An excellent conversation that is a relief from the endless Christian and atheist apologetics. As polytheist who has Neo Platonic leanings it is nice to see an author creating new material in that school of thought.
Most of this conversation is highly academic, but I would like to understand it. Where do I go to get an overview of neo platonism or anything else that would be prerequisite to understand where you're coming from? Most of this is over my head, but I've been interested in the idea of polytheist apologetics, for lack of a better term, for a while now.
If you are interested in polytheism I suggest checking out the Norroena Society. We are theological reconstructionists and our focus is Germanic heathenry (Sedianism).
Panentheism(implies neoplatonic emanation) is in my opinion the most accurate view of neoplatonic/hermetic philospohy. Also of course this can imply a soft polytheism as gods essence is the same. Think of all gods are representation of the one, philosophical monism. Alternatively, you can view it as the Gods are a family lineage which is how they are all related. Even in the bible the angels are described as sons of god and serve on his divine council. Even syncretic christopagan groups exist such as the santeria(cuba), voodoo(haiti), candomble(brazil),
@@celestialknight2339Any system that relies on faith, rigid dogma and/or is resistant to discursive reason is not only weak but very likely nonsensical.
If any God, in order to exist, must participate in the plurality of Gods that also exist, then you have an explanatorily vicious regress, where A is explained by B and C, B is explained by A and C, and C is explained by A and B. A would have to logically precede itself in order to account for the things which account for it.
I am not sure that is correct. Participation is a relation between two or more relata (A, B, and C). So shouldn't the relation between the relata be doing the explanatory work rather than the relata? By crude analogy, I am not a son without a father, so the father/son relationship is necessary for my existence as a son. And certainly, a person doesn't have to be a father, but to be father, a person must have had a son or daughter. Maybe something akin to this can be marshaled toward divinity, in that divinity qualifies as an interdependent relational property like the relational properties of son and father. Interestingly, the origins of pantheons in myth are also expressed in terms of divine family relationships. Also, the Neoplatonists expressed a similar interdependence between a plurality of gods that exist in virtue of their participation in the One by means of the One's emanation of the different levels (hierarchy) of existence. The idea is that a plurality necessarily increases for each stage of emanation as you move down that hierarchy from the most perfect and singular, the One, to the less perfect and many. Check out Proclus and his Metaphysical Elements for a full articulation of the view. It's complicated but coherent.
Ancient Judaism was polytheist. In the first chapter of the Bible says that the gods created the Heavens and the Earth. Elohim is a plural for god. The word means gods.
@@james192599 I think it’s great that you understand those traditions but you’re talking about a completely different tradition now and so you can’t really make the same judgments just cause of a parallel. The relationship between the Jews, and those other gods was monolatry where they only worshiped one of those gods, and only gave honor to one of those gods, now people would venerate Enoch that was because they thought of him kind of like a Christian would think of Jesus.
Great video. It doesn't make sence to me to say that unity is a form everything participates in/exemplifies/relates to. Any type of platonic-ish exemplification/participation relation presupposes two entities: that which exemplifies and that which is being exemplified. However, in order for x to exemplify unity, it must first exist. It doesn't make sence to say that an inexistent "thing" exemplifies something. But Steve said that existence presupposes unity. This means that participation in unity presupposes unity, which entails that things are united/unique logically BEFORE participating in unity. Participation in unity is therefore not neccesary to explain unity, because it presupposes unity. He also says that being is less fundamental than unity because being is what it is, and it isn't what it isn't (a horse, a carrot, etc.). However, it seems like unity presupposes being as well. To BE unity or to BE unique/united, you first need to BE or exist. It seems unintelligable to say that the gods are unity and are more fundamental than being. In order to BE more fundamental than x, you first need to BE. In fact, a subject without a predicate already presupposes the existence (at least in the broad logical sence) of the subject. He rejects monotheism because if there is one god, then there is a more fundamental category than this god. There is one OF SOMETHING. And that 'thing' is more fundamental. I think there are two problems with this: 1) if there are many OF SOMETHING (namely gods), then that also presupposes a more fundamental category, making polytheism 'materially atheism'. I think that Steve's response is that there aren't many gods, but they simply can't be quantified. However, I think that, at this point, he collapsed the foundations of his worldview from the top because, if the gods can't be quantified, then there aren't MANY gods. If unity can't be quantified, them the monotheism-polytheism debate is simply confused. He therefore shouldn't be a polytheist nor a theist. He should just be a theist simpliciter. 2) this seems to be merely a semantic issue. Sure, we use the expression "one of something", but that seems to be purely conventional. The only way to make this an actual metaphysical/ontollogical worry, he should probably argue that to say that there is one god is to say that there is one entity which participates in the more fundamental form of divinity. However, there is no reason to make this jump, in my mind. The form of x ONLY need to be posited if there are multiple particular entities that exemplify x. That is, to solve the problem of universals. If x is only present in a particular p, then there is absolutely no reason to assume that x is a universal. Therefore, if only God is divine, then we don't need to postulate the divine nature as a form. That would be equivalent to proposing "me" as a form because I am 'me'. I mean, if only I am 'me', then 'me' clearly doesn't need to be a universal. It's actaully polytheism the view that clearly faces that problem. If it's true of both X and Y that they are numerically distinct but are both gods or unity, then now we DO need to postulate a more fundamental form of divinity which all gods have in common and in virtue of what they are all gods and not carrots.
@Steven Dillon hello! Thanks so much for responding. It's late where I live so I'll respond tomorrow. Thanks for giving more attention to often-overlooked views of philosophy of religion. I actually thought of my own argument for polytheism (I don't think it really really works, it's just for fun really), so if you don't mind, I could share it with you when I respond to what you say here tomorrow. Have a nice day (or night)!
@Steven Dillon ok, it's already 'tomorrow' so I'll resoond. "Take as an illustration the impression that something has to exist in order to participate in unity. What has to exist, exactly? 'Something' already has an identity. That's because subject always precedes predicate, logically." I agree that that which participates in unity already needs an identity, but that was the point of my objection. I probably wasn't very clear, but this was the idea behind the objection. So, I'll re-explain the objection: P1: If P participates in U (the universal of unity), then P firstly exists. (this sounds uncontroversial and you agreed to it. All relations of P presuppose the existence of P). P2: However, if P exists, then it must first have an identity/be united (this is also uncontroversial and you also explicitly endorsed it) C1: if P participates in U, then it must first have an identity/be united. (Due to the transitivity of logical anteriority. If P's participation in U presupposes P's existence, and if P's existence presupposes P's unity, then P's participation in U presupposes P's unity) Why is this a problem? Well, because it seems to show that we don't need to appeal to participation in the universal of unity in order to explain unity, because that explanation presupposes unity in that which participates. This problem doesn't apply to other universals like colours, essences, shapes, etc. We don't need to presuppose, for example, that particular triangules are triangular in order to explain how they exemplify triangularity. We only need to presuppose that they exist and that they have an identity. If it is possible for P to the united/have an identity logically before it exemplifies unity, then it seems like unity/identity is possible even before/without exemplifying the form of unity. As for identity preceding predicate, I agree, but I think that the same can be said for Being. Any subject presupposes Being in order to have properties. To say "there is an X, such that X lacks Being" sounds incoherent. Merely by claiming "there is an X" (which is equivalent to exoressing a subject without predicate) is to say that it has both unity and Being. Non-beings aren't 'predicateable'. I agree that Being semantically presupposes unity/identity. Being is Being and not a horse. However, unity presupposes Being as well. If unity doesn't entail Being, then there could be 'a' unity/identity, such that it "ISN'T". In fact, I didn't express it properly. Here I'll express it properly: if unity doesn't entail Being, then there could NOT-BE 'a' unity/identity, such that 'it' isn't. I mean, what does that even mean? Fundamental reality isn't, if it "is" more fundamental than Being itself. I don't think that the problem is that it can't be expressed in regular language. The problem is that it can't be expressed in logic either. Unity can't "be" quantified and it isn't. How can we make true sentences of "it"? Additionally, does logic describe unity? Because if it does, then it's describing things that aren't the case. If Being presupposes unity and unity presupposes Being, then which is more fundamental? Neither. It seems like they're just conceptually different, not ontologically different. Why not say that they're the same, like Aquinas thought. It's impossible for there to be something with Being and without identity and there also doesn't seem to have identity without Being. Just like the relation between triangularity and trilaterality. They can't exist individually without the other. However, I don't think that my objection about a form of unity being unnecessary was my main objection. It was partially the expression of a seeming or intuition. I have developed it more in this comment but I think the other objections I presented are better. This comment got too long, so I'll tell you about my argument for polytheism in my next response to what you say in response to this. Maybe I'll write it down in a separate comment. Hope you can respond. Have a nice day
@Steven Dillon hello. Interesting response. "Ah but I never said that what participates in unity already needs an identity. I said that what exists already needs an identity" Yeah, but in order to participate in unity you need to exist (in sence 1 of the term). Participation is a relationship. How can unity have a relationship with non-beings? I think there are many reasons to think that isn't possible: -it seems true by definition. If X has an exemplification relation, then what does it mean to say that it doesn't exist? In order to exemplify a universal, one needs the capacity to exemplify something. However, powers don't seem to inhere in non-beings. In what sence are we talking about a non-being here, if it has capacities, relations, properties, descriptive non-hypothetical true propositions about it, etc. -induction. All relations we observe are had between beings. -intuition: this is in case you value intuition. It sounds unintuitive to claim that non-beings relate to beings, have capacities, have properties, etc. -phenomenal conservatism/epistemic particularism entails that, given that it's intuitive, we have reason to believe it, absent defeaters. -empiricism also seems to entail the rejection of this view, as we don't empirically percieve relations which consist of non-beings. If you hold to any of these views in epistemology, then you have reason to accept what I'm saying. -abduction: the best explanation for all of these facts is that non-beings can't relate to anything nor can they exemplify anything. This conclusion doesn't even sound that controversial. Now, if to participate in unity you first need to exist (in sence 1), and if, according to you, to exist (in s1) is to just have unity, then to participate in unity you first need unity. Participation in unity therefore isn't a good explanation for unity, because it presupposes unity. That's what I meant with my argument and that's my main point. You also seem to think that unity is/identity is being in S1, and that unity is to participate in unity. This would entail that to exist (in S1) is to participate in unity. However, it seems like the universal of unity itself exists in S1. It clearly has an identity (it isn't a horse but it is a universal and it is simple and not composite) and you think that identity is existence in S1 (and so do I). Therefore it would also participate in unity, which sounds a bit odd.
@Steven Dillon good response. So, technically speaking, unity isn't a universal in which everything participates. I thought of an objection but first I want to make sure I understand what you're saying. "absolutely all selves, simply insofar as they are, are 'built', so to speak, out of Self." So, unity is a kind of 'component' or 'constituent' that more than one particular have intrinsically. So you seem to concieve of unity as an aristotellian/neo-aristotellian universal, rather than as a platonic universal (I'm not claiming that you concieve of all universals this way, but merely unity). That is, you don't think of unity as an entity extrinsic to particulars to which particulars relate in certain ways. I think this view of unity is more promising, as I lean to aristotellian/neo-aristotellian realism myself. So, is this a fair representation of your ontology? Each particular is unity with properties. Each particular has a kind of 'base' or 'particular essence' or something like a hecceneity. The "isness" of an entity. When we predicate X, we are predicating something (unless you accept bunddle theory, which I wouldn't), and according to you, that "isness" IS that thing which is predicated. The "center of identity" of an entity. It could be analoguous to some non-qualitativist conceptions of consciousness. There is a kind of "center of consciousness" or of awareness or first person perspective and all qualitative properties and phenomena inhere in that center and 'around' it. It's very difficult to explain, but is your view something like that? The unity/identity of X is that which is predicated and which has properties? This way, everything would be constituted by unity/identity essentially. Hope I understood you properly.
@@yourfutureself3392 Hi! You folk had a very interesting back and forth to which I unfortunately can't add much. I would however be very curious to hear your argument for polytheism. All the best!
“If the cosmos had any other gods in them besides God - they would have been destroyed & gone to ruin! So glory be to God, Lord of the Throne, beyond what they allege.” ~ The Qur’an, Sūrah 21:22
the gods are eternal immortal celestial beings that keep balance to the cosmos and the fabric of reality. the gods themselves were never created, they have always existed, they are an emanation or a manifestation of celestial sentient intelligence of the one or chaos (impersonal source) the point of origin of all creation. the gods then created everything around us seen and unseen, and are the keepers of the entire space and time in which we live in. they can manifest themselves in physical forms, they can influence or cause change in the world, each god has their given natural roles in which they are the stewards of.
I would like to believe and I wish to understand but this doesn't make sense and sounds like gibberish. I will consider reading the book if it is any clearer. In my own words: "plurality" is part of ultimate reality and since God or divinity contains all of ultimate reality, God/divinity contains plurality (as well as oneness and uniqueness). God is both one and plural? If the number of God(s) is indeterminate it would be fallacious to describe him as plural/poly (or mono)? Because the the category of one/plural describes/determines God which isn't allowed since it would be a category preceding God?
"God is both one and plural?" --There are multiple ways of making sense of unity and plurality characterizing all of reality. See Proclus the Neoplatonist, for instance. Or Spinoza's pantheism: there is only one substance, God, and the plurality of everything else that exists is but a contingent (dependent) aspect of that substance.
"If the number of God(s) is indeterminate it would be fallacious to describe him as plural/poly (or mono)?" --I think he means many gods, but uncountable because the plurality may not have a cardinal number, i.e., the plurality could be potentially transfinite or infinite. Nothing fallacious.
Neoplatonism has almost always felt like Monotheism with extra steps to me. If all is one, then Mono. If they are separate, then Poly, but they can’t be one. Feels just as non-sensical as the trinity.
@@Eudaemoniac But if all things that are boil down to a One, then a plurality of gods is really just facets or iterations or modes. It’s not separate individual entities, correct?
@@Blackbeard0791 Try to keep the Trinity out of it, as most Christians even have trouble really understanding it. It's actually more like Hinduism. All gods are avatars of Brahman, or the ultimate reality. Or even think about yourself and all the different masks you wear. Your coworkers know you as one person, your parents know you as a different person, your lover knows you as a different person from them, and so on.
@@hold_the_mike believing in God is the definition of theism. Believing God doesn't exist is the definition of atheism. You're straying outside of those definitions.
@@TheologyUnleashed So not believing in all of the gods would make you atheist towards them. I think, and many others also think, that the definition of atheist can be used across the board with religious and a religious people.
@@hold_the_mike ruclips.net/video/0R1mru8kF_U/видео.html I did a video on this actually. That argument is super silly. It's like saying believing one particular big bang hypothesis over others makes you an a-big-banger. That use it language makes no sense because such a person does indeed believe in the big bang, they just believe it happened in a specific way.
Yes. If you reject the existence of any god you’re an atheist towards that being. Different from Monotheists, Polytheists have direct experience with deities, thus creating respect for all of them, they are literally real.
I appreciate the interview - it was interesting to ponder on the questions! However, all of those points are easy to rebute. The issue is with not making certain distinctions and mixing up things in the argumentation. For example, monotheism doesn't imply a denial of the multiplicity of perception. If it did, same would go for any kind of god, and for any kind of claim to begin with. It also seems that the drive of defending a polytheistic vision itself should be interpreted - from a purely metaphysical perspective it doesn't seem to make sense and it keeps making twists in order to prove itself worthy of the intellect in some manner. Which also betrays its lower nature.
An excellent conversation that is a relief from the endless Christian and atheist apologetics. As polytheist who has Neo Platonic leanings it is nice to see an author creating new material in that school of thought.
Most of this conversation is highly academic, but I would like to understand it. Where do I go to get an overview of neo platonism or anything else that would be prerequisite to understand where you're coming from? Most of this is over my head, but I've been interested in the idea of polytheist apologetics, for lack of a better term, for a while now.
If you are interested in polytheism I suggest checking out the Norroena Society. We are theological reconstructionists and our focus is Germanic heathenry (Sedianism).
Love this book! And I’m a proud polytheist
Panentheism(implies neoplatonic emanation) is in my opinion the most accurate view of neoplatonic/hermetic philospohy. Also of course this can imply a soft polytheism as gods essence is the same. Think of all gods are representation of the one, philosophical monism. Alternatively, you can view it as the Gods are a family lineage which is how they are all related. Even in the bible the angels are described as sons of god and serve on his divine council. Even syncretic christopagan groups exist such as the santeria(cuba), voodoo(haiti), candomble(brazil),
Monotheism: I am the truth! And only truth!
Polytheism: is this the truth? What do you think?
A system of thought that is unsure of itself is weak.
@@celestialknight2339Any system that relies on faith, rigid dogma and/or is resistant to discursive reason is not only weak but very likely nonsensical.
Micah you stated that Bayesianism is nonsense. Care to elaborate or link to anything supporting this position? Thanks for the interesting discussion!
Fun conversation
It's that military guy from twitter
If any God, in order to exist, must participate in the plurality of Gods that also exist, then you have an explanatorily vicious regress, where A is explained by B and C, B is explained by A and C, and C is explained by A and B.
A would have to logically precede itself in order to account for the things which account for it.
The web of gods itself could be necessary. It’s the way existence works in the observable world. Everything exists in a web of codependence.
I am not sure that is correct. Participation is a relation between two or more relata (A, B, and C). So shouldn't the relation between the relata be doing the explanatory work rather than the relata? By crude analogy, I am not a son without a father, so the father/son relationship is necessary for my existence as a son. And certainly, a person doesn't have to be a father, but to be father, a person must have had a son or daughter. Maybe something akin to this can be marshaled toward divinity, in that divinity qualifies as an interdependent relational property like the relational properties of son and father. Interestingly, the origins of pantheons in myth are also expressed in terms of divine family relationships.
Also, the Neoplatonists expressed a similar interdependence between a plurality of gods that exist in virtue of their participation in the One by means of the One's emanation of the different levels (hierarchy) of existence. The idea is that a plurality necessarily increases for each stage of emanation as you move down that hierarchy from the most perfect and singular, the One, to the less perfect and many. Check out Proclus and his Metaphysical Elements for a full articulation of the view. It's complicated but coherent.
Ancient Judaism was polytheist. In the first chapter of the Bible says that the gods created the Heavens and the Earth. Elohim is a plural for god. The word means gods.
That’s a damn lie Elohim can either mean singular or plural just like the word sheep can refer to one or many
@@nova8091yea but the bible also talks about other gods throughout it. Theres a literal divine council.
@@nova8091most polytheist had a supreme God like Odin, zeus, and for the jew yahweh
@@james192599 the Divine Council is not other gods, simply put it’s just representatives like in angels.
@@james192599 I think it’s great that you understand those traditions but you’re talking about a completely different tradition now and so you can’t really make the same judgments just cause of a parallel. The relationship between the Jews, and those other gods was monolatry where they only worshiped one of those gods, and only gave honor to one of those gods, now people would venerate Enoch that was because they thought of him kind of like a Christian would think of Jesus.
Great video. It doesn't make sence to me to say that unity is a form everything participates in/exemplifies/relates to. Any type of platonic-ish exemplification/participation relation presupposes two entities: that which exemplifies and that which is being exemplified. However, in order for x to exemplify unity, it must first exist. It doesn't make sence to say that an inexistent "thing" exemplifies something. But Steve said that existence presupposes unity. This means that participation in unity presupposes unity, which entails that things are united/unique logically BEFORE participating in unity. Participation in unity is therefore not neccesary to explain unity, because it presupposes unity.
He also says that being is less fundamental than unity because being is what it is, and it isn't what it isn't (a horse, a carrot, etc.). However, it seems like unity presupposes being as well. To BE unity or to BE unique/united, you first need to BE or exist. It seems unintelligable to say that the gods are unity and are more fundamental than being. In order to BE more fundamental than x, you first need to BE. In fact, a subject without a predicate already presupposes the existence (at least in the broad logical sence) of the subject.
He rejects monotheism because if there is one god, then there is a more fundamental category than this god. There is one OF SOMETHING. And that 'thing' is more fundamental. I think there are two problems with this:
1) if there are many OF SOMETHING (namely gods), then that also presupposes a more fundamental category, making polytheism 'materially atheism'. I think that Steve's response is that there aren't many gods, but they simply can't be quantified. However, I think that, at this point, he collapsed the foundations of his worldview from the top because, if the gods can't be quantified, then there aren't MANY gods. If unity can't be quantified, them the monotheism-polytheism debate is simply confused. He therefore shouldn't be a polytheist nor a theist. He should just be a theist simpliciter.
2) this seems to be merely a semantic issue. Sure, we use the expression "one of something", but that seems to be purely conventional. The only way to make this an actual metaphysical/ontollogical worry, he should probably argue that to say that there is one god is to say that there is one entity which participates in the more fundamental form of divinity. However, there is no reason to make this jump, in my mind. The form of x ONLY need to be posited if there are multiple particular entities that exemplify x. That is, to solve the problem of universals. If x is only present in a particular p, then there is absolutely no reason to assume that x is a universal. Therefore, if only God is divine, then we don't need to postulate the divine nature as a form. That would be equivalent to proposing "me" as a form because I am 'me'. I mean, if only I am 'me', then 'me' clearly doesn't need to be a universal.
It's actaully polytheism the view that clearly faces that problem. If it's true of both X and Y that they are numerically distinct but are both gods or unity, then now we DO need to postulate a more fundamental form of divinity which all gods have in common and in virtue of what they are all gods and not carrots.
@Steven Dillon hello! Thanks so much for responding. It's late where I live so I'll respond tomorrow. Thanks for giving more attention to often-overlooked views of philosophy of religion. I actually thought of my own argument for polytheism (I don't think it really really works, it's just for fun really), so if you don't mind, I could share it with you when I respond to what you say here tomorrow.
Have a nice day (or night)!
@Steven Dillon ok, it's already 'tomorrow' so I'll resoond.
"Take as an illustration the impression that something has to exist in order to participate in unity.
What has to exist, exactly? 'Something' already has an identity. That's because subject always precedes predicate, logically."
I agree that that which participates in unity already needs an identity, but that was the point of my objection. I probably wasn't very clear, but this was the idea behind the objection.
So, I'll re-explain the objection:
P1: If P participates in U (the universal of unity), then P firstly exists.
(this sounds uncontroversial and you agreed to it. All relations of P presuppose the existence of P).
P2: However, if P exists, then it must first have an identity/be united
(this is also uncontroversial and you also explicitly endorsed it)
C1: if P participates in U, then it must first have an identity/be united.
(Due to the transitivity of logical anteriority. If P's participation in U presupposes P's existence, and if P's existence presupposes P's unity, then P's participation in U presupposes P's unity)
Why is this a problem? Well, because it seems to show that we don't need to appeal to participation in the universal of unity in order to explain unity, because that explanation presupposes unity in that which participates. This problem doesn't apply to other universals like colours, essences, shapes, etc. We don't need to presuppose, for example, that particular triangules are triangular in order to explain how they exemplify triangularity. We only need to presuppose that they exist and that they have an identity. If it is possible for P to the united/have an identity logically before it exemplifies unity, then it seems like unity/identity is possible even before/without exemplifying the form of unity.
As for identity preceding predicate, I agree, but I think that the same can be said for Being. Any subject presupposes Being in order to have properties. To say "there is an X, such that X lacks Being" sounds incoherent. Merely by claiming "there is an X" (which is equivalent to exoressing a subject without predicate) is to say that it has both unity and Being. Non-beings aren't 'predicateable'.
I agree that Being semantically presupposes unity/identity. Being is Being and not a horse. However, unity presupposes Being as well. If unity doesn't entail Being, then there could be 'a' unity/identity, such that it "ISN'T". In fact, I didn't express it properly. Here I'll express it properly: if unity doesn't entail Being, then there could NOT-BE 'a' unity/identity, such that 'it' isn't. I mean, what does that even mean? Fundamental reality isn't, if it "is" more fundamental than Being itself. I don't think that the problem is that it can't be expressed in regular language. The problem is that it can't be expressed in logic either. Unity can't "be" quantified and it isn't. How can we make true sentences of "it"? Additionally, does logic describe unity? Because if it does, then it's describing things that aren't the case.
If Being presupposes unity and unity presupposes Being, then which is more fundamental? Neither. It seems like they're just conceptually different, not ontologically different. Why not say that they're the same, like Aquinas thought. It's impossible for there to be something with Being and without identity and there also doesn't seem to have identity without Being. Just like the relation between triangularity and trilaterality. They can't exist individually without the other.
However, I don't think that my objection about a form of unity being unnecessary was my main objection. It was partially the expression of a seeming or intuition. I have developed it more in this comment but I think the other objections I presented are better. This comment got too long, so I'll tell you about my argument for polytheism in my next response to what you say in response to this. Maybe I'll write it down in a separate comment.
Hope you can respond. Have a nice day
@Steven Dillon hello. Interesting response.
"Ah but I never said that what participates in unity already needs an identity. I said that what exists already needs an identity"
Yeah, but in order to participate in unity you need to exist (in sence 1 of the term). Participation is a relationship. How can unity have a relationship with non-beings? I think there are many reasons to think that isn't possible:
-it seems true by definition. If X has an exemplification relation, then what does it mean to say that it doesn't exist? In order to exemplify a universal, one needs the capacity to exemplify something. However, powers don't seem to inhere in non-beings. In what sence are we talking about a non-being here, if it has capacities, relations, properties, descriptive non-hypothetical true propositions about it, etc.
-induction. All relations we observe are had between beings.
-intuition: this is in case you value intuition. It sounds unintuitive to claim that non-beings relate to beings, have capacities, have properties, etc.
-phenomenal conservatism/epistemic particularism entails that, given that it's intuitive, we have reason to believe it, absent defeaters.
-empiricism also seems to entail the rejection of this view, as we don't empirically percieve relations which consist of non-beings. If you hold to any of these views in epistemology, then you have reason to accept what I'm saying.
-abduction: the best explanation for all of these facts is that non-beings can't relate to anything nor can they exemplify anything.
This conclusion doesn't even sound that controversial. Now, if to participate in unity you first need to exist (in sence 1), and if, according to you, to exist (in s1) is to just have unity, then to participate in unity you first need unity. Participation in unity therefore isn't a good explanation for unity, because it presupposes unity. That's what I meant with my argument and that's my main point.
You also seem to think that unity is/identity is being in S1, and that unity is to participate in unity. This would entail that to exist (in S1) is to participate in unity. However, it seems like the universal of unity itself exists in S1. It clearly has an identity (it isn't a horse but it is a universal and it is simple and not composite) and you think that identity is existence in S1 (and so do I). Therefore it would also participate in unity, which sounds a bit odd.
@Steven Dillon good response. So, technically speaking, unity isn't a universal in which everything participates. I thought of an objection but first I want to make sure I understand what you're saying.
"absolutely all selves, simply insofar as they are, are 'built', so to speak, out of Self."
So, unity is a kind of 'component' or 'constituent' that more than one particular have intrinsically. So you seem to concieve of unity as an aristotellian/neo-aristotellian universal, rather than as a platonic universal (I'm not claiming that you concieve of all universals this way, but merely unity). That is, you don't think of unity as an entity extrinsic to particulars to which particulars relate in certain ways. I think this view of unity is more promising, as I lean to aristotellian/neo-aristotellian realism myself.
So, is this a fair representation of your ontology?
Each particular is unity with properties. Each particular has a kind of 'base' or 'particular essence' or something like a hecceneity. The "isness" of an entity. When we predicate X, we are predicating something (unless you accept bunddle theory, which I wouldn't), and according to you, that "isness" IS that thing which is predicated. The "center of identity" of an entity.
It could be analoguous to some non-qualitativist conceptions of consciousness. There is a kind of "center of consciousness" or of awareness or first person perspective and all qualitative properties and phenomena inhere in that center and 'around' it.
It's very difficult to explain, but is your view something like that? The unity/identity of X is that which is predicated and which has properties?
This way, everything would be constituted by unity/identity essentially.
Hope I understood you properly.
@@yourfutureself3392 Hi! You folk had a very interesting back and forth to which I unfortunately can't add much. I would however be very curious to hear your argument for polytheism. All the best!
“If the cosmos had any other gods in them besides God - they would have been destroyed & gone to ruin! So glory be to God, Lord of the Throne, beyond what they allege.” ~ The Qur’an, Sūrah 21:22
the gods are eternal immortal celestial beings that keep balance to the cosmos and the fabric of reality. the gods themselves were never created, they have always existed, they are an emanation or a manifestation of celestial sentient intelligence of the one or chaos (impersonal source) the point of origin of all creation. the gods then created everything around us seen and unseen, and are the keepers of the entire space and time in which we live in. they can manifest themselves in physical forms, they can influence or cause change in the world, each god has their given natural roles in which they are the stewards of.
I would like to believe and I wish to understand but this doesn't make sense and sounds like gibberish. I will consider reading the book if it is any clearer.
In my own words: "plurality" is part of ultimate reality and since God or divinity contains all of ultimate reality, God/divinity contains plurality (as well as oneness and uniqueness). God is both one and plural?
If the number of God(s) is indeterminate it would be fallacious to describe him as plural/poly (or mono)? Because the the category of one/plural describes/determines God which isn't allowed since it would be a category preceding God?
I would suggest reading Plato's Timaeus. It brings light to this topic
"God is both one and plural?"
--There are multiple ways of making sense of unity and plurality characterizing all of reality. See Proclus the Neoplatonist, for instance. Or Spinoza's pantheism: there is only one substance, God, and the plurality of everything else that exists is but a contingent (dependent) aspect of that substance.
"If the number of God(s) is indeterminate it would be fallacious to describe him as plural/poly (or mono)?"
--I think he means many gods, but uncountable because the plurality may not have a cardinal number, i.e., the plurality could be potentially transfinite or infinite. Nothing fallacious.
Neoplatonism has almost always felt like Monotheism with extra steps to me. If all is one, then Mono. If they are separate, then Poly, but they can’t be one. Feels just as non-sensical as the trinity.
The one is the principle by which each thing is one. It grounds plurality.
@@Eudaemoniac But if all things that are boil down to a One, then a plurality of gods is really just facets or iterations or modes. It’s not separate individual entities, correct?
There are 50 states in the United States. Every state is separate and distinct from one another, but they are all one nation.
@@iswaswillbe567 So, trinitarianism but ad infinitum?
@@Blackbeard0791 Try to keep the Trinity out of it, as most Christians even have trouble really understanding it. It's actually more like Hinduism. All gods are avatars of Brahman, or the ultimate reality. Or even think about yourself and all the different masks you wear. Your coworkers know you as one person, your parents know you as a different person, your lover knows you as a different person from them, and so on.
Like
"monotheism is a form of atheism"
That's like saying atheism is a form of theism.
How so? Monotheism is the belief in one God. That means you do not believe in the others. It is atheism lite.
@@hold_the_mike believing in God is the definition of theism. Believing God doesn't exist is the definition of atheism. You're straying outside of those definitions.
@@TheologyUnleashed So not believing in all of the gods would make you atheist towards them. I think, and many others also think, that the definition of atheist can be used across the board with religious and a religious people.
@@hold_the_mike ruclips.net/video/0R1mru8kF_U/видео.html
I did a video on this actually.
That argument is super silly. It's like saying believing one particular big bang hypothesis over others makes you an a-big-banger. That use it language makes no sense because such a person does indeed believe in the big bang, they just believe it happened in a specific way.
Yes. If you reject the existence of any god you’re an atheist towards that being. Different from Monotheists, Polytheists have direct experience with deities, thus creating respect for all of them, they are literally real.
I appreciate the interview - it was interesting to ponder on the questions! However, all of those points are easy to rebute. The issue is with not making certain distinctions and mixing up things in the argumentation. For example, monotheism doesn't imply a denial of the multiplicity of perception. If it did, same would go for any kind of god, and for any kind of claim to begin with. It also seems that the drive of defending a polytheistic vision itself should be interpreted - from a purely metaphysical perspective it doesn't seem to make sense and it keeps making twists in order to prove itself worthy of the intellect in some manner. Which also betrays its lower nature.