Veto Players, Treaty Effectiveness, and Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control

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  • Опубликовано: 1 июн 2024
  • Why do some treaties face difficult entry-into-force prospects long after negotiators agree on their legal provisions? Bilateral nuclear arms control treaties usually require simple exchanges of diplomatic notes to enter into force. Their multilateral counterparts often face decidedly more contentious journeys. These treaties usually indicate the number of states that must deposit ratification instruments or may even require participation by specific states. Accordingly, I present a theory of treaty entry-into-force. I argue that negotiators may identify key named veto players to ensure successful implementation. In both arms control and other areas of international cooperation, the more veto players an agreement mandates, the greater its potential effectiveness. Yet, unintended consequences may emerge as an expanded club of veto players increases entry-into-force challenges. Put differently: There is a trade-off between treaty effectiveness and ease of entry-into-force. I demonstrate the logic of the argument with a case study of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Language requiring ratification by 44 named “nuclear-capable” states has created significant obstacles to realizing an inspectable global prohibition on nuclear explosive testing. Likewise, I discuss the argument in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Taken together, this research has clear implications for the politics of arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, and beyond.
    00:00 Moderator: Sarah Bidgood, Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
    01:57 Speaker: Dr. Stephen Herzog, Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control at the Center for Security Studies of ETH Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. An Associate of the Project on Managing the Atom, he Co-chairs the Harvard-MacArthur Beyond Nuclear Deterrence Working Group.
    35:56 Q&A

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