Conversation Outline: 00:00 Introduction 02:28 Opening Statement: Kevin Mitchell 16:26 Opening Statement: Robert Sapolsky 27:32 First Round of Questioning 45:56 Second Round of Questioning 1:04:56 How can we make evolutionary sense of illusory agency? 1:06:13 How can we make sense of our accomplishments if we have no free will? 1:08:21 Comparisons with Dennett and Hofstadter 1:12:28 Closing thoughts Enjoy! twitter.com/tedynenu instagram.com/tedynenu
Both of these men are great at letting the other get their point across. Like thirty times i wanted to interrupt and robert just sat there listening. And i felt the same for kevin as well.
Great point. In fact, during the Mitchel's opening statement I kept thinking how Robert would come back, but he's the master of exercising "non ad-hominin" attacks. He's too cool and gentleman-like. What a great talk from these two intelligent guys. Imagine if we had that on TV?
I am very excited that this discussion could take place here. I have read both books in the last 4 weeks and it was my dream that I could experience a direct dialog between the two authors. I find both texts (and the discussion) extremely stimulating. Ultimately, the difference is whether the biological and life-historical influences (both of which are beyond one's own control) only influence or determine. In my opinion, SAPOLSKY's arguments are less intuitive, but more consistent. He dares to think things through to the end - even if this leads to inner resistance. Mitchell cannot really justify why and at what point a person can freely decide what kind of person they become and what kind of behavior they exhibit in a specific situation. His assessment that a "gap" remains, even in view of the cumulative effect of all influencing factors, appears to be more of an assumption than a real justification. Presumably, there is indeed a certain amount of 'leeway' in small and insignificant decisions; what kind of person I became was certainly not under my control.
Interesting, because before reading both books I was more inclined to Sapolsky's view. And I still don't believe in the sort of magic God stuff that would presumably be necessary for us to make truly (libertarian) free will type decisions. I think I'm now content to view behavioral flexibility at the organismal level in the form of cognition and deliberation enough to justify the term "free will". Whether my consciousness is involved or is simply along for the ride I find more or less immaterial. If it's just along for the ride, it's still my brain circuits cogitating over decisions (and the conscious me is like the smoke coming out of a steam engine). I may not have sculpted my brain circuits, but I'm willing to "own" them. It may be all we have, but it sure beats being an amoeba. :)
This was exactly my impression too. Mitchell’s arguments consistently seemed to stop at some reductive point, after which he’d conclude with, “It just doesn’t make sense” to explain why things aren’t deterministic. It’s like some emotional and/or subconscious desire for free will to exist is preventing him from making the uncomfortable conclusion he knows is lurking just beyond where he’s content to push his reasoning.
@@psuswim07I don't think that is true in his case. It certainly would be for most. But I genuinely think he's honestly believes there is a free aspect to the will which he explains pretty clearly. Not sure why you reject his logical explanations in favor of suggesting it's some kind of emotional defense. Personally I'm of the view that free will and no free wiil are extreme positions and that as humans we can by developing more consciousness about our actions actually increase our freedom as regards our relatively determined predisposition. I believe to some extent Sapolsky is playing devil's advocate to some extent in insisting on absolute free will. I also believe his motivation for doing so comes strongly from huge compassion because strong advocacy for free will brings with it huge judgemental baggage. "You deserve your terrible lot in life cause you're a lazy bum" kind of thing. All good things to you. It's a wonderful topic which I love.
@@waterkingdavid This is pretty close to my view. I agree with a LOT of what Sapolsky said in his introduction. It's all supremely relevant, and it's the exact reason we should view ourselves and other human beings with compassion rather than judging their behavior. At the same time, I have experienced in my life that as I gain more and more awareness over my patterns and what they arose from, I gain more control over those patterns. Particularly when I experience healing of trauma that keeps me in dysregulated states or cycles of addiction, me as an organism is more free to use metacognition to make decisions as opposed to reacting. In my opinion, awareness, love, and healing are the main things that grant humanity more freedom and agency to not have our past completely determine our future. We should also consider that there is a form of collective awareness and metacognition formed through culture and community which, again, is something that can grant us more freedom from the past if we move towards healing and connection. To the extent that we don't digest and make sense out of the past, however, we *are* determined by it. It's also true that there are so, so many humans who don't have anything like free will because they and their ancestors were oppressed, and they're being denied the necessary conditions to have a regulated nervous system capable of metacognition.
I am a physician, therefore scientifically trained, and I have no problems with the idea that my life is a movie I watch, rather than a videogame I play. If anything it feels very liberating.
scientism is the way. All discussions about the non-observable or discussions that involve merging the non-observable with the observable are pointless and impossible to falsify or depend on consensus. I had a stomach ulcer months ago and they gave me meds and it went away in two weeks. Philosophers make the mistake of assuming science ONLY operates on consensus just like non-scientific disciplines and they are WRONG. You cannot deny that the atomic bomb exists. What I'm getting at is that there is no problem in believing in the tooth fairy or in determinism, they are both just as valid since they cant be disproved.
Sapolskys comments at the beginning about appreciating the two viewpoints being shared at the same time in their respective books was so wholesome. Love this guy
I am a neuropsychologist who specializes in theoretical psychology and the epigenetics of developmental psychology. I do want to mention that arousal chronic states in infants do often give rise to alterations in transcriptions from DNA to RNA. This may lead to genes that are left dormant for several years. David Chalmers’ posits “psych-physical laws” which govern and allow emergent properties like alterations in phenotype(s) to occur within a causally closed system. I wonder how Robert’s naturalist determined worldview would explain this natural phenomenon? The same question can be posed to Kevin. Thanks!
I can explain it. I've had a lot of time to think about the world, and Mensa puts my IQ at 117. So, forget about inside body versus outside world. Now, the WHOLE system is part of YOU. Therefore, any changes on the "outside" also change YOU because there is no such thing as a difference. So now let's go back to the twins. Any minor difference will lead to changes. An example: the other day, I was walking in the kitchen and I noticed a sound. I heard it one way, and one step later, I heard it differently. I went back to my original place, and the sound was very different in just those two places. This might not seem like much, but it's enough for huge changes. So, basically, time, position in the universe, and the "outside" are all part of the sum of why the twins are different.
How is it not deterministic? Chaotic systems are deterministic. Emergent properties are the sum of their parts, including processes (that they are not deterministic is a value judgement, not and objective judgement).
I actually laughed out loud when Sapolsky cheekily said that, I love this man. Oh and fyi, Sapolsky and Dennett did talk. There's a yt video, published about a month ago. It was a pretty disappointing "debate" though, ngl, as they never agreed on a common definition of free will, and Dennett just doesn't understand Robert's points while he rambled on with incoherent lines of reasonings. I agree with Kevin Mitchell's frustrated points about Dennett. It's funny that after having heard Dennett "argue" FOR his stance of Compatibilism, I became even more convinced that Compatibilism is absolutely logically incoherent.
I wrote this elsewhere: To the compatibilists/determinists: It's a probabilistic universe if it's infinite. (It's not just classical mechanics.) You are trying to apply determinism/finiteness to a probabilistic/infinite universe. The problem with causality is that infinity (and quantum instantaneousness) breaks it, fundamentally, because you cannot go far back enough to determine all the initial conditions (that lead to you/your behavior) because there are none with infinity! Infinity breaks determinism. To add: The Uncertainty Principle suggests that you cannot say for certain that we have no free will. Sure, you have no control in some senses, like classical mechanics (upbringing, gravity, etc.), but not necessarily from a fundamental/quantum sense. The universe goes beyond classical mechanics. Think also of 'spooky action at a distance.' This doesn't appear causal, but, rather, instantaneous. If the universe created you, then so did infinity if the universe is infinite.
This depends on what you mean by infinite, this includes when you're talking about the universe. It's also important to understand that eternity and infinity aren't the same thing. One could argue that the universe is eternal yet believe it isn't infinite. Or one could argue that the universe is eternal yet believe it doesn't have an infinite past but an infinite future. There are several other options, but you get the picture. The description of an infinite sequence of universes, where there is a period of expansion, followed by a period of contraction, followed by a period of expansion, and so on and so forth is called the Bing Bounce theory. It is a cyclic model and a possibility. The other possibility is to just go with the standard Big Bang model. You have necessary initial conditions (eternal initial states) known as the initial singularity. The model scientists put forth is that this initial singularity existed before the expansion event happened (the big bang). It's described as being an extremely dense and hot state. It marks a moment where the laws of nature, as we understand them, cease to apply. In this singularity, the universe’s density and temperature are thought to have been infinitely high, with all the mass and energy of the present universe compressed into an infinitesimally small point (smaller than an atom. It is from this small point from which the universe as we know it now comes from. Although there is no direct evidence for a singularity of infinite density, the cosmic microwave background is evidence that the universe expanded from a very hot, dense state. Under this model there is only continual expansion, no contraction. Even if the hypothesis of the universe evolving to a state of no thermodynamic free energy and will therefore be unable to sustain processes that increase entropy comes to pass, there will still be a universe. This describes an eternal universe that doesn't have an infinite past but does have an infinite future. I find this to be the most likely possibility based on the available scientific data we have currently. Under this model determinism is possible. Another model for an eternal universe is the static model. Where the universe is both spatially and temporally infinite, and space is neither expanding nor contracting. This possibility has been ruled out by science though. I believe this is the type of infinity you were talking about. To add: The fundamental unpredictability of some areas of physics such as quantum uncertainty or chaos does not automatically allow for freewill, they are two different concepts. I also believe quantum indeterminacy is misunderstood.
So basically, Sapolsky is saying there is no 'free' will. And Mitchell is saying we are all influenced from our pasts and biological make up (biases) but that doesn't mean we don't have free will all the time.
I find it interesting when it’s suggested anything influenced is in any way shape or form “free”. The words “influenced” and “free” are not compatible.
@@theofficialness578 that's not necessarily true. There are many definitions of freedom, and many definitions of influence. An all-or-nothing statement like that is kinda meaningless if you don't define what you mean.
Let's take a moment to realize that we live in an age where we can live in any part of the world where there is internet and a phone and listen to big intellectuals talking. And that we can learn from them. In 1920 I would probably just be a drunk. Potentially huge difference in well being
I disagree with you on your point of view because I feel that the older generations were happier and more psychologically comfortable, unlike us. Everything is available, but most of humanity is sad. In addition, we are in a time of differences and conflicts. We do not know where the truth lies.
@@minamohamed1310 (Sorry this became an essay almost :D) Well I value your response. If I understand it you say that older generations were happier than us. They had less and were happy we have way more options and are sad. I'm not sure if you indicate causation. If you do.. There's some truth to the idea that you could be less happy if you have more and if it is given to you for example. But that depends on the individual. People rich or poor can be grateful or ungrateful in either case. More or less neurotic. In varying degrees at different times. This shows that having more does not cause a permanent state of unhappiness based on a higher amount of material wealth.. If one has a lot, then one can choose to develop themselves (study etc) and travel the world or help people to find meaning for themselves. Whether one sees that as a beautiful thing (the freedom to choose so freely because one is already rich) depends not on having a lot but on other factors such as genes and upbringing. However also age and experiences and one's ability to deal with all that in a proactive way. On the notion that everything is available hence we should be happy. Well. Many people don't have everything. They might not have love, or freedom, or friendship, or they might have been through a war or some other bundle of trauma. Which then all arises in our consciousness continually. So we don't have everything, and we become sad because of a multitude of different reasons that we also could experience if we didn't have much. (Pretty sure poor people don't like to not know whether they will have food this evening) On the notion that most of humanity is sad. Sadness is a state of mind. Those change. So that statement's truth value is contingent on 5 billion or more people having that quality at the same time and permanently. Which is highly unlikely. Are they at times afraid? Yes. If I lived in the middle ages however I would have way more reason to be affraid. Look up chance to get slaughtered in your home now vs middle ages. Whether by bandits, or another war. Additionally, All you have to do is look at times where you weren't sad. Where others aren't sad. We do often see the world as we feel. And might project how we feel onto the world. I definitely agree that most humans probably have very dark thoughts at times. As in depressed thoughts. Is it Worth it all, knowing I might suffer in the future etc or in the now. But it's not a permanent state. And for me at least it isn't based on material wealth. It would be fear for suffering. And on us living in a time of differences and conflicts compared to then.. I specifically mentioned the 1920's.. that was just after WW1. Many people in America started drinking alcohol to deal with the horrors they saw. To the point it became illegal to drink alcohol. That shows that not only was there huge conflict way worse than we have. And not only was WW2 on its way. They felt so bad that alcoholism became such a problem they had to make it illegal. Many People also became addicted because there just wasn't much to do. If one had a job, they'd have almost no free time. So why not drink. But, We have access to so much more. And yes often suffering in some form leads us to RUclips. But at least now it can lead us to great philosophers and we can learn and grow. Whereas as I said if I was born in the 1920's . I'd likely be a drunk. And a drunk that didn't study is a lot more likely to vote for an evil dictator. So I'm grateful for what we have. Thus it make me always happy? No. Nothing will make humans permanently happy because we aren't wired to be permanently happy. We are wired to survive. Our brain wants to improve. What better way to improve than to create complaining thoughts about the now, fear for the future or remorse and a desire to avoid what happened on the past. Or to not be satisfied what we have whether we are rich or poor. So what do we do about this? We learn about ourselves. We study. There are thousands of years or wisdom waiting to be discovered from many different angles. That is a wonder of our time. That we lowly educated workers can do that. And .. On truth... If you want to know where truth lies. Find some ground under your feet... See if Philosophy, specifically epistomology can't be a hobby interest for you. If history has taught us anything and we want to be better. Just no matter what story you follow we should avoid to create suffering even if we have differences. Ancient Rome, Middle Ages, All of those had people that had differences. We on the other hand have hindsight. Like an old wise man. We have movies that show young kids the horrors of wars. So that most of them only want to experience in games. That used to be different I think. So we should just hold peace and tolerance as the highest ideal above truth even. And those that can't do that are the ones you hear most about. But most people IRL, outside of the internet are more moderate. Keep talking to each other valuing calm and peace even if the other doesn't and be honest to oneself. Everything is in motion. That's good. Otherwise we might actually be sad all the time.
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play thats not at all what they were implying. In the 1920s there was no internet so the only thing for adults to do is get intoxicated. But now we enjoy the internet. They didnt mention happiness at all.
Excellent conversation. The positions seem to boil down to whether we should talk about "influences" on behavior or "co-determinants" of behavior. Is the organism as a whole merely "influenced" by all the various factors of its biology and environment such that some freedom of choice ultimately still exists? Or are all those factors "co-determinants" that add up to a complete determination of choice? I tend to have the latter position, but I can see why reasonable people would have the former.
When we consider Hoffman's interface theory of perception and self as being a construct/concept (that we have a tendency to take as a thing), together with Sapolsky's reasoning, it's easier to consider that there's little we control in life. The fact that we have developed very convincing illusions and tools (religion is one of them-increases the group cohesion) does not mean we have an agency. We have a strong, convincing illusion of it for the sake of our sanity, enabling a sense of continuity. Surely, we grow, change perspectives, develop and become more sophisticated as we process more and more information and get exposed to all sorts of stimuli. Things seem to come down to the natural order, adaptation, breeding. We are animals, just with a more capable brains enabling a vaster horizon of anticipation, meta-cognition, worrying about worrying etc. Good to see two men debating respectfully, despite having perspectives on the topic.
The argument for Free will could be : we want to survive, thus whatever decisions we made that worked towards that goal, we are glad we made. (which feels like a fail). Also chaos and complexity does not lead to free will either. Also, just because the computations going on in my brain are not adequate to respond to the universe, just because I make bad decisions, doesn't mean I'm free either.
I am a filmmaker, and mostly find myself lacking the language and categories to put forward ponderings that occur to me; yet in my experience I feel the notion of free will is a category that is evoked precisely when we are confounded by our behaviour which is 'compulsive' in many senses. It is here that free will is called in to alter that behaviour or drive us towards 'taking our life in our own hands', which is to cunningly shift the focus from the environment and those who control it and direct it towards an individual-where, one can be held accountable, hence punished. To say 'you are responsible' is t say 'you can fuck up and hence be punished' and it is here that the whole law and order is justified. Being from India, I can say how the 'spiritual idea' and 'free will' and 'atman' and 'rebirth' and 'soul' and blah blah are categories precisely created to keep the people in check and in control, to control them and make them feel free agents at the same time-to sell them a drug and make them feel euphoric for a while, while slowly losing our faculties and getting addicted to these categories-like how a drug dealer almost operates. To latch onto the idea of free will is also to latch onto the social position that one thinks one holds 'rationally' and to say that I deserve this, while justify the other positions as somehow the faults of individuals (as subtext).
@@thierryf2789 The causality chain is a combination of his hardware (determined by his DNA), and the ideas and preferences in his head, which are all information that came from external sources throughout his life and experiences. The output of all of that *computation* is the deterministic result that you perceive as his 'choice'. But it's just the output of a massive computation, from other deterministic things. We don't have the tools to trace it just yet, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. (We don't have the tools to explain plenty of other things about ourselves yet, but that doesn't mean they don't exist either.)
I often when hearing sapolsky feel not just in agreement but that he is trying to emphasize that freewill is a confusion of individual unique action. Everybody is going to act differently because they are programmed sort of uniquely but that programming is still determining the decision making
Sapolsky is stubborn and fails to acknowledge that physical systems can evolve agency and causal power by limiting possible futures and that nature has obviously selected for this. And he seems to only want to call a system free willed if it is free of any prior causes, which is not necessary. You can have a physical system that has arbitrary amounts of agency and causal power while still having a physical history, a cultural history, many parts of a decision done subconsciously etc. and it would still have free will. No system has infinite free will to do whatever it wants regardless of its agency programming and inputs, on the other hand physics doesn't just determine the future since it is very easy to show that a system can have causal power and limit the possible futures and choose between options. In this spectrum there is plenty of room for free will, as obviously selected for by nature.
I am on the same thoughts and was happy to hear that also Sapolsky does not completely rule out that there might exist a wiggle room for free will. One can ask how much it shapes us and our future selves. Definitely agree that it sounds like a very good idea to be more considerate of it in our legal and personal judgements, which seems to be a major theme in Sapolsky’s book. We will still have to act on and build systems to prevent wrong doings regardless of the way the decision was made, but this might look very different depending on our philosophy regarding the size that free will wiggle room. I feel like Sapolsky kept saying that the room is negitable, but without very clearly covering the reasoning and implications of that assumption. Clearly tiny changes in a chaotic systems can have very big influences. In terms of responisibility, we also have little way to know exactly what our decions will add up to in the future, so with that it seems unfair to hold people fully responsible for the influence their limited free will had. However, in terms of philosophy of free will, the mystery of conciousness and self, the wiggle room is still super interesting to discuss based on new findings… I was a bit sad that this part was steered away from as Mitchell seemed to have more on this. Not sure as I did not read his book though. It would have been interesting to hear their thoughts on what else is influencing the decisions. For example Roger Penrose put forward arguments for there being a non-algoritmic part of making decisions in his book the emperor’s new mind (1989)
Ta to all 3 for this discussion. I just came across this channel as the algorithm threw the discussion at me for reasons which, whilst it would be untrue to say i have no understanding of , I certainly don't have complete control over.. I possibly, am choosing to subscribe , for reasons that both Kevin and Robert probably understand better than me. At least in Robert's case, he clearly deserves no credit for this fact.. I enjoyed this immensely.
We do anything because we think its good or necessary, but no one in these discussion ever focuses on what is really good and what we just perceive as good. See the book: Free Will Is An Activity by Michael A Perez. There is an opening for Free Will in human consciousness. 🙂
Yeah, its weird where he decides things are 'too complicated' to be ascribed to values. Just like Dennett, arguing out of intimidation by complexity rather than acceptance of it.
@@KCrimson00 Well, I might as well put _you_ straight too. Neither you _nor_ Marxist Sapolsky have even sufficiently _defined_ 'free will' so let me help you with that. Sticking to the computer analogy: in order to exhibit free will, a computer would have to be capable of suspending the program that governs its behaviour and creating _new_ software 'on the fly' in order to overcome the limitations imposed by the 'rules' of its 'operating system'. Right? Also, you and Sap fail to consider future undetermined outcomes such as could occur in your imagination and _their_ effect in the real world. For example, you might decide that you want to learn to play the guitar and in your imagination, you can see yourself in the future, on a stage, with Andy Baldman in a band in front of a massive adoring audience shredding on guitar. So you go to a music shop to buy a guitar and rig and you begin the journey from where you are in the present to where you *_want_* to be in the future. The thing is, _your_ 'present' moment is not the _only_ moment affected by this 'vision', if you will, that exists _only_ in _your_ imagination. Your vision, imperceptible anywhere outside your mind, has a _real_ effect on possible future outcomes available to _actual_ reality. You changed the life of the shop assistant who was delighted to sell you a guitar and rig; your neighbours who were annoyed by your practice sessions decided to move; the girls you met and got pregnant on your way to stardom... The point is; there is absolutely nothing in deterministic physics that could account for the existence of that specific picture that exists only in _your_ mind. Nothing! Let me put it this way: if there is in fact a creator God who created the universe as part of a plan, then even God would be surprised and impressed by your performance; _even_ God would have been unable to predict the effect on the world that _could_ be produced as the result of you simply imagining yourself shredding on the guitar. Determinism fails because _nothing_ is 'determined' until the 'future' is filtered out in the present moment. Mapping out the past does not provide the full picture of how we got to the present precisely because events that haven't happened yet, such as the idea that _someday,_ you _will_ play on that stage, have a real impact on the way the present moment passes into the past. Therefore, the argument 'no free will because determinism' is fallacious since even if there is _no_ 'free will', it's absense cannot be explained by determinism. Which sperm will be the one to fertilize the egg? Well, we will have to wait until _after_ the race to find out because there is _literally_ *NO* other way the universe could possibly 'know'. Right?
I disagree with abandoning incentives and behavior reinforcement. They are part of what makes life exciting and worthwhile, and social structures more safe and less anarchic.
I've been thinking about free will ever since I was a child and I could never make sense of the argument that even Sapolsky makes which states that while we don't deserve hatred, we also don't deserve praise or credit in a world without free will. How is this a necessary conclusion for not being in control? If a streamer in a livestream praises the viewer for being there and enjoying the stream, why am I not allowed to feel good about it in a strictly deterministic sense? Being deserving of praise has nothing to do with agency or control. In don't feel good about my decision for being there, but that someone else cares about me being there. We feel good just for being told we're beautiful with no further context. We don't need to feel as if this is our accomplishment. If there's any goal worth presuing it's our personal and collective well being and if being told we're beautiful is part of this by others who genuinely feel this way, isn't that good enough? None of that changes no matter whether or not free will exists.
I think the vast majority of the arguments are parallel and differ in semantics. The main differences are that Mitchell considers that reflection of the sense of self (within culture and biology) is among all influences from seconds to minutes to centuries before that are taken into consideration when the brain calculated options on what the outcome will be. Both believe then we then pick one. For Sapolsky that picking is ignorable (or more strongly explainable by other factors). Thanks for stopping by. Amazing books both of you. I am one of the biggest fans of Sapolsky. I am kinda compatibilist myself. But I believe our free will is literally only this self reflection feedback. We can use that in the future and awareness to increase the options to pick from. But not really in an instant. Our seconds decision making is kinda all determined. Kanehman and Tversky let clear that our slow brain takes time and that is generally done after you pulled the trigger. 💕
I have a sense, that I think, thinking “free will is literally only this self reflection feedback.” Assumes universal mental capacity, Brain structure and mental capability.
Words matter! We have freedom of choice but we do not have freewill. Mitchell is discussing aspects of "freedom" and Sapolsky is discussing "freewill". This is why they both can agree and also disagree, as each is explaining their topic very well. If you think there is no such thing as freedom come visit my house, I could use free labor Dr. Sapolsky. When/if all choices were/are beneficial regardless of time, experience, etc. I would have the Freedom to express my will without concern and therefore I could be confident of my decision's positive outcome, Professor Mitchell.
If all we are is the "outcome of priors" (and thus, we have no free will), is there any way, through my actions, I can falsify this claim? What action can I perform that will either support or disprove this notion? Until I’m shown a way to falsify the claim that we have no free will, I will continue to presume, and live, as if *we do have free will* -despite how erudite Robert Sapolsky is. Not having the complete answer to the question: “How did I turn out to be the person I am, making a particular decision, at a particular moment in time?” (considering my brain one second prior, my hormones, my environment for decades, my fetal stressors, my genes, and the weather this morning), does not mean that the answer to the question: “What flavor of ice cream will I have today?”, is “God will make the decision” or “Someone in ancient Egypt having passed gas, after eating a bean burrito, will be the determining factor.” I have difficulty believing that the ice cream cone I was handed was not a consequence of any decision that I, myself, freely made-if by 'free', I mean I was able to make a different choice. If the claim is unfalsifiable, as I suspect it is, then I’m going to assume the correct answer is “I don’t know if I have free will or not”-at least until there is evidence presented one way or the other. And since the answer is “I don’t know”, I’m going to continue to live my life as if I, me, moi played a significant part in my enjoyment of a chocolate/swirl ice cream cone with my grandson, Daniel. Oh, and by the way, *Daniel chose strawberry with sprinkles* (I wasn't free, apparently, to pick sprinkles because my mother’s belly was scratched by our cat one evening when she was pregnant with me-I think it was during a waxing gibbous moon, but I don’t remember a lot except for the scratch and that it was very dark).
I think that at the bottom of Kevin Mitchell's view is that he sees no way to make sense of agents making decisions if the future is fixed. But why the puzzlement? What we consider is possible consequences of actions and act to bring about the preferred consequences and or avoid negative ones. We can be predetermined to do that. Yes, there is only one physically possible future that can be arrived at from the past as it was, if determinism is true. But still there are lots of possibilities that *will happen if....* A simple example in nature is the pavement will get wet if it rains. But, of course, rain might not be predetermined to occur. So I think he starts with what Dennett would say is just a mistake. I'm sure he has discovered a lot on his journey but still the idea that indeterminism is needed for any of it, starts with the mistake that a fixed future is a problem for intentional agents trying to get to one possible future rather than another, possible in the sense of *will happen if* and looking back *would have happened if...*
My opinion on free will is that, thus far, all evidence seems to indicate that there are external and physiological events that alter human behavior, but whether they are strict determinants or mere influences that bias our choices remains to be settled. Given this uncertainty, I think we should error on the side of compassion and structure our institutions under the assumption that we do not have agency. Yet at the same time, I think it's perfectly okay to believe in a soft form of agent causal free will until we either succeed or fail in boiling down all the behaviors of a person to purely mechanistic processes.
The fact that as a species we are equipped with "an operating system" which helps us analise our own behavior and decisions doesn't mean, I'm afraid, that we are free to use it. Some of us do, but the majority don't and if Mr Mitchell was right that would mean we generally choose to be selfish , greedy and often self-destructing (including our diet, alcohol consumtion, smoking, etc). I'm not convinced.
Great discussion! I would love to talk to professor Sapolsky about a possibility that makes sense to me which I don’t think contradicts his statement. I work with people as a Coach with what I call the rule of 5/95. This rule assumes there is around 5% of our mental processes (thoughts/emotions/feelings) that we become aware and 95% we don’t. This 5% will create a window of opportunity to influence the other 95% (the automatic part). So consciousness it’s not present in the choice process (that is always autonomously done), but will influence future choices based on what was learned during those 5%. There is no way of controlling or securing that what you have learned consciously will stick around or will change anything, but there is a possibility that done repeatedly, it will. It still goes alongside with the idea that there is no free will, but the system includes a learning window that can be helpful in the medium long term, but without guarantees!
I know! But the fact that some people can’t use their conscious attention in a focused way by themselves, but then hire a Coach, a Mentor or a Consultant and then achieve results they couldn’t by themselves, seems to suggest that the power of influence is real, and it can be harnessed somehow.
Very nice point, which is why I have been inclining towards a more soft determinism/compatibilism lately and there are some superb philosophers who hold this view as far back as St. Augustine himself.@@ruigalhoz4188
So, Sapolsky wrote a book about life without free will but agreed with Mitchell there is a free will in this video. Also, how can he say Denneth didn't understand evolution and science? He was just proven wrong about his belief that free will didn't exist and, correct me if i'm wrong, Denneth's understanding about free will was very close to Mitchell's.
Mitchells argument is basically whatever feels like an act of the 'self' is free will. Even in language we say "I gave him the book", its so engrained in us to view actions with the notion of a self - I, you, she, they. Never mind physics, just stop and watch your experience. Every single event on a momentary basis is without voluntary activity. As I type this Im aware that its just a series of events that have happened where no independent will could have possibly been involved. The will is just the idea that behind all experience there is someone pulling the lever but in fact is just levers collectively pulling us. Theres an optical illusion of a cyclist cycling an indoor bike. Then the person hosting this illusion shows that its the pedals moving the cyclists feets, not the other way round. The cyclist is actually at rest but it looks to us that hes exerting effort on the pedals. This is the illusion we experience at all times. Again, just sit and do nothing. Watch exactly whats going on in your experience and you'll there is nothing voluntary happening. Any time you think 'I' thought/felt/did that, see how there was no I, just a deception of self.
Thank you for organising this debate! Having read Determined, I know that Sapolsky is a hard determinist, I think when he conceded that there's a slight amount of free will, he was saying that just to be cordial. And I mostly agree with Sapolsky's arguments in his book and in general about why he thinks free will doesn't exist, if that matters here. Kevin, while he's obviously super knowledgeable, doesn't really offer arguments of substance on this topic which refute Robert's thinking.
Roberts argument is so comprehensive and logically structured that it is clear that free will can not exist. Therefore, how do we move forward towards personal change of any behaviour we have maintained for a lengthy period of time? What language do we use to describe how change can be made? Maybe we should just accept that there is no free will, but there is influenced will but that we are not aware of what those influences were.
I think there’s a lot of randomness in our decision making (within parameters) that explains the parts we can’t predict. Also for an atheist/materialist there’s nothing else than Genes & environment- so yes everything is driven by these two. I think it’s very useful to be more self aware of all the factors that influence our decision making - and for me thats Sapolsky’s usefulness - he made me more self aware about the drivers of my “choices”
Mitchell seems to suggest that complexity cannot be deterministic. I find it odd thinking that complexity would escape causality. Sure, it cannot probably be predicted by current human technology but that doesn't mean causality is broken.
This is my take on it. To have a concrete example in mind, take a human decisionmaking mechanism like a drift diffusion model, a stochiastic drift of activiation where incoming evidence (desires, expectations, internal states, etc.) dynamically adjusts weights in the drift until a threshold is reached and an action is triggered. *At the level of that mechanism,* there is no predetermined activation, but it must dynamically play out for us to see the result. He's not saying that's un-caused or non-determined, only that the information coming into the mechanism under-determines the result until the point a threshold is actually met, plus--what makes it "free"--the fact that the input factors are weighting dynamics to respond to considerations* at the agent-level (*agent-level considerations being represented in the weighting mechanism by design). I think the free will debate has never been about determinism. If I will my arm to rise and it doesn't deterministically rise based on (in a direct causal chain with) that will, that's not free will either. So free will must be deterministic and within a causal chain. I think it's always been whether the determining mechanism can fairly be called "me" or "acting on behalf of me" or not. And I think Mitchell's argument is that it is. That's the position I'm sympathetic with.
Mitchell conflates unpredictability and complexity with "indeterministic." Deep down, in (non-quantum) physics everything is always deterministic, even though it can't be predicted, and at the macro level we label it as "indeterministic." While quantum physics is a whole other dimension that could change everything, and that's the reason why RS "thanks God" that they agree to ignore it.
@@The-Wide-Angle It doesn't make sense for you to say "deep down" with "non-quantum", because the quantum level would be equivalent to the "deepest" level of reality. If the quantum level is interministic, then reality is fundamentally indeterministic. The quantum domain is not a transcendental plane, separate from our reality, it is just its most fundamental level, on which all other levels depend to exist.
@@Vinuken07 Well, it is not clear if at the macro level the indeterminism of qm is really relevant. But even if it is, and I'm one who believes it is, try to explain this to Sapolsky and Mitchell. Sapolsky congratulates Mitchell that they are both of the same opinion that qm should be ignored.
Eu de mult am zis (pt mine) ca nu exista liber arbitru. Cel mai simplu spus: Avem un CPU (creier) care ia decizii conform celor stiute. Pai, CPU-ul nu e construit de noi, ci e primit (nu putem fi mai inteligenti oricat ne-am chinui), iar ce stim ..e la noroc.. ce-am avut norocul sa aflam (ca de vrut, normal ca vrem sa ne fie cel mai bine, sa stim ce ne trebuie, etc). Altfel spus: Eu n-am libertatea de-a alege decat cea mai buna optiune, iar ce cred eu ca-i cea mai buna optiune e pe baza cunostintelor (de care am avut norocul sa dau), si analizez cu-n creier vai de mama lui (primit genetic). E ca si cum ai avea de ales intre 1: a muri de foame maine, si 2: a nu muri de foame ci a duce un trai bun. Normal ca alegi optiunea 2, care poate ca inseamna sa jefuiesti pe cineva, caci atata te-a dus capul, si ca asa ai vazut in cartierul tau ca se face. Cum poti sa-l tragi la raspundere pe unul care atat a putut gandi? A, ok, il carantinezi daca-i periculos si vezi ca atata e in stare sa faca, dar n-ai de ce sa-i doresti raul (ca si cum a avut liber arbitru). Culmea, deci, ca toti religiosii care chipurile vor sa fie a-tot-iubitor ca Iisus, insa nu pot, fac greseala ca tin cu dintii la liberul arbitru. Ia sa gandeasca fara liberul arbitru si-o sa vada cum devin iubitori.. asa cum iubesti si cainele tau, si-l ierti chiar daca face vreo boacana, caci stii ca atat il duce capul.. Chiar daca-l pedepsesti ca masura de corectie.
The Law of Determinism makes sense when you reflect on why you choose a wife, a career or a shirt. Why do you marry your wife? Is she attractive? You can use logical reasoning like she is kind and beautiful. But why must she be the one instead of another woman? You fell in love, didn't you? And you could not control your state of mind and the emotion of romance. You didn't choose her, you did it out of love. It is an unconscious 'decision' to say the least.
Wonderful debate. And though I am Team Sapolsky all the way, I find Mitchell's evolutionary approach inspiring. How about this: Say we are completely predetermined the way Sapolsky describes, but that this notion of independent agency and free will is hard-wired into us by evolution/ culture as a determining factor that shapes our behavior. Meaning we need the illusion of free will to be able to operate as successful individual/society, including all the mechanisms of responsibility, guilt, sense of fairness and justice that seem to be more or less innate as well. If I understand Sapolsky correctly, vertebrae seem to have a fairly clear idea of what fairness and justice and other morality-driven behaviors are within their species, whereas we humans manage to get into all sorts of religious or ideological twists about it - or rather, the variety of it smacks of cultural-evolutionary adaption to different environments. Can we consider moral systems (religion, humanism and all that song and dance, as Sapolsky would probably say) as survival mechanisms and thus judge them from a non-moral standpoint (Criteria of what is the "best" system open to discussion)? This would mean that you can and should highlight the agency and free will of the individual to decide for the best "moral" option - building up pressure in a positive way, giving an individual a cause to decide for that option - while at the same time considering the action finally taken as determined, ending up in the "treatment/quarantine"-model for antisocial behavior, as Sapolsky suggests. As an analogy, you might admire a great athlete, celebrate her achievements and try to emulate her ways of training and her mind-set, but you wouldn't "blame" yourself if you were unable to win a gold medal, nor would you punish those with a handicap (you might get them a wheelchair if needed). Free will not as a "causeless cause", but as a function of our biological nature - and this is where Mitchell's idea of the evolution of agency and autonomy fits in quite neatly as a part of our make-up as a social species. Does all of this make any sense?
I like the debate. My opinion is that the desired outcome distorts the concept, but the outcome itself is not involved in definition of free will, the outcome is a seperated. The opportunity to choose one thing or another, even if the outcome is always the same, that opportunity itself is proof for free will. The desire that makes us to choose one thing doesn't mean we couldn't choose the other thing if the circumstances were different. Even if the circumstances were the same we still could have chosen the other thing, but the fact that we didn't, doesn't mean that possibility dissapeared. Circumstances and desire are seperated from free will but they affect one another, it doesn't mean free will is not there it just means something has effect on us and we direct our free will towards what fits us most.
I have a sense that I think, you’re speaking in could’ve, when the time that humans experience is linear. There is no such thing as could’ve after what has occurred.
I like Sapolsky’s points, but I don’t think all of the past influences in our lives completely eliminate the possibility of being able to make a choice independent of some of these influences.
I have a sense, that I think, even “if” a decision is made independent of “influence” The brains capacity to do so is determined by its past and development.
Dr. Sapolsky seems to be giving multiple, simple examples, yet Dr. Mitchell says abstract sentences and doesn't delve deep enough to assess whether free will truly makes sense. He keeps saying something to the tune of "it just doesn't make sense intuitively" and "well once you use the word 'choice' it's checkmate". His analysis is shallow and there is something holding him back from delving deeper.
Because the brain contains complex structures with feedback loops involving chemical reactions where precise outcomes cannot be predetermined, Mitchell argues that right there in the midst of indeterminism is where the self is making choices through a free will that uses the sort of reason and reflection that are not available to other living things. How does Mitchell get from indeterminism to free will? Indeterminism in chemical reactions would instead add randomness to outcomes. How would randomness be a medium for reason? He claims to not be invoking a ghost in the shell by saying that decision-making is not a top-down mechanism but a holistic process, but he sounds very much to be invoking a ghost in the shell.
Mitchell starts from a fundamental scientific and philosophical flaw. Namely, he assumes that there is indeterminacy in the world (7:21) having relied on the Shrodinger equation. Resorting to quantum physics as a possible mechanism for free will, is a speculative cop out. At best, the so call randomness of quantum events is statistically determinant. Mitchell subsequently says such things as I don’t see how that could work. Mitchell both acknowledges and ignores the complexity of the brain and our interaction with the environment. Mitchell relies on the language we use, as if that means free will could not be an illusion. Well, we do made choices, but we do not have the ability to have make a choice other than the choice that we make in the circumstances. The organisation of neurons can generate rationale. Not brought up is that evolution, including within the brain, involves heaps and heaps of failures for each success. Free will is not required. Mitchell has no objective evidence for his position. Sapolsky has increasingly heaps and heaps of evidence for his position. Sapolsky is right to put the onus on Mitchell to make his case.
As with Sapolsky and Mitchell, I think we'd both agree and disagree. I think you are right about the fundamental flaw in Mitchell's opener in his book about indeterminacy in the world that he then compounds in the second part of the sentence by saying the 'future is not written' (ie predetermined). The determinist (Sapolsky's) position is not a support for predeterminism but rather an emphasis on unknowability. In such a complex system, events can be determined by what went before but remain unknowable in advance. But then Saplolsky's position if equally flawed... 'show me the neuron', he says. As a scientist he knows full well that no single neuron is responsible for anything, so he sets out his stall asking for something he knows is both impossible and makes no sense. It's a rather feeble and unsustainable, albeit sound bite grabbing, premise to an otherwise entertaining book. And that's what his book is. Informative and entertaining. But the science falls down at the point of absolutism. Mitchell says influence... Sapolsky prefers determine and in a sense they are both right... but neither argument is proven... by a long way. But where I disagree with you, and ultimately Sapolsky, is only in the suggestion that it is up to the other side to make their case. In the end that's a cop out. The fact is, they are both persuasive, I tend to think RS makes his case better and yet I still agree with the position of KM. And I'm free to choose.
@@JohnClark-bh6qe This is not an objectively balanced debate just because neither side cannot theoretically absolutely prove their position. 'future is not written' is only allowing for the possibility of random events. Randoms events do not allow for free will because they are … well … random. 'show me the neuron' means show a neuron the action of which is inexplicable without the notion of free will. In other words, show a neutron, the action of which, does not support determinism. There are heaps of objective evidence supporting determinism, none for free will. The onus is on free will believers to make their case. Mitchell is a scientist behaving unscientifically on this issue. He is trying to make the conclusion fit the evidence based on what he does not know. He is even speculating without hypothesizing. The difficulty of persuading people that they do not have the free will that they think they have, is that it makes them feel uncomfortable realizing they do not have the control they think they have. It is difficult changing that which appears to be a fundamental basis on which a model of the world is based, especially when feelings are deeply affected. [The space for free will is becoming vanishingly so, so, so small that it would not be worth having even if it did exist. The onus is on free will believers to make their case.] There is no free will.
@@sjoerd1239 I wan't aware that neurons had a notion of free will. And therein lies the problematic at the heart of this reductionist argument. Only within the system of a higher order dynamic can the 'notion' of free will' exist. And I agree that free will is a notion, an idea, a concept. So who creates that concept, that notion, that idea? Are we free to do so, to reject or is it determined. As a hard line determinist you then have to conclude that the notion of free will is determined, therefore it exists. If you wish to conclude that the 'illusion of free will' is determined then we can presume in evolutionary terms that it was determined for a reason. So it is an important notion. All you can ultimately do is tie yourself in knots in an irresolvable debate. There is no onus on me to persuade you or vice versa. I believe that RS is saying that we have massively less of this thing we call free will than we think or articulate and I agree with him. I believe KM is saying that the neutrons driving and influencing metacognition create a 'reflective space' that permits choice and I agree with him and you can see those neural patterns in action - not a single neutron!! And I trust we both accept that science cannot prove anything. It can only replicate and disprove.
Comment after Mitchell's opening statement. Mitchell seems to hang his position on the argument that we think about what we want and how to achieve it before acting. Agreed. But, as Hossenfelder says (see her video on free will), the thinking itself is deterministed (to the extent it is not disrupted by quantum randomness). While we are doing the thinking, we do not know where we will end up. We are sometimes even surprised by what we eventually decide to do. So it feels free to us that we are free. But Mitchell's argument does not establish that. All it establishes is that even though our thinking about what we want and what we will do is determined, as we are doing that thinking we don't know where the determined road will lead us until we get there. Hence it feels free. Comment after Sapolsky's opening statement. I doubt that Mitchell would disagree with much that Sapolsky says. Sapolsky fails to discuss the process whereby we think about what we want and what we will do. He speaks as if all decisions are more or less instantaneous. But they're obviously not. And he ignores that. Putting these two comments together, Mitchell says we often think before we act and are thus free. Sapolsky does not engage with that argument. So Mitchell's position would prevail. But as indicated above, thinking itself is a deterministic process. It only feels free because we don't know where it will lead us. My conclusion is that Sapolsky is right even though he doesn't make the complete case. After first round of questioning. They agree that people make choices. Mitchell says that doing so reflects a degree of freedom. Sapolsky says it doesn't. After second round of questioning. They converge on a position that both can live with and sort of give up on reaching a definitive position on "free will." I think they would agree that their area of disagreement has narrowed to the point that it isn't worth debating. Sapolsky was asked how we can make evolutionary sense of our illusory agency. His answer: if we didn't trick ourselves into believeing in our own agency, we wouldn't be able to get up in the morning. Our belief in our free will is evolution's way of enabling us to survive. Mitchell was asked how his position differs from Dennett's and Hofstadter's. He said that Dennett was simply wrong. (Sapolsky commented that Dennett doesn't really understand evolution.) Mitchell also said that he likes the way Hofstadter's "recursive" perspective on thinking is a good way to eliminate the need for something external to the brain that allows us to think.
Compatibilists seem to agree on determinism but then add a second definition of free will on our experiential level but then at some point in their arguments mistake that experiential level of illusionary free will for free will at a deeper metaphysical level altough they already agreed that it is deterministic.
Not at all. Mitchell argues very clearly here for why physics doesn't fully determine the future, that it is possible for physical systems to evolve agency and casual power. It is even easy to make very simple thought (or real) experiments demonstrating this.
@@pinkfloydhomer agency or desire or choice doesn't equal free will unless you define free will as the ability to want to do x and then do x without being forced. (Such as by a gunman) But when we practice metacognition on this cognitive process we ask ourselves. Although I chose to do x. Even if thoughts of not doing x came up. My choosing to do x had a stronger pull for me then not choosing to do x. But did I choose which pull was stronger for me? Or that did just come up like any other thought. It did come up like any other thought. It's more excitatory signals for x then for other options or more inhibitory signals for other options than x. Any thought and any feeling just arises to us as it does out of the void that our neurons experientially create. They just arise to the part of us that is aware. The awareness can alter choice, but it is constrained by whatever arises as a result. As in a less gifted person isn't going to ha e Einstein level thoughts in general a lot of the time. Because they are constrained by the prior condition that is themselves as in their brain.
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play that does not make it not free will. We're automatons that can't help but always run our free will algorithm with its prior causes, subconscious processes etc. That means that we are not free to change much if the internals of that process, but the entire point of the process and the goal from evolution is making us consciously aware of some of the available options for us to choose. And then with the conscious mind that evolution created we make a real choice. If some of those choices are roughly equally good, we might have chosen otherwise in the exact same state. It's not rocket science. Computers do it all the time.
@@pinkfloydhomer you forget that the choice is part of the process that is caused. You look at it from a first person perspective. Look at it from a third person perspective. Additionally. If I program a computer to choose between option 1-10. And add prior conditions that will move it more likely to one choice. Because guess what that's what happens...And maybe add some randomness in it. For things we assume to be random but might just lack the data on. (Laplace's demon) If we have the seed of the random generator, then we know what it will pick, and how it will or won't affect the prior conditions that were going to lead the option with most weight because of the prior conditions. Hence even the randomness (which isn't even free will ofcourse), doesn't take away causation. To be truly able to choose different than whatever you choose after choosing. You'd have to be entirely free from your own causal chain. Which is impossible. you wouldn't be you.. you'd be whatever or whoever else you'd be, with its own causal chain leading to outcomes. Choice doesn't mean free will. Animals choose, for example situation x makes most animals choose y. We have the ability to see a thought arise, so unlike other animals when situation x comes, we see thought leading to behavior y, but then our complex mind adds options initially as concepts , now with the added complexity which evolution gave us indeed, we can't just see option y, we can see that there's also y, z, k, p, s, t ,l and so on on. We can even imagine, not y, not s, not k and so on. And now this does give us more options than most animals indeed. But then like any other animal causation will follow. Prior conditions, such as cognitive ability, mood, personality, culture, subculture, polarization shift if you're in a group, parenting, natural and environmentally adjusted inclination towards reason or impulse, how much you or people around you like thinking, prior choices and their effects in the same situation (learning), if your even able to learn and how much you're able, and so on This complex network of domino's then falls nicely into place using excitatory and inhibitory signals in the brain. As options arise are touched with awareness (depending on how aware we are at the moment), and then new thoughts arise in response to the initial thoughts and a cycle forms. Again until the final choice appears, having a stronger pull then any other of the options based again on all these prior conditions. Now we often say that 'we are influenced' by these prior conditions. That's already wrong. The prior conditions don't just influence you as in arise to you as if you can then choose uninfluenced by them. Additionally They are thoughts, they just arise as they do. I don't choose them. They arise because of those conditions. The response you have to them are themselves thoughts. And they also arise as they do because of those prior conditions including capacity etc. People forget that second part There might be no gunman in your room with a gun to your head But there's many gunmen with a gun to your head in the form of your prior conditions. You are constrained by your causal chain. As you said it's not rocket science
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play none of your arguments are convincing, some don't even make sense. What I wrote is true and you have written nothing to refute it. I wonder if any arguments would ever convince you. Or the outcome of any experiment. Come up with an experiment that will determine if we have free will. If you can't, your positive doesn't even make sense.
The world isn't strictly black or white, but rather various shades of grey. Both of these gentlemen make very valid points and both conclusions can be true. Barring any obvious handicap, I believe we are capable of the latitude of freedom to the degree in which we choose.
What’s missing in debates about free will is the definition of free will. I would follow Friedrich Hermanni who said that Free will is self-determinism. It’s the absence of inner and outer compulsion or mind manipulation. Sapolsky is right in saying that you can explain the action of a person based on their history. But that’s the definition of free will. It’s to make a decision based on the own character and not just a decision out of the blue. To me it seems to be important to distinguish free will from randomness. Self-determination is the best expression of free will and would therefore show that there is no conflict between free will and determinism.
When Mitchell says that the organism can take all the factors that Sapolsky discusses as determinative into consideration in making a free-will decision, he assumes that the organism exists as something apart from all these factors when in fact it is the result of all of them. Recursivity is still a deterministic process.
i watched Prof Sapolsky’s Stanford lectures when i was 16 and i took notes of them ,i remember nodding my head to the video when he asked the question “ do you believe that freewill exist” 😂 rewatching his lectures series at 20 hits different
I've listened to both outside of this conversation, and I don't have any answer or frankly even a refined position. But one question asked of Sapolsky from Kevin that I emulate is: why is it assumed/taken as fact that just because someone had a lifetime of influences and factors before them, must we somehow conclude that one cannot make a decision at the "end" of that chain of influences. For example, say I concede that there are a multitude of factors beyond my control that lead to my current position right now (it's hard to deny otherwise), but how does that necessitate that I cannot choose a blue m&m or green m&m at the end of that long chain? That chain might mean that I'm predisposed to eat the blue over the green, but that doesn't require that I eat the blue, regardless of whether or not my mother grew up eating raisin bran instead of cheerios. There are certain probabilities that I eat either, but that's simply predictive, not constraining. I'm asking this openly and am interested in responses that might help me better understand Sapolsky's and those in his sides perspective on that
You are aware of the decision, and you are executing the decision, but aren't in control of it, you did not pick the desire/preference for blue M&Ms that arose in you (due to many causal factors leading up to that moment). You are not free to act as you desire; you have no choice but to act as you desire! Moment to moment, we are consciously acting out uncontrollable decisions. Subjectively it feels like we're in the driver's seat because evolutionarily it's advantageous to feel in control, but upon closer inspection there's nothing to prove free will is really there, except that subjective feeling, in the same way someone can have a subjective religious experience which feels true to them, but that in no way proves the existence of God.
The bank analogy was interesting, what makes a person rob a bank in contrast to a person who wants to make a deposit instead. I would say financial circumstances may be a cause but yet the circumstances don't make you rob the bank, the circumstances aren't the doer of that activity even through the circumstances influence the behavior. Greed may be a factor, but that character trait in itself Isn't the doer of activity. So, while circumstances and character traits may influence activity an agent who is free to use his will to act I think is the doer of activity.
Seems the obviousness of the lack of reality of a separate person is being missed. It often is. Most are deep in the illusion that there is a person or a “me”. Once seen through, there is no way to imagine that there is a someone to possess something believed to constitute a free will. There is no decider. No free willer.
At around 3:40 into the video, Mitchell betrays his objectivity by stating "...or even worse, we're just collections of particles obeying the laws of physics." He doesn't like the possibility of not having free will so he builds his entire argument to support the conclusion he *_wants_* to believe rather than a conclusion supported solely by evidence. But I don't blame him for taking that path; he really had no choice in the matter.
The more defenses of free will I have heard, the more shallow the position seems. "It's just too complex" to not be a free will process... "It's intuitive that we have free will"... Honestly it reminds me of some of those interesting believer vs atheist debates. In a good way, not trying to trash talk!
A Marxist _would_ say that. If all of our choices are the product of the past then explain how Einstein could come up with Relativity? You are caught in your own trap. Why Einstein? And why 1905? If our choices are causally linked to the conditions and actions of all our ancestors right back to Abraham then why would Einstein even _dream_ that Newton has missed something from his description of 'gravity'? Comrade Sapolsky's monotonous mantras are designed to dull your senses; endless causal chains about how drunk your mother was and how absent your grandfather was, all the way back to whether or not Adam needed to use the bathroom before he jumped on Eve to conclude that we have no agency and if God wants us breaking rocks in the Gulags then we should just get used to it. All Sapolsky manages to do here is to reveal his lack of humanity. Although, for any theists out there, Sapolsky exonerates Adam, Eve and the Serpent in the Garden of Eden on the basis that their actions were _actually_ determined by the God who created them but then blames _them_ for bringing sin into the world because He is too much of a power-hungry coward to admit that it is _His_ fault and His fault alone. So cheers Bob! You can let Israel know that they can get TF out of the Middle-East now. :)
@@matthewleahy6565 I agree, Roberts position is based on “I have observed”. even though he intuitively didn’t Believe in free will. He gathered the evidence to prove what he realized intuitively. “Free will” belief is still only based on “I feel and think” “it just feels like it”
Free will is obviously and trivially real and Mitchell argues clearly for it here. Sapolsky seems stubborn and only willing to call something free will if it is independent of all prior history and causes, which is just silly.
Mitchell says that not only what happens to us environmentally but also our thought has causal effect on our future actions and that the future as such is not determined... However, even if all that is true there still is no free will. You do not author thoughts in consciousness. You don't controll anything on a consciousness level. You cannot anticipate a thought. It is given to you by your sub consciousness, based on countless parameters. So where is the freedom exactly? The more i listen to him the more i think he talks about somehting else than free will. But rather about that the environment is not our ultimate puppetmaster, but that is obviously true.
I have zebras I just found determined on line. I love Robert his wonderful class behavioral biology I’ve watched several times His lectures what a wonderful man I’ve picked up his stuff to repeat My favorite is religion is” “Metamagical Schizophrenia “ You say that to a bible thumper it knocks them back If ever there was a saint it’s him his work on stress saved me after my heart attack I can’t say enough about what a spiritual person he is by giving his life to helping others thru knowledge that flows out of him so effortlessly
amazing to acknowledge the vast web of prior causes but that a self has control over all of this in any way - just a five minute observation of thoughts that emerge and vanish without having control. perhaps some people are born with such a powerful sense of self no argument can undermine this sense.
I'm often surprised when listening to this (sort of) debate how little language itself is either mentioned or drawn upon. In the most basic sense, language is needed to pose the question, to form the question and to understand the question. But language is also needed to define the terms. What do we mean by 'free-will' - or as Kevin said by 'have' or 'we'. And how absolute are terms such as 'influence' and 'determine' - if I'm 'entirely influenced' by something(s) then that is more absolute than if something is 'almost entirely determined'. It's just a question of semantics and definition. But there's another more important level here - and it's not just about metalanguage or metacognition. There is a sense that it is language that permits choice, language defines choice, language allows for reflection and it makes sense of and determines cognition. There is a two way dynamic at play between language and choice. We use language to form and weigh up our options, to reflect upon intent, and language is part of (or perhaps all of) the process in which both choice is set-up and then reflected upon. It's hard to separate the views of either Robert or Kevin other than through the choice of words they actually adopt to explain their belief system. Robert is keen to point out in his book that determined does not mean knowable and nor is it the same as predetermined. And Kevin sees determined and predetermined as closer cousins. But this is just semantics. I never got the argument, as a young man, between behaviourism and mentalism in linguistics - they both seemed intuitively true - and I think the interplay is now more evident. Similarly, I don't really see the argument here. It's just about language all over again.
People generally, and in this debate, know what is meant by free will and it is the ability to do other than we do, as if we could choose differently than we do. The problem with language in the debate is that the idea of free will is so ingrained in our behaviour that the language of choice is ambiguous depending on whether free will is incorporated into the meaning. When is choice not a choice? When it is determined. That is related to why the approach is from the perspective of determinism. If determinism is true, then there is no free will.
@@sjoerd1239 For me, there is no problem with 'language in the debate'. There is only a problem if language is not in the debate. And without language there is no debate. Language is both carrier and message. The same is true for me of free will. I feel I am probably closer to RS's viewpoint than KM. I certainly feel I empathise with his general position and politics more closely and I don't think in this debate that he overstates his case (he does in the book, but that's for both comic effect and a good sales pitch - his book carries a lot less punch if he only writes what he truly believes - there is (much) less free will than we commonly assume . I just think he's wrong if he resorts to absolutism. And I think you are too. I often think that of any rigid polemic - in this case free will or determinism. I have no problem with free will and determinism. For me, choices can be both determined and made - I don't see these as mutually exclusive. I can see that for binary (scientific?) thinkers this may be a problem but I'm not here to try to persuade. My choices are determined by what has gone before but part of what has gone before is my decision making and my choices etc. I accept that in my case that takes us back to the moment of conception but the idea that I am no different now to how I was then... come on. language and thought are part of the dynamic system that comprise cognition and within that we have choice. When we exercise choice we affect and that effect determines (the next choice). And it also makes us who we are. It's a dynamic system. You can have free will in a deterministic universe.
Yeah, he just asserts that ("even classical") systems are not deterministic. I don't know how that helps his case, as the opposite of determinism is not "free will" but randomness...
Kevin Michael why argue and defend. You have your own opinions. Robert Sapolsky is open and mindful with many variables!!! He is deep and very interesting.
37:49 "…but what I would says is that those are influences that may bias our decisions and our choices, but that _we do make choices._ It almost just doesn't make any sense to me to have a conversation using those words if everything we do at every moment is fully determined." I agree, we're not doing a good job of describing the process. Rather than saying we're _making a decision,_ we should say that we're _reaching a conclusion._ Consider weighing your options regarding your best course of action. Hopefully, Professor Mitchell would concede that the options which occur to us are a function of nature and nurture, over which we have no meaningful control. You don't get to decide whether or not using the elephant occurs to you. As a determinist, I would say that because the thought has now occurred to you, you similarly have no control over whether using the elephant appears to be your _best_ option, because the weighting is similarly determined by your history. Those biases _are the weights._ As Mitchell says, your "character" has _already_ been shaped by your past. Searching for the most reasonable course of action can often be a long and laborious process, but you don't "choose" the outcome any more than you do when searching for your keys. You're not deciding where they are; you're solving the problem of where they are. You're not deciding which is best; you're solving the problem of which is best.
Heisenberg (along with Godel, probability fields, etc., etc. -- all courtesy of QM) make arguments for physical determinism (there are non-physical variants), at best, remotely likely. WTF?
As soon as Kevin Mitchell states: “it is computationally irreducible”….yes that’s it!! There is not a self to reduce any of the almost infinite array of factors too!! It’s fascinating how such intelligent people (Kevin Mitchell) literally make an argument that stands against their very position and can’t seem to acknowledge they are just wrong!! The man is literally helping make Robert’s Sapolsky’s point, but states, “the system is still able to make a choice”….the act of making any type of choice, IS A DETERMINISTIC or INDETERMINATE process, that has no “atomized”, “agent”, or “SELF” controlling or influencing theses choices!! Let it go!! LET IT GO!!!! Our first hand subjective experience is not something we own-quite contrary-the infinite irreducibility and never ending factors of interconnection is at work.
@@francescaerreia8859 If you or anyone can provide evidence for anything not energy-matter-information (physical) or that is independent of it, an Nobel Prize will likely be awarded. Perceptions, memories, hallucinations, emotions, ideas...are embodied, electrochemical, and caloric. A non-physical realm is pure speculation without evidence to the contrary.
@@francescaerreia8859 well, your explaining yourself away, just like Kevin Mitchell, and claim that “you” some how own’s this “conscious experience” as though through no other explanation than magic. Once again, it’s not just one physical/deterministic factor that brings your unique conscious existence into being, it is a never ending (quite possibly) infinite array of factors that brings “you” and “I” into the existence. None of which you or I own or creating in any sense that makes free will or a self “real”!
@@milesgrooms7343 i know it by direct experience which is the foundation upon which anyone knows anything. If that is magical explanation then so is every explanation for every phenomenon.
@@milesgrooms7343 think about it like competing theories in physics that cannot be resolved with current understanding like relativity and qm; we don’t say one is right and one is wrong, we say we don’t know how to resolve them yet and there’s probably a deeper theory that’s better than both. Similarly here with our understanding of the physical world v our conscious experience. It doesn’t make any sense to ignore the evidence of either in favor of one nor to, on a reductionistic argument, claim that free will is impossible when consciousness itself is irreducible; that fails to grasp the nature of the phenomena in question in the first place.
The very fact we have cultures, legal systems, religions etc. Is evidence we dont have a completely free will, as a species we develop social systems to shape our behavior and impulses
It would appear the argument falls at what point in time you make the assessment, as Schopenhauer said: "“You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.” Essentially prior to the action, it is always probabilistic, this is evidenced by bayesian/computational accounts of brain processing as well as quantum mechanics. Yet you can and only ever will make one decision. Post action, the action will and should rightly always be called determined, given that it happened and was constrained by a myriad of factors which lie beyond or beneath conscious/executive processing :)
I feel the the concession by Prof Sapolsky that I my have the free will to decide to start brushing my teeth from the top or the bottom is the wedge in the crack his argument. If such an act is undetermined, at what point will my actions switch to being determined? Is it when I choose to stop brushing? Is it when I roll my tongue over my teeth maybe once or twice or three times? As soon as I break the chain of determinism, do future actions become less undetermined? What if I choose to stop brushing my teeth altogether, against my better judgement, against my natural tendencies, as an act of free will? Where in this causal chain does determinism arise?
Question for Professor MItchell - imagine two 100% identical copies of Professor Mitchell (identical to the subatomic level, every particle, atom, energy state, etc) and imagine these two copies were placed in identical environments. Would they make the same or different decisions? A proponent of free will would argue they would make different decisions but that begs the question - what causes that difference? If there are no physical differences then I (and professor Sapolsky) would argue they would make the same decisions since decisions are made with hardware (not magic). Even a long drawn out self reflective contemplative decision that takes days of thought is made with hardware and if the hardware is the same, the final decision will be the same.
Just occurred to me - perhaps Professor Mitchell would argue that both identical copies, making identical decisions, have free will! If so, then his definition of free will is basically equal to "able to make decisions" which is something bacteria and computers can do and is hardly a contentious issue. Everyone agrees that everyone can make decisions.
@@DrdssikesFrom what I understand, if there is truly randomness is the universe, Robert has explained. Even if the universe was restarted with all the exact same conditions, if there is actual randomness (i.e not predictable even if all variables are known. This is the best way I can explain) it would be a different universe because of that. So likely the copy and the original would make different although “likely” similar choices because of “true” randomness. Nonetheless randomness is random, no where closer to “free will”.
My old GPS sometimes picks one route and other times picks another, it has no live data input and I doubt it has a random generator in its algorithm. Mystery to me!? Perhaps it has a free will!
We are idea-driven creatures. Free will is an idea, determinism another. Each of these ideas, deeply considered, may _change_ our conscience. It _is_ changed by the input, we are changed.
They may want to first start at what they think 'free will' is. They are both saying the same things but one is saying we don't have free will the other does. The difference may be that they don't agree that 'free will' means the same thing to one another. Also, I believe both are right - those things should be looked at on a case-by-case basis not general one size fits all.
I feel like some people who believe "free will" is some ability which we have, have an incredibly naive view of deterministic systems. They seem to view a process as some kind of preprogrammed thing which has some specific execution paths which don't change. I think it is important to consider that with every step of the process, something can alter/update/set the execution paths which will occur in the future and it can 100% happen in a deterministic way. Not sure if that makes "sense" to them but it seems to entirely align with the types of things we observe and experience. To be honest, it seems like most of what is said here is just incredulity. Simply "I can't see how that could be possible with a deterministic process, so I reject it conforming to every other observation we have of the way things operate in a deterministic way".
To get some appreciation for the other view.... consider a complex "machine" which is interactive (produces outputs according to inputs). The machine can't violate the laws of electricity, but it's organizational structure controls how that electricity is going to flow through it by virtue of the layout of it's motherboard, CPU, transistors, etc. In this way the organization of the machine determines it's output. If the machine is complicated enough, with an incredibly rich and varied set of outputs finely tuned to even the most nuanced changes in the environment... could you say it "controls" it's output? Would we want to dignify this incredible flexibility by saying the machine was "free"? I know this isn't the "God" stuff everybody is looking for when thinking about free will (I am an unmoved mover!!), but it ain't nothing. It doesn't violate physical laws, it just alters the level at which you situate the "self".
@@iAmEhead I agree to some extent. I am somewhat indifferent to compatibilist notions of "free will". I agree with control so far as it is how we seem to attribute a boundary of responsibility. I might say the process was how the output was controlled. I even think it is somewhat reasonable to attempt to modify the process to change future outputs (I think this is an abstract way to conceptualize things like persuasion and constraint). I may need to review the vid again. I felt like I had the impression that there was a rejection of "choices" being possible if things were deterministic. This doesn't seem to align with the notion u mention and which I have no issue with. It just doesn't seem to me to be the core issue. I actually think the discussion about responsibility is built on top of this missing understanding of experience being compatible with a deterministic process.
@@iAmEhead So upon reviewing again a bit. It is immediately apparent when Kevin Mitchell states in his opening that he specifically refers to "decision making". He says the following: "...really it comes down to whether we are able to make decisions and choose our own actions. And certainly, it seems like we can, at least most of the time, we go around choosing things and making decisions ... and it feels like we are in charge of our own decisions. But maybe we're deluded. Maybe it's all just mechanisms. Maybe it's all just robots acting out our programming. Or maybe it's worse and we are just collections of atoms and particles that obey the laws of physics." This is precisely the kind of thing I referring to as "an incredibly naive view of deterministic systems". If we consider the implications of actually being a part of the "process" through time, it seems entirely compatible with our experience. The process that seems to be referred to as "decision making" is something like going though a process of relating internal and external information until we reach some threshold for action. This process even may (does?) continue even past that threshold and we may pass this threshold and start to take action and then upon further processing, drop below the threshold and decide to change the type of action we are taking. Something like, "starting to grab a rock to throw at someone and then in a later moment stopping the action." There is absolutely nothing about this experience that is incompatible with a deterministic process consisting of "atoms and particles obeying the laws of physics". This is the issue I feel I am trying to contend with. To be honest, I feel like there is something completely lacking when I repeatedly don't see this issue even brought up as an issue. It seems to be "assumed as a reasonable concern that our experience isn't compatible" and then instead beginning conversations about some other thing like responsibility and instead saying "well it doesn't matter". I actually feel like Robert is at a serious disadvantage by allowing Kevin to make this type of claim and instead focusing a lot on "here are some things which are predictive of behavior". Kevin seems to gyrate between "well we don't want to invoke magic" and then completely disregarding this and implying there is some causal mechanism outside of the "deterministic chain of causation". Things like "...genuinely causal power at these higher levels of the system and all the causality doesn't just come from these low level atoms bouncing around." This seems to indicate a belief that the collection of things is "causal" in a way which could not possibly be described by the lower level behavior. This sounds to me like "invoking magic". Simply because we might not expect the lower level behavior to be able to be organized in a way which would result in these higher order behaviors, does not mean there is something special at the higher level that isn't accomplished by the lower level behaviors. I think this is observable in even simple systems like cellular automata. Once we jump up to "from simple cellular automata to a current description of physics", I just don't see why this is even remotely a reasonable position (that there must be some "special causal power" granted by this higher order organization of things). It seems like just flat out incredulity to me.
@@goblinlordx6108 I've always felt like questions of moral responsibility should be teased out of the question of whether we have free will. Or rather, it should just be handled seperately. Clearly nobody is "ultimately" morally responsible in the way we all learned about in Sunday school. There is definitely some hand waving going on by Kevin, but some of what he says I like. He helped me to realize the importance of asking "who" the self is that is "deciding". In our case, we are "wet" computers that are "deciding" based on our evolutionary pasts and personal histories of development and learning. If free will requires a little homunculi made of fairy dust that is an unmoved mover then of course none of us have it!
@@iAmEheadThanks for the response as well as your thoughts. I agree that I think a discussion concerning moral responsibility is actually valuable. My concern primarily is that the discussion concerning it currently seems to be built on top of what I think are mistaken beliefs. It could be my own biases but I have a belief that these mistaken beliefs are having a significant influence on the assessments being made by Kevin here. I think it is also common from people who might say "we have free will". If anything I would expect it empirically visible if we tested for it. Anyways... I think the discussion is only one we should have after first dealing with these mistaken beliefs. It could be my misinterpretation but my understanding of what Kevin is saying is something like "there is no homunculus, but there is some causal ability that the collection of matter has which the individual particles do not have." Essentially, the collection has the ability to work outside what we consider deterministic and only being "influenced" based on the past. He denies such a thing and then just takes the function of what the homunculus would serve and attributes it to "the stuff we know is there". This is where I would say I think the central idea of his seems just plain incorrect to me. To me,I don't even think the idea of free will in the way he describes is a coherent idea. What would it for a system to be not deterministic, not random, and not not a combination of just deterministic and random. To me, deterministic and random (indeterminacy) seem like a true dichotomy and it sounds like Kevin would argue that free will is neither. My current interpretation of "free will" is something like "the reason given for why I believe my actions are not deterministic and not random". I do not think that "something not being deterministic and not random" is actually coherent which I think is why there is so much of an issue, describing "what it actually is" or "how we have such a thing". I think it comes down to just being mistaken that there is such a thing. Or... Basically what I described before. Being mistaken about the implications of how our experience would be if it were deterministic and the mistaken beliefs that out experience somehow "shows that it could not be deterministic".
They need to start with a definition of free will that isn't nonsensical before going on to disprove it's existence. They also should be able to say what should be true that would make their claim about free wills non existence false.
Robert Solpospky no question is a highly educated scientist, and in regards human nature. Question, has Robert read, studied, and understood Spinoza’s Ethics? He talks about Descartes, but not Spinoza. Spinoza wrote his Ethics during the 17th century; however, his books were banned. He was called evil, a heretic because he dared to question the legitimacy of the Bible, Jewish, and Christian beliefs. He explains that intuition is the highest level of knowledge, and that man’s highest potential is his power in understanding the laws that influence his nature, and that the belief of free will is a great obstacle to true knowledge.
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Conversation Outline:
00:00 Introduction
02:28 Opening Statement: Kevin Mitchell
16:26 Opening Statement: Robert Sapolsky
27:32 First Round of Questioning
45:56 Second Round of Questioning
1:04:56 How can we make evolutionary sense of illusory agency?
1:06:13 How can we make sense of our accomplishments if we have no free will?
1:08:21 Comparisons with Dennett and Hofstadter
1:12:28 Closing thoughts
Enjoy!
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Shout out to everyone who’s thinking about free will these days thanks to Sapolsky 😄 and my condolences for having nobody to talk to about it lol
holyfuck, how do you know me? are you autistic like me also?
Some great discussion groups out there if you're bored...
I'm fascinated by it! Even writing a book on it
I didn't want to think about free will but now I have to.
It was Sam Harris for me. Both great orators on the subject.
Both of these men are great at letting the other get their point across. Like thirty times i wanted to interrupt and robert just sat there listening. And i felt the same for kevin as well.
yo, i know, I paused the video just to type this
Great point. In fact, during the Mitchel's opening statement I kept thinking how Robert would come back, but he's the master of exercising "non ad-hominin" attacks. He's too cool and gentleman-like. What a great talk from these two intelligent guys. Imagine if we had that on TV?
Not interrupting the other to get your point across is a skill that very few have these days. Kudos to both
Man, I _really_ love this debate format. The conversational format is much better than the more traditional back and forth argument.
To me i like to believe in free will. But sapolsky's reasoning is kind of unbreakable.
I am very excited that this discussion could take place here.
I have read both books in the last 4 weeks and it was my dream that I could experience a direct dialog between the two authors.
I find both texts (and the discussion) extremely stimulating.
Ultimately, the difference is whether the biological and life-historical influences (both of which are beyond one's own control) only influence or determine.
In my opinion, SAPOLSKY's arguments are less intuitive, but more consistent. He dares to think things through to the end - even if this leads to inner resistance.
Mitchell cannot really justify why and at what point a person can freely decide what kind of person they become and what kind of behavior they exhibit in a specific situation. His assessment that a "gap" remains, even in view of the cumulative effect of all influencing factors, appears to be more of an assumption than a real justification.
Presumably, there is indeed a certain amount of 'leeway' in small and insignificant decisions; what kind of person I became was certainly not under my control.
Interesting, because before reading both books I was more inclined to Sapolsky's view. And I still don't believe in the sort of magic God stuff that would presumably be necessary for us to make truly (libertarian) free will type decisions. I think I'm now content to view behavioral flexibility at the organismal level in the form of cognition and deliberation enough to justify the term "free will". Whether my consciousness is involved or is simply along for the ride I find more or less immaterial. If it's just along for the ride, it's still my brain circuits cogitating over decisions (and the conscious me is like the smoke coming out of a steam engine). I may not have sculpted my brain circuits, but I'm willing to "own" them. It may be all we have, but it sure beats being an amoeba. :)
This was exactly my impression too. Mitchell’s arguments consistently seemed to stop at some reductive point, after which he’d conclude with, “It just doesn’t make sense” to explain why things aren’t deterministic. It’s like some emotional and/or subconscious desire for free will to exist is preventing him from making the uncomfortable conclusion he knows is lurking just beyond where he’s content to push his reasoning.
@@psuswim07I don't think that is true in his case. It certainly would be for most. But I genuinely think he's honestly believes there is a free aspect to the will which he explains pretty clearly.
Not sure why you reject his logical explanations in favor of suggesting it's some kind of emotional defense.
Personally I'm of the view that free will and no free wiil are extreme positions and that as humans we can by developing more consciousness about our actions actually increase our freedom as regards our relatively determined predisposition.
I believe to some extent Sapolsky is playing devil's advocate to some extent in insisting on absolute free will. I also believe his motivation for doing so comes strongly from huge compassion because strong advocacy for free will brings with it huge judgemental baggage.
"You deserve your terrible lot in life cause you're a lazy bum" kind of thing.
All good things to you. It's a wonderful topic which I love.
@@waterkingdavid This is pretty close to my view. I agree with a LOT of what Sapolsky said in his introduction. It's all supremely relevant, and it's the exact reason we should view ourselves and other human beings with compassion rather than judging their behavior. At the same time, I have experienced in my life that as I gain more and more awareness over my patterns and what they arose from, I gain more control over those patterns.
Particularly when I experience healing of trauma that keeps me in dysregulated states or cycles of addiction, me as an organism is more free to use metacognition to make decisions as opposed to reacting. In my opinion, awareness, love, and healing are the main things that grant humanity more freedom and agency to not have our past completely determine our future.
We should also consider that there is a form of collective awareness and metacognition formed through culture and community which, again, is something that can grant us more freedom from the past if we move towards healing and connection. To the extent that we don't digest and make sense out of the past, however, we *are* determined by it. It's also true that there are so, so many humans who don't have anything like free will because they and their ancestors were oppressed, and they're being denied the necessary conditions to have a regulated nervous system capable of metacognition.
I think you have it reversed. Sapolsky advocates there's no free will@@waterkingdavid
I am a physician, therefore scientifically trained, and I have no problems with the idea that my life is a movie I watch, rather than a videogame I play. If anything it feels very liberating.
I feel very liberated by it too, it tends to relax me
scientism is the way. All discussions about the non-observable or discussions that involve merging the non-observable with the observable are pointless and impossible to falsify or depend on consensus.
I had a stomach ulcer months ago and they gave me meds and it went away in two weeks. Philosophers make the mistake of assuming science ONLY operates on consensus just like non-scientific disciplines and they are WRONG. You cannot deny that the atomic bomb exists. What I'm getting at is that there is no problem in believing in the tooth fairy or in determinism, they are both just as valid since they cant be disproved.
Only people with control issues are uncomfortable with it
@@Dialogos1989 great point
It's funny really, no one can say the lack of free will stopped them doing what they wanted to do, cause your wants are included in the whole system.
Sapolskys comments at the beginning about appreciating the two viewpoints being shared at the same time in their respective books was so wholesome. Love this guy
I am a neuropsychologist who specializes in theoretical psychology and the epigenetics of developmental psychology. I do want to mention that arousal chronic states in infants do often give rise to alterations in transcriptions from DNA to RNA. This may lead to genes that are left dormant for several years. David Chalmers’ posits “psych-physical laws” which govern and allow emergent properties like alterations in phenotype(s) to occur within a causally closed system.
I wonder how Robert’s naturalist determined worldview would explain this natural phenomenon? The same question can be posed to Kevin.
Thanks!
I can explain it. I've had a lot of time to think about the world, and Mensa puts my IQ at 117. So, forget about inside body versus outside world. Now, the WHOLE system is part of YOU. Therefore, any changes on the "outside" also change YOU because there is no such thing as a difference. So now let's go back to the twins. Any minor difference will lead to changes. An example: the other day, I was walking in the kitchen and I noticed a sound. I heard it one way, and one step later, I heard it differently. I went back to my original place, and the sound was very different in just those two places. This might not seem like much, but it's enough for huge changes. So, basically, time, position in the universe, and the "outside" are all part of the sum of why the twins are different.
How is it not deterministic? Chaotic systems are deterministic. Emergent properties are the sum of their parts, including processes (that they are not deterministic is a value judgement, not and objective judgement).
Worth noting Sapolsky threw subtle shade at Dennett’s knowledge of science. Would be cool to see them in conversation
I actually laughed out loud when Sapolsky cheekily said that, I love this man. Oh and fyi, Sapolsky and Dennett did talk. There's a yt video, published about a month ago. It was a pretty disappointing "debate" though, ngl, as they never agreed on a common definition of free will, and Dennett just doesn't understand Robert's points while he rambled on with incoherent lines of reasonings. I agree with Kevin Mitchell's frustrated points about Dennett. It's funny that after having heard Dennett "argue" FOR his stance of Compatibilism, I became even more convinced that Compatibilism is absolutely logically incoherent.
It would have been cool indeed.
Is wasn't that subtle, lol
The bes YT video I saw this year. Thaks so much all 3 of you. It brought me hapyness for 1 hour. Keep up the awesome work.
literally it is
I wrote this elsewhere:
To the compatibilists/determinists: It's a probabilistic universe if it's infinite. (It's not just classical mechanics.)
You are trying to apply determinism/finiteness to a probabilistic/infinite universe.
The problem with causality is that infinity (and quantum instantaneousness) breaks it, fundamentally, because you cannot go far back enough to determine all the initial conditions (that lead to you/your behavior) because there are none with infinity!
Infinity breaks determinism.
To add: The Uncertainty Principle suggests that you cannot say for certain that we have no free will.
Sure, you have no control in some senses, like classical mechanics (upbringing, gravity, etc.), but not necessarily from a fundamental/quantum sense. The universe goes beyond classical mechanics. Think also of 'spooky action at a distance.' This doesn't appear causal, but, rather, instantaneous.
If the universe created you, then so did infinity if the universe is infinite.
This depends on what you mean by infinite, this includes when you're talking about the universe.
It's also important to understand that eternity and infinity aren't the same thing. One could argue that the universe is eternal yet believe it isn't infinite. Or one could argue that the universe is eternal yet believe it doesn't have an infinite past but an infinite future. There are several other options, but you get the picture.
The description of an infinite sequence of universes, where there is a period of expansion, followed by a period of contraction, followed by a period of expansion, and so on and so forth is called the Bing Bounce theory. It is a cyclic model and a possibility.
The other possibility is to just go with the standard Big Bang model. You have necessary initial conditions (eternal initial states) known as the initial singularity.
The model scientists put forth is that this initial singularity existed before the expansion event happened (the big bang). It's described as being an extremely dense and hot state. It marks a moment where the laws of nature, as we understand them, cease to apply. In this singularity, the universe’s density and temperature are thought to have been infinitely high, with all the mass and energy of the present universe compressed into an infinitesimally small point (smaller than an atom. It is from this small point from which the universe as we know it now comes from. Although there is no direct evidence for a singularity of infinite density, the cosmic microwave background is evidence that the universe expanded from a very hot, dense state.
Under this model there is only continual expansion, no contraction. Even if the hypothesis of the universe evolving to a state of no thermodynamic free energy and will therefore be unable to sustain processes that increase entropy comes to pass, there will still be a universe.
This describes an eternal universe that doesn't have an infinite past but does have an infinite future. I find this to be the most likely possibility based on the available scientific data we have currently. Under this model determinism is possible.
Another model for an eternal universe is the static model. Where the universe is both spatially and temporally infinite, and space is neither expanding nor contracting. This possibility has been ruled out by science though. I believe this is the type of infinity you were talking about.
To add: The fundamental unpredictability of some areas of physics such as quantum uncertainty or chaos does not automatically allow for freewill, they are two different concepts. I also believe quantum indeterminacy is misunderstood.
So basically, Sapolsky is saying there is no 'free' will. And Mitchell is saying we are all influenced from our pasts and biological make up (biases) but that doesn't mean we don't have free will all the time.
Uh, right. But apparently a level or two beyond what these two philosophical nitwits are capable of entertaining.
I find it interesting when it’s suggested anything influenced is in any way shape or form “free”. The words “influenced” and “free” are not compatible.
@@theofficialness578 that's not necessarily true. There are many definitions of freedom, and many definitions of influence. An all-or-nothing statement like that is kinda meaningless if you don't define what you mean.
Let's take a moment to realize that we live in an age where we can live in any part of the world where there is internet and a phone and listen to big intellectuals talking. And that we can learn from them. In 1920 I would probably just be a drunk. Potentially huge difference in well being
Nothing is stopping you from being a drunk in 2023. Live your dreams!
/s.
I disagree with you on your point of view because I feel that the older generations were happier and more psychologically comfortable, unlike us. Everything is available, but most of humanity is sad. In addition, we are in a time of differences and conflicts. We do not know where the truth lies.
@@minamohamed1310
(Sorry this became an essay almost :D)
Well I value your response. If I understand it you say that older generations were happier than us. They had less and were happy we have way more options and are sad. I'm not sure if you indicate causation. If you do..
There's some truth to the idea that you could be less happy if you have more and if it is given to you for example. But that depends on the individual.
People rich or poor can be grateful or ungrateful in either case. More or less neurotic. In varying degrees at different times. This shows that having more does not cause a permanent state of unhappiness based on a higher amount of material wealth..
If one has a lot, then one can choose to develop themselves (study etc) and travel the world or help people to find meaning for themselves.
Whether one sees that as a beautiful thing (the freedom to choose so freely because one is already rich) depends not on having a lot but on other factors such as genes and upbringing.
However also age and experiences and one's ability to deal with all that in a proactive way.
On the notion that everything is available hence we should be happy. Well. Many people don't have everything. They might not have love, or freedom, or friendship, or they might have been through a war or some other bundle of trauma.
Which then all arises in our consciousness continually.
So we don't have everything, and we become sad because of a multitude of different reasons that we also could experience if we didn't have much. (Pretty sure poor people don't like to not know whether they will have food this evening)
On the notion that most of humanity is sad.
Sadness is a state of mind. Those change. So that statement's truth value is contingent on 5 billion or more people having that quality at the same time and permanently. Which is highly unlikely.
Are they at times afraid? Yes. If I lived in the middle ages however I would have way more reason to be affraid. Look up chance to get slaughtered in your home now vs middle ages. Whether by bandits, or another war.
Additionally, All you have to do is look at times where you weren't sad. Where others aren't sad. We do often see the world as we feel. And might project how we feel onto the world.
I definitely agree that most humans probably have very dark thoughts at times. As in depressed thoughts. Is it Worth it all, knowing I might suffer in the future etc or in the now.
But it's not a permanent state. And for me at least it isn't based on material wealth. It would be fear for suffering.
And on us living in a time of differences and conflicts compared to then.. I specifically mentioned the 1920's.. that was just after WW1. Many people in America started drinking alcohol to deal with the horrors they saw. To the point it became illegal to drink alcohol.
That shows that not only was there huge conflict way worse than we have. And not only was WW2 on its way. They felt so bad that alcoholism became such a problem they had to make it illegal.
Many People also became addicted because there just wasn't much to do. If one had a job, they'd have almost no free time. So why not drink.
But, We have access to so much more. And yes often suffering in some form leads us to RUclips.
But at least now it can lead us to great philosophers and we can learn and grow.
Whereas as I said if I was born in the 1920's . I'd likely be a drunk. And a drunk that didn't study is a lot more likely to vote for an evil dictator.
So I'm grateful for what we have. Thus it make me always happy?
No. Nothing will make humans permanently happy because we aren't wired to be permanently happy. We are wired to survive.
Our brain wants to improve. What better way to improve than to create complaining thoughts about the now, fear for the future or remorse and a desire to avoid what happened on the past. Or to not be satisfied what we have whether we are rich or poor.
So what do we do about this? We learn about ourselves. We study. There are thousands of years or wisdom waiting to be discovered from many different angles.
That is a wonder of our time. That we lowly educated workers can do that.
And .. On truth... If you want to know where truth lies. Find some ground under your feet... See if Philosophy, specifically epistomology can't be a hobby interest for you.
If history has taught us anything and we want to be better. Just no matter what story you follow we should avoid to create suffering even if we have differences.
Ancient Rome, Middle Ages, All of those had people that had differences.
We on the other hand have hindsight. Like an old wise man. We have movies that show young kids the horrors of wars. So that most of them only want to experience in games. That used to be different I think.
So we should just hold peace and tolerance as the highest ideal above truth even. And those that can't do that are the ones you hear most about.
But most people IRL, outside of the internet are more moderate.
Keep talking to each other valuing calm and peace even if the other doesn't and be honest to oneself.
Everything is in motion. That's good. Otherwise we might actually be sad all the time.
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play thats not at all what they were implying. In the 1920s there was no internet so the only thing for adults to do is get intoxicated. But now we enjoy the internet. They didnt mention happiness at all.
Excellent conversation. The positions seem to boil down to whether we should talk about "influences" on behavior or "co-determinants" of behavior. Is the organism as a whole merely "influenced" by all the various factors of its biology and environment such that some freedom of choice ultimately still exists? Or are all those factors "co-determinants" that add up to a complete determination of choice? I tend to have the latter position, but I can see why reasonable people would have the former.
What a joy to listen to this. Thank you to all involved
When we consider Hoffman's interface theory of perception and self as being a construct/concept (that we have a tendency to take as a thing), together with Sapolsky's reasoning, it's easier to consider that there's little we control in life. The fact that we have developed very convincing illusions and tools (religion is one of them-increases the group cohesion) does not mean we have an agency. We have a strong, convincing illusion of it for the sake of our sanity, enabling a sense of continuity. Surely, we grow, change perspectives, develop and become more sophisticated as we process more and more information and get exposed to all sorts of stimuli. Things seem to come down to the natural order, adaptation, breeding. We are animals, just with a more capable brains enabling a vaster horizon of anticipation, meta-cognition, worrying about worrying etc. Good to see two men debating respectfully, despite having perspectives on the topic.
Absolutely marvelous, my deepest thanks to all three of you.
The argument for Free will could be : we want to survive, thus whatever decisions we made that worked towards that goal, we are glad we made. (which feels like a fail). Also chaos and complexity does not lead to free will either. Also, just because the computations going on in my brain are not adequate to respond to the universe, just because I make bad decisions, doesn't mean I'm free either.
This is important discussion and debate, listen twice and think many times about it
I am a filmmaker, and mostly find myself lacking the language and categories to put forward ponderings that occur to me; yet in my experience I feel the notion of free will is a category that is evoked precisely when we are confounded by our behaviour which is 'compulsive' in many senses. It is here that free will is called in to alter that behaviour or drive us towards 'taking our life in our own hands', which is to cunningly shift the focus from the environment and those who control it and direct it towards an individual-where, one can be held accountable, hence punished. To say 'you are responsible' is t say 'you can fuck up and hence be punished' and it is here that the whole law and order is justified. Being from India, I can say how the 'spiritual idea' and 'free will' and 'atman' and 'rebirth' and 'soul' and blah blah are categories precisely created to keep the people in check and in control, to control them and make them feel free agents at the same time-to sell them a drug and make them feel euphoric for a while, while slowly losing our faculties and getting addicted to these categories-like how a drug dealer almost operates. To latch onto the idea of free will is also to latch onto the social position that one thinks one holds 'rationally' and to say that I deserve this, while justify the other positions as somehow the faults of individuals (as subtext).
To find that there is no liberation is liberation from liberation itself.
And very thankful to Kevin, Robert and especially Theodor for this wonderful discussion
I'm with Prof. Sapolsky on this one.
You had no choice so don't take any credit for (the) decision. lol
@@timothy4557 I wasn't taking credit for my choice, I was just making a statement.😜
This is your free will . If not, I’d like to see the causality chain
Prof. Sapolsky wrote an entire book on the subject. It's good, you should try it.@@thierryf2789
@@thierryf2789 The causality chain is a combination of his hardware (determined by his DNA), and the ideas and preferences in his head, which are all information that came from external sources throughout his life and experiences. The output of all of that *computation* is the deterministic result that you perceive as his 'choice'. But it's just the output of a massive computation, from other deterministic things. We don't have the tools to trace it just yet, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. (We don't have the tools to explain plenty of other things about ourselves yet, but that doesn't mean they don't exist either.)
Good conversation. This format of debate really helped bring out their arguments.
I often when hearing sapolsky feel not just in agreement but that he is trying to emphasize that freewill is a confusion of individual unique action. Everybody is going to act differently because they are programmed sort of uniquely but that programming is still determining the decision making
Sapolsky is stubborn and fails to acknowledge that physical systems can evolve agency and causal power by limiting possible futures and that nature has obviously selected for this. And he seems to only want to call a system free willed if it is free of any prior causes, which is not necessary. You can have a physical system that has arbitrary amounts of agency and causal power while still having a physical history, a cultural history, many parts of a decision done subconsciously etc. and it would still have free will.
No system has infinite free will to do whatever it wants regardless of its agency programming and inputs, on the other hand physics doesn't just determine the future since it is very easy to show that a system can have causal power and limit the possible futures and choose between options. In this spectrum there is plenty of room for free will, as obviously selected for by nature.
I am on the same thoughts and was happy to hear that also Sapolsky does not completely rule out that there might exist a wiggle room for free will. One can ask how much it shapes us and our future selves. Definitely agree that it sounds like a very good idea to be more considerate of it in our legal and personal judgements, which seems to be a major theme in Sapolsky’s book. We will still have to act on and build systems to prevent wrong doings regardless of the way the decision was made, but this might look very different depending on our philosophy regarding the size that free will wiggle room. I feel like Sapolsky kept saying that the room is negitable, but without very clearly covering the reasoning and implications of that assumption. Clearly tiny changes in a chaotic systems can have very big influences. In terms of responisibility, we also have little way to know exactly what our decions will add up to in the future, so with that it seems unfair to hold people fully responsible for the influence their limited free will had. However, in terms of philosophy of free will, the mystery of conciousness and self, the wiggle room is still super interesting to discuss based on new findings… I was a bit sad that this part was steered away from as Mitchell seemed to have more on this. Not sure as I did not read his book though. It would have been interesting to hear their thoughts on what else is influencing the decisions. For example Roger Penrose put forward arguments for there being a non-algoritmic part of making decisions in his book the emperor’s new mind (1989)
Ta to all 3 for this discussion. I just came across this channel as the algorithm threw the discussion at me for reasons which, whilst it would be untrue to say i have no understanding of , I certainly don't have complete control over.. I possibly, am choosing to subscribe , for reasons that both Kevin and Robert probably understand better than me. At least in Robert's case, he clearly deserves no credit for this fact..
I enjoyed this immensely.
We do anything because we think its good or necessary, but no one in these discussion ever focuses on what is really good and what we just perceive as good. See the book: Free Will Is An Activity by Michael A Perez. There is an opening for Free Will in human consciousness. 🙂
Thanks to everyone involved for this discussion.
Mitchell just keeps describing determinism. He just doesn’t seem to realize it.
Yeah, its weird where he decides things are 'too complicated' to be ascribed to values. Just like Dennett, arguing out of intimidation by complexity rather than acceptance of it.
@@KCrimson00 Well, I might as well put _you_ straight too.
Neither you _nor_ Marxist Sapolsky have even sufficiently _defined_ 'free will' so let me help you with that.
Sticking to the computer analogy: in order to exhibit free will, a computer would have to be capable of suspending the program that governs its behaviour and creating _new_ software 'on the fly' in order to overcome the limitations imposed by the 'rules' of its 'operating system'. Right?
Also, you and Sap fail to consider future undetermined outcomes such as could occur in your imagination and _their_ effect in the real world. For example, you might decide that you want to learn to play the guitar and in your imagination, you can see yourself in the future, on a stage, with Andy Baldman in a band in front of a massive adoring audience shredding on guitar. So you go to a music shop to buy a guitar and rig and you begin the journey from where you are in the present to where you *_want_* to be in the future.
The thing is, _your_ 'present' moment is not the _only_ moment affected by this 'vision', if you will, that exists _only_ in _your_ imagination. Your vision, imperceptible anywhere outside your mind, has a _real_ effect on possible future outcomes available to _actual_ reality. You changed the life of the shop assistant who was delighted to sell you a guitar and rig; your neighbours who were annoyed by your practice sessions decided to move; the girls you met and got pregnant on your way to stardom...
The point is; there is absolutely nothing in deterministic physics that could account for the existence of that specific picture that exists only in _your_ mind. Nothing!
Let me put it this way: if there is in fact a creator God who created the universe as part of a plan, then even God would be surprised and impressed by your performance; _even_ God would have been unable to predict the effect on the world that _could_ be produced as the result of you simply imagining yourself shredding on the guitar.
Determinism fails because _nothing_ is 'determined' until the 'future' is filtered out in the present moment. Mapping out the past does not provide the full picture of how we got to the present precisely because events that haven't happened yet, such as the idea that _someday,_ you _will_ play on that stage, have a real impact on the way the present moment passes into the past.
Therefore, the argument 'no free will because determinism' is fallacious since even if there is _no_ 'free will', it's absense cannot be explained by determinism.
Which sperm will be the one to fertilize the egg? Well, we will have to wait until _after_ the race to find out because there is _literally_ *NO* other way the universe could possibly 'know'.
Right?
No he isn't? He very clearly argues why physics underdetermine the future, how systems can evolve to have ever more casual power.
Another win for my boy Sapolsky dropping science. The man is ahead of his time. Zero free will. 🤠
I disagree with abandoning incentives and behavior reinforcement. They are part of what makes life exciting and worthwhile, and social structures more safe and less anarchic.
I've been thinking about free will ever since I was a child and I could never make sense of the argument that even Sapolsky makes which states that while we don't deserve hatred, we also don't deserve praise or credit in a world without free will.
How is this a necessary conclusion for not being in control? If a streamer in a livestream praises the viewer for being there and enjoying the stream, why am I not allowed to feel good about it in a strictly deterministic sense? Being deserving of praise has nothing to do with agency or control. In don't feel good about my decision for being there, but that someone else cares about me being there.
We feel good just for being told we're beautiful with no further context. We don't need to feel as if this is our accomplishment.
If there's any goal worth presuing it's our personal and collective well being and if being told we're beautiful is part of this by others who genuinely feel this way, isn't that good enough?
None of that changes no matter whether or not free will exists.
I think the vast majority of the arguments are parallel and differ in semantics.
The main differences are that Mitchell considers that reflection of the sense of self (within culture and biology) is among all influences from seconds to minutes to centuries before that are taken into consideration when the brain calculated options on what the outcome will be. Both believe then we then pick one. For Sapolsky that picking is ignorable (or more strongly explainable by other factors).
Thanks for stopping by. Amazing books both of you. I am one of the biggest fans of Sapolsky. I am kinda compatibilist myself. But I believe our free will is literally only this self reflection feedback. We can use that in the future and awareness to increase the options to pick from. But not really in an instant. Our seconds decision making is kinda all determined. Kanehman and Tversky let clear that our slow brain takes time and that is generally done after you pulled the trigger. 💕
The action of picking would not be a voluntary one per Sapolsky. Its a realization/culmination.
I have a sense, that I think, thinking
“free will is literally only this self reflection feedback.”
Assumes universal mental capacity, Brain structure and mental capability.
Words matter! We have freedom of choice but we do not have freewill. Mitchell is discussing aspects of "freedom" and Sapolsky is discussing "freewill". This is why they both can agree and also disagree, as each is explaining their topic very well. If you think there is no such thing as freedom come visit my house, I could use free labor Dr. Sapolsky. When/if all choices were/are beneficial regardless of time, experience, etc. I would have the Freedom to express my will without concern and therefore I could be confident of my decision's positive outcome, Professor Mitchell.
If all we are is the "outcome of priors" (and thus, we have no free will), is there any way, through my actions, I can falsify this claim? What action can I perform that will either support or disprove this notion? Until I’m shown a way to falsify the claim that we have no free will, I will continue to presume, and live, as if *we do have free will* -despite how erudite Robert Sapolsky is. Not having the complete answer to the question: “How did I turn out to be the person I am, making a particular decision, at a particular moment in time?” (considering my brain one second prior, my hormones, my environment for decades, my fetal stressors, my genes, and the weather this morning), does not mean that the answer to the question: “What flavor of ice cream will I have today?”, is “God will make the decision” or “Someone in ancient Egypt having passed gas, after eating a bean burrito, will be the determining factor.” I have difficulty believing that the ice cream cone I was handed was not a consequence of any decision that I, myself, freely made-if by 'free', I mean I was able to make a different choice. If the claim is unfalsifiable, as I suspect it is, then I’m going to assume the correct answer is “I don’t know if I have free will or not”-at least until there is evidence presented one way or the other. And since the answer is “I don’t know”, I’m going to continue to live my life as if I, me, moi played a significant part in my enjoyment of a chocolate/swirl ice cream cone with my grandson, Daniel. Oh, and by the way, *Daniel chose strawberry with sprinkles* (I wasn't free, apparently, to pick sprinkles because my mother’s belly was scratched by our cat one evening when she was pregnant with me-I think it was during a waxing gibbous moon, but I don’t remember a lot except for the scratch and that it was very dark).
I watch this after watching the debate between Sapolsky and Dennett. This debate makes more sense and seems more peacefully 😂
I think that at the bottom of Kevin Mitchell's view is that he sees no way to make sense of agents making decisions if the future is fixed. But why the puzzlement? What we consider is possible consequences of actions and act to bring about the preferred consequences and or avoid negative ones. We can be predetermined to do that. Yes, there is only one physically possible future that can be arrived at from the past as it was, if determinism is true. But still there are lots of possibilities that *will happen if....* A simple example in nature is the pavement will get wet if it rains. But, of course, rain might not be predetermined to occur.
So I think he starts with what Dennett would say is just a mistake. I'm sure he has discovered a lot on his journey but still the idea that indeterminism is needed for any of it, starts with the mistake that a fixed future is a problem for intentional agents trying to get to one possible future rather than another, possible in the sense of *will happen if* and looking back *would have happened if...*
Some of the commenters need to lay off on the personal attacks. Kevin Mitchell makes an argument, if you don't like it, disagree politely.
My opinion on free will is that, thus far, all evidence seems to indicate that there are external and physiological events that alter human behavior, but whether they are strict determinants or mere influences that bias our choices remains to be settled. Given this uncertainty, I think we should error on the side of compassion and structure our institutions under the assumption that we do not have agency. Yet at the same time, I think it's perfectly okay to believe in a soft form of agent causal free will until we either succeed or fail in boiling down all the behaviors of a person to purely mechanistic processes.
I started drinking again thanks to these Free Will videos
Oh no, I hope that you are pre-determined to stop again soon 🙏
@@francescomarzotto Apparently I don't have a choice in the matter.
@@ZiplineShazamdrinking happens for no one
I love u. HHAHHAHAHHAHA
@@notfarfromgone1 Cheers !
The fact that as a species we are equipped with "an operating system" which helps us analise our own behavior and decisions doesn't mean, I'm afraid, that we are free to use it. Some of us do, but the majority don't and if Mr Mitchell was right that would mean we generally choose to be selfish , greedy and often self-destructing (including our diet, alcohol consumtion, smoking, etc). I'm not convinced.
Great discussion! I would love to talk to professor Sapolsky about a possibility that makes sense to me which I don’t think contradicts his statement.
I work with people as a Coach with what I call the rule of 5/95. This rule assumes there is around 5% of our mental processes (thoughts/emotions/feelings) that we become aware and 95% we don’t.
This 5% will create a window of opportunity to influence the other 95% (the automatic part).
So consciousness it’s not present in the choice process (that is always autonomously done), but will influence future choices based on what was learned during those 5%.
There is no way of controlling or securing that what you have learned consciously will stick around or will change anything, but there is a possibility that done repeatedly, it will.
It still goes alongside with the idea that there is no free will, but the system includes a learning window that can be helpful in the medium long term, but without guarantees!
He would disagree. You sound like a compatbilist.
I know! But the fact that some people can’t use their conscious attention in a focused way by themselves, but then hire a Coach, a Mentor or a Consultant and then achieve results they couldn’t by themselves, seems to suggest that the power of influence is real, and it can be harnessed somehow.
Very nice point, which is why I have been inclining towards a more soft determinism/compatibilism lately and there are some superb philosophers who hold this view as far back as St. Augustine himself.@@ruigalhoz4188
You work with disordered people, same all are sick like them. Then, you make up metalphysical reality for which you have no evidence.
@@ruigalhoz4188 I wonder if the "decision" to seek out a coach played a part in the results they achieved?
And the outcome is... everyone leaves believing in whatever they want to believe
So, Sapolsky wrote a book about life without free will but agreed with Mitchell there is a free will in this video.
Also, how can he say Denneth didn't understand evolution and science? He was just proven wrong about his belief that free will didn't exist and, correct me if i'm wrong, Denneth's understanding about free will was very close to Mitchell's.
Mitchells argument is basically whatever feels like an act of the 'self' is free will. Even in language we say "I gave him the book", its so engrained in us to view actions with the notion of a self - I, you, she, they. Never mind physics, just stop and watch your experience. Every single event on a momentary basis is without voluntary activity. As I type this Im aware that its just a series of events that have happened where no independent will could have possibly been involved. The will is just the idea that behind all experience there is someone pulling the lever but in fact is just levers collectively pulling us.
Theres an optical illusion of a cyclist cycling an indoor bike. Then the person hosting this illusion shows that its the pedals moving the cyclists feets, not the other way round. The cyclist is actually at rest but it looks to us that hes exerting effort on the pedals. This is the illusion we experience at all times.
Again, just sit and do nothing. Watch exactly whats going on in your experience and you'll there is nothing voluntary happening. Any time you think 'I' thought/felt/did that, see how there was no I, just a deception of self.
That's not his argument at all.
Free Will is like spinning a steering wheel on a broken bumper car ride at an amusement park.
Thank you for organising this debate!
Having read Determined, I know that Sapolsky is a hard determinist, I think when he conceded that there's a slight amount of free will, he was saying that just to be cordial. And I mostly agree with Sapolsky's arguments in his book and in general about why he thinks free will doesn't exist, if that matters here. Kevin, while he's obviously super knowledgeable, doesn't really offer arguments of substance on this topic which refute Robert's thinking.
Host, you did a great job 👌👏
@@PowMusic thank you!!!
Roberts argument is so comprehensive and logically structured that it is clear that free will can not exist. Therefore, how do we move forward towards personal change of any behaviour we have maintained for a lengthy period of time? What language do we use to describe how change can be made? Maybe we should just accept that there is no free will, but there is influenced will but that we are not aware of what those influences were.
Well, if sage Sapolosky is "right", then "you" have not "maintained" anything.
love that
Personal change is included in what is predetermined.
I think there’s a lot of randomness in our decision making (within parameters) that explains the parts we can’t predict. Also for an atheist/materialist there’s nothing else than Genes & environment- so yes everything is driven by these two. I think it’s very useful to be more self aware of all the factors that influence our decision making - and for me thats Sapolsky’s usefulness - he made me more self aware about the drivers of my “choices”
Mitchell seems to suggest that complexity cannot be deterministic. I find it odd thinking that complexity would escape causality. Sure, it cannot probably be predicted by current human technology but that doesn't mean causality is broken.
This is my take on it.
To have a concrete example in mind, take a human decisionmaking mechanism like a drift diffusion model, a stochiastic drift of activiation where incoming evidence (desires, expectations, internal states, etc.) dynamically adjusts weights in the drift until a threshold is reached and an action is triggered. *At the level of that mechanism,* there is no predetermined activation, but it must dynamically play out for us to see the result. He's not saying that's un-caused or non-determined, only that the information coming into the mechanism under-determines the result until the point a threshold is actually met, plus--what makes it "free"--the fact that the input factors are weighting dynamics to respond to considerations* at the agent-level (*agent-level considerations being represented in the weighting mechanism by design).
I think the free will debate has never been about determinism. If I will my arm to rise and it doesn't deterministically rise based on (in a direct causal chain with) that will, that's not free will either. So free will must be deterministic and within a causal chain. I think it's always been whether the determining mechanism can fairly be called "me" or "acting on behalf of me" or not. And I think Mitchell's argument is that it is. That's the position I'm sympathetic with.
Mitchell conflates unpredictability and complexity with "indeterministic." Deep down, in (non-quantum) physics everything is always deterministic, even though it can't be predicted, and at the macro level we label it as "indeterministic." While quantum physics is a whole other dimension that could change everything, and that's the reason why RS "thanks God" that they agree to ignore it.
@@The-Wide-Angle It doesn't make sense for you to say "deep down" with "non-quantum", because the quantum level would be equivalent to the "deepest" level of reality.
If the quantum level is interministic, then reality is fundamentally indeterministic. The quantum domain is not a transcendental plane, separate from our reality, it is just its most fundamental level, on which all other levels depend to exist.
@@Vinuken07 Well, it is not clear if at the macro level the indeterminism of qm is really relevant. But even if it is, and I'm one who believes it is, try to explain this to Sapolsky and Mitchell. Sapolsky congratulates Mitchell that they are both of the same opinion that qm should be ignored.
Mitchell is not arguing that at all.
Eu de mult am zis (pt mine) ca nu exista liber arbitru. Cel mai simplu spus: Avem un CPU (creier) care ia decizii conform celor stiute. Pai, CPU-ul nu e construit de noi, ci e primit (nu putem fi mai inteligenti oricat ne-am chinui), iar ce stim ..e la noroc.. ce-am avut norocul sa aflam (ca de vrut, normal ca vrem sa ne fie cel mai bine, sa stim ce ne trebuie, etc).
Altfel spus: Eu n-am libertatea de-a alege decat cea mai buna optiune, iar ce cred eu ca-i cea mai buna optiune e pe baza cunostintelor (de care am avut norocul sa dau), si analizez cu-n creier vai de mama lui (primit genetic).
E ca si cum ai avea de ales intre 1: a muri de foame maine, si 2: a nu muri de foame ci a duce un trai bun.
Normal ca alegi optiunea 2, care poate ca inseamna sa jefuiesti pe cineva, caci atata te-a dus capul, si ca asa ai vazut in cartierul tau ca se face.
Cum poti sa-l tragi la raspundere pe unul care atat a putut gandi? A, ok, il carantinezi daca-i periculos si vezi ca atata e in stare sa faca, dar n-ai de ce sa-i doresti raul (ca si cum a avut liber arbitru).
Culmea, deci, ca toti religiosii care chipurile vor sa fie a-tot-iubitor ca Iisus, insa nu pot, fac greseala ca tin cu dintii la liberul arbitru. Ia sa gandeasca fara liberul arbitru si-o sa vada cum devin iubitori.. asa cum iubesti si cainele tau, si-l ierti chiar daca face vreo boacana, caci stii ca atat il duce capul.. Chiar daca-l pedepsesti ca masura de corectie.
The Law of Determinism makes sense when you reflect on why you choose a wife, a career or a shirt. Why do you marry your wife? Is she attractive? You can use logical reasoning like she is kind and beautiful. But why must she be the one instead of another woman? You fell in love, didn't you? And you could not control your state of mind and the emotion of romance. You didn't choose her, you did it out of love. It is an unconscious 'decision' to say the least.
Wonderful debate. And though I am Team Sapolsky all the way, I find Mitchell's evolutionary approach inspiring. How about this: Say we are completely predetermined the way Sapolsky describes, but that this notion of independent agency and free will is hard-wired into us by evolution/ culture as a determining factor that shapes our behavior. Meaning we need the illusion of free will to be able to operate as successful individual/society, including all the mechanisms of responsibility, guilt, sense of fairness and justice that seem to be more or less innate as well. If I understand Sapolsky correctly, vertebrae seem to have a fairly clear idea of what fairness and justice and other morality-driven behaviors are within their species, whereas we humans manage to get into all sorts of religious or ideological twists about it - or rather, the variety of it smacks of cultural-evolutionary adaption to different environments. Can we consider moral systems (religion, humanism and all that song and dance, as Sapolsky would probably say) as survival mechanisms and thus judge them from a non-moral standpoint (Criteria of what is the "best" system open to discussion)? This would mean that you can and should highlight the agency and free will of the individual to decide for the best "moral" option - building up pressure in a positive way, giving an individual a cause to decide for that option - while at the same time considering the action finally taken as determined, ending up in the "treatment/quarantine"-model for antisocial behavior, as Sapolsky suggests. As an analogy, you might admire a great athlete, celebrate her achievements and try to emulate her ways of training and her mind-set, but you wouldn't "blame" yourself if you were unable to win a gold medal, nor would you punish those with a handicap (you might get them a wheelchair if needed). Free will not as a "causeless cause", but as a function of our biological nature - and this is where Mitchell's idea of the evolution of agency and autonomy fits in quite neatly as a part of our make-up as a social species. Does all of this make any sense?
I like the debate. My opinion is that the desired outcome distorts the concept, but the outcome itself is not involved in definition of free will, the outcome is a seperated. The opportunity to choose one thing or another, even if the outcome is always the same, that opportunity itself is proof for free will. The desire that makes us to choose one thing doesn't mean we couldn't choose the other thing if the circumstances were different. Even if the circumstances were the same we still could have chosen the other thing, but the fact that we didn't, doesn't mean that possibility dissapeared. Circumstances and desire are seperated from free will but they affect one another, it doesn't mean free will is not there it just means something has effect on us and we direct our free will towards what fits us most.
I have a sense that I think, you’re speaking in could’ve, when the time that humans experience is linear. There is no such thing as could’ve after what has occurred.
Mitchell is trying to sneak in some kind of “degree of freedom” somewhere that isn’t pure randomness, but there’s just nowhere to go
Well stated
I like Sapolsky’s points, but I don’t think all of the past influences in our lives completely eliminate the possibility of being able to make a choice independent of some of these influences.
I have a sense, that I think, even “if” a decision is made independent of “influence” The brains capacity to do so is determined by its past and development.
Two of my favorit authors of all time! Greatest real discussion ever thank you
Dr. Sapolsky seems to be giving multiple, simple examples, yet Dr. Mitchell says abstract sentences and doesn't delve deep enough to assess whether free will truly makes sense. He keeps saying something to the tune of "it just doesn't make sense intuitively" and "well once you use the word 'choice' it's checkmate". His analysis is shallow and there is something holding him back from delving deeper.
Because the brain contains complex structures with feedback loops involving chemical reactions where precise outcomes cannot be predetermined, Mitchell argues that right there in the midst of indeterminism is where the self is making choices through a free will that uses the sort of reason and reflection that are not available to other living things. How does Mitchell get from indeterminism to free will? Indeterminism in chemical reactions would instead add randomness to outcomes. How would randomness be a medium for reason? He claims to not be invoking a ghost in the shell by saying that decision-making is not a top-down mechanism but a holistic process, but he sounds very much to be invoking a ghost in the shell.
Mitchell starts from a fundamental scientific and philosophical flaw. Namely, he assumes that there is indeterminacy in the world (7:21) having relied on the Shrodinger equation. Resorting to quantum physics as a possible mechanism for free will, is a speculative cop out. At best, the so call randomness of quantum events is statistically determinant. Mitchell subsequently says such things as I don’t see how that could work. Mitchell both acknowledges and ignores the complexity of the brain and our interaction with the environment.
Mitchell relies on the language we use, as if that means free will could not be an illusion. Well, we do made choices, but we do not have the ability to have make a choice other than the choice that we make in the circumstances.
The organisation of neurons can generate rationale.
Not brought up is that evolution, including within the brain, involves heaps and heaps of failures for each success. Free will is not required.
Mitchell has no objective evidence for his position. Sapolsky has increasingly heaps and heaps of evidence for his position. Sapolsky is right to put the onus on Mitchell to make his case.
As with Sapolsky and Mitchell, I think we'd both agree and disagree. I think you are right about the fundamental flaw in Mitchell's opener in his book about indeterminacy in the world that he then compounds in the second part of the sentence by saying the 'future is not written' (ie predetermined). The determinist (Sapolsky's) position is not a support for predeterminism but rather an emphasis on unknowability. In such a complex system, events can be determined by what went before but remain unknowable in advance.
But then Saplolsky's position if equally flawed... 'show me the neuron', he says. As a scientist he knows full well that no single neuron is responsible for anything, so he sets out his stall asking for something he knows is both impossible and makes no sense. It's a rather feeble and unsustainable, albeit sound bite grabbing, premise to an otherwise entertaining book. And that's what his book is. Informative and entertaining. But the science falls down at the point of absolutism.
Mitchell says influence... Sapolsky prefers determine and in a sense they are both right... but neither argument is proven... by a long way. But where I disagree with you, and ultimately Sapolsky, is only in the suggestion that it is up to the other side to make their case. In the end that's a cop out. The fact is, they are both persuasive, I tend to think RS makes his case better and yet I still agree with the position of KM. And I'm free to choose.
@@JohnClark-bh6qe
This is not an objectively balanced debate just because neither side cannot theoretically absolutely prove their position.
'future is not written' is only allowing for the possibility of random events. Randoms events do not allow for free will because they are … well … random.
'show me the neuron' means show a neuron the action of which is inexplicable without the notion of free will. In other words, show a neutron, the action of which, does not support determinism. There are heaps of objective evidence supporting determinism, none for free will. The onus is on free will believers to make their case.
Mitchell is a scientist behaving unscientifically on this issue. He is trying to make the conclusion fit the evidence based on what he does not know. He is even speculating without hypothesizing.
The difficulty of persuading people that they do not have the free will that they think they have, is that it makes them feel uncomfortable realizing they do not have the control they think they have. It is difficult changing that which appears to be a fundamental basis on which a model of the world is based, especially when feelings are deeply affected.
[The space for free will is becoming vanishingly so, so, so small that it would not be worth having even if it did exist. The onus is on free will believers to make their case.]
There is no free will.
@@sjoerd1239 I wan't aware that neurons had a notion of free will. And therein lies the problematic at the heart of this reductionist argument. Only within the system of a higher order dynamic can the 'notion' of free will' exist. And I agree that free will is a notion, an idea, a concept. So who creates that concept, that notion, that idea? Are we free to do so, to reject or is it determined. As a hard line determinist you then have to conclude that the notion of free will is determined, therefore it exists. If you wish to conclude that the 'illusion of free will' is determined then we can presume in evolutionary terms that it was determined for a reason. So it is an important notion. All you can ultimately do is tie yourself in knots in an irresolvable debate.
There is no onus on me to persuade you or vice versa. I believe that RS is saying that we have massively less of this thing we call free will than we think or articulate and I agree with him. I believe KM is saying that the neutrons driving and influencing metacognition create a 'reflective space' that permits choice and I agree with him and you can see those neural patterns in action - not a single neutron!!
And I trust we both accept that science cannot prove anything. It can only replicate and disprove.
Comment after Mitchell's opening statement. Mitchell seems to hang his position on the argument that we think about what we want and how to achieve it before acting. Agreed. But, as Hossenfelder says (see her video on free will), the thinking itself is deterministed (to the extent it is not disrupted by quantum randomness). While we are doing the thinking, we do not know where we will end up. We are sometimes even surprised by what we eventually decide to do. So it feels free to us that we are free. But Mitchell's argument does not establish that. All it establishes is that even though our thinking about what we want and what we will do is determined, as we are doing that thinking we don't know where the determined road will lead us until we get there. Hence it feels free.
Comment after Sapolsky's opening statement. I doubt that Mitchell would disagree with much that Sapolsky says. Sapolsky fails to discuss the process whereby we think about what we want and what we will do. He speaks as if all decisions are more or less instantaneous. But they're obviously not. And he ignores that.
Putting these two comments together, Mitchell says we often think before we act and are thus free. Sapolsky does not engage with that argument. So Mitchell's position would prevail. But as indicated above, thinking itself is a deterministic process. It only feels free because we don't know where it will lead us. My conclusion is that Sapolsky is right even though he doesn't make the complete case.
After first round of questioning. They agree that people make choices. Mitchell says that doing so reflects a degree of freedom. Sapolsky says it doesn't.
After second round of questioning. They converge on a position that both can live with and sort of give up on reaching a definitive position on "free will." I think they would agree that their area of disagreement has narrowed to the point that it isn't worth debating.
Sapolsky was asked how we can make evolutionary sense of our illusory agency. His answer: if we didn't trick ourselves into believeing in our own agency, we wouldn't be able to get up in the morning. Our belief in our free will is evolution's way of enabling us to survive.
Mitchell was asked how his position differs from Dennett's and Hofstadter's. He said that Dennett was simply wrong. (Sapolsky commented that Dennett doesn't really understand evolution.) Mitchell also said that he likes the way Hofstadter's "recursive" perspective on thinking is a good way to eliminate the need for something external to the brain that allows us to think.
Compatibilists seem to agree on determinism but then add a second definition of free will on our experiential level but then at some point in their arguments mistake that experiential level of illusionary free will for free will at a deeper metaphysical level altough they already agreed that it is deterministic.
Not at all. Mitchell argues very clearly here for why physics doesn't fully determine the future, that it is possible for physical systems to evolve agency and casual power. It is even easy to make very simple thought (or real) experiments demonstrating this.
@@pinkfloydhomer agency or desire or choice doesn't equal free will unless you define free will as the ability to want to do x and then do x without being forced. (Such as by a gunman)
But when we practice metacognition on this cognitive process we ask ourselves. Although I chose to do x. Even if thoughts of not doing x came up. My choosing to do x had a stronger pull for me then not choosing to do x. But did I choose which pull was stronger for me? Or that did just come up like any other thought.
It did come up like any other thought. It's more excitatory signals for x then for other options or more inhibitory signals for other options than x.
Any thought and any feeling just arises to us as it does out of the void that our neurons experientially create. They just arise to the part of us that is aware.
The awareness can alter choice, but it is constrained by whatever arises as a result. As in a less gifted person isn't going to ha e Einstein level thoughts in general a lot of the time.
Because they are constrained by the prior condition that is themselves as in their brain.
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play that does not make it not free will.
We're automatons that can't help but always run our free will algorithm with its prior causes, subconscious processes etc. That means that we are not free to change much if the internals of that process, but the entire point of the process and the goal from evolution is making us consciously aware of some of the available options for us to choose. And then with the conscious mind that evolution created we make a real choice. If some of those choices are roughly equally good, we might have chosen otherwise in the exact same state. It's not rocket science. Computers do it all the time.
@@pinkfloydhomer you forget that the choice is part of the process that is caused.
You look at it from a first person perspective.
Look at it from a third person perspective.
Additionally.
If I program a computer to choose between option 1-10. And add prior conditions that will move it more likely to one choice. Because guess what that's what happens...And maybe add some randomness in it. For things we assume to be random but might just lack the data on. (Laplace's demon)
If we have the seed of the random generator, then we know what it will pick, and how it will or won't affect the prior conditions that were going to lead the option with most weight because of the prior conditions. Hence even the randomness (which isn't even free will ofcourse), doesn't take away causation.
To be truly able to choose different than whatever you choose after choosing. You'd have to be entirely free from your own causal chain. Which is impossible. you wouldn't be you.. you'd be whatever or whoever else you'd be, with its own causal chain leading to outcomes.
Choice doesn't mean free will. Animals choose, for example situation x makes most animals choose y. We have the ability to see a thought arise, so unlike other animals when situation x comes, we see thought leading to behavior y, but then our complex mind adds options initially as concepts , now with the added complexity which evolution gave us indeed, we can't just see option y, we can see that there's also y, z, k, p, s, t ,l and so on on. We can even imagine, not y, not s, not k and so on.
And now this does give us more options than most animals indeed.
But then like any other animal causation will follow. Prior conditions, such as cognitive ability, mood, personality, culture, subculture, polarization shift if you're in a group, parenting, natural and environmentally adjusted inclination towards reason or impulse, how much you or people around you like thinking, prior choices and their effects in the same situation (learning), if your even able to learn and how much you're able, and so on
This complex network of domino's then falls nicely into place using excitatory and inhibitory signals in the brain. As options arise are touched with awareness (depending on how aware we are at the moment), and then new thoughts arise in response to the initial thoughts and a cycle forms.
Again until the final choice appears, having a stronger pull then any other of the options based again on all these prior conditions.
Now we often say that 'we are influenced' by these prior conditions. That's already wrong.
The prior conditions don't just influence you as in arise to you as if you can then choose uninfluenced by them.
Additionally
They are thoughts, they just arise as they do. I don't choose them. They arise because of those conditions.
The response you have to them are themselves thoughts. And they also arise as they do because of those prior conditions including capacity etc.
People forget that second part
There might be no gunman in your room with a gun to your head
But there's many gunmen with a gun to your head in the form of your prior conditions. You are constrained by your causal chain.
As you said it's not rocket science
@@Contribute_TakeCare_Learn_Play none of your arguments are convincing, some don't even make sense. What I wrote is true and you have written nothing to refute it.
I wonder if any arguments would ever convince you. Or the outcome of any experiment. Come up with an experiment that will determine if we have free will. If you can't, your positive doesn't even make sense.
The world isn't strictly black or white, but rather various shades of grey. Both of these gentlemen make very valid points and both conclusions can be true. Barring any obvious handicap, I believe we are capable of the latitude of freedom to the degree in which we choose.
What’s missing in debates about free will is the definition of free will.
I would follow Friedrich Hermanni who said that Free will is self-determinism.
It’s the absence of inner and outer compulsion or mind manipulation.
Sapolsky is right in saying that you can explain the action of a person based on their history. But that’s the definition of free will.
It’s to make a decision based on the own character and not just a decision out of the blue.
To me it seems to be important to distinguish free will from randomness.
Self-determination is the best expression of free will and would therefore show that there is no conflict between free will and determinism.
Thats the issue the “character” shaped by a multitude of uncontrollable factors, what is free about that.
When Mitchell says that the organism can take all the factors that Sapolsky discusses as determinative into consideration in making a free-will decision, he assumes that the organism exists as something apart from all these factors when in fact it is the result of all of them. Recursivity is still a deterministic process.
Great stuff!! Really enjoyed the dialogue!
"We are deciding what reasons to have." That's a key point.
i watched Prof Sapolsky’s Stanford lectures when i was 16 and i took notes of them ,i remember nodding my head to the video when he asked the question “ do you believe that freewill exist” 😂
rewatching his lectures series at 20 hits different
Sapolsky😀 seems to be winning the comment section
Sad comment on this site.
why? what compels you to post and say that?
Yeah, people in these comments can't think for themselves, it seems 😄
This was a really great conversation. Thanks to all three of you!
"It's complicated" is the key to all of it. It's infinitely variable.
I've listened to both outside of this conversation, and I don't have any answer or frankly even a refined position. But one question asked of Sapolsky from Kevin that I emulate is: why is it assumed/taken as fact that just because someone had a lifetime of influences and factors before them, must we somehow conclude that one cannot make a decision at the "end" of that chain of influences. For example, say I concede that there are a multitude of factors beyond my control that lead to my current position right now (it's hard to deny otherwise), but how does that necessitate that I cannot choose a blue m&m or green m&m at the end of that long chain? That chain might mean that I'm predisposed to eat the blue over the green, but that doesn't require that I eat the blue, regardless of whether or not my mother grew up eating raisin bran instead of cheerios. There are certain probabilities that I eat either, but that's simply predictive, not constraining. I'm asking this openly and am interested in responses that might help me better understand Sapolsky's and those in his sides perspective on that
You are aware of the decision, and you are executing the decision, but aren't in control of it, you did not pick the desire/preference for blue M&Ms that arose in you (due to many causal factors leading up to that moment). You are not free to act as you desire; you have no choice but to act as you desire! Moment to moment, we are consciously acting out uncontrollable decisions. Subjectively it feels like we're in the driver's seat because evolutionarily it's advantageous to feel in control, but upon closer inspection there's nothing to prove free will is really there, except that subjective feeling, in the same way someone can have a subjective religious experience which feels true to them, but that in no way proves the existence of God.
The bank analogy was interesting, what makes a person rob a bank in contrast to a person who wants to make a deposit instead. I would say financial circumstances may be a cause but yet the circumstances don't make you rob the bank, the circumstances aren't the doer of that activity even through the circumstances influence the behavior. Greed may be a factor, but that character trait in itself Isn't the doer of activity. So, while circumstances and character traits may influence activity an agent who is free to use his will to act I think is the doer of activity.
Seems the obviousness of the lack of reality of a separate person is being missed. It often is. Most are deep in the illusion that there is a person or a “me”. Once seen through, there is no way to imagine that there is a someone to possess something believed to constitute a free will. There is no decider. No free willer.
At around 3:40 into the video, Mitchell betrays his objectivity by stating "...or even worse, we're just collections of particles obeying the laws of physics." He doesn't like the possibility of not having free will so he builds his entire argument to support the conclusion he *_wants_* to believe rather than a conclusion supported solely by evidence.
But I don't blame him for taking that path; he really had no choice in the matter.
Every time I hear somebody defend Free Will I become more of a determinist.
Yeah, I agree ....but it's not their fault.
The more defenses of free will I have heard, the more shallow the position seems. "It's just too complex" to not be a free will process... "It's intuitive that we have free will"...
Honestly it reminds me of some of those interesting believer vs atheist debates. In a good way, not trying to trash talk!
A Marxist _would_ say that. If all of our choices are the product of the past then explain how Einstein could come up with Relativity? You are caught in your own trap. Why Einstein? And why 1905? If our choices are causally linked to the conditions and actions of all our ancestors right back to Abraham then why would Einstein even _dream_ that Newton has missed something from his description of 'gravity'?
Comrade Sapolsky's monotonous mantras are designed to dull your senses; endless causal chains about how drunk your mother was and how absent your grandfather was, all the way back to whether or not Adam needed to use the bathroom before he jumped on Eve to conclude that we have no agency and if God wants us breaking rocks in the Gulags then we should just get used to it.
All Sapolsky manages to do here is to reveal his lack of humanity. Although, for any theists out there, Sapolsky exonerates Adam, Eve and the Serpent in the Garden of Eden on the basis that their actions were _actually_ determined by the God who created them but then blames _them_ for bringing sin into the world because He is too much of a power-hungry coward to admit that it is _His_ fault and His fault alone.
So cheers Bob! You can let Israel know that they can get TF out of the Middle-East now. :)
@@matthewleahy6565 I agree, Roberts position is based on “I have observed”.
even though he intuitively didn’t Believe in free will.
He gathered the evidence to prove what he realized intuitively.
“Free will” belief is still only based on “I feel and think” “it just feels like it”
Free will is obviously and trivially real and Mitchell argues clearly for it here. Sapolsky seems stubborn and only willing to call something free will if it is independent of all prior history and causes, which is just silly.
Mitchell says that not only what happens to us environmentally but also our thought has causal effect on our future actions and that the future as such is not determined... However, even if all that is true there still is no free will. You do not author thoughts in consciousness. You don't controll anything on a consciousness level. You cannot anticipate a thought. It is given to you by your sub consciousness, based on countless parameters. So where is the freedom exactly? The more i listen to him the more i think he talks about somehting else than free will. But rather about that the environment is not our ultimate puppetmaster, but that is obviously true.
I have zebras I just found determined on line.
I love Robert his wonderful class behavioral biology I’ve watched several times
His lectures
what a wonderful man
I’ve picked up his stuff to repeat
My favorite is religion is” “Metamagical Schizophrenia “
You say that to a bible thumper it knocks them back
If ever there was a saint it’s him his work on stress saved me after my heart attack
I can’t say enough about what a spiritual person he is by giving his life to helping others thru knowledge that flows out of him so effortlessly
amazing to acknowledge the vast web of prior causes but that a self has control over all of this in any way - just a five minute observation of thoughts that emerge and vanish without having control. perhaps some people are born with such a powerful sense of self no argument can undermine this sense.
I'm often surprised when listening to this (sort of) debate how little language itself is either mentioned or drawn upon. In the most basic sense, language is needed to pose the question, to form the question and to understand the question. But language is also needed to define the terms. What do we mean by 'free-will' - or as Kevin said by 'have' or 'we'. And how absolute are terms such as 'influence' and 'determine' - if I'm 'entirely influenced' by something(s) then that is more absolute than if something is 'almost entirely determined'. It's just a question of semantics and definition. But there's another more important level here - and it's not just about metalanguage or metacognition. There is a sense that it is language that permits choice, language defines choice, language allows for reflection and it makes sense of and determines cognition. There is a two way dynamic at play between language and choice. We use language to form and weigh up our options, to reflect upon intent, and language is part of (or perhaps all of) the process in which both choice is set-up and then reflected upon. It's hard to separate the views of either Robert or Kevin other than through the choice of words they actually adopt to explain their belief system. Robert is keen to point out in his book that determined does not mean knowable and nor is it the same as predetermined. And Kevin sees determined and predetermined as closer cousins. But this is just semantics. I never got the argument, as a young man, between behaviourism and mentalism in linguistics - they both seemed intuitively true - and I think the interplay is now more evident. Similarly, I don't really see the argument here. It's just about language all over again.
People generally, and in this debate, know what is meant by free will and it is the ability to do other than we do, as if we could choose differently than we do. The problem with language in the debate is that the idea of free will is so ingrained in our behaviour that the language of choice is ambiguous depending on whether free will is incorporated into the meaning. When is choice not a choice? When it is determined. That is related to why the approach is from the perspective of determinism. If determinism is true, then there is no free will.
@@sjoerd1239 For me, there is no problem with 'language in the debate'. There is only a problem if language is not in the debate. And without language there is no debate. Language is both carrier and message. The same is true for me of free will. I feel I am probably closer to RS's viewpoint than KM. I certainly feel I empathise with his general position and politics more closely and I don't think in this debate that he overstates his case (he does in the book, but that's for both comic effect and a good sales pitch - his book carries a lot less punch if he only writes what he truly believes - there is (much) less free will than we commonly assume . I just think he's wrong if he resorts to absolutism. And I think you are too. I often think that of any rigid polemic - in this case free will or determinism. I have no problem with free will and determinism. For me, choices can be both determined and made - I don't see these as mutually exclusive. I can see that for binary (scientific?) thinkers this may be a problem but I'm not here to try to persuade. My choices are determined by what has gone before but part of what has gone before is my decision making and my choices etc. I accept that in my case that takes us back to the moment of conception but the idea that I am no different now to how I was then... come on.
language and thought are part of the dynamic system that comprise cognition and within that we have choice. When we exercise choice we affect and that effect determines (the next choice). And it also makes us who we are. It's a dynamic system.
You can have free will in a deterministic universe.
I’ve never seen an anti-determinist make a better argument in favor of determinism.
Yeah, he just asserts that ("even classical") systems are not deterministic.
I don't know how that helps his case, as the opposite of determinism is not "free will" but randomness...
Kevin Michael why argue and defend. You have your own opinions. Robert Sapolsky is open and mindful with many variables!!! He is deep and very interesting.
37:49 "…but what I would says is that those are influences that may bias our decisions and our choices, but that _we do make choices._ It almost just doesn't make any sense to me to have a conversation using those words if everything we do at every moment is fully determined."
I agree, we're not doing a good job of describing the process. Rather than saying we're _making a decision,_ we should say that we're _reaching a conclusion._ Consider weighing your options regarding your best course of action. Hopefully, Professor Mitchell would concede that the options which occur to us are a function of nature and nurture, over which we have no meaningful control. You don't get to decide whether or not using the elephant occurs to you.
As a determinist, I would say that because the thought has now occurred to you, you similarly have no control over whether using the elephant appears to be your _best_ option, because the weighting is similarly determined by your history. Those biases _are the weights._ As Mitchell says, your "character" has _already_ been shaped by your past. Searching for the most reasonable course of action can often be a long and laborious process, but you don't "choose" the outcome any more than you do when searching for your keys. You're not deciding where they are; you're solving the problem of where they are. You're not deciding which is best; you're solving the problem of which is best.
In terms of the physics, entropy and uncertainty preclude all possibility of "free will" to make changes to either past or future.
Heisenberg (along with Godel, probability fields, etc., etc. -- all courtesy of QM) make arguments for physical determinism (there are non-physical variants), at best, remotely likely. WTF?
As soon as Kevin Mitchell states: “it is computationally irreducible”….yes that’s it!! There is not a self to reduce any of the almost infinite array of factors too!! It’s fascinating how such intelligent people (Kevin Mitchell) literally make an argument that stands against their very position and can’t seem to acknowledge they are just wrong!!
The man is literally helping make Robert’s Sapolsky’s point, but states, “the system is still able to make a choice”….the act of making any type of choice, IS A DETERMINISTIC or INDETERMINATE process, that has no “atomized”, “agent”, or “SELF” controlling or influencing theses choices!!
Let it go!! LET IT GO!!!! Our first hand subjective experience is not something we own-quite contrary-the infinite irreducibility and never ending factors of interconnection is at work.
And yet… here I am, certainly conscious. And you can’t reduce that to the physical world.
@@francescaerreia8859 If you or anyone can provide evidence for anything not energy-matter-information (physical) or that is independent of it, an Nobel Prize will likely be awarded. Perceptions, memories, hallucinations, emotions, ideas...are embodied, electrochemical, and caloric. A non-physical realm is pure speculation without evidence to the contrary.
@@francescaerreia8859 well, your explaining yourself away, just like Kevin Mitchell, and claim that “you” some how own’s this “conscious experience” as though through no other explanation than magic.
Once again, it’s not just one physical/deterministic factor that brings your unique conscious existence into being, it is a never ending (quite possibly) infinite array of factors that brings “you” and “I” into the existence. None of which you or I own or creating in any sense that makes free will or a self “real”!
@@milesgrooms7343 i know it by direct experience which is the foundation upon which anyone knows anything. If that is magical explanation then so is every explanation for every phenomenon.
@@milesgrooms7343 think about it like competing theories in physics that cannot be resolved with current understanding like relativity and qm; we don’t say one is right and one is wrong, we say we don’t know how to resolve them yet and there’s probably a deeper theory that’s better than both. Similarly here with our understanding of the physical world v our conscious experience. It doesn’t make any sense to ignore the evidence of either in favor of one nor to, on a reductionistic argument, claim that free will is impossible when consciousness itself is irreducible; that fails to grasp the nature of the phenomena in question in the first place.
The very fact we have cultures, legal systems, religions etc. Is evidence we dont have a completely free will, as a species we develop social systems to shape our behavior and impulses
Agree, and I would add....to also control and rein them in.
One can have free will and still have to attend to and deal with external contingencies.Your argument makes no sense
It would appear the argument falls at what point in time you make the assessment, as Schopenhauer said:
"“You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.”
Essentially prior to the action, it is always probabilistic, this is evidenced by bayesian/computational accounts of brain processing as well as quantum mechanics. Yet you can and only ever will make one decision.
Post action, the action will and should rightly always be called determined, given that it happened and was constrained by a myriad of factors which lie beyond or beneath conscious/executive processing :)
I feel the the concession by Prof Sapolsky that I my have the free will to decide to start brushing my teeth from the top or the bottom is the wedge in the crack his argument. If such an act is undetermined, at what point will my actions switch to being determined? Is it when I choose to stop brushing? Is it when I roll my tongue over my teeth maybe once or twice or three times? As soon as I break the chain of determinism, do future actions become less undetermined? What if I choose to stop brushing my teeth altogether, against my better judgement, against my natural tendencies, as an act of free will? Where in this causal chain does determinism arise?
Randomness is not free will
Moderator is very good I find on second hearing.His facial and verbal expressions are delightful.
Question for Professor MItchell - imagine two 100% identical copies of Professor Mitchell (identical to the subatomic level, every particle, atom, energy state, etc) and imagine these two copies were placed in identical environments. Would they make the same or different decisions? A proponent of free will would argue they would make different decisions but that begs the question - what causes that difference? If there are no physical differences then I (and professor Sapolsky) would argue they would make the same decisions since decisions are made with hardware (not magic). Even a long drawn out self reflective contemplative decision that takes days of thought is made with hardware and if the hardware is the same, the final decision will be the same.
Just occurred to me - perhaps Professor Mitchell would argue that both identical copies, making identical decisions, have free will! If so, then his definition of free will is basically equal to "able to make decisions" which is something bacteria and computers can do and is hardly a contentious issue. Everyone agrees that everyone can make decisions.
@@DrdssikesFrom what I understand, if there is truly randomness is the universe, Robert has explained. Even if the universe was restarted with all the exact same conditions, if there is actual randomness (i.e not predictable even if all variables are known. This is the best way I can explain) it would be a different universe because of that. So likely the copy and the original would make different although “likely” similar choices because of “true” randomness. Nonetheless randomness is random, no where closer to “free will”.
My old GPS sometimes picks one route and other times picks another, it has no live data input and I doubt it has a random generator in its algorithm. Mystery to me!? Perhaps it has a free will!
We are idea-driven creatures. Free will is an idea, determinism another. Each of these ideas, deeply considered, may _change_ our conscience. It _is_ changed by the input, we are changed.
They may want to first start at what they think 'free will' is. They are both saying the same things but one is saying we don't have free will the other does. The difference may be that they don't agree that 'free will' means the same thing to one another. Also, I believe both are right - those things should be looked at on a case-by-case basis not general one size fits all.
I feel like some people who believe "free will" is some ability which we have, have an incredibly naive view of deterministic systems. They seem to view a process as some kind of preprogrammed thing which has some specific execution paths which don't change. I think it is important to consider that with every step of the process, something can alter/update/set the execution paths which will occur in the future and it can 100% happen in a deterministic way. Not sure if that makes "sense" to them but it seems to entirely align with the types of things we observe and experience. To be honest, it seems like most of what is said here is just incredulity. Simply "I can't see how that could be possible with a deterministic process, so I reject it conforming to every other observation we have of the way things operate in a deterministic way".
To get some appreciation for the other view.... consider a complex "machine" which is interactive (produces outputs according to inputs). The machine can't violate the laws of electricity, but it's organizational structure controls how that electricity is going to flow through it by virtue of the layout of it's motherboard, CPU, transistors, etc.
In this way the organization of the machine determines it's output. If the machine is complicated enough, with an incredibly rich and varied set of outputs finely tuned to even the most nuanced changes in the environment... could you say it "controls" it's output? Would we want to dignify this incredible flexibility by saying the machine was "free"?
I know this isn't the "God" stuff everybody is looking for when thinking about free will (I am an unmoved mover!!), but it ain't nothing. It doesn't violate physical laws, it just alters the level at which you situate the "self".
@@iAmEhead I agree to some extent. I am somewhat indifferent to compatibilist notions of "free will".
I agree with control so far as it is how we seem to attribute a boundary of responsibility. I might say the process was how the output was controlled. I even think it is somewhat reasonable to attempt to modify the process to change future outputs (I think this is an abstract way to conceptualize things like persuasion and constraint). I may need to review the vid again. I felt like I had the impression that there was a rejection of "choices" being possible if things were deterministic. This doesn't seem to align with the notion u mention and which I have no issue with. It just doesn't seem to me to be the core issue. I actually think the discussion about responsibility is built on top of this missing understanding of experience being compatible with a deterministic process.
@@iAmEhead So upon reviewing again a bit. It is immediately apparent when Kevin Mitchell states in his opening that he specifically refers to "decision making". He says the following:
"...really it comes down to whether we are able to make decisions and choose our own actions. And certainly, it seems like we can, at least most of the time, we go around choosing things and making decisions ... and it feels like we are in charge of our own decisions. But maybe we're deluded. Maybe it's all just mechanisms. Maybe it's all just robots acting out our programming. Or maybe it's worse and we are just collections of atoms and particles that obey the laws of physics."
This is precisely the kind of thing I referring to as "an incredibly naive view of deterministic systems". If we consider the implications of actually being a part of the "process" through time, it seems entirely compatible with our experience. The process that seems to be referred to as "decision making" is something like going though a process of relating internal and external information until we reach some threshold for action. This process even may (does?) continue even past that threshold and we may pass this threshold and start to take action and then upon further processing, drop below the threshold and decide to change the type of action we are taking. Something like, "starting to grab a rock to throw at someone and then in a later moment stopping the action." There is absolutely nothing about this experience that is incompatible with a deterministic process consisting of "atoms and particles obeying the laws of physics". This is the issue I feel I am trying to contend with.
To be honest, I feel like there is something completely lacking when I repeatedly don't see this issue even brought up as an issue. It seems to be "assumed as a reasonable concern that our experience isn't compatible" and then instead beginning conversations about some other thing like responsibility and instead saying "well it doesn't matter". I actually feel like Robert is at a serious disadvantage by allowing Kevin to make this type of claim and instead focusing a lot on "here are some things which are predictive of behavior".
Kevin seems to gyrate between "well we don't want to invoke magic" and then completely disregarding this and implying there is some causal mechanism outside of the "deterministic chain of causation". Things like "...genuinely causal power at these higher levels of the system and all the causality doesn't just come from these low level atoms bouncing around." This seems to indicate a belief that the collection of things is "causal" in a way which could not possibly be described by the lower level behavior. This sounds to me like "invoking magic". Simply because we might not expect the lower level behavior to be able to be organized in a way which would result in these higher order behaviors, does not mean there is something special at the higher level that isn't accomplished by the lower level behaviors. I think this is observable in even simple systems like cellular automata. Once we jump up to "from simple cellular automata to a current description of physics", I just don't see why this is even remotely a reasonable position (that there must be some "special causal power" granted by this higher order organization of things). It seems like just flat out incredulity to me.
@@goblinlordx6108 I've always felt like questions of moral responsibility should be teased out of the question of whether we have free will. Or rather, it should just be handled seperately. Clearly nobody is "ultimately" morally responsible in the way we all learned about in Sunday school.
There is definitely some hand waving going on by Kevin, but some of what he says I like. He helped me to realize the importance of asking "who" the self is that is "deciding". In our case, we are "wet" computers that are "deciding" based on our evolutionary pasts and personal histories of development and learning.
If free will requires a little homunculi made of fairy dust that is an unmoved mover then of course none of us have it!
@@iAmEheadThanks for the response as well as your thoughts. I agree that I think a discussion concerning moral responsibility is actually valuable. My concern primarily is that the discussion concerning it currently seems to be built on top of what I think are mistaken beliefs.
It could be my own biases but I have a belief that these mistaken beliefs are having a significant influence on the assessments being made by Kevin here. I think it is also common from people who might say "we have free will". If anything I would expect it empirically visible if we tested for it. Anyways... I think the discussion is only one we should have after first dealing with these mistaken beliefs.
It could be my misinterpretation but my understanding of what Kevin is saying is something like "there is no homunculus, but there is some causal ability that the collection of matter has which the individual particles do not have." Essentially, the collection has the ability to work outside what we consider deterministic and only being "influenced" based on the past. He denies such a thing and then just takes the function of what the homunculus would serve and attributes it to "the stuff we know is there". This is where I would say I think the central idea of his seems just plain incorrect to me. To me,I don't even think the idea of free will in the way he describes is a coherent idea. What would it for a system to be not deterministic, not random, and not not a combination of just deterministic and random. To me, deterministic and random (indeterminacy) seem like a true dichotomy and it sounds like Kevin would argue that free will is neither.
My current interpretation of "free will" is something like "the reason given for why I believe my actions are not deterministic and not random". I do not think that "something not being deterministic and not random" is actually coherent which I think is why there is so much of an issue, describing "what it actually is" or "how we have such a thing". I think it comes down to just being mistaken that there is such a thing. Or... Basically what I described before. Being mistaken about the implications of how our experience would be if it were deterministic and the mistaken beliefs that out experience somehow "shows that it could not be deterministic".
They need to start with a definition of free will that isn't nonsensical before going on to disprove it's existence. They also should be able to say what should be true that would make their claim about free wills non existence false.
I think the justice system is partly based on this. It's better to let a corrupt person get away with a crime than to put an innocent man in jail.
How does this figure into one involving a person who will not/can not make decisions but act on impulse?
Even if choice is caused by soul, not brain, you still have to admit that soul should function somehow.
I like what Sam Harris says, if having a soul is the case… You don’t get to pick your soul.
Wow! What an interview and conversations! Enlightening.
Thanks for arranging this wonderful conversation and published ...
Great debate, thanks PT
Robert Solpospky no question is a highly educated scientist, and in regards human nature. Question, has Robert read, studied, and understood Spinoza’s Ethics? He talks about Descartes, but not Spinoza. Spinoza wrote his Ethics during the 17th century; however, his books were banned. He was called evil, a heretic because he dared to question the legitimacy of the Bible, Jewish, and Christian beliefs. He explains that intuition is the highest level of knowledge, and that man’s highest potential is his power in understanding the laws that influence his nature, and that the belief of free will is a great obstacle to true knowledge.