RUclips: Oh look, here's an Austrian dude talking about German psychology & methodology of warfare with a German professor. Rest of Europe: _Nervous laughter_
Would that have anything to do with Germany being a relatively new addition to the Austria- Hungarian Empire that was dissolved at the end of the Great War? Or, the end of the second reign of the Holy Roman Empire?
in fact there is a "service regulation for the publication of regulations" "Dienstvorschrift zur Herausgabe von Vorschriften" (DV Vorschriften) There is also the "DIN EN 45202" standard, that standardizes the standards (DIN = deutsche Industrienorm, german industry standard ; EN = Europäische Norm, european standard)
This is fascinating, especially since the points the Professor makes are ones I have not heard really discussed before, but they are clearly hugely important ones to think about when it comes to organizing a military, even if they aren't "sexy" like a squad's composition or tactics.
Bernhard Kast in suit and tie? And here I was wondering what those 2% female demographic you and Chieftain mentioned in a road stories video we’re watching, now we know
Yes. That was interesting. A few comments ... First off - I wouldn't ascribe the rethinking of the tactics and strategies of NATO as due to the defeat in Vietnam - so much as the end of the war in Vietnam. During the War in Vietnam - the NATO portion of the American Armed Forces had been somewhat neglected. We had been killing and dying in SE Asia and that took up a lot more of our attention than ... not ... killing and dying in Europe. Once the war was over though - then - people in the military started thinking more about Europe again. Another factor here - would be the boost our defeat in SE Asia gave to the Russians. They probably saw themselves as winning the Cold War at that point. So - here - to counter this rise in Soviet morale and planning - the Americans devoted more to Europe than they had been. My point though - is that this isn't because we lost in Vietnam - but because we weren't paying attention to that any more and went back to what we had been paying attention to before the war in Vietnam - when Europe was our top priority. One thing about keeping all those officers as the number of troops are reduced - is that - it takes 20 years to train a senior officer ... so ... if the possibility exists that you might end up increasing the size of the Army you have just been reducing in size - it make sense to retain that senior level of expertise. And finally - yeah - there is a big difference in the amount of petty bull shit in a peace time military as opposed to one that is actively at war. One of my High School buddies did a tour of duty at Pleiku in the Central Highlands of Vietnam - then was sent to Fort Gordon, Georgia. After a few months there having to put up with all the chicken shit of a State side base - he volunteered to go back to Vietnam and they sent him to Long Binh. Now - my buddy was a finance clerk ... so ... My point though is even in a nation at war the amount of petty bull shit that goes on in the rear areas is much, much greater than that which goes on closer to the front. .
It’s like Germany, if you need to expand a military 10-20fold, when downsizing keep the thicc bois, and idiot can be trained as a rifleman, not everyone can lead a division
Just a simple reminder, training soldiers takes 6 months roughly, training Staff takes a lot longer, so maybe that's a good reason to keep a healthy amount of high ranking officers. Maybe something to think about (concerning Bundeswehr and # of Generals)
In the American Army during training (and sometimes during war) we very rarely cross the line of departure with more than a warning order and get the full order somewhere along the way or maybe not at all. The paperwork as he calls it is a huge anchor around our necks and it gets worse and worse and worse the higher you go. Impossible to keep up with.
Had the pleasure of studying under the professor last semester, very interesting bloke who clearly knows his stuff. Nice to see the two of you interacting!
Bernhard, and Bismark, are fantastic commentators on Germany military matters. And He reads and 'Hearts' so many comments - not that I'm looking for one:)
"Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face"---Mike Tyson. I had a Gunny who told me we were going in following Plan B. I asked why? He said the enemy never seems to concern itself with what we put in Plan A.
The really interesting part of this video, besides the subject and input, was the fact that these guys have a better command of English than many people I know, including myself.
I have often used "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Recently I discovered that I was missing "with the enemy main forces." "No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces. Only the layman believes that in the course of a campaign he sees the consistent implementation of an original thought that has been considered in advance in every detail and retained to the end." Von Moltke Which makes much more sense. As ex Sniper/Recce I should have realised that Contact and Commitment are different issues. That seeing the enemy's recce or forward elements can be/is just dipping the toe in a scalding bath........
Ein ziemlich interessantes Thema. Das Buch hab ich gerade bestellt. Wenn es eine Chance gibt, würde ich auch gerne eine Vorlesung von Neitzel live hören.
Modern "regulations" (if by that term you include weapon manuals, etc.) also include many topics not required in say 1940. From memory the vehicle manual for the Leopard 1 in Australian service has sections on Laser Safety, Workplace Health and Safety, Radiation hazards, Environmental considerations, etc. so while say the 120 mm mortar may have been effectively the same weapon, the current documentation probably covers things that were never considered during the Second World War.
In addition to a multitude of regulations for each branch of the US Military, there are MIL Standards for pretty much everything! The US *is* the paperwork Superpower!
You have to be an artist, a psychologist, a logistician, a mental acrobat, know when to scream and when to be calm. Your planning should be as uncomplicated as possible. Rules are important, improvisation can be even more important.
Very interesting discussion. I am far from a scholar in this area. My father was in the US 15th Air Force in Italy. In any case the common wisdom that I grew up with was that the American Army was effective because as a citizen army the command structure was less rigid and the commanders at the company and platoon levels felt more freedom to improvise and adjust as the tactical situation presented itself. The German army whether Heer or SS had a more rigid command structure with less freedom to stretch its boundaries. Dr. Nietzel seems to be describing quite the opposite. In any case it’s nice to see Bernard engaging the academics in this format. Plus he cleans up pretty good!
The differences between career (professional, standing, peacetime) armies vs wartime are significant. Interesting topic with much to consider and understand.
Interesting, thank you. By the way, an overlooked feature of the Wehrmacht was its lack of reserves, which was caused by the Versailles Treaty. A whole generation did produce little to no reservists, which eventually led to a problem in WW2 where the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and even Italy, had more reservists per capita, simply because they had 1918-1933 time to create a larger reservist base than the Reichswehr. The Versailles Treaty specifically limited the Reichswehr reserve. Therefore, I believe that it had an influence on the Wehrmacht build-up following 1933, right? All the sudden you were growing, growing, growing so fast within a few years. It must have had an influence on how you approach administration, paperwork, and generally, how you conduct exercises. The Reichswehr tried to overcome it prior to 1933 through some impressive covert operations, and also by granting German parties their own militias (that were essentially private armies), of which not the SA was the biggest, prior to 1933, but actually the SPD's Reichsbanner, KPD's Rotfrontkämpfer, or the Stahlhelm. Carl von Ossietzky revealed those Reichswehr rearmament tactics in 1931, if I recall correctly, for which he not only won a Nobel Peace Price in 1935 or 1936 but for which he went to prison where he died soon after. At least it shows how strange those times were in terms of organization and administration of both the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, and how militant the German society was even before Hitler. Something we forget, having a big focus on Hitler.
Any 'cold war turned hot' scenario would have the Warsaw Pact smash into West Germany first. The Bundeswehr was created in 1955 for exactly that reason. If anything the German military lost it's purpose when the wall came down.
In 1962 "der Spiegel" published a report on the combat preformance of the Bundeswehr which was tested in a training exercise. The NATO gave the Bundeswehr the rating "barely able to conduct defensive operations". It doesnt look like as if the situation had improved in the following decades. If the Warsaw Pact had marched into Germany, they would have quickly defeated the Bundeswehr. The current Bundeswehr is in a miserable state.
The article they published in 1962 led to a huge scandal, journalists were arrested and the publisher thrown into jail. In the end the German minister of defense had to resign.
I can't wait to read Neitzel's book (auf Englisch bitte). The explosion of regulation and policy can not be underestimated (lawfare). Imagine you're a soldier in the US Army, using an M110 SASS in a squad. The amount of lawfare needed for the Army to propose the need for the weapon system, draw a request for proposal, host a competition between manufacturers (twice, generally), achieve contract selection, create training and qualifications for soldiers, maintain stock and maintenance numbers, AND source ammunition contracts AS WELL as shipping the equipment to the AOR is astounding. All to meet the need of engaging man-sized targets from 300-800m.
I found the wide angle lens was a bit distracting in this video. Your hands were much nearer and appeared massive! Is it possible to move the camera back a bit and zoom in a bit? Great content though 😃.
In my opinion the loss we experienced in Vietnam was a failure of National and Theater level strategy not an operational or tactical failure. The adoption of Air Land battle was perhaps an inflated view of Wehrmacht success.
US Government agencies function much the same way. Bureaucracies feed rules and regulations which leads to expanded bureaucracies which in turn leads to greater paperwork required. It’s a never ending cycle.
I'm wondering if the warping of the German (and really, it starts with Prussian) way of war was being run over by Napoleon for about 10 years running. What I mean is that most of the "Coalition wars" basically went, Le Grande Arme comes racing up, extra large and with shaky supply lines. It ties the slower old-style armies in knots, and forces an unfavorable fight on them which they lose.. At which point Napoleon signs a favorable treaty and dances off after the next enemy. Works fine when you are facing mostly feudal domains that can lose a few provinces (and take years to get an army together). Eventually, someone doesn't sign that treaty, and pretty soon you are in way over your head.
With regard to the high number of generals that the bundeswehr has , apart from the argument the professor put forth , I think it can also be attributed to the potential need for the army to enlarge in the unlikely but possible eventuality of armed conflict.
The thing is that current war technology is increasingly less reliant upon numbers of men and more dependent on the infrastructure itself and its weapons. And with the number of generals, I think the professor’s point made complete sense
A soldier goes where he is told does what he is told and keeps doing it until he is told to stop. The training is brutal he becomes de-sensitized he is trained to use his weapons. He doesn’t worry about WHY or who is wrong or write he just wants to know when he can sleep 😴 eat and stuff like that . He knows that he is already a dead man walking. He fights for and helps the friends around him and vice versa. All of the high flown ideas about serving the country and being patriotic means nothing to him. Civilians don’t understand. You have to experience it yourself.
You could sum it up as the fetishisation of the art of fighting or conducting war. Specifically on the tactical and operational level, ignoring the strategic and grand strategic level. In other words, the political dimension, which ironically contradicts Clausewitz. Both German Armies essentially failed to see war as a political instrument, which was to serve a political goal. Or lost sight of how their fighting was to serve that goal. Granted, that requires the politicians having a clear political goal beyond simply winning.
Idea for a video spawned from this video How long did it take the Bundeswehr to transform away from the Wehrmacht in terms of military conduct (how they actually fight), since it’s known the Bundeswehr when it was made was armed with post war German surplus
@@demonprinces17 In the 50s, pretty much all senior NCOs and most mid-grade officer, not to mention generals, were former Wehrmacht., and taught the trade accordingly.
This is a fascinating topic that I have often pondered! Is this book available in English? Can you recommend any books in English that address this topic?
Are we sure the GERMAN MILITARY in general didn't just make more and more literature over time in general? Probably/possibly in part to the ease of creating that literature with newer tech and maybe more international trade /foreign tech to help produce it? Modern day, every truck (thinking HMMWV) has a log book and a full field manual. They're not small. I have found myself digging further into it when problems arose, and fixing issues myself, or learning to use some obscure feature I hadn't known about before as the need arises. That's the US military. Instead of guessing, the answer can be learned, so you learn a lot of correct information the more you use the equipment.
Rigid = proscriptive? While winning individual battles is important Grand strategy is vital and what happens at home behind the front is key too. The Allies prior to 1917 had a partial grand strategy and waged total war; 1917 and 1918 they had evolved a formal grand strategy; the Germans much less. The allies also paid a lot of attention to the home front. The same happened in 1939-1945: Hitler had a grand strategy, but still was focused on a series of short battles and wars. His opponents took a different approach, look at the differences in political and economic co-operation or the German approach to logistics compared to the Western allies. Gobbels, I assume with Hitler's approval, publically declared "total war" only in 1943, their enemies from 1939 or 1941.
He started with Moltke, but isn't it Clausewitz idea that "War is the realm of uncertainty" and that planning is kinda possible only in preparation and then everything is just too messy?
I wouldn't be surprised if that quote doesn't go further back, the main difference between Clausewitz and Moltke is, that the second was a practitioner, the first was mostly a theoretician. Also Neitzel's book is from 1870 to about 2020, so Moltke is also more fitting in that context.
Is there an aspect of the German attitude to war that reflects the difference in character on a regional level? On the grossest level, the difference between Prussians and Bavarians for example. Is this something that has gone away as the regional differences have smoothed out?
A peace time army vs a war time army can be best illustrated by what Gen. Marshall did right before the US entry in WWII. He got rid of a hell of a lot of field grade and general officers who he felt were not aggressive enough to lead troops into battle.
Would be interesting to see more videos with Professor Neitzel about Germany and the wars, guilt, controversities and so on, to show his (German point of view) to a larger audience. Another highly interesting topic would be: What do German history students learn about the Second World War at universities? Is there a broader angle or is it just as narrow like German history books at school? Is it worth it to study German Modern History (from the Napoleonic wars onwards) being German?
Some background: I personally was totally disilusioned from German History classes once we got to the interesting chapters. I recall the general reaction of my class mates. It was the most boring topic. I'm from Thuringia, our teachers were yet socialistic comunistic briefed and trained teachers - although Germany was already reunified. However teachers were the same. The show must go on! It could have been the most interesting part of History at all, however it was a never ending story of guilt indoctination, memorizing what the book said. If students wanted to contribute with experience of our grandfathers' and great grandfathers testimonies our teacher asked "Oh, so your grandpa also studied history!" I think it was in the 7th grade. However, since in East Germany students usually don't have classes in philosophy, we didn't learn to argue nor to question the teacher and his way of smashing of certain discussions. The only thing in Thuringia we learnt (in the 90's) was Ethics, during 8 years! The most boring part of Philosophy. In the military service I learnt that in West Germany students had philosophy classes, politics. Well in the end it was a frustrating class. We all hated it, only repeating the book's version. Any further comments in test meant 6 (the lowest German qualification). It was horrible. So at least I would have never studied History at university! Why, pure lies or point of views written in books. I loved to read Schiller about Netherland's independence, I read it here in Mexico where I live. It was Schiller who introduced to the History a focus on the main actors. In relationship to the 2nd World War this means a strong focus on Stalin, Churchill, the foreign policy amongst these countries. I would have loved this point of view. So, what has a History student to expect if he wants to study part of his career at a German university (as a German and as an International student)?
I studied in Austria and from 2001 to 2008; so some of that might apply to Germany, some might not even apply to Austria anymore. In university classes are highly dependent on what the different professors offer, at least for History at the University of Salzburg. I also studied Computer Science (CS). There was a huge difference, in CS I think about 90+ % of the courses were regular ones the content would change a bit depending on the professor / lecturer. Whereas in History the courses / classes were categories: Austrian History, Modern History, Ancient History, Contemporary History, Cultural History and Economic / Social History. E.g., I took a class Cultural History of Water, where I also mentioned Power Projection Doctrine in the exam. Besides from a few classes they subject changed all the time. I think some lecturers reused their stuff, but some made a new class every time if I am not mistaken. In short school had little to do with university, from what I know the difference is more and more eroded, which I find terrible since I was never a particular fan of schools, but of universities. School for me was: I was told what and how to do it. University for me is: You need to provide a result, how you do it is up to you as long the methodology is sound enough and you properly argue etc.
Thanks for the insides. Sounds pretty much the same to the German Magister Artium back in those days where you basically picked certain subjects to cover. As you say some were mandatory with little or no changes at all, others were held just once and in the next semester it wasn't offered anymore depending on the articles our professors had to publish, giving insides into their studies and working with students - rather to get a feedback or to get fed with new ideas. Sure, studying at universities is totally different. Maybe with the bachelor degrees it became a continuation of the school system. Were there topics where professors said "Sorry, I won't touch this topic, hot stuff!" ? I studied Germanistik and roman languages and of course besides studying the history of your own language (Old High German, Middle High German, Gothic, Old English etc.) and exchanges abroad you start to love your own language. Just as Goethe said: “Anyone that doesn't know foreign languages knows nothing of his own.” And being abroad, and with our German school system background WWII basically became a book with 7 seals, a topic you better don't talk about or avoid. And first time abroad, people were more open in relation to German History and they even asked "Is it right, better not ask a German about WWII?" Imagine, Germans better shall not know, and foreigners better do not ask! 🤔 So better never talk about it. I personally didn't talk that much about it. However I realized that people abroad sometimes knew more about it than I did. And surprisingly they asked the same questions as us, as teenangers at school wanting to know more about it. At the same time I remembered what my grandparents and great grand parents said about it. It wasn't that much either. My great grandfather who was 8 years in Russia as POW never talked about it. My grandma fleeing from Sudetia being a 6 years old child saw Dresden burning, and found it beautiful, the lights they used, like Christmas. I have heard other similar comments, children who also didn't understand what was happening there. And then you realize how this all worked for my generation, seeing it from outside. As said, I'm from the former GDR (socialistic part of German, "East Germany", with GDR teachers but West German education system) but to see this from outside, from a different point of view, and if not even Germans are interested in their History who of course have the chance to understand the language, a source most other countries are lacking of, who else can be interested in this field? So, again, to not forget: were there topics which professors tried to avoid? I heard in one of those discussions among historians that German Historians rather depend on foreign historians to bring up certain topics, otherwise they could risk their job. Or do you think it is indeed as open as studying languages or computer science - there is no political correctness in the end and everything is an open book.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Power projection doctrine! Thanks, sounds really interesting. I'm personally glad not having studied History, a mine field and later on I always considered "History as the politicians' bitch", and they do whatever they want with her. But in the end, it's up to you historians to figure out where the truth is. Often somewhere in between. Cheers!
How Ironic, he's from the University of Potsdam, the place where the Allied leaders, met to determine the future for post war Germany and Europe. And the very place where Japan was given the ultimatum of unconditional surrender.
Consider the German army was ahead of its time with in battle communications and taking mechanized warfare to the next level. So before a battle starts it’s all about training and tactics. Taking the initiative, Germany was able to pack quite a few punches. I think when battles don’t go as planned, things start to collapse. Add retrieval to that and things really start to hurt. Interesting interview 👍🏻 interesting topics no one is talking about is the number of foreign soldiers that came from occupied territories. Quite shocking to see how few joined Napoleon to fight his wars as compared to the numbers that joined Germany in WW2.
Back then when I did the interviews I asked him afterwards and he noted something might be in the works or something, but I did not hear anything else about it. So I would assume "not yet".
I apologize in advance for any Americans in the comments section that become incensed at Vietnam being called a defeat. It's unfortunately not a decided thing here culturally, even though it was definitely a defeat.
Nice suit Bernard. I can see why you wore it, with a guest and all. But in a future video with just us, throw everyone for a loop and wear something unexpected. Like an American 'bro-veteran' shirt and hat. Haha.
An example of a weapon for a peace army and a war army : The MG3 (designed to be manhandled while hot) vs the MG5 (a taxi machine gun). `Nobody can compete with the Wehrmacht : An army where all officers were tecnical (with all that means) will work better than sombody who takes on anybody.
Professor Neitzel says that the Whermacht was good at winning individual battles but not the overall war. For Germany, achieving what specific goal would have constituted winning the overall war?
I wonder it you can call this discussion a bit too narrow, as after World War 2 we have two German Armys -the Bundeswehr in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nationale Volksarmee in the German Democratic Republic. Maybe you can do a follow up?
the concepts of regulations and doctrine are parallel but unrelated. Regulations tell us how to process a supply form or leave request. All militaries are centralized in this respect. But, you are discussing doctrine and tactics. These exist in all militaries whether anyone writes them down or not. It is important to note that doctrine drives acquisition and tactical lessons drive doctrine. A lack of coherent doctrine leads to a military unable to replace the JU 87, for example.
What about german view on war in terms of... all the germans, or rather the cultural view on war? For example any common knowledge, wisdom or proverbs about the war?
As Neitzel tells in another video, in German schools when they tell about war, they don't tell about strategy. They tell about atrocities only. I guess it answers your question...
How bad was the bureaucracy in the Reichwehr during the Weimarer Republic? I cant imagine that it was really that bad. It was an army that was trained to lead a larger army in the future.
They could have had a view to win the war and not just a battle, but they had no fuel so it didn't matter. Anybody who talks about Germany in WWII and never mentions fuel has read to many books about WWII.
Yes. Perhaps with a comparison to other armies as well. One example would be the flat mess tins of the Americans and the deep soup bowl like tins of the Germans.
It’s not really an either or thing. Strategy, logistics and goals in any Army are very centralized, by necessity, because if they are not the smaller elimants have a tendency to go off after what some twenty year old Lieutenant thinks are the priorities and tear up/expend resources that are then not available to larger more strategically important operations. I don’t think the Bundeswehr was any less adaptable, because they had been taught to form an American Task Force to deal with an emergency, instead of a Kampfgoup. Kampfgroups tend to have assets not necessary to the task, but moving and engaging, simply because they boost numbers. The Germans got in some great victories against the allied peace time army, but rarely managed to achieve the Strategic, logistical and tactical vision necessary to fight the war efficiently. A professional military fought this war with no plan to disrupt or cancel out America’s industrial might or cause divisions in the Soviet Union that would have dissipated the manpower strength they had. Despite all the great books by the German Generals were better at battles that wasted men and resources than accomplishing war winning strategic goals. The Bundewehr just has better adult leadership that due to the limits placed on the interwar Reichswehr Officer Corps. Failure to achieve a war winning strategy against any major opponents Great Britain, America or the Soviet Union while crushing small or corrupted countries think France or Denmark is indicative of inability to grasp the Strategic issue, but able to grasp and execute the sergeant’s and Lieutenant’s war. Basically the Bundeswehr was built by Generals like the Imperial Army, while the Wehrmacht was very much the product of a Corporal and a bunch of so called Generals and Staffs that were educated in an Army forbidden large staffs and Professional development. If the Bundeswehr fought the Wehrmacht with equal resources the Wehrmacht would cause a lot of casualties, lots of destruction, but in the end as the war got longer the Bundeswehr would destroy the Wehrmacht with logistics, strategic vision and not grinding it’s formations to pieces taking stuff they did not have to take. The Bundeswehr of the Cold War is just a more adult formation.
Here's a funny picture from here in Amiland: listening to a German and an Austrian discussing history, about which most of my Landsmaenner know nothing, in better English than so many of my fellow nitwitted Amis could possibly muster on a good day...wieso sind die aller staerksten und reichsten Leute zugleich auch die bloedsten? Was fuer eine Welt soll das?
"The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy."
Oscar Wilde
I think Sir Humphrey Applebee said it too.
RUclips: Oh look, here's an Austrian dude talking about German psychology & methodology of warfare with a German professor.
Rest of Europe: _Nervous laughter_
The pickelhaube with quadrinoculars made me click instantly.
nothing to see here. nothing to worry about. go back to sleep.
I hate Wolfenstein.
@@davidbrennan660 Who doesnt?
Would that have anything to do with Germany being a relatively new addition to the Austria- Hungarian Empire that was dissolved at the end of the Great War? Or, the end of the second reign of the Holy Roman Empire?
You Have Neitzel as a guest? Wow! Congrats.
N,, eitzel !!!!! you have Neitzel i am truly impressed, i agree with herr Bolke. almost the same as Von Moltke, the elder . vty RG Wachendorf
My ideal German manual: a manual about making manuals.
Handbuch zum Erstellen von Handbüchern.
Crowdfunding is under way.
Is that like a factory that makes models of other factories?
in fact there is a "service regulation for the publication of regulations"
"Dienstvorschrift zur Herausgabe von Vorschriften" (DV Vorschriften)
There is also the "DIN EN 45202" standard, that standardizes the standards
(DIN = deutsche Industrienorm, german industry standard ; EN = Europäische Norm, european standard)
It's manuals all the way down.
@@marcowieber8253 German industry standarD. A standarte is a military flag. just saying....
Love to see more from Neitzel in the future.
Agreed. The videos where he talks with historians are my favourite videos
Hopefully he isn't too busy with his success!
This is fascinating, especially since the points the Professor makes are ones I have not heard really discussed before, but they are clearly hugely important ones to think about when it comes to organizing a military, even if they aren't "sexy" like a squad's composition or tactics.
Neitzel is an icon and a historian I really admire
Bernhard Kast in suit and tie?
And here I was wondering what those 2% female demographic you and Chieftain mentioned in a road stories video we’re watching, now we know
Boah! Jezt spielen sie in der ersten Liga Herr Kast, Glückwunsch!
You actually got him on your show? Very very well done. You work extremely hard and extremely effectively.
Yes. That was interesting.
A few comments ...
First off - I wouldn't ascribe the rethinking of the tactics and strategies of NATO as due to the defeat in Vietnam - so much as the end of the war in Vietnam. During the War in Vietnam - the NATO portion of the American Armed Forces had been somewhat neglected. We had been killing and dying in SE Asia and that took up a lot more of our attention than ... not ... killing and dying in Europe. Once the war was over though - then - people in the military started thinking more about Europe again. Another factor here - would be the boost our defeat in SE Asia gave to the Russians. They probably saw themselves as winning the Cold War at that point. So - here - to counter this rise in Soviet morale and planning - the Americans devoted more to Europe than they had been. My point though - is that this isn't because we lost in Vietnam - but because we weren't paying attention to that any more and went back to what we had been paying attention to before the war in Vietnam - when Europe was our top priority.
One thing about keeping all those officers as the number of troops are reduced - is that - it takes 20 years to train a senior officer ... so ... if the possibility exists that you might end up increasing the size of the Army you have just been reducing in size - it make sense to retain that senior level of expertise.
And finally - yeah - there is a big difference in the amount of petty bull shit in a peace time military as opposed to one that is actively at war. One of my High School buddies did a tour of duty at Pleiku in the Central Highlands of Vietnam - then was sent to Fort Gordon, Georgia. After a few months there having to put up with all the chicken shit of a State side base - he volunteered to go back to Vietnam and they sent him to Long Binh. Now - my buddy was a finance clerk ... so ... My point though is even in a nation at war the amount of petty bull shit that goes on in the rear areas is much, much greater than that which goes on closer to the front.
.
It’s like Germany, if you need to expand a military 10-20fold, when downsizing keep the thicc bois, and idiot can be trained as a rifleman, not everyone can lead a division
Now your famous (officially). Congrats.
I had a seminar by Neitzel last Semester, truly one of the best historians germany has to offer.
Always fascinated on the relationship between Moltke and Bismarck. Especially on their disagreements about what to do after Königgrätz.
Really like the three piece suit! But a colored tie would help you look a lot less like an undertaker.
> would help you look a lot less like an undertaker.
we don't want people to get too comfortable here :)
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I'm glad to see that you can tie a tie properly. Looking smooth.💯
Just a simple reminder, training soldiers takes 6 months roughly, training Staff takes a lot longer, so maybe that's a good reason to keep a healthy amount of high ranking officers. Maybe something to think about (concerning Bundeswehr and # of Generals)
The 'production of paper' is a really interesting, and useful phrase, in the context of discussing the administration of an army.
In the American Army during training (and sometimes during war) we very rarely cross the line of departure with more than a warning order and get the full order somewhere along the way or maybe not at all. The paperwork as he calls it is a huge anchor around our necks and it gets worse and worse and worse the higher you go. Impossible to keep up with.
Had the pleasure of studying under the professor last semester, very interesting bloke who clearly knows his stuff. Nice to see the two of you interacting!
Professor Neitzel is an extremely listenable speaker-enjoy his English lectures greatly, wish I spoke German.
I've seen this guy featured in so many documentaries, great job getting him on
Bernhard, and Bismark, are fantastic commentators on Germany military matters. And He reads and 'Hearts' so many comments - not that I'm looking for one:)
Whoa name tag edits
“The future is now, old man”
Ahhhhhh!!!!!! Sonke Neitzel!!!!!!!! He wrote "Soldaten"-an absolute explosion of a book. Thank you!!!! Greetings from Moskau.
"Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face"---Mike Tyson.
I had a Gunny who told me we were going in following Plan B. I asked why? He said the enemy never seems to concern itself with what we put in Plan A.
I hear that Mike Tyson quote a lot recently. What if getting punched in the face is part of your plan?
@@BrettonFerguson it's a plan. Not a good one, but at least you put thought into it.
@@BrettonFerguson von Schlieffen enters the chat
The really interesting part of this video, besides the subject and input, was the fact that these guys have a better command of English than many people I know, including myself.
"Regulations are written by some staff officer and no one cares" *Laughs in Regular Army*
Professor Neitzel is an excellent speaker and so knowledgeable.
I have often used "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Recently I discovered that I was missing "with the enemy main forces."
"No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.
Only the layman believes that in the course of a campaign he sees the consistent implementation of an original thought that has been considered in advance in every detail and retained to the end."
Von Moltke
Which makes much more sense. As ex Sniper/Recce I should have realised that Contact and Commitment are different issues. That seeing the enemy's recce or forward elements can be/is just dipping the toe in a scalding bath........
Ein ziemlich interessantes Thema. Das Buch hab ich gerade bestellt. Wenn es eine Chance gibt, würde ich auch gerne eine Vorlesung von Neitzel live hören.
danke, es wird noch ein paar Folge-Videos geben, ich werd den Vorschlag wegen der Vorlesung weiterleiten.
Thanks for this video! Just bought the book i would have missed it without you ^^
Modern "regulations" (if by that term you include weapon manuals, etc.) also include many topics not required in say 1940. From memory the vehicle manual for the Leopard 1 in Australian service has sections on Laser Safety, Workplace Health and Safety, Radiation hazards, Environmental considerations, etc. so while say the 120 mm mortar may have been effectively the same weapon, the current documentation probably covers things that were never considered during the Second World War.
Glad to see a "Windsor Knot" in the tie. Looks good.🤵💯
In addition to a multitude of regulations for each branch of the US Military, there are MIL Standards for pretty much everything!
The US *is* the paperwork Superpower!
Is there currently, or will there be in the future, an English translation of this book?
It is planned from what I know.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Awesome, I look forward to reading it.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I hope they keep the title in German, it's snappier
You have to be an artist, a psychologist, a logistician, a mental acrobat, know when to scream and when to be calm. Your planning should be as uncomplicated as possible.
Rules are important, improvisation can be even more important.
Very interesting discussion. I am far from a scholar in this area. My father was in the US 15th Air Force in Italy. In any case the common wisdom that I grew up with was that the American Army was effective because as a citizen army the command structure was less rigid and the commanders at the company and platoon levels felt more freedom to improvise and adjust as the tactical situation presented itself. The German army whether Heer or SS had a more rigid command structure with less freedom to stretch its boundaries. Dr. Nietzel seems to be describing quite the opposite. In any case it’s nice to see Bernard engaging the academics in this format. Plus he cleans up pretty good!
The differences between career (professional, standing, peacetime) armies vs wartime are significant. Interesting topic with much to consider and understand.
loving the suit and tie
This video was incredibly Enlightening.
I would love to see a video on the German perspective of "On War", that is the book "Vom Kriege" by Carl von Clausewitz.
More on this subject, quite interesting. Hope to get
a copy of book soon.
Interesting, thank you. By the way, an overlooked feature of the Wehrmacht was its lack of reserves, which was caused by the Versailles Treaty. A whole generation did produce little to no reservists, which eventually led to a problem in WW2 where the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and even Italy, had more reservists per capita, simply because they had 1918-1933 time to create a larger reservist base than the Reichswehr. The Versailles Treaty specifically limited the Reichswehr reserve. Therefore, I believe that it had an influence on the Wehrmacht build-up following 1933, right? All the sudden you were growing, growing, growing so fast within a few years. It must have had an influence on how you approach administration, paperwork, and generally, how you conduct exercises. The Reichswehr tried to overcome it prior to 1933 through some impressive covert operations, and also by granting German parties their own militias (that were essentially private armies), of which not the SA was the biggest, prior to 1933, but actually the SPD's Reichsbanner, KPD's Rotfrontkämpfer, or the Stahlhelm. Carl von Ossietzky revealed those Reichswehr rearmament tactics in 1931, if I recall correctly, for which he not only won a Nobel Peace Price in 1935 or 1936 but for which he went to prison where he died soon after. At least it shows how strange those times were in terms of organization and administration of both the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, and how militant the German society was even before Hitler. Something we forget, having a big focus on Hitler.
Fascinating. I had no idea that there were so many. What were their respective strengths?
As a Bundeswehr soldier I can confirm we have manuals for everything
Very interesting Topic.
The current German military was never created to fight in a war. This is the reason why they have so much paperwork and staff members and generals
Any 'cold war turned hot' scenario would have the Warsaw Pact smash into West Germany first. The Bundeswehr was created in 1955 for exactly that reason. If anything the German military lost it's purpose when the wall came down.
In 1962 "der Spiegel" published a report on the combat preformance of the Bundeswehr which was tested in a training exercise. The NATO gave the Bundeswehr the rating "barely able to conduct defensive operations". It doesnt look like as if the situation had improved in the following decades. If the Warsaw Pact had marched into Germany, they would have quickly defeated the Bundeswehr.
The current Bundeswehr is in a miserable state.
The article they published in 1962 led to a huge scandal, journalists were arrested and the publisher thrown into jail. In the end the German minister of defense had to resign.
Do you know how the Soviet Army viewed the Bundeswehr?
I dont know how they view the Bundeswehr, but they made a plan to reach the Rhine in seven days.
I can't wait to read Neitzel's book (auf Englisch bitte). The explosion of regulation and policy can not be underestimated (lawfare). Imagine you're a soldier in the US Army, using an M110 SASS in a squad. The amount of lawfare needed for the Army to propose the need for the weapon system, draw a request for proposal, host a competition between manufacturers (twice, generally), achieve contract selection, create training and qualifications for soldiers, maintain stock and maintenance numbers, AND source ammunition contracts AS WELL as shipping the equipment to the AOR is astounding.
All to meet the need of engaging man-sized targets from 300-800m.
I found the wide angle lens was a bit distracting in this video. Your hands were much nearer and appeared massive! Is it possible to move the camera back a bit and zoom in a bit? Great content though 😃.
"Much more paper..." Oh yes, I remember it well!
In my opinion the loss we experienced in Vietnam was a failure of National and Theater level strategy not an operational or tactical failure. The adoption of Air Land battle was perhaps an inflated view of Wehrmacht success.
I would love to see them talk about the state of the modern German Bundeswehr.
Neitzel said something like: better no BW than this BW
Fascinating!
US Government agencies function much the same way. Bureaucracies feed rules and regulations which leads to expanded bureaucracies which in turn leads to greater paperwork required. It’s a never ending cycle.
I'm wondering if the warping of the German (and really, it starts with Prussian) way of war was being run over by Napoleon for about 10 years running. What I mean is that most of the "Coalition wars" basically went, Le Grande Arme comes racing up, extra large and with shaky supply lines. It ties the slower old-style armies in knots, and forces an unfavorable fight on them which they lose.. At which point Napoleon signs a favorable treaty and dances off after the next enemy. Works fine when you are facing mostly feudal domains that can lose a few provinces (and take years to get an army together). Eventually, someone doesn't sign that treaty, and pretty soon you are in way over your head.
Wars are planned with Paper, but fought with fists.
With regard to the high number of generals that the bundeswehr has , apart from the argument the professor put forth , I think it can also be attributed to the potential need for the army to enlarge in the unlikely but possible eventuality of armed conflict.
The thing is that current war technology is increasingly less reliant upon numbers of men and more dependent on the infrastructure itself and its weapons. And with the number of generals, I think the professor’s point made complete sense
A soldier goes where he is told does what he is told and keeps doing it until he is told to stop.
The training is brutal he becomes de-sensitized he is trained to use his weapons. He doesn’t worry about WHY or who is wrong or write he just wants to know when he can sleep 😴 eat and stuff like that . He knows that he is already a dead man walking. He fights for and helps the friends around him and vice versa. All of the high flown ideas about serving the country and being patriotic means nothing to him. Civilians don’t understand. You have to experience it yourself.
Oh Bernard... "TZhe German Fiew". Never change.
Also never forget, Molkte was Danish and learned his soldierly trade in Denmark.
British historian, Kenneth Macksey wrote a book titled "Why the Germans lose at war".
I love the professor!
You could sum it up as the fetishisation of the art of fighting or conducting war. Specifically on the tactical and operational level, ignoring the strategic and grand strategic level. In other words, the political dimension, which ironically contradicts Clausewitz. Both German Armies essentially failed to see war as a political instrument, which was to serve a political goal. Or lost sight of how their fighting was to serve that goal. Granted, that requires the politicians having a clear political goal beyond simply winning.
Excellent
I love him I’ve seen him on some great documentaries!
Idea for a video spawned from this video
How long did it take the Bundeswehr to transform away from the Wehrmacht in terms of military conduct (how they actually fight), since it’s known the Bundeswehr when it was made was armed with post war German surplus
Think in the 50s when the Americans let the Germans make their own decisions and wermacht ways replaced what the Americans taught them
@@demonprinces17 In the 50s, pretty much all senior NCOs and most mid-grade officer, not to mention generals, were former Wehrmacht., and taught the trade accordingly.
This is a fascinating topic that I have often pondered! Is this book available in English? Can you recommend any books in English that address this topic?
Are we sure the GERMAN MILITARY in general didn't just make more and more literature over time in general? Probably/possibly in part to the ease of creating that literature with newer tech and maybe more international trade /foreign tech to help produce it?
Modern day, every truck (thinking HMMWV) has a log book and a full field manual. They're not small. I have found myself digging further into it when problems arose, and fixing issues myself, or learning to use some obscure feature I hadn't known about before as the need arises. That's the US military. Instead of guessing, the answer can be learned, so you learn a lot of correct information the more you use the equipment.
i keep thinking he said German FUEL on war.....took me a minute to realize I heard it wrong...
When is there going to be an English translation published?
More Sönke Neitzel.
Rigid = proscriptive? While winning individual battles is important Grand strategy is vital and what happens at home behind the front is key too. The Allies prior to 1917 had a partial grand strategy and waged total war; 1917 and 1918 they had evolved a formal grand strategy; the Germans much less. The allies also paid a lot of attention to the home front. The same happened in 1939-1945: Hitler had a grand strategy, but still was focused on a series of short battles and wars. His opponents took a different approach, look at the differences in political and economic co-operation or the German approach to logistics compared to the Western allies. Gobbels, I assume with Hitler's approval, publically declared "total war" only in 1943, their enemies from 1939 or 1941.
He started with Moltke, but isn't it Clausewitz idea that "War is the realm of uncertainty" and that planning is kinda possible only in preparation and then everything is just too messy?
I wouldn't be surprised if that quote doesn't go further back, the main difference between Clausewitz and Moltke is, that the second was a practitioner, the first was mostly a theoretician. Also Neitzel's book is from 1870 to about 2020, so Moltke is also more fitting in that context.
Is there an aspect of the German attitude to war that reflects the difference in character on a regional level? On the grossest level, the difference between Prussians and Bavarians for example. Is this something that has gone away as the regional differences have smoothed out?
Fascinating
great video
A peace time army vs a war time army can be best illustrated by what Gen. Marshall did right before the US entry in WWII. He got rid of a hell of a lot of field grade and general officers who he felt were not aggressive enough to lead troops into battle.
very nice!
Would be interesting to see more videos with Professor Neitzel about Germany and the wars, guilt, controversities and so on, to show his (German point of view) to a larger audience. Another highly interesting topic would be: What do German history students learn about the Second World War at universities? Is there a broader angle or is it just as narrow like German history books at school? Is it worth it to study German Modern History (from the Napoleonic wars onwards) being German?
Some background: I personally was totally disilusioned from German History classes once we got to the interesting chapters. I recall the general reaction of my class mates. It was the most boring topic. I'm from Thuringia, our teachers were yet socialistic comunistic briefed and trained teachers - although Germany was already reunified. However teachers were the same. The show must go on! It could have been the most interesting part of History at all, however it was a never ending story of guilt indoctination, memorizing what the book said. If students wanted to contribute with experience of our grandfathers' and great grandfathers testimonies our teacher asked "Oh, so your grandpa also studied history!" I think it was in the 7th grade. However, since in East Germany students usually don't have classes in philosophy, we didn't learn to argue nor to question the teacher and his way of smashing of certain discussions. The only thing in Thuringia we learnt (in the 90's) was Ethics, during 8 years! The most boring part of Philosophy. In the military service I learnt that in West Germany students had philosophy classes, politics. Well in the end it was a frustrating class. We all hated it, only repeating the book's version. Any further comments in test meant 6 (the lowest German qualification). It was horrible. So at least I would have never studied History at university! Why, pure lies or point of views written in books. I loved to read Schiller about Netherland's independence, I read it here in Mexico where I live. It was Schiller who introduced to the History a focus on the main actors. In relationship to the 2nd World War this means a strong focus on Stalin, Churchill, the foreign policy amongst these countries. I would have loved this point of view. So, what has a History student to expect if he wants to study part of his career at a German university (as a German and as an International student)?
I studied in Austria and from 2001 to 2008; so some of that might apply to Germany, some might not even apply to Austria anymore. In university classes are highly dependent on what the different professors offer, at least for History at the University of Salzburg. I also studied Computer Science (CS). There was a huge difference, in CS I think about 90+ % of the courses were regular ones the content would change a bit depending on the professor / lecturer. Whereas in History the courses / classes were categories: Austrian History, Modern History, Ancient History, Contemporary History, Cultural History and Economic / Social History. E.g., I took a class Cultural History of Water, where I also mentioned Power Projection Doctrine in the exam. Besides from a few classes they subject changed all the time. I think some lecturers reused their stuff, but some made a new class every time if I am not mistaken.
In short school had little to do with university, from what I know the difference is more and more eroded, which I find terrible since I was never a particular fan of schools, but of universities. School for me was: I was told what and how to do it. University for me is: You need to provide a result, how you do it is up to you as long the methodology is sound enough and you properly argue etc.
Thanks for the insides. Sounds pretty much the same to the German Magister Artium back in those days where you basically picked certain subjects to cover. As you say some were mandatory with little or no changes at all, others were held just once and in the next semester it wasn't offered anymore depending on the articles our professors had to publish, giving insides into their studies and working with students - rather to get a feedback or to get fed with new ideas.
Sure, studying at universities is totally different. Maybe with the bachelor degrees it became a continuation of the school system.
Were there topics where professors said "Sorry, I won't touch this topic, hot stuff!" ? I studied Germanistik and roman languages and of course besides studying the history of your own language (Old High German, Middle High German, Gothic, Old English etc.) and exchanges abroad you start to love your own language. Just as Goethe said: “Anyone that doesn't know foreign languages knows nothing of his own.” And being abroad, and with our German school system background WWII basically became a book with 7 seals, a topic you better don't talk about or avoid. And first time abroad, people were more open in relation to German History and they even asked "Is it right, better not ask a German about WWII?"
Imagine, Germans better shall not know, and foreigners better do not ask! 🤔 So better never talk about it.
I personally didn't talk that much about it. However I realized that people abroad sometimes knew more about it than I did. And surprisingly they asked the same questions as us, as teenangers at school wanting to know more about it. At the same time I remembered what my grandparents and great grand parents said about it. It wasn't that much either. My great grandfather who was 8 years in Russia as POW never talked about it. My grandma fleeing from Sudetia being a 6 years old child saw Dresden burning, and found it beautiful, the lights they used, like Christmas. I have heard other similar comments, children who also didn't understand what was happening there.
And then you realize how this all worked for my generation, seeing it from outside. As said, I'm from the former GDR (socialistic part of German, "East Germany", with GDR teachers but West German education system) but to see this from outside, from a different point of view, and if not even Germans are interested in their History who of course have the chance to understand the language, a source most other countries are lacking of, who else can be interested in this field?
So, again, to not forget: were there topics which professors tried to avoid? I heard in one of those discussions among historians that German Historians rather depend on foreign historians to bring up certain topics, otherwise they could risk their job. Or do you think it is indeed as open as studying languages or computer science - there is no political correctness in the end and everything is an open book.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Power projection doctrine! Thanks, sounds really interesting. I'm personally glad not having studied History, a mine field and later on I always considered "History as the politicians' bitch", and they do whatever they want with her. But in the end, it's up to you historians to figure out where the truth is. Often somewhere in between. Cheers!
How Ironic, he's from the University of Potsdam, the place where the Allied leaders, met to determine the future for post war Germany and Europe. And the very place where Japan was given the ultimatum of unconditional surrender.
Sönke Neitzel Visualised.
Consider the German army was ahead of its time with in battle communications and taking mechanized warfare to the next level. So before a battle starts it’s all about training and tactics. Taking the initiative, Germany was able to pack quite a few punches. I think when battles don’t go as planned, things start to collapse. Add retrieval to that and things really start to hurt. Interesting interview 👍🏻 interesting topics no one is talking about is the number of foreign soldiers that came from occupied territories. Quite shocking to see how few joined Napoleon to fight his wars as compared to the numbers that joined Germany in WW2.
Is professor Neitzel’s wonderful book going to be available in English? I searched for it on Amazon DE and I can only find the German version. 😊
Back then when I did the interviews I asked him afterwards and he noted something might be in the works or something, but I did not hear anything else about it. So I would assume "not yet".
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Thank you! Danke schoen!
I apologize in advance for any Americans in the comments section that become incensed at Vietnam being called a defeat. It's unfortunately not a decided thing here culturally, even though it was definitely a defeat.
Nice suit Bernard. I can see why you wore it, with a guest and all. But in a future video with just us, throw everyone for a loop and wear something unexpected. Like an American 'bro-veteran' shirt and hat. Haha.
An example of a weapon for a peace army and a war army : The MG3 (designed to be manhandled while hot) vs the MG5 (a taxi machine gun).
`Nobody can compete with the Wehrmacht : An army where all officers were tecnical (with all that means) will work better than sombody who takes on anybody.
Professor Neitzel says that the Whermacht was good at winning individual battles but not the overall war. For Germany, achieving what specific goal would have constituted winning the overall war?
I wonder it you can call this discussion a bit too narrow, as after World War 2 we have two German Armys -the Bundeswehr in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nationale Volksarmee in the German Democratic Republic. Maybe you can do a follow up?
I think Professor Neitzel would agree that the situation in Ukraine is a source of "pressure" on the German Army for change.
You know you can subtitle yourself as 'Historian' right Bernhard? You've earned it brother. Flex your scholarly muscles bro. FLEX.
I’d like to read his book. Please tell him to get it translated into English.
the concepts of regulations and doctrine are parallel but unrelated. Regulations tell us how to process a supply form or leave request. All militaries are centralized in this respect. But, you are discussing doctrine and tactics. These exist in all militaries whether anyone writes them down or not. It is important to note that doctrine drives acquisition and tactical lessons drive doctrine. A lack of coherent doctrine leads to a military unable to replace the JU 87, for example.
What about german view on war in terms of... all the germans, or rather the cultural view on war? For example any common knowledge, wisdom or proverbs about the war?
As Neitzel tells in another video, in German schools when they tell about war, they don't tell about strategy. They tell about atrocities only.
I guess it answers your question...
@@jurisprudens Yes. Although I'm assuming that wasn't always the case.
How bad was the bureaucracy in the Reichwehr during the Weimarer Republic? I cant imagine that it was really that bad. It was an army that was trained to lead a larger army in the future.
They could have had a view to win the war and not just a battle, but they had no fuel so it didn't matter. Anybody who talks about Germany in WWII and never mentions fuel has read to many books about WWII.
German View on War: 'Hans, are we ze baddies?'
I want to see you guys speaking german! It must be quite a sight!
Can you do a show on German feild rations other than cans of chocolate and speed
Yes. Perhaps with a comparison to other armies as well. One example would be the flat mess tins of the Americans and the deep soup bowl like tins of the Germans.
It’s not really an either or thing. Strategy, logistics and goals in any Army are very centralized, by necessity, because if they are not the smaller elimants have a tendency to go off after what some twenty year old Lieutenant thinks are the priorities and tear up/expend resources that are then not available to larger more strategically important operations.
I don’t think the Bundeswehr was any less adaptable, because they had been taught to form an American Task Force to deal with an emergency, instead of a Kampfgoup. Kampfgroups tend to have assets not necessary to the task, but moving and engaging, simply because they boost numbers. The Germans got in some great victories against the allied peace time army, but rarely managed to achieve the Strategic, logistical and tactical vision necessary to fight the war efficiently. A professional military fought this war with no plan to disrupt or cancel out America’s industrial might or cause divisions in the Soviet Union that would have dissipated the manpower strength they had. Despite all the great books by the German Generals were better at battles that wasted men and resources than accomplishing war winning strategic goals. The Bundewehr just has better adult leadership that due to the limits placed on the interwar Reichswehr Officer Corps. Failure to achieve a war winning strategy against any major opponents Great Britain, America or the Soviet Union while crushing small or corrupted countries think France or Denmark is indicative of inability to grasp the Strategic issue, but able to grasp and execute the sergeant’s and Lieutenant’s war. Basically the Bundeswehr was built by Generals like the Imperial Army, while the Wehrmacht was very much the product of a Corporal and a bunch of so called Generals and Staffs that were educated in an Army forbidden large staffs and Professional development. If the Bundeswehr fought the Wehrmacht with equal resources the Wehrmacht would cause a lot of casualties, lots of destruction, but in the end as the war got longer the Bundeswehr would destroy the Wehrmacht with logistics, strategic vision and not grinding it’s formations to pieces taking stuff they did not have to take. The Bundeswehr of the Cold War is just a more adult formation.
Here's a funny picture from here in Amiland: listening to a German and an Austrian discussing history, about which most of my Landsmaenner know nothing, in better English than so many of my fellow nitwitted Amis could possibly muster on a good day...wieso sind die aller staerksten und reichsten Leute zugleich auch die bloedsten? Was fuer eine Welt soll das?
How smart you are racist
german view on war: PAPERWORK!!!!
Black tie ... let me just extend my condolences to you.