Welcome to Day 2 of our Gettysburg Anniversary coverage! Our education team is at it again with all types of special guests. Rumor has it Garry and Kris were manning their stations at 4:30am . . .(and sorry for the lighting. Sunny days on the battlefield are a lot to handle).
Outstanding. Finally someone points out the stupidity of Hood’s request to move to the right. The terrain alone would have costed him too much time to be effective.
And this before Hood made his blunders as an army commander. Regardless of if he was really as drugged up as he was after his injuries in 1863, is it worth suggesting Hood was over promoted to Division? We only have antietam to work from, Fredericksburg and the Suffolk Siege he wasn't really enjoyed engaged.
@@colinwolf9730 Hood's single skill was an absolute attack dog as a Brigade and Division commander. What he showed in Georgia and Tennessee in 1864 was a prime example of the 'Peter principle' in action. He definitely got promoted far beyond his abilities.
Love the passion! He's right and on top of all that Hood would have been separated and split in two from Mclaws. Eventually he would have been enveloped
Especially that he'd be attempting to do an operational move through completely unknown terrain, and with no cavalry available to scout ahead for him. Lee pulled off what he did at Chancellorsville because he had locals who knew the ground, and Stuart out in front scouting ahead - exactly the opposite circumstances.
Thanks for highlighting the obvious flaws in the alternative plans. When discussing counterfactuals (what ifs), advocates for Longstreet and Hood always assume the Union army would be completely passive, even though it had demonstrated uncharacteristic aggressiveness since Meade came to command. How would the AONV disengage and move around the AOTP? What is to stop Meade from attacking as soon as the rebel move is detected? How can Lee get between Meade and Washington when Meade's army is on good roads, one of which travels directly to DC? The more likely outcome is the federal army harasses the Confederates while shifting South, always remaining between Lee and Washington. Hood's plan is even sillier. How can 7000 men detach and go around the flank of a larger army, especially without knowledge of the roads and terrain? The enemy has almost a hundred thousand men in a semicircle, and he wants to put 7000 confederates in the middle of that formation? Meade was already using his interior lines to move troops from his right (where Ewell was failing to hold the federals on Culps hill) to his left. Those troops could easily be diverted to stop and possibly envelop Hood if he came up from the South behind the Round Tops. The Union would see Hoods movement long before he could attack, and surely they wouldn't let him simply waltz into the federal supply area.
I recall reading were Meade was concerned that the AoNV would in fact attempt to move around the AotP, if it was undo able as Tim and Gary seem to feel it was, then why Was Meade concerned about it happening?
Meade was pretty good about trying to cover all his bases. That's why he allowed Sickles to stay at Emmitsburg as long as he did, and kept Merritt's Cavalry Brigade holding that flank as well - to prevent exactly that kind of surprise.
Takes a bit of planning to set up an attack of that size. Also remember that Lee and Longstreet didn't know that Sickles even existed on the battlefield until they started to bring up Hood and McLaws and found Sickles sitting in the Peach Orchard, right on the ground the Rebs wanted to line up on for their proposed attack up the Emmitsburg road.
The whole plan was faulty from the get-go. When Lee rode his lines at first light on the second, the last Union troops he could see, going south, were still those around the Codori farm. To his mind, that meant that no new Union troops had shown up, and he could roll up the supposed Union line by getting Longstreet around to the right and then attacking up the Emmitsburg road. Essentially another version of either Second Manassas or Chancellorsville, but hitting the Union left instead of the right. Wonderful plan, and probably would have worked if he were only facing the number of Yankees he believed he was. Unfortunately, here's where the lack of scouting and total unfamiliarity with the actual ground came to haunt him, conditions that he didn't have down in Virginia. Go down West Confederate Avenue and walk past the trees around the NC Monument, which is about as far south as Lee's own army stretched at that point. From there, and especially if you're staring east into the rising sun, there's no way to visually figure out that the high ground of Cemetery Hill and Ridge DOESN'T just continue right down the length of Emmitsburg Road. Obviously if Meade now had more troops, he would have extended his line down that high ground, so if the Union line ends at the Codori farm, that must be all they have. There's just no way for anyone totally unfamiliar with the ground to see that there's actually a shallow valley (Plum Run) BETWEEN that high ground and the actual extension of Cemetery Ridge that ultimately ends at the Round Tops. So while could see the II Corps troops on Cemetery Ridge (without knowing those weren't the same troops that had been there at sunset), he had no knowledge that Sickles III Corps was actually in that valley, or that the V Corps was already in position as a central reserve for Meade. As Wellington once put it, 90% of being a good general is in the ability to fully understand who was where, 'to know what was on the other side of the hill.' He won the majority of his battles by keeping as many of his troops as possible out of sight of the enemy, for as long as possible. Had Sickles followed orders and stayed where Meade wanted him, and Hood & McLaws lined up where ordered to attack up the Emmitsburg road, they would have found an entire Union Corps (Sickles) fully on their flank. At the very least, this would have likely had Longstreet and Lee call the whole thing off. At worst, with that attack underway, Sickles could have been thrown forward into that open flank, with the V Corps coming up in reserve, and the VI Corps arriving. I've gamed out every different variant of this, and it's pretty damn ugly. It comes back to that 'over-optimism' that Freemantle said was the fatal flaw in the whole campaign. After Chancellorsville, lee and his officers fell into the trap of believing that there was nothing that the AoP could do to interfere with whatever they tried to do. Twice in the previous week, Lee had been 'humbugged'(in the Wellingtonian sense) by the unexpected positioning and marching speed shown by the AoP under Meade. The chief reason for the caution he showed on July 1st was that he had just unexpectedly run into major portions of Meade's army, further north than he expected, and with his own army widely scattered. Then, for the reason I mentioned above, by the morning of July 2nd that over-optimism had returned, and he still believed that he had a chance to hit the AoP before it was fully concentrated. (To quote a certain dwarf, 'Never believe something is true just because you WANT it to be true.) Capt. Johnson's totally botched 'recon' early that morning only served to solidify Lee's completely erroneous take on reality. Considering that, if he actually went where he thought he had went, it meant that he managed to go through Buford's Cavalry pickets and Sickles entire Corps without either he or them seeing each other - Incredibly good 'infiltration', but incredibly bad recon.
The only thing that always blows my mind is that Lee spoke of Longstreet's plan with Ewell who ultimately cost them the battle because he was to timid on the first day. Everyone says Longstreet was wrong or delayed his action but never address that there wouldn't or shouldn't have even been a second day.
I think that if more things had gone according to plan, it could have worked. The artillery should have been much more effective. I heard they had bad fuses on the shells, which caused them to explode too late. Rhodes was supposed to attack from the north. The fight on Culp's Hill was supposed to coincide, but the Feds jumped the gun. Then the cavalry charge into the rear got stopped. If Pickett had been supported by effective artillery, two more infantry charges, and a cavalry charge, I think it might possibly have succeeded.
@@dinahnicest6525 The whole thing of 'Stuart attacking the rear' is BS, essentially a CYA to cover for Stuart's failure to push back the Union Cavalry in front of him. Certainly he was supposed to threaten Meade's supply lines, but I've never seen a single reliable source that said he was supposed to actually attack the rear of Meade's Infantry. Period. As for the rest, Lee famously bemoaning a 'certain lack of concerted effort' comes straight back to himself and his totally inadequate army level staff. Hooker may have 'hung fire' as an overall battlefield commander, but, like McClellan, he was a top notch administrator, and left Meade with an Army level staff that at every point got the job done.
@@elcarto22 It is admittedly a matter of speculation, the claim that Stuart was sent to the Union rear in imitation of Hannibal's victory at Cannae. Normally, the cavalry is split in two, and their job is to screen and protect both flanks. Concentrating them and leaving one flank without cavalry is unusual, but who can second guess Lee? Is there a reliable source that said he was sent to threaten Meade's supply lines?
I wanted know what Tim and Gary think about if they had done night attacks in round top and Pickets charge. The soldiers move out around 2 Am quietly maybe crawl to the fence. Go under slowly and load muskets maybe 5 AM. Stand and go. The artillery barrage was useless and could have been a different place?
You guys need to publish... Publishers are wrong word you need to indicate by way of a gui widget on screen, indicating the exact position latitude, longitude... What would be great would be a link to Google Maps overlay, Gettysburg edition
... whenever you guys produce additional footage as well expert commentary. Increase your production budget experts internet apps integration into the national park resources. The crucial resource are the ntl parks related personnel, they are gold Jerry, I tell you it's Gold !!!
Artificial intelligence will be all over this PARK ... For many years to come. The video age, has miraculously brought historical commentary to the national parks Charter... And make no mistake about it we will never Private eyes, our Great American Gettysburg crown Jewel tradition These park rangers are commendable
if America felt so grateful after World War II General Eisenhower that they gave him a estate on the grounds of the National Park,,, that means we will protect it from within the Congress for lots of yrs by contract That means Royal titles for park ranger bloodlines if they so choose. we the people could not think of a more fitting National Royal bloodline in Charter with the Constitution than the fine people that make their living talkin and preaching about America, it's not just about the history and the old American ways of thinking about our gov
There's a lot of jealous people making comments in this conversation... these people are still young just wait till they get older and More wise... Das Tagwerk Apartments Gettysburg dieselpartikelfilter
CLICK! Watched this video for less than 1 minute. Cannot watch some yahoo popinjay, dancing around the screen, blabbering almost like a carnival barker about this solemn and tragic moment of our history ... as if it was some kind of circus act. This is beyond disgusting.
Great narration concerning the pros and cons of the second day of battle. You all do a great job.
This is the best channel on RUclips hands the greatest channel ever
Welcome to Day 2 of our Gettysburg Anniversary coverage! Our education team is at it again with all types of special guests. Rumor has it Garry and Kris were manning their stations at 4:30am . . .(and sorry for the lighting. Sunny days on the battlefield are a lot to handle).
Thanks so much for being out there and doing 157! HYDRATE!!!
Thank you for all this amazing coverage guys.
Excellent presentation, thank you for your time and effort posting this important content.
Outstanding. Finally someone points out the stupidity of Hood’s request to move to the right. The terrain alone would have costed him too much time to be effective.
And this before Hood made his blunders as an army commander. Regardless of if he was really as drugged up as he was after his injuries in 1863, is it worth suggesting Hood was over promoted to Division? We only have antietam to work from, Fredericksburg and the Suffolk Siege he wasn't really enjoyed engaged.
@@colinwolf9730 Hood's single skill was an absolute attack dog as a Brigade and Division commander. What he showed in Georgia and Tennessee in 1864 was a prime example of the 'Peter principle' in action. He definitely got promoted far beyond his abilities.
Also thanks for the knowledge it’s just great and amazing
Tim KICKS Ass with the #TRUTH!!!
Really miss being there.
Tim is fired up!
Love the passion! He's right and on top of all that Hood would have been separated and split in two from Mclaws. Eventually he would have been enveloped
Especially that he'd be attempting to do an operational move through completely unknown terrain, and with no cavalry available to scout ahead for him. Lee pulled off what he did at Chancellorsville because he had locals who knew the ground, and Stuart out in front scouting ahead - exactly the opposite circumstances.
Loving it in the UK as well
Such a beautiful and interesting battle field
Wow. I knew how to say "Texan" but never heard "Alabamian" or some of the others before! This commentary rocks!!!
Thanks for highlighting the obvious flaws in the alternative plans. When discussing counterfactuals (what ifs), advocates for Longstreet and Hood always assume the Union army would be completely passive, even though it had demonstrated uncharacteristic aggressiveness since Meade came to command.
How would the AONV disengage and move around the AOTP? What is to stop Meade from attacking as soon as the rebel move is detected? How can Lee get between Meade and Washington when Meade's army is on good roads, one of which travels directly to DC? The more likely outcome is the federal army harasses the Confederates while shifting South, always remaining between Lee and Washington.
Hood's plan is even sillier. How can 7000 men detach and go around the flank of a larger army, especially without knowledge of the roads and terrain? The enemy has almost a hundred thousand men in a semicircle, and he wants to put 7000 confederates in the middle of that formation? Meade was already using his interior lines to move troops from his right (where Ewell was failing to hold the federals on Culps hill) to his left. Those troops could easily be diverted to stop and possibly envelop Hood if he came up from the South behind the Round Tops. The Union would see Hoods movement long before he could attack, and surely they wouldn't let him simply waltz into the federal supply area.
I recall reading were Meade was concerned that the AoNV would in fact attempt to move around the AotP, if it was undo able as Tim and Gary seem to feel it was, then why Was Meade concerned about it happening?
Meade was pretty good about trying to cover all his bases. That's why he allowed Sickles to stay at Emmitsburg as long as he did, and kept Merritt's Cavalry Brigade holding that flank as well - to prevent exactly that kind of surprise.
I'm surprised that none of the Confederate Generals didn't propose a full attack on the Union center, after Sickles moved off Cemetary Ridge???
Takes a bit of planning to set up an attack of that size. Also remember that Lee and Longstreet didn't know that Sickles even existed on the battlefield until they started to bring up Hood and McLaws and found Sickles sitting in the Peach Orchard, right on the ground the Rebs wanted to line up on for their proposed attack up the Emmitsburg road.
You're not understanding the field. Sickles moved forward onto high ground. There was still union troops on cemetery ridge.
Jesus, never mention the words "hoods plan" and "good plan" in the same sentence near this guy.
hahahaha
The whole plan was faulty from the get-go. When Lee rode his lines at first light on the second, the last Union troops he could see, going south, were still those around the Codori farm. To his mind, that meant that no new Union troops had shown up, and he could roll up the supposed Union line by getting Longstreet around to the right and then attacking up the Emmitsburg road. Essentially another version of either Second Manassas or Chancellorsville, but hitting the Union left instead of the right. Wonderful plan, and probably would have worked if he were only facing the number of Yankees he believed he was.
Unfortunately, here's where the lack of scouting and total unfamiliarity with the actual ground came to haunt him, conditions that he didn't have down in Virginia. Go down West Confederate Avenue and walk past the trees around the NC Monument, which is about as far south as Lee's own army stretched at that point. From there, and especially if you're staring east into the rising sun, there's no way to visually figure out that the high ground of Cemetery Hill and Ridge DOESN'T just continue right down the length of Emmitsburg Road. Obviously if Meade now had more troops, he would have extended his line down that high ground, so if the Union line ends at the Codori farm, that must be all they have. There's just no way for anyone totally unfamiliar with the ground to see that there's actually a shallow valley (Plum Run) BETWEEN that high ground and the actual extension of Cemetery Ridge that ultimately ends at the Round Tops.
So while could see the II Corps troops on Cemetery Ridge (without knowing those weren't the same troops that had been there at sunset), he had no knowledge that Sickles III Corps was actually in that valley, or that the V Corps was already in position as a central reserve for Meade. As Wellington once put it, 90% of being a good general is in the ability to fully understand who was where, 'to know what was on the other side of the hill.' He won the majority of his battles by keeping as many of his troops as possible out of sight of the enemy, for as long as possible.
Had Sickles followed orders and stayed where Meade wanted him, and Hood & McLaws lined up where ordered to attack up the Emmitsburg road, they would have found an entire Union Corps (Sickles) fully on their flank. At the very least, this would have likely had Longstreet and Lee call the whole thing off. At worst, with that attack underway, Sickles could have been thrown forward into that open flank, with the V Corps coming up in reserve, and the VI Corps arriving. I've gamed out every different variant of this, and it's pretty damn ugly.
It comes back to that 'over-optimism' that Freemantle said was the fatal flaw in the whole campaign. After Chancellorsville, lee and his officers fell into the trap of believing that there was nothing that the AoP could do to interfere with whatever they tried to do. Twice in the previous week, Lee had been 'humbugged'(in the Wellingtonian sense) by the unexpected positioning and marching speed shown by the AoP under Meade. The chief reason for the caution he showed on July 1st was that he had just unexpectedly run into major portions of Meade's army, further north than he expected, and with his own army widely scattered. Then, for the reason I mentioned above, by the morning of July 2nd that over-optimism had returned, and he still believed that he had a chance to hit the AoP before it was fully concentrated. (To quote a certain dwarf, 'Never believe something is true just because you WANT it to be true.) Capt. Johnson's totally botched 'recon' early that morning only served to solidify Lee's completely erroneous take on reality. Considering that, if he actually went where he thought he had went, it meant that he managed to go through Buford's Cavalry pickets and Sickles entire Corps without either he or them seeing each other - Incredibly good 'infiltration', but incredibly bad recon.
I want to work with these people. You need a video editor or anything?
The only thing that always blows my mind is that Lee spoke of Longstreet's plan with Ewell who ultimately cost them the battle because he was to timid on the first day. Everyone says Longstreet was wrong or delayed his action but never address that there wouldn't or shouldn't have even been a second day.
These guys are addicting especially when I am already a history buff
What is wrong with the sound. I had to jack it all the way up just to barely hear you all.
7 months after Fredericksburg, the fact that they would even consider a 'picketts charge' isnt very bright either.
I think that if more things had gone according to plan, it could have worked. The artillery should have been much more effective. I heard they had bad fuses on the shells, which caused them to explode too late. Rhodes was supposed to attack from the north. The fight on Culp's Hill was supposed to coincide, but the Feds jumped the gun. Then the cavalry charge into the rear got stopped. If Pickett had been supported by effective artillery, two more infantry charges, and a cavalry charge, I think it might possibly have succeeded.
@@dinahnicest6525 The whole thing of 'Stuart attacking the rear' is BS, essentially a CYA to cover for Stuart's failure to push back the Union Cavalry in front of him. Certainly he was supposed to threaten Meade's supply lines, but I've never seen a single reliable source that said he was supposed to actually attack the rear of Meade's Infantry. Period.
As for the rest, Lee famously bemoaning a 'certain lack of concerted effort' comes straight back to himself and his totally inadequate army level staff. Hooker may have 'hung fire' as an overall battlefield commander, but, like McClellan, he was a top notch administrator, and left Meade with an Army level staff that at every point got the job done.
@@elcarto22 It is admittedly a matter of speculation, the claim that Stuart was sent to the Union rear in imitation of Hannibal's victory at Cannae. Normally, the cavalry is split in two, and their job is to screen and protect both flanks. Concentrating them and leaving one flank without cavalry is unusual, but who can second guess Lee? Is there a reliable source that said he was sent to threaten Meade's supply lines?
I wanted know what Tim and Gary think about if they had done night attacks in round top and Pickets charge. The soldiers move out around 2 Am quietly maybe crawl to the fence. Go under slowly and load muskets maybe 5 AM. Stand and go. The artillery barrage was useless and could have been a different place?
Ehh cause you wouldn’t have really been able to see and you kinda need that running up a hill
I love studying history, I just don’t see any future in it. Could have Picketts charge have been under the cover of darkness?
You guys need to publish... Publishers are wrong word you need to indicate by way of a gui widget on screen, indicating the exact position latitude, longitude... What would be great would be a link to Google Maps overlay, Gettysburg edition
... whenever you guys produce additional footage as well expert commentary. Increase your production budget experts internet apps integration into the national park resources. The crucial resource are the ntl parks related personnel, they are gold Jerry, I tell you it's Gold !!!
Too bad Tim is so shy about his opinions, good stuff!!
5:02 possibly. There were a lot of neanderthals in the Union decision making process
Artificial intelligence will be all over this PARK ... For many years to come.
The video age, has miraculously brought historical commentary to the national parks Charter... And make no mistake about it we will never Private eyes, our Great American Gettysburg crown Jewel tradition
These park rangers are commendable
if America felt so grateful after World War II General Eisenhower that they gave him a estate on the grounds of the National Park,,, that means we will protect it from within the Congress for lots of yrs by contract
That means Royal titles for park ranger bloodlines if they so choose. we the people could not think of a more fitting National Royal bloodline in Charter with the Constitution than the fine people that make their living talkin and preaching about America, it's not just about the history and the old American ways of thinking about our gov
There's a lot of jealous people making comments in this conversation... these people are still young just wait till they get older and More wise... Das Tagwerk Apartments Gettysburg dieselpartikelfilter
#stupidestthingieverheard
You're kinda cute ngl
Wheres god dam Stewart!!!
CLICK! Watched this video for less than 1 minute. Cannot watch some yahoo popinjay, dancing around the screen, blabbering almost like a carnival barker about this solemn and tragic moment of our history ... as if it was some kind of circus act. This is beyond disgusting.
What a "stupid" rant by Tim! My first ever thumbs down for any of the American Battlefield Trust video.