General Longstreet was "in their shoes" and "in their time," and he is said to have remarked directly to General Lee at the time, "no 15,000 men ever made could take that ridge."
Yup. And even if they did, as others have pointed out, I don't see how they'd have been able to hold it more than momentarily anyway. And that includes if Stuart's cav had succeeded.
@@thodan467 If you read Douglas Southall Freeman’s biography of Gen. Lee, “RE Lee,” Longstreet sulked for several hours after Lee gave him the order, because he didn’t want to do it. That gave the Union side enough time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge with more men, thereby making it more difficult to take. If Longstreet had carried out Lee’s order promptly, it would have been quite feasible to take it and hold it. Longstreet had been drinking, was intoxicated, and was derelict in his duties. Confederate officers after the war blamed Longstreet for this, which has become lost in the shuffle with northern propagandists rewriting the history of the war in such a way as to make the South look bad and the North look like little angels (LOL). To blame Lee for the outcome of this charge is absolutely incorrect. He accepted the blame strictly because he was a gentleman and Longstreet, with the exception of this, was one of his more competent corps commanders. The Confederates actually did take the ridge briefly but couldn’t hold it, because their ranks were too decimated. That underscores the fact that if Longstreet had carried out Lee’s order quickly, they would have taken it and probably held it, and this might have changed the outcome of the entire battle.
I never understood this justification for Pickett's Charge. The Union army had internal lines; they could move troops wherever they were needed most. In addition, the Charge had no support. Even if the Confederates had broken through and established a small bridgehead on Cemetery Ridge, it would only have been a matter of time before the federals pushed them back.
As always- love these reports and love the history and debates which follow. The quote at the end sums it up nicely: retrospect has a 20/20 clarity. I’m a massive fan of Lee’s military leadership, but even he made frontal mistakes (like Malvern Hill) which require almost perfect coordination and numerical advantage (like Gaines Mill) to succeed. I feel that the contemporary observations of men like Porter Alexander and, of course, Longstreet nevertheless suggest that a strong case can be made that Lee was mistaken on the 3rd. Again, massive room for good debate on this topic. One thing not open for debate is the staggering courage of the men on both sides of that charge. Also, looking at Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, Malvern Hill, Franklin etc- it’s fairly clear that a frontal assault on an entrenched position without substantial support from the flanks is and was a doomed endeavor. Any way, keep the history coming and thank you for all you do to with the Trust to preserve the battlefields and history of this critical moment in the American narrative. Can’t thank you enough. Truly.
@@johnwhite2576 It's certainly accurate to say Lee *thought* he needed a decisive victory. What he *needed* was to grind down the northern will to fight so that Lincoln would lose the election of '64. A victory on northern soil would have been nice, of course, but far from necessary, and not worth the likelihood of a catastrophic loss of manpower.
putting ourselves back into their shoes to understand these events. Yes, Garry and you, along with your colleagues at ABT, do so much to simplify into understandable nuggets of intellectual gold that enriches everyone that tunes into this great website!!! Thank you, sir, Thank you!!!
Is it possible that General Jeb Stuart had orders to swing around to the back of the Union lines and attack the Union Center from the Rear during Pickett’s Charge? And since General Custer stopped him, wouldn’t that mean that General Custer was a key factor (amongst others) in saving the battle of Gettysburg?
Alot of the anticuster movement after the war downplayed alot of his achievements. Without Jeb's intel, Lee was fighting blind, most history books i have read ignore custer during gettisburg all together. Between custer and bad fuses on the cannon balls was the main reason picket failed.
@@ronallens6204 I never heard about bad fuses. Will keep that in mind. I thought that the more accurate Union artillery kept the trains from bringing up stores for the Southern guns and the "charge" needed to go ahead regardless.
Stuart's mission to swing around to the Union rear WAS a key component of Lee's plan on July 3rd 1863 at Gettysburg. If Stuart had penetrated the rear of the Union center, it would have been one half of a classic " pincer movement", with Pickett-Pettigrew being the other half. It may have been in Lee's mind that this could be a glorious event for Stuart, thus, redeeming himself from his earlier failure to : " feel the right of the Army" after crossing the Potomac, as Lee had ordered. Unfortunately for Stuart, he led his troopers down a NARROW path through the woods, emerging at the Rummel Farm, where Custer's almost suicidal charges were able to stem the advance of the head of Stuart's column, allowing time for federal cavalry reinforcements to appear and end the danger.
@@johnfoster535 Howdy John Foster. There are two different sides to this discussion. Those people who discount General Custer rely on the lack of documentation about General Stuart’s orders. In the heat of battle many orders are verbally given and there is little time to document them. And it seems logical that General Stuart and General Lee would have made some reference to any orders given to General Stuart to attack the Union Rear, if not immediately after the battle, at least at some point (by General Lee) after the war in the form of an explanation. The lack of any documented reference for a coordinated attack has left open the question of General Stuart’s intentions and so the relevance of General Custer’s role in the battle. The other side of the discussion (a side that I personally embrace) considers the cultural environment of the period and the physical troop movements by General Stuart. Everyone is aware of General Stuart’s screwup prior to the battle. His dressing down by General Lee is well documented. So here is the question. Did General Lee give General Stuart verbal orders to attack the Union Center’s Rear, and when General Stuart failed to reach his objective, did General Lee, after the battle, intentionally document General Stuart’s orders to simply have General Stuart protect the Confederate Left and exploit any breakthrough caused by General Pickett’s charge? Such a decision would safeguard General Stuart’s reputation and honor at a time when the Army of the South, after such a terrible defeat, needed it badly. At the same time, General Lee may have considered that he was personally critically responsible for sending General Stuart on a mission without any knowledge of the forces that General Stuart was facing in the Union’s rear. General Lee’s honor would have rebelled at allowing General Stuart to take the blame for his own gamble that failed. Would an order to attack the Union’s rear during Pickett’s charge be out of character for a General who graduated at the top of his class and is generally regarded as the most brilliant General of the Civil War? Did General Custer attack General Stuart as he sat immobile guarding the Confederate Left, or was General Stuart moving towards the Union Rear? Indications are that General Stuart was moving to the Union’s Rear. If General Custer had not disobeyed his orders and “moved to the sound of the guns”, instead of obeying his orders to take his troops to a more distant location, and then make a suicidal charge against a superior force moving South West toward the intersection of Rock Creek and the Baltimore Turnpike at the Union rear; taken command of another cavalry unit to make another suicidal charge against that same superior force; and take command of yet another cavalry unit and make a third suicidal charge against that same superior force, General Stuart would have made it to the Union rear and possibly changed the entire outcome of the battle. I wish I was more knowledgeable about this battle. I may very likely be terribly misinformed about General Stuart’s and General Custer’s troop movements and actions, and I welcome any corrections.
In his book about 'Pickett's Charge', Earl Hess writes that there is no record from any rebel source that the now-famous copse of trees, or the stone angle, were the targets of the charge. The book is 'Pickett's Charge: the Last Attack at Gettysburg'.
When I visited Gettysburg, I stood at the bottom of the hill where Pickett’s men assembled and looked up at what they faced. The courage of the men who attempted the attack is awe-inspiring, just considering the amount of cannons still firing from the Union positions, much less considering the number of Union soldiers waiting.
I went to Gettysburg about a year ago. I stood where Pickett's men assembled as well and looked at cemetery ridge and was amazed at the courage it took to walk that mile into cannon fire and troops. Then I went to Cemetery Ridge and looked across the battlefield to where the confederates where gathering. I couldn't imagine being a yankee soldier and looking at a line of troops a mile and a half long marching towards me. I read Stephan Sears book, "Gettysburg." It is very good. Long read, big book small print and 400 pages but excellent insight.
For more fun with large infantry assaults, see Franklin, Malvern Hill, Gaines' Mill. They were all large assaults (Gaines' Mill was the largest of the war) but rarely are encountered by the casual ACW observer.
Yeah you basically have to be an enthusiastic to even know of these specific battles, let alone know the full lines of battle and results. Few years back I thought the peninsular campaign was a series of skirmishes, i never realized how much carnage occurred. Entire brigades and divisions were shredded in just days. Franklin is another battle lost in the Atlanta and Nashville theater. The mist decisive battle in tennesee of the entire war. Great point there too
Yes, and at Gaines Mill, the regulars held of two divisions for hours with no support until they ran out of rounds. No one ever wants to talk about the work the professional army did: Manassas, Gaines Mill, Gettysburg.
I have seen all kinds of critics go after Lee for Gettysburg. That he should have tried to cut off the Yankees from Washington. He should have fought a defensive battle. All of these arguments miss the point completely. The truth of it is, General Lee did not have the logistical capacity to go up above the Potomac for very long. He had to go up there, and fight them where he found them because he did not have time or equipment for maneuver. And, what had always worked for him before? The offensive, it is where he always had his most brilliant successes. If he went up there and waited for the enemy to attack him, he ran the risk of getting into a fight he did not to have the ability to get out of. It's hard to think of Lee doing anything much different. The truth is the Army of the Potomac had some poor leadership, but they had been maturing down in the ranks. They were now fighting on the own soil. And they gave a good account of themselves. Like Pickett said, years later about the failure of the charge that bore his name, when assigning fault for the loss, said, "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."
Going on the offensive had, in fact, NOT worked very well for Lee. It's true he got darn lucky at Chancellorsville, but other than that most of his offensives had turned into slaughters. 1. Gaines Mill was a minor tactical success, but cost Lee heavy casualties. 2. Malvern Hill was a bloodbath. 3. The whole Maryland campaign was a debacle. 4. Longstreet's assault at 2nd Bull Run succeeded because Jackson's corps had fought a brilliant defensive battle up to that point, exhausting the disorganized Union army; even then, Longstreet's assault did not break the Union army, it merely drove it back (not trying to take away from 2BR...Lee's best battle, IMO) Lee repeated all the mistakes of the Antietam campaign at Gettysburg, and essentially got the same result.
I can’t agree more. Lee didn’t really have the option to not attack. That was the point of moving up into Pennsylvania. They were going to take the war to the north and beat the north on their own ground. Also consider what was simultaneously happening in the West. Lee intended to try to make the north “sick” of the war. Fight and win a battle on northern territory. Be in a position to challenge Washington directly. It was a big risk, but had very high reward potential. It just didn’t work. The north showed up and held their ground - finally. They had run so many times before.
ABT's videos are consistently the best ones going about the civil war. I've read about this sad war all my life, yet I still learn more thanks to you. You bring in different perspectives. Plus, seeing things from the ground level really illuminates what went on.
Very well done. I thoroughly enjoyed your presentation at the ECW seminar. Can't wait for next year's seminar, when we get to hear you and your colleagues discuss 1863.
Longstreet's idea was to pivot around to Westminster, Maryland and make a defensive stand there. Had Lee chosen that, he would have found 1,500 tons of materiel waiting at the depot there.
Longstreet's idea was a wild fantasy. If you look at a map of the road network leading to Westminster, you realize quickly that there was no way Lee was going to beat Meade there unless Meade and the rest of his army overdosed on laudanum and fell asleep for two days. As it happened, Meade already had in his pocket an excellent plan for defending Westminster in case he was somehow driven back from Gettysburg.
Part of the decision process was that Lee had been sick that spring. Some think he may have had a heart attack. In his resignation letter he sent to Jefferson Davis after Gettysburg he mentioned that he had been sick. He took the blame for Gettysburg and thought Davis could find a more able commander for the army. Lee did not want any special treatment while on the move. He exposed himself to the hardships his men suffered. He thought that way he knew the physical shape of his army. While I agree with this to a point. I think he needed to keep himself in the best shape he could, so he would be able make clear decisions during the heat of battle.
Sound advice, but we are all mortal and since tomorrow is not a certainty, seize today. Plus, Lee seemed to be the type that asked a great deal of himself, therefore he could ask more of those he led.
No, this was classic miscalculation on Lee's part and savvy maneuver on Meade's. Lee bet that Meade would follow doctrine and reinforce the flanks. Meade predicted that Lee would do a frontal assault because he guessed correctly that Lee would think Meade was playing it safe. Lee lost because he made a tactical error and was bested by a better general. Lee NEVER suffered the hardships of his men. First, he always had shoes and food. Second, he sent his men into tactically risky engagements that had little to no strategic value. Lee was a decent tactical commander but had no business conducting large scale operations. Reduce him to a corps commander and put Joseph E. Johnson in overall command.
If Mr. Lee had had a heart attack, then given that there was no real treatment for such a thing in those days, he would have had more in quick succession. He certainly wouldn't have lived another 6 years.
Lee had seen what happens to an attacking army at Fredericksburg and what he was facing was an entrenched union army with massive artillery. Most of his success had come in defensive battles and even if successful, the attack would have incurred heavy losses of men and material he could not afford. Chancellorsville is an example of a Confederate victory that in the end accomplished little, the Union army was intact, their position was secure and despite it being a Confederate victory, incurred heavy casualties. It also was flanking maneuver, not a frontal assault. The Confederates had the high ground opposite the Union army and based on the history of the Civil War armies to that date, the logical move by Lee should have been to dig in and wait for the Union forces to attack.
Thanks for the help and clarification. So many "why's" ;and "how comes?" in the Civil War. I've asked myself the same question often in the past!. Nice work, nice presentation. Ax
Always overlooked is Custer’s charge with the Michigan First Calvary against Stuart’s Calvary to defend the American right flank. Custer broke the rebel lines and captured a number of cannon. His headlong charge was so violent it is said that men and horses were killed on initial impact. The rebels retreated and did not try the right flank again
@@TTony-tu6dm It wouldn't have mattered anyway, 6th Corp. was sitting behind the lines and would have slaughtered Stewart if he had gotten around the flank.
@@easyenetwork2023 Stuart was never going to get around the AoP. He tried for weeks and never did. If he had gotten past Custer, the artillery on Little Round Top would have turned my ancestors into hamburger before they even got to there.
i respectfully disagree, Pickett's charge was not as big a folly as Fredricksburg or Franklin, but just looking at the facts and taking the emotion out of the decision makes it an easy choice. 1.) the attacks on both ends of the Union line were repulsed with heavy losses for the Confederates which can not be easily replaced. 2.) those repulses and the relative ease for which Meade showed he could reposition his reinforcements out of the line of sight of Lee's artillery and observers should have been a clear sign that Lee could not reasonably trust that an attack would succeed. 3.) after Chancellorsville, and the first two days of Gettysburg, the loss of capable regimental, brigade and division commanders should have given him pause and ultimately should have led him to pull back his forces and retreat back to the Valley. Heth and Pender's division both had regiments being led by Captains and Majors while most of the Brigades were being led by Colonels or lower. 4.) despite Pickett's Division being fresh, his division was grossly understrength due to Corse and Jenkins being left in Virginia. Overall his division through out the war had been lightly engaged for the most part and really not battle tested despite having two good Brigade commanders in Garnett and Armistead. As Longstreet and other's have pointed out, after the goals of the campaign are shown to not able to be met after the first two days, the primary course of action is the preservation of his Army. He could have got back to Virginia losing only a quarter of his force instead of a third of his force with many more ranking commanders also being lost. Lee's judgement after Chancellorsville was severely clouded by his desire to not let the Federals slip away again when he had the opportunity to destroy it. He also failed to realize that he was really lucky at Chancellorsville and that the victory was full of false hope. Had Couch knowing Hooker's incapacitation and inability to lead the Army of the Potomac at that time relieved him and order the Army to keep it's defensive lines around the ford's north of Chancellorsville, he would have had Lee right where he wanted him with Sedgewick coming in from the east with probably the killing blow to the Army of Northern Virginia. So knowing these things which were known back then, Pickett's charge was an easy decision not to proceed with. Just imagine if Lee doesn't go through with Pickett's charge, when Longstreet heads west, he is heading west with 3 division instead of 2 which and extra division at Chickamauga probably would have seen the end of the Army of the Cumberland allowing Bragg the ability to threaten Nashville which would have kept Grant in the west AND quite possibly been the morale breaker for the North causing them to sue for peace.
There is not much evidence that an extra division would have put Chickamauga into a decisive victory. Moreover, by Chickamauga, the Mississippi was already under US control. Moreover, you supposition implies that the US would do nothing to counter three divisions rather than two. It accepts as a given that events would played out the same.
@@stephenferry3017 that is why it is called supposition. Nobody can know what would have happened. But the extra 8-10,000 men that Picketts divisions would have put on the field may well have been enough to cut off Thomas's line of retreat had the battle happened exactly as it did. You are then taking away one of the Union's best defensive commanders and 10,000 men from the defense of Chattanooga. Possibly allowing Bragg and Longstreet the ability to just sweep in immediately and not worry about the siege. Things may still have went the same way, but instead of just sending the XI and XII Corps west to counter Longstreet maybe the Union combines I and III Corps and sends them west too. Who knows. The point is Picketts' charge, needlessly took away another option from the Confederates.
@@stephenferry3017 given how close chickamauga was to a complete victory, it’s not hard to imagine another division making a significant difference. And it’s hard to say how Rosecrans would have responded differently...did he know there were any Virginians on the field until it was too late? Finally, while the capture of Vicksburg was important, I think it’s often overstated. Lincoln was genuinely concerned about losing reelection as late as the summer of ‘64. If Bragg had been able to destroy Rosecrans and retake Chattanooga, it’s very difficult to imagine Atlanta falling as early as it did. But of course it’s all highly speculative.
Successful charges…Chancellorsville-outnumbered two to one and Chickamauga when Longstreet hit a hole (Created by Rosecrans) in the line. Thanks for this video.
True, and we could add Champion Hill and Big Black River Bridge, which may have loomed very large in Lee’s mind. We should add, though, that Chancellorsville was an incredible stroke of luck, and the heavy woods at Chickamauga largely negated the Union artillery advantage.
We like to impose grand theories on history, but a lot of the day to day events are up to chance. “If only General X had done Y instead of Z.” Well, he’d just seen a man get his head blown off by a cannonball and he was rattled. Or he had indigestion. Or he rode this way instead of that and saw one thing instead of the other. In our time of telecommunications we underestimate the fog of ignorance they struggled with.
Yes it is easy to win a hand of cards when you can see every card every player has. Lee had to make a educated guess based on the cards he had seen the other players play. And who knows. Maybe if the charge had not gone in, we would be asking why didn't Lee put pressure on the center with a mass charge.
I believe in one of your other videos there was a Confederate General that when given an order from General Lee he said. “I wish General Lee would come see for himself.”. Maybe things weren’t exactly like Lee thought they were.
He had eyes and saw the exact same things that Longstreet was viewing. The man dismissed several suggestions from his best subordinate during that campaign.
The short answer is because Jackson died previously at Chancellorsville. Had he been in command of his Corps during the advance into Gettysburg, he would have taken one look at that high ridge and siezed it Day One. Everything that happened at Gettysburg makes complete sense; no one did anything stupid. Maybe hubris or stress from pressure to conduct a successful campaign.
Hubris and stress explain a lot. I've wondered if there's any evidence to suggest that Grierson and Grant's success in Mississippi created personal pressure on Stuart and Lee to perform up to that level.
This battle was lost a month and a half earlier when Stonewall Jackson was shot by his own men. I think he takes Culps & Cemetery hills on day 1 and forces the union army to have a sharp rethink on whether or not to stay around Gettysburg. Also, i think he reigns in Jeb Stuart from galavanting around Pennsylvania instead of keeping tabs on the union army.
Why did Lee order the attack? Uh, because the Union refused to leave the battlefield, his blood was up, he had unused troops available, disengaging might be just as dangerous, the South needed a big win at that moment and there was a small chance it might actually work, so he gambled and they lost.
After years of study I can only conclude that losing Jackson at Chancellorsville deprived him of his only creative and committed general. Couple this with Davis' orders to win a battle in the north at all costs to convince European intervention forced Lee to throw a military Hail Mary.
+AmericanBattlefieldTrust *Lee (CSA) ordered Stuart (from the east) and Pickett (from the west) to attack simultaneously.* Stuart's cavalry was intended to hit the Potomac infantry rear but ended up short-stopped by Gregg (U.S.), which allowed the Potomac infantry to crush Pickett's division.
Once again, very well said Garry.! We all have the benefit of 20/20 vision post battle. Based on the limited intel Lee had on that day, charging up the Federals’ “gut” made good tactical sense since both the Federal flanks were solid earlier that day. He also believed Confederate Col. Alexander’s artillery barrage was successful, though that certainly proved not to be the case. The Federal center initially was less defended. It remained so until Meade was able to quickly pull his troops into the center. Meade’s officer corps were outstanding with their rapid response in redeploying troops from the flanks without delay.
There was merit in the idea of attacking the center, but there were too many things which had already gone wrong by that point. There was too much desperation in it and not enough calculation.
My understanding was that in addition to Pickett's Charge there was an additional cavalry attack that was supposed to hit the rear of the Union Army but Custer repulsed it. I've been known to be wrong, though.
The same tactic napoleon tried at Waterloo. First attack both flanks and then conclude that since the enemy reinforced it's flanks he "must" be weak in the center
It was obvious to Gen. Longstreet that Pickett’s Charge would fail. It should have been obvious to Gen. Lee as well. And the charge did not almost succeed.
Have you been there and looked across that low, open, totally exposed field towards Little Round Top? I have and it only took about 5 seconds to realize how STUPID anyone would have to be to charge across there.
When the battered and beaten remnants of the Confederate force came back to Seminary Ridge Lee is reputed to have greeted them with "This is all my fault! This is all my fault! When you walk through the maneuver from the Codori Farm then up to the Copse of Trees you see what Longstreet was talking about. For those troops that had to execute that maneuver, they had to march, completely exposed, past Union rifles and cannon on their right the entire time. It is an absolute miracle anyone made it.
He had to leave with a victory. The south had limited resources, his army would never be this strong again. Had to roll the dice , thought the esprit de corps of his men would carry the day. Rifled weapons changed everything but they were still fighting the previous wars. Grew up in PA, been there many times. Stand at the high water mark and look at the distance Lee’s men marched literally into the muzzles of cannons loaded with grapeshot and its heartbreaking. Probably the finest infantry on the planet at 2 PM and in less than an hour half were casualties.
@@felixloewenich2202 Chancellorville. Think any other infantry could run 12 miles to complete the encircling of the Union after being divided in the face of a superior strength opponent. Not even Wellington or Napoleon could pull that off.
@@felixloewenich2202 It's precisely because they were that good that Lee thought they could pull it off. If I say the Japanese had the finest carrier pilots on the planet in 1941 that doesn't make me a Hirohito-worshiper.
Did anyone read Colonel Oates, 15th Alabama, account of the battle? He was there. Relates Lee's intention to draw Meade into a defensive battle etc. And Longstreet's views. Lee knew he was outnumbered but got carried away (hubris). He'd kicked butt at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. He thought union army would break. WRONG.
Taking the broadest view possible, Lee had got the Army of Northern Virginia into a bad situation, but he had no choice but to press the attack. Both he and Jefferson Davis understood that the South would lose a long war, and the only way to win it was to defeat the Federal army and force a peace treaty. Both Antietam the previous September and Gettysburg should be seen in this strategic view, in addition to the particulars of any battle.
Hubris, sheer f'ing hubris. That is what Bobby Lee was suffering from. He really believed that he could not be beaten, that he couldn't lose at all. He was wrong.
or maybe he knew he was beaten and needed to retreat ... he dared not give a full assault because he was scared he would be destroyed ... so he sacrificed Pickett to save face. He had PLENTY of men to back Pickett up but he knew that even then he would fail and he didn't want to be trapped in the defensive so deep in enemy territory. So, he gave it a good looking final charge ... and then retreated with a still viable but failed army.
Yep. He got super lucky at Chancellorsville and took away all the wrong lessons. In all fairness, Lee may not have known that Howard point-blank disobeyed Hooker's order to prepare for Jackson's "sneaky" flank attack. Lee may not have known about Hooker's severe concussion the next day. That might have helped him come to the conclusion that the victory was because his men were so awesome. But Gettysburg also wasn't the first time Lee's hubris was on display. Antietam is probably the best example of all, and he learned nothing from that.
@@aaronfleming9426 Well, Mead did nothing the next day while Lee prepared his retreat ... Mead's men had just watched Lee throw more than 15,000 men at them point blank .... that made Lee look entirely able to respond to any attack on him in retreat.
@@persimmontea6383 I guess that could have figured into Meade's motivation. I guess I need to learn more about Meade's post-battle decision making process!
It is simple Lee saw the advantages strongly moving to the Yankees in the war and he had only one chance to win and that was at Gettysburg. So normally he would not take such a risky move but it was his last chance to win. Lee was brillant in his analysis of the situation.
I picture a middleweight boxer slugging with a heavyweight boxer in a fight to finish. The smaller guy knows he needs to use guile and aggression to try to make the heavyweight quit early. Otherwise the bigger guy simply wears down the smaller guy round after round until in inevitable comes. Lee had a narrow window of opportunity and took it when it first appeared. Failed spectacularly, but he was trying to win the fight against long odds.
I would agree if the charge had taken place earlier. At this point, however, the Union was fairly secure in their position and would not at all have been taken by surprise by the charge. Lee waited too long to try to throw the knockout blow. At this point, he should have withdrawn a little and tried to get the Union to chase him onto more favorable ground.
@@stevefabian477 Northern aggression? Maybe you should do yourself a favor and actually study the history. The south launched dozens of attacks against federal installations before Lincoln even took office. In fact, they had declared independence before then. This was SOUTHERN AGGRESSION all the way.
A fair assessment. Imagine if Meade didn't reinforce his center with 2 corps with interior lines and instead plotted an attack on the wings or blundered somehow else. It would wind up that Lee would be praised for his genius War has a way of rewriting itself in our minds.
Problem is they attended the same college and therefore were taught the same things. Meade knew lee would attack the center after his flanks stood strong. It almost worked but ended up being a massacre
@@nicknorris100 to be fair when on the defensive up until that point in the east, the union usually broke and ran (exception being malvern hill) Lee used concentration of force and failed
@@zoanth4 yah but meade had replaced the previous 5 general's who broke and ran. Lee should of listened to Longstreet who seemed to have a better understanding of the situation. Personally, i think lee is one of the most overrated generals of all time and Gettysburg proved it
Your assessment suggests Meade was very wise. He planned for different scenarios and was ready for almost anything, though partly due to superior numbers.
Gettysburg was Lee's attempt to foil Grant at Vicksburg. An interesting idea. Problem was that Lee had always fought as defender not attacker. Longstreet was right in wanting to move around Meade's left forcing northern forces to abandon their positions.
@@PatrickTyrrell-jd5zy Yes, Lee's order was wishful thinking. But Longstreet's "plan" to move around the Union left was not pragmatic...there was neither time nor a practical route to get around the Union right, and any hope of accomplishing such a move would be based on the assumption that the Federal army would sit on its thumbs doing nothing while the rebels maneuvered. THAT is wishful thinking.
Actually Lee's chief artillery officer Porter Alexander actually accurately pounded several of the Union's artillery position. Its just that the men manning those batteries didn't abandon their posts and many of them were able to fire back and stymie the Confederate troops as they charged uphill.
All of these criticisms here are valid. The Union made all the right moves with interior lines to counter attacks and wouldn't break. A plan of attack that in the end relies on the enemy running away is a faulty one, a toss of the dice that failed.
Sitting on the porch with an old guy talking about Gen Lee he said he remember as a young boy hearing his grandfather telling his dad how the local community was upset with the General because in his word how many tar heel boys were lost on Pickett charge new how fool hardly they have no chance to take the union line. Most admit was taken aback by the criticism of the General by the old man.
No mention of the cavalry charge ordered on the opposite flank to disrupt Union reinforcements and communications but was turned back by a Union cavalry force led a young George Armstrong Custer
Why did he order the charge? Easy, he thought it might work. After all, his options at this point are withdraw and seek another battle elsewhere...with insufficient artillery stocks...or make the attack today. The Union army has been beaten on day 1...it barely clung on on day 2. Who is to say whether there was much fight left in the Army of the Potomac on day 3? If Lee withdraws, it is unlikely that he will escape without serious pursuit...and the campaign ends with Lee using the weather to force a crossing of the Potomac. If Lee attacks and fails, he withdraws and the campaign ends with Lee using the weather to force a crossing of the Potomac. People hold up Picketts Charge as this momentous event. It really wasn't anything of the sort. The Gettysburg campaign was already over...it's just that no one realized it yet.
Plus, the Union was still on the battlefield. If Hooker, or some other jackass might still have been in command instead of Meade, the Union may have been ordered to conduct a fatal attack on the third day instead.
Lee was not depending solely on Pickett. He had sent Stuart to the Union rear with 5000 cavaly to do a hammer and anvil on the Union center. Stuart's move failed when he encountered Custer with 500 mounted troopers armed with repeating rifles. As a result of Custer's charge against Stuart, Stuart was never able to get into position. Frank Haskell was a Lt. in John Gibbons' Iron Brigade. In his account to his brother, Haskell reveals that many in the Union line thought they were about to be overrun by Pickett. That without even knowing about Stuart's move. The vagaries of war fell into action that day and cost the confederates the victory. It was not necessarily bad generalship on Lee's part.
Been to Gettysburg several times and stood on both sides of the line. Sending thousands of troops in an open field against a well entrenched enemy with supporting artillery fire, was bound to fail. I guess General Lee didn’t realize the Confederate artillery barrage overshot the Union line. With that said, Lee was a brilliant commander, but made a tactical mistake by ordering that charge.
The only way The Charge on Day Three could have worked was for Lee to have moved ALL troops to the center the night before and sent not just 15,000 but 25-30-35,000 to hit Meade’s Center. No matter how tired, Lee needed every non-wounded man following Pickett’s fresh troops.
With no troops on Lee's flanks, what would prevent Meade from concentrating his whole army in his center? What would prevent him from sending his own flanks forward and enveloping Lee? As it happened, on the local, tactical, level, some of Meade's troops were able to move forward and enfilade Pickett's force. That could just as easily have happened on a larger scale if Lee had stripped his own flanks.
Thanks for what you do Battlefield Trust. I live in England, so not much chance of visiting soon. Do you think if the confederates had launched a dawn/pre dawn assault with a delayed artillery assault, they would have succeeded with Pickets charge? Thanks for any answers!
It’s one thing to know the history and the maps. But to actually walk those grounds at that battlefield from both perspectives can give a good idea of why decisions where made the way they are. If you don’t know much about this battle, go to the historic site or even pull up some maps. And reveal the knowledge that was present at the current time frames from their points of view. Fatefully the union made all the right preparations and the confederate army walked right into them simply because they where all guiding themselves off of the same rule book. The civil war was inevitably decided by the ability of troops to continue to fight and beat the attrition that was being put forth the entire war, otherwise tactics and doctrine on both sides was very similar
As I recall, Lee sent J. Stuart around the Unions rear with orders to attack and meet the Confederate main assault in the middle of the line effectively cutting the Union line in two with a "pincer" movement. Stuart never made it there because of G. Custers audacious Cavalry charge to the front of Stuarts Cavalry column which threw Stuarts forces in disarray thus thwarting the "pincer" movement that Lee was counting on. I have read reports that as Armistad was crossing over the wall at the angle he was seen looking behind the Union forces probably counting on support from Stuart that never materialized.
not sure how a pincer movement could be possible versus an entrenched fish hook formation. The Union could have contracted the formation even further to make a northern circle, well out of cannon or cavalry range.
My memory says Stuart's objective was the powder reserves at the Union rear, not the rear of the Union lines. Destroy the powder reserves, which would have been visible for miles, and Union troops have a handful of shots to use to repel the charge.
@@woodysmith2681 For repelling this charge in this battle it would have made no difference at all had Stuart reached and destroyed the powder reserves. The individual units, from Company to Battalion to Regiment all replenish ammunition needs ASAP including during a battle. Also, this charge was only engaging approximately one third of the Union line. The North would have had more than enough ammunition on hand to continue the fight. The only way the South wins this attack is if it cuts the Union line in two and sends the Union forces in confused retreat. The only way that that can happen is if Stuart can successfully perform the "pincer" attack from the rear of Meads position. The South did not commit enough men into the frontal assault to break through Meads line AND envelope BOTH EXPOSED Flanks of the Union line. Were the Union forces to just fall back but not break, creating a "bulge" the attack was doomed to fail. General Longstreet knew how this attack was going to end. He just kept saying "...it's math! It's all about the math!"
@@SantomPh Remember, at this point in history there are no radios for instant communication. Orders were sent by the Commander via a written note by courier. That takes a long time! The Union forces on the line I'm sure were concentrating on a mile long line of Confederate troops marching towards their position. That had to demand their attention! It would have had my attention! The union forces were only entrenched facing the charge, huddled down behind a low wall. To their rear was open ground with all guns facing towards the confederate charge. Had it not been for Custers cavalry charge at the head of Stuarts advance which disrupted their entire column (again, no radios to give instant orders in a situation like that!) The entire column just came to a halt because they had no orders to do otherwise. The rear pincer movement was essentially halted. It would have taken hours to determine the situation and send orders to the various components of the column.
Didn't the Confederate tried to outflank the Union army with the cavalry of Stuart at the same time that their infantry attacked the center ? The Pickett Charge wasn't to go totally unsupported, nothwistanding the massive artillery barrage.
The charge was suicide The csa having to maneuver out of the treeline March over a mile to get to the federal position. Majority of the men were dead before they reached the stone wall at Hancock's position . Lee should've listened to Longstreet he should've redeployed to a better ground.
@@rc59191 Of course Sir! Ahead of the Movie i watched Ken Burns 9 Part documentary about the civil war. Can recommend that to everyone who hasn't seen it yet.
Lee believed in his own genius and legend by then and thought he could do no wrong. He dismissed all criticism of the attack, particularly from Longstreet. Lee made countless blunders at Gettysburg, not just Pickett’s charge
General Longstreet said the Army of Northern Virginia could not afford another victory like Chancellorsville. Longstreet understood that the Norman army of Northern Virginia could not sustain the heavy casualties that a quote tactical victory entailed unless it provided a strategic victory. There was not one field army in that war that possess the necessary tactical
Any army at this time could possibly defeat their rival but the adversary would always get away to fight another day. You could only win by maneuver and not by combat. He was in a position to get between the army of the Potomac supply lines to Baltimore and Washington. They would have to attack him,
Reportedly Lee, the night of July third, responded to a question about a possible next days battle - Wasn't that enough glory for the next hundred years?
We were marching to a battle during a reenactment in Gettysburg during the 90s. Several of the actors from the movie were there. Including Patrick Gorman? who played Hood. He came riding up on horseback in full uniform and told us the day was not over. There was still work to be done. Someone in the ranks hollered out to him " We will follow you anywhere General, just don't carry us to Franklin, Tennessee." LOL. Ain't that the truth. Patrick Cleburne said after the meeting with Hood on the battle plan for Franklin, "' Tomorrow as good a day to die as any." He was killed in the charge.
Purely an act of desperation with failure to adapt tactics to the given situation. Hood was a good division/regiment commander. But temperamentally unsuitable for corp and army group command because he was one dimensional on tactics.
As is mentioned in the movie Gettysburg, Confederate envoys were to attempt a meeting with Lincoln to seek peace after a major victory on Union soil. Nothing could be done about Vicksburg. The ANV did well on July 1 except failing to take the high ground south of town. July 2 was a rash of near misses that almost brought victory. For Lee, falling back now after a tactical draw was same as a defeat. He gambled on the charge. What instead, if he had concentrated artillery over night at right angles to Cemetery Hill, facing south and west? A massive bombardment early would have decimated the enemy in a cross fire they couldn't avoid. Then charge the hill, breaking the Union high ground hinge. Taking Cemetery, they could concentrate artillery on Culp's Hill, and if they took that, Lee might have enough of a victory to try the peace proposal. Meade would either have to counter attack or fall back to a better position.
There is no evidence that Confederate envoys were to attempt a meeting with Lincoln after a major victory on Union soil. The strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. Lee told Seddon in April that the surest way of accomplishing that was for the AoNV to advance into Maryland. The decision of the Confederate cabinet in Mid- May to retain all of Lee's forces in Virginia and authorize an invasion of the Union was predicated on the assumption that this would remove pressure from Vicksburg- and not offset the fall of Vicksburg. The meeting engagement on 1 July was a disaster for Lee, as it ruined his plan of campaign and forced him to attack- which was something that he had never intended to do in that area.
Because it’s a tactic that works, he just didn’t have the artillery support or enough men support the flanks and the reserve wasn’t arranged to exploit the break in the enemy line. As it was it almost worked.
Lee had other cavalry units available to him, but he never engaged them. Why? Plus, he had received intel from Longstreet prior to the second day's actions and refused to modify his plan of action accordingly.
@@thomast8539 it use to be thought their aim was bad, but research showed the fuses suffered from quality control.. they burned longer than thought and they exploded behind the union lines though the confederates could not tell. The other near miss was at round top where they ran out of ammunition trying to turn the flank.
Seems to me he was trying to replicate Blenheim. I'm curious just what Lee thought Meade had at Gettysburg - did a corps or two arrive during the night and he didn't know about it?
I agree. I also think that, begging to differ, Lee is an overrated general in terms of his military skills. Not in terms of his people skills. He was good at psychology. But let's not forget - he had already done exactly the same mistake before Gettysburg. He had ordered a disastrous charge at Malvern Hill in the Union guns' crossfire one year earlier. And he witnessed the disastrous charge of the Union army at Fredericksburg half a year earlier. And yet, he didn't learn anything from those events. He stubbornly followed the stuff he was taught at West Point. Not thinking for himself and not being innovative. That means, he definitely was no Frederick the Great or Napoleon no matter what some convinced confederates made or make out of Lee. So I think that guy in the clip is wrong. Sorry.
@@volkerwestphal3746 "He stubbornly followed the stuff he was taught at West Point..." Do they teach "attack a dug-in, well-fortified enemy who outnumbers you on high ground who also enjoys a materiel advantage over you..." at West Point?
@@geoffreypereira8024 Good point. No, they don't. As I said, Lee might have been a decent person and good at judging the mental frame of Union generals, but he didn't fully grasp the weaponry of his time.
I have heard that because Richmond Armory was destroyed, fuses were made by mom and pop industries and the fuses were not dependable in burn time. So most of the artillery exploded behind Union lines.
What? For air burst above the Union guns, so that is why the were considered to be "over shooting"? I thought batteries that are in the open were to be targeted by direct fire, not indirect fire.
Because he thought that Confederate artillery would soften up the Union center (instead it mostly missed and chewed up the ground behind them). Because Pickett's division was fresh while the Union had been fighting for three days. Because after a long string of miracles against the odds, any of one of which would seem like obvious folly in retrospect if it had failed, this newest gamble didn't seem much crazier than the previous ones.
Have to agree with other comments, this feels very Lost Cause-y. The central charge was always a bad idea. Even if it had worked, hopefully historians would have pointed out that Lee made a bad choice and happened to get lucky, the same way one might survive many games of Russian roulette. But there was little reason to think it would work out at all. The Union army had a commanding position, with easy internal lines of reinforcement and communication. Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor showed just how much an infantry assault on established positions relied on flanking support. The lack of cavalry support and ineffective barrage didn't help, obviously. But it's a very poor plan that relies on everything going perfectly. And given the well documented concerns of a number of Confederate officers at the time, calling it Monday morning quarterbacking is inaccurate and misleading.
If someone is a Monday morning quarterback that's this pathetic Gary Adelman in this video. What a sad and unnecessary attempt to protect Lee's reputation. R. E. L. was sick, exhausted, bewildered and exasperated with his armies inability to inflict a serious defeat on the Union army the two days before. All Lee had to do was listen to Longstreet when he told him: "I have been a soldier all my life. I have commanded companies, I have commanded regiments. I have commanded divisions. And I have commanded even more. But there are no fifteen thousand men in the world that can go across that ground." -- Gen James Longstreet, arguing with Gen Robert E. Lee against what became known as Pickett's Charge, July 1863
Lee was no dummy, as he had whipped every Union commander before Meade despite being outnumbered and out gunned. Lee knew that an immediate victory was crucial, especially with Vicksburg in peril. He no doubt was thinking of Gaine's Mill and a possible victory like he achieved there, however, with a heavy cost. He could not afford to let the Union take the initiative, pummeling him to buy time to bring even MORE forces up to beat him.....he HAD to fight....and HAD to win. The biggest factor was no Stonewall Jackson, Lee's " right arm" and best subordinate commander.
In the end it was probably desperation, he went north to win in a way they would get the union to negotiate an end to the war. On July 2 their attack was repulsed, and any chance to win the victory he needed was lost. My question is, had they not attacked on the 3rd, would Mead have been in a better position to pursue the retreat?
@@aaronfleming9426 Always impossible to know for sure. He had Stewart back by the end of the 2nd, so you're probably correct they could have conducted an orderly retreat. I don't suspect retreat really crossed his mind in any case. Part of it is in hindsight we know it was over on the 2nd, he didn't. He probably felt like he came closer that he really did to winning on the 2nd.
@@scottdobson1276 "He probably felt like he came closer that he really did to winning on the 2nd." That seems very plausible to me. I've long been of the opinion that Sickles' move on the 2nd was a huge benefit to Longstreet's attacks on that day. But Lee would have no way of knowing that was Sickles' blunder and not Meade's, and that Sickles was permanently off the battlefield and better corps commanders would be receiving Pickett's Charge.
Bobby Lee suffered from the same disease that the Japanese leaders suffered from early after their attack at Pearl Harbor, that was "The Victory Disease". They just could not conceive of failure. However, if the Confederate artillery was better and had more ammunition, Pickett's Charge might just have been successful. Bobby Lee's attack at Malvern Hill had the same problem. Instead of a heavy Confederate bombardment, the Yankee artillery smashed the Rebel guns in a half hour. This led to the remark that has been attributed to Conferedate General D.H.Hill - "With my infantry and the Federal artillery, we could beat any nation in he world!"
We keep talking about Lee. Perhaps we should listen to George Pickett. When asked why he thought the charge failed he is supposed to have said "I always thought the Yankees had a lot to do with it."
Leaving on the night of the 4th insured there would be no counterattack by Meade on the road south. Lincoln and Halleck insisted on an attack after the battle on the 5th or later. Meade was correct to count his blessings and leave well enough alone. July 3rd gave Lee a clear plain path home.
The guy in the video gets it. Lee had limited ammunition and supplies. Lee's gains on Day 1 cost too much.. What little he gained on Day 2 cost him even more. Eventually, Hancock's flank firmed up and stopped his attacks and it cost Lee a lot. On the other side, the 20th Maine stopped his attacks and killed many of the attackers. Then came the bayonet charge that turned his attack into another failure and a lot of prisoners taken. Day 3 comes and Lee's artillery is down to the last of its ammunition. The foot soldiers and cavalry are running out of ammunition. All supplies are low. He's got 1 last chance. The attacks on the flanks cost him too much and eventually failed. Some people call doing the same thing over & over & expecting different results "insanity". Lee wasn't insane or stupid. His attacks on the flanks failed, he had enough for 1 more attack so he tried something he hadn't. He attacked the center. Unfortunately for Lee, the Federal artillery was pretty good while his wasn't so good. Once the Confederates got close, they ran into disciplined small arms fire. This was not the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. This was a battle hardened & disciplined army under a Different George. While it was a miracle that those who made it to the Federal Line did and actually breached it, the quick thinking field commanders promptly contained & stopped up the breach. The Confederates could not even turn the abandoned cannons against the Federals as the Federal artillery commanders had ordered most of the ammunition right at the cannons fired. Longstreet and his subordinates could have screamed at Lee all that they wanted about one more try at the flanks, but my guess would be he told them "Look, we've got enough for 1 more go & I've tried the flanks, it cost me a lot & I didn't get what I paid for. They're still here & they're not running. I'm not going to waste the last of what I got on something that's failed 2X. I've got to try another way b|c this way isn't working."
lee and Yamato had the same issue. theri nations could not fight a long fight so they gambled. Lee many times won agaisnt a numerically superior army. Meade was recently promoted to command and Lee tried to make use of it. the first day went very well. but fightign the second day as he did was a mistake. Longstreet knew this. but lee's man beat thge odds so many times it blinded him to reality. and Longstreet was off. he thought none of his men would even make it to the union line..they did.
What’s hardly ever discussed is the fact that Jeb Stuart’s cavalry was to circle around and attack from the northeast simultaneously as Pickett’s attack was taking place. It never gets spoken of the Union Cavalry under Fitzpatrick and Custer stopping the CSA attack, northeast of Gettysburg, thus preventing the shock and awe of a force getting into the rear and causing chaos to dismantle the Union line thus enabling Pickett’s attack to succeed….the movie Gettysburg simply doesn’t tell the whole story of the battle
When i read Killer Angels it felt almost like Lee was blowing it deliberately. He ignored a lot of good advice from his subordinates commanders. At least that was what I was getting from Shaara. Has that ever been a theory?
No, Lee was drunk with victory. He was arrogant and also ill. He thought his men could do anything, but the war was no longer in the South, it was in the North, and at that point, the Army of the Potomac had many veterans eager to have their vengeance. Lee underestimated both Meade and the army he was fighting. He was in foreign territory with cavalry that largely failed and left his army blind. Virgina put all their eggs in one basket invading Pennsylvania, and lost. It was a downhill spiral for the confederacy after Pickett's charge. I say no, because I don't think Lee cared whether there were a lot of men in the center or not. He thought regardless of numbers that his artillery barrage was going to cause confusion and disarray within the Union ranks and it didn't. Again, Virginia committed everything to this campaign, they had to win and Lee didn't think his army would stay intact much longer without a major victory. In his mind, he had to fight or die trying, and he didn't care how many men he sent to get slaughtered, he wanted victory and justifying these horrific battles by continually stating that he'd end the war quickly and save lives. He did the complete opposite.
Pretty much what happened, how much stronger would the force have been if he did tho? I think the original attack had 12,500-14,000 against as much as 20’000
Also, putting yourself in Lee's mind, he had thrown the Army of Northern Virginia at Union emplacements before and it had never let him down so why not do it again? Things had changed though hence a close run failure.
General Longstreet was "in their shoes" and "in their time," and he is said to have remarked directly to General Lee at the time, "no 15,000 men ever made could take that ridge."
Yup. And even if they did, as others have pointed out, I don't see how they'd have been able to hold it more than momentarily anyway. And that includes if Stuart's cav had succeeded.
Yup-not really Monday morning QB if you are saying at the time haha
If Longstreet hadn’t delayed his assault on the ridge, they would have taken it.
@@JBJ29567
how
@@thodan467 If you read Douglas Southall Freeman’s biography of Gen. Lee, “RE Lee,” Longstreet sulked for several hours after Lee gave him the order, because he didn’t want to do it. That gave the Union side enough time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge with more men, thereby making it more difficult to take. If Longstreet had carried out Lee’s order promptly, it would have been quite feasible to take it and hold it. Longstreet had been drinking, was intoxicated, and was derelict in his duties. Confederate officers after the war blamed Longstreet for this, which has become lost in the shuffle with northern propagandists rewriting the history of the war in such a way as to make the South look bad and the North look like little angels (LOL). To blame Lee for the outcome of this charge is absolutely incorrect. He accepted the blame strictly because he was a gentleman and Longstreet, with the exception of this, was one of his more competent corps commanders. The Confederates actually did take the ridge briefly but couldn’t hold it, because their ranks were too decimated. That underscores the fact that if Longstreet had carried out Lee’s order quickly, they would have taken it and probably held it, and this might have changed the outcome of the entire battle.
If the initial charge had succeeded they still would've been thrown back without large reinforcements considering the casualties already suffered.
In the military, the difference between genius and idiocy is whether or not it works.
I never understood this justification for Pickett's Charge. The Union army had internal lines; they could move troops wherever they were needed most. In addition, the Charge had no support. Even if the Confederates had broken through and established a small bridgehead on Cemetery Ridge, it would only have been a matter of time before the federals pushed them back.
Agreed. This video has a "Lost Cause" vibe.
I read where General Picket never forgave General Lee for sending his men across a open ground to there death
@@dalefoster3035 After a brief meeting with Lee after the war, Pickett is quoted as saying, "That old man had my division massacred at Gettysburg."
It would have been better to have pulled out that morning. Call it a draw and move forward.
It would have been better to have pulled out that morning. Call it a draw and move forward.
As always- love these reports and love the history and debates which follow. The quote at the end sums it up nicely: retrospect has a 20/20 clarity. I’m a massive fan of Lee’s military leadership, but even he made frontal mistakes (like Malvern Hill) which require almost perfect coordination and numerical advantage (like Gaines Mill) to succeed. I feel that the contemporary observations of men like Porter Alexander and, of course, Longstreet nevertheless suggest that a strong case can be made that Lee was mistaken on the 3rd. Again, massive room for good debate on this topic. One thing not open for debate is the staggering courage of the men on both sides of that charge.
Also, looking at Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, Malvern Hill, Franklin etc- it’s fairly clear that a frontal assault on an entrenched position without substantial support from the flanks is and was a doomed endeavor.
Any way, keep the history coming and thank you for all you do to with the Trust to preserve the battlefields and history of this critical moment in the American narrative. Can’t thank you enough. Truly.
This was not a mistake…Lee knew he needed a decisive. Victory or in long term war was lost. Meade didn’t have to take such risks.
@@johnwhite2576 It's certainly accurate to say Lee *thought* he needed a decisive victory. What he *needed* was to grind down the northern will to fight so that Lincoln would lose the election of '64. A victory on northern soil would have been nice, of course, but far from necessary, and not worth the likelihood of a catastrophic loss of manpower.
putting ourselves back into their shoes to understand these events. Yes, Garry and you, along with your colleagues at ABT, do so much to simplify into understandable nuggets of intellectual gold that enriches everyone that tunes into this great website!!! Thank you, sir, Thank you!!!
Thank you for this video! I’ve wondered this for a while now.
Is it possible that General Jeb Stuart had orders to swing around to the back of the Union lines and attack the Union Center from the Rear during Pickett’s Charge? And since General Custer stopped him, wouldn’t that mean that General Custer was a key factor (amongst others) in saving the battle of Gettysburg?
Alot of the anticuster movement after the war downplayed alot of his achievements. Without Jeb's intel, Lee was fighting blind, most history books i have read ignore custer during gettisburg all together. Between custer and bad fuses on the cannon balls was the main reason picket failed.
@@ronallens6204 I never heard about bad fuses. Will keep that in mind. I thought that the more accurate Union artillery kept the trains from bringing up stores for the Southern guns and the "charge" needed to go ahead regardless.
Stuart's mission to swing around to the Union rear WAS a key component of Lee's plan on July 3rd 1863 at Gettysburg. If Stuart had penetrated the rear of the Union center, it would have been one half of a classic " pincer movement", with Pickett-Pettigrew being the other half. It may have been in Lee's mind that this could be a glorious event for Stuart, thus, redeeming himself from his earlier failure to : " feel the right of the Army" after crossing the Potomac, as Lee had ordered. Unfortunately for Stuart, he led his troopers down a NARROW path through the woods, emerging at the Rummel Farm, where Custer's almost suicidal charges were able to stem the advance of the head of Stuart's column, allowing time for federal cavalry reinforcements to appear and end the danger.
@@johnfoster535 Howdy John Foster. There are two different sides to this discussion. Those people who discount General Custer rely on the lack of documentation about General Stuart’s orders. In the heat of battle many orders are verbally given and there is little time to document them. And it seems logical that General Stuart and General Lee would have made some reference to any orders given to General Stuart to attack the Union Rear, if not immediately after the battle, at least at some point (by General Lee) after the war in the form of an explanation. The lack of any documented reference for a coordinated attack has left open the question of General Stuart’s intentions and so the relevance of General Custer’s role in the battle. The other side of the discussion (a side that I personally embrace) considers the cultural environment of the period and the physical troop movements by General Stuart. Everyone is aware of General Stuart’s screwup prior to the battle. His dressing down by General Lee is well documented. So here is the question. Did General Lee give General Stuart verbal orders to attack the Union Center’s Rear, and when General Stuart failed to reach his objective, did General Lee, after the battle, intentionally document General Stuart’s orders to simply have General Stuart protect the Confederate Left and exploit any breakthrough caused by General Pickett’s charge? Such a decision would safeguard General Stuart’s reputation and honor at a time when the Army of the South, after such a terrible defeat, needed it badly. At the same time, General Lee may have considered that he was personally critically responsible for sending General Stuart on a mission without any knowledge of the forces that General Stuart was facing in the Union’s rear. General Lee’s honor would have rebelled at allowing General Stuart to take the blame for his own gamble that failed. Would an order to attack the Union’s rear during Pickett’s charge be out of character for a General who graduated at the top of his class and is generally regarded as the most brilliant General of the Civil War? Did General Custer attack General Stuart as he sat immobile guarding the Confederate Left, or was General Stuart moving towards the Union Rear? Indications are that General Stuart was moving to the Union’s Rear. If General Custer had not disobeyed his orders and “moved to the sound of the guns”, instead of obeying his orders to take his troops to a more distant location, and then make a suicidal charge against a superior force moving South West toward the intersection of Rock Creek and the Baltimore Turnpike at the Union rear; taken command of another cavalry unit to make another suicidal charge against that same superior force; and take command of yet another cavalry unit and make a third suicidal charge against that same superior force, General Stuart would have made it to the Union rear and possibly changed the entire outcome of the battle. I wish I was more knowledgeable about this battle. I may very likely be terribly misinformed about General Stuart’s and General Custer’s troop movements and actions, and I welcome any corrections.
This little detail often gets overlooked.
In his book about 'Pickett's Charge', Earl Hess writes that there is no record from any rebel source that the now-famous copse of trees, or the stone angle, were the targets of the charge. The book is 'Pickett's Charge: the Last Attack at Gettysburg'.
When I visited Gettysburg, I stood at the bottom of the hill where Pickett’s men assembled and looked up at what they faced. The courage of the men who attempted the attack is awe-inspiring, just considering the amount of cannons still firing from the Union positions, much less considering the number of Union soldiers waiting.
I went to Gettysburg about a year ago. I stood where Pickett's men assembled as well and looked at cemetery ridge and was amazed at the courage it took to walk that mile into cannon fire and troops. Then I went to Cemetery Ridge and looked across the battlefield to where the confederates where gathering. I couldn't imagine being a yankee soldier and looking at a line of troops a mile and a half long marching towards me. I read Stephan Sears book, "Gettysburg." It is very good. Long read, big book small print and 400 pages but excellent insight.
For more fun with large infantry assaults, see Franklin, Malvern Hill, Gaines' Mill. They were all large assaults (Gaines' Mill was the largest of the war) but rarely are encountered by the casual ACW observer.
Yeah you basically have to be an enthusiastic to even know of these specific battles, let alone know the full lines of battle and results. Few years back I thought the peninsular campaign was a series of skirmishes, i never realized how much carnage occurred. Entire brigades and divisions were shredded in just days.
Franklin is another battle lost in the Atlanta and Nashville theater. The mist decisive battle in tennesee of the entire war. Great point there too
@@zoanth4 My Great x3 grandfather lost his right arm after the battle of florida.
Yes, and at Gaines Mill, the regulars held of two divisions for hours with no support until they ran out of rounds. No one ever wants to talk about the work the professional army did: Manassas, Gaines Mill, Gettysburg.
I have seen all kinds of critics go after Lee for Gettysburg. That he should have tried to cut off the Yankees from Washington. He should have fought a defensive battle. All of these arguments miss the point completely. The truth of it is, General Lee did not have the logistical capacity to go up above the Potomac for very long. He had to go up there, and fight them where he found them because he did not have time or equipment for maneuver. And, what had always worked for him before? The offensive, it is where he always had his most brilliant successes. If he went up there and waited for the enemy to attack him, he ran the risk of getting into a fight he did not to have the ability to get out of. It's hard to think of Lee doing anything much different. The truth is the Army of the Potomac had some poor leadership, but they had been maturing down in the ranks. They were now fighting on the own soil. And they gave a good account of themselves. Like Pickett said, years later about the failure of the charge that bore his name, when assigning fault for the loss, said, "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."
So, he never should have gone to Gettysburg then. He should have stayed further south until he had better forces.
He should have never attacked the Union. Period.
The armies of the United States were ALWAYS fighting in their own soil.
This is a mindset that even today, southerners cannot seem to grasp.
Going on the offensive had, in fact, NOT worked very well for Lee. It's true he got darn lucky at Chancellorsville, but other than that most of his offensives had turned into slaughters.
1. Gaines Mill was a minor tactical success, but cost Lee heavy casualties.
2. Malvern Hill was a bloodbath.
3. The whole Maryland campaign was a debacle.
4. Longstreet's assault at 2nd Bull Run succeeded because Jackson's corps had fought a brilliant defensive battle up to that point, exhausting the disorganized Union army; even then, Longstreet's assault did not break the Union army, it merely drove it back (not trying to take away from 2BR...Lee's best battle, IMO)
Lee repeated all the mistakes of the Antietam campaign at Gettysburg, and essentially got the same result.
I can’t agree more. Lee didn’t really have the option to not attack. That was the point of moving up into Pennsylvania. They were going to take the war to the north and beat the north on their own ground. Also consider what was simultaneously happening in the West. Lee intended to try to make the north “sick” of the war. Fight and win a battle on northern territory. Be in a position to challenge Washington directly. It was a big risk, but had very high reward potential. It just didn’t work. The north showed up and held their ground - finally. They had run so many times before.
ABT's videos are consistently the best ones going about the civil war. I've read about this sad war all my life, yet I still learn more thanks to you. You bring in different perspectives. Plus, seeing things from the ground level really illuminates what went on.
Thanks! Viewers like yourself make our growing outreach possible.
Very well done. I thoroughly enjoyed your presentation at the ECW seminar. Can't wait for next year's seminar, when we get to hear you and your colleagues discuss 1863.
Longstreet's idea was to pivot around to Westminster, Maryland and make a defensive stand there. Had Lee chosen that, he would have found 1,500 tons of materiel waiting at the depot there.
Longstreet's idea was a wild fantasy. If you look at a map of the road network leading to Westminster, you realize quickly that there was no way Lee was going to beat Meade there unless Meade and the rest of his army overdosed on laudanum and fell asleep for two days. As it happened, Meade already had in his pocket an excellent plan for defending Westminster in case he was somehow driven back from Gettysburg.
Part of the decision process was that Lee had been sick that spring. Some think he may have had a heart attack. In his resignation letter he sent to Jefferson Davis after Gettysburg he mentioned that he had been sick. He took the blame for Gettysburg and thought Davis could find a more able commander for the army. Lee did not want any special treatment while on the move. He exposed himself to the hardships his men suffered. He thought that way he knew the physical shape of his army. While I agree with this to a point. I think he needed to keep himself in the best shape he could, so he would be able make clear decisions during the heat of battle.
Sound advice, but we are all mortal and since tomorrow is not a certainty, seize today. Plus, Lee seemed to be the type that asked a great deal of himself, therefore he could ask more of those he led.
No, this was classic miscalculation on Lee's part and savvy maneuver on Meade's. Lee bet that Meade would follow doctrine and reinforce the flanks. Meade predicted that Lee would do a frontal assault because he guessed correctly that Lee would think Meade was playing it safe.
Lee lost because he made a tactical error and was bested by a better general.
Lee NEVER suffered the hardships of his men. First, he always had shoes and food. Second, he sent his men into tactically risky engagements that had little to no strategic value.
Lee was a decent tactical commander but had no business conducting large scale operations. Reduce him to a corps commander and put Joseph E. Johnson in overall command.
If Mr. Lee had had a heart attack, then given that there was no real treatment for such a thing in those days, he would have had more in quick succession. He certainly wouldn't have lived another 6 years.
Lee had seen what happens to an attacking army at Fredericksburg and what he was facing was an entrenched union army with massive artillery. Most of his success had come in defensive battles and even if successful, the attack would have incurred heavy losses of men and material he could not afford. Chancellorsville is an example of a Confederate victory that in the end accomplished little, the Union army was intact, their position was secure and despite it being a Confederate victory, incurred heavy casualties. It also was flanking maneuver, not a frontal assault. The Confederates had the high ground opposite the Union army and based on the history of the Civil War armies to that date, the logical move by Lee should have been to dig in and wait for the Union forces to attack.
Also, those charges at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor. Every fool makes their final throw of the dice, and poor soldiers suffer.
Except that excuses are made for Lee while Grant is called a butcher when Lee was the inferior commander.
@@stephenferry3017 You got a point there. I'll let others argue it.
Thanks for the help and clarification. So many "why's" ;and "how comes?" in the Civil War. I've asked myself the same question often in the past!. Nice work, nice presentation. Ax
Such a well made point. I don't have a strong opinion on this particular moment in history, but your take on this is refreshing.
THANK YOU for this, and great Martin Sheen impression! I always thought when Gen. Heath was saying "yes sir" he was sneezing.
Always overlooked is Custer’s charge with the Michigan First Calvary against Stuart’s Calvary to defend the American right flank. Custer broke the rebel lines and captured a number of cannon. His headlong charge was so violent it is said that men and horses were killed on initial impact. The rebels retreated and did not try the right flank again
It's "overlooked" because it was inconsequential to what was going on in town.
@@kellycochran6487 obviously a troll as that comment is so inane as to not really require response
@@TTony-tu6dm It wouldn't have mattered anyway, 6th Corp. was sitting behind the lines and would have slaughtered Stewart if he had gotten around the flank.
@@kellycochran6487It mattered because it thwarted anything Stuart was doing.
@@easyenetwork2023 Stuart was never going to get around the AoP. He tried for weeks and never did. If he had gotten past Custer, the artillery on Little Round Top would have turned my ancestors into hamburger before they even got to there.
i respectfully disagree, Pickett's charge was not as big a folly as Fredricksburg or Franklin, but just looking at the facts and taking the emotion out of the decision makes it an easy choice. 1.) the attacks on both ends of the Union line were repulsed with heavy losses for the Confederates which can not be easily replaced. 2.) those repulses and the relative ease for which Meade showed he could reposition his reinforcements out of the line of sight of Lee's artillery and observers should have been a clear sign that Lee could not reasonably trust that an attack would succeed. 3.) after Chancellorsville, and the first two days of Gettysburg, the loss of capable regimental, brigade and division commanders should have given him pause and ultimately should have led him to pull back his forces and retreat back to the Valley. Heth and Pender's division both had regiments being led by Captains and Majors while most of the Brigades were being led by Colonels or lower. 4.) despite Pickett's Division being fresh, his division was grossly understrength due to Corse and Jenkins being left in Virginia. Overall his division through out the war had been lightly engaged for the most part and really not battle tested despite having two good Brigade commanders in Garnett and Armistead. As Longstreet and other's have pointed out, after the goals of the campaign are shown to not able to be met after the first two days, the primary course of action is the preservation of his Army. He could have got back to Virginia losing only a quarter of his force instead of a third of his force with many more ranking commanders also being lost. Lee's judgement after Chancellorsville was severely clouded by his desire to not let the Federals slip away again when he had the opportunity to destroy it. He also failed to realize that he was really lucky at Chancellorsville and that the victory was full of false hope. Had Couch knowing Hooker's incapacitation and inability to lead the Army of the Potomac at that time relieved him and order the Army to keep it's defensive lines around the ford's north of Chancellorsville, he would have had Lee right where he wanted him with Sedgewick coming in from the east with probably the killing blow to the Army of Northern Virginia. So knowing these things which were known back then, Pickett's charge was an easy decision not to proceed with. Just imagine if Lee doesn't go through with Pickett's charge, when Longstreet heads west, he is heading west with 3 division instead of 2 which and extra division at Chickamauga probably would have seen the end of the Army of the Cumberland allowing Bragg the ability to threaten Nashville which would have kept Grant in the west AND quite possibly been the morale breaker for the North causing them to sue for peace.
Outstanding comment.
There is not much evidence that an extra division would have put Chickamauga into a decisive victory. Moreover, by Chickamauga, the Mississippi was already under US control. Moreover, you supposition implies that the US would do nothing to counter three divisions rather than two. It accepts as a given that events would played out the same.
@@stephenferry3017 that is why it is called supposition. Nobody can know what would have happened. But the extra 8-10,000 men that Picketts divisions would have put on the field may well have been enough to cut off Thomas's line of retreat had the battle happened exactly as it did. You are then taking away one of the Union's best defensive commanders and 10,000 men from the defense of Chattanooga. Possibly allowing Bragg and Longstreet the ability to just sweep in immediately and not worry about the siege. Things may still have went the same way, but instead of just sending the XI and XII Corps west to counter Longstreet maybe the Union combines I and III Corps and sends them west too. Who knows. The point is Picketts' charge, needlessly took away another option from the Confederates.
@@stephenferry3017 given how close chickamauga was to a complete victory, it’s not hard to imagine another division making a significant difference. And it’s hard to say how Rosecrans would have responded differently...did he know there were any Virginians on the field until it was too late? Finally, while the capture of Vicksburg was important, I think it’s often overstated. Lincoln was genuinely concerned about losing reelection as late as the summer of ‘64. If Bragg had been able to destroy Rosecrans and retake Chattanooga, it’s very difficult to imagine Atlanta falling as early as it did.
But of course it’s all highly speculative.
False hopes for a false lost cause
Love these well thought short videos. Bite size pieces.
Successful charges…Chancellorsville-outnumbered two to one and Chickamauga when Longstreet hit a hole (Created by Rosecrans) in the line. Thanks for this video.
True, and we could add Champion Hill and Big Black River Bridge, which may have loomed very large in Lee’s mind. We should add, though, that Chancellorsville was an incredible stroke of luck, and the heavy woods at Chickamauga largely negated the Union artillery advantage.
Also, Southern battlefields. Gettysburg being Northern might have made a difference too.
I like that your presentation has been toned down a wee bit. I appreciate the enthusiasm and definitely the great material.
We like to impose grand theories on history, but a lot of the day to day events are up to chance. “If only General X had done Y instead of Z.” Well, he’d just seen a man get his head blown off by a cannonball and he was rattled. Or he had indigestion. Or he rode this way instead of that and saw one thing instead of the other. In our time of telecommunications we underestimate the fog of ignorance they struggled with.
Yes it is easy to win a hand of cards when you can see every card every player has. Lee had to make a educated guess based on the cards he had seen the other players play. And who knows. Maybe if the charge had not gone in, we would be asking why didn't Lee put pressure on the center with a mass charge.
I believe in one of your other videos there was a Confederate General that when given an order from General Lee he said. “I wish General Lee would come see for himself.”. Maybe things weren’t exactly like Lee thought they were.
He had eyes and saw the exact same things that Longstreet was viewing. The man dismissed several suggestions from his best subordinate during that campaign.
The short answer is because Jackson died previously at Chancellorsville. Had he been in command of his Corps during the advance into Gettysburg, he would have taken one look at that high ridge and siezed it Day One.
Everything that happened at Gettysburg makes complete sense; no one did anything stupid. Maybe hubris or stress from pressure to conduct a successful campaign.
Hubris and stress explain a lot. I've wondered if there's any evidence to suggest that Grierson and Grant's success in Mississippi created personal pressure on Stuart and Lee to perform up to that level.
This battle was lost a month and a half earlier when Stonewall Jackson was shot by his own men. I think he takes Culps & Cemetery hills on day 1 and forces the union army to have a sharp rethink on whether or not to stay around Gettysburg. Also, i think he reigns in Jeb Stuart from galavanting around Pennsylvania instead of keeping tabs on the union army.
Lee was a different general without Jackson, who was instrumental in Lee's early successes.
Why did Lee order the attack? Uh, because the Union refused to leave the battlefield, his blood was up, he had unused troops available, disengaging might be just as dangerous, the South needed a big win at that moment and there was a small chance it might actually work, so he gambled and they lost.
After years of study I can only conclude that losing Jackson at Chancellorsville deprived him of his only creative and committed general. Couple this with Davis' orders to win a battle in the north at all costs to convince European intervention forced Lee to throw a military Hail Mary.
Ghettysburgh would’ve been much different if Jackson was alive for it ,
+AmericanBattlefieldTrust *Lee (CSA) ordered Stuart (from the east) and Pickett (from the west) to attack simultaneously.* Stuart's cavalry was intended to hit the Potomac infantry rear but ended up short-stopped by Gregg (U.S.), which allowed the Potomac infantry to crush Pickett's division.
Once again, very well said Garry.! We all have the benefit of 20/20 vision post battle. Based on the limited intel Lee had on that day, charging up the Federals’ “gut” made good tactical sense since both the Federal flanks were solid earlier that day. He also believed Confederate Col. Alexander’s artillery barrage was successful, though that certainly proved not to be the case.
The Federal center initially was less defended. It remained so until Meade was able to quickly pull his troops into the center. Meade’s officer corps were outstanding with their rapid response in redeploying troops from the flanks without delay.
There was merit in the idea of attacking the center, but there were too many things which had already gone wrong by that point. There was too much desperation in it and not enough calculation.
My understanding was that in addition to Pickett's Charge there was an additional cavalry attack that was supposed to hit the rear of the Union Army but Custer repulsed it. I've been known to be wrong, though.
The same tactic napoleon tried at Waterloo. First attack both flanks and then conclude that since the enemy reinforced it's flanks he "must" be weak in the center
It was obvious to Gen. Longstreet that Pickett’s Charge would fail. It should have been obvious to Gen. Lee as well. And the charge did not almost succeed.
Have you been there and looked across that low, open, totally exposed field towards Little Round Top? I have and it only took about 5 seconds to realize how STUPID anyone would have to be to charge across there.
I thought the same thing.
Conveniently missing from this video is Longstreet, who protested the charge in real time, while he was at the same time given command of it.
When the battered and beaten remnants of the Confederate force came back to Seminary Ridge Lee is reputed to have greeted them with "This is all my fault! This is all my fault!
When you walk through the maneuver from the Codori Farm then up to the Copse of Trees you see what Longstreet was talking about. For those troops that had to execute that maneuver, they had to march, completely exposed, past Union rifles and cannon on their right the entire time. It is an absolute miracle anyone made it.
He had to leave with a victory. The south had limited resources, his army would never be this strong again. Had to roll the dice , thought the esprit de corps of his men would carry the day. Rifled weapons changed everything but they were still fighting the previous wars. Grew up in PA, been there many times. Stand at the high water mark and look at the distance Lee’s men marched literally into the muzzles of cannons loaded with grapeshot and its heartbreaking. Probably the finest infantry on the planet at 2 PM and in less than an hour half were casualties.
Finest infantry on the planet, don't make me laugh
E top@@felixloewenich2202 yes this is a bit over top…probably more south will rise again hubris?r
@@felixloewenich2202 Chancellorville. Think any other infantry could run 12 miles to complete the encircling of the Union after being divided in the face of a superior strength opponent. Not even Wellington or Napoleon could pull that off.
@@felixloewenich2202 It's precisely because they were that good that Lee thought they could pull it off. If I say the Japanese had the finest carrier pilots on the planet in 1941 that doesn't make me a Hirohito-worshiper.
Did anyone read Colonel Oates, 15th Alabama, account of the battle? He was there. Relates Lee's intention to draw Meade into a defensive battle etc. And Longstreet's views. Lee knew he was outnumbered but got carried away (hubris). He'd kicked butt at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. He thought union army would break. WRONG.
Taking the broadest view possible, Lee had got the Army of Northern Virginia into a bad situation, but he had no choice but to press the attack. Both he and Jefferson Davis understood that the South would lose a long war, and the only way to win it was to defeat the Federal army and force a peace treaty. Both Antietam the previous September and Gettysburg should be seen in this strategic view, in addition to the particulars of any battle.
Great video. Thank you.
Love these videos with animations
Hubris, sheer f'ing hubris. That is what Bobby Lee was suffering from. He really believed that he could not be beaten, that he couldn't lose at all. He was wrong.
or maybe he knew he was beaten and needed to retreat ... he dared not give a full assault because he was scared he would be destroyed ... so he sacrificed Pickett to save face. He had PLENTY of men to back Pickett up but he knew that even then he would fail and he didn't want to be trapped in the defensive so deep in enemy territory. So, he gave it a good looking final charge ... and then retreated with a still viable but failed army.
Yep. He got super lucky at Chancellorsville and took away all the wrong lessons.
In all fairness, Lee may not have known that Howard point-blank disobeyed Hooker's order to prepare for Jackson's "sneaky" flank attack. Lee may not have known about Hooker's severe concussion the next day. That might have helped him come to the conclusion that the victory was because his men were so awesome.
But Gettysburg also wasn't the first time Lee's hubris was on display. Antietam is probably the best example of all, and he learned nothing from that.
@@persimmontea6383 How does losing another 7-8k troops help you retreat?
@@aaronfleming9426 Well, Mead did nothing the next day while Lee prepared his retreat ... Mead's men had just watched Lee throw more than 15,000 men at them point blank .... that made Lee look entirely able to respond to any attack on him in retreat.
@@persimmontea6383 I guess that could have figured into Meade's motivation. I guess I need to learn more about Meade's post-battle decision making process!
It is simple Lee saw the advantages strongly moving to the Yankees in the war and he had only one chance to win and that was at Gettysburg. So normally he would not take such a risky move but it was his last chance to win. Lee was brillant in his analysis of the situation.
I picture a middleweight boxer slugging with a heavyweight boxer in a fight to finish. The smaller guy knows he needs to use guile and aggression to try to make the heavyweight quit early. Otherwise the bigger guy simply wears down the smaller guy round after round until in inevitable comes. Lee had a narrow window of opportunity and took it when it first appeared. Failed spectacularly, but he was trying to win the fight against long odds.
Lee made several well-known risky moves before Gettysburg, some successful, others not. This was quite normal indeed for Lee.
Yet, moving men around like chess pieces on both sides was inhumane in lincoln's war of northern aggression.
I would agree if the charge had taken place earlier. At this point, however, the Union was fairly secure in their position and would not at all have been taken by surprise by the charge. Lee waited too long to try to throw the knockout blow. At this point, he should have withdrawn a little and tried to get the Union to chase him onto more favorable ground.
@@stevefabian477 Northern aggression? Maybe you should do yourself a favor and actually study the history. The south launched dozens of attacks against federal installations before Lincoln even took office. In fact, they had declared independence before then. This was SOUTHERN AGGRESSION all the way.
A fair assessment. Imagine if Meade didn't reinforce his center with 2 corps with interior lines and instead plotted an attack on the wings or blundered somehow else. It would wind up that Lee would be praised for his genius
War has a way of rewriting itself in our minds.
Problem is they attended the same college and therefore were taught the same things. Meade knew lee would attack the center after his flanks stood strong. It almost worked but ended up being a massacre
@@nicknorris100 to be fair when on the defensive up until that point in the east, the union usually broke and ran (exception being malvern hill) Lee used concentration of force and failed
@@zoanth4 yah but meade had replaced the previous 5 general's who broke and ran. Lee should of listened to Longstreet who seemed to have a better understanding of the situation. Personally, i think lee is one of the most overrated generals of all time and Gettysburg proved it
@@nicknorris100 Longstreet imo was the souths best commander. It's why he was hated after the war so much he became a republican
Your assessment suggests Meade was very wise. He planned for different scenarios and was ready for almost anything, though partly due to superior numbers.
Would love to hear more, however sound quality is very poor, ie volume.
Gettysburg was Lee's attempt to foil Grant at Vicksburg. An interesting idea. Problem was that Lee had always fought as defender not attacker. Longstreet was right in wanting to move around Meade's left forcing northern forces to abandon their positions.
Longstreet was indulging in some high-level wishful thinking.
@@aaronfleming9426Lee's ordering the attack was wishful thinking. Longstreet was the pragmatic one.
@@PatrickTyrrell-jd5zy Yes, Lee's order was wishful thinking. But Longstreet's "plan" to move around the Union left was not pragmatic...there was neither time nor a practical route to get around the Union right, and any hope of accomplishing such a move would be based on the assumption that the Federal army would sit on its thumbs doing nothing while the rebels maneuvered. THAT is wishful thinking.
Actually Lee's chief artillery officer Porter Alexander actually accurately pounded several of the Union's artillery position. Its just that the men manning those batteries didn't abandon their posts and many of them were able to fire back and stymie the Confederate troops as they charged uphill.
All of these criticisms here are valid. The Union made all the right moves with interior lines to counter attacks and wouldn't break. A plan of attack that in the end relies on the enemy running away is a faulty one, a toss of the dice that failed.
Sitting on the porch with an old guy talking about Gen Lee he said he remember as a young boy hearing his grandfather telling his dad how the local community was upset with the General because in his word how many tar heel boys were lost on Pickett charge new how fool hardly they have no chance to take the union line. Most admit was taken aback by the criticism of the General by the old man.
That Martin Sheen impersonation got me 😂
Howdy Gary, I hope you’re enjoying your Sunday.
That's probably the Garry from 10 years ago. 😄
He should of listened to General Longstreet and redeployed even if the attack succeeded it would of been a pyrrhic victory at best.
Have listened to him, not of, but yeah, he should have.
No mention of the cavalry charge ordered on the opposite flank to disrupt Union reinforcements and communications but was turned back by a Union cavalry force led a young George Armstrong Custer
Dang I’ve been on a Pickett’s charge kick recently and this gem drops.
Why did he order the charge? Easy, he thought it might work.
After all, his options at this point are withdraw and seek another battle elsewhere...with insufficient artillery stocks...or make the attack today.
The Union army has been beaten on day 1...it barely clung on on day 2. Who is to say whether there was much fight left in the Army of the Potomac on day 3?
If Lee withdraws, it is unlikely that he will escape without serious pursuit...and the campaign ends with Lee using the weather to force a crossing of the Potomac. If Lee attacks and fails, he withdraws and the campaign ends with Lee using the weather to force a crossing of the Potomac.
People hold up Picketts Charge as this momentous event. It really wasn't anything of the sort. The Gettysburg campaign was already over...it's just that no one realized it yet.
Plus, the Union was still on the battlefield. If Hooker, or some other jackass might still have been in command instead of Meade, the Union may have been ordered to conduct a fatal attack on the third day instead.
Lee was not depending solely on Pickett. He had sent Stuart to the Union rear with 5000 cavaly to do a hammer and anvil on the Union center. Stuart's move failed when he encountered Custer with 500 mounted troopers armed with repeating rifles. As a result of Custer's charge against Stuart, Stuart was never able to get into position. Frank Haskell was a Lt. in John Gibbons' Iron Brigade. In his account to his brother, Haskell reveals that many in the Union line thought they were about to be overrun by Pickett. That without even knowing about Stuart's move. The vagaries of war fell into action that day and cost the confederates the victory. It was not necessarily bad generalship on Lee's part.
Been to Gettysburg several times and stood on both sides of the line. Sending thousands of troops in an open field against a well entrenched enemy with supporting artillery fire, was bound to fail. I guess General Lee didn’t realize the Confederate artillery barrage overshot the Union line. With that said, Lee was a brilliant commander, but made a tactical mistake by ordering that charge.
The only way The Charge on Day Three could have worked was for Lee to have moved ALL troops to the center the night before and sent not just 15,000 but 25-30-35,000 to hit Meade’s Center. No matter how tired, Lee needed every non-wounded man following Pickett’s fresh troops.
With no troops on Lee's flanks, what would prevent Meade from concentrating his whole army in his center? What would prevent him from sending his own flanks forward and enveloping Lee?
As it happened, on the local, tactical, level, some of Meade's troops were able to move forward and enfilade Pickett's force. That could just as easily have happened on a larger scale if Lee had stripped his own flanks.
Thanks for what you do Battlefield Trust. I live in England, so not much chance of visiting soon.
Do you think if the confederates had launched a dawn/pre dawn assault with a delayed artillery assault, they would have succeeded with Pickets charge?
Thanks for any answers!
It’s one thing to know the history and the maps. But to actually walk those grounds at that battlefield from both perspectives can give a good idea of why decisions where made the way they are. If you don’t know much about this battle, go to the historic site or even pull up some maps. And reveal the knowledge that was present at the current time frames from their points of view. Fatefully the union made all the right preparations and the confederate army walked right into them simply because they where all guiding themselves off of the same rule book. The civil war was inevitably decided by the ability of troops to continue to fight and beat the attrition that was being put forth the entire war, otherwise tactics and doctrine on both sides was very similar
As I recall, Lee sent J. Stuart around the Unions rear with orders to attack and meet the Confederate main assault in the middle of the line effectively cutting the Union line in two with a "pincer" movement. Stuart never made it there because of G. Custers audacious Cavalry charge to the front of Stuarts Cavalry column which threw Stuarts forces in disarray thus thwarting the "pincer" movement that Lee was counting on. I have read reports that as Armistad was crossing over the wall at the angle he was seen looking behind the Union forces probably counting on support from Stuart that never materialized.
That is exactly what Lee had drawn up and it happened just as you described.
not sure how a pincer movement could be possible versus an entrenched fish hook formation. The Union could have contracted the formation even further to make a northern circle, well out of cannon or cavalry range.
My memory says Stuart's objective was the powder reserves at the Union rear, not the rear of the Union lines. Destroy the powder reserves, which would have been visible for miles, and Union troops have a handful of shots to use to repel the charge.
@@woodysmith2681 For repelling this charge in this battle it would have made no difference at all had Stuart reached and destroyed the powder reserves. The individual units, from Company to Battalion to Regiment all replenish ammunition needs ASAP including during a battle. Also, this charge was only engaging approximately one third of the Union line. The North would have had more than enough ammunition on hand to continue the fight.
The only way the South wins this attack is if it cuts the Union line in two and sends the Union forces in confused retreat. The only way that that can happen is if Stuart can successfully perform the "pincer" attack from the rear of Meads position. The South did not commit enough men into the frontal assault to break through Meads line AND envelope BOTH EXPOSED Flanks of the Union line. Were the Union forces to just fall back but not break, creating a "bulge" the attack was doomed to fail. General Longstreet knew how this attack was going to end. He just kept saying "...it's math! It's all about the math!"
@@SantomPh Remember, at this point in history there are no radios for instant communication. Orders were sent by the Commander via a written note by courier. That takes a long time! The Union forces on the line I'm sure were concentrating on a mile long line of Confederate troops marching towards their position. That had to demand their attention! It would have had my attention! The union forces were only entrenched facing the charge, huddled down behind a low wall. To their rear was open ground with all guns facing towards the confederate charge. Had it not been for Custers cavalry charge at the head of Stuarts advance which disrupted their entire column (again, no radios to give instant orders in a situation like that!) The entire column just came to a halt because they had no orders to do otherwise. The rear pincer movement was essentially halted. It would have taken hours to determine the situation and send orders to the various components of the column.
Didn't the Confederate tried to outflank the Union army with the cavalry of Stuart at the same time that their infantry attacked the center ?
The Pickett Charge wasn't to go totally unsupported, nothwistanding the massive artillery barrage.
The charge was suicide
The csa having to maneuver out of the treeline March over a mile to get to the federal position.
Majority of the men were dead before they reached the stone wall at Hancock's position .
Lee should've listened to Longstreet he should've redeployed to a better ground.
Watching the Gettysburg Movie right now as this was uploaded 👀
Hope it's the extended edition.
@@rc59191 still not very good. The history channels mini series is way better
@@nicknorris100 which one?
@@rc59191 Of course Sir! Ahead of the Movie i watched Ken Burns 9 Part documentary about the civil war. Can recommend that to everyone who hasn't seen it yet.
Lee believed in his own genius and legend by then and thought he could do no wrong. He dismissed all criticism of the attack, particularly from Longstreet. Lee made countless blunders at Gettysburg, not just Pickett’s charge
General Longstreet said the Army of Northern Virginia could not afford another victory like Chancellorsville. Longstreet understood that the Norman army of Northern Virginia could not sustain the heavy casualties that a quote tactical victory entailed unless it provided a strategic victory. There was not one field army in that war that possess the necessary tactical
Any army at this time could possibly defeat their rival but the adversary would always get away to fight another day. You could only win by maneuver and not by combat. He was in a position to get between the army of the Potomac supply lines to Baltimore and Washington. They would have to attack him,
Reportedly Lee, the night of July third, responded to a question about a possible next days battle - Wasn't that enough glory for the next hundred years?
Please I would love to hear of all the division and brigade commanders these men are the unsung heroes of the war
Great impression of Gen Martin Sheen!
This is nothing compared to Hood's reckless assault against the Union army at Franklin
We were marching to a battle during a reenactment in Gettysburg during the 90s. Several of the actors from the movie were there. Including Patrick Gorman? who played Hood. He came riding up on horseback in full uniform and told us the day was not over. There was still work to be done. Someone in the ranks hollered out to him " We will follow you anywhere General, just don't carry us to Franklin, Tennessee." LOL. Ain't that the truth. Patrick Cleburne said after the meeting with Hood on the battle plan for Franklin, "' Tomorrow as good a day to die as any." He was killed in the charge.
Purely an act of desperation with failure to adapt tactics to the given situation. Hood was a good division/regiment commander. But temperamentally unsuitable for corp and army group command because he was one dimensional on tactics.
I have visited Spring Hill and Franklin sites or what remains of it. Way overdeveloped nowadays.
@@exposethenwo6491Which boggles the mind why Texas named a military vase after him.
As is mentioned in the movie Gettysburg, Confederate envoys were to attempt a meeting with Lincoln to seek peace after a major victory on Union soil. Nothing could be done about Vicksburg. The ANV did well on July 1 except failing to take the high ground south of town. July 2 was a rash of near misses that almost brought victory. For Lee, falling back now after a tactical draw was same as a defeat. He gambled on the charge. What instead, if he had concentrated artillery over night at right angles to Cemetery Hill, facing south and west? A massive bombardment early would have decimated the enemy in a cross fire they couldn't avoid. Then charge the hill, breaking the Union high ground hinge. Taking Cemetery, they could concentrate artillery on Culp's Hill, and if they took that, Lee might have enough of a victory to try the peace proposal. Meade would either have to counter attack or fall back to a better position.
There is no evidence that Confederate envoys were to attempt a meeting with Lincoln after a major victory on Union soil. The strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. Lee told Seddon in April that the surest way of accomplishing that was for the AoNV to advance into Maryland. The decision of the Confederate cabinet in Mid- May to retain all of Lee's forces in Virginia and authorize an invasion of the Union was predicated on the assumption that this would remove pressure from Vicksburg- and not offset the fall of Vicksburg.
The meeting engagement on 1 July was a disaster for Lee, as it ruined his plan of campaign and forced him to attack- which was something that he had never intended to do in that area.
Because it’s a tactic that works, he just didn’t have the artillery support or enough men support the flanks and the reserve wasn’t arranged to exploit the break in the enemy line. As it was it almost worked.
Lee lost Gettysburg for 2 reasons.. the delayed attack on culps hill.. and complete lack of Intel from Stewart..
Stuart.
Jeb was busy with custer and could not get away.
Lee had other cavalry units available to him, but he never engaged them. Why? Plus, he had received intel from Longstreet prior to the second day's actions and refused to modify his plan of action accordingly.
@@thomast8539 no doubt he did, but his main man was jeb, who was over all the units as I understand it.
@@thomast8539 it use to be thought their aim was bad, but research showed the fuses suffered from quality control.. they burned longer than thought and they exploded behind the union lines though the confederates could not tell. The other near miss was at round top where they ran out of ammunition trying to turn the flank.
From the time they crossed the fence they were going uphill. That’s NOT good.
Seems to me he was trying to replicate Blenheim. I'm curious just what Lee thought Meade had at Gettysburg - did a corps or two arrive during the night and he didn't know about it?
Pickett’s Charge didn’t come close to succeeding.
Longstreet didn’t second guess him, he first guessed him.
Not sure who needs to hear this…
I agree. I also think that, begging to differ, Lee is an overrated general in terms of his military skills. Not in terms of his people skills. He was good at psychology. But let's not forget - he had already done exactly the same mistake before Gettysburg. He had ordered a disastrous charge at Malvern Hill in the Union guns' crossfire one year earlier. And he witnessed the disastrous charge of the Union army at Fredericksburg half a year earlier. And yet, he didn't learn anything from those events. He stubbornly followed the stuff he was taught at West Point. Not thinking for himself and not being innovative. That means, he definitely was no Frederick the Great or Napoleon no matter what some convinced confederates made or make out of Lee. So I think that guy in the clip is wrong. Sorry.
@@volkerwestphal3746 "He stubbornly followed the stuff he was taught at West Point..."
Do they teach "attack a dug-in, well-fortified enemy who outnumbers you on high ground who also enjoys a materiel advantage over you..." at West Point?
@@geoffreypereira8024 Good point. No, they don't. As I said, Lee might have been a decent person and good at judging the mental frame of Union generals, but he didn't fully grasp the weaponry of his time.
@@volkerwestphal3746 Forgot to add to my West Point lesson "...who sees you coming from over a mile away..."!!
There is no excuse for ordering this charge. it was not even a charge; it was murder plain and simple.
Here here.
Yup.
Reckless.
I have heard that because Richmond Armory was destroyed, fuses were made by mom and pop industries and the fuses were not dependable in burn time. So most of the artillery exploded behind Union lines.
They were made in Atlanta even though it was called the workshop of the Confederacy they really dropped the ball on this one.
What? For air burst above the Union guns, so that is why the were considered to be "over shooting"? I thought batteries that are in the open were to be targeted by direct fire, not indirect fire.
Add in the fact they didn’t have or take the time to test the fuse burn time all help lead to a very bad day for Lee and the South.
How could Lee possibly think this would work? sending troops uphill against Union men in guarded positions, who also had cannons to fire.
Because he thought that Confederate artillery would soften up the Union center (instead it mostly missed and chewed up the ground behind them). Because Pickett's division was fresh while the Union had been fighting for three days. Because after a long string of miracles against the odds, any of one of which would seem like obvious folly in retrospect if it had failed, this newest gamble didn't seem much crazier than the previous ones.
Have to agree with other comments, this feels very Lost Cause-y. The central charge was always a bad idea. Even if it had worked, hopefully historians would have pointed out that Lee made a bad choice and happened to get lucky, the same way one might survive many games of Russian roulette.
But there was little reason to think it would work out at all. The Union army had a commanding position, with easy internal lines of reinforcement and communication. Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor showed just how much an infantry assault on established positions relied on flanking support. The lack of cavalry support and ineffective barrage didn't help, obviously. But it's a very poor plan that relies on everything going perfectly. And given the well documented concerns of a number of Confederate officers at the time, calling it Monday morning quarterbacking is inaccurate and misleading.
If someone is a Monday morning quarterback that's this pathetic Gary Adelman in this video. What a sad and unnecessary attempt to protect Lee's reputation. R. E. L. was sick, exhausted, bewildered and exasperated with his armies inability to inflict a serious defeat on the Union army the two days before. All Lee had to do was listen to Longstreet when he told him: "I have been a soldier all my life. I have commanded companies, I have commanded regiments. I have commanded divisions. And I have commanded even more. But there are no fifteen thousand men in the world that can go across that ground."
-- Gen James Longstreet, arguing with Gen Robert E. Lee against what became known as Pickett's Charge, July 1863
My friend Scott Pickett , his grandfather, is my close associate. VA. Beach. Stories / History wow
Lee was no dummy, as he had whipped every Union commander before Meade despite being outnumbered and out gunned. Lee knew that an immediate victory was crucial, especially with Vicksburg in peril. He no doubt was thinking of Gaine's Mill and a possible victory like he achieved there, however, with a heavy cost. He could not afford to let the Union take the initiative, pummeling him to buy time to bring even MORE forces up to beat him.....he HAD to fight....and HAD to win. The biggest factor was no Stonewall Jackson, Lee's " right arm" and best subordinate commander.
In the end it was probably desperation, he went north to win in a way they would get the union to negotiate an end to the war. On July 2 their attack was repulsed, and any chance to win the victory he needed was lost.
My question is, had they not attacked on the 3rd, would Mead have been in a better position to pursue the retreat?
Good question. I've always thought Lee would have been better off retreating without the extra 8,000 casualties from Pickett's Charge.
@@aaronfleming9426 Always impossible to know for sure. He had Stewart back by the end of the 2nd, so you're probably correct they could have conducted an orderly retreat.
I don't suspect retreat really crossed his mind in any case.
Part of it is in hindsight we know it was over on the 2nd, he didn't. He probably felt like he came closer that he really did to winning on the 2nd.
@@scottdobson1276 "He probably felt like he came closer that he really did to winning on the 2nd." That seems very plausible to me.
I've long been of the opinion that Sickles' move on the 2nd was a huge benefit to Longstreet's attacks on that day. But Lee would have no way of knowing that was Sickles' blunder and not Meade's, and that Sickles was permanently off the battlefield and better corps commanders would be receiving Pickett's Charge.
Bobby Lee suffered from the same disease that the Japanese leaders suffered from early after their attack at Pearl Harbor, that was "The Victory Disease". They just could not conceive of failure. However, if the Confederate artillery was better and had more ammunition, Pickett's Charge might just have been successful.
Bobby Lee's attack at Malvern Hill had the same problem. Instead of a heavy Confederate bombardment, the Yankee artillery smashed the Rebel guns in a half hour. This led to the remark that has been attributed to Conferedate General D.H.Hill - "With my infantry and the Federal artillery, we could beat any nation in he world!"
We keep talking about Lee. Perhaps we should listen to George Pickett. When asked why he thought the charge failed he is supposed to have said "I always thought the Yankees had a lot to do with it."
Leaving on the night of the 4th insured there would be no counterattack by Meade on the road south. Lincoln and Halleck insisted on an attack after the battle on the 5th or later. Meade was correct to count his blessings and leave well enough alone. July 3rd gave Lee a clear plain path home.
The guy in the video gets it. Lee had limited ammunition and supplies. Lee's gains on Day 1 cost too much.. What little he gained on Day 2 cost him even more. Eventually, Hancock's flank firmed up and stopped his attacks and it cost Lee a lot. On the other side, the 20th Maine stopped his attacks and killed many of the attackers. Then came the bayonet charge that turned his attack into another failure and a lot of prisoners taken. Day 3 comes and Lee's artillery is down to the last of its ammunition. The foot soldiers and cavalry are running out of ammunition. All supplies are low. He's got 1 last chance. The attacks on the flanks cost him too much and eventually failed.
Some people call doing the same thing over & over & expecting different results "insanity". Lee wasn't insane or stupid. His attacks on the flanks failed, he had enough for 1 more attack so he tried something he hadn't. He attacked the center. Unfortunately for Lee, the Federal artillery was pretty good while his wasn't so good. Once the Confederates got close, they ran into disciplined small arms fire. This was not the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. This was a battle hardened & disciplined army under a Different George.
While it was a miracle that those who made it to the Federal Line did and actually breached it, the quick thinking field commanders promptly contained & stopped up the breach. The Confederates could not even turn the abandoned cannons against the Federals as the Federal artillery commanders had ordered most of the ammunition right at the cannons fired.
Longstreet and his subordinates could have screamed at Lee all that they wanted about one more try at the flanks, but my guess would be he told them "Look, we've got enough for 1 more go & I've tried the flanks, it cost me a lot & I didn't get what I paid for. They're still here & they're not running. I'm not going to waste the last of what I got on something that's failed 2X. I've got to try another way b|c this way isn't working."
lee and Yamato had the same issue. theri nations could not fight a long fight so they gambled. Lee many times won agaisnt a numerically superior army. Meade was recently promoted to command and Lee tried to make use of it. the first day went very well. but fightign the second day as he did was a mistake. Longstreet knew this. but lee's man beat thge odds so many times it blinded him to reality. and Longstreet was off. he thought none of his men would even make it to the union line..they did.
What’s hardly ever discussed is the fact that Jeb Stuart’s cavalry was to circle around and attack from the northeast simultaneously as Pickett’s attack was taking place. It never gets spoken of the Union Cavalry under Fitzpatrick and Custer stopping the CSA attack, northeast of Gettysburg, thus preventing the shock and awe of a force getting into the rear and causing chaos to dismantle the Union line thus enabling Pickett’s attack to succeed….the movie Gettysburg simply doesn’t tell the whole story of the battle
Was it Gregg?
SAVE OUR BATTLEFIELDS AMERICA 🇺🇸
Gary... I love your videos, but I have to be honest, you need better audio, it would make your videos so much better to listen to.
When i read Killer Angels it felt almost like Lee was blowing it deliberately. He ignored a lot of good advice from his subordinates commanders. At least that was what I was getting from Shaara. Has that ever been a theory?
It seems he wanted to force the issue, which is usually a bad idea.
No, Lee was drunk with victory. He was arrogant and also ill. He thought his men could do anything, but the war was no longer in the South, it was in the North, and at that point, the Army of the Potomac had many veterans eager to have their vengeance. Lee underestimated both Meade and the army he was fighting. He was in foreign territory with cavalry that largely failed and left his army blind. Virgina put all their eggs in one basket invading Pennsylvania, and lost. It was a downhill spiral for the confederacy after Pickett's charge. I say no, because I don't think Lee cared whether there were a lot of men in the center or not. He thought regardless of numbers that his artillery barrage was going to cause confusion and disarray within the Union ranks and it didn't. Again, Virginia committed everything to this campaign, they had to win and Lee didn't think his army would stay intact much longer without a major victory. In his mind, he had to fight or die trying, and he didn't care how many men he sent to get slaughtered, he wanted victory and justifying these horrific battles by continually stating that he'd end the war quickly and save lives. He did the complete opposite.
I often wonder what might have happened had General Picket had his whole division with him that day.
Pretty much what happened, how much stronger would the force have been if he did tho? I think the original attack had 12,500-14,000 against as much as 20’000
@@seank3410
the attack was 40.000 men to weak and IIRC the 5th corps was arriving
More confederate men would have died.
Also, putting yourself in Lee's mind, he had thrown the Army of Northern Virginia at Union emplacements before and it had never let him down so why not do it again? Things had changed though hence a close run failure.