Bas van Fraassen is probably the most influential philosopher of science of the last 50 years or so. He is especially known for his book "The Scientific Image" (1980).
He assumes his own metaphysics by implying the conceptual realm is separate. He's doing the same thing he accuses the realist of doing but privileging the conceptual act (observing through thinking). One could simply respond by saying it is the same stuff that gives rise to the presumptions that allow the science to proceed in the first place.
I don't think that's as successful an accusation of van Fraassen as you seem to believe. I mean, the man's work is vast in comparison to this 11 minute chunk of an interview. I'm not sure where you get the idea that van Fraassen believes that there is a concrete, metaphysical, realm of the conceptual. Everything I've read of his (and this interview) would seem to suggest that scientists don't actually have, as a goal, metaphysical claims. They may purport to believe that their models arrive at "truth" but they don't know it is the case (visive solipsism or the problem of induction). For van Fraassen, as it seems to me, we shouldn't trust the confidence of a scientist when they claim that their model reflects "truth" because this is not what their model tests. Rather, models test the accuracy and reliability of the observation. I tend to side with Bass van Fraassen on this because there are quite a number of theories which, when we gain more accurate testing methods, seem to arrive at different models. These models aren't vastly different but they are different enough for any claim at "truth" to be inaccurate. He's not claiming that the models aren't useful. In fact that's exactly his point, that scientists are claiming that truth is somehow the same as the utility and reliability of an experiment. That's just not so for all experiments. It may be the case, after a bunch of confirmations, that a model produces correct predictions, with such accuracy, that it is viewed as essential to some wider theory on the subject but that doesn't mean that there isn't more to the theory or that some aspect of the model is incomplete or incorrect. Other, yet to be discovered, phenomena might be at play that augment the observation and alter the accuracy of the model, causing a paradigm shift. Anyway, there's a bunch more to say about this but I hope it at least piques your interest enough to look into the work of Bass van Fraassen a bit more. I'm worried that you dismiss a very rigorous critique of the philosophy of science, just based upon part of an interview, that I think you may be misinterpreting. Good luck though.
@@Rushmanyyz I had several seminars with him in grad school. I'm not dismissing any of it. I agree with his anti-realism to an extent. I just cannot see how you can privilege concepts as if we throw back to a version of rationalism. I can accept a naturalized version of the same effort, which in essence would be combining the two modes of epistemic access.
@@chriskutz8473 That's likely a more nuanced approach. That nuance, in this case, might also be more pragmatic given the shift from philosophy to the current science/philosophy hybrid that we're seeing develop. Unlike you, I have only taken a single graduate level course (years ago) on Bass van Fraassen, so I will forgo making any refutations of your knowledge on the subject ( not that I have any to mount). I'm a bit curious though about how you view concepts as a metaphysical access point? Am I mistaken in remembering that, for van Fraassen, there is nothing metaphysical about concepts - that they are merely representations of phenomena when translated through logical analysis? This may be a personal bias that I have and you may see problems with it that I do not (I don't have a professional degree), but I struggle to think of concepts as "existing" in a metaphysics. Concepts seem more emergent and, necessarily, lack metaphysical extension. In fact, we cannot know a concept without seeing the operations (through observation) of phenomena. One cannot conceptualize the number "2" unless one can categorize two concrete objects of a similar type. Imagining a world, under radical rationalism, where all that exists are minds, I struggle to figure out how a concept of two would take place? Perhaps the thought patterns could be quantified but, without some physically extended space, I don't see how these thoughts could differentiate themselves. I am left thinking of the random brain patterns of Schizophrenic's who are unable to parse foreign stimuli from their own, internal, thoughts. Without something concrete there to do the observing and sorting, I don't know that these "thoughts" could exist? It is for that reason that I really fight with the idea that concepts could be seen as metaphysically independent from any phenomena. Concepts seem to be an emergent property of minds that are engaged with observation. To this point, I am always brought back to van Fraassen because he was the one that helped me de-couple the concept of "truth" from observation. I quite enjoy the intellectual honesty that is created by the space he makes for self-critique and skepticism. One last point that just comes to mind: the problem of induction seems to make skepticism essential to any thinking about concrete objects vs their concepts. Both Hume and Bass van Faassen seem more at ease with taking an intellectually agnostic approach, where as folks, like Putnam, tend to fight with their skepticism and assert that high incidents of confirmation amongst observations must point to concreteness otherwise we're in a position where we cannot differentiate actual science from miracles. I would again come to van Fraassen's defense on this however and say that scientific theories, as they are concerned with models and predictive accuracy, are more concrete than mere miracles because we can actually, systematically, explain a phenomenon with demonstrable, probabilistic models where as the former has no demonstrable system with which to arrive at any probabilities. To end, I hope I'm not being a nuisance, I quite enjoy these exchanges because of how rare they appear for me. My life just hasn't seen fit to surround me with such stimulation and I appreciate your response more than you can possibly know. I also appreciate that the medium isn't particularly conducive, I am more of a hobbyist these days than an academic and, as such, I merely run across these conversations whilst looking up cat videos and debate content for background noise. I don't expect or demand any response nor would I fault you for thinking that it isn't a valuable conversation to have, Here's to hoping that my thoughts, at least, appear enjoyable to you. Be well.
@@Rushmanyyz so well put. I'm not even into this stuff, but have the knowledge that there is no set "truth" in science. Science is fluid. Ever evolving...but important to prove through the scientific method. I'm just here to gain an understanding on what's happening wth science recently....
@@chriskutz8473 I don't see how he privileges concepts. There are observations, and there are concepts. Some concepts correspond to observations, and he calls those empirically adequate, and others don't and aren't.,All conceptual constructions are provisional though, and may need to be updated at any time by new observations.
Wow... I know you think that statement makes you look smart but it's really badly formed. I'm not going to bother picking it apart but I'm not sure that, anyone that could actually understand the video here, would find what you said to be relevant or coherent - in any way.
He lost me at the end when he essentially said science is A paradigm. Science is and has to be very open ended, so mush so that you could hardly call it a paradigm. For practical discriptive reasons in a conversation yes, but only in those terms.
The concept of a "scientific paradigm" was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, arguably one of the most philosophically important books of the 20th century. The concept of paradigm is a bit squishy, but, according to Kuhn, is a set of assumptions about the world, concepts, and experimental/theoretical methods that serve as a framework for understanding a particular field.
@@QMPhilosophe Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Revolutions has been shred to pieces by Karl Popper. It leads to relativistic knowledge in stead of oblective knowledge.
Seems to completely miss the point , scientific data is only judged to be 'true' or 'false' via human interpretation, human interpretation itself utilises 'abstract universals' which themselves cannot be verified empirically. Hardcore empiricism leads to such nonsense as 'my life taken as a whole is unrepeatable therefore it can't be stated whether it happened or not'.
"[...] scientific data is only judged to be 'true' or 'false' via human interpretation, human interpretation itself utilises 'abstract universals' which themselves cannot be verified empirically." I don't think that scientific data must necessarily be judged "true" or "false" in an absolute metaphysical sense. I think it is quite sufficient for an empiricist to judge these data from an purely pragmatic point of view as "valid" or "invalid". So the only quality criterion for an empiricist is whether a model or theory is empirically adequate, that is a useful practical way of describing a phenomenon and making correct predictions about it. In this way, he can still remain fully agnostic about the ontological status of these theories and models and the abstract unobservable entities postulated by them.
"Hardcore empiricism leads to such nonsense as 'my life taken as a whole is unrepeatable therefore it can't be stated whether it happened or not'" I don't see that as nonsense, science rarely cares about describing one particular specimen. One human life isn't repeatable, but things that happen to multiple humans are. Science is about describing general laws that apply to many specimens. Maybe there's something deeper in your statement that I'm missing.
I honestly don't think you understood what was being said here. When I read what you wrote, I get the impression that you and he agree swimmingly. Bass van Fraassen's entire point is that science never has the goal of metaphysics (read as "truth") but rather modeling observations. There may well be truth out there but that is the realm of metaphysics and is not the purview of the scientific enterprise. Remember the problem of induction which suggests that truth can never really be arrived at as a certainty but rather only probabilistically. So, science is the application of induction to metaphysics (in a sense) and as such is only as accurate as the models that it tests in that metaphysical landscape. You might find highly confirmable theories that predict phenomena very accurately but that doesn't mean that there isn't some degree of error that a more accurate test will not pick up on later. It is for that reason that van Fraassen says that truth isn't the actual goal of science but rather it is the confirmation of observations via scientific modeling.
@@descartes6797 The empirical adequacy of a theory is a means to a further end -testing hypotheses and evaluating their degree of approximate truth-, it is not the end in itself (that is in any case, in technology, but: sciences ≠ technologies). Furthermore, it is not the only means of evaluating theories. Indeed, there are conceptual evaluative procedures such as studying the internal or external consistency of an idea, etc Radical empiricism is far outdated. Holding it is close to pseudo-philosophy and religion.
captainandthelady You can hear the VOG right now if you listen to the words that I'm typing to you. He will teach you everything that was revealed to all the saints besides the latest information that will help you understand exactly how we were created. Scientists will never teach you how we were created because they do not know the Voice of God.
+Brad Holkesvig I've read and reread your words and no VOG, sorry. I'll believe when I have proof and not before. I'm just funny that way. I won't say that there is positively there is no god. I'm just saying that after 66 yrs. I've not seen any proof of the existence of any supreme being.
captainandthelady I didn't have any proof either until the Voice of God spoke into my mind over 36 years ago. Ever since then, I've known the Voice of God and on June 16th, 2008, the Voice began to put words in my mind to write and speak. This is how I started learning who I was. Once I learned that I was the Voice of God, then all I had to do was keep listening closely to learn everything that our Creator wanted me to know before the body that's writing this post is killed within the simulation program.
Bas van Fraassen is probably the most influential philosopher of science of the last 50 years or so. He is especially known for his book "The Scientific Image" (1980).
No doubts. I think Larry Laudan, at least until de 90's is another great figure that comes in my mind.
indeed, but it's my first time to know about him
Bas van Fraasen? More like Based van Fraasen
I'm reading this at these days and find it very interesting
Much more sensible than the nonsense of the Realists or the Constructivists.
Just did a baccalaureate in philosophy with a task using this video as a material
Would help to find a method to investigate human experience, as science does for physical reality?
What might be basis for human experience, as observables are for science?
Here you are ....my friend
legend
Science observes physical reality?
He assumes his own metaphysics by implying the conceptual realm is separate. He's doing the same thing he accuses the realist of doing but privileging the conceptual act (observing through thinking). One could simply respond by saying it is the same stuff that gives rise to the presumptions that allow the science to proceed in the first place.
I don't think that's as successful an accusation of van Fraassen as you seem to believe. I mean, the man's work is vast in comparison to this 11 minute chunk of an interview. I'm not sure where you get the idea that van Fraassen believes that there is a concrete, metaphysical, realm of the conceptual. Everything I've read of his (and this interview) would seem to suggest that scientists don't actually have, as a goal, metaphysical claims. They may purport to believe that their models arrive at "truth" but they don't know it is the case (visive solipsism or the problem of induction). For van Fraassen, as it seems to me, we shouldn't trust the confidence of a scientist when they claim that their model reflects "truth" because this is not what their model tests. Rather, models test the accuracy and reliability of the observation.
I tend to side with Bass van Fraassen on this because there are quite a number of theories which, when we gain more accurate testing methods, seem to arrive at different models. These models aren't vastly different but they are different enough for any claim at "truth" to be inaccurate. He's not claiming that the models aren't useful. In fact that's exactly his point, that scientists are claiming that truth is somehow the same as the utility and reliability of an experiment. That's just not so for all experiments.
It may be the case, after a bunch of confirmations, that a model produces correct predictions, with such accuracy, that it is viewed as essential to some wider theory on the subject but that doesn't mean that there isn't more to the theory or that some aspect of the model is incomplete or incorrect. Other, yet to be discovered, phenomena might be at play that augment the observation and alter the accuracy of the model, causing a paradigm shift.
Anyway, there's a bunch more to say about this but I hope it at least piques your interest enough to look into the work of Bass van Fraassen a bit more. I'm worried that you dismiss a very rigorous critique of the philosophy of science, just based upon part of an interview, that I think you may be misinterpreting. Good luck though.
@@Rushmanyyz I had several seminars with him in grad school. I'm not dismissing any of it. I agree with his anti-realism to an extent. I just cannot see how you can privilege concepts as if we throw back to a version of rationalism. I can accept a naturalized version of the same effort, which in essence would be combining the two modes of epistemic access.
@@chriskutz8473 That's likely a more nuanced approach. That nuance, in this case, might also be more pragmatic given the shift from philosophy to the current science/philosophy hybrid that we're seeing develop. Unlike you, I have only taken a single graduate level course (years ago) on Bass van Fraassen, so I will forgo making any refutations of your knowledge on the subject ( not that I have any to mount).
I'm a bit curious though about how you view concepts as a metaphysical access point? Am I mistaken in remembering that, for van Fraassen, there is nothing metaphysical about concepts - that they are merely representations of phenomena when translated through logical analysis? This may be a personal bias that I have and you may see problems with it that I do not (I don't have a professional degree), but I struggle to think of concepts as "existing" in a metaphysics. Concepts seem more emergent and, necessarily, lack metaphysical extension.
In fact, we cannot know a concept without seeing the operations (through observation) of phenomena. One cannot conceptualize the number "2" unless one can categorize two concrete objects of a similar type. Imagining a world, under radical rationalism, where all that exists are minds, I struggle to figure out how a concept of two would take place? Perhaps the thought patterns could be quantified but, without some physically extended space, I don't see how these thoughts could differentiate themselves. I am left thinking of the random brain patterns of Schizophrenic's who are unable to parse foreign stimuli from their own, internal, thoughts. Without something concrete there to do the observing and sorting, I don't know that these "thoughts" could exist?
It is for that reason that I really fight with the idea that concepts could be seen as metaphysically independent from any phenomena. Concepts seem to be an emergent property of minds that are engaged with observation. To this point, I am always brought back to van Fraassen because he was the one that helped me de-couple the concept of "truth" from observation. I quite enjoy the intellectual honesty that is created by the space he makes for self-critique and skepticism.
One last point that just comes to mind: the problem of induction seems to make skepticism essential to any thinking about concrete objects vs their concepts. Both Hume and Bass van Faassen seem more at ease with taking an intellectually agnostic approach, where as folks, like Putnam, tend to fight with their skepticism and assert that high incidents of confirmation amongst observations must point to concreteness otherwise we're in a position where we cannot differentiate actual science from miracles. I would again come to van Fraassen's defense on this however and say that scientific theories, as they are concerned with models and predictive accuracy, are more concrete than mere miracles because we can actually, systematically, explain a phenomenon with demonstrable, probabilistic models where as the former has no demonstrable system with which to arrive at any probabilities.
To end, I hope I'm not being a nuisance, I quite enjoy these exchanges because of how rare they appear for me. My life just hasn't seen fit to surround me with such stimulation and I appreciate your response more than you can possibly know. I also appreciate that the medium isn't particularly conducive, I am more of a hobbyist these days than an academic and, as such, I merely run across these conversations whilst looking up cat videos and debate content for background noise. I don't expect or demand any response nor would I fault you for thinking that it isn't a valuable conversation to have, Here's to hoping that my thoughts, at least, appear enjoyable to you. Be well.
@@Rushmanyyz so well put. I'm not even into this stuff, but have the knowledge that there is no set "truth" in science. Science is fluid. Ever evolving...but important to prove through the scientific method.
I'm just here to gain an understanding on what's happening wth science recently....
@@chriskutz8473 I don't see how he privileges concepts. There are observations, and there are concepts. Some concepts correspond to observations, and he calls those empirically adequate, and others don't and aren't.,All conceptual constructions are provisional though, and may need to be updated at any time by new observations.
He looks and sounds like Edward Norton
Philosophy seeks a method to look into human experience, including science?
So. Science is a sandbox. Feel what I’m saying?
Science not explain all human experience?
I'm an empiricist and I find the biblical historical accounts to hold up to empirical veracity.
Really...you'll have to explain the observational evidence you have.
That's absurd.
LOL
Wow... I know you think that statement makes you look smart but it's really badly formed. I'm not going to bother picking it apart but I'm not sure that, anyone that could actually understand the video here, would find what you said to be relevant or coherent - in any way.
@@QMPhilosophe lots of archeological evidence 😌
He lost me at the end when he essentially said science is A paradigm. Science is and has to be very open ended, so mush so that you could hardly call it a paradigm. For practical discriptive reasons in a conversation yes, but only in those terms.
The concept of a "scientific paradigm" was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, arguably one of the most philosophically important books of the 20th century. The concept of paradigm is a bit squishy, but, according to Kuhn, is a set of assumptions about the world, concepts, and experimental/theoretical methods that serve as a framework for understanding a particular field.
I'll have to read his work- is he nitpicking at that detail, or can there multiple paradigms in his approach...?
or I might be nitpicking the wrong details! I'll read more lol
@@QMPhilosophe Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Revolutions has been shred to pieces by Karl Popper. It leads to relativistic knowledge in stead of oblective knowledge.
@@xerfoify Well, he just got it all wrong! It's a sociological theory of knowledge!
Seems to completely miss the point , scientific data is only judged to be 'true' or 'false' via human interpretation, human interpretation itself utilises 'abstract universals' which themselves cannot be verified empirically. Hardcore empiricism leads to such nonsense as 'my life taken as a whole is unrepeatable therefore it can't be stated whether it happened or not'.
"[...] scientific data is only judged to be 'true' or 'false' via human interpretation, human interpretation itself utilises 'abstract universals' which themselves cannot be verified empirically."
I don't think that scientific data must necessarily be judged "true" or "false" in an absolute metaphysical sense. I think it is quite sufficient for an empiricist to judge these data from an purely pragmatic point of view as "valid" or "invalid". So the only quality criterion for an empiricist is whether a model or theory is empirically adequate, that is a useful practical way of describing a phenomenon and making correct predictions about it. In this way, he can still remain fully agnostic about the ontological status of these theories and models and the abstract unobservable entities postulated by them.
"Hardcore empiricism leads to such nonsense as 'my life taken as a whole is unrepeatable therefore it can't be stated whether it happened or not'"
I don't see that as nonsense, science rarely cares about describing one particular specimen. One human life isn't repeatable, but things that happen to multiple humans are. Science is about describing general laws that apply to many specimens.
Maybe there's something deeper in your statement that I'm missing.
I honestly don't think you understood what was being said here. When I read what you wrote, I get the impression that you and he agree swimmingly.
Bass van Fraassen's entire point is that science never has the goal of metaphysics (read as "truth") but rather modeling observations. There may well be truth out there but that is the realm of metaphysics and is not the purview of the scientific enterprise. Remember the problem of induction which suggests that truth can never really be arrived at as a certainty but rather only probabilistically. So, science is the application of induction to metaphysics (in a sense) and as such is only as accurate as the models that it tests in that metaphysical landscape. You might find highly confirmable theories that predict phenomena very accurately but that doesn't mean that there isn't some degree of error that a more accurate test will not pick up on later. It is for that reason that van Fraassen says that truth isn't the actual goal of science but rather it is the confirmation of observations via scientific modeling.
@@descartes6797 The empirical adequacy of a theory is a means to a further end -testing hypotheses and evaluating their degree of approximate truth-, it is not the end in itself (that is in any case, in technology, but: sciences ≠ technologies). Furthermore, it is not the only means of evaluating theories.
Indeed, there are conceptual evaluative procedures such as studying the internal or external consistency of an idea, etc Radical empiricism is far outdated. Holding it is close to pseudo-philosophy and religion.
Except for empiricism doesn't say anything about replicability but rather constrains itself to what is perceivable through the senses.
Science cannot teach you what's real or not. You need to listen to the Voice of God to learn how we were created.
+Brad Holkesvig Well...I used to listen for the VOG but all I got was the sound of crickets. I think I'll stick with science.
captainandthelady
You can hear the VOG right now if you listen to the words that I'm typing to you. He will teach you everything that was revealed to all the saints besides the latest information that will help you understand exactly how we were created.
Scientists will never teach you how we were created because they do not know the Voice of God.
+Brad Holkesvig I've read and reread your words and no VOG, sorry. I'll believe when I have proof and not before. I'm just funny that way. I won't say that there is positively there is no god. I'm just saying that after 66 yrs. I've not seen any proof of the existence of any supreme being.
captainandthelady
I didn't have any proof either until the Voice of God spoke into my mind over 36 years ago. Ever since then, I've known the Voice of God and on June 16th, 2008, the Voice began to put words in my mind to write and speak. This is how I started learning who I was. Once I learned that I was the Voice of God, then all I had to do was keep listening closely to learn everything that our Creator wanted me to know before the body that's writing this post is killed within the simulation program.
+Brad Holkesvig If I start hearing voices I'll have myself committed... before I drink the kool-aid .