I really appreciate the little progress bar during the sponsor segment! Makes it much more comfortable to watch when you know how long it is, or skip if you already know about/use the product advertised. Great video as always!
10:27 The Germans couldn't attack the Russian rail system because German trains did not have an axle width that would fit Russian tracks. They had to rely on captured Russian trains to move supplies further east. That required moving German trains to the end of the lines and unloading, then reloading supplies onto Russian trains or unloading, then using other transport to deliver the supplies. The other alternative was to build trains that would fit the Russian tracks or re-lay the entire rail system with German-standardized tracks. None of the options were good and it was a logistical nightmare problem that was never solved.
Often they would just disconnect one rail and move it closer to the other. The Soviet rail network was also primitive compared to the German one and inadequate for Heer requirements
@@visionist7 The Russian rail system provided water replenishment significantly further apart than German locomotives were designed for, causing a lot of problems. One solution was the condenser carriages added to some Henschel Locomotives which eliminated the need for water replenishment and also eliminated the steam that often attracted air attack.
"Even with the concentrated effort of directing the railroads to supply the motorised divisions, the fact remained that demand still greatly outstripped what the feeble rail network could supply. The assumption had been made during Barbarossa's planning stage that large quantities of Soviet rolling stock and locomotives would be captured in the initial phase of the campaign, providing support for the drive into the Soviet Union, while the railroad troops (Eisenbahntruppe) extended the German gauge. Yet, once the initial shock and confusion of the invasion had passed, the Soviets were quick to institute an extensive evacuation of their trains with the subsequent demolition of those remaining behind. This was so effective that, by the end of August 1941, the Germans had captured only around 1,000 Soviet locomotives of which just half were still operational. [160] This critical setback had two major repercussions for the german campaign. First, the army became almost immediately reliant on extending the narrow-gauge lines as quickly as possible in order to assume the enormous burden of sustaining operations to the east. Planning for this conversion did not anticipate the effects the Soviet 'scorched earth' policy [161] would have on the railroads and installations, nor the extent of destruction caused by the Luftwaffe and front-line units in earlier combat operations. The conversion was therefore slower than expected and achieved only by the most rudimentary standards of quality control. [162] The second complication of the German failure to capture large numbers of Soviet trains was that the deficit had to be made up by the already over-extended Reichsbahn (German railways). By the autumn of 1941, some 2,500 German locomotives and 200,000 railcars had to be employed in the east, creating additional stresses for the German economy. [163]" Quoted from: David Stahel, 'Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East', pp. 248. Footnotes being: [160] Schüler, 'The Eastern Campaign', p. 210. [161] Glantz, Barbarossa, pp. 73-74. [162] Schüler, 'The Eastern Campaign', pp. 210-211. [163] Reinhardt, Moscow - The Turning Point, p. 147.
@Charles McCarron there was a period of nominal collaboration after the Soviet Nazi pact before the war that the German's should have taken advantage of, sending engineers to help modernise the Soviet rail network who would subtly lay the groundwork for invasion by ensuring each single track line had space for another, and that the track bed was adequate for heavier German trains and so on. Barbarossa would start with a lot more intelligence on the Russian rail network. Didn't Finland use the Soviet guage? Again if the German plants had been supplying broad guage locomotives to the Finns before the war they'd have the tooling to make their own. Have a number on hand when Barbarossa begins
True. The Germans re-used many forms of Soviet wartime production. There are pictures of German troops carrying PPSH 41 submarchine guns, as wall as the use of Soviet trucks and tractors, not to mention the odd tank or artillery piece. I believe that official policy was "use it until it breaks or you run out of ammunition."
Just as the German designers were getting their long-range bomber prototypes ready, the Luftwaffe High Command being steered by Ernst Udet suddenly announced that the new bomber had to have a dive bombing capability.The massive delay that caused rippled through the industry and it was the fatal blow against having a 4-engined,heavy bomber available in 1942 to go after the the Russian war production in the Urals. I really like your videos Sir..it's a pleasure to watch and listen to an educated and articulate man.
I have read about the late war plans regarding the German effort to knock out the power grid in question somewhere but never thought much of it. But I never knew about these sorts of raids and the considerations that went into them. The Luftwaffe certainly could have been more than an operational force for sure and it would be fascinating what would have happened if they pushed for them in 1941/42. A most informative and stellar summary on the subject. I can always rely on you to teach me something I never knew about or thought about. An Iron Cross for you should be in order.
Thank you, this video added a lot to my knowledge of this topic. I'd never realised just how much of an internal high command struggle there was between wanting to stop the Soviet army, and expecting to eventually take over their facilities. And when reality arrived in force it was all too late. Victory disease, gets you every time! Thank you again.
Seems like the Luftwaffe missed a number of potentially tremendous opportunities, due to indecision, and especially due to the naive - I think even at the time - false hope that all this material would be captured from the Soviets.
Planning on stealing equipment from the masters of the "Scorched Earth Retreat, then Retaliation." strategy since Napoleon seems like a very dumb plan. Typical overambitious nazis.
Making war on the cheap, doesn't usually end well. Unless you have lots of space to trade, like the USSR and the USA. Then you get a chance to execute new designs well.
It's been fascinating to watch the development of these videos over time, from the 'good enthusiast' level to a truly professional one that ranks with the best. Informative, excellently researched and delivered, and without being dry and humourless. A joy to watch.
Glad to see that you brought up the fact that Strategic bombers weren't needed. The Ju88 and He111 were so versatile they saw no need for one. Like when ppl bring up Germany should have built aircraft carriers in reality they shouldn't of because they weren't needed. Great stuff Bis!!!
Yeah he does I have read and seen ww2 books and documentary for over 30 year's but Mr Bismarck comes out with new information, Tanks don't stop keep it up sir we will follow you
Interesting counterpoint to the West, where years of futile attempts at destroying German industry were punctuated with the very occasional use of the strategic force as a tactical weapon - over the bitter opposition of the air forces involved- as in the Normandy breakout, operation Cobra.
it still amazes me how they were able to keep these somewhat advanced factories functional with tons of ordinance dropped on then especially the germans. Like WW2 was such a unique time in history where technology was advanced enough to give us such amazing weapons but yet simple enough that factories did not require much in the way of sophisticated machinery to produce weaponry
There are several factors. A lot of the bombs droped simply failed to hit anything worthwhile. All that footage of rolling avalanches of bomb detonations waltzing over the target area look impressive, but most of those bombs didn't do any real damage. In order to bring down a brick wall, the bomb had to land rather close. Splinters would kill people in a large radius around the point of impact, but brick walls and steel beams didn't realy care. The roofs of those factories were often of rather light construction. Steel beams and corugrated sheet metal or even tar impreganted cardboard. So, the debries of a roof laying around on the factory floor looks like impressive damage, but it can often be cleared away with a broom and a shovel. Also, those machines were quite well built. Cast and forged steel. Overengineered and sturdy. Anything short of a direct hit would often do little more then superficial damage on the machinery itself.
@@Bird_Dog00 Yes. One of the conclusions of the US Strategic Bombing Survey - was that the bombs used against factories with heavy industrial equipment weren't big enough. .
Thank, I always love to lear something new. I was raised by my parents just after the war when rationing was still in existence. My parents both served in the armed forces and never talked about the war. The material that we in the UK get shown, does not cover factual information in such detail. It shows it more from our point of view or perspective. We were just told that both Stalin and Hitler were both as mad as a box of frogs as a saying we have in England. Or potty as a fruit case as some people say. All I know is that forgiveness begins with understanding. It's amazing that we often had almost identical ideas. Thank you for a very informative and educational film.
Surf Shark if you're reading this, Bismark Honest review is the reason that I'm going to try your product, it's actually a very smart way of advertising.
Vielen Dank fur dieses Video. I had little to no idea about this little known and oft-misunderstood part of the Eastern Front, finding myself wondering why the Luftwaffe appeared to miss the opportunity to handicap Soviet industry especially when Germany had, and was, experiencing the consequences of strategic blockading and bombing. At least now I understand that the German High Command did contemplate this at various stages and on various different levels, and can appreciate that part of the problem was the omnipresent, pervasive and continuous issue of 'too little too late' - that seemed to dog the fortunes of the German armed forces over and over. Excellent video.
I came to think of the minor nations chat you had with Bernard in the last video, thought maybe it would be of interest to you to look into Finnish doctrine during the Winter War and Continuation War? Speaking about the air combat tactics and ideas surrounding targeting Soviet bombers developed by Richard Lorentz and Gustaf Erik "Eka" Magnusson. I myself know absolutely nothing about it, but if I can piggy back on the interest of a Nerd (read outstanding enthusiast), I won't complain.
Luftwaffe attempts to knock out Soviet war production was a Sisyphean task anyway. U.S. Lend-Lease shipments of military equipment like Sherman tanks, fighter and bomber planes and the all-important 300,000 plus Studebaker 2-1/2 ton trucks ensured the Red Army and Air Force had plenty of war materiél: (see Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union 1941-1945, Hubert P. Van Tuyll)
The Lend Lease help geared up after the Kursk battle, only 16% was shipped in 1941-1942 when the Soviets had a really hard time. The shipments were stopped in the first half of 1943. On January 1, 1943 there was 22,000 imported trucks in the Red Army, out of 404,500 (5.4 %). After Kursk it was just a matter of time...what you could also see in this video. Edit: Only around 470 Sherman tanks were sent in 1943 (2345 in 1944) and the Soviets produced around 1300 T-34's per moth from the second half of 1942.
@@simplicius11I don't believe the US 'stopped' shipments. Winter froze up the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. But the Persian corridor (through Armenia and up the Volga) continued operations. This was the only all-season route for Lend-Lease shipments. Unlikely Russia had 385,000 trucks unless one counts smaller 1/2 ton vehicles--not suitable for transporting whole armies long distances. After the German invasion the Soviet Union lost 60% of all motor transport in the early days. Soviet figures on truck production should be viewed with suspicion because of Soviet propaganda which minimized the importance of US Lend-Lease deliveries. Stalin forbade Soviet Sherman tank battalions from participation in liberation parades as the Russian Army rolled back the Germans. It's rare to find a photograph of Sherman tanks and Studebaker trucks on the Eastern Front. The Russian US Lend-Lease museum is located in a public school room in Moscow. The exhibits are a couple of motorcycles, some C-ration cans and a few packs of Lucky Strike cigarettes and Wrigley's chewing gum. Every effort was made to hide the magnitude of the US Lend-Lease contribution.
@@johnmosbrook9964 No, the Murmansk port is never freezing, Vladivostok can be frozen but that was not a problem with a regular traffic and icebreakers. The relations were pretty cold all up to the Tehran conference because of the "Second front" that the Allies promised in 1942 when Molotov was in London and Washington (Jun??). And just a few months later they started the Torch. The Soviet Union had much more trucks than that (they were No.1 in Europe regarding truck production, 180,000 in 1937) but these were in civilian use and were planned to be mobilized in wartime. One of the reasons for that disaster in 1941, they were not mobilized and the motorized divisions were marching on foot. They had 272,600 army trucks at the start of the war. The losses were not even close to 60% and were quickly replaced by the mobilized vehicles. On January 1,1942, they had 319,500 trucks in the army. And no, I'm not aware of any 1/2 ton trucks. They had 1.5 ton (Ford license) and 3 ton trucks in around 1:1 ratio.
@Call Me Ishmael See 'Feeding the Bear' for a complete breakdown of materials, weapons, ammunition supplied through US Lend-Lease. The Soviet Union could not produce the T-34s without US steel shipments.
And britain supplied a near a third as much again, didn't like the Spitfire, but the Hurricane they did, but the Sudebaker indeed was a lifesaver, and easier to hide in the patriotic newsreels.
Bismarck, I'm not so sure that everyone's attention was on Stalingrad in 1942. BOTH SIDES sent more resources to the Rezhev Salient in 1942. I think that this was a brilliant strategy on the part of OKW as to create a meat grinder to wear down Soviet manpower as STAVKA was willing to continue the insane attacks and to throw away the lives of Soviet soldiers played right into OKW's hands. Great video, as usual. Thank you!
Heh, another brilliant armchair general... the Germans suffered terrible losses there, only the Grosdeutschland Division was cut in half in a few weeks. Together with Stalingrad the Germans lost their well trained troops and everything that was gathered later was not even close. The brilliant operation for a defending side would be a strong breakthrough, encirclement and destruction of attacking force (like Stalingrad). Also, the Germans had a plan to cut off and destroy the salient NW of Rzhev
@@turdferguson3803 Stalingrad was decisive AFTER the battle. Rzhev was a meat grinder. Wearing out the Russian infantrymen. When your enemy continues to throw lives away in a meat grinder it becomes an awful attrition battle and helps their enemy.
@@Inquisitor6321 Wrong, Stalingrad and Case Blue were infinitely more important than Rhzev because the Germans were fighting for their only chance to knock the USSR out of the war by taking the Caucasus.
The Germans, taken as a whole, were worse than awful at overall strategic vision. Tactically, pretty darn good, but the Soviets outfoxed and outfought them over time.
It sounds like one of the major problems was a lack of bombers with the payload to do reasonable damage to a target at longer ranges. Not necessarily the lack of specific type but an overall lack of capacity. The Allied strategic bombing effort was an attrition effort to hurt German industry and the Luftwaffe, a bloody and expensive effort that eventually worked. Attacking the power grid and oil production facilities was probably the wisest set of targets as their destruction had the widest ripple effects to the entire economy.
@@yamato3151 well, he need to whore out for upvotes somehow, right? Why not by playing by an established stereotype by making an offtopic comment? You can spot him under videos in any way touching France as the guy, who jokes about white flags and thinks it's original:D
Strategic bombing fits only within a war of attrition. The Wehrmacht could not win a war of attrition, and the Oberkommando generals knew it. Thus, they never committed to strategic bombing.
Exactly Why prepare for, plan or implement a doctrine that will inevitably result in defeat. Let's face it. A rational German political system would have concluded after Stalingrad in1943 that "We're done. It hasn't worked. Let's sue for peace and polish off that 'stab in the back' myth we used in 1918." Of course the Allies were intent on unconditional surrender and the Nazi's were running a death cult (the only thing left for Hitler and his band of assorted nut jobs was to replicate the kind of national disaster Germany had avoided in 1918 in the belief the somehow history would give them credit for not giving in). So the war dragged on through 1943, 1944 and the first half of 1945.😮 Truth to tell, a Hitler had won himself into a strategic dead-end by the winter of 1940 and he knew it. That's why he gambled on Barbarossa in 1941. Churchill was right. The Germans had to break British resistance in 1940 or they were going to lose the war.
3:58 sick gun cam! what type of aircraft were those? Looked like a bf110 first. then something with big cannon(s) He 129, Ju 88, maybe Ju87 with 37mm gun pods.
Focke-Wulf Fw 190A fitted with ETC bomb racks or possibly Fw 190F3 (ground attack Version with standard bomb racks). The bombs have been released and you can see the clasps extended into the slipstream. The aircraft had a pair of 13.2mm heavy machine guns synchronised to fire through the propellor above the engine, a pair of MG151/20 20mm guns in the wing roots synchronised to fire through the propellor and another pair on the wing just outside the arc. That’s 2 x 13.2mm and 4 x 20mm. Synchronisation was electrical with an electrically ignited primer in the cartridge. That is an enormous amount of fire power. Some versions had short barrelled MK108 30mm guns in the outer stations but these were generally used to attack bombers. They did try long barrelled MK103 guns under the outer wing stations but they couldn’t handle the recoil. Not until the Ta 152B could the MK103 be fitted into the broader wing chord of the bigger wing root, which was stiff enough to handle the recoil (never made it to service but photos exist)
Gun camera film is badass ,but also sade seeing aircraft exploding knowing there people inside just died. War is hell never forget, now we see on CNN reporters praising US airforce bombing civilians who cares they are not American so that don't matter. peace and love
I've seen some of your videos here and there (probably found you through your Austrian colleague), but I finally now realize how much of a rabbit hole your channel is (in a good way!). There are just so many interesting subjects, and this one pushed me over the edge, I'm now a subscriber. Not sure how much that is worth these days (demonetisation-wave), but hey. Keep up the good work! Mach's gut :)
Thank you for this interesting video. I once read "The German Air War in Russia" by Richard Muller, what was very insightful about the german bombardment plans. What nearly shocked me were the (theoritical) possibilities they had. I quote Muller, p. 115, as for the situation in 1943: "The Germans calculated that seven aircraft engine plants supplied the VVS with powerplants; five of these, accounting for fully 78% of the production totals, were within bomber range. In order of importance, these factories were Factory No. 24, Kuibyshev, with 1/4 of total production and 85% of all ground attack aircraft (Il-2) engines; Factory No. 26 at Ufa, with 31% of total production and 60% of all fighter aircraft engine production; Factory No. 16 at Kazan, producing 12% of the total and 60% of all bomber engines; Factory No. 45, Moscow, with 5% of the total but the remaining 15% of Il-2 engines; and finally Factory No. 466 at Gorki, 5% of the total production and 1/10 of all fighter engine production." In other words, attacks on these targets could result in a drastic decline of production. As the soviet armaments industry was risen out of thin air the factories producing the main weapons could not have outsource/replace the production so easily to a system of "shadow factories" or "production circles" as the british and germans did - at least it is my opinion. As far as i know, you need a strong civilian industry for outsourcing/supplementing.
The mistake is not in what was or wasn't done, but in the scale of the commitment to the enterprise. To win in war one must assess the worst case commitment that must be made to win, and then multiply that estimate by 4. Then when the enterprise is actually begun, multiply the effort by at least 2 again.
Germany is near the top of educated nations, as is Britain. But the US is down closer to impoverished middle eastern countries. (That is NOT an exaggeration. Simple fact.) It's a sad state of affairs. Most Europeans take learning a 2nd or 3d language very seriously. Most Americans would prefer to force everyone else to speak English. 'murica. Will someone please invade us and take over? We've proven that we can't do shit to better ourselves.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 I live over a thousand miles away from the nearest non-English speaking country. Why in gods name would I waste thousands of hours of my life mastering a second language I'll never use, unless I make a career out of it? Don't get me wrong I understand why the Europeans do it, some of them don't even have a majority language in there own country. But in the USA? we we don't have that problem.
If the Germans had been at all serious about strategic bombing, they would have let Heinkel put four engines in four nacelles in the He-177. The Brits did it with the Manchester (as bad a turkey as the 177) and the result was the Lancaster. Heinkel had to sneak them into the He-277, which the French used post WWII.
An interesting alternative to this approach is to ponder what a strong strategic long range bomber force would have had on the battle of Britain and the aviation factories to the North that they could not reach..
This was really a superb presentation of an important but under-examined topic. This might be your best so far! I particularly applaud your use of original sources rather than relying too much on other's work. I remember reading that during the formation of the Luftwaffe, that it was decided early on that dive bombers would replace the need for a strategic bombing force since their accuracy was so much greater than that of level bombers. With this requirement in mind, the He-111 and Do-17 both had to be able to dive. So even though the bomb load was light on a long range mission, the ability to deliver an accurate dive attack obviated the need for a large bomb load---in theory anyway. Do you know if the Luftwaffe tried diving attacks on the factories or power plants? Thanks again!
The standard Do 17 or He 111 didn’t have a dive bombing capability. Though it seems just about every Luftwaffe spec from those aircraft on had a dive bombing requirement. The Ju 88 did receive a dive bombing requirement (it significantly delayed Ju 88). Rare variants of the Do 217 had dive brakes and supposedly the He 177 could dive bomb and some were fitted with Stuvi 5B bombsights though this dive bombing requirement was only a troublesome design specification latter rescinded by Hermann Goering. The ground attack version of the Me 410 did have dive brakes fitted and was in fact designed to replace both the Ju 87 and Ju 88 in the dive bombing role. From 1942 the Luftwaffe introduced two new bomb sights. The Lofte 7 was a gyro stabilised computing bomb sight could measure bomber wind drift and target motion and accurately hit a target. (They got 50% hits on the Merchant Ships from Fw 200 in convoy from 14000ft when 4 of them attacked convoy Faith) and also the STUVI 5B which was a dive and shallow dive bombing sight that continuously computed an impact point and moved the cross hairs of the pilots sight. A dive from a Ju 88 might commence at 8000ft, reach 22 degrees and complete pull-up and bomb release by 5000ft. A good Ju 88 crew could get within 10m of a tank etc. These new bombsight removed much of the need for dive bombing.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Thank you. I always thought that all the LW med bombers could dive bomb. I think Erhard Milch after seeing a divebomber display in the US called it the New World Egg and decided it would be the only way fwd.
@@fazole It was Ernst Udet, Germany's second highest WW1 ace after Manfred von Richthofen who witnessed the Curtiss Hawke dive bombers and eventually purchased some. Junkers already had a dive bomber program so the Hawke's didn't influence the Ju 87 development but the enthusiasm it generated in Luftwaffe circles was clear. Udet did some flying display's in the US, available on Internet. Most impressive.
I wonder if there is a measurable effect on accuracy of bomb release orientation. German bombers house the bombs upside down and let them flip in mid air, US bombers carried them in the horizontal position, and I may have seen a bomber that carried ordnance in the nose down position but am not sure on that one. The transportation orientation and reasoning behind it may be a decent topic for a video sometime.
Attacking to the railroads by bomb not noticeably happened in murmansk to Leningrad line where lent lease cargo transferred to the leningrad. It would have been more efficient than U-boots.
Great video. I kept thinking in the back of my mind however, even if the Luftwaffe had carried on a successful strategic bombing of Soviet factories and/or power plants, American factories were churning out enough war material to send to the USSR which would have made the effort all for naught. And Germany had nothing that could reach America.
Battle of Britain depleted Luftwaffe strenghth, so Barbarossa was started with half the Luftwaffe planned (2000 planes for 1939 Poland.) Russians did scorched earth retreat against Napoleon; that heightens supply logistics since army can't live off the land. Germany was low on fuel resources, the reason to take Southern Russia. By 1942, Lend-Lease and native Soviet aircraft (Yak-3, Il-2, ...) outperformed and outnumbered German planes. Have you wondered about allies having unlimited fuel supplies. And 130 octane fuel provides a big performance boost over the German 95 octane. Question you didn't answer: why wasn't the Kremlin bombed?
What is always striking is reality gap between German planning departments in higher command and the actual wartime situation. The similarities between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe in fighting next years war today are signal. Churchill came out with a scheme, sometimes twice a week but few are treated with credulity today probably because the likes of Brooke, Dowding, Portal, Harris and Pound ensured the majority were stillborn with pragmatism so don't make it into alternate history which seems de rigueur for students of Axis history in general and German history in particular. Harris put it succinctly describing Germany's unrealistic attempts at wonder weapons as trying to invent the machine gun in the middle of the battle of Agincourt. The fundamentals required are firstly the aviation fuel for a sustained strategic German air offensive, something the Germans did not have since 1940, secondly, as Bismarck points out the Aircraft for a sustained effort including industry geared to support this offensive, thirdly the intelligence and fourthly the weather and finally the reaction from your enemy. Which front or arm was going to be robbed to provide the resource for a strategic campaign against Russia. Nightfighters? Nope they were are a priority from July 1943. Day Fighters? ditto. U-Boats? They were the most successful arm until May 43. Heer? Looks like German strategic bombing was no more than an augmented staff exercise for units incapable of operating in western skies.
I don't know why so many needless arguments took place regarding what to bomb or not. However, I'm certain Fegelein must've had something to do with it. Exzellentes Video vie immer, mein freund. Danskenschön, und gute Nacht!
Great video. Seems not only that Germany lacked a strategic bomber and bomber arm, but the Luftwaffe lacked a comprehensive strategic bomber mindset or forethought. Interesting. It makes sense now why it was never pursued in earnest.
development of the helicopter with specialize attack units deployed behind enemy lines could have been very useful to knock out key infrastructure or targets, complex long-winded projects and a lack of knowing what to do when let to an unravelling, fighting versus many death blows.
In order for a bombardment campaign to be considered "strategic", it cannot be conducted against a single type of industrial target. Essentially ALL of your enemy's industrial capacity must be targeted. Targeting power stations simply ISN'T strategic bombing - it's a tactical campaign against industrial targets. Moreover, the crucial problem for the Luftwaffe in conducting a strategic bombing campaign wasn't the shortage of planes and pilots - though they had too few bombers capable of flying such missions, they could certainly have diverted production from other aircraft types to increase their strategic bombing forces and trained more aircrew had they so chose. No, the crucial problem for the Luftwaffe in conducting a serial bombing campaign was far simpler yet more intractable - the critical fuel shortage. They simply did NOT have enough fuel to wage a massive long range bombing campaign and sustain it for a long enough time to create any kind of significant reduction in Soviet industrial capacity and output. And a strategic bombing campaign would do nothing to make more fuel available to the Luftwaffe.
T-60's were not in production by 1943, T-70's were. Also, one should take into account the nasty side-effect of the German bombings of GAZ plant - the loss of part of the factory archives and some of the experimental vehicles stored there.
@Mial isus More likely the gunner is moving the mount in an attempt to increase the area where bullets will be flying to compensate for the targeted aircraft's attempt to maneuvere. Those machineguns were widely available and effective en masse. Their use makes a lot of sense considering DSHKs and autocannons would be of less availability. Then theres the fact that the machineguns run on the same ammo as most soviet smallarms of the time thus making these more practical from a purely logistical view. Sorry about the length of post, just trying to cover my bases.
The lack of four-engine bombers nevertheless really hindered the German war effort against the Soviet Union (the mastermind of those tactics, General Walther Wever, died before the war). Had enough numbers of such aircraft even the Soviet war factories in the Ural mountains could be reached and bombed, changing the course of the war...
Don't forget the UK also supplied a lot of supplies to the bastards. It annoys me when commie Joe was always harping on about the Allies opening a second front because the Russians were bearing the full brunt of the Germans. He wasn't complaining when he signed the non aggression pact where they got half of Poland in 1939 though was he.
Like most things in life, you have to choose between immediate but lesser effects and indirect but greater effects. Give soldiers immediate relief while factories continue at full speed, or knock out factories and the rail network to cripple everything later while soldiers pay the price in the meanwhile. Everything has an opportunity cost. The tradeoffs are the devil's details.
4:07 why do flashes pop up when the bullets hit the ground? And why does a little smoke fly after the bullet? Has it yo do with the tracer rounds or something?
Those ought to be explosive cannon rounds, probably 20mm but could be 37mm as well. Simple machine guns are of little use against ground targets like tanks and bunkers. Also tracers can leave smoke trails, and any bullets can leave contrails through the air.
So had Germany focused more on expanding industrial production and aircrew training earlier in the war, they might have had enough forces to mount long range strategic raids.
problem all air forces have 1 bomber or 4 fighters Germany had 2 problems 1 4 engine bomber and not many airfields long enough for them to use or 2 2 engine fighters/ bombers available for use anywhere also bomb load v fuel load.
Perhaps the Germans also looked at their own experience of being able to keep producing war materials despite the Allies’ strategic bombing and decided it was a futile effort.
So it seems obvious the Luftwaffe, seem somewhat crippled by the waste of men and material on that river crossing, that the Soviet could well use, since they always knew where to find the Luftwaffes planes. And the abysmal production figures could only get worse later as the western allies punished germany both outside then inside. Germany never created a de Havilland Mosquito like 2man bomber at 1/2 the bomb load of a 10man B17g bomber (later to equal), possibly help by the fanatic bombing of Stalingrad without looking for the massive built up in the country behind.
Given the view that British and American strategic bombing was not as effective as hoped or thought, how significant an effect do you think the Luftwaffe could have had? The two scenarios have enough differences that it is a more complicated issue than just comparing the tonnage of bombs they could have dropped. Interested to know whether you have seen anything on this or can estimate from your other reading. Thanks again for the great videos!
That person isn't even welding by the looks. Just stabbing something with the rod to make some sparks. Unless they were trying to weld thin sheet (which can only be done half assedly with rod) there is no reason to move around like that. Or the combination of rod and power source was garbage. That also makes you do that. Neither case leaves acceptable welds. I smell a lot of "in mother russia....."
What happened to the radio controlled glider bombs? I believe that the allies were very nervous about these early in the war, but you don't hear much about them later in the war. Were they over rated, or did the Allies gain control of the air and make life too hard for German pilots to hang around and keep them on target?
Gonna guess that the mobile front and the range involved simply precluded any viable use of the weapons in any case. Also they were expensive and of little strategic use against such things as factories. Germany to UK is a consistent target and allows the V2 a safe firing position with minimal range to civilian targets which could be harassed by the Vengeance weapons. If Hitler had a missile that could have reached big civil populations from safely within German territory he probably would have considered it, except that he must have assumed the Soviets were rightly already fully committed. He considered the British more "gentlemanly" and someone who's morale to continue fighting might be weakened by bombardment, but no one was under any illusion that trying to weaken Russian morale would work when the Germans were the ones invading.
The idea of the V1 and V2 was as 'counter terror' weapons designed cause the same kind of damage as the carpet and terror bombing of Allied (mainly British) "Area Bombardment" and "Dehousing" campaign was causing and then to use this as leverage to negotiate a mutual end to city bombing. That's why they were known as "Vergelttungs" or Reprisal weapons. The initial version of the V1 and V2 were very inaccurate but as they could fulfil the role of an area weapon they were rushed in production before accurate guidance systems could be completed. This also had the effect of building up mass production. Obviously an area weapon was useless in the east against tactical targets. The V1 was supposed to get an guidance system called "Ewald II" which worked by having the V1 give of a single code pulse mid way through the flight. Three ground stations then received this unique pulse and use time difference to calculate the exact position of the V1. A sequence of pulses specifying a modified heading and distance to fly was then passed on and stored on an endless loop magnetic tape recorder. The whole system was designed to be impossible to jam. Ewald-II was also supposed to be used for the Hagelkorn Glide bomb. The V2 had 3 planed guidance systems. The first replaced the LEV-3 system with SG-66 which incorporated better gyroscopes and additional accelerometer to null out cross winds. It was supposed to be accurate to about 500m at maximum range. Several SG-66 were test flown. The other was called "Vollzirkel" which rode a pencil like beam, used doppler to measure missile speed and pulse to measure distance. It was also to be at least 500m accurate. Versions using 50cm had been tested around 1942/43 but the accuracy was disappointing due to ground plane interference but a version designed for 9cm was being assembled at the end of the war. The most accurate system would have been "Wasserspiegel" which was meant to be used with the A4b version of the V2. It used a sidewise laying Wasserman radar to measure the missile position to 0.01 degrees and distance to 10m. It was to be used either as midcourse guidance (eg SG-66) or be terminally guided and was thus expected to be accurate to about 20 meters. Production plans for the V1 ranged up to 100,000/month and for the V2 up to 5000/month. V2 production costs were expected to drop to 4000 man hours per unit after about 10,000 units.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Thank you! Very informative. My initial query was trying to find out if they were ever used on the troop concentrations in the bridge heads that came up, especially those on the Oder or the Seelow Heights. 🤔
Gary Webb The V2 was used in desperation against the Railway Bridge at Remagen at short range ie about 50-70km. Early tests of the V2 showed an accuracy of within 4.5km at 300km using the LEV-3 system. The Victoria beam riding system was used in 30% of launches. This version only guided laterally cut lateral dispersion in half. A Doppler System pulled another 10% of down range accuracy. Without SG66 or vollzirkel the V2 tactical accuracy was inadequate for tactical use. Werner von Braun had promised an accuracy of about 1 mil ie 1 part per 1000 which was 50% of what heavy artillery achieved. I suspect with the new guidance systems and when used at very short range the V2 might have been of tactical use.
I just realized I was an idiot and called you Bernard and had to come back and correct it. But still, hit up Kermit, it would be an epic collaboration.
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I really appreciate the little progress bar during the sponsor segment! Makes it much more comfortable to watch when you know how long it is, or skip if you already know about/use the product advertised.
Great video as always!
Cheers, good to hear it is useful!
@@MilitaryAviationHistory I never even noticed that what a clever fella you are!
Yes I can skip it 😍 (I don't need to know the product lol)
10:27 The Germans couldn't attack the Russian rail system because German trains did not have an axle width that would fit Russian tracks. They had to rely on captured Russian trains to move supplies further east. That required moving German trains to the end of the lines and unloading, then reloading supplies onto Russian trains or unloading, then using other transport to deliver the supplies. The other alternative was to build trains that would fit the Russian tracks or re-lay the entire rail system with German-standardized tracks. None of the options were good and it was a logistical nightmare problem that was never solved.
Often they would just disconnect one rail and move it closer to the other. The Soviet rail network was also primitive compared to the German one and inadequate for Heer requirements
@@visionist7 The Russian rail system provided water replenishment significantly further apart than German locomotives were designed for, causing a lot of problems. One solution was the condenser carriages added to some Henschel Locomotives which eliminated the need for water replenishment and also eliminated the steam that often attracted air attack.
"Even with the concentrated effort of directing the railroads to supply the motorised divisions, the fact remained that demand still greatly outstripped what the feeble rail network could supply. The assumption had been made during Barbarossa's planning stage that large quantities of Soviet rolling stock and locomotives would be captured in the initial phase of the campaign, providing support for the drive into the Soviet Union, while the railroad troops (Eisenbahntruppe) extended the German gauge. Yet, once the initial shock and confusion of the invasion had passed, the Soviets were quick to institute an extensive evacuation of their trains with the subsequent demolition of those remaining behind. This was so effective that, by the end of August 1941, the Germans had captured only around 1,000 Soviet locomotives of which just half were still operational. [160] This critical setback had two major repercussions for the german campaign. First, the army became almost immediately reliant on extending the narrow-gauge lines as quickly as possible in order to assume the enormous burden of sustaining operations to the east. Planning for this conversion did not anticipate the effects the Soviet 'scorched earth' policy [161] would have on the railroads and installations, nor the extent of destruction caused by the Luftwaffe and front-line units in earlier combat operations. The conversion was therefore slower than expected and achieved only by the most rudimentary standards of quality control. [162] The second complication of the German failure to capture large numbers of Soviet trains was that the deficit had to be made up by the already over-extended Reichsbahn (German railways). By the autumn of 1941, some 2,500 German locomotives and 200,000 railcars had to be employed in the east, creating additional stresses for the German economy. [163]"
Quoted from: David Stahel, 'Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East', pp. 248.
Footnotes being:
[160] Schüler, 'The Eastern Campaign', p. 210.
[161] Glantz, Barbarossa, pp. 73-74.
[162] Schüler, 'The Eastern Campaign', pp. 210-211.
[163] Reinhardt, Moscow - The Turning Point, p. 147.
@Charles McCarron there was a period of nominal collaboration after the Soviet Nazi pact before the war that the German's should have taken advantage of, sending engineers to help modernise the Soviet rail network who would subtly lay the groundwork for invasion by ensuring each single track line had space for another, and that the track bed was adequate for heavier German trains and so on. Barbarossa would start with a lot more intelligence on the Russian rail network.
Didn't Finland use the Soviet guage? Again if the German plants had been supplying broad guage locomotives to the Finns before the war they'd have the tooling to make their own. Have a number on hand when Barbarossa begins
True. The Germans re-used many forms of Soviet wartime production. There are pictures of German troops carrying PPSH 41 submarchine guns, as wall as the use of Soviet trucks and tractors, not to mention the odd tank or artillery piece. I believe that official policy was "use it until it breaks or you run out of ammunition."
Brilliantly insightful, thoroughly researched, logically analyzed and thought through to every significant detail.
Just as the German designers were getting their long-range bomber prototypes ready, the Luftwaffe High Command being steered by Ernst Udet suddenly announced that the new bomber had to have a dive bombing capability.The massive delay that caused rippled through the industry and it was the fatal blow against having a 4-engined,heavy bomber available in 1942 to go after the the Russian war production in the Urals.
I really like your videos Sir..it's a pleasure to watch and listen to an educated and articulate man.
I have read about the late war plans regarding the German effort to knock out the power grid in question somewhere but never thought much of it. But I never knew about these sorts of raids and the considerations that went into them. The Luftwaffe certainly could have been more than an operational force for sure and it would be fascinating what would have happened if they pushed for them in 1941/42.
A most informative and stellar summary on the subject. I can always rely on you to teach me something I never knew about or thought about.
An Iron Cross for you should be in order.
Reminds me, the release of a number of barrage balloons to entangle power lines with their steel cable, the east wind being predominant.
Thank you, this video added a lot to my knowledge of this topic. I'd never realised just how much of an internal high command struggle there was between wanting to stop the Soviet army, and expecting to eventually take over their facilities. And when reality arrived in force it was all too late. Victory disease, gets you every time! Thank you again.
Wow!, Apparently the Nazis own hubris prevented them from attacking Soviet assets that were sure to be overrun soon.
2:56… They really do use the Thumb in Germany when they count 3 on their hands lol!
This is the best video I've seen on your channel. Even with hints of humor - nice touch. Keep up the excellent work!
Thank you, glad you enjoyed it!
I still can't believe how much your video quality has improved after the spitfire variant video .
Thanks, working hard on it. Happy people like the way things are progressing!
@@MilitaryAviationHistory Spitfire VC vs A6M zero over Darwin !!
Seems like the Luftwaffe missed a number of potentially tremendous opportunities, due to indecision, and especially due to the naive - I think even at the time - false hope that all this material would be captured from the Soviets.
Planning on stealing equipment from the masters of the "Scorched Earth Retreat, then Retaliation." strategy since Napoleon seems like a very dumb plan. Typical overambitious nazis.
Making war on the cheap, doesn't usually end well. Unless you have lots of space to trade, like the USSR and the USA. Then you get a chance to execute new designs well.
You know the video is very good when you realize you have not seen the time fly and you expect it to be longer than its original length.
Nice, you added your own captions.
It's been fascinating to watch the development of these videos over time, from the 'good enthusiast' level to a truly professional one that ranks with the best. Informative, excellently researched and delivered, and without being dry and humourless. A joy to watch.
Glad to see that you brought up the fact that Strategic bombers weren't needed. The Ju88 and He111 were so versatile they saw no need for one. Like when ppl bring up Germany should have built aircraft carriers in reality they shouldn't of because they weren't needed. Great stuff Bis!!!
More to the point, they were cheaper and quicker to build and required fewer crew.
I've read a bunch of books about WWII, but still you added many insights that I hadn't heard before. Very interesting. Thanks
Yeah he does I have read and seen ww2 books and documentary for over 30 year's but Mr Bismarck comes out with new information, Tanks don't stop keep it up sir we will follow you
I like the fact Germany has no internet in the countryside, it keeps my pure beer safe from radio waves.
Mr Bismarck, another fascinating and informative video. I continue to look fwd to seeing your well researched and well presented work - thanks.
Thanks very much
I read the assault on Stalingrad included the second bigest airal bombardment by the Luftwaffe after London.
Thanks again Bismarck! You’re a legend bro, your thirst for knowledge is insatiable and infectious. Keep it up.
Just wanted to congratulate you for 16 Days in Berlin being funded, can't wait to watch what all of your great channels build together
Interesting counterpoint to the West, where years of futile attempts at destroying German industry were punctuated with the very occasional use of the strategic force as a tactical weapon - over the bitter opposition of the air forces involved- as in the Normandy breakout, operation Cobra.
it still amazes me how they were able to keep these somewhat advanced factories functional with tons of ordinance dropped on then especially the germans. Like WW2 was such a unique time in history where technology was advanced enough to give us such amazing weapons but yet simple enough that factories did not require much in the way of sophisticated machinery to produce weaponry
There are several factors.
A lot of the bombs droped simply failed to hit anything worthwhile.
All that footage of rolling avalanches of bomb detonations waltzing over the target area look impressive, but most of those bombs didn't do any real damage.
In order to bring down a brick wall, the bomb had to land rather close. Splinters would kill people in a large radius around the point of impact, but brick walls and steel beams didn't realy care.
The roofs of those factories were often of rather light construction. Steel beams and corugrated sheet metal or even tar impreganted cardboard. So, the debries of a roof laying around on the factory floor looks like impressive damage, but it can often be cleared away with a broom and a shovel.
Also, those machines were quite well built. Cast and forged steel. Overengineered and sturdy. Anything short of a direct hit would often do little more then superficial damage on the machinery itself.
@@Bird_Dog00 Yes. One of the conclusions of the US Strategic Bombing Survey - was that the bombs used against factories with heavy industrial equipment weren't big enough.
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Thank, I always love to lear something new. I was raised by my parents just after the war when rationing was still in existence.
My parents both served in the armed forces and never talked about the war.
The material that we in the UK get shown, does not cover factual information in such detail.
It shows it more from our point of view or perspective.
We were just told that both Stalin and Hitler were both as mad as a box of frogs as a saying we have in England. Or potty as a fruit case as some people say.
All I know is that forgiveness begins with understanding.
It's amazing that we often had almost identical ideas.
Thank you for a very informative and educational film.
Jeremy Travis check this out. Amazing
Surf Shark if you're reading this, Bismark Honest review is the reason that I'm going to try your product, it's actually a very smart way of advertising.
Vielen Dank fur dieses Video. I had little to no idea about this little known and oft-misunderstood part of the Eastern Front, finding myself wondering why the Luftwaffe appeared to miss the opportunity to handicap Soviet industry especially when Germany had, and was, experiencing the consequences of strategic blockading and bombing.
At least now I understand that the German High Command did contemplate this at various stages and on various different levels, and can appreciate that part of the problem was the omnipresent, pervasive and continuous issue of 'too little too late' - that seemed to dog the fortunes of the German armed forces over and over.
Excellent video.
I came to think of the minor nations chat you had with Bernard in the last video, thought maybe it would be of interest to you to look into Finnish doctrine during the Winter War and Continuation War? Speaking about the air combat tactics and ideas surrounding targeting Soviet bombers developed by Richard Lorentz and Gustaf Erik "Eka" Magnusson. I myself know absolutely nothing about it, but if I can piggy back on the interest of a Nerd (read outstanding enthusiast), I won't complain.
Luftwaffe attempts to knock out Soviet war production was a Sisyphean task anyway. U.S. Lend-Lease shipments of military equipment like Sherman tanks, fighter and bomber planes and the all-important 300,000 plus Studebaker 2-1/2 ton trucks ensured the Red Army and Air Force had plenty of war materiél: (see Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union 1941-1945, Hubert P. Van Tuyll)
The Lend Lease help geared up after the Kursk battle, only 16% was shipped in 1941-1942 when the Soviets had a really hard time. The shipments were stopped in the first half of 1943. On January 1, 1943 there was 22,000 imported trucks in the Red Army, out of 404,500 (5.4 %).
After Kursk it was just a matter of time...what you could also see in this video.
Edit: Only around 470 Sherman tanks were sent in 1943 (2345 in 1944) and the Soviets produced around 1300 T-34's per moth from the second half of 1942.
@@simplicius11I don't believe the US 'stopped' shipments. Winter froze up the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. But the Persian corridor (through Armenia and up the Volga) continued operations. This was the only all-season route for Lend-Lease shipments. Unlikely Russia had 385,000 trucks unless one counts smaller 1/2 ton vehicles--not suitable for transporting whole armies long distances. After the German invasion the Soviet Union lost 60% of all motor transport in the early days. Soviet figures on truck production should be viewed with suspicion because of Soviet propaganda which minimized the importance of US Lend-Lease deliveries. Stalin forbade Soviet Sherman tank battalions from participation in liberation parades as the Russian Army rolled back the Germans. It's rare to find a photograph of Sherman tanks and Studebaker trucks on the Eastern Front. The Russian US Lend-Lease museum is located in a public school room in Moscow. The exhibits are a couple of motorcycles, some C-ration cans and a few packs of Lucky Strike cigarettes and Wrigley's chewing gum. Every effort was made to hide the magnitude of the US Lend-Lease contribution.
@@johnmosbrook9964 No, the Murmansk port is never freezing, Vladivostok can be frozen but that was not a problem with a regular traffic and icebreakers. The relations were pretty cold all up to the Tehran conference because of the "Second front" that the Allies promised in 1942 when Molotov was in London and Washington (Jun??). And just a few months later they started the Torch.
The Soviet Union had much more trucks than that (they were No.1 in Europe regarding truck production, 180,000 in 1937) but these were in civilian use and were planned to be mobilized in wartime. One of the reasons for that disaster in 1941, they were not mobilized and the motorized divisions were marching on foot.
They had 272,600 army trucks at the start of the war.
The losses were not even close to 60% and were quickly replaced by the mobilized vehicles. On January 1,1942, they had 319,500 trucks in the army.
And no, I'm not aware of any 1/2 ton trucks. They had 1.5 ton (Ford license) and 3 ton trucks in around 1:1 ratio.
@Call Me Ishmael See 'Feeding the Bear' for a complete breakdown of materials, weapons, ammunition supplied through US Lend-Lease. The Soviet Union could not produce the T-34s without US steel shipments.
And britain supplied a near a third as much again, didn't like the Spitfire, but the Hurricane they did, but the Sudebaker indeed was a lifesaver, and easier to hide in the patriotic newsreels.
Bismarck, I'm not so sure that everyone's attention was on Stalingrad in 1942.
BOTH SIDES sent more resources to the Rezhev Salient in 1942.
I think that this was a brilliant strategy on the part of OKW as to create a meat grinder to wear down Soviet manpower as STAVKA was willing to continue the insane attacks and to throw away the lives of Soviet soldiers played right into OKW's hands.
Great video, as usual. Thank you!
Everyone's attention was on Stalingrad because it was a decisive engagement unlike Rzhev.
Heh, another brilliant armchair general... the Germans suffered terrible losses there, only the Grosdeutschland Division was cut in half in a few weeks. Together with Stalingrad the Germans lost their well trained troops and everything that was gathered later was not even close.
The brilliant operation for a defending side would be a strong breakthrough, encirclement and destruction of attacking force (like Stalingrad).
Also, the Germans had a plan to cut off and destroy the salient NW of Rzhev
@@simplicius11 what are your references as to those horrible German losses in the Rzhev Salient?
@@turdferguson3803 Stalingrad was decisive AFTER the battle.
Rzhev was a meat grinder. Wearing out the Russian infantrymen. When your enemy continues to throw lives away in a meat grinder it becomes an awful attrition battle and helps their enemy.
@@Inquisitor6321 Wrong, Stalingrad and Case Blue were infinitely more important than Rhzev because the Germans were fighting for their only chance to knock the USSR out of the war by taking the Caucasus.
The Germans, taken as a whole, were worse than awful at overall strategic vision. Tactically, pretty darn good, but the Soviets outfoxed and outfought them over time.
It sounds like one of the major problems was a lack of bombers with the payload to do reasonable damage to a target at longer ranges. Not necessarily the lack of specific type but an overall lack of capacity. The Allied strategic bombing effort was an attrition effort to hurt German industry and the Luftwaffe, a bloody and expensive effort that eventually worked.
Attacking the power grid and oil production facilities was probably the wisest set of targets as their destruction had the widest ripple effects to the entire economy.
Shortage of trained pilots and aircrew did not help.
19:16 thats code for "Gulag time". We know how much Stalin likes gulags and blaming others for his incompetence
How that bombing is connected to Stalins incompetence?
Oh look, I found a guy who thinks he's being very clever by believing western propaganda.
@@yamato3151 well, he need to whore out for upvotes somehow, right? Why not by playing by an established stereotype by making an offtopic comment? You can spot him under videos in any way touching France as the guy, who jokes about white flags and thinks it's original:D
Strategic bombing fits only within a war of attrition. The Wehrmacht could not win a war of attrition, and the Oberkommando generals knew it. Thus, they never committed to strategic bombing.
Exactly
Why prepare for, plan or implement a doctrine that will inevitably result in defeat.
Let's face it.
A rational German political system would have concluded after Stalingrad in1943 that "We're done. It hasn't worked. Let's sue for peace and polish off that 'stab in the back' myth we used in 1918."
Of course the Allies were intent on unconditional surrender and the Nazi's were running a death cult (the only thing left for Hitler and his band of assorted nut jobs was to replicate the kind of national disaster Germany had avoided in 1918 in the belief the somehow history would give them credit for not giving in).
So the war dragged on through 1943, 1944 and the first half of 1945.😮
Truth to tell, a Hitler had won himself into a strategic dead-end by the winter of 1940 and he knew it.
That's why he gambled on Barbarossa in 1941.
Churchill was right. The Germans had to break British resistance in 1940 or they were going to lose the war.
According to wiki, the Soviets stopped making t-60s in 1942. The Gorky factory was probably making t-70s and Su-76s.
3:58
sick gun cam!
what type of aircraft were those?
Looked like a bf110 first.
then something with big cannon(s)
He 129, Ju 88, maybe Ju87 with 37mm gun pods.
Focke-Wulf Fw 190A fitted with ETC bomb racks or possibly Fw 190F3 (ground attack Version with standard bomb racks). The bombs have been released and you can see the clasps extended into the slipstream. The aircraft had a pair of 13.2mm heavy machine guns synchronised to fire through the propellor above the engine, a pair of MG151/20 20mm guns in the wing roots synchronised to fire through the propellor and another pair on the wing just outside the arc. That’s 2 x 13.2mm and 4 x 20mm. Synchronisation was electrical with an electrically ignited primer in the cartridge. That is an enormous amount of fire power. Some versions had short barrelled MK108 30mm guns in the outer stations but these were generally used to attack bombers. They did try long barrelled MK103 guns under the outer wing stations but they couldn’t handle the recoil. Not until the Ta 152B could the MK103 be fitted into the broader wing chord of the bigger wing root, which was stiff enough to handle the recoil (never made it to service but photos exist)
William Jones-Halibut he’s asking about the gun cam clip after the shot of the fw190
Curtis is correct.
Thanks for the info on the 190's.
Its one of my fav's!
I love the MG and Cannon positions tight to the fuselage.
Gun camera film is badass ,but also sade seeing aircraft exploding knowing there people inside just died. War is hell never forget, now we see on CNN reporters praising US airforce bombing civilians who cares they are not American so that don't matter.
peace and love
Wow, surprisingly good video! One of the best on this channel
I've seen some of your videos here and there (probably found you through your Austrian colleague), but I finally now realize how much of a rabbit hole your channel is (in a good way!). There are just so many interesting subjects, and this one pushed me over the edge, I'm now a subscriber. Not sure how much that is worth these days (demonetisation-wave), but hey.
Keep up the good work! Mach's gut :)
Really nice, informative Video
Cheers Galtur, happy you enjoyed it
Fantastic video as always. Also appreciate the time marker for the sponsor spot
This won't make YT trending, but I would love to see that happen. This is wonderful content, and extremely interesting, to me at least.
Thanks!
25:38 "Sir, we have no volunteers for one way mission!!" ........ "Do we have any Japanese in Germany???"
Imagine going to the Japanese attaché and asking if he wanted to kamikaze.
Interesting strategic insights, which I had not heard before.
Congratulations on 250k
Thank you for this interesting video. I once read "The German Air War in Russia" by Richard Muller, what was very insightful about the german bombardment plans. What nearly shocked me were the (theoritical) possibilities they had. I quote Muller, p. 115, as for the situation in 1943:
"The Germans calculated that seven aircraft engine plants supplied the VVS with powerplants; five of these, accounting for fully 78% of the production totals, were within bomber range. In order of importance, these factories were Factory No. 24, Kuibyshev, with 1/4 of total production and 85% of all ground attack aircraft (Il-2) engines; Factory No. 26 at Ufa, with 31% of total production and 60% of all fighter aircraft engine production; Factory No. 16 at Kazan, producing 12% of the total and 60% of all bomber engines; Factory No. 45, Moscow, with 5% of the total but the remaining 15% of Il-2 engines; and finally Factory No. 466 at Gorki, 5% of the total production and 1/10 of all fighter engine production."
In other words, attacks on these targets could result in a drastic decline of production. As the soviet armaments industry was risen out of thin air the factories producing the main weapons could not have outsource/replace the production so easily to a system of "shadow factories" or "production circles" as the british and germans did - at least it is my opinion. As far as i know, you need a strong civilian industry for outsourcing/supplementing.
The mistake is not in what was or wasn't done, but in the scale of the commitment to the enterprise. To win in war one must assess the worst case commitment that must be made to win, and then multiply that estimate by 4. Then when the enterprise is actually begun, multiply the effort by at least 2 again.
Your delivery, and tonal quality, reminds me very much of Mentor Pilot.
Could you make a video about Soviet long range aviation striking Berlin in 1941?
Is that sarcasm or were there actually such strikes?
There were, but afaik they were like the Doolitle raid - limited in scope and not much more than a morale boost.
Your point regarding range, fuel requirements and payload, is the argument for the 4 engine strategic. This was the argument of General Weaver.
Your command of the English language is exceptional for a non-native speaker.
why thank you
Germany is near the top of educated nations, as is Britain. But the US is down closer to impoverished middle eastern countries. (That is NOT an exaggeration. Simple fact.) It's a sad state of affairs. Most Europeans take learning a 2nd or 3d language very seriously. Most Americans would prefer to force everyone else to speak English. 'murica. Will someone please invade us and take over? We've proven that we can't do shit to better ourselves.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 If the USA sucks so bad, why are there hordes of people trying to get in?
Age and Treachery a bloody mess is still better than a mountain of disaster
@@princeofcupspoc9073 I live over a thousand miles away from the nearest non-English speaking country. Why in gods name would I waste thousands of hours of my life mastering a second language I'll never use, unless I make a career out of it? Don't get me wrong I understand why the Europeans do it, some of them don't even have a majority language in there own country. But in the USA? we we don't have that problem.
If the Germans had been at all serious about strategic bombing, they would have let Heinkel put four engines in four nacelles in the He-177. The Brits did it with the Manchester (as bad a turkey as the 177) and the result was the Lancaster. Heinkel had to sneak them into the He-277, which the French used post WWII.
An interesting alternative to this approach is to ponder what a strong strategic long range bomber force would have had on the battle of Britain and the aviation factories to the North that they could not reach..
This was really a superb presentation of an important but under-examined topic. This might be your best so far! I particularly applaud your use of original sources rather than relying too much on other's work. I remember reading that during the formation of the Luftwaffe, that it was decided early on that dive bombers would replace the need for a strategic bombing force since their accuracy was so much greater than that of level bombers. With this requirement in mind, the He-111 and Do-17 both had to be able to dive. So even though the bomb load was light on a long range mission, the ability to deliver an accurate dive attack obviated the need for a large bomb load---in theory anyway. Do you know if the Luftwaffe tried diving attacks on the factories or power plants? Thanks again!
The standard Do 17 or He 111 didn’t have a dive bombing capability. Though it seems just about every Luftwaffe spec from those aircraft on had a dive bombing requirement. The Ju 88 did receive a dive bombing requirement (it significantly delayed Ju 88). Rare variants of the Do 217 had dive brakes and supposedly the He 177 could dive bomb and some were fitted with Stuvi 5B bombsights though this dive bombing requirement was only a troublesome design specification latter rescinded by Hermann Goering. The ground attack version of the Me 410 did have dive brakes fitted and was in fact designed to replace both the Ju 87 and Ju 88 in the dive bombing role. From 1942 the Luftwaffe introduced two new bomb sights. The Lofte 7 was a gyro stabilised computing bomb sight could measure bomber wind drift and target motion and accurately hit a target. (They got 50% hits on the Merchant Ships from Fw 200 in convoy from 14000ft when 4 of them attacked convoy Faith) and also the STUVI 5B which was a dive and shallow dive bombing sight that continuously computed an impact point and moved the cross hairs of the pilots sight. A dive from a Ju 88 might commence at 8000ft, reach 22 degrees and complete pull-up and bomb release by 5000ft. A good Ju 88 crew could get within 10m of a tank etc. These new bombsight removed much of the need for dive bombing.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs
Thank you. I always thought that all the LW med bombers could dive bomb. I think Erhard Milch after seeing a divebomber display in the US called it the New World Egg and decided it would be the only way fwd.
@@fazole It was Ernst Udet, Germany's second highest WW1 ace after Manfred von Richthofen who witnessed the Curtiss Hawke dive bombers and eventually purchased some. Junkers already had a dive bomber program so the Hawke's didn't influence the Ju 87 development but the enthusiasm it generated in Luftwaffe circles was clear. Udet did some flying display's in the US, available on Internet. Most impressive.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs
Yes, Udet, not Milch. He was an impressive stunt pilot.
Prima discussion. Understanding the greater picture is key to these topics. This is the post graduate part of RUclips.
you don't need 4 engines to be a strategic bomber, just look at italy and their 3 engined bomber ; )
Tu-160?
de Havilland Mosquito 2man bomber at 1/2 the bomb load of a 10man B17g bomber (later to equal)
Very interesting. But on the subject of one-way bombing trips, why weren’t V-1s and V-2s considered? Were they used at all on the Ostfront?
Thanks for broadening understanding of the topic. Liked and shared.
I wonder if there is a measurable effect on accuracy of bomb release orientation. German bombers house the bombs upside down and let them flip in mid air, US bombers carried them in the horizontal position, and I may have seen a bomber that carried ordnance in the nose down position but am not sure on that one. The transportation orientation and reasoning behind it may be a decent topic for a video sometime.
7:12 Spray n pray -colorized-
Attacking to the railroads by bomb not noticeably happened in murmansk to Leningrad line where lent lease cargo transferred to the leningrad. It would have been more efficient than U-boots.
Great video. I kept thinking in the back of my mind however, even if the Luftwaffe had carried on a successful strategic bombing of Soviet factories and/or power plants, American factories were churning out enough war material to send to the USSR which would have made the effort all for naught. And Germany had nothing that could reach America.
they where going to make Me 264 America bombers to hit New York but nothing came of that.
Always interesting, thank you.
Battle of Britain depleted Luftwaffe strenghth, so Barbarossa was started with half the Luftwaffe planned (2000 planes for 1939 Poland.) Russians did scorched earth retreat against Napoleon; that heightens supply logistics since army can't live off the land. Germany was low on fuel resources, the reason to take Southern Russia. By 1942, Lend-Lease and native Soviet aircraft (Yak-3, Il-2, ...) outperformed and outnumbered German planes. Have you wondered about allies having unlimited fuel supplies. And 130 octane fuel provides a big performance boost over the German 95 octane. Question you didn't answer: why wasn't the Kremlin bombed?
What is always striking is reality gap between German planning departments in higher command and the actual wartime situation. The similarities between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe in fighting next years war today are signal. Churchill came out with a scheme, sometimes twice a week but few are treated with credulity today probably because the likes of Brooke, Dowding, Portal, Harris and Pound ensured the majority were stillborn with pragmatism so don't make it into alternate history which seems de rigueur for students of Axis history in general and German history in particular. Harris put it succinctly describing Germany's unrealistic attempts at wonder weapons as trying to invent the machine gun in the middle of the battle of Agincourt.
The fundamentals required are firstly the aviation fuel for a sustained strategic German air offensive, something the Germans did not have since 1940, secondly, as Bismarck points out the Aircraft for a sustained effort including industry geared to support this offensive, thirdly the intelligence and fourthly the weather and finally the reaction from your enemy. Which front or arm was going to be robbed to provide the resource for a strategic campaign against Russia. Nightfighters? Nope they were are a priority from July 1943. Day Fighters? ditto. U-Boats? They were the most successful arm until May 43. Heer? Looks like German strategic bombing was no more than an augmented staff exercise for units incapable of operating in western skies.
Great video as always so interesting thanks Bismark
I don't know why so many needless arguments took place regarding what to bomb or not. However, I'm certain Fegelein must've had something to do with it.
Exzellentes Video vie immer, mein freund. Danskenschön, und gute Nacht!
Great video. Seems not only that Germany lacked a strategic bomber and bomber arm, but the Luftwaffe lacked a comprehensive strategic bomber mindset or forethought. Interesting. It makes sense now why it was never pursued in earnest.
development of the helicopter with specialize attack units deployed behind enemy lines could have been very useful to knock out key infrastructure or targets, complex long-winded projects and a lack of knowing what to do when let to an unravelling, fighting versus many death blows.
Another great video. Keep them coming!
In order for a bombardment campaign to be considered "strategic", it cannot be conducted against a single type of industrial target. Essentially ALL of your enemy's industrial capacity must be targeted. Targeting power stations simply ISN'T strategic bombing - it's a tactical campaign against industrial targets.
Moreover, the crucial problem for the Luftwaffe in conducting a strategic bombing campaign wasn't the shortage of planes and pilots - though they had too few bombers capable of flying such missions, they could certainly have diverted production from other aircraft types to increase their strategic bombing forces and trained more aircrew had they so chose.
No, the crucial problem for the Luftwaffe in conducting a serial bombing campaign was far simpler yet more intractable - the critical fuel shortage. They simply did NOT have enough fuel to wage a massive long range bombing campaign and sustain it for a long enough time to create any kind of significant reduction in Soviet industrial capacity and output. And a strategic bombing campaign would do nothing to make more fuel available to the Luftwaffe.
Military Aviation History - When research on WW2 started being sexy.
That SovietWomble on the right side @ 5:00
That's amazing
T-60's were not in production by 1943, T-70's were. Also, one should take into account the nasty side-effect of the German bombings of GAZ plant - the loss of part of the factory archives and some of the experimental vehicles stored there.
7:12 Quad Maxim mount? Count me in :)
Confused. The quad maxim was quite ubiquitous, and useful against low flying jabos.
@Mial isus More likely the gunner is moving the mount in an attempt to increase the area where bullets will be flying to compensate for the targeted aircraft's attempt to maneuvere. Those machineguns were widely available and effective en masse. Their use makes a lot of sense considering DSHKs and autocannons would be of less availability. Then theres the fact that the machineguns run on the same ammo as most soviet smallarms of the time thus making these more practical from a purely logistical view. Sorry about the length of post, just trying to cover my bases.
The sunflower strapped to it bouncing up and down was a nice touch.
The lack of four-engine bombers nevertheless really hindered the German war effort against the Soviet Union (the mastermind of those tactics, General Walther Wever, died before the war). Had enough numbers of such aircraft even the Soviet war factories in the Ural mountains could be reached and bombed, changing the course of the war...
A good part of Soviet industrial capacity was located at America.
Don't forget the UK also supplied a lot of supplies to the bastards.
It annoys me when commie Joe was always harping on about the Allies opening a second front because the Russians were bearing the full brunt of the Germans. He wasn't complaining when he signed the non aggression pact where they got half of Poland in 1939 though was he.
Like most things in life, you have to choose between immediate but lesser effects and indirect but greater effects. Give soldiers immediate relief while factories continue at full speed, or knock out factories and the rail network to cripple everything later while soldiers pay the price in the meanwhile.
Everything has an opportunity cost. The tradeoffs are the devil's details.
4:07 why do flashes pop up when the bullets hit the ground?
And why does a little smoke fly after the bullet? Has it yo do with the tracer rounds or something?
Those ought to be explosive cannon rounds, probably 20mm but could be 37mm as well. Simple machine guns are of little use against ground targets like tanks and bunkers. Also tracers can leave smoke trails, and any bullets can leave contrails through the air.
@@scottwatrous I haven't seen smoke coming from bullets and tracers flying from ground footage
Around the 14:30 mark, your graphic on the screen says "9th Army" when I am fairly certain you meant "6th Army".
So had Germany focused more on expanding industrial production and aircrew training earlier in the war, they might have had enough forces to mount long range strategic raids.
I'd enjoy a video on Germany's 4 engine bombers and about their potential impact.
problem all air forces have 1 bomber or 4 fighters Germany had 2 problems 1 4 engine bomber and not many airfields long enough for them to use or 2 2 engine fighters/ bombers available for use anywhere also bomb load v fuel load.
As i know, German army in stalingrad area , commanded by Von paulus, was the 6th army and not the 9th ..
Perhaps the Germans also looked at their own experience of being able to keep producing war materials despite the Allies’ strategic bombing and decided it was a futile effort.
Good point.
Allied strategic bombing did mess up troop deployment and fuel production regardless
Trying to capture everything intact....which is exactly how I play Command and Conquer.
wait...they used mistel to blow up bridges? isnt that too overkill? I thought they already had Ju87 for that kind of accurate bombing?
Meanwhile, Supreme Allied command: Should we hit power plants, factories, oil and food production, civilian targets?
Allied Bomber Command: Yes.
Never any consideration of using weapons of mass destruction remains the odd decision...particularly in 1941 but also in 1942 and Case Blue.
What weapons of mass destruction?
@@nathanwinhusen6017 probably the Coal dust bombs made by Mario Zippermayr. That’s really the only one I can think of.
So it seems obvious the Luftwaffe, seem somewhat crippled by the waste of men and material on that river crossing, that the Soviet could well use, since they always knew where to find the Luftwaffes planes. And the abysmal production figures could only get worse later as the western allies punished germany both outside then inside. Germany never created a de Havilland Mosquito like 2man bomber at 1/2 the bomb load of a 10man B17g bomber (later to equal), possibly help by the fanatic bombing of Stalingrad without looking for the massive built up in the country behind.
Given the view that British and American strategic bombing was not as effective as hoped or thought, how significant an effect do you think the Luftwaffe could have had? The two scenarios have enough differences that it is a more complicated issue than just comparing the tonnage of bombs they could have dropped. Interested to know whether you have seen anything on this or can estimate from your other reading.
Thanks again for the great videos!
Danke, ich genieße deine Videos! Woher kommst du?
speaking os German Strategic Bombers could you do a video on the Grief Bomber? that is a very interesting design that was had bizarre engine problems.
Thanks. That was interesting.
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5:21 Wow. She is just staring straight into that arc.
That person isn't even welding by the looks. Just stabbing something with the rod to make some sparks. Unless they were trying to weld thin sheet (which can only be done half assedly with rod) there is no reason to move around like that. Or the combination of rod and power source was garbage. That also makes you do that. Neither case leaves acceptable welds. I smell a lot of "in mother russia....."
Background music "blinded by the light..."
As usual the top brass behind a comfy desk ruin everything.
23:07 E I G H T Y P E R C E N T
Danke, Bismark, ich genieße deinen Kanal! Woher kommst du in Deutschland, und lebst du noch dort? Dein Amerikanisch ist hervorragend!
What a monumental effort the whole war was, especially on the eastern front, beggars belief I always say!
What happened to the radio controlled glider bombs? I believe that the allies were very nervous about these early in the war, but you don't hear much about them later in the war. Were they over rated, or did the Allies gain control of the air and make life too hard for German pilots to hang around and keep them on target?
I'm 68, I've read a LOT of history books and have yet to read of any V1 or V2 attacks toward the east. Is this so and why? 🤔
Gonna guess that the mobile front and the range involved simply precluded any viable use of the weapons in any case. Also they were expensive and of little strategic use against such things as factories.
Germany to UK is a consistent target and allows the V2 a safe firing position with minimal range to civilian targets which could be harassed by the Vengeance weapons. If Hitler had a missile that could have reached big civil populations from safely within German territory he probably would have considered it, except that he must have assumed the Soviets were rightly already fully committed. He considered the British more "gentlemanly" and someone who's morale to continue fighting might be weakened by bombardment, but no one was under any illusion that trying to weaken Russian morale would work when the Germans were the ones invading.
The idea of the V1 and V2 was as 'counter terror' weapons designed cause the same kind of damage as the carpet and terror bombing of Allied (mainly British) "Area Bombardment" and "Dehousing" campaign was causing and then to use this as leverage to negotiate a mutual end to city bombing. That's why they were known as "Vergelttungs" or Reprisal weapons. The initial version of the V1 and V2 were very inaccurate but as they could fulfil the role of an area weapon they were rushed in production before accurate guidance systems could be completed.
This also had the effect of building up mass production. Obviously an area weapon was useless in the east against tactical targets.
The V1 was supposed to get an guidance system called "Ewald II" which worked by having the V1 give of a single code pulse mid way through the flight. Three ground stations then received this unique pulse and use time difference to calculate the exact position of the V1. A sequence of pulses specifying a modified heading and distance to fly was then passed on and stored on an endless loop magnetic tape recorder. The whole system was designed to be impossible to jam. Ewald-II was also supposed to be used for the Hagelkorn Glide bomb.
The V2 had 3 planed guidance systems. The first replaced the LEV-3 system with SG-66 which incorporated better gyroscopes and additional accelerometer to null out cross winds. It was supposed to be accurate to about 500m at maximum range. Several SG-66 were test flown. The other was called "Vollzirkel" which rode a pencil like beam, used doppler to measure missile speed and pulse to measure distance. It was also to be at least 500m accurate. Versions using 50cm had been tested around 1942/43 but the accuracy was disappointing due to ground plane interference but a version designed for 9cm was being assembled at the end of the war.
The most accurate system would have been "Wasserspiegel" which was meant to be used with the A4b version of the V2. It used a sidewise laying Wasserman radar to measure the missile position to 0.01 degrees and distance to 10m. It was to be used either as midcourse guidance (eg SG-66) or be terminally guided and was thus expected to be accurate to about 20 meters.
Production plans for the V1 ranged up to 100,000/month and for the V2 up to 5000/month. V2 production costs were expected to drop to 4000 man hours per unit after about 10,000 units.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Thank you! Very informative. My initial query was trying to find out if they were ever used on the troop concentrations in the bridge heads that came up, especially those on the Oder or the Seelow Heights. 🤔
Gary Webb The V2 was used in desperation against the Railway Bridge at Remagen at short range ie about 50-70km. Early tests of the V2 showed an accuracy of within 4.5km at 300km using the LEV-3 system. The Victoria beam riding system was used in 30% of launches. This version only guided laterally cut lateral dispersion in half. A Doppler System pulled another 10% of down range accuracy. Without SG66 or vollzirkel the V2 tactical accuracy was inadequate for tactical use.
Werner von Braun had promised an accuracy of about 1 mil ie 1 part per 1000 which was 50% of what heavy artillery achieved. I suspect with the new guidance systems and when used at very short range the V2 might have been of tactical use.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Thank you again! I'm learning things now that wasn't widely disseminated when I was a puppy. 😊
Would it be fair to say that the luftwaffe were looking for a tactical victory but in the process losing strategically?
Bernard, have to ever spoken to Kermit Weeks from Fantasy of Flight about coming over to Florida and spending a week filming his vast collection?
I just realized I was an idiot and called you Bernard and had to come back and correct it. But still, hit up Kermit, it would be an epic collaboration.