Could you explain to me, why don't they vote for what they want themselves? I understand that this is simplified model, but then it isn't clear to me, why they do it, because each project will end up with 1 vote each, the same result as if they voted themselves. Perhaps it would be helpful, if you would explain how this is supposed to work, or works, in reality. Thanks, keep it up.
it must be late to discuss with you about this but I think the total number of votes is not limited. So if they vote for each other and don't vote for the left one, the result will be 2-2-1 and as a result, 2 projects will be passed
Logrolling is illegal in most state constitutions for a reason - something public choice theorists do not discuss. In the mid 1800s the evils of logrolling were important topics.
In one piece Public Choice economist McGann claims that logrolling is ‘an essential part of the legislative process.’ Yet, he declares the advantages of logrolling (vote-trading based on public legislative votes) without once considering the negative sides of open voting. These negatives include the ability for powerful outside (and even foreign) interests to monitor member’s votes, driving bribery, extortion and intimidation. This means that McGann’s ‘essential part of the legislative process’ is a principal driver of government capture. Further the public voting allows for another pernicious aspect of legislation, one that scholars call call weaponization. This line of supposedly cool and rational ‘economic’ thinking with respect to the benefit of logrolling, begins with Gordon Tullock’s work in 1959. And it continues obliviously until today, as if untarnished by the scads of evidence. It ignores the publications of Mancur Olson and it ignores the outrageous rise in lobbying when the votes of legislators are made more public. In the citation above, McGann claims that logrolling even works better if the parties polarize more. This tragic outcome is precisely what we observe. Further remarkable is that this work is widely endorsed by libertarian powerhouses like Charles Koch. Which makes sense, because open voting is the central tool that allows them to control (and capture) government. Studying logrolling without mentioning bribery or intimidation is a bit like studying egg production without acknowledging chickens.
U rock man 🇹🇿🌟📌
Could you explain to me, why don't they vote for what they want themselves? I understand that this is simplified model, but then it isn't clear to me, why they do it, because each project will end up with 1 vote each, the same result as if they voted themselves. Perhaps it would be helpful, if you would explain how this is supposed to work, or works, in reality. Thanks, keep it up.
it must be late to discuss with you about this but I think the total number of votes is not limited. So if they vote for each other and don't vote for the left one, the result will be 2-2-1 and as a result, 2 projects will be passed
Logrolling is illegal in most state constitutions for a reason - something public choice theorists do not discuss. In the mid 1800s the evils of logrolling were important topics.
In one piece Public Choice economist McGann claims that logrolling is ‘an essential part of the legislative process.’ Yet, he declares the advantages of logrolling (vote-trading based on public legislative votes) without once considering the negative sides of open voting. These negatives include the ability for powerful outside (and even foreign) interests to monitor member’s votes, driving bribery, extortion and intimidation. This means that McGann’s ‘essential part of the legislative process’ is a principal driver of government capture. Further the public voting allows for another pernicious aspect of legislation, one that scholars call call weaponization.
This line of supposedly cool and rational ‘economic’ thinking with respect to the benefit of logrolling, begins with Gordon Tullock’s work in 1959. And it continues obliviously until today, as if untarnished by the scads of evidence. It ignores the publications of Mancur Olson and it ignores the outrageous rise in lobbying when the votes of legislators are made more public. In the citation above, McGann claims that logrolling even works better if the parties polarize more. This tragic outcome is precisely what we observe. Further remarkable is that this work is widely endorsed by libertarian powerhouses like Charles Koch. Which makes sense, because open voting is the central tool that allows them to control (and capture) government. Studying logrolling without mentioning bribery or intimidation is a bit like studying egg production without acknowledging chickens.
Yes!!!!
yOU HAVE A PEN AND A WHITEBOARD JUST WRITE IT DOWN😡😡😡