l'effet majeur, at least for me, is the thing you did or can do for the desired outcome allowing it to arise, the action which tipped the scale so to speak in a pivotal way, or provides leverage at a pivotal time if momentary action or over time etc . my 2cents
As a former french NCO in operational headquarters, I stopped at 4:25 when you said "Yakovlev is a very intelligent man". Just BS. He's a pro-NATO/globalist (pleonasm) propagandist. At least in operational headquarters, we have J2 which give us real information, not mass medias propaganda. In 2002/2003 we knew there was no weapons of mass destruction in Irak. Your BS propaganda is destroying Europe and France. Disgusting.
French way of war : rationalism (Vauban), audacity (Surcouf), elitism (Bayard) French culture : rationalism (Descartes), audacity (Molière), elitism (Corneille)
@@benoitbvg2888 oui, bon, en même temps, "de l'audace, toujours de l'audace", ça a coûté bien des vie inutilement gaspillées en 14-18 il y a un temps pour tout, et face à un mur de mitraille, l'audace fait pas long feu
@@kolerick cette citation date de la révolution, et je doute fortement que les sous-off qui lançaient la 15ème vague humaine sur des positions retranchées en 14-18 le faisaient en hurlant "de l'audace!!!"
@@benoitbvg2888 audacity was pretty universal across all european nations, that had been merely subjugating colonial opposition for the last century. all of them had had the grandaddy stories from the Napoleonic wars and the experience of beating down colonies or tribals in their lifetime. how could a side NOT develop overconfidence in audacity from that?
It’s funny that the back handed complimented against Eisenhower was that he was a logistician considering that was probably what was needed most of the allies in World War II - someone who could manage large quantities of resources, multiple fronts and larger than life personalities amongst the allies.
@@MrT0777It seems almost impossible to believe that a human being could confuse themselves so deeply about the meaning and importance of “logistics” in modern warfare that they’d be amused at somebody who’s not entirely convinced it’s an insult. Note: the American army’s tooth to tail ratio is about 1:8, while the French have 5 combat and 4 support divisions for a T3R of 1:0.8. That is literally *10x MORE* non combat support- proportionally- than the French. Are you still confused as to why an American commander would need to be an expert in logistics?
@@matthewnewton8812 idk why you seem so insulted. I stated a rather benign fact. I myself would even take it as a compliment even though it is an insult. I think you miss understand me.
Eisenhower was undoubtedly a great general. Anyone saying something else, has misunderstood something or is ill-informed. Operationally, Eichelberger outshone everyone, though Collins and Truscott and Ridgeway were fine commanders as well, but Eisenhower mastered strategy and socalled grand strategy.
I was an ESL instructor at L'Ecole de Guerre from 2013-15. If only we had someone as informed and reflective as yourself to bounce off. There were some very bright people there but also some who maybe weren't.
The French army knows how to do everything, it is robust, versatile but it is "échantillonnaire", it has a volume problem, particularly for a high intensity war!
@@khaldrago911 Hey, here's American arrogance again, it's no wonder that no one in the world knows you love it! France has a military past, which is still taught at West Point today! Don't be jealous! ;)
@@salahidinbruh, the Brits did alright, as little ol’ Napoleon found out at Trafalgar and Waterloo. There was a reason the sun never set on their empire.
It is way smarter to remember your losses than your victories. Because understanding and remembering why you lost is a good way to not lose again in the same fashion. A military that forgets their loss is bound to make the same mistakes. Also, remembering the fallen comrades make you feel like if you die, you will be remembered and knowing your generals remember the past mistakes put you at ease.
I've long seen this as why French mil thinking is so good: Painful defeats provoke thinking. Victories lend themselves to over-confidence. Complacency.
Hello . Hello for Operation Serval the artillery detachments were not only composed of Caesar but also of a 120 mm towed mortar section. The effectiveness of the 120 mm shell is close to that of the 155 mm shell, only the range of the shot with a 120 mm mortar is smaller compared to a 155 mm gun. The 11th Marine Artillery Regiment was deployed with the 4 Caesar, but a 120 mm mortar section towed (by a VAB) deployed by the 68th African Artillery Regiment. So there was no lack of support at the support level, for the different GTIA/SGTIA. Since it has been decided to redeploy the 120 mm mortars towed to the infantry regiments, the gunners will instead have the new Griffon MEPAC (120 mm mortar on board the Griffon). For the concept of GTIA/SGTIA, the French army can also increase the workforce by gathering several GTIA/SGTIA at the brigade and divisional level, and the current evolution of infantry weapons, anti-tank while having the Scorpion program that makes it possible to designate a threat and destroy it and allow the combat vehicle closest to the threat and the most adapted according to its capabilities at the armament level of the destruction vehicle will be designated to destroy. So in the concept of GTIA/SGTIA, technology via Scorpion offers the army greater flexibility in terms of communication, observation, destruction, a huge added value without having a mass in staff. Of course I think that the French army must increase its workforce, in order to manage the attrition on a high-intensity conflict, but in the meantime we perfected joint work at various levels, from the lowest to the highest while increasingly mastering the systems offered by the Scorpion program in terms of speed in communication, observation, destruction. So for Serval the GTIA/SGTIA had capabilities in custom artillery supports but not limited to Caesar guns, but also 120 mm mortars, so closer to combat to support but adapt by offering a lightness to follow the VABs of the infantry units as well as the infantrymen when they were landed and engaged in combat. So with the 120 mm mortar we remain on an efficiency of the shell close to that of the 155 mm shell. With the arrival of the MEPAC Griffins in the CAESAR artillery regiments, replacing the 120 mm towed mortars that are back in the infantry regiments (they will be towed by the Servals who replace the VABs). The goal is to densify artillery supports with the CAESAR and the MEPAC Griffin, and the good old 120 mm mortar towed model F1 is back in the infantry regiments. Between the CAESAR and the LRU at the artillery level and the MEPAC 120 Griffins, plus the 120 mm mortars within the infantry regiments, we have a capacity offering a maximum of mortars that can fire 120 mm shells close to the efficiency of the 155 mm shell. So of course it will be necessary for the French army to increase the strength of the army in men and equipment, weapons, but thanks to the quality of the precision of our artillery, with the Caesar and the Griffin MEPAC 120, LRU, with the Scorpion program we have an enormous added value that will be profitable with the accuracy of the shot, the effectiveness of the ammunition. At the infantry level, the basic combat group sees its firepower increase with a rifle grenade capacity in place (all men in the groups equipped with the HK 416 F long barrel can fire the rifle grenade), with the 40 mm HK Grenade lance (2 per groups), AT4, the Minimi should be replaced by the 5.56 mm FN Evolys light machine gun, and the SCAR precision team shooter in 7.62 mm. The LGI will also evolve, each man having a Glock 17 as a double endowment weapon. So we already have a significant firepower by also taking into account the armaments of the Griffons, Serval (12.7 or LG of 40 mm), Ditto with the 25 mm and its 7.62 mm MAG of the VBCI etc... our new MMP anti-tank missile launcher, the modernisation of the Leclerc, I think we have an evolution of firepower at all levels that will be increased with the Scorpion program. Finally, sorry for the message not very well written, but I think we have the elements that will allow us to offer the elements that allow us to be in the continuity of our vision of war. Nevertheless, there has been a delay in budgets, and that it will be necessary to increase the workforce and weapons, equipment (remake a substantial stock of ammunition) to move towards high-intensity war in order to manage the attrition in men and equipment. But our vision of war with the Scorpion program will allow us to have the opportunity to adapt the size of the inter-arm units, to fight in high intensity. Thank’s for your job , merci 🙂 Cordialement
@michaelshurkin613 yes, it's all about hand-play, manoeuvre, speed, audacity. To the detriment of brute force (the pack) or defensive play (advance by kicking the ball). The French play the elegant style, like the NZ (but not often as well lol).
@@michaelshurkin613 Yes the term often used is, “Jouer! Jouer!” It’s heads up, play on, attacking mentality. Like in this game from a couple years ago: ruclips.net/video/ZP6vEX2BLvM/видео.html New Zealand pressures heavy and pins France deep in their own half. Ntamack makes the audacious decision to go on the attack from his own goal line, seizing the initiative back from NZ, and creating even further opportunity for attack.
@@seeriktus The Chef, who assesses the kitchen with a quick glance, expects the line cooks to anticipate everything that needs to be done to The Chef's satisfaction. No talking, even small chat with brand new staff is curtailed - if you have time to talk then you should be doing more prep and cleaning as you go. Mis-en-place! (Everything in its place)
Cameron was NOT a defeat: the mission was completed, even if, yes, the Foreign Legion detachment was destroyed to do so. The Foreign Legion celebrates the sacrifice for the sake of the mission.
43:15 The Battle of Camerone took place 30 April 1863. The Pionniers you mentioned attend various ceremonies not just the recitation of the Battle of Camerone. Not to be "that guy," but the battle was not a defeat. The Legion Etrangere defended the shipment of gold bullion which was their mission.
@@loading2256 It was a battle 65 vs 3300, it was not winnable, the men decided to stay and fight despite they knew what would happen. How is that not heroic ?
Very interesting. Thak you. Just a detail : it's Danton, during the Revolution, who said : "De l'audace, de. l'audace, encore de l'audace" (pour vaincre les ennemis de la patrie).
I have several friends who are French soldiers and who have participated in different campaigns in Mali. They all told me the same thing: "Because we are used to not having much, it forces us to remain very proactive and creative". When your convoy has for example only the 'minimum' fuel to get to point B, you find a way to be there no matter what. Adaptation and taking initiative are essential and encouraged. And you also trust that a supply unit will arrive at the right time. Everything is based on trust and the desire to surpass oneself. But this state of mind is of course also difficult after a couple of weeks / months. It gives the feeling that they are always in "just-in-time". And it is because the officer corps is also very competent that few problems arise. It's a strength as well as a weakness. My friends are really proud to be French soldiers and they really like their equipment. However, it is also a joke for them to say that they really have few resources compared to other Western forces. An observation that is apparently also shared by the General Staff.
@@pauljermyn5909 I assume you are referring to the Uzbin Valley ambush (2008). The term "massacre" is an exaggeration and it is not a comparable campaign and command either (not the same tactics, not the same type of operation, etc.). Basically, 100 soldiers (60 French) are attacked by surprise in the mountains by approximately 150 Taliban. They suffer 10 deaths and inflict 60 on the other side while avoiding complete encirclement. And here is extract from the wikipedia page: "Some French soldiers sacrifice themselves to cover the retreat of their section and their non-commissioned officer, to maintain radio contact or to try to rescue the wounded." The US command (via NATO) wrote a report stating that yes, the operation had been poorly prepared (by them). However, reinforcements were able to quickly come to support this unit. So basically, the operation (convoy) was strategically poorly prepared, but the tactical situation on the ground did a good job. During Operation Serval (Mali - 2013/2014), French troops suffered 9 deaths during intense fighting for more than 15 months (for approx. 2000 soldiers). This is impressive.
@@ZifnabHydre i served in the Legion in the late 80s, doing things without adequate manpower, ammunition or support was standard practice, the French army are brave, well trained and audacious soldiers so they get away with it most of the time in Africa and to a certain extent the middle east, i think like all armies, the French military got a wake up call in Afghanistan, it was harder to get away with it there, in a conventional European war they wouldn't get away with it at all, but at least they can fight a war, currently, discounting nuclear capability, Britain can barely defend itself and would be incapable of fighting in a European conflict, even if it supplied a token force they would have little ammunition.
Very interesting video as always. I think that celebrating defeats come from the fact France is a very old country. You know that defeats will be parts of your history. A defeat could seem very threatening for a young country, but far less for an old country, because you know that history will not stop there, but continue and it's up to you to learn how to survive the centuries if not more. Knowing that can be dangerous, because it can bring apathie, just like during WWII for France. In France one of the reason behind the collaborationists thinking was that it was just another round of the franco-german "rivalry" and that things would be turned around later on, so that they could just stop fighting and wait. They thus missed the big picture of what World War II was and would become. But it is also in defeats that we learn the most things generally speaking. So, not being afraid of them and thinking further and beyond means that you will not be paralyzed by say defeats, that you will overcome them and adapt. Well, at least it's my interpretation as a french who studied history (even if it was quite some time ago).
Well having 1115 battle victories (highest count in history) and England having 1105 (knowing who England fought the most 😂) you can imagine we didn't had only victories Like Dunkerque even if being a defeat for French Army, was what prevented England to collapse against Germany in WWII due to the heroic defense of French soldiers A "mission over all" mindset which is common in the french army
I don’t think that Cameron was a defeat. The mission was to prevent the Mexican army to attack an important convoy of the French army. Mission accomplished That’s the mission overall spirit
"Pour les vaincre, il nous faut de l’audace, encore de l’audace, toujours de l’audace, et la France sera sauvée !", est une citation de Danton à l'époque du comité de salut public, donc vers 1793. Ce n'est pas de Napoléon.
The French way of war, as recently demonstrated in Mali a decade ago, is the idealized image of what the russians attempted to replicate in the following decade leading up to the large scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Let's just say the entire debacle was much like that scene when Homer Simpson attempted to build a barbecue pit.
From what I understood, Russian army is missing the right organisation (especially warren officier) and training (trust, subsidiarity, ...) to apply French way of war. But getting them back to their old fashion seems to work...
This is an excellent analysis. Some of your other videos have felt very Francophile, but I continue to appreciate a different view point. Also greatly appreciate the book recommendations. I would also reinforce that the US has two "cultural" impacts that affect operations (the first of which you have called out specifically, the second follows from the first). The first is a huge risk aversion. If any US service member dies, there seems to be an immediate congressional inquiry as to what could have been done to prevent it. There is ALWAYS something, so this necessitates over planning to ensure maximum CYA. Second, because the US has fought so far afield for much of its modern existence, logistics is always given huge priority in planning. Good lines of communication require more effort and security, which in turn requires a larger footprint, which in turn means more resources. Thank you, and please continue with your series.
Very interesting video, but what you have identified is older than Napoleon. The best example is the last De Rochambeau campaign, abandoning New York for Yorktown (initiative, manoeuvre), using Lafayette's irregular forces to fix the Brits for the duration of the manoeuvre (pragmatism), risky rendezvous with the Navy (Audacity). Maximum political effect.
One additional remark if you allow me. It is true that the French Army does not have massive artillery numbers. But if I remember correctly the French army aviation (ALAT - Aviation d'Armee de Terre) is quite decent in size and quality and in I believe that the French used their helicopters (Gazelles mainly) as mobile artillery for close (fire) support besides the 4 Cesar SPGs. This to my mind would fit into the doctrine that stresses subsidiarity, speed and audacity while maintaining a relative small logistical footprint (the Gazelles required less maintenance than the HAD Tigre for example). But I could be wrong of course, I'm not a specialist on French operations by any stretch of the imagination.
Each infantry regiment used to have a heavy mortars section of 6-8 120mm mobile mortars per regiment, as well as a section of 4-6 81mm mortars per combat company, so each regiment had their own reasonable fire support, however they have removed the heavy mortar capability from infantry and given it to the artillery.
@neige9 thanks for that, they are saying this is a new thing though, i was in SML (120mm mortar section) in the Legion in the late 80s, so not exactly new lol
As a musician I would describe the GTIAs as this: you can find several instruments on the market, ready-made, some are supposed to be "jack of all trades" to cover many styles of music, say an electric bass or guitar, and some are more specific, like... a violin or an upright bass: the one trick poneys. In both situations, you have no choice, you buy it, or you don't. But you can also ask a luthier to build a custom instrument for you, telling him: I want a specific kind of instrument that can do perfectly these things like a 70's jazz bass sound for slap, but also with a low B string to get those extra low notes in church gigs. I want those tuning keys, those woods, etc... to match the things I want. So here you're in between the jack of all trades and the One Trick Poney. Now as an ex sergent in the SSA (Service de Santé des Armées) I've been experiencing interarmes maneuvers in the early 90's, I was basically thrown into a régiment du matériel, or a groupement de chasseurs, an armoured group so, or some artillery things or génie (engineers). In fact, I was based in Trier then Rastatt, In Trier we had in the same garrison a régiment du matériel (logistics), a régiment du génie (engineers), and an artillery regiment. I've been doing some specific trainings with the engineers and artillery, then in maneuvers had to work with armoured groupements de chasseurs. The facts is it's very enriching, you never get bored doing the same thing again and again the whole year. It really adds up to your brain. Oh, and for those who said french rugby philosophy is the same as french way of war, even if you're not familiar with rugby as an american, just watch this french rugby analysis in english: ruclips.net/video/baxMx9iYgso/видео.html ruclips.net/video/3b-ecdTtpeo/видео.html
Could you possibly do another video which gives more French perspectives on the American way of war. I truly enjoyed that episode since the French seem to be keen observers of the way the Americans do military strategy.
Hi, I just discovered your channel and this is really well done and interesting. I think you could put this kind of videos on audio platfroms as podcasts, I mostly listened to you while working and the hour went very fast.
I like a lot the "Subsidiarité" concept. The stranger thing is it is pretty old and highly modern. Any commercial company should promote this principe in their management line to face the fast pacing of their market. (in fact, I'm following this paradigm since a while on my professional career. Some books of General Desportes inspired me a lot) But it rely on Trust and Bond which are much more complicated to build in commercial company than on military organisation (and that my main job when I build a dev team)
I enjoyed the presentation. It's interesting to see how much doctrine is shaped differently by different needs, culture, experience, and goals in the french army compared to other nations.
Incomprehensible that Belgium, with our crippling risk-aversion and institutional inertia chose to integrate militarily with France considering this doctrine.
This doctrine is for expeditionary operations. On continental Europe, since the revolutionary wars, France has used mass mobilization + conversion of industry to make weapons for total war. Belgium choosed French vehicles for inter-operability, lower costs, and the Scorpion programme was just the best available solution to jump into the 21st century with infovalued collaborative combat capacity.
Probably linguistically sensible... Belgium also needs a strong ally since your military is tiny. I mean lets face it you're a harmless bunch. No one is afraid of you. So yeah it's not the worst strategy.
Yes, it would be a sensible strategy IF Belgium had a normal political structure. Our entire land force will now be geared on a doctrine/strategy that a Belgian government would never be able to implement. France would deploy to Mali for Operation Serval in 2013 and Belgium would probably be launching a commission to investigate wether we should deploy a company as well by the time 2019 rolls around.
Very informative episode. It’s obvious that you are comprehensively read in French military doctrine. I was particularly interested in your references to the interactions between the French and Americans who together executed Operation Dragoon and the subsequent liberation of Southern France and eventual conquest of Germany. I find it interesting that the French considered the Americans too slow and plodding though its true my understanding is that the Americans did love firepower. It’s ironic that the Americans considered the British too measured in their movement preferring set piece battle to spontaneous exploitation of battlefield advantages.
The _subsidiarité_ principle has evolved since the times of Maréchal Foch, I recently heard this comment from a French high-ranking officer (sorry, I don't remember his name but I watched it very recently on a YT short), this isn't the exact verbatim but here the _esprit_ (gist) of it : In a very fundamental manner, the way of supervising French soliders is to have them subscibing to the strategy that has been decided by explaing it with enough detail from the officers (while still avoiding elements that could be leak edto the enemy) when soldiers from other countries are supposed to just follow the orders without them having to envision the possible outcome related to any decision.
for me *something is missing* in your discussion. The french, during the cold war, had maintained two primary military organizations designed for different strategic purposes: - a first force was structured to serve as the primary line of defense against a potential Soviet invasion. - a second force was designed for overseas deployment and quick intervention in various global conflicts. This is an important topic these days since the reckless invasion by Putin's Riuzzia of Ukraine. Because after the collapse of the SSSR, france shrank the organization to only a task force to fight enemies like you mentioned in Mali. However now they realize this is not enough for a war like the one we see today in Ukraine.
I think one way to look at defeats as victories is Bir Hakeim... While it was a technical defeat it denied Rommel the victory at Tobruk allowing the British Army to regroup in El Alamein. 3000 French Infantrist/Artillerist held up 30000 Germans with tanks and Stuka's for 1-2 weeks. That was Audacity. And it ultimately lead to a total defeat of Rommel.
For the French, Bir Hakeim is a big deal. Their take is this: A far less-well equipped French force than the French Army that lost the battle of France did well against the Germans. How? By switching its software. Out with the inter-war defensive, menthodical war doctrine, in with something more in line with how they understand Napoleon. Audacity, etc.
The French Navy's approach privileged the mission as well, compared to the British who focused on the destruction of the enemy fleet. That led to the Chesapeake and the Glorious First of June, erm I mean the battle of 13 Prairial An II.
For Camerone, it is not a true defeat, thanks to their sacrifice, the legionnaires had slow down enough the opposite army to secure french positions, therfore they have distrubed the enemy plans, preventing an attack and releaving them from the initiative
Very interseting and thoughtfull, as usual. Technically theFree French Forces were officialy founded on July the 1st 1940, and lasted until August the 1st 1943 after the allied victory in North Africa. At which point they were merged with the former Vichy "Armée d'Afrique" to form the new Arméé Française de Libération (French Liberation Army). However In many sources, Free French describes any French individual or unit that fought against Axis forces after the June 1940 armistice. Postwar, to settle disputes over the Free French heritage, the French government issued an official definition of the term. Under this "ministerial instruction of July 1953" (instruction ministérielle du 29 juillet 1953), only those who served with the Allies after the Franco-German armistice in 1940 and before 1 August 1943 may correctly be called "Free French"
The difficulty with that is the fact that Germany is still occupied. Thus it is difficult to determine how German military doctrine would evolve if Germany were truly independent. There would likely be a large swing away from the US and Britain, as these nations have dominated German policy, perhaps moving Germany towards Russia and BRICS. It is all only guesses and fun discussion, as a real independent Germany has not existed post WWII.
@LarthV That’s precisely why I’d like Michael to cover it, I’m curious to know where it’s all going wrong, besides the obvious surface level issues with bureaucracy and procurement.
There's some of hubris to the idea of "audacity." As dry and wasteful as "war as a demolition project" can seem, there's almost a certain humility: it does NOT presume that the enemy can be outsmarted, nor does it presume that information is complete and accurate. "Fighting for/with initiative" is effective and efficient... unless you become exhausted, or get tricked and wiped out.
@@michaelshurkin613 IIRC, their fighter aircraft were good too. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the main problem was too much confidence in Maginot's Ligne, too much money invested in and not enough in the rest...
@@Nick-y9c maginot Line worked as the germans did not try to face it. It seems to me it was a blind Luck for the germans to get through the Ardennes while the French were unlucky in every aspect. After all, what is the difference between Marne in 14 and Ardennes in 40? Finally, not to forget, France in 40 is a country of 40M that lost 1.5M 20 years earlier: it « kills » audacity, innovation and risk taking.
around 15:43 : about the word *esprit* has to be read like *mindset* in way of something that define the french doctrine therefor the way a commander acts.
Something I’ve long wondered: how much was the French command influenced by General Slim’s campaigns when they were planning Dien Bien Phu? The whole thing seems like they decided to imitate the battles of Imphal and the Admin Box, and then it went very wrong.
If you want to understand dien bien phu planification, look at Na San battle (23 november - 2 december 1952). Then global context. Needed to force a decisiv battle before international peace resolution conference. You are welcome.
I found this video so interesting, and reminded me that the concept of 'winning' is so cultural. For those who read books in the 1970s, remember Joseph Heller's Catch 22, I think where Yossarian and Nate are in an Italian whore house talking to an old man there. The guy mentions that he's pleased to see the Italians are winning again, to the surprise of his audience. He explains, invaders come. Invaders go. But we Italians are still here. So the French military like the little wins, but like the neighbours, we are still here.
Another thing, French tailored their strategy around the nuclear doctrine, the concept of "first employment" (première emploi) which refers to the potential for France to use nuclear weapons preemptively or early in a conflict. The germans are not very fan of that idea, cause during the cold war, if the russians invaded Federal Republic of Germany, the idea was for the french to do one nuclear attack against the Russians forces as a "warning". During cold war France used to have a nuclear missile base at "Plateau D'Albion" with missile ranges just enough to land in germany hehehe
Very interesting insights, thanks a lot. Looking on how well Perun videos are doing, I think that longer format of 30+ minutes is perfect for a topic like that, to fully elaborate on the ideas that are being presented.
Napoleon was at his best when his means were inferior to the opponent... when he had better means then the opponents, he was complacent in his strategy/tactic
Sadly, whilst there is a paperback copy of Armel Dirou's book. At more than £80, its as expensive as the other versions. Including Kindle and hardback.
Regarding what is expected from a commander I don’t think this is only pure romanticism. I was reading Pierre Santoni former commander of the CENZUB (Urban warfare training center), for him citing Moltke, nothing happens as expected in a war, at least from a tactical and operational level. Therefore having commanders who shows personality in their actions guarantees that you have more chance not to remain passive but are able to fend off or counter attack in many situations (instead of waiting order / folding). It is a very general comment and a bad summary (I am on mobile) but I think that’s the idea. Also France is one if not the only country that still imposes a tactics exam for its higher officers.
À point is our ressources are limited because we choose to be independant for nuclear, naval and air forces. We build them and so it is quite expansive but better be a lean wolf than a fat dog, well a choice I agree with
I'd imagine having subordinates' role be something akin to semi-autonomous mind readers presents a challenge of opsec. To understand the commander's intentions for the battlefield would presumably require more information than other armies typically give to the lower ranks, no? Are the French systemically more comfortable with less secrecy, or is this too handled at the commanders' level?
Depending at what point, French lieutenant here ✋🏻 For platoon leaders and company leaders it’s quite easy because we received the same education with « effet majeur » and the « spirit » of each mission explained in ours courses in addition to the « text » of the missions. At a sergeant level it’s depends.., we have even some enlisted roles in the infantry which go for more autonomy on the battlefield depending the mission (it’s decrease with increasing combat intensity I think) but at the end of the day, a group isn’t that secable - except if you have many options of transmissions A citation we learned: « the initiative is the more evolved form of discipline » or something like that. In practice it’s depends Plus, we don’t understand all but understanding N+1 issues is good and N+2 ones is luxury
Indeed, a war against another army from another states could be a problem (not just for France actually), but actually how could it happen ? I mean, France like other western countries will never (not by the coming few decades) fight against an equivalent in term of ressources etc.
France deployed a SGTIA at Tapa, Estonia. If Putinist Russia decides a special military operation to "liberate" Russian brothers oppressed by Estonian government (as declared by members of the Duma), shouldn't the SGTIA fight against such invasion? What for the rest of the French Army?
I'd like to, but it's difficult in part because for most of its history, the Canadian forces were a subset of the British forces. But I do know one person who can speak to this topic and think I can get her to do an interview for the channel. So, thank you for the rec. I'll reach out to her.
Thanks for this amazing channel! i hope we'll hear you again on the collimateur podcast. Concerning the video i'm wondering if our "today" way of war and all its limitation in a high intencity conflict is not compensate(?) or mitigate(?) by our nuclear doctrine ? in theory, there is no reason for us to reach an high intensity conflict that would not justified the use of m51 or asmpa ?
Let me guess. Wake up angry, can't talk to anyone for at least 30 min . Have a coffee and cigarette. Still grumpy. Don't talk to any strangers. Everyone is a stranger.
I can say that listening you, the most "French" U.S generals is George Patton. Now I understand why...He was and fought in France during WW1 and was considered as the most dangerous by German's high generals during WW2. He was the perfect union of our both countries, born as American with a French audacity shaped mindset and also fodded with U.S logistic and mighty manpower.
Yes. One way to think of it is that after 1914, the pendulum swung in favor of methodical warfare. But then in the interwar years they went too far. So after 1940, what happened was pushing the pendulum back in the other direction. Such that the French Army of 1945 sort of kind of had more in common with the Army of 1914 than it did with that of 1940.
Absolutely fascinating and such a true analysis. One of the most striking aspect I found in the many French officers I had thee pleasure to discuss with is their vast general culture, particularly in literature and history. That knowledge and intellectual capacities is key to their ability to be autonomous; It also has a secondary effect, many officers are admired by the petty officers and the troops, which means they are not just trusted but soldiers will follow them in hell, a tremendous advantage. Audacity and initiative are embodied in the French actions by Juin at Monte Cassino and by Leclercq 2DB during WWII. Regarding artillery, I partially disagree; France has a very long tradition of excellente artillery (actually this won the 100 hundred years war !) and is very much including the use of arty in their tactic, although not to crush a large front but rather to obtain breakthrough over a limited area of the front, and then move the arty where it is needed (very much the Napoleon tactic). The problem of numbers of Caesar is mostly a resource problem. As for Mali, remember they also had Mirage 2000 and Rafale available in case they required a precision strike anywhere over the country. Finally, while it is true that the French army is not currently prepared for a fight against a large army like the Russians, remember that this is because France right now has no enemy at its borders. If a war erupted against Russia, France would be involved as part of a large coalition and, hopefully, French troops would be used according to their strength. When France had enemies at its borders, they had the army and the ammunitions required for a full war effort. While it would take years for France to build up its industrial capacities and manpower for a large war, it can do it, and probably faster than a country like Germany as it stands because its political structure is better set up for war.
Good point about air support in Serval/Barkhane. And yes, French officers are very well educated and great to talk to. I've always enjoyed my conversations with the ones I've met.
What I'm a little afraid of is the notion that that every big war would be fought in a coalition because it can tempt the individual nations to become "lazy". Every European Nato member I can think of (maby with the exception of Poland) plans to build a small, highly professional military force that relys on contract soldiers, perfectly executed missions and extremely expensive and high-tech weapons systems in very low numbers. This approach is very attractive to sell to the public for sure, but if I remember correctly, Germany has artillery ammonition for less then a week of full scale conflict and during operations in Libya, France and Britain needed a resupply of ammonition from the US as well. Now imagine a worst case scenario where the US is involved in a total war with China and Russia trys the the goth land scenario or some similar shenanigans the baltic states, I'm sure Britain, France and Germany would give them hell... For about a week or two before we collectively realize that we all wanted to play the same role and no one brought the millions of conscripts and grenades the others relied on
Very interesting video. However, I think that your analysis only takes into account the way France manages asymmetric conflicts. The concept of GTIA and SGTIA also follows this logic of rapid deployment of forces that recent external operations (Afghanistan and Africa) required. However, I think that in the context of a conventional war, these structures would be different. Of course, the mentality remains the same (audacity, maneuver, initiative). But I think that for example on the question of firepower, the problem is more budgetary and political than doctrinal. In the last two world wars, French artillery was present (one of the only positive points in 1940, by the way). It is also Pétain who summarizes this: ""The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies."" Finally, a point that I think has been forgotten but which is important. The notion of rusticity. The French army has always been based on this idea of rusticity where we do not rely on a dependence on comfort that we do not have (contrary to the Americans) and therefore we push as far as possible the little that we have.
With respect, sir, it's a little bit strange to hear you talk about Camerone without making a comparison with the Alamo. Because it seems to me that in terms of glorious defeat and romanticism... There's something to celebrate there. I hope the American military doesn't despise this battle.
Very interesting, didn't know much about French warfare despite their lengthy tradition. I do question the constant references to Clausewitz, but no references to Napoleon. Strange that France produces one of the greatest military leaders in history, and people focus on a German instead. Did Napoleon truly leave no writings worth considering in this analysis?
The French have studied Napoleon's campaigns in detail, like every one else. And his writing. But from what I understand, much of what he wrote was sort of BS. So everyone, French included, lean heavily on interpreters of Napoleon, the two most important being Clausewitz and Jomini.
French military deployment is tied to limited funds provided by the politics (for various budget and political reasons) hence the 4 césar in mali. Up to Macron, all previous political leader were very "shy" on that which create additionnal issues, an artillery commander at the beginning of the Ukraine war said "we never deployed an entire artillery company and at this point i don't know if we would know how". Your analysis is missing for me a crucial point, the political one, the GTIA, the "let's do with what we have" is derivated from the politics, giving the bare minimum to save as much as possible. As for the romantic defeats, it's not about victory or defeat, it's about the tenacity of the french soldier.
Thank you, Dr. Shurkin. Bat-shit crazy is an interesting description. My first thought was that French doctrine requires the regular supply of French "Captain Americas", who can perform military magic, with style and panache. Or cloning Napoleon in large numbers (which might actually be possible). All three militaries that you mention: French, American and Russian, are all still fighting World War 2. With the French still using the guerrilla tactics of the French Resistance. Patton and Zhukov are still in command.
En vous écoutant, on se rend compte combien les armées françaises et russes sont à l'opposée l'une de l'autre. D'un côté, une armée qui privilégie vitesse, légèreté et autonomie sur le terrain, face à une armée qui ne possède pas de sous-officiers et qui au contraire favorise l'envoi massive de troupes sur le terrain, avec un appui d'artillerie important. En revanche, cela se traduit par un manque de réactivité sur le terrain et une certain lenteur dans les manoeuvres. De plus, l'industrie russe dont on annonçait la débâcle imminente a montré une capacité surprenante à augmenter sa production et à approvisionner ses troupes.Enfin, l'armée russe est adossée à sa frontière et peut donc très facilement transférer la production de ses usines sur le terrain, ce qui dans le cas des Européens de l'ouest pourraient s'avérer une véritable gageure. C'est pour ça qu'une guerre entre les deux armées pourraient s'avérer une tâche quasi impossible pour une armée française loin de ses bases. Autant, je pense que les officiers et les soldats français sont largement mieux entrainés que les troupes russes, même si après 3 ans de guerre, elles sont particulièrement aguerries, autant la logistique pourrait s'avérer un véritable cauchemar.
Thanks for this great video. I have one question on the GTIA/SGTIA concept. Did you feel any second thoughts about that in French circles given the not so good performance of the Russian version of the concept at the beginning of Ukraine war? While the French army has extensively used these structures in overseas intervention, there is no track record against a peer adversary. Also, thanks for linking effet majeur to the indirect approach, but arguably at a more tactical level.
I'm pretty sure the GTIA/SGTIA thing was expressely designed to facilitate overseas projection.Lots of what is described in this video is more relevant to post cold war/non conscript army France, France wouldn't fight Russia like they fought Jihadists.What France loose in aversion to firepower they gain in liberal nuclear doctrine, declasified USSR documents showed that French nuclear deterence was extremely effective on the soviets and that is for good reason.
GTIA are for projection and oversea interventions during asymmetrical warfares or in coalition. For continental war, France use mass mobilization and war economy. Macron spoke at the Eurosatory exhibition on June 13, 2022 about war economy. He directed the military and manufacturers to "anticipate and invest now in their production tools... produce more and faster". Ramping up some production like ammunition, AA missiles, artillery guns etc.
They would send GTIAs to fight Russians, but much more amply provided with firepower than what they sent to Mali. They sent armor SGTIAs to Estonia and Romania. Leclercs + VBCI.
No, I think GTIAs are standard and will remain so. Remember, they can be made heavier or lighter, as requirements dictate. Now, I have no idea when they started doing the GTIA thing.
I read on wiki (sorry!) that contrary to French GTIA, Commonwealth Brigade Groups and US BCTs, Russian BTGs were more or less thought as permanent units, at least in their skeletal organization, and given that Poutine's reforms were not over when he (prematurely) invaded Ukraine, if they should share the same advantages on the paper, they lacked in practice any reserve and logistics from the next echelon (brigade or division administrative levels). When they started loosing specialists and suppliers, they were quite disorganized, instead of being immediately (if temporarily, and to some extent) reinforced by their non existing parent units. Is this understanding correct?
During my time in the American Army (70's) a popular refrain was to refer to the French as "Cheese eating surrender Monkeys" and the jokes about the French were equally mean spirited and inaccurate. My compatriots too often confuse French soldiers with the French government. Have no bouts adout it , French soldiers can fight.
C est très intéressant merci. Je ne pense pas que les russes prendront le risque un jour de combattre les français car nous avons l arme nucléaire. Donc il me semble que c est très théorique comme scénario et je ne pense pas que du coup notre armée soit fondée sur cette hypothèse de combat conventionnel contre les russes.
Dans la doctrine de dissuasion actuelle, si la France est entrainée dans une guerre contre la Russie par le jeu des alliances et qu'une partie de ses forces déportées entre en contact avec les forces ennemies, le principe de défense des "intérêts vitaux" n'est pas évident, et je ne pense pas que la dissuasion nucléaire inclue ce cas de figure. Songez que si nous avons abandonné nos armes nucléaires de théâtre et tactiques (missiles sol-sol Pluton et Hadès, les petits modèles de bombes), contrairement je crois aux Anglais et aux États-uniens, c'est pour précisément ne pas avoir à faire ce choix, et pour crédibiliser l'extrême violence de la doctrine de destruction mutuelle assurée, vu la petite taille de notre territoire métropolitain.
Si une puissance nucléaire attaque un intérêt français non critique, je doute que la France réplique (ou menace de répliquer) avec l'arme nucléaire. Ne pas être en mesure de monter une réplique conventionnelle dissuasive, c'est accepter la perte de tout intérêt non critique. Cela fait beaucoup... Y compris des alliés que la France déclare protéger (par ex. Estonie, Roumanie).
Fascinating. Keep thinking about French military history as I listen to this - thinking that this explains, for example, the offensives in Alsace Lorraine in 1914 and the appalling casualties. I also thought about the critique of the German army (1914-1945 in particular, but perhaps more generally) about Operational excellence (and associated with this usually Tactical excellence) but that lack of an overarching Strategy or Grand Strategy this was all in service of. Yes, it’s all brilliant and might sort out a limited dispute. But when you run into the Soviets or Chinese, it’s all really just a recipe for losing gloriously as your ground into dust. Shades of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Kaisers Army in 1918 or the Wehrmacht in 1941-42 - at some point Operational Excellence is just futile when you face a determined enemy with overwhelming resources of men, material, time and space. The French army harkening back to 1944-45 is absurd, they were an irrelevant appendage (albeit a brave and dashing one) that ultimately relied on the resources of America and the British Empire to prevail. I get that no one wants to go back to France of 1939-40, but how do the French see summer and fall of 1918? This was the last time a French dominated effort (albeit with considerable support from the US and British Empire) won a major war. French leadership and inspiration, audacity, offensive spirit, etc. were all important in defeating the Kaiser’s army here - by my understanding is that it was also utterly dependent on overwhelming material superiority delivering a never ending series of blows which the exhausted German army could survive. Is examining this seen as opening an intellectual door to 1939-40 defeatism? Or do the French see or explain it otherwise? Because, unless the French can say how their doctrine will produce victory in circumstances like 1918 or 1944-45, then the French army really is just a glorified colonial army that will not matter all that much in Great Power struggles. In other words, why didn’t they go for a Finnish option with a small standing army but massive reserve potential to deal with another national crisis. A second point, is why do the French always start with Napoleon? From 1214 on (excepting arguable a couple of decades in the mid 14 and early 15th century) until 1870 the French army was the dominant force in Europe. It was their army, its training and tactical methods, its mode of recruiting, its financial and military bureaucracy which set the standard and it was French innovations in these which other nations copied. Is it a Republican thing (which can encompass the Empire) which sees no value in the Ancient Regime as providing any useful lessons?
Before 1944, only the soviets really were relevant agaisnt germany. Dont forget all the french intel provide btw, or all the french serving in the BEF. "Defeatism" after the german crushed the franco english lines is understandable by : we were defeated. Simple as that. As french soldiers were saying talking about material during first battle of france : "too few, too late." The army was pushing for mecanization and full armored division in 34/35. The chamber refused the credits for, budget restriction logic. We started in 36/37. To late. About french military history before napoleon, you are more than right. But as its not modern, we tend to not talk about it. Napoleon era organisation, tactics and strategy are in someway still in use. Middle age ones arent.
Oui question de soutien les Etats Unis ont amenés des soldats grippés du kansas résultats 20 millions de morts . quand aux britanniques ils ont la mémoire courte la bataille de la Sommes a été un désastre , en 1940 c'est grâce à sa situation géographique que les britanniques n'ont pas été envahis c'est simplement une île . faut il rappeler que l'armée britannique a été aussi vaincu par les allemands leurs rembarquement de Dunkerque est une retraite un désastre après 15 jours de combats . actuellement le Royaume Unis est le porte avions des Etats Unis
The French Army has audacity but it lacks logistics and manpower for a real war. Amunition also is a real problem + it does not have military exercises on a level of large units.
Une seule question : que vaudrait l'armée française (ou ce qu'il en reste) face à une agression brutale telle l'agression russe en Ukraine ? Les Ukrainiens tiennent depuis 3 ans : où puisent-ils cette résilience ? J'ai des doutes sur la résistance française, vautrée dans sa culture de l'apéro et des congés payés...
C'est une question qui ne sert à rien de se poser du fait que l'on possède l'arme atomique : si le pays est menacé à ce point on a la capacité de totalement détruire instantanément l'ennemi et si celui-ci est capable de faire la même chose, il y aura destruction mutuelle totale et donc aucune résistance possible.
From what it sounds like the French value mobility far more than shock but without a break in an enemy line or ability to hold ground mobility is not possible. I think going forward the American’s new divisional composition of defensive, breakthrough and exploitation divisions will prove the future of peer to peer conflicts. The French have talked for years about a Euro centric army but unless they have the political and economic power to become a multi capable force they’ll just be an exploitation (maneuver) element as a part of a US lead coalition. Regardless, I think most current western systems are just relics of the GWOT.
We are pushing for european independance capability. Sadly, we are a voice among the others inside EU. Others have their view, we are force to compose with. And their goal isnt independance at all. Thats why EU will never be independant. And thats why we will leave it soon or later.
Did you already do the italian way of war? If not, could you please do It? I'd love to see your intersting and clear explanation about modern italy's way of war
I'd love to, but I'm not sure if there is one. Meaning, I know that Italy has a strong intellectual tradition re: military strategy. French guys like Coutau-Bégarie write a lot about it. But I have no idea if any of that has any influence in any way on how the contemporary Army thinks about anything. The same thing is true of Germany. There's tons of talk of a German Way of War, but I have yet to determine if all that pre-1945 stuff has any influence on the contemporary Bundeswehr, even if all its commanders in the beginning were ex-Wehrmacht.
Vous auriez pu, vous référer au « programme Scorpion » (qui sera à terme remplacé par le « programme Titan ») qui relie tous les corps d’armées, ceci pour aussi bien une bataille que pour une guerre. L’essence même réside dans la communication entre tous les corps d’armées et a les faire évoluer ensemble sur un même objectif. Un fantassin pourra interagir avec un « Rafale », un char » Leclerc » un véhicule blindé, ou bien une batterie de missiles ou bien pour finir avec un navire de la marine nationale ! Ce programme redéfini la donne au sujet de notre armée et « peut être » de son efficacité future, ou pas ! La France est le pays qui a gagnée le plus de guerre et de batailles, dans le monde. Selon l'historien Niall Ferguson, la France est la puissance militaire la plus victorieuse de l'Histoire. Elle a participé à 50 des 125 grandes guerres européennes qui ont eu lieu depuis 1495, soit plus que tout autre État européen.
Oui, je peux faire un video entier sur SCORPION et Titan. Un jour. Mais ce qui est important, ce sont les idées du GEN Hubin. warontherocks.com/2021/02/kill-the-homothetic-army-gen-guy-hubins-vision-of-the-future-battlefield/
@@michaelshurkin613 Merci pour votre réponse. Ce qui me dérange, quand même, c'est la date de parution de votre article de référence " February 4, 2021". Je reconnais que votre travail est hyper intérressant, et je vous remercie aussi d'en avoir fait une vidéo. Mais regardez ce qui se passe actuellement en Ukraine, l'inventivité ukrainienne à changée la donne quand à la façon d'aborder les guerres actuelles (choses qui n'existait pas quand le général de Brigade Guy Hubin, a écrit ses livres. (le dernier livre remonte aux années 2012). Les drones a 100€, entre autre, capables d'exploser un char T90 Russe n'étaient pas en services et ont certainement changés la donne dans les états majors du monde entier, y compriy la France!
Also, something thats been true for a very long time and that seems crazy to the anglo-saxons, we fight for honour. That explains all the arty part, the love for risk, the focus on attack, the celebration of glorious defeats transformed in spiritual victories etc.
The English ship commander who captured Duguay-Trouin (in 1694 ?) insisted on that « we, English, fight for honour while you, French, fight for money » to which DT replied « true, we all fight for what we miss most »
@@StephLudwigRobert Surcouf was active in the Indian Ocean, where he gained fame as a privateer. After joining the French Navy, he began his most notable privateering career in the late 18th century, primarily operating in the waters around the Indian Ocean. He famously captured several British merchant ships and warships, particularly around the coasts of Mauritius, Reunion, and the Bay of Bengal. Surcouf's most celebrated victory occurred in 1806, when he captured the East Indiaman ship Kent, a heavily armed British vessel, off the coast of India. This victory made him one of the most renowned privateers of the period and a national hero in France. His exploits in the Indian Ocean were a significant part of his legacy, where he engaged in numerous battles with the British Royal Navy and merchants during the Napoleonic Wars.
@ Duguay however claims he was the author in his « mémoires » released in 1740, ie 4 years after his death. But it is not so important. Have a good day
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French military people, your thoughts?
Mostly accurate... but you know how French people dislike to agree with anglo-saxon people ! 😅
l'effet majeur, at least for me, is the thing you did or can do for the desired outcome allowing it to arise, the action which tipped the scale so to speak in a pivotal way, or provides leverage at a pivotal time if momentary action or over time etc . my 2cents
Enough to give me one additional year of patience infront of some anglo saxon trashtalks. Thank you for your work. ✌️
I am a former officer in the french army, faught as an helicopter Pilot. Nice to listen your thinkings about this doctrine.
As a former french NCO in operational headquarters, I stopped at 4:25 when you said "Yakovlev is a very intelligent man". Just BS. He's a pro-NATO/globalist (pleonasm) propagandist. At least in operational headquarters, we have J2 which give us real information, not mass medias propaganda. In 2002/2003 we knew there was no weapons of mass destruction in Irak. Your BS propaganda is destroying Europe and France. Disgusting.
I'm a simple French man, i see someone talking about the French army, i suscribe.
Great minds think alike
I’m a simple French man, I wear ze beret, I smoke ze cigarette, I eat ze baguette
Be more. Concise .be. Brave. Www platoon. Take. The. Pain. The. Fear. The. Threat. I. Allwauys. Hold. On. Ur. Human. Life form. 😢. Breath. 🇿🇦🌳🇿🇦
I'm Belgian, and I subscribe to contribute to the stereotype that Belgians know more about french affairs than belgian ones
@@Paraphen I zmoke, I zmoke, not I smoke
French way of war : rationalism (Vauban), audacity (Surcouf), elitism (Bayard)
French culture : rationalism (Descartes), audacity (Molière), elitism (Corneille)
De l'audace!!!!
@@benoitbvg2888 oui, bon, en même temps, "de l'audace, toujours de l'audace", ça a coûté bien des vie inutilement gaspillées en 14-18
il y a un temps pour tout, et face à un mur de mitraille, l'audace fait pas long feu
L'audace va bien pour les corps francs, pour gagner la guerre il faut des chars Renault
@@kolerick cette citation date de la révolution, et je doute fortement que les sous-off qui lançaient la 15ème vague humaine sur des positions retranchées en 14-18 le faisaient en hurlant "de l'audace!!!"
@@benoitbvg2888 audacity was pretty universal across all european nations, that had been merely subjugating colonial opposition for the last century. all of them had had the grandaddy stories from the Napoleonic wars and the experience of beating down colonies or tribals in their lifetime. how could a side NOT develop overconfidence in audacity from that?
It’s funny that the back handed complimented against Eisenhower was that he was a logistician considering that was probably what was needed most of the allies in World War II - someone who could manage large quantities of resources, multiple fronts and larger than life personalities amongst the allies.
I find it humorous that an American would probably take it as a compliment.
@ And I find it humorous that someone would not understand what a "backhanded" compliment actually is.
@@MrT0777It seems almost impossible to believe that a human being could confuse themselves so deeply about the meaning and importance of “logistics” in modern warfare that they’d be amused at somebody who’s not entirely convinced it’s an insult. Note: the American army’s tooth to tail ratio is about 1:8, while the French have 5 combat and 4 support divisions for a T3R of 1:0.8. That is literally *10x MORE* non combat support- proportionally- than the French. Are you still confused as to why an American commander would need to be an expert in logistics?
@@matthewnewton8812 idk why you seem so insulted. I stated a rather benign fact. I myself would even take it as a compliment even though it is an insult. I think you miss understand me.
Eisenhower was undoubtedly a great general. Anyone saying something else, has misunderstood something or is ill-informed. Operationally, Eichelberger outshone everyone, though Collins and Truscott and Ridgeway were fine commanders as well, but Eisenhower mastered strategy and socalled grand strategy.
I was an ESL instructor at L'Ecole de Guerre from 2013-15. If only we had someone as informed and reflective as yourself to bounce off. There were some very bright people there but also some who maybe weren't.
The French army knows how to do everything, it is robust, versatile but it is "échantillonnaire", it has a volume problem, particularly for a high intensity war!
Including surrender - ain’t that a word that comes from French?
Snarky @@khaldrago911
@@khaldrago911 Hey, here's American arrogance again, it's no wonder that no one in the world knows you love it!
France has a military past, which is still taught at West Point today! Don't be jealous! ;)
@@khaldrago911 like 45% of English vocabulary. The English learnt that particular word the hard way.
@@salahidinbruh, the Brits did alright, as little ol’ Napoleon found out at Trafalgar and Waterloo. There was a reason the sun never set on their empire.
It is way smarter to remember your losses than your victories. Because understanding and remembering why you lost is a good way to not lose again in the same fashion.
A military that forgets their loss is bound to make the same mistakes. Also, remembering the fallen comrades make you feel like if you die, you will be remembered and knowing your generals remember the past mistakes put you at ease.
I've long seen this as why French mil thinking is so good: Painful defeats provoke thinking. Victories lend themselves to over-confidence. Complacency.
Hello .
Hello for Operation Serval the artillery detachments were not only composed of Caesar but also of a 120 mm towed mortar section. The effectiveness of the 120 mm shell is close to that of the 155 mm shell, only the range of the shot with a 120 mm mortar is smaller compared to a 155 mm gun.
The 11th Marine Artillery Regiment was deployed with the 4 Caesar, but a 120 mm mortar section towed (by a VAB) deployed by the 68th African Artillery Regiment. So there was no lack of support at the support level, for the different GTIA/SGTIA. Since it has been decided to redeploy the 120 mm mortars towed to the infantry regiments, the gunners will instead have the new Griffon MEPAC (120 mm mortar on board the Griffon). For the concept of GTIA/SGTIA, the French army can also increase the workforce by gathering several GTIA/SGTIA at the brigade and divisional level, and the current evolution of infantry weapons, anti-tank while having the Scorpion program that makes it possible to designate a threat and destroy it and allow the combat vehicle closest to the threat and the most adapted according to its capabilities at the armament level of the destruction vehicle will be designated to destroy. So in the concept of GTIA/SGTIA, technology via Scorpion offers the army greater flexibility in terms of communication, observation, destruction, a huge added value without having a mass in staff. Of course I think that the French army must increase its workforce, in order to manage the attrition on a high-intensity conflict, but in the meantime we perfected joint work at various levels, from the lowest to the highest while increasingly mastering the systems offered by the Scorpion program in terms of speed in communication, observation, destruction.
So for Serval the GTIA/SGTIA had capabilities in custom artillery supports but not limited to Caesar guns, but also 120 mm mortars, so closer to combat to support but adapt by offering a lightness to follow the VABs of the infantry units as well as the infantrymen when they were landed and engaged in combat. So with the 120 mm mortar we remain on an efficiency of the shell close to that of the 155 mm shell. With the arrival of the MEPAC Griffins in the CAESAR artillery regiments, replacing the 120 mm towed mortars that are back in the infantry regiments (they will be towed by the Servals who replace the VABs). The goal is to densify artillery supports with the CAESAR and the MEPAC Griffin, and the good old 120 mm mortar towed model F1 is back in the infantry regiments. Between the CAESAR and the LRU at the artillery level and the MEPAC 120 Griffins, plus the 120 mm mortars within the infantry regiments, we have a capacity offering a maximum of mortars that can fire 120 mm shells close to the efficiency of the 155 mm shell. So of course it will be necessary for the French army to increase the strength of the army in men and equipment, weapons, but thanks to the quality of the precision of our artillery, with the Caesar and the Griffin MEPAC 120, LRU, with the Scorpion program we have an enormous added value that will be profitable with the accuracy of the shot, the effectiveness of the ammunition. At the infantry level, the basic combat group sees its firepower increase with a rifle grenade capacity in place (all men in the groups equipped with the HK 416 F long barrel can fire the rifle grenade), with the 40 mm HK Grenade lance (2 per groups), AT4, the Minimi should be replaced by the 5.56 mm FN Evolys light machine gun, and the SCAR precision team shooter in 7.62 mm. The LGI will also evolve, each man having a Glock 17 as a double endowment weapon. So we already have a significant firepower by also taking into account the armaments of the Griffons, Serval (12.7 or LG of 40 mm), Ditto with the 25 mm and its 7.62 mm MAG of the VBCI etc... our new MMP anti-tank missile launcher, the modernisation of the Leclerc, I think we have an evolution of firepower at all levels that will be increased with the Scorpion program. Finally, sorry for the message not very well written, but I think we have the elements that will allow us to offer the elements that allow us to be in the continuity of our vision of war. Nevertheless, there has been a delay in budgets, and that it will be necessary to increase the workforce and weapons, equipment (remake a substantial stock of ammunition) to move towards high-intensity war in order to manage the attrition in men and equipment. But our vision of war with the Scorpion program will allow us to have the opportunity to adapt the size of the inter-arm units, to fight in high intensity.
Thank’s for your job , merci 🙂
Cordialement
THANK you for this information.
French here ; funnily, the french doctrine resembles very closely to the way we play rugby...
Really?
@michaelshurkin613 yes, it's all about hand-play, manoeuvre, speed, audacity. To the detriment of brute force (the pack) or defensive play (advance by kicking the ball). The French play the elegant style, like the NZ (but not often as well lol).
@@michaelshurkin613 Yes the term often used is, “Jouer! Jouer!” It’s heads up, play on, attacking mentality. Like in this game from a couple years ago:
ruclips.net/video/ZP6vEX2BLvM/видео.html
New Zealand pressures heavy and pins France deep in their own half. Ntamack makes the audacious decision to go on the attack from his own goal line, seizing the initiative back from NZ, and creating even further opportunity for attack.
Or this one, perhaps the most famous example of French Flair: the Try from the End of the World
ruclips.net/video/MJfvfx0titc/видео.html
Largely true !
This Channell is a Gold mine!
I was trained in the Haute Cuisine culinary brigade method by a French Chef. There are a lot of analogues to what you describe!
Interesting!
I wonder does 'initiative' play a role in the kitchen? 😅
@@seeriktusI would say yes when it comes to question your recipe or cooking process therefore innovate. That’s why we’re also the best cuisine
@@seeriktus The Chef, who assesses the kitchen with a quick glance, expects the line cooks to anticipate everything that needs to be done to The Chef's satisfaction. No talking, even small chat with brand new staff is curtailed - if you have time to talk then you should be doing more prep and cleaning as you go. Mis-en-place! (Everything in its place)
Did you known that cooks in the kitchen are called a "brigade"
Cameron was NOT a defeat: the mission was completed, even if, yes, the Foreign Legion detachment was destroyed to do so. The Foreign Legion celebrates the sacrifice for the sake of the mission.
THANK YOU FOR THE TIMESTAMPS!!
43:15 The Battle of Camerone took place 30 April 1863. The Pionniers you mentioned attend various ceremonies not just the recitation of the Battle of Camerone. Not to be "that guy," but the battle was not a defeat. The Legion Etrangere defended the shipment of gold bullion which was their mission.
How is it not a defeat ?
@@loading2256The mission was accomplished. Read article 6 Code d'honneur de Legionnaire.
@ okay so pretty much exactly what the dude said. Celebrating glorious defeat. And im saying that as a French. Rule of cool ain’t always cool lol
@@loading2256 It was a battle 65 vs 3300, it was not winnable, the men decided to stay and fight despite they knew what would happen. How is that not heroic ?
In France, we like to celebrate glorious "faits d'armes", either a victory or not. That's somehow a privilege, having a long military record.
Very interesting. Thak you. Just a detail : it's Danton, during the Revolution, who said : "De l'audace, de. l'audace, encore de l'audace" (pour vaincre les ennemis de la patrie).
I have several friends who are French soldiers and who have participated in different campaigns in Mali.
They all told me the same thing: "Because we are used to not having much, it forces us to remain very proactive and creative". When your convoy has for example only the 'minimum' fuel to get to point B, you find a way to be there no matter what. Adaptation and taking initiative are essential and encouraged. And you also trust that a supply unit will arrive at the right time. Everything is based on trust and the desire to surpass oneself.
But this state of mind is of course also difficult after a couple of weeks / months. It gives the feeling that they are always in "just-in-time". And it is because the officer corps is also very competent that few problems arise. It's a strength as well as a weakness.
My friends are really proud to be French soldiers and they really like their equipment. However, it is also a joke for them to say that they really have few resources compared to other Western forces. An observation that is apparently also shared by the General Staff.
@@ZifnabHydre they also got massacred in Afghanistan when they initially patrolled without enough ammunition, men and support
@@pauljermyn5909 I assume you are referring to the Uzbin Valley ambush (2008). The term "massacre" is an exaggeration and it is not a comparable campaign and command either (not the same tactics, not the same type of operation, etc.). Basically, 100 soldiers (60 French) are attacked by surprise in the mountains by approximately 150 Taliban. They suffer 10 deaths and inflict 60 on the other side while avoiding complete encirclement.
And here is extract from the wikipedia page: "Some French soldiers sacrifice themselves to cover the retreat of their section and their non-commissioned officer, to maintain radio contact or to try to rescue the wounded."
The US command (via NATO) wrote a report stating that yes, the operation had been poorly prepared (by them). However, reinforcements were able to quickly come to support this unit. So basically, the operation (convoy) was strategically poorly prepared, but the tactical situation on the ground did a good job.
During Operation Serval (Mali - 2013/2014), French troops suffered 9 deaths during intense fighting for more than 15 months (for approx. 2000 soldiers). This is impressive.
@@ZifnabHydre i served in the Legion in the late 80s, doing things without adequate manpower, ammunition or support was standard practice, the French army are brave, well trained and audacious soldiers so they get away with it most of the time in Africa and to a certain extent the middle east, i think like all armies, the French military got a wake up call in Afghanistan, it was harder to get away with it there, in a conventional European war they wouldn't get away with it at all, but at least they can fight a war, currently, discounting nuclear capability, Britain can barely defend itself and would be incapable of fighting in a European conflict, even if it supplied a token force they would have little ammunition.
Very interesting video as always.
I think that celebrating defeats come from the fact France is a very old country. You know that defeats will be parts of your history. A defeat could seem very threatening for a young country, but far less for an old country, because you know that history will not stop there, but continue and it's up to you to learn how to survive the centuries if not more. Knowing that can be dangerous, because it can bring apathie, just like during WWII for France. In France one of the reason behind the collaborationists thinking was that it was just another round of the franco-german "rivalry" and that things would be turned around later on, so that they could just stop fighting and wait. They thus missed the big picture of what World War II was and would become. But it is also in defeats that we learn the most things generally speaking. So, not being afraid of them and thinking further and beyond means that you will not be paralyzed by say defeats, that you will overcome them and adapt.
Well, at least it's my interpretation as a french who studied history (even if it was quite some time ago).
Also it really isn't just a French thing, just look at all the US movies like Black Hawk Down or Lone Survivor.
@@redwithblackstripesOr the seas of ink that have been spilt over the Battle of the Little Bighorn or the retreat from Chosin.
@@redwithblackstripes Also, the Alamo.
Well having 1115 battle victories (highest count in history) and England having 1105 (knowing who England fought the most 😂) you can imagine we didn't had only victories
Like Dunkerque even if being a defeat for French Army, was what prevented England to collapse against Germany in WWII due to the heroic defense of French soldiers
A "mission over all" mindset which is common in the french army
I don’t think that Cameron was a defeat. The mission was to prevent the Mexican army to attack an important convoy of the French army. Mission accomplished That’s the mission overall spirit
I'm glad I found your channel, and appreciate your knowledge a great deal! Thank you
Thanks for watching!
Thank you, appreciate the book recommendations.
Oh, I forgot to add links! Will do that now.
"Pour les vaincre, il nous faut de l’audace, encore de l’audace, toujours de l’audace, et la France sera sauvée !", est une citation de Danton à l'époque du comité de salut public, donc vers 1793. Ce n'est pas de Napoléon.
Et dieu sait qu en 1793, l audace était nécessaire, suis passé près de Valmy récemment, j ai expliqué le contexte à mes enfants.
Merci. Je ne savais pas.
The French way of war, as recently demonstrated in Mali a decade ago, is the idealized image of what the russians attempted to replicate in the following decade leading up to the large scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Let's just say the entire debacle was much like that scene when Homer Simpson attempted to build a barbecue pit.
Operation Serval was a decisive success. Operation Barkhane derailed mostly from the shift in local politics, its failure is political in nature.
From what I understood, Russian army is missing the right organisation (especially warren officier) and training (trust, subsidiarity, ...) to apply French way of war. But getting them back to their old fashion seems to work...
You know the video is gonna be good when he’s speaking about his sources for 5 minutes and already giving recommendations.
learn alot from this, thank you for putting this out on YT
You're welcome.
This is an excellent analysis. Some of your other videos have felt very Francophile, but I continue to appreciate a different view point. Also greatly appreciate the book recommendations. I would also reinforce that the US has two "cultural" impacts that affect operations (the first of which you have called out specifically, the second follows from the first). The first is a huge risk aversion. If any US service member dies, there seems to be an immediate congressional inquiry as to what could have been done to prevent it. There is ALWAYS something, so this necessitates over planning to ensure maximum CYA. Second, because the US has fought so far afield for much of its modern existence, logistics is always given huge priority in planning. Good lines of communication require more effort and security, which in turn requires a larger footprint, which in turn means more resources. Thank you, and please continue with your series.
Thank you for watching.
Very interesting video, but what you have identified is older than Napoleon. The best example is the last De Rochambeau campaign, abandoning New York for Yorktown (initiative, manoeuvre), using Lafayette's irregular forces to fix the Brits for the duration of the manoeuvre (pragmatism), risky rendezvous with the Navy (Audacity). Maximum political effect.
One additional remark if you allow me. It is true that the French Army does not have massive artillery numbers. But if I remember correctly the French army aviation (ALAT - Aviation d'Armee de Terre) is quite decent in size and quality and in I believe that the French used their helicopters (Gazelles mainly) as mobile artillery for close (fire) support besides the 4 Cesar SPGs. This to my mind would fit into the doctrine that stresses subsidiarity, speed and audacity while maintaining a relative small logistical footprint (the Gazelles required less maintenance than the HAD Tigre for example). But I could be wrong of course, I'm not a specialist on French operations by any stretch of the imagination.
Excellent point.
@@michaelshurkin613 Thank you kindly.
Completely right, hello support was critical in Mali.
Each infantry regiment used to have a heavy mortars section of 6-8 120mm mobile mortars per regiment, as well as a section of 4-6 81mm mortars per combat company, so each regiment had their own reasonable fire support, however they have removed the heavy mortar capability from infantry and given it to the artillery.
They are bringing back the 120mm to the infantry regiments
Battle Order made a video about the recréation of 120mm mortars platoon in regiments
ruclips.net/video/ZRtnPFyqRy0/видео.html
Footnote: 120 mm mortars are compatible with 105 mm howitzers,but half the max range. I read that somewhere.
@@gunmonkey1185equivalent
@neige9 thanks for that, they are saying this is a new thing though, i was in SML (120mm mortar section) in the Legion in the late 80s, so not exactly new lol
As a musician I would describe the GTIAs as this: you can find several instruments on the market, ready-made, some are supposed to be "jack of all trades" to cover many styles of music, say an electric bass or guitar, and some are more specific, like... a violin or an upright bass: the one trick poneys. In both situations, you have no choice, you buy it, or you don't.
But you can also ask a luthier to build a custom instrument for you, telling him: I want a specific kind of instrument that can do perfectly these things like a 70's jazz bass sound for slap, but also with a low B string to get those extra low notes in church gigs. I want those tuning keys, those woods, etc... to match the things I want. So here you're in between the jack of all trades and the One Trick Poney.
Now as an ex sergent in the SSA (Service de Santé des Armées) I've been experiencing interarmes maneuvers in the early 90's, I was basically thrown into a régiment du matériel, or a groupement de chasseurs, an armoured group so, or some artillery things or génie (engineers). In fact, I was based in Trier then Rastatt, In Trier we had in the same garrison a régiment du matériel (logistics), a régiment du génie (engineers), and an artillery regiment. I've been doing some specific trainings with the engineers and artillery, then in maneuvers had to work with armoured groupements de chasseurs. The facts is it's very enriching, you never get bored doing the same thing again and again the whole year. It really adds up to your brain.
Oh, and for those who said french rugby philosophy is the same as french way of war, even if you're not familiar with rugby as an american, just watch this french rugby analysis in english:
ruclips.net/video/baxMx9iYgso/видео.html
ruclips.net/video/3b-ecdTtpeo/видео.html
Merci !
Could you possibly do another video which gives more French perspectives on the American way of war. I truly enjoyed that episode since the French seem to be keen observers of the way the Americans do military strategy.
Foreign French Legion Cameron is some kind of Fort Alamo battle with all its tragic glory.
Hi, I just discovered your channel and this is really well done and interesting. I think you could put this kind of videos on audio platfroms as podcasts, I mostly listened to you while working and the hour went very fast.
I did in the past and had to stop because of storage issues. I intend to return to that. Look for me on apple and spotify. Same channel name.
Fantastic video, thank you! Will be following your channel in the future.
Thank you.
I like a lot the "Subsidiarité" concept. The stranger thing is it is pretty old and highly modern. Any commercial company should promote this principe in their management line to face the fast pacing of their market. (in fact, I'm following this paradigm since a while on my professional career. Some books of General Desportes inspired me a lot) But it rely on Trust and Bond which are much more complicated to build in commercial company than on military organisation (and that my main job when I build a dev team)
I'm working on a piece about Desportes. Which of his works do you like the most?
-Qu'est ce que l'Audace ?
"C'est ça !"
20/20
I enjoyed the presentation. It's interesting to see how much doctrine is shaped differently by different needs, culture, experience, and goals in the french army compared to other nations.
Incomprehensible that Belgium, with our crippling risk-aversion and institutional inertia chose to integrate militarily with France considering this doctrine.
This doctrine is for expeditionary operations.
On continental Europe, since the revolutionary wars, France has used mass mobilization + conversion of industry to make weapons for total war.
Belgium choosed French vehicles for inter-operability, lower costs, and the Scorpion programme was just the best available solution to jump into the 21st century with infovalued collaborative combat capacity.
😁🇨🇵🇧🇪
Probably linguistically sensible... Belgium also needs a strong ally since your military is tiny. I mean lets face it you're a harmless bunch. No one is afraid of you. So yeah it's not the worst strategy.
...their navy is under Dutch command...
Yes, it would be a sensible strategy IF Belgium had a normal political structure. Our entire land force will now be geared on a doctrine/strategy that a Belgian government would never be able to implement. France would deploy to Mali for Operation Serval in 2013 and Belgium would probably be launching a commission to investigate wether we should deploy a company as well by the time 2019 rolls around.
Very informative episode. It’s obvious that you are comprehensively read in French military doctrine. I was particularly interested in your references to the interactions between the French and Americans who together executed Operation Dragoon and the subsequent liberation of Southern France and eventual conquest of Germany. I find it interesting that the French considered the Americans too slow and plodding though its true my understanding is that the Americans did love firepower. It’s ironic that the Americans considered the British too measured in their movement preferring set piece battle to spontaneous exploitation of battlefield advantages.
The _subsidiarité_ principle has evolved since the times of Maréchal Foch, I recently heard this comment from a French high-ranking officer (sorry, I don't remember his name but I watched it very recently on a YT short), this isn't the exact verbatim but here the _esprit_ (gist) of it :
In a very fundamental manner, the way of supervising French soliders is to have them subscibing to the strategy that has been decided by explaing it with enough detail from the officers (while still avoiding elements that could be leak edto the enemy) when soldiers from other countries are supposed to just follow the orders without them having to envision the possible outcome related to any decision.
Utterly fascinating. So glad I've stumbled on this channel
Glad you enjoy it!
I think you are quoting Danton, not Napoléon at 25:10
Really? Thanks.
I wasn't expecting a Mohammad Ali quote. Sweet!
for me *something is missing* in your discussion. The french, during the cold war, had maintained two primary military organizations designed for different strategic purposes:
- a first force was structured to serve as the primary line of defense against a potential Soviet invasion.
- a second force was designed for overseas deployment and quick intervention in various global conflicts.
This is an important topic these days since the reckless invasion by Putin's Riuzzia of Ukraine. Because after the collapse of the SSSR, france shrank the organization to only a task force to fight enemies like you mentioned in Mali. However now they realize this is not enough for a war like the one we see today in Ukraine.
I think one way to look at defeats as victories is Bir Hakeim... While it was a technical defeat it denied Rommel the victory at Tobruk allowing the British Army to regroup in El Alamein. 3000 French Infantrist/Artillerist held up 30000 Germans with tanks and Stuka's for 1-2 weeks. That was Audacity. And it ultimately lead to a total defeat of Rommel.
For the French, Bir Hakeim is a big deal. Their take is this: A far less-well equipped French force than the French Army that lost the battle of France did well against the Germans. How? By switching its software. Out with the inter-war defensive, menthodical war doctrine, in with something more in line with how they understand Napoleon. Audacity, etc.
The French Navy's approach privileged the mission as well, compared to the British who focused on the destruction of the enemy fleet. That led to the Chesapeake and the Glorious First of June, erm I mean the battle of 13 Prairial An II.
Really good. Thanks.
For Camerone, it is not a true defeat, thanks to their sacrifice, the legionnaires had slow down enough the opposite army to secure french positions, therfore they have distrubed the enemy plans, preventing an attack and releaving them from the initiative
Merci!
Very interseting and thoughtfull, as usual.
Technically theFree French Forces were officialy founded on July the 1st 1940, and lasted until August the 1st 1943 after the allied victory in North Africa. At which point they were merged with the former Vichy "Armée d'Afrique" to form the new Arméé Française de Libération (French Liberation Army).
However In many sources, Free French describes any French individual or unit that fought against Axis forces after the June 1940 armistice. Postwar, to settle disputes over the Free French heritage, the French government issued an official definition of the term. Under this "ministerial instruction of July 1953" (instruction ministérielle du 29 juillet 1953), only those who served with the Allies after the Franco-German armistice in 1940 and before 1 August 1943 may correctly be called "Free French"
As a go player, everyting i hear there about initiative, minimum of means, audacity, and so on, is cristal clear.
Damn that was interesting ! Amazing !
Merci pour la vidéo ! Are you open to making a video on the German way of war (post WW2), or a video on the Bundeswehr ?
The difficulty with that is the fact that Germany is still occupied. Thus it is difficult to determine how German military doctrine would evolve if Germany were truly independent. There would likely be a large swing away from the US and Britain, as these nations have dominated German policy, perhaps moving Germany towards Russia and BRICS.
It is all only guesses and fun discussion, as a real independent Germany has not existed post WWII.
@@joebombero1 Not sure if _occupied_ is the right term - but the state and doctrine of the German military are ... problematic.
@LarthV That’s precisely why I’d like Michael to cover it, I’m curious to know where it’s all going wrong, besides the obvious surface level issues with bureaucracy and procurement.
There's some of hubris to the idea of "audacity." As dry and wasteful as "war as a demolition project" can seem, there's almost a certain humility: it does NOT presume that the enemy can be outsmarted, nor does it presume that information is complete and accurate. "Fighting for/with initiative" is effective and efficient... unless you become exhausted, or get tricked and wiped out.
Reminder: The most famous WW2 American tank, the M4 Sherman tank, had its roots in a French design.
French tanks in 1940 were excellent.
@@michaelshurkin613 IIRC, their fighter aircraft were good too. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the main problem was too much confidence in Maginot's Ligne, too much money invested in and not enough in the rest...
@@Nick-y9c maginot Line worked as the germans did not try to face it. It seems to me it was a blind Luck for the germans to get through the Ardennes while the French were unlucky in every aspect. After all, what is the difference between Marne in 14 and Ardennes in 40? Finally, not to forget, France in 40 is a country of 40M that lost 1.5M 20 years earlier: it « kills » audacity, innovation and risk taking.
Britain is not about land power, just about land mowers
around 15:43 : about the word *esprit* has to be read like *mindset* in way of something that define the french doctrine therefor the way a commander acts.
Outstanding! Thank you!
Something I’ve long wondered: how much was the French command influenced by General Slim’s campaigns when they were planning Dien Bien Phu? The whole thing seems like they decided to imitate the battles of Imphal and the Admin Box, and then it went very wrong.
I don't think it was, but I might be wrong.
I have this same question, as I'm reading Louis Allen's The Longest War, and the question just occurred to me.
If you want to understand dien bien phu planification, look at Na San battle (23 november - 2 december 1952).
Then global context. Needed to force a decisiv battle before international peace resolution conference.
You are welcome.
I found this video so interesting, and reminded me that the concept of 'winning' is so cultural. For those who read books in the 1970s, remember Joseph Heller's Catch 22, I think where Yossarian and Nate are in an Italian whore house talking to an old man there. The guy mentions that he's pleased to see the Italians are winning again, to the surprise of his audience. He explains, invaders come. Invaders go. But we Italians are still here. So the French military like the little wins, but like the neighbours, we are still here.
Another thing, French tailored their strategy around the nuclear doctrine, the concept of "first employment" (première emploi) which refers to the potential for France to use nuclear weapons preemptively or early in a conflict.
The germans are not very fan of that idea, cause during the cold war, if the russians invaded Federal Republic of Germany, the idea was for the french to do one nuclear attack against the Russians forces as a "warning". During cold war France used to have a nuclear missile base at "Plateau D'Albion" with missile ranges just enough to land in germany hehehe
Very interesting insights, thanks a lot. Looking on how well Perun videos are doing, I think that longer format of 30+ minutes is perfect for a topic like that, to fully elaborate on the ideas that are being presented.
Napoleon was at his best when his means were inferior to the opponent...
when he had better means then the opponents, he was complacent in his strategy/tactic
Sadly, whilst there is a paperback copy of Armel Dirou's book. At more than £80, its as expensive as the other versions. Including Kindle and hardback.
That's a pity. I really like the book.
Do you perhaps know where i can buy a English version of the introduction to strategy that you mentioned?
There's none for sale; the translation is long out of print. But there is a PDF version available on the internet. I'll look for it and post.
3:09 Such humility.
Regarding what is expected from a commander I don’t think this is only pure romanticism.
I was reading Pierre Santoni former commander of the CENZUB (Urban warfare training center), for him citing Moltke, nothing happens as expected in a war, at least from a tactical and operational level.
Therefore having commanders who shows personality in their actions guarantees that you have more chance not to remain passive but are able to fend off or counter attack in many situations (instead of waiting order / folding).
It is a very general comment and a bad summary (I am on mobile) but I think that’s the idea.
Also France is one if not the only country that still imposes a tactics exam for its higher officers.
À point is our ressources are limited because we choose to be independant for nuclear, naval and air forces. We build them and so it is quite expansive but better be a lean wolf than a fat dog, well a choice I agree with
I agree.
I'd imagine having subordinates' role be something akin to semi-autonomous mind readers presents a challenge of opsec. To understand the commander's intentions for the battlefield would presumably require more information than other armies typically give to the lower ranks, no? Are the French systemically more comfortable with less secrecy, or is this too handled at the commanders' level?
Interesting question. I need to think about this. It's never come up in my conversations with French officers.
Depending at what point, French lieutenant here ✋🏻
For platoon leaders and company leaders it’s quite easy because we received the same education with « effet majeur » and the « spirit » of each mission explained in ours courses in addition to the « text » of the missions.
At a sergeant level it’s depends.., we have even some enlisted roles in the infantry which go for more autonomy on the battlefield depending the mission (it’s decrease with increasing combat intensity I think) but at the end of the day, a group isn’t that secable - except if you have many options of transmissions
A citation we learned: « the initiative is the more evolved form of discipline » or something like that. In practice it’s depends
Plus, we don’t understand all but understanding N+1 issues is good and N+2 ones is luxury
@ Thanks for the input.
Oh man. I want your reading list.
Indeed, a war against another army from another states could be a problem (not just for France actually), but actually how could it happen ? I mean, France like other western countries will never (not by the coming few decades) fight against an equivalent in term of ressources etc.
France deployed a SGTIA at Tapa, Estonia. If Putinist Russia decides a special military operation to "liberate" Russian brothers oppressed by Estonian government (as declared by members of the Duma), shouldn't the SGTIA fight against such invasion? What for the rest of the French Army?
I was expecting to hear interesting thoughts but wasn't expecting a mad max reference😂 good one!
9:31 self referential org design is really good. Its resilient. I think Ashby had a law about it.
acceptance of risk seams to be different between US and French , how politics think losses will impact their respective public opinion ...
This was excellent. Any chance of doing the Canadian way of war? Assuming it's different to the British and is worth examining?
I'd like to, but it's difficult in part because for most of its history, the Canadian forces were a subset of the British forces. But I do know one person who can speak to this topic and think I can get her to do an interview for the channel. So, thank you for the rec. I'll reach out to her.
@michaelshurkin613 Wow, thanks for getting back to me and considering it seriously!
Don't forget to start at Ridgeway haha!
Thanks for this amazing channel! i hope we'll hear you again on the collimateur podcast. Concerning the video i'm wondering if our "today" way of war and all its limitation in a high intencity conflict is not compensate(?) or mitigate(?) by our nuclear doctrine ? in theory, there is no reason for us to reach an high intensity conflict that would not justified the use of m51 or asmpa ?
Let me guess. Wake up angry, can't talk to anyone for at least 30 min . Have a coffee and cigarette. Still grumpy. Don't talk to any strangers. Everyone is a stranger.
I can say that listening you, the most "French" U.S generals is George Patton. Now I understand why...He was and fought in France during WW1 and was considered as the most dangerous by German's high generals during WW2. He was the perfect union of our both countries, born as American with a French audacity shaped mindset and also fodded with U.S logistic and mighty manpower.
Often quoted that Germans rated Patton but with little evidence.
Faint praise.
He was not as bad as the others.
Maybe. I don't know enough about him other than having watched the movie 10x :)
Very interesting examination. A lot of this that could be seen as a reaction to the catastrophic french high command of ww2?
Probably but French high command thoughts in 40 were a reaction to 1914/15: audacity and manœuvre had a high cost then.
Yes. One way to think of it is that after 1914, the pendulum swung in favor of methodical warfare. But then in the interwar years they went too far. So after 1940, what happened was pushing the pendulum back in the other direction. Such that the French Army of 1945 sort of kind of had more in common with the Army of 1914 than it did with that of 1940.
Thanks your videos. Very educating. I have a question, do you think G. Patton fought as french way of war, in some way?
Oh, I'm sure many fought in similar ways. I don't claim the French have a patent on any of this.
Absolutely fascinating and such a true analysis. One of the most striking aspect I found in the many French officers I had thee pleasure to discuss with is their vast general culture, particularly in literature and history. That knowledge and intellectual capacities is key to their ability to be autonomous; It also has a secondary effect, many officers are admired by the petty officers and the troops, which means they are not just trusted but soldiers will follow them in hell, a tremendous advantage. Audacity and initiative are embodied in the French actions by Juin at Monte Cassino and by Leclercq 2DB during WWII. Regarding artillery, I partially disagree; France has a very long tradition of excellente artillery (actually this won the 100 hundred years war !) and is very much including the use of arty in their tactic, although not to crush a large front but rather to obtain breakthrough over a limited area of the front, and then move the arty where it is needed (very much the Napoleon tactic). The problem of numbers of Caesar is mostly a resource problem. As for Mali, remember they also had Mirage 2000 and Rafale available in case they required a precision strike anywhere over the country. Finally, while it is true that the French army is not currently prepared for a fight against a large army like the Russians, remember that this is because France right now has no enemy at its borders. If a war erupted against Russia, France would be involved as part of a large coalition and, hopefully, French troops would be used according to their strength. When France had enemies at its borders, they had the army and the ammunitions required for a full war effort. While it would take years for France to build up its industrial capacities and manpower for a large war, it can do it, and probably faster than a country like Germany as it stands because its political structure is better set up for war.
Good point about air support in Serval/Barkhane. And yes, French officers are very well educated and great to talk to. I've always enjoyed my conversations with the ones I've met.
What I'm a little afraid of is the notion that that every big war would be fought in a coalition because it can tempt the individual nations to become "lazy". Every European Nato member I can think of (maby with the exception of Poland) plans to build a small, highly professional military force that relys on contract soldiers, perfectly executed missions and extremely expensive and high-tech weapons systems in very low numbers. This approach is very attractive to sell to the public for sure, but if I remember correctly, Germany has artillery ammonition for less then a week of full scale conflict and during operations in Libya, France and Britain needed a resupply of ammonition from the US as well. Now imagine a worst case scenario where the US is involved in a total war with China and Russia trys the the goth land scenario or some similar shenanigans the baltic states, I'm sure Britain, France and Germany would give them hell... For about a week or two before we collectively realize that we all wanted to play the same role and no one brought the millions of conscripts and grenades the others relied on
The british way of war is if they lose they retreat on their island and wait for the americans to come hahahaha
Very interesting video. However, I think that your analysis only takes into account the way France manages asymmetric conflicts. The concept of GTIA and SGTIA also follows this logic of rapid deployment of forces that recent external operations (Afghanistan and Africa) required. However, I think that in the context of a conventional war, these structures would be different. Of course, the mentality remains the same (audacity, maneuver, initiative). But I think that for example on the question of firepower, the problem is more budgetary and political than doctrinal. In the last two world wars, French artillery was present (one of the only positive points in 1940, by the way). It is also Pétain who summarizes this: ""The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.""
Finally, a point that I think has been forgotten but which is important. The notion of rusticity. The French army has always been based on this idea of rusticity where we do not rely on a dependence on comfort that we do not have (contrary to the Americans) and therefore we push as far as possible the little that we have.
With respect, sir, it's a little bit strange to hear you talk about Camerone without making a comparison with the Alamo.
Because it seems to me that in terms of glorious defeat and romanticism... There's something to celebrate there. I hope the American military doesn't despise this battle.
There's little remembrance of Alamo here, and plus it wasn't the US Army, I don't think. Not quite the same level of nostalgia.
Very interesting, didn't know much about French warfare despite their lengthy tradition. I do question the constant references to Clausewitz, but no references to Napoleon. Strange that France produces one of the greatest military leaders in history, and people focus on a German instead. Did Napoleon truly leave no writings worth considering in this analysis?
Napoleon’s memorial is a propaganda text. Saying this clausewitz tales about Napoleon a lot ;)
The French have studied Napoleon's campaigns in detail, like every one else. And his writing. But from what I understand, much of what he wrote was sort of BS. So everyone, French included, lean heavily on interpreters of Napoleon, the two most important being Clausewitz and Jomini.
French military deployment is tied to limited funds provided by the politics (for various budget and political reasons) hence the 4 césar in mali. Up to Macron, all previous political leader were very "shy" on that which create additionnal issues, an artillery commander at the beginning of the Ukraine war said "we never deployed an entire artillery company and at this point i don't know if we would know how".
Your analysis is missing for me a crucial point, the political one, the GTIA, the "let's do with what we have" is derivated from the politics, giving the bare minimum to save as much as possible.
As for the romantic defeats, it's not about victory or defeat, it's about the tenacity of the french soldier.
Thank you, Dr. Shurkin. Bat-shit crazy is an interesting description. My first thought was that French doctrine requires the regular supply of French "Captain Americas", who can perform military magic, with style and panache. Or cloning Napoleon in large numbers (which might actually be possible). All three militaries that you mention: French, American and Russian, are all still fighting World War 2. With the French still using the guerrilla tactics of the French Resistance. Patton and Zhukov are still in command.
En vous écoutant, on se rend compte combien les armées françaises et russes sont à l'opposée l'une de l'autre. D'un côté, une armée qui privilégie vitesse, légèreté et autonomie sur le terrain, face à une armée qui ne possède pas de sous-officiers et qui au contraire favorise l'envoi massive de troupes sur le terrain, avec un appui d'artillerie important. En revanche, cela se traduit par un manque de réactivité sur le terrain et une certain lenteur dans les manoeuvres. De plus, l'industrie russe dont on annonçait la débâcle imminente a montré une capacité surprenante à augmenter sa production et à approvisionner ses troupes.Enfin, l'armée russe est adossée à sa frontière et peut donc très facilement transférer la production de ses usines sur le terrain, ce qui dans le cas des Européens de l'ouest pourraient s'avérer une véritable gageure. C'est pour ça qu'une guerre entre les deux armées pourraient s'avérer une tâche quasi impossible pour une armée française loin de ses bases. Autant, je pense que les officiers et les soldats français sont largement mieux entrainés que les troupes russes, même si après 3 ans de guerre, elles sont particulièrement aguerries, autant la logistique pourrait s'avérer un véritable cauchemar.
Thanks for this great video. I have one question on the GTIA/SGTIA concept. Did you feel any second thoughts about that in French circles given the not so good performance of the Russian version of the concept at the beginning of Ukraine war? While the French army has extensively used these structures in overseas intervention, there is no track record against a peer adversary. Also, thanks for linking effet majeur to the indirect approach, but arguably at a more tactical level.
I'm pretty sure the GTIA/SGTIA thing was expressely designed to facilitate overseas projection.Lots of what is described in this video is more relevant to post cold war/non conscript army France, France wouldn't fight Russia like they fought Jihadists.What France loose in aversion to firepower they gain in liberal nuclear doctrine, declasified USSR documents showed that French nuclear deterence was extremely effective on the soviets and that is for good reason.
GTIA are for projection and oversea interventions during asymmetrical warfares or in coalition. For continental war, France use mass mobilization and war economy.
Macron spoke at the Eurosatory exhibition on June 13, 2022 about war economy. He directed the military and manufacturers to "anticipate and invest now in their production tools... produce more and faster". Ramping up some production like ammunition, AA missiles, artillery guns etc.
They would send GTIAs to fight Russians, but much more amply provided with firepower than what they sent to Mali. They sent armor SGTIAs to Estonia and Romania. Leclercs + VBCI.
No, I think GTIAs are standard and will remain so. Remember, they can be made heavier or lighter, as requirements dictate. Now, I have no idea when they started doing the GTIA thing.
I read on wiki (sorry!) that contrary to French GTIA, Commonwealth Brigade Groups and US BCTs, Russian BTGs were more or less thought as permanent units, at least in their skeletal organization, and given that Poutine's reforms were not over when he (prematurely) invaded Ukraine, if they should share the same advantages on the paper, they lacked in practice any reserve and logistics from the next echelon (brigade or division administrative levels). When they started loosing specialists and suppliers, they were quite disorganized, instead of being immediately (if temporarily, and to some extent) reinforced by their non existing parent units. Is this understanding correct?
starts at 6:20
Ah !
If you now take a look at the Italian armed forces and make a video on them, MY LIFE IS YOURS!
ruclips.net/video/vh4e6EmqC4I/видео.html
During my time in the American Army (70's) a popular refrain was to refer to the French as "Cheese eating surrender Monkeys" and the jokes about the French were equally mean spirited and inaccurate. My compatriots too often confuse French soldiers with the French government. Have no bouts adout it , French soldiers can fight.
Well, in vietnam, Irak, Afghanistan or Somalie, pretty sure that refrain was not much popular…
@@Boblaure32459 Copy that, Brother.
C est très intéressant merci. Je ne pense pas que les russes prendront le risque un jour de combattre les français car nous avons l arme nucléaire. Donc il me semble que c est très théorique comme scénario et je ne pense pas que du coup notre armée soit fondée sur cette hypothèse de combat conventionnel contre les russes.
C'est vrai.
Dans la doctrine de dissuasion actuelle, si la France est entrainée dans une guerre contre la Russie par le jeu des alliances et qu'une partie de ses forces déportées entre en contact avec les forces ennemies, le principe de défense des "intérêts vitaux" n'est pas évident, et je ne pense pas que la dissuasion nucléaire inclue ce cas de figure. Songez que si nous avons abandonné nos armes nucléaires de théâtre et tactiques (missiles sol-sol Pluton et Hadès, les petits modèles de bombes), contrairement je crois aux Anglais et aux États-uniens, c'est pour précisément ne pas avoir à faire ce choix, et pour crédibiliser l'extrême violence de la doctrine de destruction mutuelle assurée, vu la petite taille de notre territoire métropolitain.
Si une puissance nucléaire attaque un intérêt français non critique, je doute que la France réplique (ou menace de répliquer) avec l'arme nucléaire. Ne pas être en mesure de monter une réplique conventionnelle dissuasive, c'est accepter la perte de tout intérêt non critique. Cela fait beaucoup... Y compris des alliés que la France déclare protéger (par ex. Estonie, Roumanie).
@@FabGreg oui effectivement. Dans cas-la c est vrai que ça paraît justifié de se demander si on a la masse nécessaire. 🙏
Fascinating.
Keep thinking about French military history as I listen to this - thinking that this explains, for example, the offensives in Alsace Lorraine in 1914 and the appalling casualties.
I also thought about the critique of the German army (1914-1945 in particular, but perhaps more generally) about Operational excellence (and associated with this usually Tactical excellence) but that lack of an overarching Strategy or Grand Strategy this was all in service of.
Yes, it’s all brilliant and might sort out a limited dispute. But when you run into the Soviets or Chinese, it’s all really just a recipe for losing gloriously as your ground into dust. Shades of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Kaisers Army in 1918 or the Wehrmacht in 1941-42 - at some point Operational Excellence is just futile when you face a determined enemy with overwhelming resources of men, material, time and space. The French army harkening back to 1944-45 is absurd, they were an irrelevant appendage (albeit a brave and dashing one) that ultimately relied on the resources of America and the British Empire to prevail.
I get that no one wants to go back to France of 1939-40, but how do the French see summer and fall of 1918? This was the last time a French dominated effort (albeit with considerable support from the US and British Empire) won a major war. French leadership and inspiration, audacity, offensive spirit, etc. were all important in defeating the Kaiser’s army here - by my understanding is that it was also utterly dependent on overwhelming material superiority delivering a never ending series of blows which the exhausted German army could survive. Is examining this seen as opening an intellectual door to 1939-40 defeatism? Or do the French see or explain it otherwise? Because, unless the French can say how their doctrine will produce victory in circumstances like 1918 or 1944-45, then the French army really is just a glorified colonial army that will not matter all that much in Great Power struggles. In other words, why didn’t they go for a Finnish option with a small standing army but massive reserve potential to deal with another national crisis.
A second point, is why do the French always start with Napoleon? From 1214 on (excepting arguable a couple of decades in the mid 14 and early 15th century) until 1870 the French army was the dominant force in Europe. It was their army, its training and tactical methods, its mode of recruiting, its financial and military bureaucracy which set the standard and it was French innovations in these which other nations copied. Is it a Republican thing (which can encompass the Empire) which sees no value in the Ancient Regime as providing any useful lessons?
Before 1944, only the soviets really were relevant agaisnt germany.
Dont forget all the french intel provide btw, or all the french serving in the BEF.
"Defeatism" after the german crushed the franco english lines is understandable by : we were defeated. Simple as that. As french soldiers were saying talking about material during first battle of france : "too few, too late."
The army was pushing for mecanization and full armored division in 34/35. The chamber refused the credits for, budget restriction logic. We started in 36/37. To late.
About french military history before napoleon, you are more than right. But as its not modern, we tend to not talk about it. Napoleon era organisation, tactics and strategy are in someway still in use. Middle age ones arent.
Oui question de soutien les Etats Unis ont amenés des soldats grippés du kansas résultats 20 millions de morts . quand aux britanniques ils ont la mémoire courte la bataille de la Sommes a été un désastre , en 1940 c'est grâce à sa situation géographique que les britanniques n'ont pas été envahis c'est simplement une île . faut il rappeler que l'armée britannique a été aussi vaincu par les allemands leurs rembarquement de Dunkerque est une retraite un désastre après 15 jours de combats . actuellement le Royaume Unis est le porte avions des Etats Unis
This video, and all the videos on this channel are great! I feel like you should be teaching a class.
I appreciate it!
The French Army has audacity but it lacks logistics and manpower for a real war. Amunition also is a real problem + it does not have military exercises on a level of large units.
Une seule question : que vaudrait l'armée française (ou ce qu'il en reste) face à une agression brutale telle l'agression russe en Ukraine ? Les Ukrainiens tiennent depuis 3 ans : où puisent-ils cette résilience ? J'ai des doutes sur la résistance française, vautrée dans sa culture de l'apéro et des congés payés...
Vous nous montrerez...
C'est une question qui ne sert à rien de se poser du fait que l'on possède l'arme atomique : si le pays est menacé à ce point on a la capacité de totalement détruire instantanément l'ennemi et si celui-ci est capable de faire la même chose, il y aura destruction mutuelle totale et donc aucune résistance possible.
Les Ukrainiens ont tenus car ils ont eu accès aux stocks de l OTAN.
From what it sounds like the French value mobility far more than shock but without a break in an enemy line or ability to hold ground mobility is not possible. I think going forward the American’s new divisional composition of defensive, breakthrough and exploitation divisions will prove the future of peer to peer conflicts.
The French have talked for years about a Euro centric army but unless they have the political and economic power to become a multi capable force they’ll just be an exploitation (maneuver) element as a part of a US lead coalition.
Regardless, I think most current western systems are just relics of the GWOT.
We are pushing for european independance capability. Sadly, we are a voice among the others inside EU. Others have their view, we are force to compose with. And their goal isnt independance at all.
Thats why EU will never be independant. And thats why we will leave it soon or later.
Is it good to have Ally exposing french militaries processes on RUclips!
En des temps si sombres : - (
Did you already do the italian way of war?
If not, could you please do It?
I'd love to see your intersting and clear explanation about modern italy's way of war
You're presupposing that there is such a thing as an Italian doctrine of war 😳
I'd love to, but I'm not sure if there is one. Meaning, I know that Italy has a strong intellectual tradition re: military strategy. French guys like Coutau-Bégarie write a lot about it. But I have no idea if any of that has any influence in any way on how the contemporary Army thinks about anything. The same thing is true of Germany. There's tons of talk of a German Way of War, but I have yet to determine if all that pre-1945 stuff has any influence on the contemporary Bundeswehr, even if all its commanders in the beginning were ex-Wehrmacht.
Vous auriez pu, vous référer au « programme Scorpion » (qui sera à terme remplacé par le « programme Titan ») qui relie tous les corps d’armées, ceci pour aussi bien une bataille que pour une guerre. L’essence même réside dans la communication entre tous les corps d’armées et a les faire évoluer ensemble sur un même objectif.
Un fantassin pourra interagir avec un « Rafale », un char » Leclerc » un véhicule blindé, ou bien une batterie de missiles ou bien pour finir avec un navire de la marine nationale ! Ce programme redéfini la donne au sujet de notre armée et « peut être » de son efficacité future, ou pas ! La France est le pays qui a gagnée le plus de guerre et de batailles, dans le monde. Selon l'historien Niall Ferguson, la France est la puissance militaire la plus victorieuse de l'Histoire. Elle a participé à 50 des 125 grandes guerres européennes qui ont eu lieu depuis 1495, soit plus que tout autre État européen.
Oui, je peux faire un video entier sur SCORPION et Titan. Un jour. Mais ce qui est important, ce sont les idées du GEN Hubin. warontherocks.com/2021/02/kill-the-homothetic-army-gen-guy-hubins-vision-of-the-future-battlefield/
@@michaelshurkin613 Merci pour votre réponse. Ce qui me dérange, quand même, c'est la date de parution de votre article de référence " February 4, 2021".
Je reconnais que votre travail est hyper intérressant, et je vous remercie aussi d'en avoir fait une vidéo.
Mais regardez ce qui se passe actuellement en Ukraine, l'inventivité ukrainienne à changée la donne quand à la façon d'aborder les guerres actuelles (choses qui n'existait pas quand le général de Brigade Guy Hubin, a écrit ses livres. (le dernier livre remonte aux années 2012). Les drones a 100€, entre autre, capables d'exploser un char T90 Russe n'étaient pas en services et ont certainement changés la donne dans les états majors du monde entier, y compriy la France!
Also, something thats been true for a very long time and that seems crazy to the anglo-saxons, we fight for honour. That explains all the arty part, the love for risk, the focus on attack, the celebration of glorious defeats transformed in spiritual victories etc.
The English ship commander who captured Duguay-Trouin (in 1694 ?) insisted on that « we, English, fight for honour while you, French, fight for money » to which DT replied « true, we all fight for what we miss most »
@@StephLudwigsurcouf*, not duguay drouin
@ indeed it is often assigned to Surcouf but it is not from him as it happened in the Indian Ocean where Surcouf never went to.
@@StephLudwigRobert Surcouf was active in the Indian Ocean, where he gained fame as a privateer. After joining the French Navy, he began his most notable privateering career in the late 18th century, primarily operating in the waters around the Indian Ocean. He famously captured several British merchant ships and warships, particularly around the coasts of Mauritius, Reunion, and the Bay of Bengal.
Surcouf's most celebrated victory occurred in 1806, when he captured the East Indiaman ship Kent, a heavily armed British vessel, off the coast of India. This victory made him one of the most renowned privateers of the period and a national hero in France.
His exploits in the Indian Ocean were a significant part of his legacy, where he engaged in numerous battles with the British Royal Navy and merchants during the Napoleonic Wars.
@ Duguay however claims he was the author in his « mémoires » released in 1740, ie 4 years after his death. But it is not so important. Have a good day