if you happened to be carrying an extra 30 round magezine intended for your bren-gun, you could still, given time, load the bullets into enfield stripper clips, or load them one at a time if desperate. The same goes for most nations lmgs and rifles to be fair, but it is worth mentioning regardless.
MG-42 fired 1,200 rounds per minute at full auto.
Another great video the Germans literally built their squads around their machine guns, Your squad based tactics were solely based around the positioning of the MG34/42 And when they started building sturmgewehr armed squads which I'm not sure if was fully implemented but that would have up their firepower as well though the Americans definitely had the advantage because of their communications for artillery tank and air support
Outstanding. Please update if your viewers provide you with additional information. This is just fascinating stuff.
Such a cool video. Do more comparisons like this!!!
Ideal WW2 rifle squad, MG42 machine gun team and riflemen armed with Garands?
Thumbs up, thanks again!
I have been very short on time lately and have missed most of the non-audible content. Now I have an entire week free, and I get to watch all the Battlestorms from the past 2 months that I have been postponing because they are too good for only listening, and require the visual aspect.
I'm basically like a kid in a candy shop.
Damn! 18 minutes after you posted this TIK.. fresh off the press. Very Interesting. Thank you
More on guns please!
What about range/falloff, bullet speed? Ability to penetrate certain materials? Or jamming?
What about reliability under bad conditions (hot/cold weather, water, mud, sand)? (The AK-47 was built after MP-44s at last.)
This is a very good video. You covered a lot of bases
Very interesting and well presented mate. Well done!
Excellent video, sir.
The low rate of fire with the ppsh could also be that these sub guns were not known for interchangeable drums they were kinda fitted to the gun so I don’t know if they were issued multiple drums but if they were it would probably be one. Or stick mags possibly.
Awesome stuff like always. 11:10 is SVT, not Mosin.
The main difference between military marksmen and snipers is that marksmen are usually considered an organic part of a fireteam of soldiers and are never expected to operate independently away from the main force, whereas snipers are special ops troops who usually work alone or in very small teams with independent mission objectives.
I really enjoyed the video but I really think you cannot understate the ability a semi-automatic rifle gives you just from a shooters perspective. The ability to have a second round ready to go in the chamber the split second you can pull the trigger again is so much easier than having to break check weld, crank the bolt, than re acquire the target and make an aimed shot. While the actual rate of fire in an engagement is probably not very high if it is of a prolonged nature because most troops could probably blow through all of their ammunition in 5 minutes, the ability of a soldier carrying a semiautomatic rifle to fire 2-3 shots in a situation where in that same situation a soldier with a bolt action gun could only get off one shot would be massive psychologically and tactically. I know as an American I am obviously pretty biased and do not even wish to make the case that the Americans had the best unit of the 4 identified here, but I wanted to state that as someone who’s lucky enough to have fired an M1 Garand and Mauser-action rifles that the difference there is unbelievably huge. Obviously the same argument is true when comparing machine guns/assault rifles to semiautos, but at least in the US army they had plenty of M1 (rifle and carbines) to go around where semiautos would have been rarer in the German and Soviet militaries. Keep up the good work, I am very much looking forward to the next episode in the Stalingrad series
Marching fire, also known as walking fire, is a military tactic; a form of suppressive fire used during an infantry assault or combined arms assault.
There needs to be SABRmetric style analysis of small arms.
Thank you