The Free Will Dilemma
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- Опубликовано: 6 сен 2024
- An argument that shows that Craig's solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma and Plantiga's solution to the Problem of Evil are inconsistent.
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
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Thank you. This video has been giving me trouble like you wouldn't believe.
😂😂😂😂😂😂
The question then is why couldn't God have created us like himself, with free will as a true property and good as an essential property? This would allow us to both have free will and do no evil (just as God does). Therefore there would be no evil.
guillatra But if, in Craig's definition, God is defined as something that must do good, and in Plantinga's definition Free Will is defined as being able to do both good and evil, then, God cannot have Free Will. If God does not have Free Will it cannot be good according to Craig's definition. If you disagree with Craig's definition, that is fine, it just means the theist needs to find a new response to the Euthyphro Dilemma.
okay, that's right.
All God does is Good but All Good not necessarily is God
+Jitendra Vispute As the video points out, you can take this view but it will mean that you can't defeat the Euthyphro dilemma with WLC's argument, so you may solve this dispute, but you will have a much harder time suppoorting Divine Command Theory.
Interesting.
1. While maybe humans cannot have essential goodness, it definitely seems possible that they are always forced to make a good choice.
2. Why is it better to achieve essential goodness than to simply have it?
3. The Problem of Evil is asking for exactly that "good reason" for why there is evil in the world. To respond to it one must offer such a reason.
Imagine there is a designer. It is not innately wrong for him to design a mindless computer. However it is good to GIVE a child he made (theoretically ahaha) the ability to ALLOW him choose to truly love him and as a father in return rather than just mindlessly display signs of affection. If the child turned the gift (which is not good nor bad innately) into a good thing then that is amazing and if not, the child would have to face justice (a good thing) because of turning the gift into a bad thing. Also, once the ability is given it would be wrong to take away by force.
With John if we say that “John has the necessary property of being a bachelor” either we mean 3. that of the John that exists he cannot marry (De Re). Or 4. In no possible world does there exist a version of John that is married (De Dicto).
So if I (or Craig) says that “God has the necessary property of being good” either I mean 5. Of the God that does exist, he cannot do evil (De Re) or 6. In no possible world does there exist a God that can do evil (De Dicto)...
P1.4) The Second Horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma follows (1.3,1.2 Modus Ponens). At the very least denying that God is essentially good seems to pose some problems for Craig's argument.
There is a difference between saying an essential property of being a bachelor is being unmarried and saying of an individual that an essential property of John (a bachelor) is unmarried. In effect if he were married he would not be John. I am not saying that an essential property of being a God is being good (though this is also there). Rather the individual, God, is essentially good (if he were not good he would not be God).
And, I would love to do a series on Theology. I confess that I am generally unfamiliar with the subject. I would love some guidance on some areas that might be interesting to explore.
Help me with exactly what you mean by true vs essential properties. I know essential vs accidental properties, is that what we are talking about (just with different language)?
I think the problem we are having is a modal difference between De Re and De Dicto. I need to make a video on the darn thing if only to remind myself of what it is. Take “the number of elements in the periodic table is necessarily greater than 100.” Either I am saying 1. Of the number of elements that there actually are (117) cannot be less than 100 (De Re) or 2. That in no possible world are the elements of the periodic table less than 100 (false De Dicto)…
1. Why is that a bad thing?
2. If soul-building is good, why can God not build his soul? How does it make us a better creation?
3. It's like Fermat's last theorem. Just because he scrawled a note in the margins that he had a great idea of how to prove it, does not prove it. It is possible that God has some good reason just as it is possible that the laws of logic are flawed. As a skeptic, the Problem of Evil does not seem conclusive, but Plantinga's response seems insufficient. And...
I'm certainly no theist. But couldn't they simply change 1 and then deny two
1) God chooses to not do evil.
2) "All that is good is God" Can be safely denied without contradicting anything else in the argument now.
Beowwulf That seems to come down to how you look at the word 'choose' is it possible for God to do evil? If the answer is no, then there is no way that he can choose to do good. If the answer is yes, then God is not necessarily good, and there are possible worlds in which he is evil. This makes the whole idea of God actualizing the best possible world nonsensical since that only works if God is the same in all possible worlds, and that one and only one God chose which world to actualize. Also if God is not the same in all possible worlds then he simply is not necessary, he's only possible. These would mean that both the cosmological and ontological arguments for the existence of God would be useless as they both rely on God's necessity to a certain degree.
Aah so it gets them to give up the ontological argument. Now suppose we're dealing with a deist instead of a theist. And his definition of maximally great is simply lack of restriction by physical laws of nature. To him it doesn't matter if god actualized the best possible world or not, if free will does or doesn't exist, or if morality is anything more than a human concept and cannot be attributed to god, or a law of logic which god cannot break.
For clarity you should know my position is agnostic deism.
Beowwulf If the only definition of absolute greatness that we are working with is that God is able to break the laws of nature, then the problem of evil does not apply, since God is not good. And the euthyphro dilemma does not seem to apply either since we are not defining good as what God does. So the original problems don't seem to apply because God is not all good.
I like you carneades, it's good to have an actual discussion like this one with people once in a while.
Fair enough, I'll try to restate:
P1) Goodness is an essential property of God (Craig).
P3.5) If X is an essential property of Y, then X cannot have not Y (definition of essential property)
P3) God cannot do evil. (P1, P3.5 Modus Ponens).
If we deny P1) now we get P1.1) It is not the case that Goodness is an essential property of God. P1.2) God could lack goodness and still be God. P1.3) If God could lack goodness and still be God the impotence horn of the Euthyphro dilemma follows....
1. But the prime objection to hard determinism would also be thrown out as we would never need to hold anyone morally responsible since they would only do good.
2. Why is soul-building a good thing?
3. Both problems seem to pose the question if a 3O God exists "whence then cometh evil?" To be convincing any objection to either problem would have to explain God's good reason.
No problem thank you as well. I think there are lots of good people online that get overshadowed by the knuckleheads.
You conflict the conclusions of free will defense and william lane craig. Alvi was to show that if free will exist and people plead to God is a contradiction. In otherwords, you can't have free will and remove evil. That is the whole point of his argument. You will have to show us that free will does not exist. But God can't do evil because that would mean he would go against him self since he him self is the defintion of Good. He has free will but he can't go against him self. It is logical impossible. Thus it is logical. Craig defined God as good. thus evil is when you do something against God. Since if God exist, he is standard morality. and since he is that, he can't do evil. It is impossible for God to do evil when he is the defintion of Good. That is why problem of evil is illogical.
'God does not do evil' is the correct Obversion of P1 not 'God cannot do evil'.
+Manan Korjan At the end of the day this comes down to how we define ability. It seems to me that if in no possible world I commit genocide, it seems that I cannot commit genocide. Craig claims that God only does good in all possible worlds. Therefore, it seems that there is no way that God could do otherwise. If you think that there is some possible world where God is evil, then not only will the MOA (ruclips.net/video/m_edcGIK9dw/видео.html) have some problems so will the very idea that God is necessarily good. You are correct, though that there is a little more going on behind the scenes, however it seems to me that neither Plantinga nor Craig would claim that God is not necessarily good. And it seems to me that they would solve the problem of "Can God make himself not good?" in the same way that they would solve the problem of "Can God make himself not Omnipotent?" by claiming it is a logical impossibility (ruclips.net/video/2tEuDNsvS4c/видео.html).
It's not that God cannot do evil, it's that he 'will' not do evil. As you infer, it would seem to be a contradiction that a perfectly good God would have the will to do evil in any possible world, therefore P3 is not supported by obversion of P1.
Hi Philip - this distinction is covered in Carneades.org's video: The Partial Free Will Argument (Response to the Free Will Defense). Hope this helps. :)
It seems that 2, 3, 4, and 6 are false, while 1 and 5 (from my understanding of Craig) are held to be true. Note the important difference between God and John. Being married is not inconsistent with being John. But being evil is inconsistent with being God.
Interesting idea. I can see how that might excuse God from having free will (but I'll have to think about it more). But for me the question is then what makes free will good? If it is some property that God does not have, why is it good?
Is "cannot" the same with "will not. If God will not do evil, does this mean that God cannot do evil. Maybe God can do evil, but will not do evil. In this case, God has free will and is the Good. If "will not" means "cannot", then God does not have free will, but is still the Good. For me, it does not matter is God has free will or not. What matters is God is the Good.
There is a weird echo in the last few minutes. Are you attempting to sound like the god in the movie The Ten Commandments?
But does that mean that there are some parts of morality that come form our culture and not from God?
Free will may be comparable to money... giving it to someone’s who doesn’t have any out of love is good... money in itself is not good or bad but the giving of it is good... stealing it once it is given is bad... not giving it to EVERYONE is not necessarily bad
Very interesting. I am quite impressed by your combination of Craig's responses. I'm fine with the argument because I am not a libertarianist. I mainly argue for the problem of evil that God allows evil so we will enjoy his grace and goodness more anndddd so that we will have faith in him rather than trusting in ourselves. The apostle Paul says: "We do not want you to be unaware, brothers, of the affliction we experienced in Asia. For we were so utterly burdened beyond our strength that we despaired of life itself. Indeed, we felt that we had received the sentence of death. But that was to make us rely not on ourselves but on God who raises the dead." (2 Corinthians 1:8-9) So the pain was there to make them trust God rather than themselves. And I believe you say as yourself that the problem of evil only brings into doubt the belief. It is not proof that God cannot exist with evil. Craig's opponent in one of his debates that is on RUclips even says that he thinks the problem of evil cannot prove or disprove God. Basically, I can only appeal to guesses of why God allows evil. The argument would be just because we cannot know for certain why God allows evil does not mean there is not a reason. Perhaps I am understanding it wrong, but that's what I think. Good work, showing that libertarianism isn't very defensible.
If you are not going to subscribe to Plantinga's version, you will have some deeper problems. Offering explanations or stories that explain why God might want evil may or may not suffice for the evidentiary problem of evil, but it will not work for the logical problem of evil. If you accept logic, you must show that the evil in the world is not inconsistent with God's Properties. I would suggest that you look at J.L. Mackie's article "Evil and Omnipotence" www.ditext.com/mackie/evil.html specifically the third inadequate response.
For me at the end of the day, I agree that we can't show anything with certainty (though this is more because I doubt logic than anything else). The Problem of Evil is important to me as it seems to convince more people than any other argument for or against God. Many lose their faith because of the evil in the world. They find it absurd that God would kill and torture millions of children before they have had the chance to have their faith tested. Does he really kill people in poor countries so that you can enjoy his goodness more? Does he really give people diseases that make their flesh fall off so that you can be thankful that he is nice to you and leaves your flesh on your body? He tests the faith of people that have never heard of him by torturing them and telling them to not rely on their bodies. How can they conclude that they should trust him if they have never heard of him? To me, such a God is a patently absurd concept from the start, and while my logic might be wrong, I see no reason, that even if it was, to have faith in such a cruel and malevolent God.
Carneades.org Gotcha.. I’m beginning to see I didn’t think hard enough. I think I may have a way to deny P3. P7 obviously follows from logic and I’m not going to doubt logic, but P3 is not so clear. Let me expalin. Xamarmm’s comment reminded me of something. I would agree with his assertion. God can do evil. I would then say, but God cannot morally do evil. It goes like this: Jonathan Edwards explained the problem of predestination and human responsibility with this distinction. So God is “naturally able” or has the “natural ability” to do evil. But, God cannot do evil because he is “morally unable” to do evil according to his nature. God’s choices are not made just capriciously without regard to his nature. And so, these motivations that come from his nature guide his will. I hope that made sense. If not try reading under the portion "seeking to understand" in the link below and more closely the second paragraph under "Man's enslaved will" on down. It may give some examples which could be helpful. Sorry if it just confuses you more. Anyways in this way, God still is the good and all that he does is good and free will is good and free will allows you to choose evil. Nothing follows.
www.desiringgod.org/articles/a-response-to-ji-packer-on-the-so-called-antinomy-between-the-sovereignty-of-god-and-human-responsibility
Ben Van Dalen Just to clarify, I was denying P3 in the first argu of this video.
I still don't feel the libertarian view of free will works for human's. It does work for God though because God does "whatever he pleases" as the Psalms say. So for now, I still have a problem with the problem of evil..
Carneades.org commonsenseatheism.com/?p=3115 Would you accept the final formulation of the argument on this page? Because I think the person shows that the formulation follows from his examples.
I think in Alvin's argument you have to understand the context he is making his argument in. I don't think it is true that free will necessarily entail the ability to do evil. It just means that there isn't any outside force that is acting on the being to cause it to do something. The context that Alvin was referring to was the created world, and in that world, the GOOD is to give them the ability to do both good and evil and feeling choose. The description of free will is not universal, meaning true for all beings.
Hi Tim - A logically deductive argument is independent of external contexts since it provides the premises - although its semantics can be debated. As you say - it doesn't follow that free will entails the ability to do evil (which counts against Alvin if anything). However, Plantinga argues that: in some possible world (not necessarily the created one) a degree of evil may be required by dint of libertarian free will to achieve a greater good. Of course, while logically valid this also begs the question about libertarian free will, as well as, by implication, denying the possibility of a Heaven in which free will and no evil may co-exist; a proposition that seems counter-intuitive to classic Christian theology. It remains extremely problematic & dubious, whichever way you try to cut it. Cheers
Your P3 is not the obverse of P1 as you claim.
P1 says "All that God DOES is good".
P3 says "God CANNOT do evil".
The actual obverse of P1 is "God DOES NOT do evil" (assuming good and evil are contradictories), not "God CANNOT do evil".
While P3 implies P1, P1 does not imply P3 because you have switched modalities from simple "does/does not" to "can/cannot".
One could say...
P1) All that God does is the Good.
But God CAN do evil, but chooses not to because God is good. All God does is good because he chooses to be good because he's God. So it's not that he's incapable of doing evil. He just chooses not to because it's not in his nature.
Like we're all capable of murder potentially. But we choose not to because we are good people.
All that being said, I'm atheist. I just like playing devil's advocate.
I'm not sure if is a typo or your true position. However, what wrote was: "the individual, God, is essentially good...if he were not good he would not be God."
Let's compare that with John, the bachelor. If John were married he would not be a bachelor, yet it is possible for John to marry.
The analogous position for God is this. If the individual, God, were evil, he would not be God, yet it is possible for God to do evil.
Did you write what you intended to convey?
I keep updating what I am trying to say ahahahah. Free will is comparable to money (God is the money giver) in that: it is not always necessarily bad not to give it.... it can be very good to give it.... once given it is wrong to steal it back.... the principle of giving it out of love is good, them using it to do wrong is not the fault of the giver but giving it out of love so then they can have the ability to use it for good outweighs it... especially if you knew that if they were to use it to harm someone else justuce would be served and all made well
Could it not be that it is not that giving free will is innately good but the possibility it creates to truly choose goodness (God) that is innately good. Those who choose to reject goodness and would of course be horrible but that would be their choice and they would face justice for it, while those who always ultimately chose goodness and mercy (God) no matter what would be able to ultimately partake in something wonderful. In other words free will is not innately good or bad, the results from it are good or bad however the good results (truly choosing goodness and mercy) are worth the possiblely very bad results (which some may choose by themselves- of course without God directly causing them to do so) because ultimate justice would be served upon those who do evil unrepentantly. Of course, once someone had free will, then it would be wrong to take that right away from them... like once you allow your adult child to go out into the world it would be wrong to force them home. Pr maybe it could be that not giving a creation free will may not be wrong, but allowing them to have free will in the first place may be a good thing and to then take it away again would be wrong. For example, building a computer may not be bad but building a child (theoretically ahahah) and giving them free will because it means they can truly choose you (and if they don’t then justice) may be good. Having free will not be innately good or bad, rather the giving and not taking it away may be good while not giving it would not be innately bad
How is being a mental slave that is only capable of accepting God less favorable than beings that reject God? Aren't we already mental slaves if God knows exactly what we are going to think before we think it?
Irrespective of Good/Evil etc - I don't understand how it can be argued that God has free will
Perhaps he does not. But if he does not this causes a problem for the claim that free will is good and that God is all good.
Carneades.org
Hmmm .... Maybe - not sure - Could a robot not do actions that I wouldn't deem morally good but still have no free will - (imagine a robotic judge issuing out a death penalty for a parking violation). Could God not be 100% evil (by human standards) but still totally mechanistic ?
Artifactorfiction
Two thoughts. The reason that God cannot be all good without free will is not that totally determined or mechanistic beings cannot be moral, but that in order for Plantinga's "Free Will Defense" to work Free Will must be good and God must be all good (so God must have free will.
As for determined beings being good or bad, it probably depends on what you believe about ethics. A Utilitarian would say that any act is bad if it does not produce the greatest possible pleasure (so even inanimate objects could do evil). But a Deontologist is going to be concerned about the motives of the agent, so it would probably depend on whether or not the robot has consciousness (The Chinese Room (Thought Experiment)). And beyond that depending on what you believe in terms of Free Will you may think that someone can do good without being free (Free Will (4 Minute Philsophical Positions)).
Carneades.org
Another good answer. I'm not really trying to disagree with the arguments in the video. It just seems to me that everything falls down before we get to this point as I can't see how God could have free will. Again I'm far from qualified but how do philosophers argue this bit out - the definitions seem to 'box in' God completely in terms of free will as he can't really change his mind in the future and 'do otherwise' as he is all knowing and already knows his future decisions - to do so would mean he had been wrong and was thus not perfect. So I guess what I'm really trying to get at is how, until it can be shown that God has free will, can we assume this and use this 'free will' to imply God being good. Is there a standard philosophical argument that gives God an escape to allow him 'free will' ?
Artifactorfiction
That's an interesting idea. There is the problem for Theologians around omniscience and Free Will of normal people that I go into here: Omniscience (The 12 Days of Theology), but I am not sure about God knowing his own choices or God having free will. It seems like a good place to put pressure on the Theist.
I think you are wrong. If goodness is defined as consistency with god's actions/nature, then it is a tautology that god can only be good. God's incapability of doing evil doesn't come at all from a lack of power/freedom, it comes from Craig's definition.
One can say that it is an essential, or even necessary, property of bachelors that they are unmarried. Clearly, one cannot both be married and at the same time be a bachelor.
However, it doesn't follow that if someone is a bachelor, then that someone cannot marry.
You seem to be making an analogously invalid argument.
This explanation assumes world as black n White like the digital switch but it's not
+Jitendra Vispute In terms of what? In terms of somethign being good or not? While you might argue that there are shades of grey between an act that is good and one that is bad, if you claim that an all powerful, all knowing God dictates what is good, and there is evil in the world, you'll still ahve this problem. If your claim is that some God could exist which does not fit those criteria, you are correct in saying that this argument does not show that no God exists, or that either this type of God exists or no God exists, but that is not its goal. The point of the argument is to demonsrate a contradiction within a specific view of God.
Here the trick you are employing is to suggest that all good is same set "is God."
If God says he has designed husband and wife to have sex and procreate and that "it is good," well your response is OPPS GOD can't procreate therefore it is inconsistent with p2 all that is good is God.
You are extending the grounding of moral good in a an all-good being. Neither Craig or Plantinga teach that God has the ability (free will) to do evil. So your p6 and p7 are false. Both men would say God is free to create world's but that he is not free to operate in a way that is inconsistent with his nature. A god could be evil or less than perfectly good, but a maximally great being worthy of worship must necessarily have perfect goodness as his nature. Your conundrum is in your misunderstanding of Plantinga and Craig.
This argument is flawed. Because from P2) It says all that is good is God. You use p3) and p7) to contradict on another but you are not understanding the Christian Faith. God sent Jesus to die on the Cross to cover the sins we do with the free will we have. This is because God is all Good and cannot be in the presence of evil or sin. Reasoning that God went through Sacraficing his son in order that we may continue to have a relationship is the ultimate demonstration that God is all good and does not desire to part take in evil. p3) you claim that God cannot do evil. It never stated that God can not do evil, but God chooses to do Good and Be God rather than Evil.
You are free to deny P2 or P1 (P3 logically follows from P1, so without being irrational, you need to deny P1 if you want to deny P3). But the problem, as stated in the video, is that this means you can't deal with the Euthyphro dilemma, a problem for divine command theory which has gone without a sufficient answer for thousands of years, yet many theists insist on holding contradictory beliefs in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.
Your video have an "audio" problem after minute 6:27 ;-).
Thanks for the heads up, there is an edited one floating around somewhere, I thought I had it linked. I'll check it out.