Hi drach, I've just got back from a holiday at the seaside. Whilst there I was happy to see the RNLI returning ashore with two people who had been swept out to sea. This made me think, could you do a video or two on the RNLI, their history and maybe some of the most famous, or historic, rescues such as the hospital ship Rohilla in 1914?
If Hiryu's air group had not found Yorktown the second time but one of the other carreirs (And the same damage had been applied as historically from said attack) would Spruance have tried to go for Hiryu still or would he go for a withdrawal?
it seems that throughout naval history, any screw up or major defeat leads to decades, if not centuries, of catch up needing to be done, is this assessment correct? and has anyone ever managed to get out of such a pit?
These “pocket” professional biographies of the various admirals and key personnel are absolutely great. I wish RUclips contained more historical content producers with the same level of quality and quantity that Drachinifel seemingly produces so easily. However, one only need survey RUclips more broadly to quickly realize that what Drach does is neither easy nor quick. You really have a gift for this Drach, and thank you for sharing it with the world. We are in your debt.
The only one that I can think of with the same level of context, nuancy and possibly even better minute-for-minute analysis and what-ifs is Montemayor. But he only puts out a video every 2 years or so.
Man, I had sought to avoid these encapsulated biographical episodes - knowing the addiction was lurking in them. Now I'm hooked. Anyone got a complete listing of all of Admiral Spruance's various command ships to tide me over to the next episode?
Spruance's reasons for choosing a cruiser for his flagship makes sense. Choosing USS Indianapolis as that cruiser also makes sense as she had a reputation as a tight ship and had been specifically outfitted as a fleet flagship. Her being named for Spruance's home town was probably just an added bonus.
I was wondering why Kurita initially had his flag aboard a cruiser during Leyte as opposed to one of his battleships. But assuming his reasoning was similar to Spruance I suppose it makes perfect sense.
I agree that Spruance's reasons make perfect sense. It's interesting, though, that the rationale for making a choice like Spruance did only really arose with fleets of the size and diversity of those in the Pacific War. There really isn't any reason to think that Nelson would have been in better position to command from a frigate rather than Victory, for example, or Jellicoe being on a cruiser rather than Iron Duke. The concept of a fleet with multiple massive elements, each of which was responsible for different tasks in a gigantic combined operation, was essentially a novel one for the Pacific War in WWII, so it's interesting that Spruance came up with a logical new solution so quickly.
The Japanese pilots who really did get sent to “fly until they died” could attest to how much benefit the US reaped from Spruance’s simple act of listening to his aviators about their combat fatigue and instituting the rotation program. Maybe it helped that he *wasn’t* an experienced carrier admiral - he didn’t think he knew better than the actual pilots.
The Japanese did not have the fuel to spare to afford the luxury of sending their best pilots home. Also, when the VT fuses reached the Pacific supply yards, experience didn't matter much anymore. Even at Midway, iirc, Japanese wings lost 50% of their strength per sortie... So you are right on a summary level, but the devil is always in the details 🙃
@@MrNicoJac The US used its pilots from 42 to train the pilots of 43 and then to lead in 44. They also would take the top 10-20% of candidates and train them into pilots whereas the IJN took maybe the top 5% and washed a lot of them out of the program. And the US at the time was the leading producer of petroleum products in the world thanks to Texas Tea. Fletcher also would talk to the junior pilots and listen to what they had to say which kinda upset the head of the Carrier's aviation. But both men seemed to be respected an to some degree liked by most of the men under their command.
@@PeteOtton Speaking of Fletcher. Joseph "Jocko" Clarke was XO on Yorktown for those early raids and was pissed off that Fletcher and Yorktown's Captain Elliot Buckmaster were consulting the younger pilots instead of someone like him who has more experience. In someways, dismissing Fletcher after Saratoga's torpedoing at the end of August actually set the Guadalcanal Campaign back. As he was the USN's most experienced carrier admiral. At a time when the IJN's carriers were still a potent threat.
@@ph89787 The junior pilots seemed to have better ideas than the older brown shoes who reset the way the USN operated carriers. Imagine if we had stuck with operating carriers as groups instead of on their own. We might have been able to go toe to toe with IJN more effectively sooner.
“A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.” Or my other favorite, “War is chaos, and the US military practices chaos on a daily basis.”
Lack of air search radar on the Japanese side combined with improper radio set magnetic shielding in the Zero fighters was decisive. Otherwise, the mostly unescorted US bombers would have been savaged by the Japanese CAP. Lack of air search radar was also the reason why the Japanese escort ships were spread out (to provide early warning) and too far to contribute to the carrier's AAA. Of course, something as simple as a sufficient cloud cover could completely ruin such an early warning system (which is what happened at Midway).
@@VersusARCH Japanese AA was also pretty poor. The CAP was naturally aggressive; that happened on both sides throughout the war. Brutally, pragmatically, the Torpedo planes coming in first should have been the plan. WIth lousy torpedoes and lousy planes, they were the correct diversion for the Sunday Punch of the Dive Bombers
A big fan of Raymond Spruance. His ability to make decisions based on his foundation of experience and profound brilliance led directly to American victory.
Well , Mac deserves it. But Drach is a Navy centric channel. Rather than commanding, Mac had a press Corp on staff and was after glory rather than fighting the war he worried about his ratings in the news. Comparable to someone else who measures his glories by where he is in the news cycle being
@@daleheun7222 he is much reviled , though people forget that he also comanded the american forces in korea, and was in charge of teh landing in incheon, which almost ended the war. he is known to be a glory hound, but so do many other generals.
You turned information that wouldve put me to sleep in school, into something quite entertaining and digestable. Currently binging your pacific war videos. The way you phrase things, or ocasionally give emotions to objects like torpedos missing their target, reminds me of Douglas Adams. 👍
@@johnbuchman4854 As Drach explains, it was Spruance who organized the first attack, and after Yorktown was damaged Fletcher gave him overall control of the battle.
True of most leaders at most big battles, really. Being able to handle the pressures is the price of admission to high rank. (Or at least, the price of being remembered fondly by history if you *do* get high rank in wartime, because there's certainly those who can't hack it.)
He was in clover. The torpoedo bombers were scrapped so he wouldn't have to wait for them to waste his time anymore, his second and third in command were incompetent results of Democrat selection before the war. Anything he did that could go wong had a better than even chance of being a good strategy since they had never had a stratery that worked.
One of the great injustices of the Pacific War was that Halsey was promoted to five-star instead of Spruance. Halsy's later several mistakes make him clearly undeserving of that honor, especially in comparison to Spruance's performance. Halsey simply got better press, and his mistakes were swept under the carpet.
@@ph89787 Spruance also had a knack for investing in the stock market. I think his daughter took over this task during the war. The freezing of the Fleet Admirals' pay was something of a bother for Nimitz. Luckily he took a job with the UN to be a mediator between India and Pakistan for about 18 months that helped pay the bills even while having to maintain a second apartment in NYC.
Good generals and admirals all make some very big errors. That is because they take the chances that the more timid generals and admirals would not take. You could have a few generals or admirals possibly made not big errors---and weren't worth much.
The argument between Browning and McCluskey was actually a bit bigger. As when he found out. He got VS-6 CO Earl Gallagher and Enterprise’s Captain George Murray. Also McCluskey was recovering after being shot in the shoulder and Gallagher had his back thrown out when diving on Hiryu.
Unfortunately even with multi-part videos like this, sometimes I have to give a very abbreviated version of some events. In this case the main point was to explain that there was an argument and why the ships launched later in the day with smaller bombs :)
On a separate note: It's great to see you are moderating the discussion "Leyte Gulf at 80". I'd love to attend, but it is during my already planned cross country motorcycle trip.
You know, the fact that he was responsible for rotating experience airmen into training back home may have been his greatest contribution to the war. And that's saying something.
TIL that it was specifically him that initiated that procedure. The more and more I learn about him, the more I realize that he was very much the superior leader compared to Halsey. Not to slight Halsey, who was brilliant during 1941-1943, but his missteps later unfortunately tarnish his reputation.
I just have to say the superb intelligence the narrator possesses is quite impressive. I learn a lot from these videos. 5 star to this man for the wording and research work. I love this channel. It’s very fascinating and informative. Much respect to the makers of this channel. One of my favorites RUclips has to offer on naval history
Glad to see that Spruance is getting deserved recognition, so tired of people thinking that Halsey win the pacific war on his own, or thinking that he was the one on midway, hell, they even joke about it in family guy.
@@jimmyseaver3647 It's actually not as bad as you would think. The dog Brian is dating some girl who is smarter than him and he comments something about Halsey at Midway and she corrects him that it was not Halsey at Midway but Spruance.
Man, I didn't even get to 3 minutes and I'm already chasing a rabbit down a hole. You mentioned maneuvering boards and that got me wondering what the difference might be between a WWII maneuvering board and the ones we were using in the 80's and 90's, and off I went. I better be careful as even though it's been 25 years, in my search I noticed a Maneuvering Board Manual online and I can probably find maneuvering boards somewhere....nah. Back to the video.
I have the Quiet Warrior but I believe that an updated biography of Spruance is overdue- Admiral Fletcher was done right by Black Shoe Warrior.; Keep 'em coming Drach!!!
39:45 I remember as a child in the mid 1970s reading books written in the 1950s about frogmen / UDT teams swimming up to beaches and testing sand, tides, etc. That was one of the lessons learned from Tarawa.
5 minutes in and there are already 30 likes on this post. every body getting eager for a Spruance- geek-off hosted by the one and only, the giant of our times, Drachinifel, protector of the sacred lore, holder of the great seal, the CHANNEL MASTER and grand sea lord. all bow to his wizardry and video editing and narration prowess!!!
Calling "The General", (Dug-Out-Doug) a "spanner" is about the nicest insult I have heard. My words to describe that egomaniac would be unprintable. What a bag of hot air he was.
And again, Drach brings naval history to life for the masses. Thank you for brightening my life with every video you post. My best to you, Mrs. Drach and Baby Drach. Congratulations on your growing family, our world needs more thoughtful parents such as you and Mrs Drach
20:50 Spruance: The only sure kill is overkill. 25:50 My money says that if the US *had* tried to invade and occupy New Guinea under the command of McArthur at that point, they would have had more casualties from tropical diseases, exhaustion, starvation and simply getting lost in jungles than from Japanese actions.
Joseph Campbell's _The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea - The Forgotten War of the South Pacific_ covers the use of the 32nd Division during the Kokoda Trail and Buna-Gona campaigns. To put it lightly MacArthur's claims about Army operations generating "light" casualties are BS. Especially since in early 1943 he was ordering frontal assaults, not being patient with commanders suffering from logistics issues and bad terrain, and pretty much being an awful general.
@@Owktree I looked up the Kokoda trail campaign on Wikipedia and it had this charming quote: *Operations in New Guinea were impacted by tropical diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, scrub typhus, tropical ulcers, dysentery from a range of causes and fungal infections. Walker observes that the Kokoda Track "starts and ends with malaria".*
I’ve said this before but it’s been awhile so I’ll do it again. I’m a 47 land lover outta Cleveland. I’ve been on couple boats but not for years. Your series on Guadalcanal is by far of the best PERIOD! I’ve been reading just about everything on the pacific I can. Finally got The First Team book by Lundstrom. Wow just wow. Can’t wait to get book 2
Bill Slim was accused of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut while he was deliberately using large forces to crush small Japanese units to improve moreale. His reply was that if you had a sledgehammer handy it was a good way to crack a nut. Thanks for another frascinating videol
I love the way this covered aftermath actions and little battles in between major actions. There are lots of coverage of the primary battles, but for example, I had never heard about the strikes on the cruisers following Midway.
23:41 "... the BEST at what they did" I was looking away from the visuals when I heard that and looked back and saw EXACTLY who had come to mind when you said that... "Ching" Lee. :D
If you worked under MacArthur, no one ever heard your name as Doug did it all by himself completely alone. Too bad he wasn't nearly as smart as his ego was massive.
Another great job. And you've all set to cover the idiocy of the change in USN policy regarding commanders and their chiefs of staff. I thought his son was serving on the Nautilus at Midway, but Tambor is correct. I think it's worth stressing that the forces under Spruance's command suffered almost no casualties at the Battle of Midway. The air groups suffered losses, and so did ships under Fletcher's command, but the ships of TF 16 were really not even attacked. Considering the loses to every other TF involved in a battle in 1942, this is notable.
Not only was Spruance a highly competent and appreciated commander, he also never lost sight of his objectives and priorities in search of personal glory. One can only wonders what would have happened if he and not also Halsey had been in command of 3rd fleet during the campaign for Leyte Gulf. There's no doubt in my mind that he wouldn't have let the San Bernardino Straight unguarded and that Kurita's Central Force would have been met by an inferno of bombs and 16 inch shells. And Taffy 3 would have had another "quiet" day providing anti-submarine patrols and shore bombardment missions...
The question is would he have split his forces or had everything at San Bernadino? Would TF58.2 have been the only aircover for Lee, assuming they decided to chance running out of fuel and delaying their departure for 24 hours, while Spruance sent the rest of the carriers north?
@@PeteOtton That is an interesting one to ponder. If Spruance went by the same mindset as at Philippine Sea, he might well have kept everything near the San Bernardino Strait. In that historical case, Spruance's reasoning was that his primary mission was to protect the landing forces, and he was willing to risk fighting off an enemy carrier airstrike in order to ensure he doesn't allow a separate enemy surface force to get around him and attack the landing forces. At Leyte, with the surface threat to the landing forces clear and close by, and the enemy carrier threat presumably less than four months earlier, I think it makes perfect sense that he would have focused on Center Force first based on the same line of reasoning. It's certainly possible that he would have detached Lee with TF 34 (or 54 in this case) along with one carrier group for air cover. Spruance might have decided that he had sufficiently superior forces to divide them up in that way. However, detaching Lee would have meant potentially authorizing a surface action very similar to the one that he (with Lee's concurrence) decided against in the early stages of Philippine Sea. In fact, you could even argue that Lee's odds with TF 34/54 against Center Force would have been *worse* than with TG 58.7 against the IJN's Van Force at Philippine Sea (4 BBs vs. 4 BB/BCs in the first case compared to 7 BBs vs. 4 or possibly 5 BBs/BCs in the second). If I had to guess, I suspect Spruance would have kept everything around San Bernardino and concentrated on destroying Center Force. That was the most immediate potential threat to the landing forces that he had to stop, and there's also the factor that Spruance would certainly have had a better sense of how weakened Northern Force's carrier were likely to be (having been the one to inflict it upon them) than Halsey did in the historical event.
@@Wolfeson28 The quibble I have with TF34/54 being worse off is that the fight could have happened at daybreak after an initial air attack to soften up the Center Force. It is a question of whether or not TF38.2 had enough fuel for one more day of flight operations, or at least enough fuel to operate through the night and then recover aircraft early to mid morning and then retire for refueling. Since USS Independence had night qualified pilots they could have kept Lee up to date on Kurita's movements. But you are correct that Spruance probably would have kept his carriers at San Bernadino with a massive air strike at dawn with a follow up strike by Lee and the surface ships. Spruance probably would have kept a strike force at the ready for use against the carriers with plenty of scouting to keep an eye on them.
And I'm sure he still got more commendations than many of the men under him I knew many young officers in Iraq who never left the base, spent more time in the gym and chow hall than anywhere else, and still walked out with more commendations than us enlisted did.
As a child in Poland, probably around 1986, I received as a gift "Storm over the Pacific." -- a book by a Polish author about the war in the Pacific (actually the first volume, the second came out later). I remember being enthralled with Spruance -- he seemed more my personality type than Halsey (though of course I know it's silly to contrast the two).
You have said the US Navy learned a great deal about how to correctly operate fighters from carriers when HMS Victorious had its temporary name change to USS Robin. What were those differences that made RN fighter direction so much better?
The Royal Navy had fighter direction as part of their doctrine since before the war. Not just carriers, but most capital ships, and even some cruisers, were equipped for it, and had officers trained in FD.
@@alexandermonro6768 Reading up on Guadalcanal, the USN was still trying to get FD coordinated, the FD would say directions in relation to the fleet and the CAP would assume the directions were relative to their vector.
@@redskindan78 1. No Marines at Kokoda, Milne Bay, Buna Gona, Salmua Lae where the Aussies with some US Army help beat the Japanese before your Marines were off the canal No Marines at the other 27 battles on New Guinea 2. MacArthur and his Army were hardly supported by the USN King did not like the Army or anyone else for that matter And the US 6th Army were only given a USN six inch Cruiser his largest Ship. 3. Our two RAN Heavy Cruisers were supporting the USN Pacific Fleet 4. MacArthur had his Army when he landed at the Philippines I doubt he wanted any Marine hierarchy to interfere 5. The USArmy had been with him since New Guinea And Marine and Army tactics were different
Thank goodness for the levelheaded strategic thinking Of Admiral Spruance. I shudder to think what Halsey would have done had his shiggles not kicked in. 0~o
The only good thing is that: the flyboys from Hornet might have actually followed orders and as John Parshall says the battle would be over 4 zip by lunchtime. Imagine if McClusky had a column or two of black smoke to home in on? How many of his boys would have made it back to their ship before taking a swim due to running out of gas. The question then becomes, how many of the cruisers and destroyers would have been knocked out before dark? And would the bull run west into their torpedoes or would he have played it safe for once and run east? I think by morning it would have been Halsey snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory and the battle would have been a draw we couldn't sustain.
I've always maintained that Halsey was a good ship's captain, just not a very good Admiral. His biggest problem in command was his inability to listen to other or take their advice.
@@ditzydoo4378 I think for command as an Admiral he did ok during the Guadalcanal campaign after he took over for Ghormely, but again it wasn't a large force he was commanding. It was small TF's often cobbled together out of what units were available. He did throw the dice once or twice and got lucky and it helped that the Japanese were throwing troops and ships at Guadalcanal piecemeal instead of all at once. Granted the slot didn't leave a lot of space for large fleets and big ships to maneuver. Luckily Yamato stayed at Truk, Callahan/Scott would have really been in trouble if they had to deal with her. And even Lee on Washington would have been in trouble.
@@ditzydoo4378 Yes, but Yamato was a bit thicker of skin and bigger of gun and was designed to take on 2 of the predecessors to the North Carolinas (Wahington) and South Dakotas. Yamato probably wouldn't have gone down as easily as Kirishima. In fact it would take dozens of bombs and torpedoes. Only a few of Washington's shots went torpedo.
Interesting to see the divergence of opinion with MacArthur. He was not a popular commander when he was running the New Guinea campaign in Australia. The Aussies thought he wasted their talents in a sideshow and sent inexperienced GI's into a meat grinder, with predictable results. On at least one occasion MacArthur would complain that the Aussie casualties weren't high enough, suggesting they lacked aggression. Despite the fact they had the most success and the lowest casualties compared to the less experienced American GI's. However MacArthur's plan in the Korean war was a bold game changer that in the end, fell flat due to overreach and ignorance of intelligence. Arrogance is truly the enemy of the enlightened leader. Spruance was the opposite. A great and enlightened commander.
This attention to detail to produce a video of this quality must have been extremely time consuming. I am a great fan of understanding how and why things are done they way they are done, and the thought process behind it. I ate this up! Great stuff! Please, please keep this up as a focus. I know there are other aspects that can be discussed but this is extraordinary work, and should be highly touted and continued to develop. And if I may.... Drach rules! Posers drool! (couldn't help myself)
We were so lucky, luckier than luck itself. Sometimes it just happens that way, it is written. Drach should do a presentation on luck at at sea, it's just crazy.
Thanks for your detailed series on the, arguably more effective admiral. Over his more recognized and publicity hound counter part. Much like the army in Europe had an effective and a "colorful". Pair of top generals..
My disclaimer: I served in the US ARMY for 25 years & mean no disrespect towards anyone who has ,or is currently serving. It's just my opinion. Any combatant commander charged with holding the line because that line is the final line & regardless of costs has to be held has to be pure hell for any commander . Chamberlain pops in my head. He was ordered to hold his position on the extreme left flank of the Union line at all costs. And he did. Like wise for a naval commander of any rank, if your ship or TF is ordered, hold the line like Chamberlain ,the implications & stark reality of failure and losing the initiative by either being out maneuvered ,possibly routed and potentially the finality of being sunk or the TF destroyed i think is a little more costly in the big picture. But so could Chamberlains unit. So while both situations had to have been mind numbing think while the burden in both cases are extreme, the prospect of losing an entire TF and potentially giving the Japanese the initiative to run the Pacific had to be constantly running through Spruances mind. Anyway, as always I welcome any rebuttals up or down. Thanks ever much
I would say that the industrial capabilities of both Japan and the US should've played a major role in how each nation should've valued their carriers. In Japan's case, they had very weak industry, so they could ill-afford to lose ships, much less four aircraft carriers in a single day. Therefore, the Japanese decision to hold the line with only the Hiryu after the other three carriers were out of operation was not a strategically wise decision because it deprived Japan of the necessary carrier that would have so well aided them in the carrier battles that would follow, particularly Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz. Conversely, the US was currently building the Essex class carriers that are scheduled to finish construction in December of '42. The US could be slightly less careful with their carriers, however, with the US starting the war on the defensive, they correctly played so that they could exert the most amount of damage while simultaneously retaining as much of their forces intact as possible. This is because the US didn't have carriers to spare in the early part of the war, and allowing the Japanese to run wild in the Pacific would be disastrous for their alliance with Australia and New Zealand. Even if Japan most or all of the American carriers and taken Midway like they planned, it would be logistically impossible for them to retain it due to the astronomical distance from Japan and the close proximity to Pearl Harbor. Hence, the Americans would be able to attrition the Japanese held Midway until it was easy to capture. Additionally, an invasion of Hawaii would also be impossible. This is due to the heightened security and logistics. The only thing that Japan would really be able to do with their carriers after sinking the American fleets at Midway would be securing the South Pacific or refitting and replenishing their carrier force. In any case, the war would be prolonged, though the US would quickly catch up to the Japanese due to their mighty industrial sector.
@LuckyE-CV6 That's one of the best full spectrum answers I've heard in a good while . That raises to me an interesting question? If Japan couldn't or at least didn't for whatever reasons, anticipate the loss at midway to be as costly as it had been. Based on that , they probably really hadn't looked at midway from a backwards planning strategy. Because it had to be stunning to see four carriers gone with nothing to replace them in the near future if at all. You really can't mitigate this. In the same token do you believe either side had a plan B ? Thanks ever much for the reply.
@@frankknudsen842 I don't believe that the Japanese had a plan B because they assumed that the Americans would act passively and follow their scripted plans of battle. In fact, it is better to look at Japanese Naval planning during the early part of the war as nothing more than scripts. Basically, the Japanese's Midway plan went like this: Suppress Midway defenses on June 4, the landing force takes the island on June 6, US Navy arrives and gets sunk on ~June 9. As you can see, it has no room to plan for when things go wrong due to the extremely tight operational table. And historically, things went wrong just because the Americans arrived at the battle early. I have no doubt that the Japanese assumed that the Americans had low morale and had to be coaxed out to fight when the opposite was true in regard to American morale. The Doolittle Raid is proof that the Japanese wildly misread the American attitude. In short, the Japanese most likely didn't have a plan B for when things go wrong at Midway. On the flip side, the Americans were tasked with sinking as many of the Japanese carriers as possible while losing as few of their own simultaneously. Nimitz did NOT want the carriers getting into a 1-1 attrition rate. Therefore, he told the carrier commanders to withdraw if things weren't looking good, a prudent choice when compared to the Japanese who decided to hold the line with 1 carrier against 3. His orders were flexible, allowing his commanders to exercise their own judgment on what should be done to either win the battle or escape with as much of their forces as possible. I believe that the US didn't necessarily have plan B per se, but rather a contingency to escape intact if the battle didn't go their way.
@@frankknudsen842 Japan didn't really have a plan B because they expected to complete all of their objectives and assumed that the Americans would behave passively, following their scripted battle plans. Each plan was extremely complicated requiring high levels of cooperation between multiple naval groups to arrive and function properly at the correct time. The timetable was rigid, offering no room for a commander's own judgement when the plan falls apart. This can be blatantly seen with Nagumo's Dilemma. Additionally, the Japanese also assumed that the Americans would have poor morale and would need to be drawn out to battle. This notion was proven otherwise with the Doolittle Raid. Therefore, I believe that Japan had no plan B for Midway. On the flip side, Nimitz ordered his carrier commanders to exert the most damage possible while retaining their forces as much as possible. He did NOT want to get into a 1-1 attrition rate with the Japanese. So, he told them to withdraw if the situation didn't look good. Nimitz's orders were both flexible and prudent, allowing his commanders to make the call as to what to do to win the battle. It also provided a contingency for if the battle was falling to the wayside. Hence, the Americans didn't have a plan B per se, but rather a contingency to preserve their forces in the event that the battle wasn't favoring them.
@LuckyE-CV6 If the gains aren't worth the cost, they can have midway, we retain our fleet, and we'll be back. I frequently watch this channel and make comments. I'd appreciate to here you're insight on any topic if your schedule permits . Thanks ever much.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Did any other navy make use of underway replenishment for coal-powered fleets after the Second Pacific Squadron proved that it was _possible?_
If Spruance and Nimitz swapped positions how exactly would the US war effort have gone?
Hi drach, I've just got back from a holiday at the seaside. Whilst there I was happy to see the RNLI returning ashore with two people who had been swept out to sea. This made me think, could you do a video or two on the RNLI, their history and maybe some of the most famous, or historic, rescues such as the hospital ship Rohilla in 1914?
If Hiryu's air group had not found Yorktown the second time but one of the other carreirs (And the same damage had been applied as historically from said attack) would Spruance have tried to go for Hiryu still or would he go for a withdrawal?
it seems that throughout naval history, any screw up or major defeat leads to decades, if not centuries, of catch up needing to be done, is this assessment correct? and has anyone ever managed to get out of such a pit?
These “pocket” professional biographies of the various admirals and key personnel are absolutely great. I wish RUclips contained more historical content producers with the same level of quality and quantity that Drachinifel seemingly produces so easily. However, one only need survey RUclips more broadly to quickly realize that what Drach does is neither easy nor quick. You really have a gift for this Drach, and thank you for sharing it with the world. We are in your debt.
I'm guessing some you have come across other channels that are basically a rehash of Drach's work. Almost word for word in some instances.
The only one that I can think of with the same level of context, nuancy and possibly even better minute-for-minute analysis and what-ifs is Montemayor. But he only puts out a video every 2 years or so.
@@DornishVintage agreed
Sadly RUclips fears historically relevant yet controversial or dark topics.
Could not have said it better!
You know you’ve got a raging Drach addiction when 40 minutes of Drach on Spruance just isn’t enough.
You can go back and relisten to the other one on him
When do we get Spruance's apotheosis from a boy to a destroyer class?
And it's only part 2 of who knows how many?
And of course.. I find my twin brother.. here in the midst of our all encompassing addictions.. Hey Jules.. sup buddy :)
Man, I had sought to avoid these encapsulated biographical episodes - knowing the addiction was lurking in them. Now I'm hooked. Anyone got a complete listing of all of Admiral Spruance's various command ships to tide me over to the next episode?
Spruance's reasons for choosing a cruiser for his flagship makes sense. Choosing USS Indianapolis as that cruiser also makes sense as she had a reputation as a tight ship and had been specifically outfitted as a fleet flagship. Her being named for Spruance's home town was probably just an added bonus.
I was wondering why Kurita initially had his flag aboard a cruiser during Leyte as opposed to one of his battleships. But assuming his reasoning was similar to Spruance I suppose it makes perfect sense.
I agree that Spruance's reasons make perfect sense. It's interesting, though, that the rationale for making a choice like Spruance did only really arose with fleets of the size and diversity of those in the Pacific War. There really isn't any reason to think that Nelson would have been in better position to command from a frigate rather than Victory, for example, or Jellicoe being on a cruiser rather than Iron Duke. The concept of a fleet with multiple massive elements, each of which was responsible for different tasks in a gigantic combined operation, was essentially a novel one for the Pacific War in WWII, so it's interesting that Spruance came up with a logical new solution so quickly.
Some ships of different classes and types are built with accomidations to be Flag Ships.
The Japanese pilots who really did get sent to “fly until they died” could attest to how much benefit the US reaped from Spruance’s simple act of listening to his aviators about their combat fatigue and instituting the rotation program. Maybe it helped that he *wasn’t* an experienced carrier admiral - he didn’t think he knew better than the actual pilots.
The Japanese did not have the fuel to spare to afford the luxury of sending their best pilots home.
Also, when the VT fuses reached the Pacific supply yards, experience didn't matter much anymore.
Even at Midway, iirc, Japanese wings lost 50% of their strength per sortie...
So you are right on a summary level, but the devil is always in the details 🙃
@@MrNicoJac The US used its pilots from 42 to train the pilots of 43 and then to lead in 44. They also would take the top 10-20% of candidates and train them into pilots whereas the IJN took maybe the top 5% and washed a lot of them out of the program. And the US at the time was the leading producer of petroleum products in the world thanks to Texas Tea. Fletcher also would talk to the junior pilots and listen to what they had to say which kinda upset the head of the Carrier's aviation. But both men seemed to be respected an to some degree liked by most of the men under their command.
@@PeteOtton Speaking of Fletcher. Joseph "Jocko" Clarke was XO on Yorktown for those early raids and was pissed off that Fletcher and Yorktown's Captain Elliot Buckmaster were consulting the younger pilots instead of someone like him who has more experience.
In someways, dismissing Fletcher after Saratoga's torpedoing at the end of August actually set the Guadalcanal Campaign back. As he was the USN's most experienced carrier admiral. At a time when the IJN's carriers were still a potent threat.
@@ph89787 The junior pilots seemed to have better ideas than the older brown shoes who reset the way the USN operated carriers. Imagine if we had stuck with operating carriers as groups instead of on their own. We might have been able to go toe to toe with IJN more effectively sooner.
@@ph89787Yeah, sadly Fletcher caught the short end of the stick when in reality he had done a fantastic job with what limited resources he had.
Ironically the total chaos of the American air strikes helped because the Japanese had no idea what to expect next or from where.
“A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.”
Or my other favorite,
“War is chaos, and the US military practices chaos on a daily basis.”
you can see the full extent of this by watching Montemayor's Battle of Midway series.
Lack of air search radar on the Japanese side combined with improper radio set magnetic shielding in the Zero fighters was decisive. Otherwise, the mostly unescorted US bombers would have been savaged by the Japanese CAP. Lack of air search radar was also the reason why the Japanese escort ships were spread out (to provide early warning) and too far to contribute to the carrier's AAA. Of course, something as simple as a sufficient cloud cover could completely ruin such an early warning system (which is what happened at Midway).
@@VersusARCH Japanese AA was also pretty poor. The CAP was naturally aggressive; that happened on both sides throughout the war. Brutally, pragmatically, the Torpedo planes coming in first should have been the plan. WIth lousy torpedoes and lousy planes, they were the correct diversion for the Sunday Punch of the Dive Bombers
Exactly the same argument for Trump being President. His unpredictability is absolutely the best thing for stability in the world...
A big fan of Raymond Spruance. His ability to make decisions based on his foundation of experience and profound brilliance led directly to American victory.
you get a feeling that drach is not a fan of Gen Mcarthur..
frankly no one should be
Being a Naval Histriographer is not a popularity contest.
@@robertserafini560 yes. the guy was a bastard. i agree on that
Well , Mac deserves it.
But Drach is a Navy centric channel.
Rather than commanding, Mac had a press Corp on staff and was after glory rather than fighting the war he worried about his ratings in the news.
Comparable to someone else who measures his glories by where he is in the news cycle being
@@daleheun7222 he is much reviled , though people forget that he also comanded the american forces in korea, and was in charge of teh landing in incheon, which almost ended the war. he is known to be a glory hound, but so do many other generals.
You turned information that wouldve put me to sleep in school, into something quite entertaining and digestable. Currently binging your pacific war videos.
The way you phrase things, or ocasionally give emotions to objects like torpedos missing their target, reminds me of Douglas Adams. 👍
I served on USS Kinkaid DD 965 1987-89; Spruance Class Destroyer
Awesome,thanks for being a brave man
And on today's episode of Everybody loves Raymond.
Everybody but IJN vets I'd guess.
@@RCAvhstape and (looking into the future) John Tower.
I can't imagine how it felt for Spruance at Midway, knowing the potential consequences if he did anything wrong.
Stressful, I bet. 😳
Admiral Fletcher was the overall commander of the U.S. Navy for the Battle of Midway, not Spruance.
@@johnbuchman4854 As Drach explains, it was Spruance who organized the first attack, and after Yorktown was damaged Fletcher gave him overall control of the battle.
True of most leaders at most big battles, really. Being able to handle the pressures is the price of admission to high rank. (Or at least, the price of being remembered fondly by history if you *do* get high rank in wartime, because there's certainly those who can't hack it.)
He was in clover. The torpoedo bombers were scrapped so he wouldn't have to wait for them to waste his time anymore, his second and third in command were incompetent results of Democrat selection before the war. Anything he did that could go wong had a better than even chance of being a good strategy since they had never had a stratery that worked.
One of the great injustices of the Pacific War was that Halsey was promoted to five-star instead of Spruance. Halsy's later several mistakes make him clearly undeserving of that honor, especially in comparison to Spruance's performance. Halsey simply got better press, and his mistakes were swept under the carpet.
On the other hand. Fleet Admiral’s pay was frozen in the 50s. While Spruance’s Admiral’s pay went up. So he made more money than Halsey in retirement.
@@michaelrodgers6732 lets keep modern politician buzzwords out of this history channel
@@jacobdill4499 Hello, thank you and best regards! Michael
@@ph89787 Spruance also had a knack for investing in the stock market. I think his daughter took over this task during the war.
The freezing of the Fleet Admirals' pay was something of a bother for Nimitz. Luckily he took a job with the UN to be a mediator between India and Pakistan for about 18 months that helped pay the bills even while having to maintain a second apartment in NYC.
Good generals and admirals all make some very big errors. That is because they take the chances that the more timid generals and admirals would not take. You could have a few generals or admirals possibly made not big errors---and weren't worth much.
"interestingly shaped floating toys", another great zinger from the Drach!
Nice, new Drach video to listen to when I drive to work tomorrow
What’s a “tomorrow”?
The argument between Browning and McCluskey was actually a bit bigger. As when he found out. He got VS-6 CO Earl Gallagher and Enterprise’s Captain George Murray. Also McCluskey was recovering after being shot in the shoulder and Gallagher had his back thrown out when diving on Hiryu.
Unfortunately even with multi-part videos like this, sometimes I have to give a very abbreviated version of some events. In this case the main point was to explain that there was an argument and why the ships launched later in the day with smaller bombs :)
@@DrachinifelStill a great video though.
Thank you Mr. Drach for your absolutely excellent biographies. You are a truly gifted man.
The picture if the 3 aircraft carriers turning while burning is just amazing. The rest is as usual brilliant 👍
Was eagerly awaiting this. The US was so fortunate to have a leader of Spruance’s capabilities in the Pacific
On a separate note: It's great to see you are moderating the discussion "Leyte Gulf at 80". I'd love to attend, but it is during my already planned cross country motorcycle trip.
When and where will this be?
@@Josephbloe 11 September 2024 at 1100 EST at the Jack C. Taylor Conference Center, in Annapolis, MD.
Actually, I’ll be moderating.
Damned nice presentation. Admiral Spruance was a genius and honoring him with a class of destroyer was barely adequate.
But absolutely appropriate, given his major developmental years in the Navy and just how important that class of destroyer proved to be.
You know, the fact that he was responsible for rotating experience airmen into training back home may have been his greatest contribution to the war. And that's saying something.
TIL that it was specifically him that initiated that procedure. The more and more I learn about him, the more I realize that he was very much the superior leader compared to Halsey. Not to slight Halsey, who was brilliant during 1941-1943, but his missteps later unfortunately tarnish his reputation.
Lol. Spruance was responsible for many things, but rotating aviators probably wasn't one of them.
@@JackNiles-hc8yz That seemed to be what was said in the video. I mean it's possible I miss-heard something in that part.
@@FenthisI heard that, also. Unaware if he truly was responsible for that superb usage of personnel.
Clicked "like", before I even watched it.
Finally getting to watch this broadcast with a cool one in my hand, and with no distractions.
I just have to say the superb intelligence the narrator possesses is quite impressive. I learn a lot from these videos. 5 star to this man for the wording and research work.
I love this channel. It’s very fascinating and informative. Much respect to the makers of this channel. One of my favorites RUclips has to offer on naval history
Glad to see that Spruance is getting deserved recognition, so tired of people thinking that Halsey win the pacific war on his own, or thinking that he was the one on midway, hell, they even joke about it in family guy.
Wait, seriously? Something like _Family Guy_ poked fun at this perception?
Next should be Frank jack fletcher. he’s very underrated
@@jimmyseaver3647 Yeah, I need to find this Family Guy clip
@@jimmyseaver3647 It's actually not as bad as you would think. The dog Brian is dating some girl who is smarter than him and he comments something about Halsey at Midway and she corrects him that it was not Halsey at Midway but Spruance.
Yes but what other Admiral gets his name in a McCartney song?
Man, I didn't even get to 3 minutes and I'm already chasing a rabbit down a hole. You mentioned maneuvering boards and that got me wondering what the difference might be between a WWII maneuvering board and the ones we were using in the 80's and 90's, and off I went. I better be careful as even though it's been 25 years, in my search I noticed a Maneuvering Board Manual online and I can probably find maneuvering boards somewhere....nah. Back to the video.
I have the Quiet Warrior but I believe that an updated biography of Spruance is overdue- Admiral Fletcher was done right by Black Shoe Warrior.; Keep 'em coming Drach!!!
Don't know how you'd get any better than Buell's two biographies.
One of the best, if not THE best series you've done. Thank you.
39:45 I remember as a child in the mid 1970s reading books written in the 1950s about frogmen / UDT teams swimming up to beaches and testing sand, tides, etc. That was one of the lessons learned from Tarawa.
5 minutes in and there are already 30 likes on this post. every body getting eager for a Spruance- geek-off hosted by the one and only, the giant of our times, Drachinifel, protector of the sacred lore, holder of the great seal, the CHANNEL MASTER and grand sea lord. all bow to his wizardry and video editing and narration prowess!!!
Agreed. The only person with more authority is of course Mrs Drach...and Baby Drach... and sometimes Floppy the dog😉
Ahhhh Drach. Hitting it out of the park again. Most excellent, can’t wait for the next episode. Salute!
Nice video for the drive home from work!
We need to compile a list of 'things I do while listening to Drach'.
Superb work Drach. Looking foward to part three.
Brilliant Drack. Loved it. Look after yourself, a couple of guys who I follow have suffered a bit of "Burn out" recently.
Calling "The General", (Dug-Out-Doug) a "spanner" is about the nicest insult I have heard. My words to describe that egomaniac would be unprintable. What a bag of hot air he was.
And again, Drach brings naval history to life for the masses. Thank you for brightening my life with every video you post. My best to you, Mrs. Drach and Baby Drach. Congratulations on your growing family, our world needs more thoughtful parents such as you and Mrs Drach
Hear! Hear!
20:50 Spruance: The only sure kill is overkill.
25:50 My money says that if the US *had* tried to invade and occupy New Guinea under the command of McArthur at that point, they would have had more casualties from tropical diseases, exhaustion, starvation and simply getting lost in jungles than from Japanese actions.
As an Australian. That idea would have made the Eastern Front look like a walk in the park.
@@ph89787 New Guinea probably has a lower percentage of venomous snakes and bugs, but it has a whole lot more of them to make up the horror.
Joseph Campbell's _The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea - The Forgotten War of the South Pacific_ covers the use of the 32nd Division during the Kokoda Trail and Buna-Gona campaigns. To put it lightly MacArthur's claims about Army operations generating "light" casualties are BS. Especially since in early 1943 he was ordering frontal assaults, not being patient with commanders suffering from logistics issues and bad terrain, and pretty much being an awful general.
@@Owktree There were no Americans on Kokoda
@@Owktree I looked up the Kokoda trail campaign on Wikipedia and it had this charming quote: *Operations in New Guinea were impacted by tropical diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, scrub typhus, tropical ulcers, dysentery from a range of causes and fungal infections. Walker observes that the Kokoda Track "starts and ends with malaria".*
I’ve said this before but it’s been awhile so I’ll do it again. I’m a 47 land lover outta Cleveland. I’ve been on couple boats but not for years. Your series on Guadalcanal is by far of the best PERIOD! I’ve been reading just about everything on the pacific I can.
Finally got The First Team book by Lundstrom. Wow just wow. Can’t wait to get book 2
Brilliant Discussion of THE BEST USN ADMIRAL IN THE PACIFIC!!!!
We really appreciate the work you've put into this series, Drach. 👍
Bill Slim was accused of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut while he was deliberately using large forces to crush small Japanese units to improve moreale. His reply was that if you had a sledgehammer handy it was a good way to crack a nut. Thanks for another frascinating videol
Down a deep hole researching the Pacific war last few months. What a pleasant surprise this is! Thanks!
I love the way this covered aftermath actions and little battles in between major actions. There are lots of coverage of the primary battles, but for example, I had never heard about the strikes on the cruisers following Midway.
Everyone forgets the battle lasted for a few days :)
@user-gl5dq2dg1j Some forget, many of us were never taught. Which makes having channels like this to help fill in such knowledge gaps so important.
Really good. Comprehensive to the point of including the various personalities on board. Thank you!
These little bio’s are some of my fav videos
Excellent video! Admiral Spruance's strategic brilliance from Midway to Tarawa is highlighted perfectly. Informative and well-presented-great job!
23:41 "... the BEST at what they did" I was looking away from the visuals when I heard that and looked back and saw EXACTLY who had come to mind when you said that... "Ching" Lee. :D
Thanks Drach, Spruance is a guy I'd like to know more about. Definitely agree with some of the other posts on here, this video ends far to quickly.
An amazing video to listen to while installing drapery😌
Mac Arthur’s brilliance was his PR staff he assembled, that was the extent of his brilliance.
If you worked under MacArthur, no one ever heard your name as Doug did it all by himself completely alone. Too bad he wasn't nearly as smart as his ego was massive.
@@marknelson8724 By all accounts, he was an excellent politician. Too bad his job was mostly 'general.'
This, part 1&2, are absolutely excellent. Then again, the work done on this channel is nothing but the highest quality. Job well done as always.
Another great job. And you've all set to cover the idiocy of the change in USN policy regarding commanders and their chiefs of staff.
I thought his son was serving on the Nautilus at Midway, but Tambor is correct.
I think it's worth stressing that the forces under Spruance's command suffered almost no casualties at the Battle of Midway. The air groups suffered losses, and so did ships under Fletcher's command, but the ships of TF 16 were really not even attacked. Considering the loses to every other TF involved in a battle in 1942, this is notable.
Not only was Spruance a highly competent and appreciated commander, he also never lost sight of his objectives and priorities in search of personal glory.
One can only wonders what would have happened if he and not also Halsey had been in command of 3rd fleet during the campaign for Leyte Gulf. There's no doubt in my mind that he wouldn't have let the San Bernardino Straight unguarded and that Kurita's Central Force would have been met by an inferno of bombs and 16 inch shells. And Taffy 3 would have had another "quiet" day providing anti-submarine patrols and shore bombardment missions...
The question is would he have split his forces or had everything at San Bernadino? Would TF58.2 have been the only aircover for Lee, assuming they decided to chance running out of fuel and delaying their departure for 24 hours, while Spruance sent the rest of the carriers north?
@@PeteOtton That is an interesting one to ponder. If Spruance went by the same mindset as at Philippine Sea, he might well have kept everything near the San Bernardino Strait. In that historical case, Spruance's reasoning was that his primary mission was to protect the landing forces, and he was willing to risk fighting off an enemy carrier airstrike in order to ensure he doesn't allow a separate enemy surface force to get around him and attack the landing forces. At Leyte, with the surface threat to the landing forces clear and close by, and the enemy carrier threat presumably less than four months earlier, I think it makes perfect sense that he would have focused on Center Force first based on the same line of reasoning.
It's certainly possible that he would have detached Lee with TF 34 (or 54 in this case) along with one carrier group for air cover. Spruance might have decided that he had sufficiently superior forces to divide them up in that way. However, detaching Lee would have meant potentially authorizing a surface action very similar to the one that he (with Lee's concurrence) decided against in the early stages of Philippine Sea. In fact, you could even argue that Lee's odds with TF 34/54 against Center Force would have been *worse* than with TG 58.7 against the IJN's Van Force at Philippine Sea (4 BBs vs. 4 BB/BCs in the first case compared to 7 BBs vs. 4 or possibly 5 BBs/BCs in the second).
If I had to guess, I suspect Spruance would have kept everything around San Bernardino and concentrated on destroying Center Force. That was the most immediate potential threat to the landing forces that he had to stop, and there's also the factor that Spruance would certainly have had a better sense of how weakened Northern Force's carrier were likely to be (having been the one to inflict it upon them) than Halsey did in the historical event.
@@Wolfeson28 The quibble I have with TF34/54 being worse off is that the fight could have happened at daybreak after an initial air attack to soften up the Center Force. It is a question of whether or not TF38.2 had enough fuel for one more day of flight operations, or at least enough fuel to operate through the night and then recover aircraft early to mid morning and then retire for refueling. Since USS Independence had night qualified pilots they could have kept Lee up to date on Kurita's movements.
But you are correct that Spruance probably would have kept his carriers at San Bernadino with a massive air strike at dawn with a follow up strike by Lee and the surface ships. Spruance probably would have kept a strike force at the ready for use against the carriers with plenty of scouting to keep an eye on them.
Drach, great vid, loving how you raise the quality of content on RUclips
Browning was nearly one of Japan's best officers.
And I'm sure he still got more commendations than many of the men under him
I knew many young officers in Iraq who never left the base, spent more time in the gym and chow hall than anywhere else, and still walked out with more commendations than us enlisted did.
Browning instantly reminded me of one of Germany‘s best officers in WW1, a certain Seymour.
As a child in Poland, probably around 1986, I received as a gift "Storm over the Pacific." -- a book by a Polish author about the war in the Pacific (actually the first volume, the second came out later). I remember being enthralled with Spruance -- he seemed more my personality type than Halsey (though of course I know it's silly to contrast the two).
You have said the US Navy learned a great deal about how to correctly operate fighters from carriers when HMS Victorious had its temporary name change to USS Robin.
What were those differences that made RN fighter direction so much better?
The Royal Navy had fighter direction as part of their doctrine since before the war. Not just carriers, but most capital ships, and even some cruisers, were equipped for it, and had officers trained in FD.
@@alexandermonro6768 Reading up on Guadalcanal, the USN was still trying to get FD coordinated, the FD would say directions in relation to the fleet and the CAP would assume the directions were relative to their vector.
An excellent video. Thanks.
A minor correction at 39:08. Marines, not soldiers. We don't want to be called soldiers.
Well troops then.
@@jacktattis Old soldier here. The Marines earned it -- the correct term is "Marines."
@@davidk7324 Why did they earn it.
WW1 1 Brigade in France
WW2 None in the ETO/ MTO
"By the grace of God / And the US Marines / MacArthur Returned / To the Philippines".
@@redskindan78 1. No Marines at Kokoda, Milne Bay, Buna Gona, Salmua Lae where the Aussies with some US Army help beat the Japanese before your Marines were off the canal No Marines at the other 27 battles on New Guinea
2. MacArthur and his Army were hardly supported by the USN King did not like the Army or anyone else for that matter And the US 6th Army were only given a USN six inch Cruiser his largest Ship.
3. Our two RAN Heavy Cruisers were supporting the USN Pacific Fleet
4. MacArthur had his Army when he landed at the Philippines I doubt he wanted any Marine hierarchy to interfere
5. The USArmy had been with him since New Guinea And Marine and Army tactics were different
Wonderful stuff, as always. Can't wait for part 2.
Great stuff as always Drach. Well done.
Great video, as always!
That was a great second part, thanks Drach
Thank you for doing an in depth series on Spruance. I subscribed when I came across episode 1. 👏👏👏👏
New Drach is "InstaLike"
Drach, you are a gem! Thank you!
We’ve seen the man upto now, let’s see how his first major combat debut goes!
Exceptional! Well done!
Awesome. Keep these coming.
Always top notch historical content.
Excellent. Interesting and detailed. Hard to do. But Drach makes it look easy.
Big fan of videos focused one one notable person
Thank goodness for the levelheaded strategic thinking Of Admiral Spruance. I shudder to think what Halsey would have done had his shiggles not kicked in. 0~o
The only good thing is that: the flyboys from Hornet might have actually followed orders and as John Parshall says the battle would be over 4 zip by lunchtime. Imagine if McClusky had a column or two of black smoke to home in on? How many of his boys would have made it back to their ship before taking a swim due to running out of gas.
The question then becomes, how many of the cruisers and destroyers would have been knocked out before dark? And would the bull run west into their torpedoes or would he have played it safe for once and run east? I think by morning it would have been Halsey snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory and the battle would have been a draw we couldn't sustain.
I've always maintained that Halsey was a good ship's captain, just not a very good Admiral. His biggest problem in command was his inability to listen to other or take their advice.
@@ditzydoo4378 I think for command as an Admiral he did ok during the Guadalcanal campaign after he took over for Ghormely, but again it wasn't a large force he was commanding. It was small TF's often cobbled together out of what units were available. He did throw the dice once or twice and got lucky and it helped that the Japanese were throwing troops and ships at Guadalcanal piecemeal instead of all at once. Granted the slot didn't leave a lot of space for large fleets and big ships to maneuver. Luckily Yamato stayed at Truk, Callahan/Scott would have really been in trouble if they had to deal with her. And even Lee on Washington would have been in trouble.
@@PeteOtton Ah but Admiral Willis Augustus "Ching" Lee Jr. was sniper par' excelon on USS Washington, one need only ask Kirishima.
@@ditzydoo4378 Yes, but Yamato was a bit thicker of skin and bigger of gun and was designed to take on 2 of the predecessors to the North Carolinas (Wahington) and South Dakotas. Yamato probably wouldn't have gone down as easily as Kirishima. In fact it would take dozens of bombs and torpedoes. Only a few of Washington's shots went torpedo.
Well done. Excellent work.
Interesting to see the divergence of opinion with MacArthur. He was not a popular commander when he was running the New Guinea campaign in Australia. The Aussies thought he wasted their talents in a sideshow and sent inexperienced GI's into a meat grinder, with predictable results. On at least one occasion MacArthur would complain that the Aussie casualties weren't high enough, suggesting they lacked aggression. Despite the fact they had the most success and the lowest casualties compared to the less experienced American GI's. However MacArthur's plan in the Korean war was a bold game changer that in the end, fell flat due to overreach and ignorance of intelligence. Arrogance is truly the enemy of the enlightened leader. Spruance was the opposite. A great and enlightened commander.
Excellent! Thank you for this 2nd part. Looking forward to the other ones, now.
hI DRACH- A MOST EXCELLENT VIDEO- I am waiting for part 2 !!!!
Great job Drach. Thx.
Thanks again, Drax.
Thanks Drach!
These are great, keep up the good work.
Yay! I was hoping this would be out soon.
Thanks Drach.
I love these deep dives into history! (And yes I realize I should have saved this one for a sub video.)
This attention to detail to produce a video of this quality must have been extremely time consuming. I am a great fan of understanding how and why things are done they way they are done, and the thought process behind it. I ate this up! Great stuff! Please, please keep this up as a focus. I know there are other aspects that can be discussed but this is extraordinary work, and should be highly touted and continued to develop. And if I may.... Drach rules! Posers drool! (couldn't help myself)
Drach, great series on the Central Pacific campaign and Spruance.
awesome episode, sir. Thank you.
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Love your work
I don't even like stuff to do with the navy! But your videos are superb.
Atlanta-class AA cruiser in the picture at about 10:50. Hadn’t realized they were in the picture that early in the war.
Atlanta arrived in the Pacific in April and joined Task Force 16 on 16 May.
@@ph89787 Thanks. Shows that the Navy woke up to the importance of AA a lot sooner than I imagined.
Thanks, have a nice day. 👍.
We were so lucky, luckier than luck itself.
Sometimes it just happens that way, it is written.
Drach should do a presentation on luck at at sea, it's just crazy.
Thanks for your detailed series on the, arguably more effective admiral. Over his more recognized and publicity hound counter part. Much like the army in Europe had an effective and a "colorful". Pair of top generals..
My disclaimer: I served in the US ARMY for 25 years & mean no disrespect towards anyone who has ,or is currently serving. It's just my opinion. Any combatant commander charged with holding the line because that line is the final line & regardless of costs has to be held has to be pure hell for any commander . Chamberlain pops in my head. He was ordered to hold his position on the extreme left flank of the Union line at all costs. And he did. Like wise for a naval commander of any rank, if your ship or TF is ordered, hold the line like Chamberlain ,the implications & stark reality of failure and losing the initiative by either being out maneuvered ,possibly routed and potentially the finality of being sunk or the TF destroyed i think is a little more costly in the big picture. But so could Chamberlains unit. So while both situations had to have been mind numbing think while the burden in both cases are extreme, the prospect of losing an entire TF and potentially giving the Japanese the initiative to run the Pacific had to be constantly running through Spruances mind. Anyway, as always I welcome any rebuttals up or down. Thanks ever much
I would say that the industrial capabilities of both Japan and the US should've played a major role in how each nation should've valued their carriers. In Japan's case, they had very weak industry, so they could ill-afford to lose ships, much less four aircraft carriers in a single day. Therefore, the Japanese decision to hold the line with only the Hiryu after the other three carriers were out of operation was not a strategically wise decision because it deprived Japan of the necessary carrier that would have so well aided them in the carrier battles that would follow, particularly Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz. Conversely, the US was currently building the Essex class carriers that are scheduled to finish construction in December of '42. The US could be slightly less careful with their carriers, however, with the US starting the war on the defensive, they correctly played so that they could exert the most amount of damage while simultaneously retaining as much of their forces intact as possible. This is because the US didn't have carriers to spare in the early part of the war, and allowing the Japanese to run wild in the Pacific would be disastrous for their alliance with Australia and New Zealand.
Even if Japan most or all of the American carriers and taken Midway like they planned, it would be logistically impossible for them to retain it due to the astronomical distance from Japan and the close proximity to Pearl Harbor. Hence, the Americans would be able to attrition the Japanese held Midway until it was easy to capture. Additionally, an invasion of Hawaii would also be impossible. This is due to the heightened security and logistics. The only thing that Japan would really be able to do with their carriers after sinking the American fleets at Midway would be securing the South Pacific or refitting and replenishing their carrier force. In any case, the war would be prolonged, though the US would quickly catch up to the Japanese due to their mighty industrial sector.
@LuckyE-CV6 That's one of the best full spectrum answers I've heard in a good while . That raises to me an interesting question? If Japan couldn't or at least didn't for whatever reasons, anticipate the loss at midway to be as costly as it had been. Based on that , they probably really hadn't looked at midway from a backwards planning strategy. Because it had to be stunning to see four carriers gone with nothing to replace them in the near future if at all. You really can't mitigate this. In the same token do you believe either side had a plan B ? Thanks ever much for the reply.
@@frankknudsen842 I don't believe that the Japanese had a plan B because they assumed that the Americans would act passively and follow their scripted plans of battle. In fact, it is better to look at Japanese Naval planning during the early part of the war as nothing more than scripts. Basically, the Japanese's Midway plan went like this: Suppress Midway defenses on June 4, the landing force takes the island on June 6, US Navy arrives and gets sunk on ~June 9.
As you can see, it has no room to plan for when things go wrong due to the extremely tight operational table. And historically, things went wrong just because the Americans arrived at the battle early. I have no doubt that the Japanese assumed that the Americans had low morale and had to be coaxed out to fight when the opposite was true in regard to American morale. The Doolittle Raid is proof that the Japanese wildly misread the American attitude. In short, the Japanese most likely didn't have a plan B for when things go wrong at Midway.
On the flip side, the Americans were tasked with sinking as many of the Japanese carriers as possible while losing as few of their own simultaneously. Nimitz did NOT want the carriers getting into a 1-1 attrition rate. Therefore, he told the carrier commanders to withdraw if things weren't looking good, a prudent choice when compared to the Japanese who decided to hold the line with 1 carrier against 3. His orders were flexible, allowing his commanders to exercise their own judgment on what should be done to either win the battle or escape with as much of their forces as possible. I believe that the US didn't necessarily have plan B per se, but rather a contingency to escape intact if the battle didn't go their way.
@@frankknudsen842 Japan didn't really have a plan B because they expected to complete all of their objectives and assumed that the Americans would behave passively, following their scripted battle plans. Each plan was extremely complicated requiring high levels of cooperation between multiple naval groups to arrive and function properly at the correct time. The timetable was rigid, offering no room for a commander's own judgement when the plan falls apart. This can be blatantly seen with Nagumo's Dilemma. Additionally, the Japanese also assumed that the Americans would have poor morale and would need to be drawn out to battle. This notion was proven otherwise with the Doolittle Raid. Therefore, I believe that Japan had no plan B for Midway.
On the flip side, Nimitz ordered his carrier commanders to exert the most damage possible while retaining their forces as much as possible. He did NOT want to get into a 1-1 attrition rate with the Japanese. So, he told them to withdraw if the situation didn't look good. Nimitz's orders were both flexible and prudent, allowing his commanders to make the call as to what to do to win the battle. It also provided a contingency for if the battle was falling to the wayside. Hence, the Americans didn't have a plan B per se, but rather a contingency to preserve their forces in the event that the battle wasn't favoring them.
@LuckyE-CV6 If the gains aren't worth the cost, they can have midway, we retain our fleet, and we'll be back. I frequently watch this channel and make comments. I'd appreciate to here you're insight on any topic if your schedule permits . Thanks ever much.
Excellent content!
Thank you.
The speech to text translated the devastator torpedo attack aircraft to "devastated." Unfortunate but apt
Thamks Drach
That tide problem on Tarava lead directly to formation of the SEALs predecessors.
110th view, not bad! Keep up the great work!!!
Capt Browning is the USN equivalent of Lt Seymour of the RN.