To me, the argument is not right. When you copy a brain or a person, the copy becomes a separate, independent entity. Identity is shaped by continuous experience, so copying creates a new "self," not a continuation of the original. Copies do not share the same identity: It assumes that a recreated state would continue the same "self" rather than forming a new, independent one. Non-copyability does not prove non-locality: The inability to copy consciousness doesn’t imply non-locality; it reflects the complexity of emergent systems. Algorithmic processes can still produce consciousness: It assumes that if consciousness can’t be perfectly copied, it must be non-algorithmic, which is not necessarily true.
The entire argument is not valid. The assumption that consciousness is based on quantum information has no contradictions, and at the very basic level, quantum teleportation does not contradict the idea that consciousness could be qubits.
This would not be true if we assume that consiousness is not something that we individually own. Instead we own our memories, and the sense that we are conscious is more like a fire that burns in our minds. Like fire, a burning log doesnt own the fire, fire is just a thing that is happening to the log.
I agree. Knight's argument assumes that consciousness is a property of a "Self" or a "Soul," and that this soul would have to be either transported or recreated in a teleportation. If we think of consciousness more like a process, as a verb that brains "do," then there is no issue with that process beginning anywhere where the necessary conditions are met. Derek Parfit covered this thought experiement pretty well.
To me, the argument is not right. When you copy a brain or a person, the copy becomes a separate, independent entity. Identity is shaped by continuous experience, so copying creates a new "self," not a continuation of the original.
Copies do not share the same identity: It assumes that a recreated state would continue the same "self" rather than forming a new, independent one.
Non-copyability does not prove non-locality: The inability to copy consciousness doesn’t imply non-locality; it reflects the complexity of emergent systems.
Algorithmic processes can still produce consciousness: It assumes that if consciousness can’t be perfectly copied, it must be non-algorithmic, which is not necessarily true.
Agree. But still a nice presentation :).
Consciousness can't be held by anything mechanical, physicalist. Consciousness itself is a fluid unfolding.
True! The copies are qualitatively identical to the original, but not numerically identical.
Very interesting.
The entire argument is not valid. The assumption that consciousness is based on quantum information has no contradictions, and at the very basic level, quantum teleportation does not contradict the idea that consciousness could be qubits.
It's true..scientific intelligence can be concious....
This would not be true if we assume that consiousness is not something that we individually own. Instead we own our memories, and the sense that we are conscious is more like a fire that burns in our minds. Like fire, a burning log doesnt own the fire, fire is just a thing that is happening to the log.
A machine can't hold consciousness. It's not even a log to be "flammable" or compatible with it.
I agree. Knight's argument assumes that consciousness is a property of a "Self" or a "Soul," and that this soul would have to be either transported or recreated in a teleportation. If we think of consciousness more like a process, as a verb that brains "do," then there is no issue with that process beginning anywhere where the necessary conditions are met. Derek Parfit covered this thought experiement pretty well.
where can one see the actual slides and/or READ this argument? because this video does not do a great job of presenting it...
Unproven assumptions