I appreciated Nigel's insights into Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law Montgomery and his role during the Battle of the Bulge. I think his biggest leadership mistake in dealing with the American Generals was when he arrived at the front and many American officers felt he came on "Like Christ cleansing the temple." As for his summoning and chastising General Bradley on Christmas day I think he overstepped in that it was General Eisenhower's prerogative to correct one of his subordinate Army Group leaders, not Monty's. I am still glad that Monty was an allied commander on our side, for he was a brilliant commander. If only he was always as right as he thought he was than perhaps the war would have been shortened. Thanks for such an honest conversation.
the issue was that he WAS always right. It's just unfortunate that he was also not afraid to say "I told you so....." and certain people didn't appreciate being told!
Monty put the union flag on the Rolls-Royce so US troops would not mistake them for Germans. At the time US troops were in semi-panic mode shooting at anything in sight, even their own men.
@@sean640307 Not many people do. I'm not sure that all his Normandy operations that failed, such as Goodwood etc. could be considered always right, but I respect your opinion.
@@davidlavigne207 Goodwood _never_ failed. _"My discussion today with the commanders in the Caen sector has afforded regrettable evidence in face of the enemy's complete command of the air there is no possibility that our strategy will counter-balance its truly annihilating effect unless we give up the field of battle. In spite of our intense efforts this front, already heavily strained, will break. And once the enemy is in open country an orderly command will be hardly practicable in view of the insufficient mobility of our troops."_ - Field Marshal Von Kluge in his dispatch to Hitler on the day Goodwood ended: _"The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]."_ - Field Marshall Montgomery (1960s)
Nigel does not appear to be well up on the Scheldt/Antwerp/Arnhem. Antwerp was a lame duck of a port being 50 miles from the sea up a mined river with a German army at its mouth, which would take many weeks to get into operation after the German army was defeated and the whole river was secured. When reaching Antwerp Monty was looking ahead, not to his side too much. Monty wanted Rotterdam straight ahead, a port on the sea not 50 miles up a river which even when cleared could be mined at night by aircraft. Eisenhower said no to Monty. Then Eisenhower wanted Antwerp as part of his broad-front, so Antwerp became the focus, despite supplies coming in as the allied rail crews were reinstating the rail network at a dizzying rate. But the Germans were in artillery range of Antwerp so Noord Brabant had to be taken up to Nijmegen to create a buffer for the port, hence the Market Garden operation. Taking the Scheldt without first securing Noord Brabant was meaningless. Taking Noord Brabant also put into position the northern pincer on the Rhur. As they wanted to reach the Rhine they may as well jump over the river at Arnhem.
I very much enjoy Nigel’s fluid presentation skills and he’s only marginally biased but, he misses the point about Monty (and yes I read his biography) - in an age of warrior generals Monty was nothing more than a battlefield manager. He was a technocrat without the ability to push his will upon his enemies if his plans went sideways.
The advance to Antwerp was not actually at all slow, it was the fastest Allied advance in WW2, 30 Corps advanced over 240 miles in record time. The issue was at that point, whether to go for Market garden OR open the Scheldt but not both. Taking the Scheldt was always going to be a tough undertaking. Eisenhower ultimately decided that they should take advantage of the German flux and go for Market Garden, which came within a whisker of succeeding. Its easy after the event laying blame.
and to extend that further, Montgomery is often cited as having "ignored" the clearing of the Scheldt. This is blatantly incorrect. As far back as the first week of September, First Canadian Army was assigned the task, and was to be bolstered with some of the British units for that task. In fact, Montgomery had even asked First Allied Airborne Army to work on a plan to drop airborne units on Walcheren Island (the original "Operation Infatuate") to largely coincide with the original timing of Operation Comet, but Brereton dismissed this as unsuitable territory for airborne operations. The first moves towards clearing the Scheldt actually took place as early as the 12th September, but were ineffective. Montgomery's failing was not anything to do with ignoring the Scheldt or not giving it enough credence, as he clearly did. The failing, such as it was, was to not appreciate just how close to the bone First Canadian Army was and that it was almost completely exhausted with zero reserves. I don't believe Crerar had made the true situation known, although even if he had, Monty may well have dismissed that thought as he didn't think very highly of Crerar's ability. He DID, however, think the world of Simonds, and would later back him to the best of his ability to do so. I strongly disagree with Hamilton's assessment that Monty got it wrong with regards to the priority of the Scheldt by doing Market Garden first. It was actually the right order to do it in. I also don't necessarily agree that Market Garden created the situation of "The Bulge", at least not directly. If we consider that the Scheldt was done first, then what would have happened is that 21AG would have been drawn even further away from the US lines, into territory that the SHAEF planners had already ruled out as being unsuitable territory to wage war in (even more so than the rest of The Netherlands) and would have boxed 21AG into a corner. The Germans would simply have destroyed every bridge over every waterway, such as they were already doing, making every canal and every river an amphibious crossing, delaying 21AG even further. The estuary would still have taken those same 3 weeks to have cleared (and re-done, as the Germans dropped mines by air into the waterway again) and the sea-born approaches would still have had to be cleared exactly the same. The key to opening the Scheldt was to clear Walcheren Island at the very mouth of it. As was shown later, that would have still been just as bloody a task, regardless of the timing. If there was a mistake, it is the one that Hamilton eludes to with regards to Horrocks and the failure to go just that little bit beyond Antwerp and to attempt to seal off the Albert Canal. However, the maps they were working with lacked sufficient granularity to show the flaw in the British tactics on that 5th of September. Whilst Horrocks and Brooke (in his sometimes scathing diaries) both wrote later that this was a mistake, it was with the benefit of hindsight. Interestingly, Brooke's words are quite telling as he used the phrase "for once, Montgomery's strategy was wrong" but as stated, this was in hindsight and other than Ramsay, nobody questioned the priority of Market Garden first, as the benefits were clear for a successful Market Garden - opening Rotterdam and potentially Amsterdam ports would have had exactly the same benefit as opening the approaches to Antwerp and as either port had almost direct access to the open sea, this had greater potential for the resupply of the Allied forces particularly if the subsequent push to secure the Rhur had been pursued. The failure to open Antwerp is usually used as a criticism of Montgomery, mostly by Americans, but the reality is that if the US had actually opened any of the deep water ports in Britanny, which both 3rd US Army and then 9th US Army failed to do, the US would not have had anywhere near the same issues with logistics, as they could have taken advantage of the French rail system that deep into France, which was largely intact. It was only in Normandy that the French railway system was obliterated, which is why supply became an issue. There were sufficient stocks of supply on the Normandy beaches, but no efficient way of moving them forward. Initiatives like the Red Ball Express, as good as it was, were wholly inefficient as the distances to the various front line units increased, to the point where the Red Ball Express was burning as much fuel (or more) as it was delivering.
I think Montgomery's biggest problem is that he had absolutely no political skills when it came to the US home front. He also never knew when to shut-up.
@@johnburns4017 you mean like his non-stop babbling press conference? In which he appeared in a jump harness and 'jaunty beret'? Of which his subordinates begged him not to perform? got it.
Monty seems to draw a lot of criticism in these comments more than any commander, what about Hurtgen Forest or operation Queen which were failures? Patton is criticised due to the costly siege of Metz which gave time for the Germans to build up border defences and the disastrous attempt to rescue pows. All of these commanders had large egos and made big mistakes as a result.
@@duwop544 He personally knew Monty. He pulled punches on the poor performance of the egotistical US generals. Hamilton pulled punches on the buffoon at times, Patton, when he wandered off to Palermo where there was no Germans to fight - but it was great on the newsreels, and he sent a band in front of his men entering towns. Monty demanded professionalism, which a lot of the time he never got from the lax US generals. Monty could have said _yes_ to firing Hodges. He never as the next general would not be much different.
@@Tuning3434 Absolutely, he's past it. Have been living near my mother who's going through this, probably a bit more advanced. Anyway, he shouldn't be put in this position any longer.
The FAAA was a flexible army for the use of any of the three army groups. The FAAA was only answerable to SHAEF. Monty could not tell them what to do. It was _notionally_ in the 21st Army group, hence Monty was largely sidelined. Market Garden, initially called Sixteen, was part of the broad-front strategy to create the northern pincer on the Ruhr - get to Arnhem then consolidate. It was an operation of the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army, approved and liked by Eisenhower, based on a cancelled Monty operation, Comet, being greatly fleshed out. It was to take advantage of the disorganized German army's retreat. The FAAA was led by Brereton of the USAAF. Brereton and Williams of the USAAF planned the operation using elements of the Second Army for the ground actions. Monty's role was more of an arbitrator having no role in its planning or its execution. Market Garden was a success in creating a 60 mile salient in a few days splitting two German armies. The operation was poorly resourced, with only one British corps above Eindhoven. Monty was promised all allied resources to be given to the operation by Ike. Little came. A division of the US First army was to be on the right flank. It never came. The British VIII Corps hardly got off the start line due to being under resourced. German tanks were being taken to Aachen by train. When seeing no US First Army attack, they diverted them to Arnhem to face lightly armed paras. Claiming Market Garden was Monty's and a defeat is grossly incorrect. It was clearly was not a part of Monty's 40 Division Thrust for sure.
@@mjjoseph1853 Einsenhower wanted a move north to form a northern pincer on the Ruhr of his broad front. He liked Monty's Comet that was cancelled by Monty not presenting it to Ike for approval. Ike gave it to Brereton of the FAAA who extended it, initially calling it Sixteen then Market Garden.
@@mjjoseph1853 Bradley would not use the FAAA in his army group. Probably because he would not have full control of the army. Also Bradley described Brereton as _incompetent on good day._ So the FAAA was _notionally_ in the 21st Army Group until the end of the war.
Ingersoll is not an unbiased source as he was fiercely loyal to Bradley (the general on who's staff he served) and was hypercrital of Eisenhower and Montgomery, often portraying them as people doing little but getting in the way of Bradley winning the war. The truth of why Bradley lost command of the 1st and 9th US Armies during the Battle of the Bulge is because he refused to leave his Luxembourg HQ to take personal command of the threatened sector. Eisnhower wanted Bradley in the field and in charge on the ground. Bradley insisted he could run the battle by telephone, so when communication lines between Bradley's HQ and the 1st and 9th US Armies were threatened, if not broken entirely, Eisenhower was not prepared to indulge Bradley's obstinence and sidelined him for a General who was willing to immediately go to the front. If Bradley had visited the threatened sector he would never has lost command of two of his three armies.
@@11nytram11 The action they took resulted in drama, complications and bruised egos involved with putting two US armies under a British Field Marshal (and leaving Bradley with a single army) It would have been far simpler to transfer Patton's 3rd army into the 6th Army Group, and have Bradley focus on the northern flank, with the 1st and 9th armies
Fascinating conversation. General Montgomery whatever his foibles and failings was a true hero of the Allied command. No commanders were perfect in every decision. I think this constant belittling of Monty in American retelling in mostly fictional movies is very ridiculous and irritating in the extreme. I am American but my Father was in the Royal navy in WW2 and my uncle was in the British 8th army in North Africa before and during Monty’s command. I will leave it at that .
US 99 div defeated the Ardennes offensive on the very first day. Monty missed (another!) opportunity when advising (stupidly) to push back slowly on a broad front.
Correct. In 1943 the Americans managed to get their numbers up to half a dozen divisions at the front in Europe and the same in the Pacific, but still not matching the British or British Indian armies respectively, and barely matching the combined efforts of minor allies like the Free Poles, Free French, Greeks and Italians etc. The Increase in American numbers was not until after mid 1944, a full 2.5 years after entering the war. Green American units started arriving directly to France. American troops may have outnumbered British and Commonwealth troops in France by late 1944, however the total of Allied troops, including the Free French, Free Poles, Czech, Dutch, Belgians, ensured that it was never American domination. The US 6th Army Group that came up from southern France was half French. France had 1.3 million men in the field by VE Day. The US fielded 60 divisions in France compared to only 20 British Commonwealth other allies is the figure put about. Fifteen of the US divisions did not get there until 1945 not seeing any action. The war was spread a bit further than France. If you take Europe as a whole, the US in combat in Europe possibly didn’t start to outnumber the total other Western Allies until about the time of the collapse of Germany’s frontiers, and only weeks before the final surrender.
@ … In the current day the explanation of Monty being Monty is he was autistic. For certain Monty without his chief of staff would have been relieved of command. PM Churchill and the commander of British Army had to intervene to keep Monty in line. As well as mend fences. After Monty’s faux pas press conference angered the Americans Churchill had to go before Parliament and walk back Monty’s claims
@@ianprice9563 Meh, fact is we will never know. By the time the Autism spectrum was beginning to be defined Montgomery was long dead, and its all but impossible to place people on the spectrum posthumously. Another thing to bear in mind also is that it IS a spectrum, not a one size fits all condition. At the end of the day however its rather past the point, and more or less irrelevant save potentially as an explanation for some of Montgomery's more bizarre eccentricities. It has very little bearing on the historiography beyond that.
Bradley was also arrogant, his forces were tied down for more than two and a half weeks in Aachen since he wanted to outdo Monty and gain glory. Eisenhower meanwhile backed down to Stalin and allowed the Soviets to take Berlin and Prague much to the uproar of his commanders.
@@thevillaaston7811 exactly! Bradley had no idea about what was going on in his own patch, which is why Eisenhower had to give the northern sector to Montgomery. Ike gave Bradley some key questions and he was unable to provide any useful answers, forcing Ike's hand. Later, a huge big deal was made of the southern sector to mask the failures of the US chain of command. It's not a popular topic, but the battle of the Ardennes was not won in the southern sector and was not won by Patton & Bradley!!
I would be a bit hesitant to consider a book written in 1946 as gospel. Probably very insightful, but I fear written in due haste for other motives than pure broad and even based analysis. Best to consider it as a source, not THE source. Undeniably there is tension between the US centric and the UK centric point of view. The UK was pulling the train since September 1939, had deserved criticism on how the US performed during 1942 and early 1943 and just 18 months later had to sidestep because they had burned through their divisions while the US was still working up to their 90 division gamble. It is the truth UK / Commonwealth commanders had to face, but I am not surprised at all that there was some friction, and I would be hesitant to claim it wasn't deserved at all. P.o.v: in the Netherlands we very much consider the British and Canadians as the liberating force, and wartime experience of our Free Dutch Forces is very much linked to UK and Commonwealth military efforts, although we are very aware of the monumental US efforts taken. But in the end, there is a different perspective if your country is mostly filled with Commonwealth war graves full of British aircrew and commonwealth Soldiers.
Great review of Montgomery.👍
I appreciated Nigel's insights into Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law Montgomery and his role during the Battle of the Bulge. I think his biggest leadership mistake in dealing with the American Generals was when he arrived at the front and many American officers felt he came on "Like Christ cleansing the temple." As for his summoning and chastising General Bradley on Christmas day I think he overstepped in that it was General Eisenhower's prerogative to correct one of his subordinate Army Group leaders, not Monty's. I am still glad that Monty was an allied commander on our side, for he was a brilliant commander. If only he was always as right as he thought he was than perhaps the war would have been shortened. Thanks for such an honest conversation.
the issue was that he WAS always right. It's just unfortunate that he was also not afraid to say "I told you so....." and certain people didn't appreciate being told!
Monty put the union flag on the Rolls-Royce so US troops would not mistake them for Germans. At the time US troops were in semi-panic mode shooting at anything in sight, even their own men.
@@johnburns4017 Capital Idea I'm sure.
@@sean640307 Not many people do. I'm not sure that all his Normandy operations that failed, such as Goodwood etc. could be considered always right, but I respect your opinion.
@@davidlavigne207
Goodwood _never_ failed.
_"My discussion today with the commanders in the Caen sector has afforded regrettable evidence in face of the enemy's complete command of the air there is no possibility that our strategy will counter-balance its truly annihilating effect unless we give up the field of battle. In spite of our intense efforts this front, already heavily strained, will break. And once the enemy is in open country an orderly command will be hardly practicable in view of the insufficient mobility of our troops."_
- Field Marshal Von Kluge in his dispatch to Hitler on the day Goodwood ended:
_"The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector]."_
- Field Marshall Montgomery (1960s)
It can be useful to read Roger Cirillo's PHd thesis before discussing Monty.
@@tarjei99
This is/was online. Cirillo was in the US Army at the time.
Nigel does not appear to be well up on the Scheldt/Antwerp/Arnhem.
Antwerp was a lame duck of a port being 50 miles from the sea up a mined river with a German army at its mouth, which would take many weeks to get into operation after the German army was defeated and the whole river was secured. When reaching Antwerp Monty was looking ahead, not to his side too much. Monty wanted Rotterdam straight ahead, a port on the sea not 50 miles up a river which even when cleared could be mined at night by aircraft. Eisenhower said no to Monty.
Then Eisenhower wanted Antwerp as part of his broad-front, so Antwerp became the focus, despite supplies coming in as the allied rail crews were reinstating the rail network at a dizzying rate. But the Germans were in artillery range of Antwerp so Noord Brabant had to be taken up to Nijmegen to create a buffer for the port, hence the Market Garden operation. Taking the Scheldt without first securing Noord Brabant was meaningless. Taking Noord Brabant also put into position the northern pincer on the Rhur. As they wanted to reach the Rhine they may as well jump over the river at Arnhem.
I very much enjoy Nigel’s fluid presentation skills and he’s only marginally biased but, he misses the point about Monty (and yes I read his biography) - in an age of warrior generals Monty was nothing more than a battlefield manager. He was a technocrat without the ability to push his will upon his enemies if his plans went sideways.
The advance to Antwerp was not actually at all slow, it was the fastest Allied advance in WW2, 30 Corps advanced over 240 miles in record time. The issue was at that point, whether to go for Market garden OR open the Scheldt but not both. Taking the Scheldt was always going to be a tough undertaking. Eisenhower ultimately decided that they should take advantage of the German flux and go for Market Garden, which came within a whisker of succeeding. Its easy after the event laying blame.
and to extend that further, Montgomery is often cited as having "ignored" the clearing of the Scheldt. This is blatantly incorrect. As far back as the first week of September, First Canadian Army was assigned the task, and was to be bolstered with some of the British units for that task. In fact, Montgomery had even asked First Allied Airborne Army to work on a plan to drop airborne units on Walcheren Island (the original "Operation Infatuate") to largely coincide with the original timing of Operation Comet, but Brereton dismissed this as unsuitable territory for airborne operations.
The first moves towards clearing the Scheldt actually took place as early as the 12th September, but were ineffective. Montgomery's failing was not anything to do with ignoring the Scheldt or not giving it enough credence, as he clearly did. The failing, such as it was, was to not appreciate just how close to the bone First Canadian Army was and that it was almost completely exhausted with zero reserves. I don't believe Crerar had made the true situation known, although even if he had, Monty may well have dismissed that thought as he didn't think very highly of Crerar's ability. He DID, however, think the world of Simonds, and would later back him to the best of his ability to do so.
I strongly disagree with Hamilton's assessment that Monty got it wrong with regards to the priority of the Scheldt by doing Market Garden first. It was actually the right order to do it in. I also don't necessarily agree that Market Garden created the situation of "The Bulge", at least not directly.
If we consider that the Scheldt was done first, then what would have happened is that 21AG would have been drawn even further away from the US lines, into territory that the SHAEF planners had already ruled out as being unsuitable territory to wage war in (even more so than the rest of The Netherlands) and would have boxed 21AG into a corner. The Germans would simply have destroyed every bridge over every waterway, such as they were already doing, making every canal and every river an amphibious crossing, delaying 21AG even further.
The estuary would still have taken those same 3 weeks to have cleared (and re-done, as the Germans dropped mines by air into the waterway again) and the sea-born approaches would still have had to be cleared exactly the same. The key to opening the Scheldt was to clear Walcheren Island at the very mouth of it. As was shown later, that would have still been just as bloody a task, regardless of the timing. If there was a mistake, it is the one that Hamilton eludes to with regards to Horrocks and the failure to go just that little bit beyond Antwerp and to attempt to seal off the Albert Canal. However, the maps they were working with lacked sufficient granularity to show the flaw in the British tactics on that 5th of September.
Whilst Horrocks and Brooke (in his sometimes scathing diaries) both wrote later that this was a mistake, it was with the benefit of hindsight. Interestingly, Brooke's words are quite telling as he used the phrase "for once, Montgomery's strategy was wrong" but as stated, this was in hindsight and other than Ramsay, nobody questioned the priority of Market Garden first, as the benefits were clear for a successful Market Garden - opening Rotterdam and potentially Amsterdam ports would have had exactly the same benefit as opening the approaches to Antwerp and as either port had almost direct access to the open sea, this had greater potential for the resupply of the Allied forces particularly if the subsequent push to secure the Rhur had been pursued. The failure to open Antwerp is usually used as a criticism of Montgomery, mostly by Americans, but the reality is that if the US had actually opened any of the deep water ports in Britanny, which both 3rd US Army and then 9th US Army failed to do, the US would not have had anywhere near the same issues with logistics, as they could have taken advantage of the French rail system that deep into France, which was largely intact. It was only in Normandy that the French railway system was obliterated, which is why supply became an issue. There were sufficient stocks of supply on the Normandy beaches, but no efficient way of moving them forward. Initiatives like the Red Ball Express, as good as it was, were wholly inefficient as the distances to the various front line units increased, to the point where the Red Ball Express was burning as much fuel (or more) as it was delivering.
260 miles in six days
I think Montgomery's biggest problem is that he had absolutely no political skills when it came to the US home front. He also never knew when to shut-up.
The other commanders were no different
Monty did not need to shut up. He never babbled for the sake of it. When he did speak it made perfect sense.
@@johnburns4017 you mean like his non-stop babbling press conference? In which he appeared in a jump harness and 'jaunty beret'? Of which his subordinates begged him not to perform? got it.
A sentiment shared about Rommel, Patton and Macarthur lol.
@@mjjoseph1853
The press conference was excellent.
and Ingersoll was a liaison officer with Monty for Overlord.
Monty seems to draw a lot of criticism in these comments more than any commander, what about Hurtgen Forest or operation Queen which were failures? Patton is criticised due to the costly siege of Metz which gave time for the Germans to build up border defences and the disastrous attempt to rescue pows. All of these commanders had large egos and made big mistakes as a result.
this video is about Ardennes.
@@mjjoseph1853 yes but it doesn’t change that the other allied commanders made mistakes too.
This bloke is painful to listen too.
A straight, direct answer takes about ten minutes. Then, says that he would not want to speculate.
He's such a huge fanboi of Monty. Kind of clickbaity title really.
@@duwop544
He personally knew Monty. He pulled punches on the poor performance of the egotistical US generals. Hamilton pulled punches on the buffoon at times, Patton, when he wandered off to Palermo where there was no Germans to fight - but it was great on the newsreels, and he sent a band in front of his men entering towns. Monty demanded professionalism, which a lot of the time he never got from the lax US generals. Monty could have said _yes_ to firing Hodges. He never as the next general would not be much different.
Well, Mr. Hamilton is 80 years old. I think some patience would be deserved.
Yes absolutely grim!!
@@Tuning3434 Absolutely, he's past it. Have been living near my mother who's going through this, probably a bit more advanced. Anyway, he shouldn't be put in this position any longer.
The FAAA was a flexible army for the use of any of the three army groups. The FAAA was only answerable to SHAEF. Monty could not tell them what to do. It was _notionally_ in the 21st Army group, hence Monty was largely sidelined.
Market Garden, initially called Sixteen, was part of the broad-front strategy to create the northern pincer on the Ruhr - get to Arnhem then consolidate. It was an operation of the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army, approved and liked by Eisenhower, based on a cancelled Monty operation, Comet, being greatly fleshed out. It was to take advantage of the disorganized German army's retreat. The FAAA was led by Brereton of the USAAF. Brereton and Williams of the USAAF planned the operation using elements of the Second Army for the ground actions. Monty's role was more of an arbitrator having no role in its planning or its execution.
Market Garden was a success in creating a 60 mile salient in a few days splitting two German armies. The operation was poorly resourced, with only one British corps above Eindhoven. Monty was promised all allied resources to be given to the operation by Ike. Little came. A division of the US First army was to be on the right flank. It never came. The British VIII Corps hardly got off the start line due to being under resourced. German tanks were being taken to Aachen by train. When seeing no US First Army attack, they diverted them to Arnhem to face lightly armed paras.
Claiming Market Garden was Monty's and a defeat is grossly incorrect. It was clearly was not a part of Monty's 40 Division Thrust for sure.
it really is amazing that Montgomery is never at fault.
@@mjjoseph1853
For Market Garden? Monty was not at fault in any way for not establishing the bridgehead over the Rhine. Blame Eisenhower and his FAAA.
whose idea was it? Market / Garden?
@@mjjoseph1853
Einsenhower wanted a move north to form a northern pincer on the Ruhr of his broad front. He liked Monty's Comet that was cancelled by Monty not presenting it to Ike for approval. Ike gave it to Brereton of the FAAA who extended it, initially calling it Sixteen then Market Garden.
@@mjjoseph1853
Bradley would not use the FAAA in his army group. Probably because he would not have full control of the army. Also Bradley described Brereton as _incompetent on good day._ So the FAAA was _notionally_ in the 21st Army Group until the end of the war.
Read Ingersoll and you will learn why Eisenhower gave 1st and 9th to Monty during the bulge.
Ingersoll is not an unbiased source as he was fiercely loyal to Bradley (the general on who's staff he served) and was hypercrital of Eisenhower and Montgomery, often portraying them as people doing little but getting in the way of Bradley winning the war.
The truth of why Bradley lost command of the 1st and 9th US Armies during the Battle of the Bulge is because he refused to leave his Luxembourg HQ to take personal command of the threatened sector.
Eisnhower wanted Bradley in the field and in charge on the ground. Bradley insisted he could run the battle by telephone, so when communication lines between Bradley's HQ and the 1st and 9th US Armies were threatened, if not broken entirely, Eisenhower was not prepared to indulge Bradley's obstinence and sidelined him for a General who was willing to immediately go to the front.
If Bradley had visited the threatened sector he would never has lost command of two of his three armies.
@@11nytram11 The action they took resulted in drama, complications and bruised egos involved with putting two US armies under a British Field Marshal (and leaving Bradley with a single army)
It would have been far simpler to transfer Patton's 3rd army into the 6th Army Group, and have Bradley focus on the northern flank, with the 1st and 9th armies
Fascinating conversation. General Montgomery whatever his foibles and failings was a true hero of the Allied command. No commanders were perfect in every decision. I think this constant belittling of Monty in American retelling in mostly fictional movies is very ridiculous and irritating in the extreme. I am American but my Father was in the Royal navy in WW2 and my uncle was in the British 8th army in North Africa before and during Monty’s command. I will leave it at that .
US 99 div defeated the Ardennes offensive on the very first day. Monty missed (another!) opportunity when advising (stupidly) to push back slowly on a broad front.
read Ingrrsoll
For what? And is the name spelt correctly?
Other countries were in WW2? lol
Correct. In 1943 the Americans managed to get their numbers up to half a dozen divisions at the front in Europe and the same in the Pacific, but still not matching the British or British Indian armies respectively, and barely matching the combined efforts of minor allies like the Free Poles, Free French, Greeks and Italians etc.
The Increase in American numbers was not until after mid 1944, a full 2.5 years after entering the war. Green American units started arriving directly to France. American troops may have outnumbered British and Commonwealth troops in France by late 1944, however the total of Allied troops, including the Free French, Free Poles, Czech, Dutch, Belgians, ensured that it was never American domination.
The US 6th Army Group that came up from southern France was half French. France had 1.3 million men in the field by VE Day. The US fielded 60 divisions in France compared to only 20 British Commonwealth other allies is the figure put about. Fifteen of the US divisions did not get there until 1945 not seeing any action. The war was spread a bit further than France. If you take Europe as a whole, the US in combat in Europe possibly didn’t start to outnumber the total other Western Allies until about the time of the collapse of Germany’s frontiers, and only weeks before the final surrender.
Painful.
Monty thought himself as a better General than Eisenhower and Bradley. Fine… but he was tactless about it
Tact, was definitely a proper four letter word to Montgomery..
@ … In the current day the explanation of Monty being Monty is he was autistic. For certain Monty without his chief of staff would have been relieved of command. PM Churchill and the commander of British Army had to intervene to keep Monty in line. As well as mend fences. After Monty’s faux pas press conference angered the Americans Churchill had to go before Parliament and walk back Monty’s claims
Montgomery's greatest fault was that he wasn't American.
@@ianprice9563 Meh, fact is we will never know. By the time the Autism spectrum was beginning to be defined Montgomery was long dead, and its all but impossible to place people on the spectrum posthumously.
Another thing to bear in mind also is that it IS a spectrum, not a one size fits all condition.
At the end of the day however its rather past the point, and more or less irrelevant save potentially as an explanation for some of Montgomery's more bizarre eccentricities. It has very little bearing on the historiography beyond that.
Bradley was also arrogant, his forces were tied down for more than two and a half weeks in Aachen since he wanted to outdo Monty and gain glory. Eisenhower meanwhile backed down to Stalin and allowed the Soviets to take Berlin and Prague much to the uproar of his commanders.
Bradley WAS in good communication with the 9th army. See Top Secret by Ralph Ingersoll.
Rubbish.
@@thevillaaston7811 exactly! Bradley had no idea about what was going on in his own patch, which is why Eisenhower had to give the northern sector to Montgomery. Ike gave Bradley some key questions and he was unable to provide any useful answers, forcing Ike's hand.
Later, a huge big deal was made of the southern sector to mask the failures of the US chain of command. It's not a popular topic, but the battle of the Ardennes was not won in the southern sector and was not won by Patton & Bradley!!
I would be a bit hesitant to consider a book written in 1946 as gospel. Probably very insightful, but I fear written in due haste for other motives than pure broad and even based analysis. Best to consider it as a source, not THE source. Undeniably there is tension between the US centric and the UK centric point of view. The UK was pulling the train since September 1939, had deserved criticism on how the US performed during 1942 and early 1943 and just 18 months later had to sidestep because they had burned through their divisions while the US was still working up to their 90 division gamble. It is the truth UK / Commonwealth commanders had to face, but I am not surprised at all that there was some friction, and I would be hesitant to claim it wasn't deserved at all.
P.o.v: in the Netherlands we very much consider the British and Canadians as the liberating force, and wartime experience of our Free Dutch Forces is very much linked to UK and Commonwealth military efforts, although we are very aware of the monumental US efforts taken. But in the end, there is a different perspective if your country is mostly filled with Commonwealth war graves full of British aircrew and commonwealth Soldiers.
@@sean640307
Most of the German army was in the north. The part Monty was in command of.
If that was the case why did Eisenhower give Montgomery command of 2 of Bradley's army's?