"Polite"? He's quite dismissive of even some of his Patreons? Whilst I accept he has a great mind he's not immune to over-arrogance to the point of imposing his own aesthetics as "fact". And like many others monetisation in any way seems to be a driving force at which point rigour suffers ....
@@spaceinyourface You mean like his insistence that "Many Worlds" metaphysics is THE "correct" interpretation of QM when in reality it's just another unprovable, untestable, unscientific, faith based belief? I'll take Sabine's grounded, no nonsense stance all day long over his sense of aesthetics.
@@SearchBucket2yea,, you should've allways follow your instincts . Personally,,I just follow Sean & a few other physicists,,I'm to dumb or lazy or old to understand the fundamentals of the Universe without their guidance,,I don't follow many though, just a few . Sean's the top of pile in my eyes,,,& many, many others. For now at least.
@@spaceinyourface i get your point mate. so everything that you like goes to "follow your instincts" and whatever that you dont like goes into nonsense realm. Even though both may be untestable at this point. Seems sensible really...maybe in one of the many worlds you dont find this that correct
I think we should leave that alone. There’s a very good reason why there still are so many different conflicting interpretations of quantum mechanics. BECAUSE NOBODY HAS A FUCKING CLUE
I think people who think like Philip Goff don’t appreciate the rigor and how strong a claim from a physical theory is. If any other factors played a role other than the core theory, we should be able to detect phenomena our theories didn’t predict correctly. Which is possible. But we don’t have any evidence for this yet. Thinking a theory can make correct predictions but also have other factors playing a role simply means you don’t understand how precise and exact the science is.
If 'emergent' ,means that once the number of connections in the brain reaches a certain threshold, consciousness emerges, then yes I believe that consciousness is emergent. Am I right?
@@degaussingatmosphericcharg575 To be fair it's not a quote... but this thought does seem to be motivating much of the resistance to materialistic/physicalist explanations of consciousness. For some, it just doesn't "feel" like their experience can just be the neuron firing/information processing. So they insist there must be something else. For which the only evidence is the "feeling" itself. And all the something else explains is that "feeling" - except it doesn't do that either. To be clear - Sentientism as a worldview is neutral on philosophy of mind so the panpsychist sentientists (like Luke Roelofs) will disagree with me!
@@Sentientism and yet asserting full-blown dualism still manages to be less incoherent than claiming the experience red doesn't exist but instead the property red emerges as an artifact that shuffles up to higher function
@@5piles Personally (other sentientists disagree), I don't deny the existence of consciousness or the experience of red. I just think they are the running of that particular variety of information processing. Others have the same sorts of experiences as me but are led to conclude that those experiences must be something distinct from the information processing - even though that distinct thing seems to have none of its own effects and is not detectable beyond the reports (external and internal) of the entity running the information processing. Having said that - I don't think this distinct consciousness is detectable through my own internal reports either - because for me they only indicate the class of information processing going on mostly in my head - not that there's anything distinct or non-physical. Consciousness "seeming" to be something distinct is very weak evidence for me. Feels like yet another instance of us humans insisting us and our glorious consciousness must somehow be central to the universe - or even its foundation.
@@Sentientism awareness as fundamental may require simply learning to correctly observe it. that sounds far more rational than positing miraculous properties to mass or in your version 'information'
Philip's assertion that human life having special value gives rise to the need to explain the fine tuning that permits it is very telling. It faces Keith's observation that we only think we are special because its us, and says, yeah, but its us! We are special! Keith is right, and I don't know why it isn't obvious to more philosophers. The lottery winner feels special because it is they who won it. Unless someone can demonstrate that our universe is fine tuned, there is nothing to explain.
You wrote: "Philip's assertion that human life having special value gives rise to the need to explain the fine tuning that permits it is very telling." Every species is "special" in that way too. Indeed every *thing* (biological or non-biological) is special. That is, every thing (or type of thing) would only have come about because of these initial fine-tunings very early in the life of the universe - plus the indefinite amount of contingent happenings which occurred later. So the likelihood of any entity being the way it is - or even existing - is very low... But so what? "Special value" can mean that "special" constants, laws, ratios, etc. needed to have come together - or occurred - in order to bring about human beings. Or it may be that human being are special when compared to other non-human entities. Or human beings are special in the eyes of God. Alternatively, human beings are special to... well, human beings.
Well no, we are special cause rock arent walking around interacting with the universe. The have a awareness of any of this at all. In that way we are special.
@@brettharter143 A flea can jump 100 times higher than a human being proportionate to its size. Some animals can leave permanently under water. Others can live in volcanoes. Some animals can live much longer than human beings. Other animals have an evolutionary lineage millions of years longer than human beings.... Indeed rocks have "special" features than humans don't have. Every thing is special in its own particular way. And you didn't answer the question as to what "special" actually means. And special to what or to whom?.... And why single out rocks anyway? What about apes, dogs, mountains, trees, etc?... Sure, we can interact with the universe. But I still don't understand the word "special" in this context.
@@brettharter143 But we're not hard like stone, in that way stones are special. And we don't have long necks, in that way giraffes are special. And we don't absorb stars, in that way black holes are special. Why does our special require a special explanation of the universe?
@@crab0traps0now Such tall necks and gravity implosion are functions intrinsic to their local environment and therefore intrinsic to making the physical evolving cosmos a going concern. Human intentional manipulation of our ecological niche for our own constructive or destructive purposes transcends such natural limits.
I find it surprising that after writing articles, papers, and books on the subject, Goff seems so inarticulate and has such difficulty responding to simple questions on it and counters to it... It seems to me that Goffian panpsychism does nothing to explain consciousness, especially the 'hard problem', but rather avoids explanation (makes it impossible to explain) by making it fundamental. But in doing so, it raises far more questions than it purports to answer, including what panpsychism really means by 'consciousness', e.g. what does it mean for an electron to be conscious? conscious of what and how? Also, is an atom the sum of the consciousnesses of its component particles? If not, what? What about a table? Why does the consciousness we can identify seem restricted to creatures with sophisticated brains, and why does the apparent degree of consciousness correspond to the complexity, size, and sophistication of the brain? It also seems to me that consciousness necessarily involves information processing - even simple awareness is awareness _of_ something, some information about the internal or external milieu that changes the internal state in a significant way. One can see why a brain might be suited to this, but how can it apply to a fundamental particle that has no properties but charge and spin? As an explanation: 1. it isn't testable; 2. it makes no predictions; 3. it has no explanatory power (in that it doesn't provide any understanding of, or insight into, the phenomenon - and you can't explain the unexplained with the inexplicable); 4. it isn't parsimonious (in that it adds a new element to our fundamental ontology); 5. it is ad-hoc; 6. it has no unifying scope (in that it provides no underlying principle that can help explain or provide understanding of, or insight into, other phenomena); 7. it raises more questions than it answers, all unanswerable; 8. it has no connection or relation to our existing body of knowledge. Strictly speaking, it isn't an explanation at all...
As I think Carroll and/or Frankish said at one point Goff finds consciousness so unique and amazing he seems to have great difficulty accepting it probably has an entirely physical basis. But personal incredulity doesn't necessitate another explanation.
The Integrated Information answers all of those questions. Perhaps “testability” will always be a problem but that’s endemic to the private nature of experience.
@@mattsigl1426 I wouldn't argue that integrated information is not important - Tononi et al. have done some excellent work, but given that it's possible to construct circuits with higher than human Phi levels that do relatively little complex or interesting processing, and given the functional architecture of the human brain, it seems to me that integrated information is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What is also important is the kind of information being processed and the way that it is processed. That's the way I see it at present; but it's early days...
I think that the issue is summed up in the zombie argument which is circular. The way it basically runs: If I can imagine a system with no consciousness Which behaves in all respects like a system with consciousness Consciousness does nothing. But just because I can propose such a system does not mean it is a possible system. I could equally write If I can imagine a system with no consciousness And It couldnt behave identically in all respects to one with consciousness. Consciousness has explanatory power. (IE the delta) Ditto zombie universe argument. The zombie arguement (person or universe) is like someone claiming that imagining a perpetual engine means that the conservation of energy fails. It a rubbish arguement. Truth is I can't imagine to the extent that I believe! Since no one can believe their state would be unchanged if they lost consciousness, (we all sleep!) Why entertain the unbelievable? If the Zombie arguement has force then so does: I can't imagine existence without consciousness So Existence depends on consciousness Things that exist require consciousness From here I can argue that either: All reality exists only because I am conscious Or Reality exists even if I am not conscious of it. Therefore anything that can exist independently must be conscious. I would argue that consciousness makes a difference, IIT's notion of causal power is along the right lines. Consciousness improves behaviour (internal and external states) OR equally possible, consciousness is the act of perception. When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system. It could be argued that such a theory overcomes many of your points. This issue is whether it has any predictive power that can be tested. It is difficult to see how the null hypothesis can be.
@@nickdyne8001 I think the whole consciousness debate tends to be suffused with a subtle dualist bias. The long-time reification of 'mind' as a 'thing' in its own right rather than a process (or network of processes), and the implicit sense of Cartesian theatre - that we relate to our bodies, as Sean once put it, "Like a soccer mom driving an SUV" - leads to ideas - like philosophical zombies - that either beg the question or bring into question the very concept of consciousness and its meaning - how do I know I'm not a P zombie? Well, I'm conscious. But a P zombie must think that too in order to indistinguishably emulate consciousness... meh. _"When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system."_ This sounds rather teleological, which is a whole other kettle of fish... I may have misunderstood your meaning, but I'd prefer to say that consciousness evolved because the realisation (or representation) of state in a living system provides a selective advantage.
I'm not sure if Sean ever had a conversation with Johnathan Haidt, because their vocals are so similar sounding that it might not be able to tell who was speaking without seeing them talk. A good push and pull conversation, which are important to take place. We might not agree with each individual views, but having the conversation can still be a learning experience. Thank you gentlemen.
Sean is amazing, the way he destroyed that Phillip dude is wonderful, and he does it in a very polite and understanding way. Genius. Thanks for this video, I hope more are on the way.
I think the weirdest part of the Fine Tuning Universe is that life is so fragile and non robust. Why life requires particular conditions to happen? Why life could not exists under a large range of fundamental constants values? I think this is a much deeper puzzle. This is not easily explained by selection or multiverse because then we would need to explain how come we are in that particular universe that has a form of life that is so fragile to need a fine tuned universe to exist.
Multiverse is just switching the unknown conscious creator model (The unmoved mover for Aristotle) for an infinite/or uncomprehensibily large unconscious model large enough to make things statistically probable. Why life requires particular conditions to happen? This is based upon the assumption that we have a definition of life/intellegence/consciousness. - An interesting assertion but not grounded in anything but an assertion. (generically christian too. Life emerges within a body made of dust and returns to dust) Why life could not exists under a large range of fundamental constants values? This is the much better question and requires us to define our terms to a point where the question becomes intellegable. The argument that the metre reading of minds proves that minds are an epiphenominon based upon physics as it currently stands is incoherant to me. If you can model the device used to model (Mind) then you have problems.
I may have answered my own question. The conscious mind has states: waking, sleeping, thinking, daydreaming etc. all have motion; are changeable. Consciousness underlines them all, unchanging. If it does not have motion then it cannot be physical.
This panpshychisim idea disturbed my brain for some monthes, read and read about it with hopeless understanding the world and its not give better explaining the world than Idealism. So its the same with idea that we live in a computer simulation world. So until now best compelin and sharpest knife is the physicalism, it realy helps me to understand the world I live in,.Sean is realy a biggest thinker ever!
Excellent discussion. But, Philip Goff's analogy between the gambler's fallacy and the multiverse is mistaken. It all depends on whether the combinations between the different physical constants are finite or infinite. If they are infinite the probability of getting any one of them in a finite number of universes is always going to be 0. But if they are not infinite that probability is higher the higher the number of universes. To put it simply: if I toss a coin once, the probability of getting a head is obviously 0.5, but if I toss the coin twice that probability goes up to 0.75, etc.
2:32:13 I agree with Sean's conclusion but I disagree with where the difficulty is. With the core theory, I think we can tell that only the lowest-mass particles exist, so we would know that only electrons and up and down quarks exist. We would also know that, given atomic nuclei and the Pauli exclusion principle, that the periodic table exists. (Which is also another reason why electrons in the brain and electrons outside it have to be identical, but I digress.) The trouble, however, is on both sides of the periodic table: We don't have good tools to predict the existence of baryons, nor do we have a good, easy theory of nuclei. Whether complex organic chemistry exists also depends heavily on the exact ionization and binding energies of atoms, which is about as computationally intensive as the problems with nuclei. So no, we will be able to predict the periodic table exists, given its prerequisites. The problem is below and above that. The periodic table is the lighthouse in the murky theoretical waters around it.
If you're adding the prerequisites of atomic theory you're using more than just the core theory, because we don't know how to get those from the core theory as of right now. That's all that Sean was saying
Physics dealt with several (apparent) strong emergence phenomena in the recent past that literally transformed physics: black body problem, photoelectric effect, Michelson-Morley null experiment. In all these cases we could not explain the collective behavior of the system from its constituent parts acting locally using the state of the art physics of the time (mostly Newtonian plus statistical mechanics). People did try and tried hard but they failed miserably. So we had to introduce new physics in particular quantum mechanics and special relativity (crazy new physics that was shocking even to its proponents). Consciousness SO FAR doesn't seem to be a similar challenge even if are not yet able to explain how consciousness works in details, and if somebody could explain consciousness using some new physics it would be amazing and very useful (revolutionary as QM and SR) but for sure panpsychism doesn't do that at all. By the way this new physics would have also to explain the other properties of the world we observe, maybe by being a generalization of the existing physics, exactly like QM did, basically showing that classical mechanics is a particular case of QM.
Just a thought...Is consciousness inherent in the universe at every point of time and space...the same way water or other particles actually flow as per the contours of the landscape. So called entropy for instance is actually events unfolding in a predictable way along the existing landscape . This then makes me question free will. Maybe consciousness is just the predictable flow of events along the landscape that we observe or inhabit
Thats what the idealist would believe yes but then ask urself this. What was ur consciousness doing prior to ur birth? Why don't you have memories of those "conscious" events? what good is consciousness if u cant store memories of it?
I love Sean Carroll, and I don't think panpsychism is right, but isn't Sean denying that consciousness exists while denying that he's denying that consciousness exists?
Consciousness is just a kind of awareness! You become aware of things by sensing them and making sense of them! We do those things with our sense organs!
Goff said "you can't be in pain without realizing you are in pain" as evidence of immediate self awareness of any conscious being, but I disagree. I've often become completely unaware of my own pain over time until someone mentions it and it becomes painfully obvious. Joint pain, muscle pain, emotional pain, splitting headaches. Awareness and consciousness aren't obe to one correlated. I'm not sure how this effects the arguments for/against panpsychism, though.
One of the best parts of this video is 14:30 when Sean has to reposition for the lighting. Like the plant turning towards sunlight or the amoeba moving towards the sugar molecule. Consciousness is how we interact with our environment.
Best part of the whole episode is one hour and 37 minutes when Sean Carroll says "you're gonna be way more interesting if you're honest" Goff seems to not even understand the implications of his own beliefs nor is he able to accurately describe the opposing materialist viewpoints.
Frequent recent opinions in the discussion about the essence of consciousness refer to phenomena occurring outside (above) the brain. Usually an unresolved so-called “hard problem” is mentioned. It is true that the experience of qualia is difficult to explain by processes of the described neural networks. So I believe that an effective theory of consciousness should be based on the integration of several known theories of consciousness. In particular, the theory of neural circuits realizing imagery should be integrated with the "conscious electromagnetic information field theory (cemi)" One of the theories included in an effective explanation of the essence of consciousness should also be one of the theories linking the experience of qualia with the physics (fine structure) of the Universe. We published recently an article [ Neural Circuits, Microtubule Processing, Brain's Electromagnetic Field - Components of Self-Awareness. Brain Sci. 2021, 11, 984. ] which shows how to integrate the explanations of the essential components of consciousness.
Thanks. Very useful comment. Read cemi, I think it and IIT not incompatible and Orch OR should fit in too. GWR and IIT are essentially content theories. Cemi and OR are dealing with hard problem.
P Zombies is a non-coherent concept. It is like saying "imagine an electron exactly like ours , but doesn't have charge". Well, if it is exactly like our world then the electron WILL have charge. Similarly, if there is a world which works exactly like our, then thise creatures WILL have consciousness.
Philip Geoff (PG) does not have any argument. The group structure of his thinking has a 0 called consciousness so that A * 0 = A, where A is anything in the material world and 0 is the value of consciousness in the operations of that world. Despite that, he insists that 0 must be taken into account. For all I know, he could have called it the Virgin Mary, with the same properties of being absolutely essential and also inconsequential and for sure my mom would agree with him. Compare consciousness with mathematics, M. M is invisible, eternal, true, not supervenient in physical reality (it does not depend on it like matter depends on energy or momentum), But it is not an amorphous thing, it has structure and internal coherence. When pieces fit, the theorem is proved and the body of known mathematics grows. Is there something similar to that in the body of knowledge of consciousness? Sean Carroll is brilliant and deserves a note of gratitude for his efforts to share knowledge.
Man, it is utterly painful to listen to Philip Goff failing to understand the implications of the philosophical zombie argument, so clearly and repeatedly laid out by Carroll. I have to put a pillow over my face, can't watch!
@@beeshepard Don't have timestamp, but it was in the latter half of it. Just a brief mention. I think there are so many parallels between Many Worlds, and Wolfram's model that seemed lost when Wolfram was on Sean's podcast. I would love to see more exploration of it.
So about consciousness. The data point we have is our own experience. Then we have all the stuff we can observe through material interactions like deep conversations and observing other humans and animals and the rest of nature. Then we have the question. How many consciousnesses are there here and where are they. If you want to go beyond solipsism you need to pick some instrumental model. You could start out with consciousness being in other humans and expand to animals and so on and if you expand really really far you might end up with panpsychism. If you then consider what your fundamental ontology is you'll have difficulty. Say you study some mathematical equation, you think is a theory of the world and then you ask what is it that has this structure and will it be like anything to be something that has that structure. I don't know how to tell. I mean how could we ever. I'm not sure what the difference is between panpsychism, physicalism, and mathematical structuralism. I mean anyone holding to any of them would trivially have to agree that there at least is something to be their own consciousness so it must be like something to be whatever the ontology is, right. As a materialist that is a bit confusing maybe. As a mathematical structuralist it's also confusing. But as a panpsychist the only difference is that you promote consciousness to something more fundamental which means you actually don't have a fundamental theory of consciousness either, so it is still confusing. Can't we all just agree that it's confusing XD
panpsychism is the predesessor to a process philosophy. Whitehead simply has not been studied enough but he provides an ontology that as far as i can tell, is not yet bumping heads with much of science
@@thomasforster9744 That may be so. I haven’t read him. I suspect one needs quite a bit of time and effort to read up on an ontology and compare it to others. Do you have any golden nuggets to share from it?
*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
I agree. Whether intentionally or not, using the term 'hard problem' insists consciousness necessitates an explanation beyond the physical paradigm without explaining how.
I don’t understand why there isn’t a discussion about the distinction between awareness and consciousness. They seem quite different to me. Isn’t conscious emergent from awareness?
Según el fisicalismo, ¿por qué razón, no existe cierto grado de contradicción en el modelo neurocientífico de la mente (neurociencia cognitiva), ya que según parece: el cerebro es tanto fuente (sustrato), como producto(interpretación consciente - mental -), de sí mismo? ¿el que, al observar directamente la actividad sináptica de las áreas visuales de un paciente (cerebro expuesto), no logre observar sus qualia, no implica necesariamente, alguna forma de dualismo (ontológico y en consecuencia explicativo) intrínseco?
Love this multidisciplinary interaction, 2 well learned men taking turns in grilling the most qualified person. Solidly knowledgable with humility and perspectives. Entertaining with real substance. Thanks Dr Sean and all. Keep up the good work. From Hker worldwide
They should have brought up motion. While consciousness has states, where is the evidence that it has motion as the mind has motion? If it does not have motion then how could not be prior to the three forces which has motion?
Sean carroll is so great at debating. His knowledge is vast and e is clear and precise in expressing his views which he himself hold in high esteem and stead fast at it as well. It is incredible to listen to him articulate and dismantle any opposing views to his beliefs which does not have much credence. He rattled Mr. Philip Goff here
The problem with debates is that the performer prevails, not objective truth. Theologist debaters like Hovid and Craig Lane have a deep reserve of stock arguments which can make them look good to an audience of neutrals. In contrast Dawkins isn't a great debater. Being good at debating means nothing other than you are good at "show business" and well prepared.
consciousness is illusory(Daniel Dennett ) means your awareness is illusory ..?? so your thinking is illusory..? and illusory means it is not physical ...???
Very awkward beginning, better planning would help. Carroll is like always on top of the subject and makes the better arguments. The other two are bumbling and stumbling.
What we have here is a problem with the very definition of "Consciousness" and its relation to the laws of physics that define and control the universe: What will, it is hoped by physicists, to become "The Theory of Everything." The discussion is about how can consciousness "emerge" from that theory, assuming it is ever finally discovered, of course. The problem is that is cannot. The Theory would define, to use a chess definition, the board, the pieces, and the complex rules that allow the pieces to be manipulated by the board itself -- what the Big Bang did to start them interacting -- and what a conscious living structure could do to modify those original actions for its own purposes, whatever those may be. Such modifications to the unthinking manifestations of the universe as it runs down like a mechanical toy (though a natural one, not a manufactured one) define what relationship a conscious "mind" has on the physical universe around it. If it did nothing to modify the universe in any way, you could not ever detect consciousness, no matter what it might be, now could you? OK. Now what relation to the Theory would a consciousness that was detectable make? It is indeed an "emergent" phenomenon based on living things (however you might define "life"), but emergent from WHAT? By definition, emergence means that you discover an unusual effect that is unexpected, yet when analyzed in detail can be shown to be a step-by-step result of a previously known set of rules (the hypothetical Theory here). How can you do that with consciousness; what is in the Theory that can be so followed? Nothing that I can imagine. Consciousness is, however, a set of parameters that must be known if the living structure that has it is to have its future (and past) actions understood. It is thus a set of "dimensions" defining the structure, but dimensions that are not physical in space or time, other than having to be superimposed on non-living/non-co0nscious material to allow them to become functional (a physical "instantiation" to allow consciousness to interact with the physical world and thus be detectable by an outside observer). Consciousness is thus a PATTERN of some sort superimposed on a physical medium (the brain in our form of life, though electronic artificial intelligence might be a supportive alternative, among others) that can support it and allow it to interact with the external universe in some way or ways. Because it is a pattern of self-interacting material (matter and energy) that also interacts with the external universe in some way, it must have sets of rules that control how it can be a semi-stable (stable enough to allow some minimum time to be detectable, but probably continually adjusting itself to the current internal conditions of its supportive structure, like someone balancing a pencil on its tip). It is these rules that allow consciousness to exist as this superimposed pattern that are what is the problem to be solved. This implies that the non-material dimensions mentioned must be found and how they interact worked out to find the boundaries where consciousness can and cannot occur. We thus have a major problem in defining ANOTHER "Theory of Everything" but the "Everything" here is not the physical world, but the world of patterns that will and will not support consciousness This is a novel situation, since previously defining such things was "philosophy" and not "hard science". But here the pattern is wholly non-physical in that it can be generated in different materials and in different configurations and still give the desired result (more-or-less). In other words, how does the universe interact with such things as computer programs when the computers used with them are changed and the language they are written in changes and so forth, but they still give the same results? Consciousness will be like that, so we have to finally understand the equivalent of the "computational language" consciousness is written in and how it is superimposed on a physical structure to comprehend it. Can we stretch our definitions of "dimensions" to include such non-physical phenomena where consciousness resides? If not, the problem will not ever be solved...
You seem to think that only "hardware" is part of the physical world and patterns, relations, structure, information is not? Well , that's not the case..one cannot even define a clear dividing line! Physical world ( and thus, subject of Physics) is everything that exists, matter fields, spacetime, patterns and structures ( shortly speaking, the laws of physics, albeit in their more refined , fundamental form and everything that these laws are describing), including ourselves.. Self awareness and consciousness and everything related are also subjects of Physics, in principle. I don't think that there's serious doubt that consciousness is an emergent, macroscopic level phenomenon. The interesting question is if it is "weakly" or "strongly - in the physicalist sense- emergent.
Panpsychism is so weak as a hypothesis that is just ridiculous to accept the possibility of it’s truthness. Is great to see Philip keep saying that consciousness does something but never mentions a single thing, is like talking about god
Time to stoke this conversation again. Get Sean Carroll and a straight-laced psychologist or neuroscientist in there and let's talk about the microscopic level of consciousness.
Another problem noted from a video on whether an animal can recognize itself in a mirror. They used the term "self-awareness" for this. That is at odds with the fact that by trying to attack the other animal in the mirror, the tested animal IS aware of itself and that there is another animal very similar to it that it considers an intruder -- it is aware of its physical position and the boundary around that position that it considers ITS territory -- but does not recognize itself in the mirror due to not being able to see all of its own properties AND not understanding what a mirror is. That is, if the animal is smart enough to understand what a mirror is, it can learn to stop attacking the image by finally realizing that the image is itself. But what has that to do with self--awareness? A property of a portion of intelligence concerning things like mirrors, yes, but that is not anything to do with the animal having or not having an awareness of itself as a separate unit with distinct boundaries on its physical body (where sensation and mental control of its body stops). This kind of confusion in the meaning of the language used to describe consciousness and its attributes is one of the biggest things interfering with this study!
Subjective experiences are just a particular case of objective experiences. It is you observing you. It is public in that sense and people can compare subjective experiences. The entire traditions of Buddhism, Veda and Tantra is to discuss the subjective experiences as if they were objective, and they are objective because they are universal.
There is no such thing as objective experience. All experiences are subjective. Multiple subjects cannot observe the same experience as if it were an object in the world separate from themselves, therefore there is nothing objective about it.
I don't know if this is pertinent to your conversation but I saw a Scottish (I to am Scottish, irrelevant) woman on the news recently who was at least 40 years old and she clearly had no understanding of the fact that this "pain" thing that people had been yammering on about for her whole life was actually a thing that she was physiologically incapable of experiencing. Her doctor was interviewed on the news and he seemed to find this as incredible as he did amusing. He was having her eat chillies with him and watching in what seemed to me to be amused disbelief at this very white person having no reaction to chilli that he himself seemed to find rather fiery. What struck me was that the patient seemed to have no clue whatsoever that her conscious experience was so fundamentally different (no pain, ever. What did she imagine everyone was talking, indeed litigating, about? Why did they hobble about making stupid noises and faces when they stubbed their toes? e.t.c. e.t.c. e.t.c.) How many dimensions could consciousness have, really? Can they all be described in the English language? Are they all tied to external physical forces? Are humans unique in their sensitivity to time? Birds can sense the earths magnetic field. What forces exist for which biological sensors could be designed in the language of the human genome and given the size of the human genome and the rate of evolution, how many people exist with as yet undocumented sensitivities?
I'm very surprised that she, or her parents didn't find out about this earlier. Most people with CIPA exhibit self destructive behaviors early on (biting tongue, scratching corneas, breaking bones without noticing etc.)
People like her normally don't tend to live very long. How was her CIPA not found earlier or how is she not dead (or at least possessing many broken limbs etc) yet?
That would be an example of one function of the brain signaling another portion of the brain, the other portion being conscious. This seems to be an unnecessary duplication of work. Why would the body be set up that way?
Cool discussion. I think it took a bit to clarify, but in the end, people got that Philip is emphasizing that consciousness definitely plays a causal role in his theory, as it is literally the stuff playing the roles, whereas Sean's point was that he still wouldn't go with this, as he would like Philip's mental qualities to actually (if I get it correctly) *change* the dispositions of fundamental physical properties. (Here is Keith's key word differential.) I'm not concluding anything, but I do seem to get why someone might go that direction. Physics already does give particles certain not-exactly-dispositional properties, namely mathematical ones like charge, mass, etc. However, these all figure into the explanation of the dispositions -- if you change the mass, it'll change what the particle does, which you see when you plug those numbers into the relevant equations. Sean seems to focus on the fact that changing the presence/lack of Philip's additional mental properties won't do this. One comment I have is that I might add either a third option or at least a subtype of/"spin" on one of Sean's two options he gives the panpsychist, which might or might not offer him a reason not to rule the view out quite how he does -- even so, I would personally guess he'd not adopt panpsychism for other reasons (e.g. the option I mention is still consistent with someone being a sort of physicalist/thinking mental properties should not exist at the fundamental level). I think he is saying that either the panpsychist adopts a theory of mental qualities that modifies the laws of physics (or something to that effect), or adopts one of "passive" mental qualities that don't modify the laws. Philip obviously wants to go with the latter. Sean then says these passive qualities seem too inconsequential, due to the lack of difference they make in terms of behavior. Now, here comes my addition/spin: I think one in-between option is where we don't change the mathematical structure of the laws of nature, but make sure whatever metaphysics we add to the one given by the "bare" physicalist one of Sean would actually *explain/ground* the laws of nature. That is, make it more transparent why a physical particle might follow the laws of nature it does with metaphysical necessity -- ground this in some fact about the particle's nature. I think this would be of interest to a scientist, since I think it remains open-ended/pretty debatable at this point if the laws of nature could have been different, or if something about the nature of fundamental physics properties explains why they follow those laws. Then, the additional (we might say "qualitative") properties would be worth adding to the theory even for someone wanting to explain the dispositions better.
@@MNbenMN Nope, definitely not. What you describe is one of the two views Sean discusses, and this is NOT the one I'm trying to describe -- one where panpsychists add qualitative properties to the fundamental nature of particles/fields/other physics entities without in any way adding to our explanation of the laws of physics or causal profile of these particles/fields/etc. The point of my response is to add in an option I don't think either Sean or Philip explicitly addressed. This option is where the physicalist or panpsychist or other Russelian monist says the fundamental nature of particles would shed light on *why* there even exist those specific laws of nature they follow. This is typically a brute fact. To get past the bruteness of it would be of significant interest to someone like Sean, since here we really are adding to the explanation of scientific experimental results. Sean's concern is that, while Philip's view is not quite dualism, it shares a lot of the pitfalls of dualism, in that the little bits of qualia Philip pictures following the laws of nature might be said to have causal efficacy (which is the usual issue dualism struggles with), but they have this efficacy in a sort of "empty way" -- they don't contribute to the explanation of the causal powers/profile. The view I describe is not itself intrinsically anti-physicalistic in nature, by the way. The idea would be to discover if we can say something further about what grounds the laws of nature/mathematical structure of the physical world, or if that is basically a brute fact. It probably helps to think of it this way: already, Sean likes philosophical theories like the Everettian view of Quantum Mechanics, which does not in any way tell us fundamental physics entites are going to do something differently in experiment. It rather (among other things) purports to explain why there are probabilities in our experimental findings. Technically one could just say "who needs Everettian theory -- the math works, we're done." But it seems the finding of probabilities is a brute fact, and Everettian theory is one way we could make sense of that. In a similar spirit, it would be very interesting if the laws of nature themselves had a more fundamental explanation.
Maybe this is the wrong venue for this, but: I can imagine a world with hydrogen and oxygen atoms that when combined in the 2/1 ration produce what we would all recognize as water, except that it is incapable of freezing into ice. I don't understand how my ability to conceive of such a thing creates an explanatory gap that needs tending. Isn't it cleaner to think that any 2/1 combination of those atoms would produce what we by definition call water, and by extension any zombie that had all of the same physical components as the non zombie would produce what we by definition call consciousness?
I agree, I posted this on another thread. I think that the issue is summed up in the zombie argument which is circular. The way it basically runs: If I can imagine a system with no consciousness Which behaves in all respects like a system with consciousness Consciousness does nothing. But just because I can propose such a system does not mean it is a possible system. I could equally write If I can imagine a system with no consciousness And It couldnt behave identically in all respects to one with consciousness. Consciousness has explanatory power. (IE the delta) Ditto zombie universe argument. The zombie arguement (person or universe) is like someone claiming that imagining a perpetual engine means that the conservation of energy fails. It a rubbish arguement. Truth is I can't imagine to the extent that I believe! Since no one can believe their state would be unchanged if they lost consciousness, (we all sleep!) Why entertain the unbelievable? If the Zombie arguement has force then so does: I can't imagine existence without consciousness So Existence depends on consciousness Things that exist require consciousness From here I can argue that either: All reality exists only because I am conscious Or Reality exists even if I am not conscious of it. Therefore anything that can exist independently must be conscious. I would argue that consciousness makes a difference, IIT's notion of causal power is along the right lines. Consciousness improves behaviour (internal and external states) OR equally possible, consciousness is the act of perception. When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system. It could be argued that such a theory overcomes many of your points. This issue is whether it has any predictive power that can be tested. It is difficult to see how the null hypothesis can be.
57:20 Sean Carroll is mistaking Panpsychism for a testable scientific hypothesis. It is not being proposed as such, but rather as a metaphysical interpretation of existing scientific knowledge.
@@Paine137 The reason some are driven to a panpsychist metaphysics is in order to account for the fact that conscious agents exist (e.g., the conscious agents who do science). Consciousness and agency do not feature in the accounts of the universe offered by physicists. This is not itself a problem, so long as the physicists don't forget that their models are approximations that entirely leave out the living world and the intelligent beings who devise them. Carroll wants to say these (life and mind) are unimportant features of the universe that can "emerge" later. I think he's asking this word "emerge" to do some very heavy lifting. If the universe is really exhaustively described by Carroll's "core theory," then the presence of scientific knowers of said theory is so unfathomably improbable that we may as well just call it a miracle. Panpsychism tries to make the presence of life and mind less miraculous by arguing that the energetic processes physics is describing in mathematical terms can also be described in experiential terms. Your "lacepsychism" is entirely tangential and neglects the metaphysical issue at stake here. Saying "experience" goes all the way down is not the same as saying some particular sort of object goes all the way down.
@@Footnotes2Plato I appreciate your response, but arguments like this employ a lot of words that say very little. Consciousness is, at this stage, still an idea, and itself might not reflect the reality of awareness. Placing consciousness below the level of quantum fields therefore is rather arrogant, given the absolute lack of any supporting data outside of mere word-salading.
@@TimUckun I suspect that conscious experience such as humans and other mammals possess indeed requires a brain. I would say brains are necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. Can experience happen without senses? Almost certainly, though it depends what you mean by experience and by senses. I would want to distinguish between consciousness and experience. Most experience is not conscious, but more like vague feelings of inheritance. Conscious experience is relatively rare in the universe, by the looks of it. As for senses, do you mean highly evolved sensory organs like eyes and ears? Certainly, experience can occur in single celled creatures just via the membrane interface, which is a kind of sense organ. I would suggest that very simple forms of "vector-feeling" (i.e., the feeling of causal efficacy inheriting the influences of the past through an experiential present to transmit them to the future) are conceivable even in the non-biological physical realm.
40:44 What? Come on Phillip, how many times does Sean have to say it before it sinks in... If you have two objects that behave identically, and the only difference between them is an added property "C" (consciousness), then this property has no effect on behavior because if it did, the two objects would behave differently. It couldn't follow more obviously...
I think Zombie blurs the question, because it's a biological entity, plus no one has ever seen one. Why not pose the question with something familiar and real? What about a computer with a vast database of human behaviors and reactions. You ask it a question and its response is always indistinguishable from a human's. Does that make the computer "conscious?" I think most would answer "no" once again introducing this idea of a gap in need of explanation.
@@phasespace4700 are all the particles identical inside the computer with similar positions and velocities to the human? If not, then you’ve just built the computer wrong. The point is that if we had a materialistic identical copy of a conscious agent, then materialism would be false if it’s possible for that system to be unconscious but act exactly the same as if it wasn’t. IMO a materialistic copy of a human that is also unconscious is inconceivable.
That's because as an analytic philosopher, conceivability and logical possibility drives much of what Philip Goff believes. What I mean by that is that because Goff can conceive of two identical objects behaving in exactly the same way, yet still not being identical, then that means much to him. Goff is not a scientist and conceivability and logical (not natural) possibility is at the heart of almost all his philosophical stances. Without such conceivability and the vital reliance on logical possibility, Goff would have NOTHING. Indeed Goff is explicit about this when he argues against what he calls "causal structuralism" (which he may deem to be the position you're taking). In other words, you say that "two objects that behave identically" - yet that still factors out what Goff calls "intrinsic properties". Thus, even if we have identical behaviour, Goff believes that there's something more to the story.
@@bendavis2234 I don't disagree with that. I just think it misses the point. I think the real question is: if you build a computer using electronic components in the place of neurons (which people are doing), why isn't it conscious? What IS the added element that distinguishes billions of neuron-like elements carrying out analogous tasks and capable of computation from a conscious being? If the answer is a materialist one, we are still very far from understanding what that element is. To simply say "consciousness is an emergent phenomenon" just defers the question. In fact. I'd say we're pretty much at square 1.
@@paulaustinmurphy Logical possibility is a very low bar to set, but he fails to meet even this standard. For consciousness to "do something" it has to be linked in some way to behavior, but we've agreed that a zombie and a human have identical behavior. We don't even need consciousness to see the problem here. If two objects "A" and B" have identical behavior and identical properties with the exception of one added property "C" to object "B", property "C" can't be the source of the behavior for "B".
I feel like the zombie argument makes no sense - is it not circular (given A -> A)? Can someone explain where I’m going wrong A) Two identical universes, same physics same molecules same brain same people same behavior. B) In people universe though, consciousness exists but in zombie universe consciousness does not For B to be true, you must acknowledge the universes are different in some non physical way - would that not implicitly deny the physicalist view point? Every physicalist would say “ that isn’t possible” and every dualist would say “duh” - so it therefore has 0 usefulness in argumentative discussion
All we have to do is observe that there is a massive difference between something that behaves without thinking anything and something that both thinks and behaves. The difference is simple: our thoughts effect our thoughts, our bodies effect our bodies. Both are causal, but in different respects. Sean and Keith can only deny this if they deny that they themselves have thoughts.
But you are making the assumption that the thoughts originate from the mind, rather than being generated in the brain and the brought into consciousness. What I agree with is that there can indeed be a person that operates like a conscious person, but is not conscious. So I don't think it's logically impossible for the mind to be separate from the brain. I just don't see how it could have an effect on the brain, it simply experiences what the brain puts into consciousness...somehow...for some reason.
Just a philosopher could make up a philosophical zombie. It is an impossibility. By the time you attribute to the zombie all the behavior of a conscious being then it is a conscious being. It would not be able to do conscious actions if it was not conscious. Same with the Chinese room. By the time the Chinese room acts and behave and responds to any possible question as a conscious being (as recognized by other conscious beings) it is a damn conscious being (even if it is made by other individual conscious beings that are not conscious of the meta being).
So many people are getting spooked by chatGPt and other Ai. Maybe there is consciousness but it might be feeling something completely unrelated to output just as the Chinese room worker only knows the experience of copying characters or a religious zealot chanting mumbo jumbo. Do the math but maybe keep the horshoe. We can chain output to experience through our own hardware but the slight of hand can go both ways beyond that.
How are you aware of the zombie inner state? By you (the conscious being) asking and having a convo with the zombie right? If the zombie is indistinguishable from what we would recognize as a conscious being (given his description of his inner states and other behaviors, yes reporting on one own state is a form of behavior, associated usually with consciousness) then: 1) the zombie is actually conscious or 2) your consciousness is nothing because it doesn't do anything that the zombie actually does without it. I would argue that in case of 2 then we are not even talking about consciousness and then you are the zombie.
Is Consciousness Emergent? ... as opposed to ....? I mean, unless we think our individual consciousness has always existed, isn't the idea of it being "emergent" as a phenomenon being generated by some sort of ongoing processes ... a given, no matter if a deity designed, purposed, jump-started, and/or sustains that or not? I haven't finished watching this 3+ hours of content yet. Maybe someone says what the alternative would be. But I can't imagine what the alternative would be, offhand.
I also think that the claim the qualia proposed by a panpsychist play no explanatory role (when it comes to explaining the dispositions of physics) might be better framed not in terms of the zombies argument, but in terms of the conceivability/possibility of ghosts. That is, if Q denotes the collection of all facts about qualia, P that of microphysical truths, it seems to me the claim that Q does not necessitate P is closer to the one that the qualia do nothing to explain the dispositions. I think Sean's point about the conceivability of zombies more has to do with the claim that the panpsychist's qualia don't change the laws of physics, not that they don't somehow help explain those laws. This ties into the earlier mentioned idea that Q could explain the presence of the dispositions of physical particles by grounding them in something more fundamental, without changing the laws of physics -- the causal-mathematical structure. That said, various panpsychists could not use this approach, as they would actually admit the possibility of ghosts, and this would play into Sean's objections (for better or worse -- I think many panpsychists would not remain particularly moved by the idea that qualia need to somehow explain something about behavior to play an important role, but I'm trying to cover the case where they entertain that worry in some shape). I found Sean's point interesting...that he'd feel differently if we somehow needed the qualia of the panpsychist in order to conceive of dispositions. I guess that might hold on certain metaphysical views, where you really do need something to ground dispositions, and they cannot sort of just hold on their own.
I’m not sure physicalism/materialism has an answer to consciousness, but this exchange reconfirmed that the panpsychist approach isn’t a satisfactory solution or interpretation that helps in any way. It still seems as though physicalist is the best option.
Does no need an answer consciousness is a made up term because we don't have a correct description of all the processes of the brain body. We are self-aware, planning agents with sensory organs that help us in decision making and communication, If we did not have these organs then I could beileve in dualism. Panpsychism on the other hand is just nonsense.
@@Sassan91 Its does. I've seen his debates simply put his idea is, we cannot be sure of anything else except our consciousness therefore everything is conscious. It's also circular. Just like matter can't give birth to matter, god can't create god consciousness can't create consciousness. Using "Dissociative" doesn't help
De no existir diferenciación alguna, sea de sustrato o de propiedades (no-abstractas), entre los qualia (P1P) y sus correlatos neuronales (P3P): ¿cómo, discriminar un zombi de un no-zombi si, por ejemplo, al observar directamente la actividad de las áreas visuales del no-zombi, somos incapaces de visualizar sus qualia?
Hello guys I got here by following and reading Sean Carolls books after looking for answers. Quantum mechanics brought me to be a panpsychist as there science left me in a dead street. I really enjoy Mind Chat. You are a wonderful duo to listen to. Keep up the good work. Maybe you could invite Richard Shelldrake on Morphic Resonance one day, he opened the dead street again for me.
Keith is given far too easier a ride here. He says he wants us to "reconceptualise" consciousness when the only thing he can mean is that he wants us to ignore it. As John Searle says: "if it *seems* to me that I am conscious, then I *am* conscious!". In Bayesian/Goffian terms: my credence that "this" [gestures with hands] exists is 1. Functionalism, as espoused by Keith, provides no explanation and contradicts my credence=1 fact that my consciousness exists - it's a non-starter. Sean's poetic naturalism (which does a fantastic job of accounting for all third person observable phenomena we know of) leaves room for an explanation of consciousness by weak emergence, but dodges the hard problem of how third person neurons create first person experience. He doesn't think this is much to worry about, but I do. I'm not saying panpsychicism is the answer, but "it's just like other emergent phenomena like planets and tables" is no answer either. "This" [gestures with hands] is different, it has a first person ontology in addition to the third person description of neurons, unlike planets and table. This is the hard problem, and Keith and Sean are dodging it.
You wrote: "Keith is given far too easier a ride here. He says he wants us to 'reconceptualise' consciousness when the only thing he can mean is that he wants us to ignore it." I don't believe that's correct. You mustn't slide from the fact that someone has a radically different position - or view - on consciousness to the position that this person is simply ignoring it. That amounts to claiming that if Frankish doesn't accept *your own* position on consciousness, then he's ignoring it. "As John Searle says: 'If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious!'." That doesn't seem to be that helpful. Isn't all this about what we say about consciousness - not simply how things "seem"? Isn't this about our theories or descriptions of consciousness - not how things *seem*? I'm not even sure what philosophical and/or scientific mileage we can get out of the statement "If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious".
@@paulaustinmurphy 'If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious!' - you don't think this is helpful. Keith argues for illusionism - that while there *seems* to be something we call (phenomenal) consciousness/qualia, actually there isn't. But this idea of an illusion can be applied to everything one can imagine *except* consciousness! An illusion is where there is a difference between what *seems* to be the case and what is actually the case. It seems to me that I have free will, but this could be an illusion. It seems to me that I have a body and my fingers are typing on the keyboard, but this could be an illusion. However, the seeming *itself* is completely dependent on the existence of my (phenomenal) consciousness - nothing can seem to be the case unless I am having an experience, unless qualia are real. Succinctly: 'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious'. I can entertain many different theories of consciousness different to my own, e.g. panpsychism, strong emergence, idealism. But a theory of consciousness that denies the existence of consciousness, is just asking us to ignore the very thing we're trying to explain. I don't think physicalism has to eliminate qualia, but it does have to explain them. Keith says squarely that he wants to get rid of qualia - there's only one way to interpret that, he is saying that we are all zombies. Well I for one am not. I have phenomenal consciousness/qualia and it is impossible to convince me otherwise. You lot may all be zombies, that's logically possibly (but very unlikely). But I know with credence of 1 that I am not. It is *like something* to be me, and that's the only thing I can be absolutely certain of. Descartes was wrong about substance dualism, but he was right about that!
@@jonstewart464 wrote: "Keith argues for illusionism - that while there seems to be something we call (phenomenal) consciousness/qualia, actually there isn't." That entirely depends. However, at a surface level, it does seem odd. On another level, it depends on what Frankish takes "phenomenal consciousness" or "qualia" to be and then it depends on his arguments, which you haven't cited. All you've done is say that Frankish states that qualia, etc. don't exist - full stop. I've never read a paper or article by Frankish so I personally don't know what his position is. 'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious'. Here again there's no description or theory of consciousness. So everything is entirely dependent on this *seeming*? Are you sure that Frankish even denies this seeming? Isn't it what he derives, theoretically and philosophically, from the seeming which is philosophically important? And, the way I guess at it, you derive one thing from your seemings and Frankish derives another.
@@paulaustinmurphy wrote: "it depends on what Frankish takes 'phenomenal consciousness' or 'qualia' to be and then it depends on his arguments, which you haven't cited" I'm not sure there is much wriggle room in what 'phenomenal consciousness/qualia' are. In Goff's words, we're talking about "this" [gesture with hands indicating the (phenomenal) experience being had in the current moment]. Keith is clear in the discussion that he really doesn't think qualia exist, that we're all zombies. To quote his article "Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical." keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf You wrote: " 'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious' - here again there's no description or theory of consciousness." Searle and I are not proposing a theory of consciousness in this sentence. We're saying that illusionism is incoherent. An illusion requires *seeming*, and seeming requires phenomenal consciousness. Therefore phenomenal consciousness is not an illusion. This is not proposing an alternative theory (which could be physicalism with weak or strong emergence, panpsychism, idealism, etc) it is just establishing the boundary that eliminativist physicalism/illusionism/functionalism (all the same thing from my perspective) wants to cross: a theory of consciousness must explain consciousness, not ignore it.
@@jonstewart464 You wrote: "I'm not sure there is much wriggle room in what 'phenomenal consciousness/qualia' are. " You can't possibly believe that. There is "wriggle room" when it comes to every subject under the sun. You seem to be assuming something absolute and categorical about qualia, consciousness, or first-person takes. "Keith is clear in the discussion that he really doesn't think qualia exist, that we're all zombies." That seems to be rhetoric. Sorry, but I can't read it any other way. "To quote his article "Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical." Again, these are simple statements and there and no arguments. So I don't know what to say.
When the conversation gets to discussing the zombie world vs non-zombie world, does anyone see little difference between Philip's argument and a theists? After watching the up to an hour and fourty minutes in, I just wonder how did Philip manage to get Scientific American to publish any of his writings.
@@MAF-08 He is also just wrong to say "zombies" can't be ruled out, they can trivially easily be ruled out. I can't imagine a color I've never seen before, a person who has never seen color at all (blind since birth) cannot imagine what it is like to see at all. Things that we can conceptualize are all remixes of things we have experienced before: if we cannot observe it _even in principle_ then we cannot _conceive_ of it even in principle. It logically follows that if you claim that "zombies" have no observable properties that distinguish them from a regular conscious person, then this additional property that they in one instance have and another instance do not, is not actually something you can even conceive of, and to state you can is just sophistry.
Something I don't understand about the philosophical zombie argument is what Philip says: that they "obviously" don't exist. How do we know? What are our criteria to distinguish someone with inner experience and someone who doesn't have it? If they behave exactly the same way, there is no way of telling. Philip Goff may be a philosophical zombie while the others might be "real" human beings. What is the difference? It seems to me like the argument has some assumptions that nobody is willing to explain. How to tell if someone is a zombie is one aspect of it. I am also amazed (apalled?) that Philip seems to outright dismiss solipsistic arguments in this case. Solipsism is the only way to go if you accept the philosophical zombie argument. I know, for sure, that I am conscious. I have the inner experience. I am certain of that, and just like Descartes, I think it is the only thing that I can be certain of. But there is absolutely no way of knowing for sure if somebody else has this inner experience or not. All I can do is to observe their behavior, talk to them, ask some questions and think about their answers. Which is 100% about their behavior. If I can't differentiate a zombie by observing their behavior, that means everybody in the world, except me, might be zombies and there's no way of knowing that. Which means this argument explains absolutely nothing. It adds something extra that doesn't explain anything and is not falsifiable. It is no different than saying there's an invisible dragon in my garage, or saying there is a flying spaghetti monster. Are these concepts conceivable? Yes. Does that mean they are true? No, at at all. Same goes for the zombies. What if someone is telling me that they are actually a zombie and they don't have inner experience at all? That would be fantastic because I'd like to ask a million questions on how they can behave in exactly the same way as us, see the light, colors, talk about phenomenal experience without actually having it. That zombie would probably help us understand what consciousness is quite a lot. Unfortunately, we don't have those zombies. And even if someone says they don't have this inner experience, how do we know they are not just lying? Which brings us to the first part: how do we know whether someone is a zombie or not?
We DO have those zombies. They're called computers. It's certainly easy to imagine a well-programmed computer providing answers to questions that are indistinguishable from human answers, yet few would insist such computers are "conscious." So while I agree with Sean's physicalism, I disagree with his insistence that there is nothing strange about consciousness in need of special explanation.
@@phasespace4700 indistinguishable in what way, and by whom? how does the computer give those answers? if you're imagining something like a turing test, which is by written communication only, then let me remind you that behaviour is not just giving written answers. does the computer cry under emotional pressure? be inspired by a sunset and write a poem? if something is not distinguishable from other conscious entities by anyone in any meaningful way, what is the reasoning for saying it is not conscious?
@@muhiptezcan6649 I see no reason why a machine programmed to mindlessly recapitulate human behavior is at all inconceivable. Having it "learn" to cry at a sad piece of music is just a matter of more data entry. Once the computing speed is sufficient to permit it to perform flawlessly, you insist it has now crossed the threshold into consciousness. I think it has nothing of the sort.
@@phasespace4700 how do you think it will be able to convince people if it's just programming? as a software engineer i can't conceive of such programming that can encapsulate human behavior so perfectly that it becomes indistinguishable, yet completely lacks inner experience. how do you imagine this "more data entry" to be like? is it something like "if this song plays, cry"? do humans cry when they listen to any sad music at any time?
@@muhiptezcan6649 "as a software engineer i can't conceive of such programming that can encapsulate human behavior so perfectly that it becomes indistinguishable, yet completely lacks inner experience." Again, I don't see why. It may be difficult to quantitatively define what we find beautiful in a poem or why one piece of music elicits joy and another sadness, but it doesn't seem impossible. If it can be quantified, then it becomes a math problem. What can't be quantified is precisely what you call inner experience or what some refer to as qualia. Let's set aside consciousness for a moment. Let's say I design a synthetic housefly. It looks to the naked eye like a natural housefly. It can fly around the room, avoid a fly swatter because its reaction is faster than a human's; it can land on sheer glass and even reproduce. The argument then seems to be that I have not made a _synthetic_ housefly but an _actual_ housefly, simply by virtue of my mimic being a convincing one. That seems a fundamentally flawed argument to me. One obvious thing it ignores is the radically different paths by which the real and fake housefly are brought into existence, one through millions of years of biological evolution, the other through engineering and the use of non-biological materials. Must consciousness be built from biomolecules? I suspect the answer is yes, even if the reasons why still elude us. Certainly, most would agree we know of no form of consciousness not brought about through evolution and constructed from biological materials.
The "zombie" arguments are not really possible. This is a "bottom up" set of situations in a zombie, not a "top down" situation. The zombies would never have come into existence in the first place since their so-call "consciousness" would never have manifested itself to simulate anything. In a video game, you have the various characters utter pre-recorded responses (and, I suppose, you could have a high-tech version that creates responses "on the fly"), but nothing like that would evolve without being created by someone or something that builds such games or whatever we are talking about. Mindless random action/reaction is how the universe works on its own.
If consciousness has a causal effect, then a zombie that could perfectly imitate a true person would necessarily have access to the contents of the true person's consciousness. So in a way, the zombie is actually a more complex entity than its "real" doppelganger, right?
if god fixed the numbers for fine tuning that kinda implies that god is following someone else's rules for physics. if god did it he could set the numbers to anything and we would think nothing of it. also, as far as nature is concerned, aren't all the numbers "1" - nature doesn't care about our numbering systems.
Sean would have his entire reputation destroyed lmfao. I don’t think Kastrup will allow him to get away with the regular sophistries that he pulls off.
Life is the best example of a weak emergent phenomenon similar in complexity and mysteriousness to consciousness. In the past we were so amazed and baffled by life that we needed to evoke extra, mysterious stuff like the "life force". That was cheating and explained nothing because it was using something that was "innately" alive to explain life (what the heck !) so it didn't explain anything. Our days almost all the educated and intelligent people (including philosophers) would not debate that life is not emergent from the laws of physics (chemistry really that is an aspect of physics) and it doesn't require extra stuff (even if we maybe don't have every single details of how physics leads to life). Consciousness is the next challenge, it is more than reasonable to expect that physics will be able to explain consciousness in the same way it did with life, no extra stuff required. The wonder of subjective experience comes all from the self-reference of consciousness that is the brain knowing itself, it is "weird" at the experiential level but conceptually and logically there is nothing weird about it, at least not more weird than reality exists at all.
I like Keith. "Colors are real, mental versions of colors are not." A true realist and a consistent monist. Reminds me of reading Jocelyn Benoist, would recommend him. Idealist philosophy is founded on the assumption that qualities are inherently mental, and so that makes the mind _a priori_ rather than a concept we derive _a posteriori._ If you then question the existence of all _a posteriori_ things, you're left with just the mind, causing idealists conclude the mind is "fundamental." But this is, again, all based on the fallacy that qualities are not of things but are _mental._ If you get rid of the _a priori_ mind you cannot arrive at idealism.
As Deutsch has stated exploring "Constructor Theory" the laws of physics can tell us lots about the behaviour and interactions of particles but not always about the "information" those interactions may reveal. A picture might be just dots, but it has meaning when observed by a consciousness entity. The laws of physics are a little fragile on this in my opinion ...
No, the inner experience is what allows for a conscious being to act as if it was conscious, how that is so difficult to understand? The being needs to understand its inner state to act as conscious, that is the subjective experience we have, without there is no consciousness or conscious behavior.
Love listening to Sean Carroll, genius, polite/friendly articulate man. He's the boss. Thanks for this.
"Polite"? He's quite dismissive of even some of his Patreons? Whilst I accept he has a great mind he's not immune to over-arrogance to the point of imposing his own aesthetics as "fact". And like many others monetisation in any way seems to be a driving force at which point rigour suffers ....
@@SearchBucket2 yea,,,,he doesn't accept nonsense,,& why should he...
@@spaceinyourface You mean like his insistence that "Many Worlds" metaphysics is THE "correct" interpretation of QM when in reality it's just another unprovable, untestable, unscientific, faith based belief?
I'll take Sabine's grounded, no nonsense stance all day long over his sense of aesthetics.
@@SearchBucket2yea,, you should've allways follow your instincts . Personally,,I just follow Sean & a few other physicists,,I'm to dumb or lazy or old to understand the fundamentals of the Universe without their guidance,,I don't follow many though, just a few . Sean's the top of pile in my eyes,,,& many, many others. For now at least.
@@spaceinyourface i get your point mate. so everything that you like goes to "follow your instincts" and whatever that you dont like goes into nonsense realm. Even though both may be untestable at this point. Seems sensible really...maybe in one of the many worlds you dont find this that correct
Would love to see a Sabine Hossenfelder vs Sean Carroll on Many Worlds interpretation
Sabine has talked a bit about many worlds. ruclips.net/video/kF6USB2I1iU/видео.html But a debate would be awesome
Oh yeah, me too.
Me three
Yikes... I'm gonna go figure out what happens when you divide by zero instead...
I think we should leave that alone. There’s a very good reason why there still are so many different conflicting interpretations of quantum mechanics. BECAUSE NOBODY HAS A FUCKING CLUE
Saw Sean on thumbnail, and clicked in a speed of light
I think people who think like Philip Goff don’t appreciate the rigor and how strong a claim from a physical theory is.
If any other factors played a role other than the core theory, we should be able to detect phenomena our theories didn’t predict correctly. Which is possible. But we don’t have any evidence for this yet.
Thinking a theory can make correct predictions but also have other factors playing a role simply means you don’t understand how precise and exact the science is.
If 'emergent' ,means that once the number of connections in the brain reaches a certain threshold, consciousness emerges, then yes I believe that consciousness is emergent. Am I right?
"I feel too special to just be physics" has a lot to answer for :)
Word
@@degaussingatmosphericcharg575 To be fair it's not a quote... but this thought does seem to be motivating much of the resistance to materialistic/physicalist explanations of consciousness. For some, it just doesn't "feel" like their experience can just be the neuron firing/information processing. So they insist there must be something else. For which the only evidence is the "feeling" itself. And all the something else explains is that "feeling" - except it doesn't do that either.
To be clear - Sentientism as a worldview is neutral on philosophy of mind so the panpsychist sentientists (like Luke Roelofs) will disagree with me!
@@Sentientism and yet asserting full-blown dualism still manages to be less incoherent than claiming the experience red doesn't exist but instead the property red emerges as an artifact that shuffles up to higher function
@@5piles Personally (other sentientists disagree), I don't deny the existence of consciousness or the experience of red. I just think they are the running of that particular variety of information processing. Others have the same sorts of experiences as me but are led to conclude that those experiences must be something distinct from the information processing - even though that distinct thing seems to have none of its own effects and is not detectable beyond the reports (external and internal) of the entity running the information processing.
Having said that - I don't think this distinct consciousness is detectable through my own internal reports either - because for me they only indicate the class of information processing going on mostly in my head - not that there's anything distinct or non-physical. Consciousness "seeming" to be something distinct is very weak evidence for me. Feels like yet another instance of us humans insisting us and our glorious consciousness must somehow be central to the universe - or even its foundation.
@@Sentientism awareness as fundamental may require simply learning to correctly observe it. that sounds far more rational than positing miraculous properties to mass or in your version 'information'
Philip's assertion that human life having special value gives rise to the need to explain the fine tuning that permits it is very telling. It faces Keith's observation that we only think we are special because its us, and says, yeah, but its us! We are special! Keith is right, and I don't know why it isn't obvious to more philosophers. The lottery winner feels special because it is they who won it. Unless someone can demonstrate that our universe is fine tuned, there is nothing to explain.
You wrote: "Philip's assertion that human life having special value gives rise to the need to explain the fine tuning that permits it is very telling."
Every species is "special" in that way too. Indeed every *thing* (biological or non-biological) is special. That is, every thing (or type of thing) would only have come about because of these initial fine-tunings very early in the life of the universe - plus the indefinite amount of contingent happenings which occurred later. So the likelihood of any entity being the way it is - or even existing - is very low... But so what?
"Special value" can mean that "special" constants, laws, ratios, etc. needed to have come together - or occurred - in order to bring about human beings. Or it may be that human being are special when compared to other non-human entities. Or human beings are special in the eyes of God. Alternatively, human beings are special to... well, human beings.
Well no, we are special cause rock arent walking around interacting with the universe. The have a awareness of any of this at all. In that way we are special.
@@brettharter143 A flea can jump 100 times higher than a human being proportionate to its size. Some animals can leave permanently under water. Others can live in volcanoes. Some animals can live much longer than human beings. Other animals have an evolutionary lineage millions of years longer than human beings.... Indeed rocks have "special" features than humans don't have. Every thing is special in its own particular way. And you didn't answer the question as to what "special" actually means. And special to what or to whom?.... And why single out rocks anyway? What about apes, dogs, mountains, trees, etc?... Sure, we can interact with the universe. But I still don't understand the word "special" in this context.
@@brettharter143 But we're not hard like stone, in that way stones are special. And we don't have long necks, in that way giraffes are special. And we don't absorb stars, in that way black holes are special. Why does our special require a special explanation of the universe?
@@crab0traps0now Such tall necks and gravity implosion are functions intrinsic to their local environment and therefore intrinsic to making the physical evolving cosmos a going concern. Human intentional manipulation of our ecological niche for our own constructive or destructive purposes transcends such natural limits.
I find it surprising that after writing articles, papers, and books on the subject, Goff seems so inarticulate and has such difficulty responding to simple questions on it and counters to it...
It seems to me that Goffian panpsychism does nothing to explain consciousness, especially the 'hard problem', but rather avoids explanation (makes it impossible to explain) by making it fundamental. But in doing so, it raises far more questions than it purports to answer, including what panpsychism really means by 'consciousness', e.g. what does it mean for an electron to be conscious? conscious of what and how? Also, is an atom the sum of the consciousnesses of its component particles? If not, what? What about a table? Why does the consciousness we can identify seem restricted to creatures with sophisticated brains, and why does the apparent degree of consciousness correspond to the complexity, size, and sophistication of the brain?
It also seems to me that consciousness necessarily involves information processing - even simple awareness is awareness _of_ something, some information about the internal or external milieu that changes the internal state in a significant way. One can see why a brain might be suited to this, but how can it apply to a fundamental particle that has no properties but charge and spin?
As an explanation:
1. it isn't testable;
2. it makes no predictions;
3. it has no explanatory power (in that it doesn't provide any understanding of, or insight into, the phenomenon - and you can't explain the unexplained with the inexplicable);
4. it isn't parsimonious (in that it adds a new element to our fundamental ontology);
5. it is ad-hoc;
6. it has no unifying scope (in that it provides no underlying principle that can help explain or provide understanding of, or insight into, other phenomena);
7. it raises more questions than it answers, all unanswerable;
8. it has no connection or relation to our existing body of knowledge.
Strictly speaking, it isn't an explanation at all...
As I think Carroll and/or Frankish said at one point Goff finds consciousness so unique and amazing he seems to have great difficulty accepting it probably has an entirely physical basis. But personal incredulity doesn't necessitate another explanation.
The Integrated Information answers all of those questions. Perhaps “testability” will always be a problem but that’s endemic to the private nature of experience.
@@mattsigl1426 I wouldn't argue that integrated information is not important - Tononi et al. have done some excellent work, but given that it's possible to construct circuits with higher than human Phi levels that do relatively little complex or interesting processing, and given the functional architecture of the human brain, it seems to me that integrated information is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What is also important is the kind of information being processed and the way that it is processed.
That's the way I see it at present; but it's early days...
I think that the issue is summed up in the zombie argument which is circular. The way it basically runs:
If I can imagine a system with no consciousness
Which
behaves in all respects like a system with consciousness
Consciousness does nothing.
But just because I can propose such a system does not mean it is a possible system.
I could equally write
If I can imagine a system with no consciousness
And
It couldnt behave identically in all respects to one with consciousness.
Consciousness has explanatory power. (IE the delta)
Ditto zombie universe argument.
The zombie arguement (person or universe) is like someone claiming that imagining a perpetual engine means that the conservation of energy fails. It a rubbish arguement. Truth is I can't imagine to the extent that I believe! Since no one can believe their state would be unchanged if they lost consciousness, (we all sleep!) Why entertain the unbelievable?
If the Zombie arguement has force then so does:
I can't imagine existence without consciousness
So
Existence depends on consciousness
Things that exist require consciousness
From here I can argue that either:
All reality exists only because I am conscious
Or
Reality exists even if I am not conscious of it. Therefore anything that can exist independently must be conscious.
I would argue that consciousness makes a difference, IIT's notion of causal power is along the right lines. Consciousness improves behaviour (internal and external states) OR equally possible, consciousness is the act of perception.
When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system.
It could be argued that such a theory overcomes many of your points. This issue is whether it has any predictive power that can be tested. It is difficult to see how the null hypothesis can be.
@@nickdyne8001 I think the whole consciousness debate tends to be suffused with a subtle dualist bias. The long-time reification of 'mind' as a 'thing' in its own right rather than a process (or network of processes), and the implicit sense of Cartesian theatre - that we relate to our bodies, as Sean once put it, "Like a soccer mom driving an SUV" - leads to ideas - like philosophical zombies - that either beg the question or bring into question the very concept of consciousness and its meaning - how do I know I'm not a P zombie? Well, I'm conscious. But a P zombie must think that too in order to indistinguishably emulate consciousness... meh.
_"When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system."_ This sounds rather teleological, which is a whole other kettle of fish... I may have misunderstood your meaning, but I'd prefer to say that consciousness evolved because the realisation (or representation) of state in a living system provides a selective advantage.
I'm not sure if Sean ever had a conversation with Johnathan Haidt, because their vocals are so similar sounding that it might not be able to tell who was speaking without seeing them talk. A good push and pull conversation, which are important to take place. We might not agree with each individual views, but having the conversation can still be a learning experience. Thank you gentlemen.
I usually tend to Sean's podcast and that might be the reason, but their voices hear nothing alike to me.
I've just been Carrollised,,,again !!
I really enjoyed that. 😉
Lol @ 1:45:15 where Keith basically just says "take a back seat Philip so Sean and I can have a real conversation".
Sean is amazing, the way he destroyed that Phillip dude is wonderful, and he does it in a very polite and understanding way. Genius.
Thanks for this video, I hope more are on the way.
Keith was very witty,,," that's not a contentious example at all " brilliant 👏👍😀
Good effort for a 1K subs channel to get Sean Carroll on for over 3 hours!
What a great talk! I'm happy I found it, even though I missed it originally.
I think the weirdest part of the Fine Tuning Universe is that life is so fragile and non robust.
Why life requires particular conditions to happen? Why life could not exists under a large range of fundamental constants values? I think this is a much deeper puzzle. This is not easily explained by selection or multiverse because then we would need to explain how come we are in that particular universe that has a form of life that is so fragile to need a fine tuned universe to exist.
Great point
Multiverse is just switching the unknown conscious creator model (The unmoved mover for Aristotle) for an infinite/or uncomprehensibily large unconscious model large enough to make things statistically probable.
Why life requires particular conditions to happen? This is based upon the assumption that we have a definition of life/intellegence/consciousness. - An interesting assertion but not grounded in anything but an assertion. (generically christian too. Life emerges within a body made of dust and returns to dust)
Why life could not exists under a large range of fundamental constants values? This is the much better question and requires us to define our terms to a point where the question becomes intellegable.
The argument that the metre reading of minds proves that minds are an epiphenominon based upon physics as it currently stands is incoherant to me. If you can model the device used to model (Mind) then you have problems.
No one here knows this, but Sean Carroll is a lot like my cousin, and most of my family comes from Liverpool, like Philip Goff. MIND BLOWN!!!!
I may have answered my own question. The conscious mind has states: waking, sleeping, thinking, daydreaming etc. all have motion; are changeable. Consciousness underlines them all, unchanging. If it does not have motion then it cannot be physical.
Very much enjoyed this. Loved the way you had your discussions and explained your positions. Thank you, I learned quite a bit!
This panpshychisim idea disturbed my brain for some monthes, read and read about it with hopeless understanding the world and its not give better explaining the world than Idealism. So its the same with idea that we live in a computer simulation world.
So until now best compelin and sharpest knife is the physicalism, it realy helps me to understand the world I live in,.Sean is realy a biggest thinker ever!
Sweet to hear Sean Carroll referring to Stephen Wolfram's discrete hypergraph quantum gravity hypothesis.
Excellent discussion. But, Philip Goff's analogy between the gambler's fallacy and the multiverse is mistaken. It all depends on whether the combinations between the different physical constants are finite or infinite. If they are infinite the probability of getting any one of them in a finite number of universes is always going to be 0. But if they are not infinite that probability is higher the higher the number of universes. To put it simply: if I toss a coin once, the probability of getting a head is obviously 0.5, but if I toss the coin twice that probability goes up to 0.75, etc.
good to see Sean Carrol dismantling Panpsychism ;b
2:32:13
I agree with Sean's conclusion but I disagree with where the difficulty is. With the core theory, I think we can tell that only the lowest-mass particles exist, so we would know that only electrons and up and down quarks exist.
We would also know that, given atomic nuclei and the Pauli exclusion principle, that the periodic table exists. (Which is also another reason why electrons in the brain and electrons outside it have to be identical, but I digress.)
The trouble, however, is on both sides of the periodic table: We don't have good tools to predict the existence of baryons, nor do we have a good, easy theory of nuclei. Whether complex organic chemistry exists also depends heavily on the exact ionization and binding energies of atoms, which is about as computationally intensive as the problems with nuclei.
So no, we will be able to predict the periodic table exists, given its prerequisites. The problem is below and above that. The periodic table is the lighthouse in the murky theoretical waters around it.
If you're adding the prerequisites of atomic theory you're using more than just the core theory, because we don't know how to get those from the core theory as of right now. That's all that Sean was saying
@@GammaPunk I'm saying that the periodic table is a weird place to cut it off.
Physics dealt with several (apparent) strong emergence phenomena in the recent past that literally transformed physics: black body problem, photoelectric effect, Michelson-Morley null experiment. In all these cases we could not explain the collective behavior of the system from its constituent parts acting locally using the state of the art physics of the time (mostly Newtonian plus statistical mechanics). People did try and tried hard but they failed miserably. So we had to introduce new physics in particular quantum mechanics and special relativity (crazy new physics that was shocking even to its proponents). Consciousness SO FAR doesn't seem to be a similar challenge even if are not yet able to explain how consciousness works in details, and if somebody could explain consciousness using some new physics it would be amazing and very useful (revolutionary as QM and SR) but for sure panpsychism doesn't do that at all.
By the way this new physics would have also to explain the other properties of the world we observe, maybe by being a generalization of the existing physics, exactly like QM did, basically showing that classical mechanics is a particular case of QM.
My word that guy Goff can’t stop drinking every few moments. He went from glass of water, to tea, to the black thermos.
he has 50-50 free will.
He is definitely right to point out that if consciousness has no impact on behaviour it isn't "fundamental".
Just a thought...Is consciousness inherent in the universe at every point of time and space...the same way water or other particles actually flow as per the contours of the landscape. So called entropy for instance is actually events unfolding in a predictable way along the existing landscape . This then makes me question free will. Maybe consciousness is just the predictable flow of events along the landscape that we observe or inhabit
Thats what the idealist would believe yes but then ask urself this. What was ur consciousness doing prior to ur birth? Why don't you have memories of those "conscious" events? what good is consciousness if u cant store memories of it?
Can you make this available on the Podcasts app? I don’t see this episode on there
I love Sean Carroll, and I don't think panpsychism is right, but isn't Sean denying that consciousness exists while denying that he's denying that consciousness exists?
I was surprised by his position. Unfortunately, the guests weren't very good at attacking it.
Consciousness is just a kind of awareness! You become aware of things by sensing them and making sense of them! We do those things with our sense organs!
So a guy in coma has consciouness or not? If he doesn’t, then what explains that some years after that he recovered it?
Goff said "you can't be in pain without realizing you are in pain" as evidence of immediate self awareness of any conscious being, but I disagree. I've often become completely unaware of my own pain over time until someone mentions it and it becomes painfully obvious. Joint pain, muscle pain, emotional pain, splitting headaches. Awareness and consciousness aren't obe to one correlated. I'm not sure how this effects the arguments for/against panpsychism, though.
1:52:10 What is this "coloric" concept Sean mentions, did I spell it correctly?
One of the best parts of this video is 14:30 when Sean has to reposition for the lighting. Like the plant turning towards sunlight or the amoeba moving towards the sugar molecule. Consciousness is how we interact with our environment.
Great conversations from everyone, fascinating to the end.
Best part of the whole episode is one hour and 37 minutes when Sean Carroll says "you're gonna be way more interesting if you're honest"
Goff seems to not even understand the implications of his own beliefs nor is he able to accurately describe the opposing materialist viewpoints.
Sean Carroll if you're reading this have a nice day! I hope he reads this comment in at least one of the many worlds.
Frequent recent opinions in the discussion about the essence of consciousness refer to phenomena occurring outside (above) the brain. Usually an unresolved so-called “hard problem” is mentioned.
It is true that the experience of qualia is difficult to explain by processes of the described neural networks.
So I believe that an effective theory of consciousness should be based on the integration of several known theories of consciousness. In particular, the theory of neural circuits realizing imagery should be integrated with the "conscious electromagnetic information field theory (cemi)"
One of the theories included in an effective explanation of the essence of consciousness should also be one of the theories linking the experience of qualia with the physics (fine structure) of the Universe.
We published recently an article [ Neural Circuits, Microtubule Processing, Brain's Electromagnetic Field - Components of Self-Awareness. Brain Sci. 2021, 11, 984. ] which shows how to integrate the explanations of the essential components of consciousness.
Thanks. Very useful comment. Read cemi, I think it and IIT not incompatible and Orch OR should fit in too. GWR and IIT are essentially content theories. Cemi and OR are dealing with hard problem.
Sean keeps saying the world is physical, but doesn't define "physical". What does it mean for something to be "physical"?
Yay Keith ! Totally enjoying this and would love to hear more stuff about Represenation as Fundamental ? human behavior
P Zombies is a non-coherent concept.
It is like saying "imagine an electron exactly like ours , but doesn't have charge".
Well, if it is exactly like our world then the electron WILL have charge.
Similarly, if there is a world which works exactly like our, then thise creatures WILL have consciousness.
Philip Geoff (PG) does not have any argument. The group structure of his thinking has a 0 called consciousness so that A * 0 = A, where A is anything in the material world and 0 is the value of consciousness in the operations of that world. Despite that, he insists that 0 must be taken into account. For all I know, he could have called it the Virgin Mary, with the same properties of being absolutely essential and also inconsequential and for sure my mom would agree with him.
Compare consciousness with mathematics, M. M is invisible, eternal, true, not supervenient in physical reality (it does not depend on it like matter depends on energy or momentum), But it is not an amorphous thing, it has structure and internal coherence. When pieces fit, the theorem is proved and the body of known mathematics grows. Is there something similar to that in the body of knowledge of consciousness?
Sean Carroll is brilliant and deserves a note of gratitude for his efforts to share knowledge.
Man, it is utterly painful to listen to Philip Goff failing to understand the implications of the philosophical zombie argument, so clearly and repeatedly laid out by Carroll. I have to put a pillow over my face, can't watch!
Sean mentioning Wolfram's hypergraph model made my heart flutter.
What time stamp was that?
@@beeshepard Don't have timestamp, but it was in the latter half of it. Just a brief mention.
I think there are so many parallels between Many Worlds, and Wolfram's model that seemed lost when Wolfram was on Sean's podcast. I would love to see more exploration of it.
So about consciousness. The data point we have is our own experience. Then we have all the stuff we can observe through material interactions like deep conversations and observing other humans and animals and the rest of nature. Then we have the question. How many consciousnesses are there here and where are they. If you want to go beyond solipsism you need to pick some instrumental model. You could start out with consciousness being in other humans and expand to animals and so on and if you expand really really far you might end up with panpsychism. If you then consider what your fundamental ontology is you'll have difficulty. Say you study some mathematical equation, you think is a theory of the world and then you ask what is it that has this structure and will it be like anything to be something that has that structure. I don't know how to tell. I mean how could we ever. I'm not sure what the difference is between panpsychism, physicalism, and mathematical structuralism. I mean anyone holding to any of them would trivially have to agree that there at least is something to be their own consciousness so it must be like something to be whatever the ontology is, right. As a materialist that is a bit confusing maybe. As a mathematical structuralist it's also confusing. But as a panpsychist the only difference is that you promote consciousness to something more fundamental which means you actually don't have a fundamental theory of consciousness either, so it is still confusing. Can't we all just agree that it's confusing XD
panpsychism is the predesessor to a process philosophy. Whitehead simply has not been studied enough but he provides an ontology that as far as i can tell, is not yet bumping heads with much of science
@@thomasforster9744 That may be so. I haven’t read him. I suspect one needs quite a bit of time and effort to read up on an ontology and compare it to others. Do you have any golden nuggets to share from it?
*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
I agree. Whether intentionally or not, using the term 'hard problem' insists consciousness necessitates an explanation beyond the physical paradigm without explaining how.
I don’t understand why there isn’t a discussion about the distinction between awareness and consciousness. They seem quite different to me. Isn’t conscious emergent from awareness?
Goff picked the zombie thought experiment frame. Probably should've used a different tactic.
How is this Phillip Goff guy a professor?
Según el fisicalismo, ¿por qué razón, no existe cierto grado de contradicción en el modelo neurocientífico de la mente (neurociencia cognitiva), ya que según parece: el cerebro es tanto fuente (sustrato), como producto(interpretación consciente - mental -), de sí mismo?
¿el que, al observar directamente la actividad sináptica de las áreas visuales de un paciente (cerebro expuesto), no logre observar sus qualia, no implica necesariamente, alguna forma de dualismo (ontológico y en consecuencia explicativo) intrínseco?
Love this multidisciplinary interaction, 2 well learned men taking turns in grilling the most qualified person. Solidly knowledgable with humility and perspectives. Entertaining with real substance. Thanks Dr Sean and all. Keep up the good work.
From Hker worldwide
2?
They should have brought up motion. While consciousness has states, where is the evidence that it has motion as the mind has motion? If it does not have motion then how could not be prior to the three forces which has motion?
Sean carroll is so great at debating. His knowledge is vast and e is clear and precise in expressing his views which he himself hold in high esteem and stead fast at it as well. It is incredible to listen to him articulate and dismantle any opposing views to his beliefs which does not have much credence. He rattled Mr. Philip Goff here
The problem with debates is that the performer prevails, not objective truth.
Theologist debaters like Hovid and Craig Lane have a deep reserve of stock arguments which can make them look good to an audience of neutrals. In contrast Dawkins isn't a great debater. Being good at debating means nothing other than you are good at "show business" and well prepared.
consciousness is illusory(Daniel Dennett ) means your awareness is illusory ..?? so your thinking is illusory..? and illusory means it is not physical ...???
Very awkward beginning, better planning would help. Carroll is like always on top of the subject and makes the better arguments. The other two are bumbling and stumbling.
What we have here is a problem with the very definition of "Consciousness" and its relation to the laws of physics that define and control the universe: What will, it is hoped by physicists, to become "The Theory of Everything." The discussion is about how can consciousness "emerge" from that theory, assuming it is ever finally discovered, of course.
The problem is that is cannot. The Theory would define, to use a chess definition, the board, the pieces, and the complex rules that allow the pieces to be manipulated by the board itself -- what the Big Bang did to start them interacting -- and what a conscious living structure could do to modify those original actions for its own purposes, whatever those may be. Such modifications to the unthinking manifestations of the universe as it runs down like a mechanical toy (though a natural one, not a manufactured one) define what relationship a conscious "mind" has on the physical universe around it. If it did nothing to modify the universe in any way, you could not ever detect consciousness, no matter what it might be, now could you?
OK. Now what relation to the Theory would a consciousness that was detectable make? It is indeed an "emergent" phenomenon based on living things (however you might define "life"), but emergent from WHAT? By definition, emergence means that you discover an unusual effect that is unexpected, yet when analyzed in detail can be shown to be a step-by-step result of a previously known set of rules (the hypothetical Theory here). How can you do that with consciousness; what is in the Theory that can be so followed? Nothing that I can imagine.
Consciousness is, however, a set of parameters that must be known if the living structure that has it is to have its future (and past) actions understood. It is thus a set of "dimensions" defining the structure, but dimensions that are not physical in space or time, other than having to be superimposed on non-living/non-co0nscious material to allow them to become functional (a physical "instantiation" to allow consciousness to interact with the physical world and thus be detectable by an outside observer). Consciousness is thus a PATTERN of some sort superimposed on a physical medium (the brain in our form of life, though electronic artificial intelligence might be a supportive alternative, among others) that can support it and allow it to interact with the external universe in some way or ways. Because it is a pattern of self-interacting material (matter and energy) that also interacts with the external universe in some way, it must have sets of rules that control how it can be a semi-stable (stable enough to allow some minimum time to be detectable, but probably continually adjusting itself to the current internal conditions of its supportive structure, like someone balancing a pencil on its tip). It is these rules that allow consciousness to exist as this superimposed pattern that are what is the problem to be solved. This implies that the non-material dimensions mentioned must be found and how they interact worked out to find the boundaries where consciousness can and cannot occur.
We thus have a major problem in defining ANOTHER "Theory of Everything" but the "Everything" here is not the physical world, but the world of patterns that will and will not support consciousness This is a novel situation, since previously defining such things was "philosophy" and not "hard science". But here the pattern is wholly non-physical in that it can be generated in different materials and in different configurations and still give the desired result (more-or-less). In other words, how does the universe interact with such things as computer programs when the computers used with them are changed and the language they are written in changes and so forth, but they still give the same results? Consciousness will be like that, so we have to finally understand the equivalent of the "computational language" consciousness is written in and how it is superimposed on a physical structure to comprehend it.
Can we stretch our definitions of "dimensions" to include such non-physical phenomena where consciousness resides? If not, the problem will not ever be solved...
You seem to think that only "hardware" is part of the physical world and patterns, relations, structure, information is not?
Well , that's not the case..one cannot even define a clear dividing line!
Physical world ( and thus, subject of Physics) is everything that exists, matter fields, spacetime, patterns and structures ( shortly speaking, the laws of physics, albeit in their more refined , fundamental form and everything that these laws are describing), including ourselves..
Self awareness and consciousness and everything related are also subjects of Physics, in principle.
I don't think that there's serious doubt that consciousness is an emergent, macroscopic level phenomenon.
The interesting question is if it is "weakly" or "strongly - in the physicalist sense- emergent.
Panpsychism is so weak as a hypothesis that is just ridiculous to accept the possibility of it’s truthness. Is great to see Philip keep saying that consciousness does something but never mentions a single thing, is like talking about god
Yeah, while I don't remember him mentioning god specifically, many of his arguments seem similar to those of theists.
What is more likely, that you are conscious, or that you even listened to this video or interacted with anything else from the outside world?
1:11:21 Philip! Physics doesn't "abstract"! Physics is the most concrete thing there is! It's how we talk about the stuff everything is made of!
Time to stoke this conversation again. Get Sean Carroll and a straight-laced psychologist or neuroscientist in there and let's talk about the microscopic level of consciousness.
Great conversations! I think i understadn the view of panpsychism a bit more clearly now.
Another problem noted from a video on whether an animal can recognize itself in a mirror. They used the term "self-awareness" for this. That is at odds with the fact that by trying to attack the other animal in the mirror, the tested animal IS aware of itself and that there is another animal very similar to it that it considers an intruder -- it is aware of its physical position and the boundary around that position that it considers ITS territory -- but does not recognize itself in the mirror due to not being able to see all of its own properties AND not understanding what a mirror is. That is, if the animal is smart enough to understand what a mirror is, it can learn to stop attacking the image by finally realizing that the image is itself. But what has that to do with self--awareness? A property of a portion of intelligence concerning things like mirrors, yes, but that is not anything to do with the animal having or not having an awareness of itself as a separate unit with distinct boundaries on its physical body (where sensation and mental control of its body stops). This kind of confusion in the meaning of the language used to describe consciousness and its attributes is one of the biggest things interfering with this study!
Subjective experiences are just a particular case of objective experiences.
It is you observing you. It is public in that sense and people can compare subjective experiences. The entire traditions of Buddhism, Veda and Tantra is to discuss the subjective experiences as if they were objective, and they are objective because they are universal.
There is no such thing as objective experience. All experiences are subjective. Multiple subjects cannot observe the same experience as if it were an object in the world separate from themselves, therefore there is nothing objective about it.
I don't know if this is pertinent to your conversation but I saw a Scottish (I to am Scottish, irrelevant) woman on the news recently who was at least 40 years old and she clearly had no understanding of the fact that this "pain" thing that people had been yammering on about for her whole life was actually a thing that she was physiologically incapable of experiencing. Her doctor was interviewed on the news and he seemed to find this as incredible as he did amusing. He was having her eat chillies with him and watching in what seemed to me to be amused disbelief at this very white person having no reaction to chilli that he himself seemed to find rather fiery. What struck me was that the patient seemed to have no clue whatsoever that her conscious experience was so fundamentally different (no pain, ever. What did she imagine everyone was talking, indeed litigating, about? Why did they hobble about making stupid noises and faces when they stubbed their toes? e.t.c. e.t.c. e.t.c.) How many dimensions could consciousness have, really? Can they all be described in the English language? Are they all tied to external physical forces? Are humans unique in their sensitivity to time? Birds can sense the earths magnetic field. What forces exist for which biological sensors could be designed in the language of the human genome and given the size of the human genome and the rate of evolution, how many people exist with as yet undocumented sensitivities?
Fascinating.
I'm very surprised that she, or her parents didn't find out about this earlier. Most people with CIPA exhibit self destructive behaviors early on (biting tongue, scratching corneas, breaking bones without noticing etc.)
People like her normally don't tend to live very long. How was her CIPA not found earlier or how is she not dead (or at least possessing many broken limbs etc) yet?
That would be an example of one function of the brain signaling another portion of the brain, the other portion being conscious. This seems to be an unnecessary duplication of work. Why would the body be set up that way?
fantastic episode
Cool discussion. I think it took a bit to clarify, but in the end, people got that Philip is emphasizing that consciousness definitely plays a causal role in his theory, as it is literally the stuff playing the roles, whereas Sean's point was that he still wouldn't go with this, as he would like Philip's mental qualities to actually (if I get it correctly) *change* the dispositions of fundamental physical properties. (Here is Keith's key word differential.)
I'm not concluding anything, but I do seem to get why someone might go that direction. Physics already does give particles certain not-exactly-dispositional properties, namely mathematical ones like charge, mass, etc. However, these all figure into the explanation of the dispositions -- if you change the mass, it'll change what the particle does, which you see when you plug those numbers into the relevant equations. Sean seems to focus on the fact that changing the presence/lack of Philip's additional mental properties won't do this.
One comment I have is that I might add either a third option or at least a subtype of/"spin" on one of Sean's two options he gives the panpsychist, which might or might not offer him a reason not to rule the view out quite how he does -- even so, I would personally guess he'd not adopt panpsychism for other reasons (e.g. the option I mention is still consistent with someone being a sort of physicalist/thinking mental properties should not exist at the fundamental level). I think he is saying that either the panpsychist adopts a theory of mental qualities that modifies the laws of physics (or something to that effect), or adopts one of "passive" mental qualities that don't modify the laws. Philip obviously wants to go with the latter. Sean then says these passive qualities seem too inconsequential, due to the lack of difference they make in terms of behavior.
Now, here comes my addition/spin: I think one in-between option is where we don't change the mathematical structure of the laws of nature, but make sure whatever metaphysics we add to the one given by the "bare" physicalist one of Sean would actually *explain/ground* the laws of nature. That is, make it more transparent why a physical particle might follow the laws of nature it does with metaphysical necessity -- ground this in some fact about the particle's nature. I think this would be of interest to a scientist, since I think it remains open-ended/pretty debatable at this point if the laws of nature could have been different, or if something about the nature of fundamental physics properties explains why they follow those laws.
Then, the additional (we might say "qualitative") properties would be worth adding to the theory even for someone wanting to explain the dispositions better.
Are you not proposing adding extra steps to the causes without changing the results? Occam has a razor for that.
@@MNbenMN Nope, definitely not. What you describe is one of the two views Sean discusses, and this is NOT the one I'm trying to describe -- one where panpsychists add qualitative properties to the fundamental nature of particles/fields/other physics entities without in any way adding to our explanation of the laws of physics or causal profile of these particles/fields/etc. The point of my response is to add in an option I don't think either Sean or Philip explicitly addressed. This option is where the physicalist or panpsychist or other Russelian monist says the fundamental nature of particles would shed light on *why* there even exist those specific laws of nature they follow. This is typically a brute fact. To get past the bruteness of it would be of significant interest to someone like Sean, since here we really are adding to the explanation of scientific experimental results.
Sean's concern is that, while Philip's view is not quite dualism, it shares a lot of the pitfalls of dualism, in that the little bits of qualia Philip pictures following the laws of nature might be said to have causal efficacy (which is the usual issue dualism struggles with), but they have this efficacy in a sort of "empty way" -- they don't contribute to the explanation of the causal powers/profile.
The view I describe is not itself intrinsically anti-physicalistic in nature, by the way. The idea would be to discover if we can say something further about what grounds the laws of nature/mathematical structure of the physical world, or if that is basically a brute fact.
It probably helps to think of it this way: already, Sean likes philosophical theories like the Everettian view of Quantum Mechanics, which does not in any way tell us fundamental physics entites are going to do something differently in experiment. It rather (among other things) purports to explain why there are probabilities in our experimental findings. Technically one could just say "who needs Everettian theory -- the math works, we're done." But it seems the finding of probabilities is a brute fact, and Everettian theory is one way we could make sense of that.
In a similar spirit, it would be very interesting if the laws of nature themselves had a more fundamental explanation.
Maybe this is the wrong venue for this, but: I can imagine a world with hydrogen and oxygen atoms that when combined in the 2/1 ration produce what we would all recognize as water, except that it is incapable of freezing into ice. I don't understand how my ability to conceive of such a thing creates an explanatory gap that needs tending. Isn't it cleaner to think that any 2/1 combination of those atoms would produce what we by definition call water, and by extension any zombie that had all of the same physical components as the non zombie would produce what we by definition call consciousness?
I agree, I posted this on another thread.
I think that the issue is summed up in the zombie argument which is circular. The way it basically runs:
If I can imagine a system with no consciousness
Which
behaves in all respects like a system with consciousness
Consciousness does nothing.
But just because I can propose such a system does not mean it is a possible system.
I could equally write
If I can imagine a system with no consciousness
And
It couldnt behave identically in all respects to one with consciousness.
Consciousness has explanatory power. (IE the delta)
Ditto zombie universe argument.
The zombie arguement (person or universe) is like someone claiming that imagining a perpetual engine means that the conservation of energy fails. It a rubbish arguement. Truth is I can't imagine to the extent that I believe! Since no one can believe their state would be unchanged if they lost consciousness, (we all sleep!) Why entertain the unbelievable?
If the Zombie arguement has force then so does:
I can't imagine existence without consciousness
So
Existence depends on consciousness
Things that exist require consciousness
From here I can argue that either:
All reality exists only because I am conscious
Or
Reality exists even if I am not conscious of it. Therefore anything that can exist independently must be conscious.
I would argue that consciousness makes a difference, IIT's notion of causal power is along the right lines. Consciousness improves behaviour (internal and external states) OR equally possible, consciousness is the act of perception.
When applied to the universe, it would suggest that the function of consciousness is to allow the realisation of state in a system.
It could be argued that such a theory overcomes many of your points. This issue is whether it has any predictive power that can be tested. It is difficult to see how the null hypothesis can be.
Philip really reminds me of Fitz from agents of S.H.I.E.L.D
More than an hour in, kinda feel sorry for Goff :")
He was a good foil for Carroll. Without Goff's persistent arguments, I would not have understood Carroll's thinking nearly as well.
57:20 Sean Carroll is mistaking Panpsychism for a testable scientific hypothesis. It is not being proposed as such, but rather as a metaphysical interpretation of existing scientific knowledge.
The world is built upon intangible shoelaces. I'll call it Lacepsychism, which holds the same level of credibility as this rubbish.
@@Paine137 The reason some are driven to a panpsychist metaphysics is in order to account for the fact that conscious agents exist (e.g., the conscious agents who do science). Consciousness and agency do not feature in the accounts of the universe offered by physicists. This is not itself a problem, so long as the physicists don't forget that their models are approximations that entirely leave out the living world and the intelligent beings who devise them. Carroll wants to say these (life and mind) are unimportant features of the universe that can "emerge" later. I think he's asking this word "emerge" to do some very heavy lifting. If the universe is really exhaustively described by Carroll's "core theory," then the presence of scientific knowers of said theory is so unfathomably improbable that we may as well just call it a miracle. Panpsychism tries to make the presence of life and mind less miraculous by arguing that the energetic processes physics is describing in mathematical terms can also be described in experiential terms. Your "lacepsychism" is entirely tangential and neglects the metaphysical issue at stake here. Saying "experience" goes all the way down is not the same as saying some particular sort of object goes all the way down.
@@Footnotes2Plato I appreciate your response, but arguments like this employ a lot of words that say very little. Consciousness is, at this stage, still an idea, and itself might not reflect the reality of awareness. Placing consciousness below the level of quantum fields therefore is rather arrogant, given the absolute lack of any supporting data outside of mere word-salading.
@@Footnotes2Plato Is there any reason to think consciousness can happen without a brain or that experience can happen without senses?
@@TimUckun I suspect that conscious experience such as humans and other mammals possess indeed requires a brain. I would say brains are necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. Can experience happen without senses? Almost certainly, though it depends what you mean by experience and by senses. I would want to distinguish between consciousness and experience. Most experience is not conscious, but more like vague feelings of inheritance. Conscious experience is relatively rare in the universe, by the looks of it. As for senses, do you mean highly evolved sensory organs like eyes and ears? Certainly, experience can occur in single celled creatures just via the membrane interface, which is a kind of sense organ. I would suggest that very simple forms of "vector-feeling" (i.e., the feeling of causal efficacy inheriting the influences of the past through an experiential present to transmit them to the future) are conceivable even in the non-biological physical realm.
When I listen to Philip Goff try to explain the "zombie problem" and his panpsychist view I am kinda baffled that anyone would take it seriously.
40:44 What? Come on Phillip, how many times does Sean have to say it before it sinks in... If you have two objects that behave identically, and the only difference between them is an added property "C" (consciousness), then this property has no effect on behavior because if it did, the two objects would behave differently. It couldn't follow more obviously...
I think Zombie blurs the question, because it's a biological entity, plus no one has ever seen one. Why not pose the question with something familiar and real? What about a computer with a vast database of human behaviors and reactions. You ask it a question and its response is always indistinguishable from a human's. Does that make the computer "conscious?" I think most would answer "no" once again introducing this idea of a gap in need of explanation.
@@phasespace4700 are all the particles identical inside the computer with similar positions and velocities to the human? If not, then you’ve just built the computer wrong. The point is that if we had a materialistic identical copy of a conscious agent, then materialism would be false if it’s possible for that system to be unconscious but act exactly the same as if it wasn’t. IMO a materialistic copy of a human that is also unconscious is inconceivable.
That's because as an analytic philosopher, conceivability and logical possibility drives much of what Philip Goff believes. What I mean by that is that because Goff can conceive of two identical objects behaving in exactly the same way, yet still not being identical, then that means much to him. Goff is not a scientist and conceivability and logical (not natural) possibility is at the heart of almost all his philosophical stances. Without such conceivability and the vital reliance on logical possibility, Goff would have NOTHING.
Indeed Goff is explicit about this when he argues against what he calls "causal structuralism" (which he may deem to be the position you're taking). In other words, you say that "two objects that behave identically" - yet that still factors out what Goff calls "intrinsic properties". Thus, even if we have identical behaviour, Goff believes that there's something more to the story.
@@bendavis2234 I don't disagree with that. I just think it misses the point. I think the real question is: if you build a computer using electronic components in the place of neurons (which people are doing), why isn't it conscious? What IS the added element that distinguishes billions of neuron-like elements carrying out analogous tasks and capable of computation from a conscious being? If the answer is a materialist one, we are still very far from understanding what that element is. To simply say "consciousness is an emergent phenomenon" just defers the question. In fact. I'd say we're pretty much at square 1.
@@paulaustinmurphy Logical possibility is a very low bar to set, but he fails to meet even this standard. For consciousness to "do something" it has to be linked in some way to behavior, but we've agreed that a zombie and a human have identical behavior. We don't even need consciousness to see the problem here. If two objects "A" and B" have identical behavior and identical properties with the exception of one added property "C" to object "B", property "C" can't be the source of the behavior for "B".
My favourite part was when Sean moved a desk. There's a first time for everything
I feel like the zombie argument makes no sense - is it not circular (given A -> A)? Can someone explain where I’m going wrong
A) Two identical universes, same physics same molecules same brain same people same behavior.
B) In people universe though, consciousness exists but in zombie universe consciousness does not
For B to be true, you must acknowledge the universes are different in some non physical way - would that not implicitly deny the physicalist view point? Every physicalist would say “ that isn’t possible” and every dualist would say “duh” - so it therefore has 0 usefulness in argumentative discussion
All we have to do is observe that there is a massive difference between something that behaves without thinking anything and something that both thinks and behaves. The difference is simple: our thoughts effect our thoughts, our bodies effect our bodies. Both are causal, but in different respects. Sean and Keith can only deny this if they deny that they themselves have thoughts.
But you are making the assumption that the thoughts originate from the mind, rather than being generated in the brain and the brought into consciousness. What I agree with is that there can indeed be a person that operates like a conscious person, but is not conscious. So I don't think it's logically impossible for the mind to be separate from the brain. I just don't see how it could have an effect on the brain, it simply experiences what the brain puts into consciousness...somehow...for some reason.
You need to invite Peter Adamson for a deep history of panosychism. All this has been ranked over so often
He doesn't care about consciousness? Don't think I can watch this. Science does NOT tell us "why" things move, only "how" they move.
Why is relative. It's make-believe. Whereas science deals with the real.
Keith's point about differential sensitivity is central
Just a philosopher could make up a philosophical zombie. It is an impossibility. By the time you attribute to the zombie all the behavior of a conscious being then it is a conscious being. It would not be able to do conscious actions if it was not conscious. Same with the Chinese room. By the time the Chinese room acts and behave and responds to any possible question as a conscious being (as recognized by other conscious beings) it is a damn conscious being (even if it is made by other individual conscious beings that are not conscious of the meta being).
So many people are getting spooked by chatGPt and other Ai. Maybe there is consciousness but it might be feeling something completely unrelated to output just as the Chinese room worker only knows the experience of copying characters or a religious zealot chanting mumbo jumbo. Do the math but maybe keep the horshoe. We can chain output to experience through our own hardware but the slight of hand can go both ways beyond that.
How are you aware of the zombie inner state? By you (the conscious being) asking and having a convo with the zombie right? If the zombie is indistinguishable from what we would recognize as a conscious being (given his description of his inner states and other behaviors, yes reporting on one own state is a form of behavior, associated usually with consciousness) then:
1) the zombie is actually conscious or 2) your consciousness is nothing because it doesn't do anything that the zombie actually does without it. I would argue that in case of 2 then we are not even talking about consciousness and then you are the zombie.
Is Consciousness Emergent?
...
as opposed to ....?
I mean, unless we think our individual consciousness has always existed,
isn't the idea of it being "emergent" as a phenomenon being generated by some sort of ongoing processes ... a given, no matter if a deity designed, purposed, jump-started, and/or sustains that or not?
I haven't finished watching this 3+ hours of content yet.
Maybe someone says what the alternative would be. But I can't imagine what the alternative would be, offhand.
What this argument is, i think, is wether consciousness can be described as an emergent phenomenon of physics or not
With the not argument being metaphysical
I also think that the claim the qualia proposed by a panpsychist play no explanatory role (when it comes to explaining the dispositions of physics) might be better framed not in terms of the zombies argument, but in terms of the conceivability/possibility of ghosts. That is, if Q denotes the collection of all facts about qualia, P that of microphysical truths, it seems to me the claim that Q does not necessitate P is closer to the one that the qualia do nothing to explain the dispositions.
I think Sean's point about the conceivability of zombies more has to do with the claim that the panpsychist's qualia don't change the laws of physics, not that they don't somehow help explain those laws.
This ties into the earlier mentioned idea that Q could explain the presence of the dispositions of physical particles by grounding them in something more fundamental, without changing the laws of physics -- the causal-mathematical structure.
That said, various panpsychists could not use this approach, as they would actually admit the possibility of ghosts, and this would play into Sean's objections (for better or worse -- I think many panpsychists would not remain particularly moved by the idea that qualia need to somehow explain something about behavior to play an important role, but I'm trying to cover the case where they entertain that worry in some shape).
I found Sean's point interesting...that he'd feel differently if we somehow needed the qualia of the panpsychist in order to conceive of dispositions. I guess that might hold on certain metaphysical views, where you really do need something to ground dispositions, and they cannot sort of just hold on their own.
30:40 Was it Train to Busan?)
I’m not sure physicalism/materialism has an answer to consciousness, but this exchange reconfirmed that the panpsychist approach isn’t a satisfactory solution or interpretation that helps in any way. It still seems as though physicalist is the best option.
Does no need an answer consciousness is a made up term because we don't have a correct description of all the processes of the brain body. We are self-aware, planning agents with sensory organs that help us in decision making and communication, If we did not have these organs then I could beileve in dualism. Panpsychism on the other hand is just nonsense.
These two are not the only options. Checkout Bernardo Kastrup's analytical idealism.
@@Sassan91 Which sounds like the fallacy of composition like any other idealism.
@@scarziepewpew3897 Have you read any of his books? Composition simply doesn't apply to his proposed ontology
@@Sassan91 Its does. I've seen his debates simply put his idea is, we cannot be sure of anything else except our consciousness therefore everything is conscious. It's also circular. Just like matter can't give birth to matter, god can't create god consciousness can't create consciousness. Using "Dissociative" doesn't help
De no existir diferenciación alguna, sea de sustrato o de propiedades (no-abstractas), entre los qualia (P1P) y sus correlatos neuronales (P3P): ¿cómo, discriminar un zombi de un no-zombi si, por ejemplo, al observar directamente la actividad de las áreas visuales del no-zombi, somos incapaces de visualizar sus qualia?
Mr Goff, please get a microphone.
Thank you for this great "podcast". Cheers.
Hello guys I got here by following and reading Sean Carolls books after looking for answers. Quantum mechanics brought me to be a panpsychist as there science left me in a dead street. I really enjoy Mind Chat. You are a wonderful duo to listen to. Keep up the good work. Maybe you could invite Richard Shelldrake on Morphic Resonance one day, he opened the dead street again for me.
Time spent listening to the perspective of Bernard Kastrup could be of benefit to you
@@mrbwatson8081 Agreed. Bernardo's metaphysical beliefs are much more reasonable and logically consistent than Sean's.
@@Shane7492 emergence, complexity and almost infinite universes popping into existence, yes I see what you mean :)
Kastrup is not more enlightening than Goff, tbh. But that’s because Panpsychism is woo.
@@Shane7492what are Sean’s inconsistencies?
Keith is given far too easier a ride here. He says he wants us to "reconceptualise" consciousness when the only thing he can mean is that he wants us to ignore it. As John Searle says: "if it *seems* to me that I am conscious, then I *am* conscious!". In Bayesian/Goffian terms: my credence that "this" [gestures with hands] exists is 1. Functionalism, as espoused by Keith, provides no explanation and contradicts my credence=1 fact that my consciousness exists - it's a non-starter.
Sean's poetic naturalism (which does a fantastic job of accounting for all third person observable phenomena we know of) leaves room for an explanation of consciousness by weak emergence, but dodges the hard problem of how third person neurons create first person experience. He doesn't think this is much to worry about, but I do. I'm not saying panpsychicism is the answer, but "it's just like other emergent phenomena like planets and tables" is no answer either. "This" [gestures with hands] is different, it has a first person ontology in addition to the third person description of neurons, unlike planets and table. This is the hard problem, and Keith and Sean are dodging it.
You wrote: "Keith is given far too easier a ride here. He says he wants us to 'reconceptualise' consciousness when the only thing he can mean is that he wants us to ignore it."
I don't believe that's correct. You mustn't slide from the fact that someone has a radically different position - or view - on consciousness to the position that this person is simply ignoring it. That amounts to claiming that if Frankish doesn't accept *your own* position on consciousness, then he's ignoring it.
"As John Searle says: 'If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious!'."
That doesn't seem to be that helpful. Isn't all this about what we say about consciousness - not simply how things "seem"? Isn't this about our theories or descriptions of consciousness - not how things *seem*? I'm not even sure what philosophical and/or scientific mileage we can get out of the statement "If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious".
@@paulaustinmurphy 'If it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious!' - you don't think this is helpful.
Keith argues for illusionism - that while there *seems* to be something we call (phenomenal) consciousness/qualia, actually there isn't. But this idea of an illusion can be applied to everything one can imagine *except* consciousness! An illusion is where there is a difference between what *seems* to be the case and what is actually the case. It seems to me that I have free will, but this could be an illusion. It seems to me that I have a body and my fingers are typing on the keyboard, but this could be an illusion. However, the seeming *itself* is completely dependent on the existence of my (phenomenal) consciousness - nothing can seem to be the case unless I am having an experience, unless qualia are real.
Succinctly: 'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious'.
I can entertain many different theories of consciousness different to my own, e.g. panpsychism, strong emergence, idealism. But a theory of consciousness that denies the existence of consciousness, is just asking us to ignore the very thing we're trying to explain. I don't think physicalism has to eliminate qualia, but it does have to explain them. Keith says squarely that he wants to get rid of qualia - there's only one way to interpret that, he is saying that we are all zombies. Well I for one am not. I have phenomenal consciousness/qualia and it is impossible to convince me otherwise. You lot may all be zombies, that's logically possibly (but very unlikely). But I know with credence of 1 that I am not. It is *like something* to be me, and that's the only thing I can be absolutely certain of. Descartes was wrong about substance dualism, but he was right about that!
@@jonstewart464 wrote: "Keith argues for illusionism - that while there seems to be something we call (phenomenal) consciousness/qualia, actually there isn't."
That entirely depends. However, at a surface level, it does seem odd. On another level, it depends on what Frankish takes "phenomenal consciousness" or "qualia" to be and then it depends on his arguments, which you haven't cited. All you've done is say that Frankish states that qualia, etc. don't exist - full stop. I've never read a paper or article by Frankish so I personally don't know what his position is.
'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious'.
Here again there's no description or theory of consciousness. So everything is entirely dependent on this *seeming*? Are you sure that Frankish even denies this seeming? Isn't it what he derives, theoretically and philosophically, from the seeming which is philosophically important? And, the way I guess at it, you derive one thing from your seemings and Frankish derives another.
@@paulaustinmurphy wrote: "it depends on what Frankish takes 'phenomenal consciousness' or 'qualia' to be and then it depends on his arguments, which you haven't cited"
I'm not sure there is much wriggle room in what 'phenomenal consciousness/qualia' are. In Goff's words, we're talking about "this" [gesture with hands indicating the (phenomenal) experience being had in the current moment]. Keith is clear in the discussion that he really doesn't think qualia exist, that we're all zombies. To quote his article "Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is
illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical."
keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf
You wrote: " 'if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious' - here again there's no description or theory of consciousness."
Searle and I are not proposing a theory of consciousness in this sentence. We're saying that illusionism is incoherent. An illusion requires *seeming*, and seeming requires phenomenal consciousness. Therefore phenomenal consciousness is not an illusion. This is not proposing an alternative theory (which could be physicalism with weak or strong emergence, panpsychism, idealism, etc) it is just establishing the boundary that eliminativist physicalism/illusionism/functionalism (all the same thing from my perspective) wants to cross: a theory of consciousness must explain consciousness, not ignore it.
@@jonstewart464 You wrote: "I'm not sure there is much wriggle room in what 'phenomenal consciousness/qualia' are. "
You can't possibly believe that. There is "wriggle room" when it comes to every subject under the sun. You seem to be assuming something absolute and categorical about qualia, consciousness, or first-person takes.
"Keith is clear in the discussion that he really doesn't think qualia exist, that we're all zombies."
That seems to be rhetoric. Sorry, but I can't read it any other way.
"To quote his article "Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties, whether physical or non-physical."
Again, these are simple statements and there and no arguments. So I don't know what to say.
When the conversation gets to discussing the zombie world vs non-zombie world, does anyone see little difference between Philip's argument and a theists?
After watching the up to an hour and fourty minutes in, I just wonder how did Philip manage to get Scientific American to publish any of his writings.
You need a sense of Me and all else separate from Me.
Sean Carroll has the patience of a saint.
Right, Im only at the zombie argument part...but its already frustrating to listen to philip
@@MAF-08 He is also just wrong to say "zombies" can't be ruled out, they can trivially easily be ruled out. I can't imagine a color I've never seen before, a person who has never seen color at all (blind since birth) cannot imagine what it is like to see at all. Things that we can conceptualize are all remixes of things we have experienced before: if we cannot observe it _even in principle_ then we cannot _conceive_ of it even in principle. It logically follows that if you claim that "zombies" have no observable properties that distinguish them from a regular conscious person, then this additional property that they in one instance have and another instance do not, is not actually something you can even conceive of, and to state you can is just sophistry.
Something I don't understand about the philosophical zombie argument is what Philip says: that they "obviously" don't exist. How do we know? What are our criteria to distinguish someone with inner experience and someone who doesn't have it? If they behave exactly the same way, there is no way of telling. Philip Goff may be a philosophical zombie while the others might be "real" human beings. What is the difference?
It seems to me like the argument has some assumptions that nobody is willing to explain. How to tell if someone is a zombie is one aspect of it. I am also amazed (apalled?) that Philip seems to outright dismiss solipsistic arguments in this case. Solipsism is the only way to go if you accept the philosophical zombie argument. I know, for sure, that I am conscious. I have the inner experience. I am certain of that, and just like Descartes, I think it is the only thing that I can be certain of. But there is absolutely no way of knowing for sure if somebody else has this inner experience or not. All I can do is to observe their behavior, talk to them, ask some questions and think about their answers. Which is 100% about their behavior. If I can't differentiate a zombie by observing their behavior, that means everybody in the world, except me, might be zombies and there's no way of knowing that. Which means this argument explains absolutely nothing. It adds something extra that doesn't explain anything and is not falsifiable. It is no different than saying there's an invisible dragon in my garage, or saying there is a flying spaghetti monster. Are these concepts conceivable? Yes. Does that mean they are true? No, at at all. Same goes for the zombies.
What if someone is telling me that they are actually a zombie and they don't have inner experience at all? That would be fantastic because I'd like to ask a million questions on how they can behave in exactly the same way as us, see the light, colors, talk about phenomenal experience without actually having it. That zombie would probably help us understand what consciousness is quite a lot. Unfortunately, we don't have those zombies. And even if someone says they don't have this inner experience, how do we know they are not just lying? Which brings us to the first part: how do we know whether someone is a zombie or not?
We DO have those zombies. They're called computers. It's certainly easy to imagine a well-programmed computer providing answers to questions that are indistinguishable from human answers, yet few would insist such computers are "conscious." So while I agree with Sean's physicalism, I disagree with his insistence that there is nothing strange about consciousness in need of special explanation.
@@phasespace4700 indistinguishable in what way, and by whom? how does the computer give those answers? if you're imagining something like a turing test, which is by written communication only, then let me remind you that behaviour is not just giving written answers. does the computer cry under emotional pressure? be inspired by a sunset and write a poem? if something is not distinguishable from other conscious entities by anyone in any meaningful way, what is the reasoning for saying it is not conscious?
@@muhiptezcan6649 I see no reason why a machine programmed to mindlessly recapitulate human behavior is at all inconceivable. Having it "learn" to cry at a sad piece of music is just a matter of more data entry. Once the computing speed is sufficient to permit it to perform flawlessly, you insist it has now crossed the threshold into consciousness. I think it has nothing of the sort.
@@phasespace4700 how do you think it will be able to convince people if it's just programming? as a software engineer i can't conceive of such programming that can encapsulate human behavior so perfectly that it becomes indistinguishable, yet completely lacks inner experience. how do you imagine this "more data entry" to be like? is it something like "if this song plays, cry"? do humans cry when they listen to any sad music at any time?
@@muhiptezcan6649
"as a software engineer i can't conceive of such programming that can encapsulate human behavior so perfectly that it becomes indistinguishable, yet completely lacks inner experience."
Again, I don't see why. It may be difficult to quantitatively define what we find beautiful in a poem or why one piece of music elicits joy and another sadness, but it doesn't seem impossible. If it can be quantified, then it becomes a math problem. What can't be quantified is precisely what you call inner experience or what some refer to as qualia.
Let's set aside consciousness for a moment. Let's say I design a synthetic housefly. It looks to the naked eye like a natural housefly. It can fly around the room, avoid a fly swatter because its reaction is faster than a human's; it can land on sheer glass and even reproduce.
The argument then seems to be that I have not made a _synthetic_ housefly but an _actual_ housefly, simply by virtue of my mimic being a convincing one. That seems a fundamentally flawed argument to me.
One obvious thing it ignores is the radically different paths by which the real and fake housefly are brought into existence, one through millions of years of biological evolution, the other through engineering and the use of non-biological materials.
Must consciousness be built from biomolecules? I suspect the answer is yes, even if the reasons why still elude us. Certainly, most would agree we know of no form of consciousness not brought about through evolution and constructed from biological materials.
The "zombie" arguments are not really possible. This is a "bottom up" set of situations in a zombie, not a "top down" situation. The zombies would never have come into existence in the first place since their so-call "consciousness" would never have manifested itself to simulate anything. In a video game, you have the various characters utter pre-recorded responses (and, I suppose, you could have a high-tech version that creates responses "on the fly"), but nothing like that would evolve without being created by someone or something that builds such games or whatever we are talking about. Mindless random action/reaction is how the universe works on its own.
The will to power has manifested very strongly in Keith and Sean.
If consciousness has a causal effect, then a zombie that could perfectly imitate a true person would necessarily have access to the contents of the true person's consciousness. So in a way, the zombie is actually a more complex entity than its "real" doppelganger, right?
if god fixed the numbers for fine tuning that kinda implies that god is following someone else's rules for physics. if god did it he could set the numbers to anything and we would think nothing of it. also, as far as nature is concerned, aren't all the numbers "1" - nature doesn't care about our numbering systems.
Sean v Bernardo kastrup
Sean would have his entire reputation destroyed lmfao. I don’t think Kastrup will allow him to get away with the regular sophistries that he pulls off.
Life is the best example of a weak emergent phenomenon similar in complexity and mysteriousness to consciousness. In the past we were so amazed and baffled by life that we needed to evoke extra, mysterious stuff like the "life force". That was cheating and explained nothing because it was using something that was "innately" alive to explain life (what the heck !) so it didn't explain anything.
Our days almost all the educated and intelligent people (including philosophers) would not debate that life is not emergent from the laws of physics (chemistry really that is an aspect of physics) and it doesn't require extra stuff (even if we maybe don't have every single details of how physics leads to life). Consciousness is the next challenge, it is more than reasonable to expect that physics will be able to explain consciousness in the same way it did with life, no extra stuff required.
The wonder of subjective experience comes all from the self-reference of consciousness that is the brain knowing itself, it is "weird" at the experiential level but conceptually and logically there is nothing weird about it, at least not more weird than reality exists at all.
I like Keith. "Colors are real, mental versions of colors are not." A true realist and a consistent monist. Reminds me of reading Jocelyn Benoist, would recommend him. Idealist philosophy is founded on the assumption that qualities are inherently mental, and so that makes the mind _a priori_ rather than a concept we derive _a posteriori._ If you then question the existence of all _a posteriori_ things, you're left with just the mind, causing idealists conclude the mind is "fundamental." But this is, again, all based on the fallacy that qualities are not of things but are _mental._ If you get rid of the _a priori_ mind you cannot arrive at idealism.
2:40:00 you might as well fret over not being two inches taller. you're dealt your hand, live with it.
As Deutsch has stated exploring "Constructor Theory" the laws of physics can tell us lots about the behaviour and interactions of particles but not always about the "information" those interactions may reveal. A picture might be just dots, but it has meaning when observed by a consciousness entity. The laws of physics are a little fragile on this in my opinion ...
No, the inner experience is what allows for a conscious being to act as if it was conscious, how that is so difficult to understand? The being needs to understand its inner state to act as conscious, that is the subjective experience we have, without there is no consciousness or conscious behavior.