It's finally viewed as the smartest move so everyone does it. you win alot less games if they replace you, and if you lose the game and it looks like its your fault then you risk getting the boot. It was all about risk aversion. Which is why the NFL is a copy cat league, partly.
The NFL making the extra point longer a few years ago is what prompted the popularization of this strategy. Missed extra points, while still not the norm, are much more common than they used to be, thus making the "kick twice" strategy much less of a sure bet than it was before.
I forgot where but the average nfl play goes for something like 2.5ish yards per play Edit I might be wrong but the worst offense team by total yards in 2023 was the Carolina Panthers at 4510 yards or 265.29 yards per game. NFL team usually play 60ish plays on offense per game and that using that and the Panthers data for 2023 equals 4.42 yards per snap. Of course anything might happen on any particular play and some say it's easier to play defense at the goal line. So 49 percent seems logical to me
@@Michael-sb8jf The average play went for 5.3 yards last season. This has been measured since 1932 and the lowest it ever got was 3.6 y/p in 1935. It has literally never been close to 2.5ish yards per play. It hasn't even dipped below 5 y/p in 30 years.
@@DoubleTTB22you can’t just lump all plays together like that though. Down, distance, game clock, and obviously field position are all significant factors that go into the yards gained on a play and how difficult it was to get them.
Not really @@alexleach4002 John urschel (ex NFL lineman now full time mathematician) does a good short demonstration of this fact. It's really just some simple algebra and solving quadratic formulas
@@MovieMakingMan I quit and play poker full time now haha. That experience helped me realize people are just going to do what they are comfortable with despite hard evidence there are better ways. Thought why fight it? Just play a game where you can make the most of it,
@@alexleach4002 That’s quite the career change. You must be a great player to do it professionally. Do you tend to play the same group of people a lot of the time?
I've seen a *lot* of discussion of this tactic over the years and I find it rare that someone writing a piece like this actually describes an aspect that helps explain why this strategy works. To be clear, the probabilities described in the video are correct, but intuitively, it can be difficult to get past "if the deuce is a coin flip and worth about 1 point as a result, how are you actually gaining an advantage by going for 2 the first time?" The answer is that this strategy changes the chances of different outcomes compared to the "kick twice" strategy. Let's assume that the kick is 100% and the deuce is 50% just to make the math easier. Long story short, if you "kick twice," you are going to score 14 points 100% of the time. If you "kick first, deuce second," you are going to score 13 points 50% of the time and 15 points 50% of the time. If you use the video's strategy "deuce first, decide second", you're going to score 15 points 50% of the time, 14 points 25% of the time, and *12* points 25% of the time. The key is that "14 points 25% of the time, 12 points 25% of the time" part. That's the difference between "kick first, deuce second" and "deuce first, react second." You run the risk of scoring only *12* points, which neither of the other strategies risks. But big deal!!! Scoring 12 and scoring 13 are functionally equivalent in this situation. So "deuce first, decide second" converts some of the losses from "kick first, deuce second" into *ties*, giving you a chance to win in overtime. Essentially, what you risk is "we'll sometimes score only 12 points from the two touchdowns"...but 12 points is the same as scoring 13 in this scenario because you lose the game either way. But what you *gain* is "we'll score 15 points (to win) or 14 points (to tie)" more frequently, and *that's* how this strategy increases your chances of winning. It's "win a few more games" in exchange for "a few of the games that we *do* lose will be lost by a greater margin, but we will lose fewer such games."
So in essense, deuce works at its best after a kick, as the chances of an undesirable result is 50/50, whereas deuce and deuce risks 50/25/25... and its potential gain outweighs the potential loss. 50/50 > 50/25/25
@@krazzed3243 ? This isnt a troll though? This is based on my understanding, you can feel free to correct me on this. Unlike with a divorce, my reasoning can be fixed if you were communicative instead of reactionary.
@kyperactive sorry I kind of immediately assumed it was a troll cause we're on the internet and too many people these days troll for reactions. Let's go through the issue: given this 50/50 for extra points then deuce you have a 50% chance to win and 50% chance to lose. The other strategy (strategy 3: 50, 25, 25) the 50% is still a straight win like the kick first strategy. The middle 25% is a tie which goes to OT. Supposing both teams are equally likely to win overtime this means you win half of that 25% of the time where you tied at end of regulation. This means you win 12.5% of the time there. You still lose 25% of the time (didn't make either 2 point conversion) but the other 12.5 + 25% only amounts to you losing 37.5% of the time and winning 62.5% of the time which is better than the kick first strategy. So deuce first strategy with option to kick second if first made or do a second deuce attempt if first failed strictly dominates kick first. So 50/25/25 > 50/50
There is one scenario that further increases the odds. If you convert on the first attempt, you have the option to kick two field goals should your next drive stall short of the goal line - which increases your odds of tying the game.
Not sure if it got mentioned or not in the video, but teams have actually known this for a long time now. Coaches were just never brave enough to do it because if it failed they would likely lose their jobs.
Good stuff. My only critique would be on the way you explained the maths behind the different strategies. None of it is wrong, btw, but I think a visual representation (decision tree, flowchart, etc.) is more effective when breaking down probabilities to a general audience that might not be familiar with this stuff. Anyways- Sports stats nerds like us seem to be entering into a golden age so I’m always stoked to see new content around it! Subbed.
The numbers for 2-pt conversion success rate only go up if you couple it with burgeoning 4th down philosophies; if coaches opt for offensive plays on 4th down rather than punting, then you only need to average 2.5 yards per play to make the requisite 10 yards for a first down. The NFL 2-pt attempt starts from the 2-yard line, so if one's entire offense is geared around getting 2.5 yards then you have basically your entire playbook at your disposal for the goalline attempt as opposed to historically niche schemes reserved specifically for the 2-pt attempt.
I've thought this way for quite a while, but one assumption that I think needs to be challenged before the argument is water-tight is whether or not teams truly do have a 50% change of winning in overtime. Intuitively, let's say team A scores 14 points in the first quarter, and then their offense is completely flat the rest of the game. Team B starts off not having any competency on offense, but picks up steam in the fourth quarter and scores 14 quickly to tie up the game. Which team are you putting your money on to win in OT? Let's introduce a variable a representing overtime win probability into the equations. The team following strategy 1 has a win probability of a, while the team following strategy 3 has a win probability of making 2pt + a(making 2pt) - a(making 2pt)^2. With this new variable, any team that is >66% confident of winning in overtime (and also is certain of making both extra points) should now prefer strategy 1, assuming the league average for 2 point conversion percentage. So maybe this is an interesting statistic to track this upcoming NFL season - when teams do make the rare, late-game 14 point comeback, what are their chances of winning in overtime?
I was just thinking about this. I also think teams should go for two if they are the first team to score with a touchdown. If they fail, the losing team is still 2 field goals away. If they succeed, the other team is now in a much riskier spot.
I have another strategy that I think will emerge in the next several years: if a team is down 9 10 or 11 late in the game, you should try to get a FG as soon as u reach the FG range. And the less timeouts u have - the earliest u should go for three.
I want a similar analysis on a related but slightly different scenario: what to do when you're down _15_ instead of 14. For years conventional wisdom has been kick the PAT to "make it a one score game". That's always driven me nuts because it's only a 1 score game if you assume you make the 2 point conversion later, and if you're assuming you're gonna make it. It doesn't matter when you do it. But if you _miss_, it's better to miss early so you have more time to react. When down 15, I think you should always go for 2 after the first TD. I want to see the math to know if I'm right
god yeah i hate that, if you miss the first 2pt you know what youre in for and have time go game plan. otherwise youre just banking on the percent chance to get the 2pt the second time around. idk why its normal to do the pat first!
I think the simplest way to explain this is in terms of coin flips. Assuming that extra points are guaranteed and both OT and 2-point conversions are around 50/50, it comes down to, would you rather have: Heads: Win Tails: Lose OR Heads: Win Tails: Flip another coin - Heads: OT, Tails: Lose
A coach may have his reasons for not doing this. In the 1980s, Tom Landry took a lot of heat in one game for not trying for a game-winning field goal when that seemed the obvious play. After losing the game and misspeaking about the decision in a press conference, some people were calling for his job, saying he was clearly washed up. But in fact, the kicker had been sketchy throughout the game, so even though the field goal attempt seemed obvious, Landry simply didn't trust his kicker to get the job done. Analytics is a tool, not an answer for every situation.
since this is predicated on the other team not scoring, i think another thing to keep in mind with that is the mental difference of a 6 point lead vs a 7 point lead. if you get the 2 point conversion, it puts more pressure on the opposing team to get atleast a field goal when they have the ball, vs a 7 (or 8) point lead allows them to be conservative and try to maximize time they chew off the clock. good video though!
If what you say is true and 2-point converts are successful 49% of the time while 1-point converts are successful 94% of the time, then it also follows that 2-point converts should be used in almost all situations all game long, barring specific point differentials late in the game.
This is where the dispersion might start playing effect: there are might not to be enough opportunities for the 2-point attempts to be viable In the provided scenario it works because we have a very specific scenario: scoring exactly 2 touchdowns before the end of the game and 14 point deficit.
7-ish years ago they had precisely this in mind when they moved the 1-pt conversion back from the 2yd line. They moved it far enough back that the probability of it succeeding was about 2x the probability of 2-pt conversions succeeding.
The statisticians have been saying that coaches should be going for 2 more often. And also going for it on 4th and short more often as well. Different analysts have different recommendations. Pretty much all of them advocate being more aggressive but some actually do advocate going for it all the time barring specific point differentials as you say. Especially below the NFL level where defenses are much more easily exploited.
Yes, you are correct. However, it's still pretty much a wash in most situations, and it's fair to argue that you create a lot of game tape for your opponents to study if you're going for 2 all of the time. It also increases the variance in your outcomes, which is generally *good* if you're a bad team (you're more likely to steal a win here and there than you are to blow a game using this strategy because you're already losing most of your games to begin with) and *bad* if you're a good team (the exact opposite of the scenario I just described.)
This has been driving me insane for years, and I was pumped to not only finally see it become the more common decision this last year, but actually see it result in a win (GB over NO). I believe the reason why it took so long to finally be used is the fact that it is hard to see success stories on so few samples - that is not because it is a bad strategy, but because the odds of winning when you are in this situation are pretty low to begin with. It's a strategy that probably increases win probability from like 22% to 23%. That said, when the Bills converted against my Bengals last year, I was terrified. The Bengals had outplayed them all game, and the idea that the Bills could steal one was terrifying. This could have been another success story, but luckily for me the Bengals moved the chains.
@@thekingbarrelmaker7642 It will eventually. Hopefully it just happens after the strategy is more well known and accepted or the outrage will get some coach fired for making a good decision
one of the faults of this study is that while the teams P(making_2p) might be > 38.2% statistically, there might be an issue with personnel or play availability... something to keep in mind.
Some teams are better at making conversions, and some teams are better at defending against it. So, depending on your team and who you are playing against, it can make sense NOT to go for it.
sure, but the math for that is impossible to figure out, especially considering that the sample size of that situation happening is < 10 total. it's probably close to independent though, and it would be more likely to be independent if this became a well known/accepted strategy
The problem is that the probability of making a 2 point conversion (or any play for that matter) is not the same as the probability of your team making the conversion at that moment. For example, you're playing a team with a really good goal-line D and you have a terrible goal life offense, or your offense is really tired that drive. etc. Its the coach's role to be able to accurately evaluate the actual probability of converting in that moment, and make decisions that increase the probability. This is why Brandon Staley failed. While, he made the "analytically smart decisions" he did it in a way that would actually minimize the probability of converting.
interesting you didn't explore *why* coaches are choosing to play it conservatively, simply writing it off as 'old-school'. there are very real pressures on them to perform, and by sticking their necks out to try something 'better but visibly risky', they're likely doing so more to not risk their very livelihood in case they get a bad break or two. the potential cost on a loss is not just losing that one game, it could be personally costly as well
I think the whole video is kind of an effort to undermine that “play it safe” mentality by coaches, changing the pressure from “I can’t believe you lost the game because you went for 2”, and instead becoming “I can’t believe you lost that game because you didn’t go for 2 the first time”. Until coaches are held to account for sub optimal choices by fan bases and the media, you’re right, the safer move for their career is to not take the more mathematically ideal approach.
What’s assumed in this calculation is the not-always-accurate constant of 50% overtime win. If a coach is more confident in his team he will be less likely to deploy this strategy. The proper calculation is “how likely do you have to be to win in overtime for the kick twice strategy to be optimal?”
At any time (not just the end game scenario shown here) if a team can score the 2 point conversion more than 50% of the time... Using the 2 point method will lead to higher scores.
Great video but the end caught me off guard. Wouldn’t the optimal decision for teams that’s convert a 2 pointer less than 38% of the time, not do this strategy? I guess what I’m saying is that there need’s to be more analytics that need to be involved in order for you to say “x amount of optimal play is still being left on the table.”
Nice video. I hope everyone followed the math. Of course there are secondary factors involved, like how you're moving the ball in that game, against that team. And as more teams go for two, more teams will practice longer against it, perhaps changing the probabilities.
I think there's another reason going for 2 when down by 8 is smart: if you make the 2 point conversion, you'll then be down by 6. If there's enough time (especially if you have all or at least some time-outs left), you might be able to get two more possessions. You could kick two field goals and tie the game. If my team was down by 6 with 2:30 left and 3 time outs left, and I was 4th-and-15 on the 30 yard line, I'd kick the FG and try for another possession.
If every team adopted this strategy the number of successful conversions would definitely trend downward. Teams that go for 2 now are more confident, probably because they're better in the redzone already, and the more teams do it the more defenses will adapt to them, there will be a lot more film to analyze. I'd like to see how the probability changes if every team defaulted to doing it.
that's a good point, and i would imagine that two point conversions would be practiced a lot more than they already are. something to note though is that the lower bound on a team's 2 pt conversion rate is ~27% (27% of plays at the opponent's 2 yd line result in a touchdown in any situation, and this includes 1-3rd down plays where the team isn't doing their all to score)
Average 2pt percentage doesn't apply to the individual team's percentage, especially when that can depend on the defense you are facing. The percentage is also artificially high, due to teams that have lower chances of success on the 2pt conversion take less attempts.
It boils down to, if there's a 50% chance of making a 2pt conversion and you get 2x chances, statistics says you will make 1/2 therefore tying the game at a minimum. So it has no advantage over strat 1. There is a 50% chance you make it on the FIRST attempt, that essentially guarantees a win, so it's worth it. That's where the increase win % comes from.
The probability of getting criticized for a loss after employing the 3 strategies is as follows: Strategy 1 yields a probability of 0%; Strategy 2 is about 50% because lots of people will love the "aggressive" approach to try to win it at the end; Strategy 3 will be 95% because few understand analytics and it's "too early" to go for 2 and the idiot is chasing points that are not needed. Human instinct is diametrically opposed to rational, mathematical reality. So, if you want to prosper as a coach, you need to ignore the best possible way to win games and instead pursue the best possible way to avoid criticism. Similar analytics also show how going for it on 4th down more frequently is a better strategy than kicking field goals. Same in baseball with sacrifice bunting a runner over to 2B. Statistically, you score more runs playing it straight and swinging the bat, but managers will always sac the runner over. Feelings are more important than data ... not just in politics, but in sports, too.
There is one advantage to strategy 1: minimizing injuries. Early in the season, a team down 8 should probably just kick and take the already likely L, because injuries are most common in a touchdown zone when players are closer and stakes are high. Late in the season, a go-for-it down 8 should be automatic
Assuming 100% on PAT is kind of dumb tbh. I get its "easier". But none of this math is hard. .94*.94*.5= .4418 Plus the scenario where you miss first kick then go for 2 on second. .06*.49*.5= .0147 .4565 = 45.65% to win when scoring two touch downs. Meanwhile, just look at the chance you succeed and then get the extra point. .49*.94= 46.06% chance to win before OT. This DOESNT EVEN ACCOUNT FOR BEING ABLE TO GO FOR TWO AGAIN. .51(fail) *.49 *.5= .1249 Lets say they changed the ruling where you could only go for two once a half. Math STILL says to go for it. Not to mention the benfits toward the health of your players to more likely avoid OT. Its a no brainer to go for it.
I would expect that the 2-point conversion success rate differs by time in the game and which team is attempting it. Has there been any analysis on whether 2-point conversions are more or less successful than average in the last 7 minutes of the game? If it’s less successful (because game theory tells us that the defense should be more aware of 2-point attempts and should be more diligent at not allowing the 2-point conversion to be successfully executed when they know the stakes are higher) in the last few minutes of the game, that would certainly change the maths. Also, when was the rule changed to push the 1-point EP kick back to the 20-yard line? It’s inconsistent to assume that statistics of successful conversion in the era when all EP attempts started on the 2-yard line with those that are kicked from the 20 or 2-point attempt at the 2.
Still waiting on any team to have a fake 2 point play, where one player drop kicks the ball for a successful PAT, when they fooled the other team into thinking it was a 2 point attempt instead. 😂
It's not "analytics". It's trivial high school math that should have been obvious as soon as the two point rule existed. Every one of these teams hire hundreds of people, and it took the entire league decades to just barely now get here
I mean, moving the extra point kick line 20 yards farther away in 2016 is a big factor in why 2-pt conversions are now more popular. But even ignoring that, close to 50% success in 2-pt conversions should make it just as attractive as a single point, but that's over a large sample size. Two or three attempts in a game can still result in no success, but still over the course of a season end up being 50% successful.
It's really simple. If you want to not lose you need two touchdowns and a defensive stop anyway. So in both scenarios that needs to happen. When kicking PATs you also need a third touchdown and the luck of a coin flip in OT. In the 2 point conversion scenario, you flip the coin on the first 2 point attempt. Either you get heads and an 8 point play, or tails and you only get 6. If you get heads you win the game with a second touchdown instead of a third. If you get tails, you have another coin flip opportunity to force overtime anyway on your second touchdown. Super simple. It seems like all 32 teams should be doing this every time in this scenario.
Football coaches, even winning NFL coaches, have been slow learners. For many years, coaches of teams trailing but hoping to catch up would save their time outs for when their offense has the ball. For quite a few years lately, however, they mostly have learned to save more time by calling their time outs while the other team has the ball. But, if they need only a field goal to not lose, and the other team has the ball, they still usually save a timeout for their offense because it takes about 18 seconds to get the field goal team onto the field. Never mind that saving the timeout to get those 18 seconds costs them more than 18 seconds when the other team kills the clock before running a play before which they could have used that timeout. The coaches still fear the disgrace of losing when they can't get the field goal team on the field more than they fear losing in general.
What I don’t like seeing is coaches chasing points way too early in the game. A good example of this is the Panthers-Patriots Super Bowl. If you follow the scoring progress of that game you will see that if Carolina would have just kicked extra points instead of going for 2 then that last game winning field goal by the Patriots would have been a game tying field goal.
There is a variable here that you may not realize actually has an effect - momentum. When you are down 2+ scores, you have more than a math problem getting a TD and then getting shut down on a 2 point conversion can actually really mess with your head. I’ve always thought teams should go for 2 every single time, but there is a reason that teams don’t always do these strategies when they’re down.
@@henrycheatum8546 I’m not entirely sure how to quantify it, but if you ask any NFL player they will tell you momentum is real. Pat McAfee has been beating that drum for a couple years now because some analyst said momentum isn’t legit in the NFL.
Good explanation. I wish the announcers were versed in probability. They make it sound like this is some strategy by GPT9 that we humans can't understand 😂🤦🏾♂️
With the success rate of 2-point conversions being 49%, that's pretty much the break even point between an all-kicking strategy to an all-running strategy for extra points. Like for instance, if you're doing that well on conversions and you lost your kicker, you'd still average just a little under 7 points per touchdown.
Also, keep in mind that "kick vs. go for 2" doesn't have to be "kick vs go for 2 and stick to that decision every single time no matter what." If you convert the deuce on the first touchdown, you don't have to go for it again! You can kick the second time and retain your advantage.
@@4jp Sure, but the video already notes that the success rate of kicking was 94% and rounded that up to 100%. I was purposefully vague about the two being almost the same, since I didn't want to calculate how close getting two points almost half the time was to getting one point almost all the time.
Wait. How could this be discussed in 1967? The NFL didn't have a 2 point conversion and the NCAA didn't have overtime. Nowhere to apply it, unless some states had it for high school.
I think the fact that the 2 point conversion was not legal in the NFL until 1994 has something to do with it (wait, the 2-point conversion has been around 30 years? I would have guessed 15...). Compare proper use of the 2 to effective use of the 3-point shot in the NBA- it also took about 30 years for coaches to understand how to use the 3- in the 80's the 3 was treated like a gimmick.
There is a BIG flaw in this logic. Even if we grant that your base probability assumptions are correct and accept the 38% threshold, you still go wrong with your statement "in the past five years 2-point conversions were successful 49% of the time." The obvious bias in this assertion is that the probability of successfully converting will always average out to 49%. Teams tend to go for the conversion when they have a team that is good at them. The data is skewed because of this. The only way we could know the true success rate is if we eliminated the PAT altogether and make every team go for two every time.
But most of the time teams don't choose to go for two because they have a good offense; they usually do it because it's needed to tie the game or if it's a no lose scenario, like if they're up by 1 point. It's not a perfect illustration for various reasons, but in 2023 only 4 teams were in the top 10 for both points per game and 2 point conversion attempts per game (note that two entirely random lists would likely have 2-4 teams overlapping). And sources generally put the conversion rate even for bad offenses at >40%. Obviously there are match-ups where which defense/offense each team has matters a great deal, but it's pretty clear that going for two when down by 8 late in the game is usually the best strategy.
There's another flaw in the logic, which hurts the XP attempt strategy: we assume that XPs are 100%. They aren't. There is about a 15-20% chance you'll miss one of the two XPs, which means the 2P attempt strategy is even more favorable than the simple math implies. (and the simple math still puts it way ahead!)
@@NashRespectI ran the numbers because I was curious. League average after moving the kick back to 15 yard line is 94.1%. Making two consecutively is 88.5%. You're right that rounding this up to 100% isn't accurate but wrong about the magnitude. Still in my opinion this ~12% moves the needle enough that I do think teams are going for 2pt attempts too infrequently - even when accounting for the "true" average being likely below 49%. There's quite a bit of wiggle room given 1pt is not 100%.
@@canadianbakn Yeah, I think I got the CFL XP rate mixed up with the NFL one. Not a huge difference though, but either way it moves the needle even further in the direction of winning in regulation.
But you can also look at conversion of touchdowns when you around around the same yard marker that the two point conversion is at. Most teams use the same plays when distance is similar
2:11: you’ve not yet mentioned the analytics part, yet claim the preeminence of Strategy 3 should be obvious. I certainly hope that there will be analytics coming in this vid, analytics that take into account a) how frequently is the 2 point attempt successful, b) how frequently is it made by teams who are down late in the game, and c) how frequently is it successful for ‘bad’ teams in that scenario.
Just finished… and the provided analytics don’t really cover it. If you were coach of the Carolina Panthers last year, what would it have looked like for you versus, say, the coach of the Philadelphia Eagles?
Your last chart has the y-axis either mislabeled or the numbers are wrong. It says percent going for two and the last season was at .6. So you plotted 6 out of 1000 (.6%). It should either be likelihood of going for two or be 60 instead of .6.
If extra points are made 94% of the time, and 2 point conversions are made 49% of the time, wouldn't it be reasonable to ALWAYS go for the 2 points!?!? Seems like the expectation value is 0.94 vs 0.98 to me... I mean in practice it depends on the probabilities of your team, not the overall average, and in certain game situations taking one point for a sure win makes more sense, but shouldn't we see much more 2 point attemps in, say, the first half of the game?
While I appreciate the pure mathmatical approach. I really think you should note when the 2 point coversion came to the NFL. And when the (1 point) extra point was move back from the 2 to the 15. Both changes are significantly relevant though would not change the conclusions.
Coaches leave wins on the table because they will get fired by people who reason with their gut instead of using probability.
Yes, and the fans are even worse.
Never forget to account for the stupid.
@@lucasmembrane4763 Don't forget talking heads on these sports networks.
This was the reason Phil Galfond suggested for why coaches are weary of going for the 2 point conversion in his video on the topic.
It's finally viewed as the smartest move so everyone does it. you win alot less games if they replace you, and if you lose the game and it looks like its your fault then you risk getting the boot. It was all about risk aversion. Which is why the NFL is a copy cat league, partly.
my left ear really loved this video good work
Thought it was my headphones
world's most panned audio frfr
RUclips could and probably should add "mix to mono" as an option next to "stable volume".
The video’s audio went wide left.
@@mal2ksc and an option to change the sync on the audio while they're at it
The NFL making the extra point longer a few years ago is what prompted the popularization of this strategy. Missed extra points, while still not the norm, are much more common than they used to be, thus making the "kick twice" strategy much less of a sure bet than it was before.
Wait. 2 point conversions have a 49% chance of succeeding? Thats way better than I thought.
I forgot where but the average nfl play goes for something like 2.5ish yards per play
Edit
I might be wrong but the worst offense team by total yards in 2023 was the Carolina Panthers at 4510 yards or 265.29 yards per game. NFL team usually play 60ish plays on offense per game and that using that and the Panthers data for 2023 equals 4.42 yards per snap.
Of course anything might happen on any particular play and some say it's easier to play defense at the goal line. So 49 percent seems logical to me
@@Michael-sb8jf The average play went for 5.3 yards last season. This has been measured since 1932 and the lowest it ever got was 3.6 y/p in 1935. It has literally never been close to 2.5ish yards per play. It hasn't even dipped below 5 y/p in 30 years.
@@Michael-sb8jfIs that applicable at the 2 yard mark?
@@DoubleTTB22you can’t just lump all plays together like that though. Down, distance, game clock, and obviously field position are all significant factors that go into the yards gained on a play and how difficult it was to get them.
@@osrsfl618 He (DoubleTT) replied to him (Michael) just about average play.
For those wondering the exact value of 0.382 is (3-√5)/2
little golden ratio in there
Not really @@alexleach4002
John urschel (ex NFL lineman now full time mathematician) does a good short demonstration of this fact. It's really just some simple algebra and solving quadratic formulas
I tried many times to explain this as a HS coach to the other staff and it just fell on deaf ears. One of the reasons I am no longer coaching.
Probably even better for many HS teams, where PAT kicks are less consistent than high levels.
I hope you were able to pick up the pieces after you were fired. What type coach were you?
What field did you end up in? All the best.
@@MovieMakingMan I quit and play poker full time now haha. That experience helped me realize people are just going to do what they are comfortable with despite hard evidence there are better ways. Thought why fight it? Just play a game where you can make the most of it,
@@alexleach4002 That’s quite the career change. You must be a great player to do it professionally. Do you tend to play the same group of people a lot of the time?
@@alexleach4002 going from that to playing poker professionally is funny as fuck
I've seen a *lot* of discussion of this tactic over the years and I find it rare that someone writing a piece like this actually describes an aspect that helps explain why this strategy works. To be clear, the probabilities described in the video are correct, but intuitively, it can be difficult to get past "if the deuce is a coin flip and worth about 1 point as a result, how are you actually gaining an advantage by going for 2 the first time?"
The answer is that this strategy changes the chances of different outcomes compared to the "kick twice" strategy. Let's assume that the kick is 100% and the deuce is 50% just to make the math easier. Long story short, if you "kick twice," you are going to score 14 points 100% of the time. If you "kick first, deuce second," you are going to score 13 points 50% of the time and 15 points 50% of the time. If you use the video's strategy "deuce first, decide second", you're going to score 15 points 50% of the time, 14 points 25% of the time, and *12* points 25% of the time.
The key is that "14 points 25% of the time, 12 points 25% of the time" part. That's the difference between "kick first, deuce second" and "deuce first, react second." You run the risk of scoring only *12* points, which neither of the other strategies risks. But big deal!!! Scoring 12 and scoring 13 are functionally equivalent in this situation. So "deuce first, decide second" converts some of the losses from "kick first, deuce second" into *ties*, giving you a chance to win in overtime.
Essentially, what you risk is "we'll sometimes score only 12 points from the two touchdowns"...but 12 points is the same as scoring 13 in this scenario because you lose the game either way. But what you *gain* is "we'll score 15 points (to win) or 14 points (to tie)" more frequently, and *that's* how this strategy increases your chances of winning. It's "win a few more games" in exchange for "a few of the games that we *do* lose will be lost by a greater margin, but we will lose fewer such games."
thanks for the clear explanation
So in essense, deuce works at its best after a kick, as the chances of an undesirable result is 50/50, whereas deuce and deuce risks 50/25/25... and its potential gain outweighs the potential loss.
50/50 > 50/25/25
@@kyperactivewhat kind of troll is this? That is literally not at all what the entire video or this comment said
@@krazzed3243 ?
This isnt a troll though?
This is based on my understanding, you can feel free to correct me on this. Unlike with a divorce, my reasoning can be fixed if you were communicative instead of reactionary.
@kyperactive sorry I kind of immediately assumed it was a troll cause we're on the internet and too many people these days troll for reactions.
Let's go through the issue: given this 50/50 for extra points then deuce you have a 50% chance to win and 50% chance to lose. The other strategy (strategy 3: 50, 25, 25) the 50% is still a straight win like the kick first strategy. The middle 25% is a tie which goes to OT. Supposing both teams are equally likely to win overtime this means you win half of that 25% of the time where you tied at end of regulation. This means you win 12.5% of the time there. You still lose 25% of the time (didn't make either 2 point conversion) but the other 12.5 + 25% only amounts to you losing 37.5% of the time and winning 62.5% of the time which is better than the kick first strategy.
So deuce first strategy with option to kick second if first made or do a second deuce attempt if first failed strictly dominates kick first. So 50/25/25 > 50/50
In 1969 Texas went for two down 14-6 in the 4th quarter to Arkansas. So I guess coaches have known rarely using this for a long time.
There was no OT at the time, so not quite the same. But still similar. (just that the odds of OT are "odds of tie")
There is one scenario that further increases the odds. If you convert on the first attempt, you have the option to kick two field goals should your next drive stall short of the goal line - which increases your odds of tying the game.
What needs to also be considered is that by converting the first two pointer the other team becomes more motivated to score on their drive
Not sure if it got mentioned or not in the video, but teams have actually known this for a long time now. Coaches were just never brave enough to do it because if it failed they would likely lose their jobs.
He specifically mentions how long teams have known this
My left ear didn't enjoy this
You had your earbuds in backward then
Good stuff. My only critique would be on the way you explained the maths behind the different strategies.
None of it is wrong, btw, but I think a visual representation (decision tree, flowchart, etc.) is more effective when breaking down probabilities to a general audience that might not be familiar with this stuff.
Anyways- Sports stats nerds like us seem to be entering into a golden age so I’m always stoked to see new content around it! Subbed.
The numbers for 2-pt conversion success rate only go up if you couple it with burgeoning 4th down philosophies; if coaches opt for offensive plays on 4th down rather than punting, then you only need to average 2.5 yards per play to make the requisite 10 yards for a first down. The NFL 2-pt attempt starts from the 2-yard line, so if one's entire offense is geared around getting 2.5 yards then you have basically your entire playbook at your disposal for the goalline attempt as opposed to historically niche schemes reserved specifically for the 2-pt attempt.
I've thought this way for quite a while, but one assumption that I think needs to be challenged before the argument is water-tight is whether or not teams truly do have a 50% change of winning in overtime. Intuitively, let's say team A scores 14 points in the first quarter, and then their offense is completely flat the rest of the game. Team B starts off not having any competency on offense, but picks up steam in the fourth quarter and scores 14 quickly to tie up the game. Which team are you putting your money on to win in OT?
Let's introduce a variable a representing overtime win probability into the equations. The team following strategy 1 has a win probability of a, while the team following strategy 3 has a win probability of making 2pt + a(making 2pt) - a(making 2pt)^2. With this new variable, any team that is >66% confident of winning in overtime (and also is certain of making both extra points) should now prefer strategy 1, assuming the league average for 2 point conversion percentage.
So maybe this is an interesting statistic to track this upcoming NFL season - when teams do make the rare, late-game 14 point comeback, what are their chances of winning in overtime?
I was just thinking about this. I also think teams should go for two if they are the first team to score with a touchdown. If they fail, the losing team is still 2 field goals away. If they succeed, the other team is now in a much riskier spot.
Agreed
Great video man! I always love to see a team go for two at the right time, just makes so much sense in so many cases.
I like to explain this as playing to win rather than playing to not lose. Cool to see the whole breakdown of the situation!
I have another strategy that I think will emerge in the next several years: if a team is down 9 10 or 11 late in the game, you should try to get a FG as soon as u reach the FG range. And the less timeouts u have - the earliest u should go for three.
I want a similar analysis on a related but slightly different scenario: what to do when you're down _15_ instead of 14.
For years conventional wisdom has been kick the PAT to "make it a one score game". That's always driven me nuts because it's only a 1 score game if you assume you make the 2 point conversion later, and if you're assuming you're gonna make it. It doesn't matter when you do it. But if you _miss_, it's better to miss early so you have more time to react.
When down 15, I think you should always go for 2 after the first TD. I want to see the math to know if I'm right
Go for 2 in the first quarter and you will be down 13 instead of 14.
god yeah i hate that, if you miss the first 2pt you know what youre in for and have time go game plan. otherwise youre just banking on the percent chance to get the 2pt the second time around. idk why its normal to do the pat first!
I think the simplest way to explain this is in terms of coin flips. Assuming that extra points are guaranteed and both OT and 2-point conversions are around 50/50, it comes down to, would you rather have:
Heads: Win
Tails: Lose
OR
Heads: Win
Tails: Flip another coin - Heads: OT, Tails: Lose
mans really pulled out probability theory to explain 2 point conversions😭😭😭
A coach may have his reasons for not doing this. In the 1980s, Tom Landry took a lot of heat in one game for not trying for a game-winning field goal when that seemed the obvious play. After losing the game and misspeaking about the decision in a press conference, some people were calling for his job, saying he was clearly washed up. But in fact, the kicker had been sketchy throughout the game, so even though the field goal attempt seemed obvious, Landry simply didn't trust his kicker to get the job done.
Analytics is a tool, not an answer for every situation.
since this is predicated on the other team not scoring, i think another thing to keep in mind with that is the mental difference of a 6 point lead vs a 7 point lead. if you get the 2 point conversion, it puts more pressure on the opposing team to get atleast a field goal when they have the ball, vs a 7 (or 8) point lead allows them to be conservative and try to maximize time they chew off the clock. good video though!
If what you say is true and 2-point converts are successful 49% of the time while 1-point converts are successful 94% of the time, then it also follows that 2-point converts should be used in almost all situations all game long, barring specific point differentials late in the game.
This is where the dispersion might start playing effect: there are might not to be enough opportunities for the 2-point attempts to be viable
In the provided scenario it works because we have a very specific scenario: scoring exactly 2 touchdowns before the end of the game and 14 point deficit.
Not necessarily as the 7th point will often be more important to obtain than the right point (as 2 field goals reaches 6 points)
7-ish years ago they had precisely this in mind when they moved the 1-pt conversion back from the 2yd line. They moved it far enough back that the probability of it succeeding was about 2x the probability of 2-pt conversions succeeding.
The statisticians have been saying that coaches should be going for 2 more often. And also going for it on 4th and short more often as well. Different analysts have different recommendations. Pretty much all of them advocate being more aggressive but some actually do advocate going for it all the time barring specific point differentials as you say. Especially below the NFL level where defenses are much more easily exploited.
Yes, you are correct. However, it's still pretty much a wash in most situations, and it's fair to argue that you create a lot of game tape for your opponents to study if you're going for 2 all of the time.
It also increases the variance in your outcomes, which is generally *good* if you're a bad team (you're more likely to steal a win here and there than you are to blow a game using this strategy because you're already losing most of your games to begin with) and *bad* if you're a good team (the exact opposite of the scenario I just described.)
This has been driving me insane for years, and I was pumped to not only finally see it become the more common decision this last year, but actually see it result in a win (GB over NO). I believe the reason why it took so long to finally be used is the fact that it is hard to see success stories on so few samples - that is not because it is a bad strategy, but because the odds of winning when you are in this situation are pretty low to begin with. It's a strategy that probably increases win probability from like 22% to 23%.
That said, when the Bills converted against my Bengals last year, I was terrified. The Bengals had outplayed them all game, and the idea that the Bills could steal one was terrifying. This could have been another success story, but luckily for me the Bengals moved the chains.
It also happened in Titans-Dolphins last year. But there has not yet been an occurrence where the strategy directly resulted in a regulation loss.
@@thekingbarrelmaker7642 It will eventually. Hopefully it just happens after the strategy is more well known and accepted or the outrage will get some coach fired for making a good decision
one of the faults of this study is that while the teams P(making_2p) might be > 38.2% statistically, there might be an issue with personnel or play availability... something to keep in mind.
Go for 2, AND
always on sides kick offs,AND
Go for it on 4th down!
Some teams are better at making conversions, and some teams are better at defending against it. So, depending on your team and who you are playing against, it can make sense NOT to go for it.
Except probably no team is as good or bad as the 38% threshold required.
The probability of scoring the second TD is correlated with the success of the first 2PT, even if this model assumes they’re independent
sure, but the math for that is impossible to figure out, especially considering that the sample size of that situation happening is < 10 total. it's probably close to independent though, and it would be more likely to be independent if this became a well known/accepted strategy
In defense of coaches of old, the probability of making a two point try was thought to be 0.33, which is lower than the threshold of 0.38.
not sure how far back you're talking about but the odds of an extra point back then was probably much lower also.
@@Sashinator0 It is fun to watch videos from back when kickers were straight on style. Far more missed extra points, fewer long field goals.
if you have your headphones slightly unplugged you can hear it from both ears
I finally have something to contribute to conversation once fall hits lol
Really cool video. Thanks for walking us through the math
Well maybe the coach doesn't think they can make the point thst tome or higher chance to win in OT
In 2013 Week 17, a must-win game. Green Bay went for 2 down TWO.
This one barely counts as analytics and almost qualifies as basic math, which makes it even more disappointing that it took so long to be accepted.
Great video and explanation
This is a good analysis. Teams also need to punt much less than they do.
The problem is that the probability of making a 2 point conversion (or any play for that matter) is not the same as the probability of your team making the conversion at that moment. For example, you're playing a team with a really good goal-line D and you have a terrible goal life offense, or your offense is really tired that drive. etc.
Its the coach's role to be able to accurately evaluate the actual probability of converting in that moment, and make decisions that increase the probability. This is why Brandon Staley failed. While, he made the "analytically smart decisions" he did it in a way that would actually minimize the probability of converting.
interesting you didn't explore *why* coaches are choosing to play it conservatively, simply writing it off as 'old-school'. there are very real pressures on them to perform, and by sticking their necks out to try something 'better but visibly risky', they're likely doing so more to not risk their very livelihood in case they get a bad break or two. the potential cost on a loss is not just losing that one game, it could be personally costly as well
I think the whole video is kind of an effort to undermine that “play it safe” mentality by coaches, changing the pressure from “I can’t believe you lost the game because you went for 2”, and instead becoming “I can’t believe you lost that game because you didn’t go for 2 the first time”. Until coaches are held to account for sub optimal choices by fan bases and the media, you’re right, the safer move for their career is to not take the more mathematically ideal approach.
@@chrishays1740 sure, and that helps/matters, but ultimately the public and the media aren't in charge of hiring/firing decisions - owners are
Playing to win helps the coach keep the job, but playing not to lose makes it easier for him to get his next job
This is a math video, and that's a psychology question.
What’s assumed in this calculation is the not-always-accurate constant of 50% overtime win. If a coach is more confident in his team he will be less likely to deploy this strategy.
The proper calculation is “how likely do you have to be to win in overtime for the kick twice strategy to be optimal?”
Hopefully fans will start to understand this decision.
I hate the talk after an unsuccessful conversion like it was a bad decision or sth.
At any time (not just the end game scenario shown here) if a team can score the 2 point conversion more than 50% of the time...
Using the 2 point method will lead to higher scores.
Great video but the end caught me off guard. Wouldn’t the optimal decision for teams that’s convert a 2 pointer less than 38% of the time, not do this strategy?
I guess what I’m saying is that there need’s to be more analytics that need to be involved in order for you to say “x amount of optimal play is still being left on the table.”
Based!
Nice video. I hope everyone followed the math. Of course there are secondary factors involved, like how you're moving the ball in that game, against that team. And as more teams go for two, more teams will practice longer against it, perhaps changing the probabilities.
I think there's another reason going for 2 when down by 8 is smart: if you make the 2 point conversion, you'll then be down by 6. If there's enough time (especially if you have all or at least some time-outs left), you might be able to get two more possessions. You could kick two field goals and tie the game. If my team was down by 6 with 2:30 left and 3 time outs left, and I was 4th-and-15 on the 30 yard line, I'd kick the FG and try for another possession.
If every team adopted this strategy the number of successful conversions would definitely trend downward. Teams that go for 2 now are more confident, probably because they're better in the redzone already, and the more teams do it the more defenses will adapt to them, there will be a lot more film to analyze. I'd like to see how the probability changes if every team defaulted to doing it.
that's a good point, and i would imagine that two point conversions would be practiced a lot more than they already are. something to note though is that the lower bound on a team's 2 pt conversion rate is ~27% (27% of plays at the opponent's 2 yd line result in a touchdown in any situation, and this includes 1-3rd down plays where the team isn't doing their all to score)
Average 2pt percentage doesn't apply to the individual team's percentage, especially when that can depend on the defense you are facing. The percentage is also artificially high, due to teams that have lower chances of success on the 2pt conversion take less attempts.
It boils down to, if there's a 50% chance of making a 2pt conversion and you get 2x chances, statistics says you will make 1/2 therefore tying the game at a minimum. So it has no advantage over strat 1.
There is a 50% chance you make it on the FIRST attempt, that essentially guarantees a win, so it's worth it. That's where the increase win % comes from.
The probability of getting criticized for a loss after employing the 3 strategies is as follows: Strategy 1 yields a probability of 0%; Strategy 2 is about 50% because lots of people will love the "aggressive" approach to try to win it at the end; Strategy 3 will be 95% because few understand analytics and it's "too early" to go for 2 and the idiot is chasing points that are not needed. Human instinct is diametrically opposed to rational, mathematical reality. So, if you want to prosper as a coach, you need to ignore the best possible way to win games and instead pursue the best possible way to avoid criticism.
Similar analytics also show how going for it on 4th down more frequently is a better strategy than kicking field goals. Same in baseball with sacrifice bunting a runner over to 2B. Statistically, you score more runs playing it straight and swinging the bat, but managers will always sac the runner over. Feelings are more important than data ... not just in politics, but in sports, too.
It's the Monty Hall 2-point Conversion Problem.
I cannot believe it took this long for people to figure this out.
Interesting video. I’m wondering of the teams who deployed option 3 in 2023 how many went on to actually win the game?
There is one advantage to strategy 1: minimizing injuries.
Early in the season, a team down 8 should probably just kick and take the already likely L, because injuries are most common in a touchdown zone when players are closer and stakes are high. Late in the season, a go-for-it down 8 should be automatic
Assuming 100% on PAT is kind of dumb tbh. I get its "easier". But none of this math is hard.
.94*.94*.5= .4418
Plus the scenario where you miss first kick then go for 2 on second.
.06*.49*.5= .0147
.4565 = 45.65% to win when scoring two touch downs.
Meanwhile, just look at the chance you succeed and then get the extra point.
.49*.94= 46.06% chance to win before OT.
This DOESNT EVEN ACCOUNT FOR BEING ABLE TO GO FOR TWO AGAIN.
.51(fail) *.49 *.5= .1249
Lets say they changed the ruling where you could only go for two once a half. Math STILL says to go for it. Not to mention the benfits toward the health of your players to more likely avoid OT. Its a no brainer to go for it.
I would expect that the 2-point conversion success rate differs by time in the game and which team is attempting it. Has there been any analysis on whether 2-point conversions are more or less successful than average in the last 7 minutes of the game? If it’s less successful (because game theory tells us that the defense should be more aware of 2-point attempts and should be more diligent at not allowing the 2-point conversion to be successfully executed when they know the stakes are higher) in the last few minutes of the game, that would certainly change the maths.
Also, when was the rule changed to push the 1-point EP kick back to the 20-yard line? It’s inconsistent to assume that statistics of successful conversion in the era when all EP attempts started on the 2-yard line with those that are kicked from the 20 or 2-point attempt at the 2.
Still waiting on any team to have a fake 2 point play, where one player drop kicks the ball for a successful PAT, when they fooled the other team into thinking it was a 2 point attempt instead. 😂
A drop kick from the 2 yard line is not a legal point-after attempt under NFL rules.
It's not "analytics". It's trivial high school math that should have been obvious as soon as the two point rule existed. Every one of these teams hire hundreds of people, and it took the entire league decades to just barely now get here
I mean, moving the extra point kick line 20 yards farther away in 2016 is a big factor in why 2-pt conversions are now more popular.
But even ignoring that, close to 50% success in 2-pt conversions should make it just as attractive as a single point, but that's over a large sample size. Two or three attempts in a game can still result in no success, but still over the course of a season end up being 50% successful.
This always seemed pretty obvious to me without the math. Glad to see teams are actually doing it.
Good video, very interesting! Would love to see some more math analysis regarding decision-making in football
It's really simple. If you want to not lose you need two touchdowns and a defensive stop anyway. So in both scenarios that needs to happen. When kicking PATs you also need a third touchdown and the luck of a coin flip in OT. In the 2 point conversion scenario, you flip the coin on the first 2 point attempt. Either you get heads and an 8 point play, or tails and you only get 6. If you get heads you win the game with a second touchdown instead of a third. If you get tails, you have another coin flip opportunity to force overtime anyway on your second touchdown. Super simple. It seems like all 32 teams should be doing this every time in this scenario.
Nice video, I'd be interested in seeing how the actual win probability lines up with the actual results.
Bill Barwell had an article on this after the 2015 (played in Jan '16) Chiefs vs Pats playoff game
If team A is down 14 to 0 with 5 minutes to go, you have evidence that the teams are not evenly matched.
If you find that evidence persuasive, you should pursue the third strategy more often because your chances to win in overtime are less than 50%
Great breakdown of the strategy! looking forward to what you got coming
Very well-done video! Can't believe you only have 30 subs!
He might have 60 if he didn’t discriminate against right ears
Great video, only note is that the graph at the end the y axis is labeled as percentages but the units aren't applicable
Football coaches, even winning NFL coaches, have been slow learners. For many years, coaches of teams trailing but hoping to catch up would save their time outs for when their offense has the ball. For quite a few years lately, however, they mostly have learned to save more time by calling their time outs while the other team has the ball. But, if they need only a field goal to not lose, and the other team has the ball, they still usually save a timeout for their offense because it takes about 18 seconds to get the field goal team onto the field. Never mind that saving the timeout to get those 18 seconds costs them more than 18 seconds when the other team kills the clock before running a play before which they could have used that timeout. The coaches still fear the disgrace of losing when they can't get the field goal team on the field more than they fear losing in general.
This is fairly straightforward - NFL teams use EVERY possible edge kinda wierd they are not embracing this 100%
What I don’t like seeing is coaches chasing points way too early in the game. A good example of this is the Panthers-Patriots Super Bowl. If you follow the scoring progress of that game you will see that if Carolina would have just kicked extra points instead of going for 2 then that last game winning field goal by the Patriots would have been a game tying field goal.
There is a variable here that you may not realize actually has an effect - momentum. When you are down 2+ scores, you have more than a math problem getting a TD and then getting shut down on a 2 point conversion can actually really mess with your head. I’ve always thought teams should go for 2 every single time, but there is a reason that teams don’t always do these strategies when they’re down.
I don’t think we have proof that momentum really exists in the NFL
@@henrycheatum8546 I’m not entirely sure how to quantify it, but if you ask any NFL player they will tell you momentum is real. Pat McAfee has been beating that drum for a couple years now because some analyst said momentum isn’t legit in the NFL.
The left side of my headphones doesn't work so this video is just silent.
Chip Kelly was ahead of the game again
Good explanation. I wish the announcers were versed in probability. They make it sound like this is some strategy by GPT9 that we humans can't understand 😂🤦🏾♂️
I suck at stats, but I love 'em. Nice math.
With the success rate of 2-point conversions being 49%, that's pretty much the break even point between an all-kicking strategy to an all-running strategy for extra points. Like for instance, if you're doing that well on conversions and you lost your kicker, you'd still average just a little under 7 points per touchdown.
Assuming all kicks hit the goal target. They probably don't so you would have to multiply that 1 points times the probability of getting a kick.
Also, keep in mind that "kick vs. go for 2" doesn't have to be "kick vs go for 2 and stick to that decision every single time no matter what." If you convert the deuce on the first touchdown, you don't have to go for it again! You can kick the second time and retain your advantage.
@@4jp Sure, but the video already notes that the success rate of kicking was 94% and rounded that up to 100%. I was purposefully vague about the two being almost the same, since I didn't want to calculate how close getting two points almost half the time was to getting one point almost all the time.
@@Tickenest You bet. I was just simplifying to see where the break even point was.
Quick question; why did you do some of the text in manim (like the animation at 3:37), but then do the plot at 4:46 in Desmos?
My left ear LOVED this. Righty...
an interesting stat would be the % of teams that won when they used the 2pt strategy
Wait. How could this be discussed in 1967?
The NFL didn't have a 2 point conversion and the NCAA didn't have overtime. Nowhere to apply it, unless some states had it for high school.
The AFL had the 2 point conversion prior to the merger with the NFL.
A bird in hand turns out NOT to be worth two in the bush.
If the conversion rate is over 50% it ought to be a no-brainer.
I think the fact that the 2 point conversion was not legal in the NFL until 1994 has something to do with it (wait, the 2-point conversion has been around 30 years? I would have guessed 15...). Compare proper use of the 2 to effective use of the 3-point shot in the NBA- it also took about 30 years for coaches to understand how to use the 3- in the 80's the 3 was treated like a gimmick.
fun fact the % needed ito justify going for it is the small portion of the golden ratio!
There is a BIG flaw in this logic. Even if we grant that your base probability assumptions are correct and accept the 38% threshold, you still go wrong with your statement "in the past five years 2-point conversions were successful 49% of the time." The obvious bias in this assertion is that the probability of successfully converting will always average out to 49%. Teams tend to go for the conversion when they have a team that is good at them. The data is skewed because of this. The only way we could know the true success rate is if we eliminated the PAT altogether and make every team go for two every time.
But most of the time teams don't choose to go for two because they have a good offense; they usually do it because it's needed to tie the game or if it's a no lose scenario, like if they're up by 1 point. It's not a perfect illustration for various reasons, but in 2023 only 4 teams were in the top 10 for both points per game and 2 point conversion attempts per game (note that two entirely random lists would likely have 2-4 teams overlapping). And sources generally put the conversion rate even for bad offenses at >40%.
Obviously there are match-ups where which defense/offense each team has matters a great deal, but it's pretty clear that going for two when down by 8 late in the game is usually the best strategy.
There's another flaw in the logic, which hurts the XP attempt strategy: we assume that XPs are 100%. They aren't. There is about a 15-20% chance you'll miss one of the two XPs, which means the 2P attempt strategy is even more favorable than the simple math implies. (and the simple math still puts it way ahead!)
@@NashRespectI ran the numbers because I was curious. League average after moving the kick back to 15 yard line is 94.1%. Making two consecutively is 88.5%. You're right that rounding this up to 100% isn't accurate but wrong about the magnitude. Still in my opinion this ~12% moves the needle enough that I do think teams are going for 2pt attempts too infrequently - even when accounting for the "true" average being likely below 49%. There's quite a bit of wiggle room given 1pt is not 100%.
@@canadianbakn Yeah, I think I got the CFL XP rate mixed up with the NFL one. Not a huge difference though, but either way it moves the needle even further in the direction of winning in regulation.
But you can also look at conversion of touchdowns when you around around the same yard marker that the two point conversion is at. Most teams use the same plays when distance is similar
Good video but the mic* audio is all panned to left. see if mic is in mono or stereo
can't hear the comentary. I suspect they are only on the left channel as that speaker is broken
Next they might start not punting inside the oponents 50.
my left ear just gave up
get this man more subs so he can afford dual channel audio
Audio only from the left after the intro?
Oops, sorry about that. I'll make sure that's fixed in the next video
@@HunterHacking
Interesting coincidence: the winningest teams in the NBA shoot around 38% on threes.
math and sports are a match made in heaven
2:11: you’ve not yet mentioned the analytics part, yet claim the preeminence of Strategy 3 should be obvious. I certainly hope that there will be analytics coming in this vid, analytics that take into account a) how frequently is the 2 point attempt successful, b) how frequently is it made by teams who are down late in the game, and c) how frequently is it successful for ‘bad’ teams in that scenario.
Just finished… and the provided analytics don’t really cover it. If you were coach of the Carolina Panthers last year, what would it have looked like for you versus, say, the coach of the Philadelphia Eagles?
Your last chart has the y-axis either mislabeled or the numbers are wrong. It says percent going for two and the last season was at .6. So you plotted 6 out of 1000 (.6%). It should either be likelihood of going for two or be 60 instead of .6.
If extra points are made 94% of the time, and 2 point conversions are made 49% of the time, wouldn't it be reasonable to ALWAYS go for the 2 points!?!? Seems like the expectation value is 0.94 vs 0.98 to me... I mean in practice it depends on the probabilities of your team, not the overall average, and in certain game situations taking one point for a sure win makes more sense, but shouldn't we see much more 2 point attemps in, say, the first half of the game?
While I appreciate the pure mathmatical approach. I really think you should note when the 2 point coversion came to the NFL. And when the (1 point) extra point was move back from the 2 to the 15. Both changes are significantly relevant though would not change the conclusions.
There's a reason why they're coaching football and not teaching mathematics.
Cool video!