It should be mentioned that even centuries later despite so many Earthquakes, Suleymaniye Mosque doesn’t have a single crack, so well was it built by Architect Sinan! 💙
In old times , things used to last for many many years . Even in subcontinent , structures built hundreds of years ago without any modern technology still stand firm . Pyramids were built 5000 years ago . Simply breathtaking
I have missed secondary characters like Sinan Aga and Nasuah efendi. I also miss the character who ran the kitchen in the palace, his give and take with Sumbul was always light hearted and could lift the series after a particularly heavy scene. These characters and others added more depth to the series
Sinan aga was a very meticulous architect he checks every nook and cranny of the mosque in order to ensure that every design consideration needed in a mosque is met.
Part I Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa according the current scholarship in Ottoman historiography. I think the author sum up his points pretty well in his conclusion sections. Rather than paraphrase his works, I will instead use his entire conclusion sections. Abstract This article examines the reasons why Süleyman the Magnificent executed his son Şehzade Mustafa during the Nahçıvan military campaign of 1553. According to the dominant narrative in both Ottoman sources and academic literature, Süleyman’s concubine and later wife Hürrem Sultan and her closest ally, Süleyman’s son-in-law Rüstem Pasha, plotted against Mustafa in order to save the throne for one of Hürrem’s own sons. Though the latter was widely beloved, this scheme cost him his father’s favor. Afterward, however, the sultan regretted the decision and dismissed Rüstem Pasha from his position as grand vizier. This article examines the roles of Sultan Süleyman, Şehzade Mustafa, Hürrem Sultan, and Rüstem Pasha in the Ottoman, Venetian, Habsburg, French, and Persian sources, investigating why the sultan executed the prince in the context of the Ottoman succession experience. Adding complexity to the common narrative, this article concludes that the sultan, who was losing his authority to the prince, desired to consolidate his power and to remove his dynasty from the competition between social groups that had characterized earlier succession struggles. Conclusion and Implications for Ottoman Succession, 94-98. The most obvious observation to be made about the context in which Mustafa was executed is that Sultan Süleyman had lost control of the Ottoman army; the legitimacy of his sultanate was being questioned by those with the power to end it. In the majority view, Mustafa was superior to his brothers in leadership capacity, and he was even considered preferable to the aging and ill sultan. Mustafa had apparently gained the favor of janissaries, scholars, poets, and many others who wanted to see him take the throne-perhaps even before Süleyman’s death. Dernschwam asserts that if the sultan had not acted when he did, Mustafa would have taken the initiative to dethrone his father; he certainly had the military support needed to do so, and the janissaries would have installed him as sultan. Popular love for Mustafa grew to the extent that troops could disregard the reigning sultan’s command when the interests of Mustafa (and their own) were threatened. The author of Relazione Anonima describes the janissaries’ devotion to Mustafa in such a way that they could defend Mustafa even against the sultan himself: Some important men in this army … assured me that if poor Mustafa had left his father’s tent alive when he escaped from the hand of the mutes who wanted to murder him, the majority of the army would have run to his aid against the sultan, his father. Some might argue that the army would naturally shift its devotion to the promising prince, perhaps especially considering that he had once been the ill sultan’s own favorite. However, were not the janissaries supposedly the most loyal of the sultan’s soldiers? How did they dare to ignore the command of the ruler to whom they owed absolute obedience? Even before the prince’s execution, when Rüstem Pasha was in command of the army, a group of soldiers set out despite warnings to salute Mustafa, whom they considered the future sultan. They blatantly disregarded the command of the sultan’s absolute deputy in order to pay respects to a prince who had not yet become sultan. All these actions might be considered simple errors of judgment committed by janissaries and other soldiers who had lost touch with the empire’s hierarchical authority, but Mustafa himself welcomed these men and allowed them to kiss his hand. Did he consider himself to be sultan at the time? Or was he not aware that these soldiers had disobeyed their legitimate sultan’s deputy by coming to greet him? On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Süleyman was oblivious to the possible succession scenarios, including one in which Mustafa, backed by unequivocal military support, could overthrow the sultan, ascend the throne, and send his father into retirement or perhaps even to death. From either perspective, it seems that the sultan was convinced that Mustafa was a threat to his authority. Even if the prince never openly rebelled against his father, events positioned him as the potential leader of a rebellion, at least from the sultan’s perspective. It is also worth remembering that the memory of Selim I’s succession through the support of the janissaries and the provincial cavalry would still have been vivid in the 1550s. Even though Mustafa underlined, in his letter to Ayas Pasha, that he had no intention of overthrowing his father but hoped to ascend the throne when the sultan died, conditions appeared strikingly similar to those surrounding Selim’s rise to power. Like his courageous grandfather, Mustafa appeared to be the prince who could satisfy the various groups with a stake in choosing the next emperor. Given the importance of gaza and its role in Ottoman legitimacy, Mustafa’s military prowess and leadership abilities were virtues seen necessary to a sultan’s legitimacy. But while courage and enthusiasm for gaza fit the ideology of the Ottoman state in the early sixteenth century, when Selim had ascended the throne, in the mid- sixteenth century those virtues seemed to conflict with an emerging state ideology and an Ottoman foreign policy characterized by peace agreements with foreign powers (including the Habsburgs, France, Venice, and even the Safavids). How could Mustafa’s willingness to engage in gaza be reconciled with this new reality in which the sultan and his grand vizier were attempting to end hostilities and to sign treaties with rivals in both the west and the east?
Part II If Mustafa had survived to sit on the imperial throne, he would have satisfied a wide spectrum of Ottoman society. The role of social groups in a prince’s success cannot be denied, and various stakeholders (e.g., janissaries, governing elites, religious scholars) were involved in the accession of each sultan. For example, toward the end of Bayezid II’s reign (1481-1512), while the governing elite and viziers supported Şehzade Ahmed, the janissaries and provincial forces supported Şehzade Selim. In this competition, Selim’s triumph was also the triumph of the janissaries and the provincial forces. Similarly, Şehzade Mustafa’s success would have paralleled the success of the social groups that supported him and marked the failure of the harem-palace faction. It is worth asking whether by this time an Ottoman prince still needed support from outside sources. Given all of its military conquests and victories, had the Ottoman dynasty not yet achieved political legitimacy beyond competition between social groups? Recent historiography shows that the dynastic legitimacy of the Ottoman household had gained full legitimacy by the middle of the sixteenth century, when the focus of politics shifted from the identity of the sultan to that of viziers and bureaucrats-that is, by the end of Süleyman’s reign. Such full dynastic legitimacy can largely be attributed to Süleyman’s lifting the Ottoman dynasty out of the realm of competition by executing Mustafa, who had in some ways been used by politically active janissaries, bureaucrats, and scholars. Süleyman’s message may have been this: the dynasty would no longer tolerate investment in a princely enterprise that tested the legitimacy of the reigning sultan. If a prince intended to increase his power, or if any social group encouraged a prince, his chances of rule would only decrease because of his threat to the reigning sultan. Süleyman thus established the dynasty’s absolute legitimacy, shifting the competition for power away from members of the imperial family and onto other social groups. Indeed, the sultan’s attitude in the following period, especially toward Şehzade Bayezid in the late 1550s, suggests that he wished to reassert his authority as well as to remove the dynasty from social competition. The sultan probably would not have begrudged Mustafa the throne, for he was the most capable and most talented of Süleyman’s sons, but the problem of authority would not then have been resolved. If Mustafa had ascended the throne by overthrowing Süleyman, this would have strengthened the precedent, rendering it a standard course of action in every succession. How then could a sultan have secured his power against socially aggrieved groups who supported one of his children in a claim to the throne, even before his own death? Any person or any group that was disenchanted with the reigning sultan or his viziers would then gather around a promising prince and convince him to oust the current sultan and his court. Beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, the sultan gradually withdrew from daily politics and delegated his power to the imperial court, headed by the grand vizier: thus, the focus of politics shifted from the sultan to the ruling elite. The viziers came to control imperial politics, taking on full power and responsibility, while the sultan came to hold a symbolically lofty place. Related to this, books on politics written during this period increasingly focused on the qualities and responsibilities of the viziers rather than on those of the sultan. Describing the age of Rüstem Pasha in the 1550s, Mustafa Âlî wrote that “at that time, the only point of recourse and refuge was the grand vizier’s gate, and those who were in need had only to have his dispensation.” Thus, for Ottoman intellectuals, the identity of the grand vizier became more important than the identity of the sultan; the latter was no longer a question. Could Mustafa have revived the image of the gazi sultan and resumed successful military conquests? It seems unlikely. Given the difficulties of provisioning the army and the slim returns that recent conquests had yielded, the empire’s zeal for territorial gains was waning by his time, and conquest was growing marginal to the Ottoman enterprise as its ideological contribution faded. By the middle of the sixteenth century, peace treaties with the Habsburgs, Venetians, and Safavids were signed in order to avoid wasting funds on extravagant, unrealistic ambitions. Even if Mustafa had ascended the throne, it would have been very difficult for him to expand Ottoman lands farther east or west without technological or strategic innovations. In addition, it is clear that by the time of his death, controlling the government and a growing Ottoman bureaucracy had become a task well beyond the capacity of one individual, be he powerful sultan or vizier. If he had overthrown his father, sealing the precedent of deathly fraternal competition for rule, Mustafa himself could hardly have guarded his authority against socially aggrieved groups backing one of his own children. Although the execution of Mustafa was a bitter and tragic event, it resolved these questions for the Ottoman dynasty forever. Atçıl, Z (2016). Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa in 1553?. The Journal of Ottoman Studies, 2016(48), 67-103
@@danialfitri9618 Mustafa maybe would never kill his brothers, as at the show he loved them but Mahidevran I don't think. I love Mahidevran but she never would let Hürrem's sons alive. Even in the real history she didn't kill Mehmet
@@ramn_bennington Mustafa would kill his brothers because it was LAW! What does love have to do with it? 😆😆 Also in real history Hurrem’s children were not even close with Mustafa, so what love are you talking about? 🤣🤣🤣 And lastly-Suleiman never regretted killing Mustafa!
@@ramn_bennington Lol what? Mustafa would kill all his brothers and Hurrem! What are you bllabbering? What love? It was Law for Order in state! “And whoever from my offspring becomes sultan, he must execute his brothers for the sake of Empire Order” Code of Fratricide issued by Mehmet ll.
It should be mentioned that even centuries later despite so many Earthquakes, Suleymaniye Mosque doesn’t have a single crack, so well was it built by Architect Sinan! 💙
In old times , things used to last for many many years . Even in subcontinent , structures built hundreds of years ago without any modern technology still stand firm . Pyramids were built 5000 years ago . Simply breathtaking
Wonderful structure simply awe inspiring
Remarkable!!
So does Mihrimah's Mosque (a mosque with a broken heart story)
@@ChickenSoup736 why? Tell me please
Suleiman looks so regal and magnificent , I really doubt is it even possible to look better? This guy gives the most sultan vibe ever
He wanted hurrem to be near her after his death and thus wished for the mosque to be ready soon. It's just so beautiful🥰
I have missed secondary characters like Sinan Aga and Nasuah efendi. I also miss the character who ran the kitchen in the palace, his give and take with Sumbul was always light hearted and could lift the series after a particularly heavy scene. These characters and others added more depth to the series
So very true❣
Sinan aga was a very meticulous architect he checks every nook and cranny of the mosque in order to ensure that every design consideration needed in a mosque is met.
Lol him testing the echo was hilarious
He want his Mosque for her wife ❤
This scene is to highlight the architect.
Another proof he loved valide sultan, his wife, more than everyone
I once watch a documentary about Sinan Pasha's building , that show pipe in the mosque , he is a really genius
An interesting civil engineering course by Mimar Sinan
Suleiman is so handsome my loins are in 🔥🔥🔥🥵🥵🥵
Part I
Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa according the current scholarship in Ottoman historiography. I think the author sum up his points pretty well in his conclusion sections. Rather than paraphrase his works, I will instead use his entire conclusion sections.
Abstract
This article examines the reasons why Süleyman the Magnificent executed his son Şehzade Mustafa during the Nahçıvan military campaign of 1553. According to the dominant narrative in both Ottoman sources and academic literature, Süleyman’s concubine and later wife Hürrem Sultan and her closest ally, Süleyman’s son-in-law Rüstem Pasha, plotted against Mustafa in order to save the throne for one of Hürrem’s own sons. Though the latter was widely beloved, this scheme cost him his father’s favor. Afterward, however, the sultan regretted the decision and dismissed Rüstem Pasha from his position as grand vizier. This article examines the roles of Sultan Süleyman, Şehzade Mustafa, Hürrem Sultan, and Rüstem Pasha in the Ottoman, Venetian, Habsburg, French, and Persian sources, investigating why the sultan executed the prince in the context of the Ottoman succession experience. Adding complexity to the common narrative, this article concludes that the sultan, who was losing his authority to the prince, desired to consolidate his power and to remove his
dynasty from the competition between social groups that had characterized earlier succession struggles.
Conclusion and Implications for Ottoman Succession, 94-98.
The most obvious observation to be made about the context in which Mustafa was executed is that Sultan Süleyman had lost control of the Ottoman army; the legitimacy of his sultanate was being questioned by those with the power to end it. In the majority view, Mustafa was superior to his brothers in leadership capacity, and he was even considered preferable to the aging and ill sultan. Mustafa had apparently gained the favor of janissaries, scholars, poets, and many others who wanted to see him take the throne-perhaps even before Süleyman’s death. Dernschwam asserts that if the sultan had not acted when he did, Mustafa would have taken the initiative to dethrone his father; he certainly had the military support needed to do so, and the janissaries would have installed him as sultan. Popular love for Mustafa grew to the extent that troops could disregard the reigning sultan’s command when the interests of Mustafa (and their own) were threatened. The author of Relazione Anonima describes the janissaries’ devotion to Mustafa in such a way that they could defend Mustafa even against the sultan himself:
Some important men in this army … assured me that if poor Mustafa had left
his father’s tent alive when he escaped from the hand of the mutes who wanted
to murder him, the majority of the army would have run to his aid against the
sultan, his father.
Some might argue that the army would naturally shift its devotion to the promising prince, perhaps especially considering that he had once been the ill
sultan’s own favorite. However, were not the janissaries supposedly the most loyal of the sultan’s soldiers? How did they dare to ignore the command of the ruler to whom they owed absolute obedience? Even before the prince’s execution, when Rüstem Pasha was in command of the army, a group of soldiers set out despite warnings to salute Mustafa, whom they considered the future sultan. They blatantly disregarded the command of the sultan’s absolute deputy in order to pay respects to a prince who had not yet become sultan. All these actions might be considered simple errors of judgment committed by janissaries and other soldiers who had lost touch with the empire’s hierarchical authority, but Mustafa himself welcomed these men and allowed them to kiss his hand. Did he consider himself to be sultan at the time? Or was he not aware that these soldiers had disobeyed their legitimate sultan’s deputy by coming to greet him?
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Süleyman was oblivious to the possible succession scenarios, including one in which Mustafa, backed by unequivocal military support, could overthrow the sultan, ascend the throne, and send his father into retirement or perhaps even to death. From either perspective, it seems that the sultan was convinced that Mustafa was a threat to his authority. Even if the prince never openly rebelled against his father, events positioned him as the potential leader of a rebellion, at least from the sultan’s perspective. It is also worth remembering that the memory of Selim I’s succession through the support of the janissaries and the provincial cavalry would still have been vivid in the 1550s. Even though Mustafa underlined, in his letter to Ayas Pasha, that he had no intention of overthrowing his father but hoped to ascend the throne when the sultan died, conditions appeared strikingly similar to those surrounding Selim’s rise to power.
Like his courageous grandfather, Mustafa appeared to be the prince who could satisfy the various groups with a stake in choosing the next emperor. Given
the importance of gaza and its role in Ottoman legitimacy, Mustafa’s military prowess and leadership abilities were virtues seen necessary to a sultan’s legitimacy. But while courage and enthusiasm for gaza fit the ideology of the Ottoman state in the early sixteenth century, when Selim had ascended the throne, in the mid- sixteenth century those virtues seemed to conflict with an emerging state ideology and an Ottoman foreign policy characterized by peace agreements with foreign powers (including the Habsburgs, France, Venice, and even the Safavids). How could Mustafa’s willingness to engage in gaza be reconciled with this new reality in which the sultan and his grand vizier were attempting to end hostilities and to
sign treaties with rivals in both the west and the east?
Part II
If Mustafa had survived to sit on the imperial throne, he would have satisfied a wide spectrum of Ottoman society. The role of social groups in a prince’s success cannot be denied, and various stakeholders (e.g., janissaries, governing elites, religious scholars) were involved in the accession of each sultan. For example, toward the end of Bayezid II’s reign (1481-1512), while the governing elite and viziers supported Şehzade Ahmed, the janissaries and provincial forces supported Şehzade Selim. In this competition, Selim’s triumph was also the triumph of the janissaries and the provincial forces. Similarly, Şehzade Mustafa’s success would have paralleled the success of the social groups that supported him and marked the failure of the harem-palace faction.
It is worth asking whether by this time an Ottoman prince still needed support from outside sources. Given all of its military conquests and victories, had the Ottoman dynasty not yet achieved political legitimacy beyond competition between social groups? Recent historiography shows that the dynastic legitimacy
of the Ottoman household had gained full legitimacy by the middle of the sixteenth century, when the focus of politics shifted from the identity of the sultan
to that of viziers and bureaucrats-that is, by the end of Süleyman’s reign. Such full dynastic legitimacy can largely be attributed to Süleyman’s lifting the Ottoman dynasty out of the realm of competition by executing Mustafa, who had in some ways been used by politically active janissaries, bureaucrats, and scholars. Süleyman’s message may have been this: the dynasty would no longer tolerate investment in a princely enterprise that tested the legitimacy of the reigning sultan. If a prince intended to increase his power, or if any social group encouraged a prince, his chances of rule would only decrease because of his threat to the reigning sultan. Süleyman thus established the dynasty’s absolute legitimacy, shifting the competition for power away from members of the imperial family and onto other social groups.
Indeed, the sultan’s attitude in the following period, especially toward Şehzade Bayezid in the late 1550s, suggests that he wished to reassert his authority as well as to remove the dynasty from social competition. The sultan probably would not have begrudged Mustafa the throne, for he was the most capable and most talented of Süleyman’s sons, but the problem of authority would not then have been resolved. If Mustafa had ascended the throne by overthrowing Süleyman, this would have strengthened the precedent, rendering it a standard course of action in every succession. How then could a sultan have secured his power against socially aggrieved groups who supported one of his children in a claim to the throne, even before his own death? Any person or any group that was disenchanted with the reigning sultan or his viziers would then gather around a promising prince and convince him to oust the current sultan and his court.
Beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, the sultan gradually withdrew from daily politics and delegated his power to the imperial court, headed
by the grand vizier: thus, the focus of politics shifted from the sultan to the ruling elite. The viziers came to control imperial politics, taking on full power and
responsibility, while the sultan came to hold a symbolically lofty place. Related to this, books on politics written during this period increasingly focused on the qualities and responsibilities of the viziers rather than on those of the sultan. Describing the age of Rüstem Pasha in the 1550s, Mustafa Âlî wrote that “at that time, the only point of recourse and refuge was the grand vizier’s gate, and those who were in need had only to have his dispensation.” Thus, for Ottoman intellectuals, the identity of the grand vizier became more important than the identity of the sultan; the latter was no longer a question.
Could Mustafa have revived the image of the gazi sultan and resumed successful military conquests? It seems unlikely. Given the difficulties of provisioning the army and the slim returns that recent conquests had yielded, the empire’s zeal for territorial gains was waning by his time, and conquest was growing marginal to the Ottoman enterprise as its ideological contribution faded. By the middle of the sixteenth century, peace treaties with the Habsburgs, Venetians, and Safavids were signed in order to avoid wasting funds on extravagant, unrealistic ambitions. Even if Mustafa had ascended the throne, it would have been very difficult for him to expand Ottoman lands farther east or west without technological or strategic innovations. In addition, it is clear that by the time of his death, controlling the government and a growing Ottoman bureaucracy had become a task well beyond the capacity of one individual, be he powerful sultan or vizier. If he had overthrown his father, sealing the precedent of deathly fraternal competition for rule, Mustafa himself could hardly have guarded his authority against socially aggrieved groups backing one of his own children. Although the execution of Mustafa was a bitter and tragic event, it resolved these questions for the Ottoman dynasty forever.
Atçıl, Z (2016). Why Did Süleyman the Magnificent Execute His Son Şehzade Mustafa in 1553?. The Journal of Ottoman Studies, 2016(48), 67-103
Mustfafa’s BOT entered the chat, guys! ☝🏼☝🏼☝🏼 😂😂😂😂😂
Alsooo, Suleyiman NEVER regretted killing traiitorr musfafa, sooo🤫🤫🤫
@@danialfitri9618 Mustafa maybe would never kill his brothers, as at the show he loved them but Mahidevran I don't think. I love Mahidevran but she never would let Hürrem's sons alive. Even in the real history she didn't kill Mehmet
@@ramn_bennington Mustafa would kill his brothers because it was LAW! What does love have to do with it? 😆😆
Also in real history Hurrem’s children were not even close with Mustafa, so what love are you talking about? 🤣🤣🤣
And lastly-Suleiman never regretted killing Mustafa!
@@ramn_bennington Lol what?
Mustafa would kill all his brothers and Hurrem! What are you bllabbering? What love? It was Law for Order in state!
“And whoever from my offspring becomes sultan, he must execute his brothers for the sake of Empire Order” Code of Fratricide issued by Mehmet ll.
Suleimanyie mosque!!!!!
Why he plastered the jars with egg white.