Thanks so much for the quick Ethics lesson. I've only been teaching this stuff for a decade or so (including Religious Studies classes), so finally having someone straighten me out about what they think secular ethics is capable of, and about what the Biblical teachings are on the dignity of the created human being, is really helpful.
@05sn Well. . . I see it as a false dilemma -- as any Christian Platonist (which I am) has to. So, if you want to call it a "solution" to the dilemma, it would run more or less like this: God is in fact the goodness in which other goodnesses in one way or another participate. Goodness does depend on God's will in a sense, but God wills precisely what God does because of the divine nature -- so it's not as if God is somehow constrained by a Goodness "beyond" or "above" God
It imposes a choice between two possibilities, presented as exhaustive (those two possibilities are presented as the ONLY ones) and as mutually exclusive (they can't both be true). One classical way of addressing the issue is to focus on the divine nature (the works only with monotheistic views, I'd think), and say God chooses/loves/approves of the good precisely because it flows from the divine nature. Good still remains good, not merely dependent upon the will or arbitrary choice of God
I truly appreciate you uploading this. My teacher (same dilemma) didn't spend too much time on it and expected us to write a paper worth 50% of our grade on it. Without this video, I wouldn't of known what to do! Thank you very much!
I'm glad you enjoy these videos. As to the ideas you're asking me about, I'd say three things: 1) they're interesting 2) they don't have that much to do with Plato or the Euthyphro, which is what I'd prefer to discuss here 3) they'd be good to discuss in a variety of other forums -- maybe I'll make a video response
You're quite welcome. I'd agree that there's plenty who think morality is merely subjective. I have to admit to being puzzled why you would say that feeding the poor can't be determined to be a good thing from a deontological perspective (Kant actually discusses such benevolence) or from a Utilitarian perspective (Bentham discusses it as well), or why you'd put a divine command theory (which seems to be what you're advocating in the previous post) in with those others.
"Pious" and "piety" are what Socrates and Euthyphro are trying to define in the dialogue. Yes, those are ways of expressing the two options. I think you should probably read the dialogue and watch the whole video, and then your questions will be answered
i definitely wish you had some online "practice test" i feel part of the class already. i wonder how immersed i truly am though. by the way, i subscribed before watching because i love ancient Greek philosophy and those who feel the same.
They had -- at least most of them -- but Marist students are bit more difficult to get talking, to get to assert a position. Very nice students, but a bit prone to a passivity that is very much like politeness. So, I try to prompt them, to get them started. Some days are easier to get a conversation going than others
Well, that's certainly true -- he not only wants what he intends to do to be pious, but also wants it to be recognized as such, against the more commonsensical view of his fellow citizens. You might say that he wants to have things both ways -- if what E is doing is ok because the gods did similarly, and therefore like that sort of thing, but it's not morally good, that looks and feels bad for him. But, if he tries to reason things out, what he's doing no longer seems like its even pious!
Sure, all of those are possibilities -- in fact, when we get to discussing other issues in Philosophy of Religion, we talk about those thematically. For this Intro class, though, I try to resist the temptation as a prof to throw too many issues or ideas at them -- perhaps unsuccessfully
Well, as always when reading these kind of bittersweet comments -- I'm very glad that the video helped. Sad to hear that your own prof is not teaching the material well, and, it sounds, structuring the class assignments rather thoughtlessly
Thanks. This was my second time watching your video, and from it I can conclude that the reason why none of these options are attractive options for Euthyphro is because he has his mind already set on what is holy and what isn't holy. No matter what Socrates says, Euthyphro thinks persecuting his own dad is the pious thing to do...
Well, sometimes they are. It's tough with freshmen straight out of High School, where we generally teach them absolutely nothing about Philosophy, except a few blurbs in history textbooks
Good news on this. 7 years later I recently had to help my little brother with a class covering Enlightenment Philosophy. Most notably Voltaire, but with what seemed to be an emphasis on deism.
Thanks very much for this. It has been really helpful. Referring to Plato's work generally, there is a sense of the absolute Good which is God. What then are the 'gods' in Plato's view, please?
Dr. Sadler, Around the 44 minute mark, you say that what is loved by the gods and what's dear to the gods can't be the same thing because they have different relationships to the holy. But as I've always read this text, Socrates seems to be using "that which is dear to the gods" as a synonym for "that which is loved by the gods". His point (I take it) is that since the piety of an action explains why the gods love it/why it is dear to the gods, piety can't be identical to what is loved by or dear to the gods. The pious must be some separate thing that doesn't depend on the attitudes of the gods (be that love or dearness) at all. I don't see the move you discuss in the text nor do I see how it is necessary to Socrates' argument, but you've clearly been reading and thinking about this stuff much longer than I have, so I'm not posing this as a 'gotcha' or a challenge to your interpretation, but rather as a request for further explanation. Could you explain a little more why you think this move is needed and where you see it in the text (or point me to a paper/video in which it is explained more fully)?
"But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved." You're right that in general, Socrates treats them as synonymous. That's precisely what allows this distinction to stand out.
Thanks for the swift reply! I think I see why I was missing this distinction. My translation (G.M.A. Grube, ed. by John Cooper in the complete works) reads: "But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being god-loved because it was god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods." My translation must be running roughshod over a subtle distinction in the Greek text that you're picking up on. Perhaps because Grube is just assuming the synonymy that seems to hold elsewhere holds here and using only one of the synonymous phrases in an attempt to preserve the clarity of Socrates' argument. However, I'm still not certain I see that there's great evidence that Socrates is making the distinction between dearness to the gods and being loved by the gods here though for two reasons. First, the distinction seems irrelevant to his argument. Second, he takes dearness to the gods and being loved by the gods as equivalent elsewhere in the dialogue. So, even if the Greek text can be read as making the distinction between these two here, unless the text demands this reading, it seems more charitable to go with the reading from the Grube translation which treats dearness and belovedness as synonyms. Is there something in the Greek that demands reading Socrates as making the distinction here instead of infelicitously switching back and forth between synonymous terms? Does the distinction play any role in Socrates' argument? If not, why not go with Grube's translation? (Sorry if I'm being too persistent and long-winded here, but I have to teach this stuff next year, so I want to make sure I understand it!)
I'd say that if you're teaching it, and you don't read Greek, you're under no obligation to try to teach every single little bit of the text to students. Given my work and project schedule, I've not got the time to set aside myself to go back to the materials and provide a fuller answer to your concerns here. If you want to In effect book my time to work on that with you, that's a different matter - but that would have to happen later this summer. Here's my own short take on this text: there's multiple arguments and accounts at work. You can, of course, as a reader, ignore whatever you like as "irrelevant", but that's up to your judgement. Generally I take Socrates not as providing once and for all arguments on every case, but arguments tailored to the interlocutors he has to work with, and, Plato has us as readers engage with them ourselves. So, the distinction is certainly one a person can make - and one Socrates does make - without being something Socrates or Plato is sticking with as part of some comprehensive, systematic account
I'm sure you're well versed in all theories on ethics. What I've noticed is there are many, young and old, who think morality can't be defined because of their relativist approach to it. Why is feeding the poor good, for example, cannot be answered by private/societal/cultural subjectivism, divine command, rational deontology, utilitarianism, etc. BTW Thanks for the video!
I'm a disabled veteran with a lot of free time on my hands and an interest in philosophy. Thank you so much for posting these, as I can "take classes" and not worry about loans. I read this along with Meno today, and the two seem to compliment each other. The word virtue is often used in conjunction with holiness, and vice with the unholy. This Euthyphro Dilemma sounds a bit like the chicken vs. the egg debate. Or I have no idea what I'm talking about.
Dear Gregory, I would like to know the two options socrates offers to Euthyphro and exactly why both of these options aren't particularly attractive options for Euthyphro. I think the first option Socrates offers to Euthyphro is that the gods love pious because they're pious and second that pious acts are pious because the gods love them. By the term pious I mean right regarding to actions. Am I correct, and can you help me out with why both options aren't attractive to Euthyphro? Thank you
well, that's got its good side and its bad side -- I'm glad you got so much out of the video, but sad to learn that the class you're in has not been quite so good.
Thanks for replying, but what I am trying to say is that based on what I have said earlier, I can imangine myself trying to look at it from Euthyphro's point. The principle that murder is wrong and if it is wrong for one, it is wrong for all, including my father, or his as it were. Thankks again
Well, now I think I have a better idea of what you're driving at. And, being long-winded myself, no need for you to apologize to me! Euthyphro, as Plato depicts him, believes that most people are dead off when it comes to piety and impiety, and that he knows better than others. He does hold that principle you mention: murder is wrong, and you should prosecute whoever does it -- even your father, a rather revolutionary idea for Greeks at that time. More later, or maybe a vid response
Is the flaw in the reasoning ( 46:34 ) the paradox that is created if something is holy in it of itself? Because that would imply that what is holy in it of itself is separate from the gods. In other words, that which is holy in of itself becomes something even gods have no say over or did not create. So if something can be holy in it of itself implies that there is something outside of the gods' domain. This then means that then the only answer is what the gods hold dearly becomes holy. I also wanted to say that I appreciate the fact that you have these videos of college level courses on the internet for free. It is a very Socratic thing to do, to educate people without a fee.
I've just finished reading Euthyphro(i'm new to philosophy).I'd say,he's quite the "objective individual" regarding his father's judgement.I would say,his objectivity,is but another form of subjectivity.fueld by his beliefs.That being said,does objectivity exist? I haven't watched the video,for I don't have time,I will tomorrow.Could you answer that for me,or is it answered in the video?
@ataoldotcom Well, that's not a bad idea for down the line -- when I'm not quite so busy as I am right at the moment. I've been toying with the idea of creating an interactive online environment somewhat like what I provide to my students in the Course Management System. That's a lot of work, though! I share the love of ancient Greek (and Roman too) Philosophy and Literature -- they have a lot of wisdom to communicate to us -- and wisdom, when grasped, produces a kind of joy
Yes. It's be nice if that class of students had talked more (the best of other people's comments) It'd also be nice if people don't criticize my students (my own comment)
+Gregory B. Sadler Is there a particular philosopher, or theologian whose persuasion has kept you on the side of the faithful? I've always enjoyed Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Tillich, and Niebuhr very much. Though they have made me think faith can seldom be tenable, the atheists (and "New Atheists") have successfully kept from having any sort of religious faith. With that said, I envy certain people with the capacity to have faith. Thank you very much for your extraordinary lectures.
Michael Brinkley Well, if I had to pick several out of the many, I'd say Anselm of Canterbury, Soren Kiekregaard, Maurice Blondel, and Gabriel Marcel. Some others - not theologians or philosophers - wold be G.K. Chesterton and Graham Greene
Gregory B. Sadler You just listed a few names for me to read, so I thank you for your response. In my freshman logic class, our final was an essay concerning Anselm's indirect proof of God.
I have a question, where in the reading can I find things to help me out with this conclusion: morally good acts are willed by God because God is good.
26:40 Although Plato may not like examples, it seems like all forms are "dependent" on "examples". So in essence the good couldn't be on its own, for it needs that which is good. Right? Say I see a beautiful sunset and a beautiful woman. In both cases they appeal to the form called "beauty" but for beauty to "be" in some sense it needs the sunset and the woman - beauty "in itself" isn't beautiful. And I wonder if there is something important to that. I also wonder what the "realm of the Forms" is like if there were such a thing. It wouldn't seem to be intelligible at all for there are no entities which could in some sense manifest the various forms. So the question of "what is piety?" can never be answered except through examples for the examples give life to the forms. Having only gone through the Meno, Ion, Lysis, and Euthyphro I'm still new to forms so if this sounds like an amateur observation/question it most surely is! Still confused about the problem in the dialogue. In my own words: That which is holy for us is whatever the gods love. However, whatever the gods love, for them, is holy because it is holy. Correct?
For Plato -- as opposed to many other thinkers -- the Forms are not dependent on examples. The examples, rather, whether we realize it or not, are dependent upon -- they "participate in" or are (usually bad) copies of the Forms.
Dear Gregory - I wonder if you can help me? A professional you-tuber has claimed that the horns of the Euthyphro cannot be split and that any appeal to god's nature as some third alternative is futile because if God has no control over his nature it is equal to being an "external force". I don't know enough about this to tell if he has a point or not. Could you watch his short video and let me know if he has a point or whether his response is incorrect? Marry Christmas.
Justice, to me is partly; do to others as you would have them do to you. To me this is simple and if we do this, everything is accounted for; all the rules per se. And what St Paul said, about being guilt free, tells me that we have this inside us if we are truthful to ourselves, we all know when something we do is less than right. So virtue, courage, loyalty, and all these and other terms that seem to fit within what justice is, is covered off if we live by the golden rule.
Mother Teresa died 13 or 14 years before this video was made. I don't really know what kind of person she really was, except what I have heard. If it is true about how she thought about piety etc, it would seem that she might hold the same view of whether she was being "pious" or not -- that she didn't know, or think about it. Some would say that she lived only for her actions to be a humble servant to God. I don't know if this is true or not. But if it is true, it reminded me a bit of Socrates thinking.
5. Socrates(Plato), always the great master of cross examination, has left us all to wonder. And I conclude that what is just could be held in high regard by God. And what is just is doing unto other as you would have them do to you, because this covers all the laws. Sorry I am so long winded.
well, if a professional RUclipsr says the Euthyphro dilemma can't be addressed, that must decide matters, eh? (just kidding) The idea of God having no control over God's nature is a bit unusual, and doesn't line up with traditional monotheistic conceptions of God, many of which discuss that sort of objection explicitly. So, I'd be inclined to say that the RUclipsr has a point, but a mistaken, and poorly informed point.
@5:10 The teacher assumes feeding the poor was something good that mother Teresa did. I wonder if he or anyone else could tell us why that is instrumental for good. Any secular theories on ethics would fail to answer this question, but in the Bible we know as people we have dignity and value because we are made in the image of our Creator. He created everything perfect, but it was man's rebellion then and now that we have starving people, along with pain, suffering and death.
A thought Perhaps we could say that God gave us a mind. Perhaps God wants to see what we do with our decisions. Blessed is the mans who does not feel guilty about his or her actions. St. Paul
Piety to me is a reverence for God. Or in Euthyphro’s case, perhaps a reverence for the gods. Would I prosecute my Father? I believe it would not be pleasant, but if I knew, or believed, he intended to kill; I would prosecute him because it would be right according to my principles. From very early on, we are taught that murder is morally wrong. Reason and logic tells me that murder is wrong. We all have an inherent right to exist.
1.Piety to me is a reverence for God...Impiety would be having no reverence for God. 2.Reverence is doing unto others what you have them do unto you. Not committing murder is also showing reverence because muder is wrong. 3. Intent should be questioned...Did Euthypho's fater intend for the slave murder to die? No...but he gave him no mind in the ditch either. 4. In putting myself in Euthyphro's shoes these are the things I would consider.
Pity Being Pious Holiness Being Holy-God/divine There weren’t holy books for the Greek, instead, hymns and poetry. Euthyphro takes the gods, specifically Zeus, in example. Flatline, if the gods did it, it is ok-pious Socrates: How little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth? The man must be an extraordinary man to make great strides and wisdom before he could of seen himself to such an action. What’s dear to the gods, they like. -What is holiness? Behaving how the gods want you to. ALL GODS DON’T AGREE ON ONE THING WE DISAGREE ABOUT: - the good and the bad - just and unjust - honest and dishonest Philosophy of religion: Euthyphro dilemma: Are religion and morality connected in someway? Because something is holy, it is loved by the gods. It IS holy because it is loved by the gods. Gods love bananas because they are holy. Gods love bananas, therefore they are holy. But gods love and hate different things. It is impossible to please all of the gods. ( reference from ruclips.net/video/OhWwV7OAyr8/видео.html&index=2&list=PLtGTILCOOpOYizymHmMXLvD0eVgHf1HYf ) Socrates is asking Euthyphro what IS piety and impiety, but Euthyphro could only give examples. He was unsuccessful in being able to define what is pious and impious. It cannot be determined. You cannot please all gods; you always will be displeasing to another god(s). Not only can you not please both, blurring the lines of what is pious and impious-similar to what is just and unjust, which is a more prominent argument in The Republic with the dilemma expanded which points to once again: what is just one one side, it is unjust on another side-Euthyphro seems to be rationalizing the act of charging his father for murder of a slave, whom killed a domestic servant over an argument/disagreeance, as the slave was not taken care of before deciding what Athens rule was for punishment, as Athens was some distance away. Euthyphro is piety-he is in the right-according to him. Socrates doesn’t want examples. It brings to the full circle of a question, which is not just about good and bad to the gods, but it is part of the argument Euthyphro tries to make. The gods benefit from us humans from their sacrifices, prayers, worship, honor, goodwill. Humans benefit from the gods. But, are the sacrifices and prayers holy on it’s own? It’s not giving the gods something. It’s asking for something back in return from the gods. (Latin: Do ut des--I give so you give) It’s not helping the gods. Euthyphro thinks when he attends to the gods, he is benefiting the gods. But the gods have no benefit from humans.
The typical argument in making the accusation that this is a false dilemma is to appeal to God's nature. If you claim that God's nature is a third option, and that his nature *is* good, do you not then just create another dilemma? 1) Does God have control over this nature? If so, then he is deciding what is good and what is not - which brings you back to the point in the original dilemma which is to say that good can now be anything. 2) Does God *not* have control over his nature? If he does not, then something external to him is deciding his nature and therefore is also deciding what is good.
Well. . . it doesn't really create another dilemma. Certainly not in the classical literature discussing the subject. (though one can certainly think up and pose all sorts of dilemmas and objections - they're just not going to be taken seriously on the one hand by those working in the field of Philosophy of Religion, and on the other hand by the theists that they're supposed to confute) It's sort of missing the point of examining (or appealing to) the divine nature -- in a rough way analogous to the "but who created God?" line of argument people end up falling into when discussing causality. What you're really asking about, in terms of "control over God's nature" is whether God determines his nature, right? Or whether God causes God to have the nature he does? I'd suggest to read and reflect upon some classic discussions of the divine nature and whether God can do/be otherwise than he is, and whether that constitutes a genuine problem or not -- I'd poke around in the classic "three As" - Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas
I appreciate the response and feedback. I am certainly no philosophical heavyweight, but I do consult those that are. I'm early in my journey no doubt. How seriously anyone takes an argument has no bearing on the robustness of it. The question I posed to you was not one that *I* came up with, but it *was* one that is being discussed by those in the field of philosophy - Rebecca Goldstein comes to mind. I was reading her comments on this earlier today which is what got me thinking about this topic to begin with. It led me to reading arguments from others as well - including some sources you mentioned. My brief investigation of this, has if anything, shown me that there is anything BUT consensus on this matter by experts in this field. Can anyone do/be other than they are? We certainly know God was capable of doing/being evil. He said so himself: "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things." Are we to interpret creating evil as doing/being good? I presume your answer would be yes. Thanks for taking the time collaborate with your viewers and subscribers. No doubt you have to have patience with noobs like myself!
Yeah. . . you're not going to find consensus by all the experts in the field in just about any matter of Philosophy! -- and that itself (i.e. the lack of consensus) gets interpreted differently by various authors (so, e.g. Kant sees it as sign that philosophy is a "history of errors")! I'll have to check Goldstein out sometime -- when I can make the time (right now I'm supposed to be grading. . .I'd really do anything that grade!). Her recent novel sounds pretty interesting . . If you look at classic Christian thinkers, e.g. Anselm -- they will actually say that God in some sense can't be other than he is, and give some justification for that position -- he's also got some advice here and there in his works about how those sorts of passages ought to be interpreted. The key phrase though is the "in some sense". We ought to be on guard against thinking that when we're engaging in argument-making about murky topics (e.g. God, the human will, the nature of evil, if it has one, etc) that our grasp on the notions we're working with is as adequate as we want it to be. . . much more could be said about this, but now it's time to actually quite procrastinating and to grade
I like the way you explain the Greek pantheon within its own context. Your description that Sitz im Leben is right on. When applied to the Christian faith, because of the distinct context and description of the Greek gods, the Euthyphro dilemma is historically and culturally anachronistic, and thereby it results in diffusionism. The Greek deities were pantheistic, and they were not maximally great beings with great making properties, as we see in the Christian description of God. Today, many philosophers and ethicists are neither good classicists nor anthropologically sound in their scholarship. Therefore, they misread, misinterpret, and misappropriate ancient cultures and their concepts. Thank you again for a great lecture.
I will send you a message with this answer since I'm limited to only 500 characters. Plus I'm sure your busy and don't have extra time looking for multiple posts.
One of the more difficult lectures I've attempted to watch online (only made it about halfway). I understand trying to engage students but the time spent waiting for interaction deters from the learning experience imo. I would have had to consider dropping the class were I to have had it while in college. No offense to the professor intended. Just a different style of teaching than is effective for me.
Strictly speaking, if you want to go that route, it ought to be "Criton" (long "o"), or "Euthyphron", as it is in the Greek. It's pretty common practice in languges that use the definite article more often than does classic Greek to append the "the" -- you'll see this not only in English, but French, German, Italian. . . and it's done by the best. So, yes, it is a pet peeve
Hmm, very interesting. Thank you for that. I love learning new things and being corrected when I'm wrong. :) Are the titles not based only on the characters names; I was thinking it would be like saying "The Greg". I guess I will stick to only criticizing people for saying THE Ukraine, lol. BTW, I enjoy your videos. I didn't expect you to read my petty comments on a two year old video, lol.
Hahaha! I would perhaps avoid universal rules for all uses of the definite article. It would be weird indeed to say "the Greg". I've seen "the Ukraine" used sometimes. I actually read all the comments, sooner or later.
A thought Perhaps we could say that God gave us a mind. Perhaps God wants to see what we do with our decisions. Blessed is the mans who does not feel guilty about his or her actions. St. Paul
Thanks so much for the quick Ethics lesson. I've only been teaching this stuff for a decade or so (including Religious Studies classes), so finally having someone straighten me out about what they think secular ethics is capable of, and about what the Biblical teachings are on the dignity of the created human being, is really helpful.
I feel I've learned more from you from an hours lecture than attending every class of philosophy 01 for about two months. Thank you.
@05sn Well. . . I see it as a false dilemma -- as any Christian Platonist (which I am) has to.
So, if you want to call it a "solution" to the dilemma, it would run more or less like this: God is in fact the goodness in which other goodnesses in one way or another participate. Goodness does depend on God's will in a sense, but God wills precisely what God does because of the divine nature -- so it's not as if God is somehow constrained by a Goodness "beyond" or "above" God
I wished i had you as my philosophy teacher you really know how to explain to where its very easy to grasp the concepts
Glad you enjoy the videos
It imposes a choice between two possibilities, presented as exhaustive (those two possibilities are presented as the ONLY ones) and as mutually exclusive (they can't both be true).
One classical way of addressing the issue is to focus on the divine nature (the works only with monotheistic views, I'd think), and say God chooses/loves/approves of the good precisely because it flows from the divine nature. Good still remains good, not merely dependent upon the will or arbitrary choice of God
I truly appreciate you uploading this. My teacher (same dilemma) didn't spend too much time on it and expected us to write a paper worth 50% of our grade on it. Without this video, I wouldn't of known what to do! Thank you very much!
I'm glad you enjoy these videos. As to the ideas you're asking me about, I'd say three things:
1) they're interesting
2) they don't have that much to do with Plato or the Euthyphro, which is what I'd prefer to discuss here
3) they'd be good to discuss in a variety of other forums -- maybe I'll make a video response
You're quite welcome. I'd agree that there's plenty who think morality is merely subjective.
I have to admit to being puzzled why you would say that feeding the poor can't be determined to be a good thing from a deontological perspective (Kant actually discusses such benevolence) or from a Utilitarian perspective (Bentham discusses it as well), or why you'd put a divine command theory (which seems to be what you're advocating in the previous post) in with those others.
Is the question "does objectivity exist" asked and answered in the video, or in Plato's dialogue? Not directly.
"Pious" and "piety" are what Socrates and Euthyphro are trying to define in the dialogue.
Yes, those are ways of expressing the two options. I think you should probably read the dialogue and watch the whole video, and then your questions will be answered
True -- but does this have anything to do with the text we're discussing?
i definitely wish you had some online "practice test" i feel part of the class already. i wonder how immersed i truly am though.
by the way, i subscribed before watching because i love ancient Greek philosophy and those who feel the same.
We will be going over this tomorrow in my class, so I wanted to go in better prepared. Thank you so much for this.
Glad it was useful for you
Glad to help -- but sorry to hear about your prof!
Thank you for this lecture. I was having such a hard time understanding Euthyphro. It's too bad I do not have you as my professor instead!
They had -- at least most of them -- but Marist students are bit more difficult to get talking, to get to assert a position. Very nice students, but a bit prone to a passivity that is very much like politeness. So, I try to prompt them, to get them started. Some days are easier to get a conversation going than others
Well, that's certainly true -- he not only wants what he intends to do to be pious, but also wants it to be recognized as such, against the more commonsensical view of his fellow citizens.
You might say that he wants to have things both ways -- if what E is doing is ok because the gods did similarly, and therefore like that sort of thing, but it's not morally good, that looks and feels bad for him.
But, if he tries to reason things out, what he's doing no longer seems like its even pious!
Sure, all of those are possibilities -- in fact, when we get to discussing other issues in Philosophy of Religion, we talk about those thematically. For this Intro class, though, I try to resist the temptation as a prof to throw too many issues or ideas at them -- perhaps unsuccessfully
Well, as always when reading these kind of bittersweet comments -- I'm very glad that the video helped. Sad to hear that your own prof is not teaching the material well, and, it sounds, structuring the class assignments rather thoughtlessly
Thanks. This was my second time watching your video, and from it I can conclude that the reason why none of these options are attractive options for Euthyphro is because he has his mind already set on what is holy and what isn't holy. No matter what Socrates says, Euthyphro thinks persecuting his own dad is the pious thing to do...
Well, sometimes they are. It's tough with freshmen straight out of High School, where we generally teach them absolutely nothing about Philosophy, except a few blurbs in history textbooks
Good news on this. 7 years later I recently had to help my little brother with a class covering Enlightenment Philosophy. Most notably Voltaire, but with what seemed to be an emphasis on deism.
Point well taken. Very good though, the entire point is to get people to think, so far I am thinking and enjoying the lectures very much.
Thank you very much for your replies. It surely is very good of you to share your thoughts and your videos.
You're very welcome
Thanks a lot. this helped me out tremendously.
Good!
@LovelesOne It certainly is. I'm happy that I get to do it for my day-job
Thank you for the video Dr. Sadler. Can you give a solution to the dilemma, I cant think of one.
You're welcome!
I actually got more out of this lecture than from my current Intro to Philosophy professor, I understood it better
youtube seems to be having trouble with posting comments
Thanks very much for this. It has been really helpful. Referring to Plato's work generally, there is a sense of the absolute Good which is God. What then are the 'gods' in Plato's view, please?
For Plato, the form of the good is not God. you're thinking later writers.
Gods are immortal beings, higher than us, who don't have bodies.
Dr. Sadler,
Around the 44 minute mark, you say that what is loved by the gods and what's dear to the gods can't be the same thing because they have different relationships to the holy. But as I've always read this text, Socrates seems to be using "that which is dear to the gods" as a synonym for "that which is loved by the gods". His point (I take it) is that since the piety of an action explains why the gods love it/why it is dear to the gods, piety can't be identical to what is loved by or dear to the gods. The pious must be some separate thing that doesn't depend on the attitudes of the gods (be that love or dearness) at all. I don't see the move you discuss in the text nor do I see how it is necessary to Socrates' argument, but you've clearly been reading and thinking about this stuff much longer than I have, so I'm not posing this as a 'gotcha' or a challenge to your interpretation, but rather as a request for further explanation. Could you explain a little more why you think this move is needed and where you see it in the text (or point me to a paper/video in which it is explained more fully)?
"But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved."
You're right that in general, Socrates treats them as synonymous. That's precisely what allows this distinction to stand out.
Thanks for the swift reply! I think I see why I was missing this distinction. My translation (G.M.A. Grube, ed. by John Cooper in the complete works) reads:
"But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being god-loved because it was god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods."
My translation must be running roughshod over a subtle distinction in the Greek text that you're picking up on. Perhaps because Grube is just assuming the synonymy that seems to hold elsewhere holds here and using only one of the synonymous phrases in an attempt to preserve the clarity of Socrates' argument.
However, I'm still not certain I see that there's great evidence that Socrates is making the distinction between dearness to the gods and being loved by the gods here though for two reasons. First, the distinction seems irrelevant to his argument. Second, he takes dearness to the gods and being loved by the gods as equivalent elsewhere in the dialogue. So, even if the Greek text can be read as making the distinction between these two here, unless the text demands this reading, it seems more charitable to go with the reading from the Grube translation which treats dearness and belovedness as synonyms.
Is there something in the Greek that demands reading Socrates as making the distinction here instead of infelicitously switching back and forth between synonymous terms? Does the distinction play any role in Socrates' argument? If not, why not go with Grube's translation? (Sorry if I'm being too persistent and long-winded here, but I have to teach this stuff next year, so I want to make sure I understand it!)
I'd say that if you're teaching it, and you don't read Greek, you're under no obligation to try to teach every single little bit of the text to students.
Given my work and project schedule, I've not got the time to set aside myself to go back to the materials and provide a fuller answer to your concerns here. If you want to In effect book my time to work on that with you, that's a different matter - but that would have to happen later this summer.
Here's my own short take on this text: there's multiple arguments and accounts at work. You can, of course, as a reader, ignore whatever you like as "irrelevant", but that's up to your judgement. Generally I take Socrates not as providing once and for all arguments on every case, but arguments tailored to the interlocutors he has to work with, and, Plato has us as readers engage with them ourselves. So, the distinction is certainly one a person can make - and one Socrates does make - without being something Socrates or Plato is sticking with as part of some comprehensive, systematic account
Ok, I understand. I appreciate you giving me what time you could!
I'm sure you're well versed in all theories on ethics. What I've noticed is there are many, young and old, who think morality can't be defined because of their relativist approach to it. Why is feeding the poor good, for example, cannot be answered by private/societal/cultural subjectivism, divine command, rational deontology, utilitarianism, etc. BTW Thanks for the video!
Well, then I'd say: watch the videos. And, read the texts before and after. See if that helps out
There are all sorts of cognates from aporia, that's true.
You're very welcome
I'm a disabled veteran with a lot of free time on my hands and an interest in philosophy. Thank you so much for posting these, as I can "take classes" and not worry about loans.
I read this along with Meno today, and the two seem to compliment each other. The word virtue is often used in conjunction with holiness, and vice with the unholy. This Euthyphro Dilemma sounds a bit like the chicken vs. the egg debate. Or I have no idea what I'm talking about.
You'll find Plato's dialogues in general complement each other in that way
Dear Gregory, I would like to know the two options socrates offers to Euthyphro and exactly why both of these options aren't particularly attractive options for Euthyphro. I think the first option Socrates offers to Euthyphro is that the gods love pious because they're pious and second that pious acts are pious because the gods love them. By the term pious I mean right regarding to actions. Am I correct, and can you help me out with why both options aren't attractive to Euthyphro? Thank you
Whether we believe in God or not.
I would look for what the intent of any act was before I prosecute anyone.
Am I way off base in these thoughts?
well, that's got its good side and its bad side -- I'm glad you got so much out of the video, but sad to learn that the class you're in has not been quite so good.
Thanks for replying, but what I am trying to say is that based on what I have said earlier, I can imangine myself trying to look at it from Euthyphro's point. The principle that murder is wrong and if it is wrong for one, it is wrong for all, including my father, or his as it were. Thankks again
Well, now I think I have a better idea of what you're driving at. And, being long-winded myself, no need for you to apologize to me!
Euthyphro, as Plato depicts him, believes that most people are dead off when it comes to piety and impiety, and that he knows better than others. He does hold that principle you mention: murder is wrong, and you should prosecute whoever does it -- even your father, a rather revolutionary idea for Greeks at that time.
More later, or maybe a vid response
Is the flaw in the reasoning ( 46:34 ) the paradox that is created if something is holy in it of itself? Because that would imply that what is holy in it of itself is separate from the gods. In other words, that which is holy in of itself becomes something even gods have no say over or did not create.
So if something can be holy in it of itself implies that there is something outside of the gods' domain. This then means that then the only answer is what the gods hold dearly becomes holy.
I also wanted to say that I appreciate the fact that you have these videos of college level courses on the internet for free. It is a very Socratic thing to do, to educate people without a fee.
I've just finished reading Euthyphro(i'm new to philosophy).I'd say,he's quite the "objective individual" regarding his father's judgement.I would say,his objectivity,is but another form of subjectivity.fueld by his beliefs.That being said,does objectivity exist? I haven't watched the video,for I don't have time,I will tomorrow.Could you answer that for me,or is it answered in the video?
@ataoldotcom Well, that's not a bad idea for down the line -- when I'm not quite so busy as I am right at the moment.
I've been toying with the idea of creating an interactive online environment somewhat like what I provide to my students in the Course Management System. That's a lot of work, though!
I share the love of ancient Greek (and Roman too) Philosophy and Literature -- they have a lot of wisdom to communicate to us -- and wisdom, when grasped, produces a kind of joy
Well, that is both good . . . and bad. Good that the lecture helped. Bad that the prof isn't as helpful
As a professor I sympathise with feelings regarding student silence!
Yes. It's be nice if that class of students had talked more (the best of other people's comments)
It'd also be nice if people don't criticize my students (my own comment)
This was very helpful, thank you.
+Audible Quote Library Glad it was useful for you -- you're welcome!
Hey Gregory, you're a good guy, thanks for the videos.
Not to be personal, but what are your opinions of religion? Are you religious yourself? Agnostic? Atheist?
I am religious -- though if I thought it was non-personal, and also merely opinion, I'd likely not be
+Gregory B. Sadler Is there a particular philosopher, or theologian whose persuasion has kept you on the side of the faithful? I've always enjoyed Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Tillich, and Niebuhr very much. Though they have made me think faith can seldom be tenable, the atheists (and "New Atheists") have successfully kept from having any sort of religious faith. With that said, I envy certain people with the capacity to have faith. Thank you very much for your extraordinary lectures.
Michael Brinkley Well, if I had to pick several out of the many, I'd say Anselm of Canterbury, Soren Kiekregaard, Maurice Blondel, and Gabriel Marcel. Some others - not theologians or philosophers - wold be G.K. Chesterton and Graham Greene
Gregory B. Sadler You just listed a few names for me to read, so I thank you for your response. In my freshman logic class, our final was an essay concerning Anselm's indirect proof of God.
Why is it a false dilemma?
I have a question, where in the reading can I find things to help me out with this conclusion: morally good acts are willed by God because God is good.
+Kimberly Hancock That's not in the Euthyphro. That's an alternative to the two parts of the Euthyphro dilemma
26:40 Although Plato may not like examples, it seems like all forms are "dependent" on "examples". So in essence the good couldn't be on its own, for it needs that which is good. Right? Say I see a beautiful sunset and a beautiful woman. In both cases they appeal to the form called "beauty" but for beauty to "be" in some sense it needs the sunset and the woman - beauty "in itself" isn't beautiful. And I wonder if there is something important to that. I also wonder what the "realm of the Forms" is like if there were such a thing. It wouldn't seem to be intelligible at all for there are no entities which could in some sense manifest the various forms. So the question of "what is piety?" can never be answered except through examples for the examples give life to the forms. Having only gone through the Meno, Ion, Lysis, and Euthyphro I'm still new to forms so if this sounds like an amateur observation/question it most surely is!
Still confused about the problem in the dialogue. In my own words: That which is holy for us is whatever the gods love. However, whatever the gods love, for them, is holy because it is holy. Correct?
For Plato -- as opposed to many other thinkers -- the Forms are not dependent on examples. The examples, rather, whether we realize it or not, are dependent upon -- they "participate in" or are (usually bad) copies of the Forms.
Dear Gregory - I wonder if you can help me? A professional you-tuber has claimed that the horns of the Euthyphro cannot be split and that any appeal to god's nature as some third alternative is futile because if God has no control over his nature it is equal to being an "external force". I don't know enough about this to tell if he has a point or not. Could you watch his short video and let me know if he has a point or whether his response is incorrect? Marry Christmas.
Justice, to me is partly; do to others as you would have them do to you. To me this is simple and if we do this, everything is accounted for; all the rules per se. And what St Paul said, about being guilt free, tells me that we have this inside us if we are truthful to ourselves, we all know when something we do is less than right. So virtue, courage, loyalty, and all these and other terms that seem to fit within what justice is, is covered off if we live by the golden rule.
Being truthful to ourselves. The truth is only as true as your culture defines it.
I'm trying to figure out the metaphysical theory held by Plato in Euthyphro & Apology.. Help!!
Sure. The classic solution is that it's a false dilemma.
Well, that certainly settles it, doesn't it? If you're unconvinced by that option, it must be wrong, eh?
Mother Teresa died 13 or 14 years before this video was made. I don't really know what kind of person she really was, except what I have heard. If it is true about how she thought about piety etc, it would seem that she might hold the same view of whether she was being "pious" or not -- that she didn't know, or think about it. Some would say that she lived only for her actions to be a humble servant to God. I don't know if this is true or not. But if it is true, it reminded me a bit of Socrates thinking.
5. Socrates(Plato), always the great master of cross examination, has left us all to wonder. And I conclude that what is just could be held in high regard by God. And what is just is doing unto other as you would have them do to you, because this covers all the laws.
Sorry I am so long winded.
Yeah, it looks like you just described one of the horns of the original dilemma.
Has teaching become easier since your RUclips empire? Perhaps more involvement from the students?
+bandrow Haha! I wish I had an "empire"!
Actually, at this point, all of my course teaching is done online.
well, if a professional RUclipsr says the Euthyphro dilemma can't be addressed, that must decide matters, eh? (just kidding)
The idea of God having no control over God's nature is a bit unusual, and doesn't line up with traditional monotheistic conceptions of God, many of which discuss that sort of objection explicitly.
So, I'd be inclined to say that the RUclipsr has a point, but a mistaken, and poorly informed point.
v=UY_zGA8pQLI
Sorry - I forgot to mention where the video can be found. This is the link to it.
@5:10 The teacher assumes feeding the poor was something good that mother Teresa did. I wonder if he or anyone else could tell us why that is instrumental for good. Any secular theories on ethics would fail to answer this question, but in the Bible we know as people we have dignity and value because we are made in the image of our Creator. He created everything perfect, but it was man's rebellion then and now that we have starving people, along with pain, suffering and death.
Yep, sometimes. . . but these are freshmen, right at the start of the semester
A thought
Perhaps we could say that God gave us a mind.
Perhaps God wants to see what we do with our decisions.
Blessed is the mans who does not feel guilty about his or her actions. St. Paul
Piety to me is a reverence for God. Or in Euthyphro’s case, perhaps a reverence for the gods. Would I prosecute my Father? I believe it would not be pleasant, but if I knew, or believed, he intended to kill; I would prosecute him because it would be right according to my principles. From very early on, we are taught that murder is morally wrong. Reason and logic tells me that murder is wrong. We all have an inherent right to exist.
I dont think the "nature" option works.
1.Piety to me is a reverence for God...Impiety would be having no reverence for God.
2.Reverence is doing unto others what you have them do unto you. Not committing murder is also showing reverence because muder is wrong.
3. Intent should be questioned...Did Euthypho's fater intend for the slave murder to die? No...but he gave him no mind in the ditch either.
4. In putting myself in Euthyphro's shoes these are the things I would consider.
Pity
Being Pious
Holiness
Being Holy-God/divine
There weren’t holy books for the Greek, instead, hymns and poetry.
Euthyphro takes the gods, specifically Zeus, in example.
Flatline, if the gods did it, it is ok-pious
Socrates:
How little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth? The man must be an extraordinary man to make great strides and wisdom before he could of seen himself to such an action.
What’s dear to the gods, they like.
-What is holiness?
Behaving how the gods want you to.
ALL GODS DON’T AGREE ON ONE THING
WE DISAGREE ABOUT:
- the good and the bad
- just and unjust
- honest and dishonest
Philosophy of religion: Euthyphro dilemma:
Are religion and morality connected in someway?
Because something is holy, it is loved by the gods.
It IS holy because it is loved by the gods.
Gods love bananas because they are holy.
Gods love bananas, therefore they are holy.
But gods love and hate different things.
It is impossible to please all of the gods.
( reference from ruclips.net/video/OhWwV7OAyr8/видео.html&index=2&list=PLtGTILCOOpOYizymHmMXLvD0eVgHf1HYf )
Socrates is asking Euthyphro what IS piety and impiety, but Euthyphro could only give examples. He was unsuccessful in being able to define what is pious and impious.
It cannot be determined.
You cannot please all gods; you always will be displeasing to another god(s).
Not only can you not please both, blurring the lines of what is pious and impious-similar to what is just and unjust, which is a more prominent argument in The Republic with the dilemma expanded which points to once again: what is just one one side, it is unjust on another side-Euthyphro seems to be rationalizing the act of charging his father for murder of a slave, whom killed a domestic servant over an argument/disagreeance, as the slave was not taken care of before deciding what Athens rule was for punishment, as Athens was some distance away.
Euthyphro is piety-he is in the right-according to him.
Socrates doesn’t want examples. It brings to the full circle of a question, which is not just about good and bad to the gods, but it is part of the argument Euthyphro tries to make.
The gods benefit from us humans from their sacrifices, prayers, worship, honor, goodwill. Humans benefit from the gods.
But, are the sacrifices and prayers holy on it’s own?
It’s not giving the gods something.
It’s asking for something back in return from the gods. (Latin: Do ut des--I give so you give)
It’s not helping the gods.
Euthyphro thinks when he attends to the gods, he is benefiting the gods.
But the gods have no benefit from humans.
The typical argument in making the accusation that this is a false dilemma is to appeal to God's nature. If you claim that God's nature is a third option, and that his nature *is* good, do you not then just create another dilemma? 1) Does God have control over this nature? If so, then he is deciding what is good and what is not - which brings you back to the point in the original dilemma which is to say that good can now be anything. 2) Does God *not* have control over his nature? If he does not, then something external to him is deciding his nature and therefore is also deciding what is good.
Well. . . it doesn't really create another dilemma. Certainly not in the classical literature discussing the subject. (though one can certainly think up and pose all sorts of dilemmas and objections - they're just not going to be taken seriously on the one hand by those working in the field of Philosophy of Religion, and on the other hand by the theists that they're supposed to confute)
It's sort of missing the point of examining (or appealing to) the divine nature -- in a rough way analogous to the "but who created God?" line of argument people end up falling into when discussing causality.
What you're really asking about, in terms of "control over God's nature" is whether God determines his nature, right? Or whether God causes God to have the nature he does? I'd suggest to read and reflect upon some classic discussions of the divine nature and whether God can do/be otherwise than he is, and whether that constitutes a genuine problem or not -- I'd poke around in the classic "three As" - Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas
I appreciate the response and feedback.
I am certainly no philosophical heavyweight, but I do consult those that are. I'm early in my journey no doubt. How seriously anyone takes an argument has no bearing on the robustness of it. The question I posed to you was not one that *I* came up with, but it *was* one that is being discussed by those in the field of philosophy - Rebecca Goldstein comes to mind. I was reading her comments on this earlier today which is what got me thinking about this topic to begin with. It led me to reading arguments from others as well - including some sources you mentioned. My brief investigation of this, has if anything, shown me that there is anything BUT consensus on this matter by experts in this field.
Can anyone do/be other than they are? We certainly know God was capable of doing/being evil. He said so himself: "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things." Are we to interpret creating evil as doing/being good? I presume your answer would be yes.
Thanks for taking the time collaborate with your viewers and subscribers. No doubt you have to have patience with noobs like myself!
Yeah. . . you're not going to find consensus by all the experts in the field in just about any matter of Philosophy! -- and that itself (i.e. the lack of consensus) gets interpreted differently by various authors (so, e.g. Kant sees it as sign that philosophy is a "history of errors")!
I'll have to check Goldstein out sometime -- when I can make the time (right now I'm supposed to be grading. . .I'd really do anything that grade!). Her recent novel sounds pretty interesting . .
If you look at classic Christian thinkers, e.g. Anselm -- they will actually say that God in some sense can't be other than he is, and give some justification for that position -- he's also got some advice here and there in his works about how those sorts of passages ought to be interpreted.
The key phrase though is the "in some sense". We ought to be on guard against thinking that when we're engaging in argument-making about murky topics (e.g. God, the human will, the nature of evil, if it has one, etc) that our grasp on the notions we're working with is as adequate as we want it to be. . . much more could be said about this, but now it's time to actually quite procrastinating and to grade
I like the way you explain the Greek pantheon within its own context. Your description that Sitz im Leben is right on. When applied to the Christian faith, because of the distinct context and description of the Greek gods, the Euthyphro dilemma is historically and culturally anachronistic, and thereby it results in diffusionism. The Greek deities were pantheistic, and they were not maximally great beings with great making properties, as we see in the Christian description of God. Today, many philosophers and ethicists are neither good classicists nor anthropologically sound in their scholarship. Therefore, they misread, misinterpret, and misappropriate ancient cultures and their concepts. Thank you again for a great lecture.
You're quite welcome!
I will send you a message with this answer since I'm limited to only 500 characters. Plus I'm sure your busy and don't have extra time looking for multiple posts.
One of the more difficult lectures I've attempted to watch online (only made it about halfway). I understand trying to engage students but the time spent waiting for interaction deters from the learning experience imo. I would have had to consider dropping the class were I to have had it while in college. No offense to the professor intended. Just a different style of teaching than is effective for me.
Yep. You can't please - or teach to - all students at the same time
omg it's not THE Euthyphro or THE Crito. It's just Euthyphro. Sorry, pet peeve of mine.
Strictly speaking, if you want to go that route, it ought to be "Criton" (long "o"), or "Euthyphron", as it is in the Greek.
It's pretty common practice in languges that use the definite article more often than does classic Greek to append the "the" -- you'll see this not only in English, but French, German, Italian. . . and it's done by the best.
So, yes, it is a pet peeve
Hmm, very interesting. Thank you for that. I love learning new things and being corrected when I'm wrong. :) Are the titles not based only on the characters names; I was thinking it would be like saying "The Greg". I guess I will stick to only criticizing people for saying THE Ukraine, lol. BTW, I enjoy your videos. I didn't expect you to read my petty comments on a two year old video, lol.
Hahaha! I would perhaps avoid universal rules for all uses of the definite article. It would be weird indeed to say "the Greg". I've seen "the Ukraine" used sometimes.
I actually read all the comments, sooner or later.
True. I should have known better, lol.
Man, your students don't like answering questions.
A thought
Perhaps we could say that God gave us a mind.
Perhaps God wants to see what we do with our decisions.
Blessed is the mans who does not feel guilty about his or her actions. St. Paul