Street Epistemologist vs Professional Philosopher - Can we know that God exists?
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- Опубликовано: 18 сен 2024
- Professional philosopher Tyler McNabb will be dialoguing with Street Epistemologist Hunter Glenn on whether we can know that God exists.
What is Street Epistemology? Read this: capturingchrist...
Website: capturingchrist...
Patreon: / capturingchristianity
It seems to me that Hunter is right in what he said at the end. Hunter raises the problem of believing X on the basis of a seeming if one also believes that the seeming is equally likely whether or not X is true. I think the reformed epistemologist can and should agree. If you believe in God on the basis of an internal sense that meets the standards of proper function, you might then infer that the basis of your belief is NOT equally likely whether or not God exists. Yet, if you have some reason to think it IS equally likely, then it seems to me you have a defeater for trusting the internal sense. (Technically, I don't think Tyler said anything incompatible with this point.)
Its rational for adults to reason the same way as dogs and babies
Really enjoyed that Cameron. Was not sure why you interrupted near the end, really felt like they were doing a great job clarifying and coming to a true understanding of what the other was saying. Either way, really enjoyed the discussion.
The question of whether the sensus divinitatis is as likely to be present if God exists as it is if God does not exist seems to be impossible without begging the question.
How does one go about analyzing that probability on those two conditions?
1:35:07 Tyler says God's knowledge must be understood analogically. I suppose God's designing must also be understood analogically. If that's the case, I wonder if this kind of God can account for the design plan required for warrant. In other words, is "design plan" in the analogical sense good enough?
There are perfectly warranted beliefs that in fact turn out to be wrong. Prior to the Copernican revolution people were perfectly warranted in believing in the Ptolemaic system. It actually described the workings of the heavens quite well.
It seems like the bulk of this conversation was the two of them trying to decide whether rational justification or probability to determine the truth of a belief was more important.
Tyler, what are your reasons to believe that our faculties were designed to assess fundamental nature of events outside of our universe or supernatural interventions?
OMG! Worst arguments ever; both folks.
There is no reason McNabb or anyone else should take Davidson's "Swamp Tyler" seriously.
If the argument is formally T = T', then logically you have to consider Leibniz and the "indiscernibility of identicals" and the "identity of indiscernibles". That is, there's no way to suggest, even by design, that T isn't T' and bestowed with all features, honors, and respects as T. So, whether T or T' are designed is irrelevant by virtue of how both function. He's smuggling in design. This however is the former issue, but on the issue of identity, we cannot allow as in the former that T is just reeeeeeallllllly like T' and not get around to saying what is different between them -- that difference is all that could make a difference to "Swamp Tyler's" beliefs et. al.). As an ontological matter of identity, if T = T' just in case in every aspect, then T' is simply one and the same entity, T.
The SE guy isn't even worth the time engaging, and McNabb, only to remind him that he knows better (or should) about his "design" smuggling.
How do you then discern that T=T at any point in time? There are no exactly similar things in this universe or are there? My issue with many christians regarding this is that they promote and cling to a worldview in which T=T,, always, exactly, unconditionally, definitively because it gives them a sense of security and righteousness towards themselves and reality. 2+2=4 applied to everything.
The christian philosopher beats around the bush; There are perceptions and interpretations. if a child perceives a shadow and interprets it to be a monster we do not pander to it, and say that because he interprets the perceived shadow to be a monster, this interpretation of perception is likely proof of a fact, and that he has likely or truly encountered a monster. At times, in certain cases, the child is not so different from a christian. In other words not perception or interpretation of such, but namely functional interpretation, as the street epistimologist said, determines what is factual truth; what is fact. " I just know it exists because it just feels right or convincing to me due to my emotional experience" is not a logical substantiation for a fact.
The biggest source of confusion in this discussion seems to be centered around the idea that 1st person, subjective experiences, which are not able (at least not with ease) to be adduced in some sort of Bayesian calculation, can possibly, nevertheless, provide warrant and, thereby, justification for a belief even if there is no empirical evidence for--or even if there is a positive presence of empirical evidence against--such a belief. This seems to indicate that there are *at least* two sources of warrant, or paths to justification, namely, 1st person, subjective experiences (in the absence of standing defeaters) and empirical evidence. This means that when the "street epistemologist" kept saying that there was no evidence for the belief of X person, and the philosopher (as well as C.C.) kept pointing out that there was a "seeming", the street epistemologist erred. Evidence is anything which ought to provide warrant for a belief. Certain 1st person, subject experiences ought to provide warrant for certain beliefs. Therefore, 1st person, subjective experiences are evidence for certain beliefs.
There seems to be much confusion about warrant, justification, knowledge, epistemological (subjective/personal) probability, ontological (classical) probability, evidence, (edit: properly basic belief), etc. If we could just hammer out these definitions before the debate/discussion, or at least very early on, then I think both sides would benefit greatly. Unless I'm wrong somehow, which I very well may be, explanations such as these would remove the need for hours of dialogue and are, therefore, crucial to make early on in the discussion.
The christian philosopher beats around the bush; There are perceptions and interpretations. if a child perceives a shadow and interprets it to be a monster we do not pander to it, and say that because he interprets the perceived shadow to be a monster, this interpretation of perception is likely proof of a fact, and that he has likely or truly encountered a monster. At times, in certain cases, the child is not so different from a christian. In other words not perception or interpretation of such, but namely functional interpretation, as the street epistimologist said, determines what is factual truth; what is fact. " I just know it exists because it just feels right or convincing to me due to my emotional experience" is not a logical substantiation for a fact.
@@ronnywijngaarde7555 There is some confusion here.
*"if a child perceives a shadow and interprets it to be a monster we do not pander to it, and say that because he interprets the perceived shadow to be a monster, this interpretation of perception is likely proof of a fact, and that he has likely or truly encountered a monster."*
Yet, if an adult says that he encountered a bear, then it is a different story. We're not talking about children who do not yet know how to reason very well and we are not talking about claims of something existing for which there is zero evidence, even in the form of argumentation. Now, that is, of course, disputed. The evidence needs to be dealt with before you can liken it to claims of monsters. Likely you weren't saying that the monster bit was analogous, but I point this out just in case.
*"At times, in certain cases, the child is not so different from a christian. In other words not perception or interpretation of such, but namely functional interpretation, as the street epistimologist said, determines what is factual truth; what is fact. " I just know it exists because it just feels right or convincing to me due to my emotional experience" is not a logical substantiation for a fact."*
At this point I honestly don't remember what he said about functional interpretation, so you might have to remind me, but I don't know any Christian that makes this claim. Let's put it this way, if Christians have an experience of God, then they are rational to believe that God exists on the basis of that experience, correct? Nobody is claiming that emotions and feelings are proper experiences and seemings. The point is just that experiences and seemings are a basis to hold some beliefs.
@@Real_LiamOBryan
Hi, thanks for responding!
Many children or teenagers are better at reasoning than adults. Many adults, namely religious ones, do not reason well or sincerely when reasoning about faith, God, or morality. As such there are adults that confuse shadows or people for monsters as well, in which case their interpretation alone does not make it so, which is my point.
Why does it matter wether or not you personaly happen to know a christian that makes certain claims? Do you deny that certain if not many christians do assume that God exists because they believe he does? There is a difference between believing something to be fact, and assuming it is fact, only because you believe it, purely because the idea appeals to you, but they make no such distinction, anything sacred and familiair becomes truth, which then often becomes fact, in their reasoning.
Experiences are a basis to hold beliefs, sure, indeed. But they are not a basis for claiming unsubstantiated facts regarding those beliefs. So, your beliefs could, be factual, but your beliefs are not a substantiation for any fact, they are not a means to confirm that a belief, is also a fact, if it is at all.
A moving spiritual experience, is not automatically proof of fact. The child or adult can interpret a perception as a monster, with a sense of great horror, however this does not mean or prove he or she has literally engaged with a monster.
@@ronnywijngaarde7555 *"Many children or teenagers are better at reasoning than adults."*
That doesn't interact with my point that we are not talking about the same things when we are talking about an adult believing in something that there is some argumentation and evidence in support of it and an adolescent believing in something for which there is no argumentation or evidence in support of it.
*"Many adults, namely religious ones, do not reason well or sincerely when reasoning about faith, God, or morality."*
I don't agree. Do you have any evidence for this claim? Non-theists seem just as likely to reason sloppily on these topics. I'm not saying that theists don't reason sloppily sometimes. I just don't see any reason to think that theists do so any more than non-theists do relative to their percentage of the population.
*"As such there are adults that confuse shadows or people for monsters as well, in which case their interpretation alone does not make it so, which is my point."*
That's true, but it's trivial. Everybody agrees, at least every reasonable person, that interpretation of an experience doesn't make said interpretation true. Who says anything like that?
*"Do you deny that certain if not many christians do assume that God exists because they believe he does?"*
I wouldn't put it like that, because I don't think that makes any sense, but I would agree that certain people just pick and choose beliefs (including, but not limited to, Christians) based on what they like and what they feel; however, that is not what the conversation is about regarding experiencing God, so I don't see what that has to do with anything. If your point was merely that some Christians, like some atheists, say, do, and believe some stupid things, and we should not just let them say, do, and believe stupid things, then maybe I would agree.
*"Experiences are a basis to hold beliefs, sure, indeed. But they are not a basis for claiming unsubstantiated facts regarding those beliefs."*
Who said that they were, though? The video is about knowing that God is real, not showing that God is real. The question is not are experiences a good tool for apologetics. The question is can we know that God exists. We can know that God exists if we experience Him, I'm not claiming here that we do, but that has nothing to do with making claims based on that belief.
*"A moving spiritual experience, is not automatically proof of fact. The child or adult can interpret a perception as a monster, with a sense of great horror, however this does not mean or prove he or she has literally engaged with a monster."*
And that has nothing to do with whether or not theists are rational in believing in God on the basis of a veridical experience. The Christian would agree that some things that are put forward as experiences of God are not truly experiences of God. In case you aren't aware, Christian make outrageous claims about God all the time. God told me to sleep around although I'm married. God told me that I need to quit my job and become a full-time drunkard. God told me to kill my dog and my neighbors dog. Of course, some people even really believe they have had experiences of God when they haven't. Misinterpretations of experiences, false claims of experiences, experiences which are themselves falsidical... None of these things has anything to do with the properly basic nature of of beliefs based on experiences.
@@Real_LiamOBryan
Ok. A summary of your replies:
" It's not true, I disagree, I am not familiair with those facts. "
What is, your point sir? I did not say or imply that one cannot or can know God exists, or that theists cannot be right, I criticise their common reasoning regarding facts.
You say that the examples I gave have nothing, to do with the way theists reason?
How do you come to that conclusion? Plenty of theists reason as I set forth in my example; " I feel and believe it to be true so it is fact".
You have to logically explain why my examples have "nothing" to do with theists, you can't just make the claim, state it as fact and be done with it.
I consistently interact with you points and then you just deny it without giving a logical basis for the denial. Substantiate your claims, logically with logical reasoning, common facts or examples.
I will give an example of common illogical theist reasoning;
"God is my creator and God loves me, therefore I ought to worship him."
1:23:46 to 1:23:53 What about cogito and being appeared to redly?
It’s helpful to see how the courts determine what is true. They start from what’s called the ‘presumption of innocence.’ Defendants are innocent until proven guilty. Defendants do not have to prove their innocence. Their innocence is presupposed. The starting point for the courts is to presume a claim is not true. It’s the job of the prosecution to prove something is true beyond reasonable doubt. In the same way, we should start with a presupposition that God does not exist (Atheism). It is not the Atheist’s job to prove that God does not exist, rather it’s the job of the Christian apologist to prove Yahweh exists beyond reasonable doubt.
That's not how philosophical dialogue works. Whoever is making a claim has a burden of proof, and debates are structured around whether certain propositions are true or false.
And why should we apply the rules and methods of a court of law to anything outside of a court of law? There's a lot of silly and illogical procedure that gets tolerated in courts that only make sense in the context of a court.
@@Jimmy-iy9pl Hi Jimmy, I’m struggling to see how the two are not analogous. Whether someone is making a philosophical claim (God can break the laws of logic), a legal claim (John is guilty of tax fraud), or your best friend is claiming to have a billion dollars in his bank account; all of these claims have, as you said, a burden of proof.
Metaphysically, a claim is either true or false. Epistemologically, we can either know or believe a claim to be true or false with various degrees of certainty based upon the available evidence. The more extravagant the claim, the more we demand evidence. If you claim to know the earth is flat, Yahweh exists, the Bible is true, the Book of Mormon is true, the Quran is true, or that Mohammed is the prophet of Allah, then it is up to you to prove this/these claims with evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Within structured debates you have a proposition side who is primarily using reasons supported by evidence for the judges to adopt the resolution. The oppositions job is to refute the evidence brought forth by the proposition. In fact, structured debates are excellent training grounds for future lawyers within the court room setting. I also see the benefit of applying rules or methods in one discipline to other disciplines. We do this with the scientific method for instance.
It's interesting Tyler says we cannot know god and then proceeds to claim what can and cannot be applied to god--he doesn't have faculties, design plans, knowledge, parts, multiple properties, etc.
But don't worry, he's "professional philosopher".....
We cannot know God in the sense that we can't imagine empty space. Imagining a being without form and with infinite knowledge is beyond our faculties.
@@PHDinADHD ... it could be rational, but all the same, can't be seen as truth-bearing in the sense he would have to admit it's not an empirical claim.
in that case, any value there would be instrumental and wouldn't be tied to the factuality of anything, just what the idea itself does for us.
to me, that's a more damning admission than claiming god is completely unknowable ... it implies god is completely irrelevant to the human enterprise.
@@Pngiaca It is called apophatic language, google it you ignorant atheist Neanderthal. The concept has been around since the Neo-Platonists.
Is it just me, or what almost all of this discussion about beliefs? Where was the discussion about how someone who believes in a god could "Know" it?
Yes, he certainly does seem to believe that. I just wish he had gotten to the knowing part.
@@BrendaCreates I don't think anything was "destroyed" here for anyone. It was a discussion and it seemed pretty reasonable.
@@BrendaCreates I personally feel like that is an assumption.
I made it to the swamp. I’m out.
Tylers positions seems to me to be: "I can know something to be true because of my internal feelings about it." Hunter correctly points out many times the problems with this, mainly that that with that position you can feel something is true whether or not is actually is true. So it is plainly obviously that this position cannot lead to Knowledge, because there is no way to determine which condition the person actually is in at any time (feeling something is true that really is true, or feeling something is true that really is not true).
His position is a little more informed and nuanced than that. He’s also a fallibilist (that was stated toward the end).
If he is a fallibilist, then the answer to "Can we know god exists" is simply, No. The entirety of this discussion was spent on beliefs, not knowledge. If he could be wrong about his claim, then in what sense does he know it to be true? Seems like this could be a semantics issue of what we are using "know" to express. If "know" is used as "I strongly believe", then who cares. The title of this would more accurately have been, IMO, "Can we have rationally justified beliefs in a gods existence."
How can one know things to be true then? How does one acquire knowledge?
"Hunter correctly points out many times the problems with this, mainly that that with that position you can feel something is true whether or not is actually is true. So it is plainly obviously that this position cannot lead to Knowledge."
Maybe I did not understand this point, but it seems clearly false. Take P to be the belief that - I am typing on a computer. I feel like it is true that P. I would feel this way whether it is true that I am or not. Maybe P is true, maybe I am a brain in a vat. It is not obvious that feeling that P is true cannot lead to knowledge that P. Surely I know P and surely it feels like P is true. Furthermore, some would say that all I based my belief that P on was that it feels like P is true. Maybe you mean "...this position cannot lead to *objective probability."
But let me know if I am missing something or if I did not understand the point.
Barry: One cannot objectively know anything to be true, in my opinion, except for ones own existence. I believe Decartes had something to say on this....
Know? No. Believe? Yes.
It seems that Hunter is actually saying more than he's admitting when he says "Beliefs that are more likely to be true are more likely to be true." If that's all he is saying, then why should anyone, under this position, care to find out whether a belief is more likely to be true than not? What would be the reason for doing so? Finding out that something is more likely to be true cannot be, itself, the end goal. Then, there would be no reason to go beyond that and accept such a belief.
I imagine it's because he thinks it's rational to hold beliefs that are more likely to be true, given his method of inference.
Its because he is likely under the impression that the best way to believe the most true things is to tend to believe the things that are most likely to be true.
Brenda, the question is, does *Hunter* think it is rational to hold beliefs that are unlikely to be true?
Pngiaca, but that doesn't answer why anyone should care to hold beliefs that are shown to be more likely true than not. If words like rational, warranted and justified are of no significance to someone like Hunter, then why *should* anyone hold to beliefs that are shown to be more likely true than their counterparts?
Slaughter: I do not believe that there is any objectively true reason to care about believing in true things. If someone personally does not care if what they believe to be true, is more likely to be true than to be false, then more power to them. From a subjective point of view, I personally feel that the most people believing in the most true things is what is best for our society, and leads to the most usefull progress. But I recognize that is my opinion.
The problem with discussions like this, and the reason I am done after 13 minutes of listening, is when a person is allowed to ramble on without having to establish agreed upon premises along the path. In the case of Tyler here, he is allowed to carry on with a diatribe which carries no weight do to unresponded questions, like, Davidson's swamp thought experiment, it is so full of assumption and holes that it just holds zero validity. Just skipping around on lily pads in the pond without connecting any dots. Philosophical chest beating....No fun to listen to.
I did skip ahead looking for some SE talk and did not find any.
This would have been much better as an SE back and forth.
It does become more of a back and forth. However its really just two hours of semantic disputes.
Can you be more specific? Where has he been bigoted, difficult to work with, given advantages to Christian apologists or been uncharitable towards opponents? Feel free to share links with time markers or anything else to support your case. Thanks!
Can you give me an example? What argument did they make and what was the refutation? I've been following their page since they had around 300 likes so I'm probably familiar with most if not all of their content.
Those are refutations? Really? On naturalism evil doesn't exist so I'm not sure it explains anything at all. Naturalist attempts to account for why people have moral notions in the first place is what has been an abject failure of speculation. Your number three is just plain ignorance. You are parroting Richard Carrier. Honestly I've seen all of these silly arguments from atheists on there numerous times, and as long as the interlocutor is polite they are welcomed to stay.
Barry from this atheists point of view those are all valid refutations. Apparently in the 3rd example here you are not seeing the term naturalism in the same light as us "atheists".
How can you possibly dispute the possibility that Taylor's statement that they could have been visions or for that matter fables? Faith? Is that it?
Not accepting a god belief has nothing to do with the first two refutations. Because you believe attempts to explain are failures, could it be you don't understand them?
BTW. If you could try to view this in the same way as if it were coming from a Hindhu defending Vishnu maybe that would help.
just because Carrier makes a point that you are not comprehending does not mean it is being parroted. It holds substantial logic without authorship.
What do you think a world would look like without good and evil? They are two sides of the same coin and cannot exist sans the other.
In a world where there is no thinking agency would be the only place good and evil do not exist. So they are primary to a conscious mind that can evaluate what is good or bad for the situation at hand. Nothing more than that need be expected.