Aristotle, The Categories | Substances and Contraries | Philosophy Core Concepts
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- Опубликовано: 4 авг 2024
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This video focuses on Aristotle's work, the Categories, and examines his discussion in chapter 5 of the relationship between substances and contraries. Substances - whether primary or secondary - do not have contraries themselves, and do not admit of degrees. Substances do, however, admit of or accept contraries - and this is something distinctive to substances as opposed to other things.
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Finding your courses on Aristotle is definitely one of the best things that happened to me this year, thank you very much!
You're welcome!
Thank you finally found someone one who explains it so clearly and sound
You're very welcome
Ousia has two main characteristics of permanence (either as temporal duration or not being bounded by time and space) and self-identity as an essence. For Aristotle, the primary substance is a concrete particular, for example, one man or one horse. Thus the temporal duration of the existence of substance is the temporal aspect of primary substance, as no individual man or horse exists forever. Substance's ability to support contraries is one of its key aspects, as this allows for change in the substance (not substantial change, but changes in the value of a category, moving from a position of sitting to a position of standing for example). The categories are necessary determinates of substance, but may vary in the concrete determinate. For example, each substance has a quantity, but the number of substances may vary. One day I have two cats, the next I have ten. But I cannot have an instance of a cat without have some sort of quantity of them. I want to continue further close study. Thank you for these videos.
The principle that identifies substance is temporal continuity. Instead of a discrete succession of one state being replaced by another, (like the static picture of one frame of a film on a reel going through a projector being replaced by another) substance is what is the subject of the change. But what is the characteristic of this continuity? For Aristotle, it is temporal. Individual cats come and go. For Spinoza, the essence as essence of substance would identical for all instances, and as identical not distinguishable, and thus numerically one (metaphysically one as well) . Given that substance is present at all times one could consider it either of interminable duration, or beyond the measure of time itself. But enough of this thinking. Back to a close reread of Aristotle's categories. Thank you for you video.
You're very welcome!
I find these videos so interesting. Always a multitude of questions arise. I'll limit it to one, that I find particularly puzzling. If the degrees belong not to the substances, but rather to the qualities, what to make of Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal? Isn't rationality a quality then, given that someone can be more or less rational? In terms of virtue ethics, as I understand them, doing justice to yourself would be to be virtuous in relation to your own being(being more of what you already are). In this case, being more rational. But that seems to be a matter of degrees that comes and goes, in act at least; at times I can be a fool and at times more rational.
Doesn't seem a problem to me
Is "substance" synonymous with "subject" in Aristotle's taxonomy of being? Thank you.
Not always
My thinking is that Aristotle's categories are dangerously close to a natural science. The main difference is that here he places substance as a category rather than the 'categories of substance'. At first it's uncomfortable to consider substance on equal footing as like quantity, but his organization implies the rational mind that is ordering. The mind is like substance where it allows differences but it is receptive to the differences of what is external to it.
“Other than substance we could hardly
come up with an example that has this [capable of being the recipient of
contrary qualities].”
I’m guessing that people have come up with various counter examples, since Aristotle’s time. If so, are any of them plausible?
Sounds like a good research project for you
Why is black the contrary of white? The whiteness of something can be diminished by making it, say, purple or pink and it would thereby lose the quality of being white. So why do we then say that black is the contrary of white?
ruclips.net/video/xgf2jztjaF4/видео.html
You are a good teacher because you are not that smart. If you can think of many things, so many, so much, so, so can an other
Well, that's certainly an interesting assessment on your part