Well done Tony. One thing you captured was the confusion that existed but was coped with by the still organised ex rhodesian army and air force units. Lionel Dyke was decorated as was Colin James the lynx pilot I think. In my humble opinion Nkomo vastly underestimated the cunning and brutality of mugabe.
Wow Tony - You spoke about Mpofu siding where 2 trains were diverted to, in order for the "ordanance" to be off loaded and transferred to Gwaai mine? I was a Signal Technician (New Works) on R. R and after completing my N.S. (Intake 134 B coy) in September '74, I went back to work on R.R. I was sent to complete that exact Spur "MPOFU SIDING" - ( I was based at Dete Single Quarters and made the daily drive along the dirt service road to Mpofu and back- early every morning- returning in the afternoon! I installed the Signalling ( stop and Go lights etc) as well as the Points machines to enable the Rail traffic to be diverted from the main line into the Mpofu Spur line! It was """SECRET"" at that time - as the RR "clandestinely) carried arms and ammunition wagons ( as part of the goods trains loads going to Zambia) to that location, where said arms wagons were parked off in the spur- they were then offloaded by N.S. 1 Indep "masodjas" into trucks - and then driven the 4 kms to the air strip at Wankie Safari Lodge, for "safer air delivery" by RHAF Daks - to out lying Army/Police stations/depots along Kariba shoreline, where it was too risky by road freight! First time I have ever heard of MPOFU mentioned "in despatches" out side of my time there!!!
Thank you Tony for reinforcing the talks given in earlier episodes by John 'Hoppie' Hopkins and Mike Jones (A and Sp Coy, 1RAR respectively) regarding Entumbane 1 and 2. The following 1RAR (1:1 Inf Bn) members were decorated for gallantry after Entumbane 2: OC C Coy, 1RAR: Maj Lionel Dyke SCZ OC Sp Coy, 1RAR: Temp Maj Anthony Husher BCZ (former Royal Green Jackets) Acting OC D Coy, 1RAR: Lt Dave Hill BCZ (former U.S. Vietnam veteran) Tp Comd Zimbabwe Armoured Regiment: Sgt Stephen 'Skippy' Devine BCZ (former 1RLI and an Australian). Devine was cited for a SCZ but, and for whatever reason this was, sadly, downgraded to a BCZ. Flt Lt Colin James, (Hornet 2) Lynx pilot of 4 Sqn, AFZ was nominated for a SCZ but, apparently, this was vetoed by Air HQ because he defied orders to return to Thornhill choosing, rather, to remain overhead to provide 'top-cover' to his ground force colleagues. Happy for this to be corrected as I haven't been able to find his award in the Government Gazette that states otherwise. What a shame things turned out as they did for our beloved Country! Had level heads, a genuine will on all sides and true democracy prevailed after Independence, who knows where Zimbabwe could have/should have been today. Cry, our beloved Country.
I remember this. I was still at school. We lived in Northend. Just over the road from Mzikazi. I attended the local high school, Northlea. There was a ZIPRA internment camp just over the road from the school.
I am glad you mentioned interfactional fighting during Chimurenga. There were never reall allies, and fought hammer and tongs against each other at every opportunity. What happened in Enbtumane gave Mugs the excuse to unleash 5th Bde. It would be very interesting to get some of the low down on the dissident campaign and SA operations but i understand there are sensitivities about people still living in Zimbabwe today.
I remember going up to the top field at Hamilton high school to take a look at the action in the distance as we could clearly hear the sound of rifle fire and explosions. We had a few days off school but had to work in the garden at home. We were not told about the teacher's booze being stolen but the headmaster Ian Armstrong (AKA Casper because of his white hair) would have been upset that his booze had been stolen. My parents were afraid that a stray mortar round could land on our house in the Eastern suburbs and my father was prepared to go to war if necessary. My brother was told to report for duty and took a photo for me of one of the T34 tanks plus he told us about the burrned out Zipra vehicles that had been towed back to Brady barracks and the burned bits of bodies inside them. He was not involved in the action and was stood down after a few days.
Feb 1980 I just dumped all my kit at Old Cranborne , after a last call up for training "New Army" ,put rifle on counter signature no interest and walked away never officially disbanded from 5RR
Clearly without the Ex Rhodesian soldiers and officers this would have turned into an absolute circus. Thank the lord there was a disciplined and experienced force involved to take command of this incident.
@@Wolf-hh4rv I think the out come of Rhodesia was terrible to be totally honest with you. Why you ask? Because thousands of Africans have been murdered by the ZANU PF murdering machine since independence that have gone totally unchecked by the international community because Zimbabwe was supposed to be the text book case of reconciliation, of peace, of total interracial integration. What a load of of absolute propaganda garbage. Today (factcheck me if you like) millions. . . . . Repeat millions of Black Zimbabweans have fled the country to live in white controlled countries. (The people they fought against to get majority rule, why did they not flee into neighbouring black countries?) Tells me a story, may not ring in your ears but it does mine. So in answer to your question. Yes it was a good outcome, a bloody fine outcome actually because if there had not been a disciplined expertly trained army in place with amazing military hardware I think that the death toll of civilians who were in lockdown during this time would have been in the thousands and infrastructure would have been destroyed rendering the capital city of Matabeleland useless. Does not take a brain surgeon to work that out. How old are you wolf-hh4rv. Were you even born in 1980? Are you even an African? Don’t get me started on “Is this something to be celebrated”. . . . . . There’s one in every forum. 😡
@@Wolf-hh4rv I think the out come of Rhodesia was terrible to be totally honest with you. Why you ask? Because thousands of Africans have been murdered by the ZANU PF murdering machine since independence that have gone totally unchecked by the international community because Zimbabwe was supposed to be the text book case of reconciliation, of peace, of total interracial integration. What a load of of absolute propaganda garbage. Today (factcheck me if you like) millions. . . . . Repeat millions of Black Zimbabweans have fled the country to live in white controlled countries. (The people they fought against to get majority rule, why did they not flee into neighbouring black countries?) Tells me a story, may not ring in your ears but it does mine. So in answer to your question. Yes it was a good outcome, a bloody fine outcome actually because if there had not been a disciplined expertly trained army in place with amazing military hardware I think that the death toll of civilians who were in lockdown during this time would have been in the thousands and infrastructure would have been destroyed rendering the capital city of Matabeleland useless. Does not take a brain surgeon to work that out. How old are you wolf-hh4rv. Were you even born in 1980? Are you even an African? Don’t get me started on “Is this something to be celebrated”. . . . . . There’s one in every forum. 😡
Just a bit of a correction on the opening caption The equipment at Essexvale was not captured, but was surrendered to Gvt after the fighting And the Gwayi unit simply went back to Gwayi AP not the bush
Zipra and Zapu youths conducted door to door searches in western suburbs especially Pumula North & East a few days after the Entumbane clashes in 1980 beating and killing Shona speaking residents. We survived through our neighbour Mr Nkomo.
Visited Zim a couple of years ago. Speaking to some Ndebele who helped out our fishing- they very definitely harbour a grudge towards the Shona. They told me a lot of Shona in Bulawayo, that really pissed them off. They feel bullied basically.
The tension between the Matabele and Shona tribes still persists today because no proper reconciliation has ever been achieved. One of the key reasons is the failure to openly acknowledge the Gukurahundi genocide, where thousands of Ndebele people were killed in the 1980s. Without genuine acknowledgment or compensation for the victims and their families, these wounds remain deeply embedded in the national consciousness. Additionally, the marginalization of the Matabeleland region continues to exacerbate these tensions. There is a lack of meaningful support for the participation of the Ndebele people in the economy, civil service, and national development, further fueling resentment. The superficial reconciliation efforts that have been attempted are often seen as acts of political grandstanding, lacking sincerity or a real commitment to healing the divisions. Proper reconciliation requires truth-telling, justice, and reparations, but these have been absent from the government’s approach. What makes the situation worse is that many of the chief proponents of division during Gukurahundi remain in power. Their refusal to acknowledge their past actions or take responsibility ensures that these historical grievances remain unresolved. Until there is a genuine effort to address these issues, including the marginalization and historical injustices, the tensions between the Matabele and Shona are unlikely to dissipate. True reconciliation is not just about words; it requires bold and transformative actions.
If it wasn’t for the intervention of the former Rhodesian soldiers, the ZANLA ex-soldiers would likely not have stood a chance in open warfare against the battle-hardened ZIPRA forces. ZIPRA had superior training, equipment, and conventional military capabilities, which included tanks and aircraft that were a legacy of their Soviet and Eastern Bloc allies. In contrast, ZANLA forces were primarily trained in guerrilla tactics and were less adept at conventional warfare. The intervention shifted the balance, allowing ZANLA and its allies to suppress ZIPRA. Without this external support, the outcome of the conflict could have been drastically different, potentially altering the trajectory of Zimbabwe’s post-independence political landscape.
@ The Rhodesians indeed feared that ZIPRA, with its strong ties to the Soviet Union, might introduce a communist regime if it gained power. This fear of communism, which was heavily associated with ZIPRA’s main sponsor, led the Rhodesians to align themselves with Mugabe and ZANLA, believing he would be the lesser evil of the two. However, history has proven how misguided that belief was. Mugabe’s leadership ultimately brought widespread suffering, authoritarian rule, economic collapse, and human rights abuses that devastated Zimbabwe. In hindsight, the choice of the “lesser evil” turned out to have catastrophic consequences, leaving many to wonder how different Zimbabwe’s path might have been if events had unfolded otherwise.
I dont believe the assertion that the Shona are peaceful they just didnt have the mean and skill then.Look at them know and tell me if they are as peaceful..what has changed?
They have the Physical population numbers - when the settlers arrived, the Matebele were soundly beaten in several recorded battles - losing thousands of warriors and the Matebele "raiding parties disappeared . The Shonas then outnumbered the vanquished Matebele and their numbers exploded - as did their attitude. They hated the Matebele - and once the Mugabe Gvt took power?( with all the military might and control) the Shona powered Gvt still harbouring seething resentment, led to the Gukurahundi massacres. [ WIKI: Motive: Anti-Ndbele sentiment, Anti-Kalanga sentiment, Racism, Tribalism, crushing dissent to the Mugabe regime ] THATS WHAT CHANGED!
Zipra were hammered by the RAR who were doing the job that they were trained to do. It had nothing to do with politics. The same thing would have happened to them had they tried invade Rhodesia from Zambia in 1979
@@nickcarter-qf9hi While the RAR was a highly trained and disciplined force, it’s essential to consider the context of the Entumbane skirmishes and the broader dynamics between ZIPRA and ZANLA. The clashes were not a measure of ZIPRA’s full military capabilities but rather the result of frustration and disillusionment among ZIPRA forces. They felt betrayed by ZANLA’s actions and the lack of a genuine commitment to integration within the newly formed Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The Entumbane skirmishes were chaotic and uncoordinated, stemming from deep mistrust and simmering tensions rather than being a strategically planned engagement. ZIPRA forces had been sidelined despite their significant contributions to the liberation struggle and were being forced into a union with ZANLA forces who showed little intention of cooperating or respecting ZIPRA’s role. This political undercurrent cannot be ignored when evaluating the events. It’s also worth noting that ZIPRA had proven themselves capable in previous engagements and were far from a force to be underestimated. Their frustration at Entumbane was a symptom of broader political betrayal rather than a reflection of their military readiness or discipline. Had ZIPRA been in a more organized and unified state, the outcome of any conflict, whether with the RAR or ZANLA, could have been very different.
As an external, but militarily-oriented outsider who has taken an acute interest in Rhodesia since before military service in 1976, I am left with the impression of how this conflict escalated militarily from 1966 to the mid-1980s. Here in 1980/1981 we are dealing with formations of thousands of ZIPRA, ZANLA and ZA troops with main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry combat vehicles, large calibre artillery, anti-armour systems, 81 mm mortars and an air force. Even the last days of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in late 1979 this was still mainly an insurgency war of AK-47 and landmine vs FN FAL assault rifle and Alouette helicopter. It makes me think how fortunate we are that things ended tamely and without full force of heavy weaponry and brigade-strength formations of mechanised infranty. RMY
It’s true that had the conflict escalated into full-scale conventional warfare with the heavy weaponry and mechanized infantry available in 1980/81, it would have been a war of attrition with devastating consequences for all sides. Such a scenario would likely have resulted in immense loss of life, widespread destruction, and no clear winner in the end. Here are some reasons why: 1. Well-Matched Forces • By 1980, both ZIPRA and ZANLA had significantly built up their military capabilities. ZIPRA had Soviet-trained soldiers equipped with tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft systems, making them formidable in conventional warfare. • ZANLA, though focused more on guerrilla tactics, had also increased its firepower and numbers, benefiting from Chinese support and an expanded arsenal. • The Rhodesian military, now absorbed into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), was highly skilled and experienced but stretched thin in the face of multiple adversaries. The balance of power would have meant no side could easily achieve a decisive victory, leading to prolonged and bloody engagements. 2. Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Destruction • A conventional war with brigade-strength formations, heavy artillery, and mechanized units would have devastated towns, villages, and critical infrastructure. • Civilians, already suffering from years of guerrilla warfare, would have borne the brunt of such a conflict, with displacement, famine, and disease likely following in its wake. 3. Political Instability • The fledgling Zimbabwean government, already fragile, would have struggled to maintain control in the face of such widespread chaos. • The lack of cohesion between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces, combined with political divisions between Nkomo’s and Mugabe’s factions, would have further fueled instability, making governance almost impossible. 4. International Complications • Neighboring countries and international powers would likely have been drawn into the conflict, escalating it beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. • ZIPRA’s Soviet backing and ZANLA’s ties to China would have turned Zimbabwe into another Cold War proxy battlefield, prolonging the conflict and complicating resolution efforts. 5. No Clear Winner • As seen in other protracted wars, such as Angola’s civil war, no side would likely have emerged as a definitive winner. Instead, the conflict would have left the country in ruins, with none of the factions achieving their goals. • The very fabric of Zimbabwean society would have been torn apart, making reconstruction and reconciliation even more difficult. Conclusion It’s a sobering thought how close Zimbabwe came to descending into such a catastrophic conflict. The tensions and divisions of the time made peace precarious, and had the heavy weaponry and mechanized forces been fully unleashed, the cost would have been unthinkable. While the political and social struggles of the time were far from resolved, avoiding this bloodbath was a fortunate turn in a fragile moment of history.
@@nkwestM It quite ironic that that massive force build-up in Zambia and Mozambique was never used against the white opponents, but was kept in reserve only to be used against the brotherhood in late 1980 / early 1981 and maybe a bit in 1985, although that was mainly throwing black brothers-in-arms down Matabeleland mineshafts. RMY
I believe that large formations of enemy troops in conventional mode would have been far easier to deal with than hunting small groups of terrs ad nauseum mainly because we had an air force.
Sure, but the one comes first to soften the opponent and the other is the end game. All the various deal from 1976 onwards actually meant that the endgame was an election and acceptance and not a Saigon-type catastrophe. RMY
@@Toncor12 Your assertion that large formations of enemy troops in a conventional mode would have been easier to deal with than hunting small groups of guerrillas is overly simplistic, especially considering the budding strength of ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) during the Rhodesian Bush War. 1. ZIPRA’s Budding Air Force ZIPRA had invested heavily in creating a formidable air force, a strategy that was unprecedented among African liberation movements at the time. With training and equipment supplied by the Soviet Union and other allies, ZIPRA’s air capability was poised to grow into a significant threat. Had the war continued or shifted to a conventional theater, their air force could have challenged Rhodesia’s dominance, even rivaling the RAF’s presence in the region. The introduction of aerial capabilities would have changed the entire dynamic, reducing the Rhodesian forces’ reliance on their air superiority and forcing them into a more balanced confrontation. 2. The Transition to Conventional Warfare ZIPRA’s strategy focused on transitioning from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. They organized their forces into battalions, equipped them with tanks, heavy artillery, and surface-to-air missiles, and trained them for large-scale operations. This shift was a game-changer. If the war had progressed to this stage, Rhodesian forces, despite their professionalism and air support, would have struggled to adapt to a conventional battlefield where ZIPRA was equipped and ready for open engagements. 3. Soviet and Cuban Support The support ZIPRA received from the Soviet Union and Cuba was not limited to training. They were supplied with advanced weaponry, including SAM systems capable of targeting Rhodesian aircraft. This external support ensured that ZIPRA’s growing air force and conventional capabilities were sustainable. In a prolonged conflict, ZIPRA’s air defense systems could have neutralized Rhodesia’s air force advantage, making conventional formations far more challenging to engage. 4. Strategic Challenges for Rhodesia Large formations of conventional troops require significant logistical support, air superiority, and cohesive command structures. While Rhodesia excelled in asymmetric warfare against small guerrilla groups, a transition to conventional warfare would have exposed their vulnerabilities. A ZIPRA-led conventional assault, supported by air capabilities and heavy weaponry, would have overwhelmed Rhodesian resources and created a far more balanced military conflict. 5. The Psychological and Strategic Impact The mere existence of a ZIPRA air force and conventional strategy would have forced Rhodesian forces to divert resources from their counter-insurgency operations. The psychological impact of losing air superiority or engaging in conventional battles with well-trained ZIPRA forces would have eroded morale and strained Rhodesia’s already limited manpower and economic resources. Conclusion While hunting guerrillas was undoubtedly frustrating and resource-intensive, ZIPRA’s strategic shift toward conventional warfare, supported by an air force, posed a long-term existential threat to Rhodesian forces. Had the conflict continued, the combination of ZIPRA’s conventional tactics and air capabilities could have reshaped the theater of war, diminishing the Rhodesian forces advantage and potentially altering the outcome of the struggle.
As an observer from a land and time far away, all of those Rhodesian soldiers that stayed always try to justify why they sold their fellow Rhodies out. If they backed ZIPRA they'd have had more leverage in the coalition and Mugabe's bloody reign never would've reached the heights it did. I pity those soldiers that let down their countrymen.
You are not going to make many friends Tony because the details in this episode clearly indicates that a civil war occurred in the early years of Zim and some people i don't know why want to paint a pic of unprovoked and unwarranted the early Zim government by taking decisive action to avoid recurrence of such incidents again was not right
So we sweep history under the carpet to keep the peace do we and remove the 3 other episodes on the subject. Whats your point? Its not about making friends its history. Anyway what was not right im not sure what you mean by not right? Tony
@@Mutemafamily so when the 5th brigade descended on the Ndebele, indiscriminately killing people including women and children is to be written off as "decisive action" to stop an uprising that had already been halted? As Tony said it's about history not making friends by changing the facts to portray corrupt murderous actions in a better light.
Are u trying to justify Gukurahundi which happened in 83 way after Zipra was disbanded? There is a lot that happened in the National army between 81 and 83
@Abbonorvall in war situations, unfortunately, collateral damage is inevitable, especially when it's not a conventional war or against a regular army. The Inthumbane battles clearly shows not only the friction between Zanla and Zipra but how armed to the teeth were some of these rogue elements and I can not imagine any other effective way than applied but ofcoz with hindsight so many brilliant options and ideas easily pop up. The war mentality was still palpable, probably that is why they used the fifth brigade unfortunate option I didn't mean literally making friends, I mean not many warm up to the idea that a lot happened before 83 to suggest that there was a need to stop a potential civil war , most people want to start in 1983 , just like what Israel try to create a narrative that the Gaza genocide started on the 7th of Oct
Wayne Stevenson has just completed a full interview with Tony regarding Wayne's experiences in Entumbane 2. Out soon!
Well done Tony. One thing you captured was the confusion that existed but was coped with by the still organised ex rhodesian army and air force units.
Lionel Dyke was decorated as was Colin James the lynx pilot I think.
In my humble opinion Nkomo vastly underestimated the cunning and brutality of mugabe.
Wow Tony - You spoke about Mpofu siding where 2 trains were diverted to, in order for the "ordanance" to be off loaded and transferred to Gwaai mine? I was a Signal Technician (New Works) on R. R and after completing my N.S. (Intake 134 B coy) in September '74, I went back to work on R.R. I was sent to complete that exact Spur "MPOFU SIDING" - ( I was based at Dete Single Quarters and made the daily drive along the dirt service road to Mpofu and back- early every morning- returning in the afternoon! I installed the Signalling ( stop and Go lights etc) as well as the Points machines to enable the Rail traffic to be diverted from the main line into the Mpofu Spur line! It was """SECRET"" at that time - as the RR "clandestinely) carried arms and ammunition wagons ( as part of the goods trains loads going to Zambia) to that location, where said arms wagons were parked off in the spur- they were then offloaded by N.S. 1 Indep "masodjas" into trucks - and then driven the 4 kms to the air strip at Wankie Safari Lodge, for "safer air delivery" by RHAF Daks - to out lying Army/Police stations/depots along Kariba shoreline, where it was too risky by road freight! First time I have ever heard of MPOFU mentioned "in despatches" out side of my time there!!!
Interesting! Is there an interview in your story boet. Contact me if keen. Tony B
Thank you Tony for reinforcing the talks given in earlier episodes by John 'Hoppie' Hopkins and Mike Jones (A and Sp Coy, 1RAR respectively) regarding Entumbane 1 and 2.
The following 1RAR (1:1 Inf Bn) members were decorated for gallantry after Entumbane 2:
OC C Coy, 1RAR: Maj Lionel Dyke SCZ
OC Sp Coy, 1RAR: Temp Maj Anthony Husher BCZ (former Royal Green Jackets)
Acting OC D Coy, 1RAR: Lt Dave Hill BCZ (former U.S. Vietnam veteran)
Tp Comd Zimbabwe Armoured Regiment: Sgt Stephen 'Skippy' Devine BCZ (former 1RLI and an Australian). Devine was cited for a SCZ but, and for whatever reason this was, sadly, downgraded to a BCZ.
Flt Lt Colin James, (Hornet 2) Lynx pilot of 4 Sqn, AFZ was nominated for a SCZ but, apparently, this was vetoed by Air HQ because he defied orders to return to Thornhill choosing, rather, to remain overhead to provide 'top-cover' to his ground force colleagues. Happy for this to be corrected as I haven't been able to find his award in the Government Gazette that states otherwise.
What a shame things turned out as they did for our beloved Country! Had level heads, a genuine will on all sides and true democracy prevailed after Independence, who knows where Zimbabwe could have/should have been today. Cry, our beloved Country.
Thanks for sharing this information.
Brilliant Tony, very interesting.
Thanks boet!! ❤
Thanks Tony for doing this, Excellent!!! a great contribution to history
Thanks no#1 !!!!!
@Toncor12 💯👍
Very informative. Thanks Tony
Thanks boet ❤
It actually is a crying shame that the TF Battalions were not officially stood down wth a final parade as the regulars did
I remember this. I was still at school. We lived in Northend. Just over the road from Mzikazi.
I attended the local high school, Northlea.
There was a ZIPRA internment camp just over the road from the school.
I am glad you mentioned interfactional fighting during Chimurenga. There were never reall allies, and fought hammer and tongs against each other at every opportunity. What happened in Enbtumane gave Mugs the excuse to unleash 5th Bde. It would be very interesting to get some of the low down on the dissident campaign and SA operations but i understand there are sensitivities about people still living in Zimbabwe today.
I remember going up to the top field at Hamilton high school to take a look at the action in the distance as we could clearly hear the sound of rifle fire and explosions. We had a few days off school but had to work in the garden at home. We were not told about the teacher's booze being stolen but the headmaster Ian Armstrong (AKA Casper because of his white hair) would have been upset that his booze had been stolen. My parents were afraid that a stray mortar round could land on our house in the Eastern suburbs and my father was prepared to go to war if necessary. My brother was told to report for duty and took a photo for me of one of the T34 tanks plus he told us about the burrned out Zipra vehicles that had been towed back to Brady barracks and the burned bits of bodies inside them. He was not involved in the action and was stood down after a few days.
Feb 1980 I just dumped all my kit at Old Cranborne , after a last call up for training "New Army" ,put rifle on counter signature no interest and walked away never officially disbanded from 5RR
Was Sgt Skippy Devine the eland 90 on the esexvale road commander decorated?
Yes...with the BCZ.
Clearly without the Ex Rhodesian soldiers and officers this would have turned into an absolute circus. Thank the lord there was a disciplined and experienced force involved to take command of this incident.
Was the outcome good? Is this something to be celebrated ?
@@Wolf-hh4rv I think the out come of Rhodesia was terrible to be totally honest with you. Why you ask? Because thousands of Africans have been murdered by the ZANU PF murdering machine since independence that have gone totally unchecked by the international community because Zimbabwe was supposed to be the text book case of reconciliation, of peace, of total interracial integration. What a load of of absolute propaganda garbage. Today (factcheck me if you like) millions. . . . . Repeat millions of Black Zimbabweans have fled the country to live in white controlled countries. (The people they fought against to get majority rule, why did they not flee into neighbouring black countries?) Tells me a story, may not ring in your ears but it does mine. So in answer to your question. Yes it was a good outcome, a bloody fine outcome actually because if there had not been a disciplined expertly trained army in place with amazing military hardware I think that the death toll of civilians who were in lockdown during this time would have been in the thousands and infrastructure would have been destroyed rendering the capital city of Matabeleland useless. Does not take a brain surgeon to work that out. How old are you wolf-hh4rv. Were you even born in 1980? Are you even an African?
Don’t get me started on “Is this something to be celebrated”. . . . . . There’s one in every forum. 😡
@@Wolf-hh4rv I think the out come of Rhodesia was terrible to be totally honest with you. Why you ask? Because thousands of Africans have been murdered by the ZANU PF murdering machine since independence that have gone totally unchecked by the international community because Zimbabwe was supposed to be the text book case of reconciliation, of peace, of total interracial integration. What a load of of absolute propaganda garbage. Today (factcheck me if you like) millions. . . . . Repeat millions of Black Zimbabweans have fled the country to live in white controlled countries. (The people they fought against to get majority rule, why did they not flee into neighbouring black countries?) Tells me a story, may not ring in your ears but it does mine. So in answer to your question. Yes it was a good outcome, a bloody fine outcome actually because if there had not been a disciplined expertly trained army in place with amazing military hardware I think that the death toll of civilians who were in lockdown during this time would have been in the thousands and infrastructure would have been destroyed rendering the capital city of Matabeleland useless. Does not take a brain surgeon to work that out. How old are you wolf-hh4rv. Were you even born in 1980? Are you even an African?
Don’t get me started on “Is this something to be celebrated”. . . . . . There’s one in every forum. 😡
Great talk Tony, those were dark days and those if us who warned of these possibilities were told to keep our opinions to ourselves.
Thanks boet
Just a bit of a correction on the opening caption
The equipment at Essexvale was not captured, but was surrendered to Gvt after the fighting
And the Gwayi unit simply went back to Gwayi AP not the bush
Thanks for that. However if equipment is abandoned in the face of a superior enemy is it not considered "captured"?
Zipra and Zapu youths conducted door to door searches in western suburbs especially Pumula North & East a few days after the Entumbane clashes in 1980 beating and killing Shona speaking residents. We survived through our neighbour Mr Nkomo.
In Pumula?
You are lying
@@rozvi9728 We lived with our Shona neighbours during that period in those times we didnt see any killings
I dont think AP Mike was at Gwai River more like Lupane.
Thanks for another great video. Do the Matabele vs Shona tensions still exist today or have they managed to sort it out over the years?
Visited Zim a couple of years ago. Speaking to some Ndebele who helped out our fishing- they very definitely harbour a grudge towards the Shona. They told me a lot of Shona in Bulawayo, that really pissed them off. They feel bullied basically.
The tension between the Matabele and Shona tribes still persists today because no proper reconciliation has ever been achieved. One of the key reasons is the failure to openly acknowledge the Gukurahundi genocide, where thousands of Ndebele people were killed in the 1980s. Without genuine acknowledgment or compensation for the victims and their families, these wounds remain deeply embedded in the national consciousness.
Additionally, the marginalization of the Matabeleland region continues to exacerbate these tensions. There is a lack of meaningful support for the participation of the Ndebele people in the economy, civil service, and national development, further fueling resentment.
The superficial reconciliation efforts that have been attempted are often seen as acts of political grandstanding, lacking sincerity or a real commitment to healing the divisions. Proper reconciliation requires truth-telling, justice, and reparations, but these have been absent from the government’s approach.
What makes the situation worse is that many of the chief proponents of division during Gukurahundi remain in power. Their refusal to acknowledge their past actions or take responsibility ensures that these historical grievances remain unresolved.
Until there is a genuine effort to address these issues, including the marginalization and historical injustices, the tensions between the Matabele and Shona are unlikely to dissipate. True reconciliation is not just about words; it requires bold and transformative actions.
If it wasn’t for the intervention of the former Rhodesian soldiers, the ZANLA ex-soldiers would likely not have stood a chance in open warfare against the battle-hardened ZIPRA forces. ZIPRA had superior training, equipment, and conventional military capabilities, which included tanks and aircraft that were a legacy of their Soviet and Eastern Bloc allies. In contrast, ZANLA forces were primarily trained in guerrilla tactics and were less adept at conventional warfare.
The intervention shifted the balance, allowing ZANLA and its allies to suppress ZIPRA. Without this external support, the outcome of the conflict could have been drastically different, potentially altering the trajectory of Zimbabwe’s post-independence political landscape.
I remember the talk amongst our parents, and other adults, who were hoping the Rhodesian forces would join ZIPRA in removing mugabe.
@ The Rhodesians indeed feared that ZIPRA, with its strong ties to the Soviet Union, might introduce a communist regime if it gained power. This fear of communism, which was heavily associated with ZIPRA’s main sponsor, led the Rhodesians to align themselves with Mugabe and ZANLA, believing he would be the lesser evil of the two.
However, history has proven how misguided that belief was. Mugabe’s leadership ultimately brought widespread suffering, authoritarian rule, economic collapse, and human rights abuses that devastated Zimbabwe. In hindsight, the choice of the “lesser evil” turned out to have catastrophic consequences, leaving many to wonder how different Zimbabwe’s path might have been if events had unfolded otherwise.
I still do it "I called it the "Wyat Earp" seat
Don’t think Rhodesian soldiers should have ever got involved in Zipra v ZANU issues
I dont believe the assertion that the Shona are peaceful they just didnt have the mean and skill then.Look at them know and tell me if they are as peaceful..what has changed?
They have the Physical population numbers - when the settlers arrived, the Matebele were soundly beaten in several recorded battles - losing thousands of warriors and the Matebele "raiding parties disappeared . The Shonas then outnumbered the vanquished Matebele and their numbers exploded - as did their attitude. They hated the Matebele - and once the Mugabe Gvt took power?( with all the military might and control) the Shona powered Gvt still harbouring seething resentment, led to the Gukurahundi massacres. [ WIKI: Motive: Anti-Ndbele sentiment, Anti-Kalanga sentiment, Racism, Tribalism, crushing dissent to the Mugabe regime ] THATS WHAT CHANGED!
Have you read early missionary reports on them? Very placcid people. They have developed skills since the Matabele raided them.
They are what they are.......part of the savages!!
@@petervanzyl518 Good answer Peter.Yes the Matebele were beaten by the settlers...as hardened warriors they couldnt stand the weaponry at that time.
Peaceful nomadic?
Rozvi means Plunderers and destroyers and Mwenemutapa means Master Pillager
Those were not misnomers
Zipra were hammered by the RAR who were doing the job that they were trained to do. It had nothing to do with politics. The same thing would have happened to them had they tried invade Rhodesia from Zambia in 1979
@@nickcarter-qf9hi While the RAR was a highly trained and disciplined force, it’s essential to consider the context of the Entumbane skirmishes and the broader dynamics between ZIPRA and ZANLA. The clashes were not a measure of ZIPRA’s full military capabilities but rather the result of frustration and disillusionment among ZIPRA forces. They felt betrayed by ZANLA’s actions and the lack of a genuine commitment to integration within the newly formed Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).
The Entumbane skirmishes were chaotic and uncoordinated, stemming from deep mistrust and simmering tensions rather than being a strategically planned engagement. ZIPRA forces had been sidelined despite their significant contributions to the liberation struggle and were being forced into a union with ZANLA forces who showed little intention of cooperating or respecting ZIPRA’s role. This political undercurrent cannot be ignored when evaluating the events.
It’s also worth noting that ZIPRA had proven themselves capable in previous engagements and were far from a force to be underestimated. Their frustration at Entumbane was a symptom of broader political betrayal rather than a reflection of their military readiness or discipline. Had ZIPRA been in a more organized and unified state, the outcome of any conflict, whether with the RAR or ZANLA, could have been very different.
Politics as always caused the fight. It's always about Politics.
Nkomo stopped the fighting
Zipra were not fighting RAR in 1980
They were fighting Zanla
RAR should have stayed out
As an external, but militarily-oriented outsider who has taken an acute interest in Rhodesia since before military service in 1976, I am left with the impression of how this conflict escalated militarily from 1966 to the mid-1980s.
Here in 1980/1981 we are dealing with formations of thousands of ZIPRA, ZANLA and ZA troops with main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry combat vehicles, large calibre artillery, anti-armour systems, 81 mm mortars and an air force.
Even the last days of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in late 1979 this was still mainly an insurgency war of AK-47 and landmine vs FN FAL assault rifle and Alouette helicopter.
It makes me think how fortunate we are that things ended tamely and without full force of heavy weaponry and brigade-strength formations of mechanised infranty.
RMY
It’s true that had the conflict escalated into full-scale conventional warfare with the heavy weaponry and mechanized infantry available in 1980/81, it would have been a war of attrition with devastating consequences for all sides. Such a scenario would likely have resulted in immense loss of life, widespread destruction, and no clear winner in the end.
Here are some reasons why:
1. Well-Matched Forces
• By 1980, both ZIPRA and ZANLA had significantly built up their military capabilities. ZIPRA had Soviet-trained soldiers equipped with tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft systems, making them formidable in conventional warfare.
• ZANLA, though focused more on guerrilla tactics, had also increased its firepower and numbers, benefiting from Chinese support and an expanded arsenal.
• The Rhodesian military, now absorbed into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), was highly skilled and experienced but stretched thin in the face of multiple adversaries.
The balance of power would have meant no side could easily achieve a decisive victory, leading to prolonged and bloody engagements.
2. Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Destruction
• A conventional war with brigade-strength formations, heavy artillery, and mechanized units would have devastated towns, villages, and critical infrastructure.
• Civilians, already suffering from years of guerrilla warfare, would have borne the brunt of such a conflict, with displacement, famine, and disease likely following in its wake.
3. Political Instability
• The fledgling Zimbabwean government, already fragile, would have struggled to maintain control in the face of such widespread chaos.
• The lack of cohesion between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces, combined with political divisions between Nkomo’s and Mugabe’s factions, would have further fueled instability, making governance almost impossible.
4. International Complications
• Neighboring countries and international powers would likely have been drawn into the conflict, escalating it beyond Zimbabwe’s borders.
• ZIPRA’s Soviet backing and ZANLA’s ties to China would have turned Zimbabwe into another Cold War proxy battlefield, prolonging the conflict and complicating resolution efforts.
5. No Clear Winner
• As seen in other protracted wars, such as Angola’s civil war, no side would likely have emerged as a definitive winner. Instead, the conflict would have left the country in ruins, with none of the factions achieving their goals.
• The very fabric of Zimbabwean society would have been torn apart, making reconstruction and reconciliation even more difficult.
Conclusion
It’s a sobering thought how close Zimbabwe came to descending into such a catastrophic conflict. The tensions and divisions of the time made peace precarious, and had the heavy weaponry and mechanized forces been fully unleashed, the cost would have been unthinkable. While the political and social struggles of the time were far from resolved, avoiding this bloodbath was a fortunate turn in a fragile moment of history.
@@nkwestM
It quite ironic that that massive force build-up in Zambia and Mozambique was never used against the white opponents, but was kept in reserve only to be used against the brotherhood in late 1980 / early 1981 and maybe a bit in 1985, although that was mainly throwing black brothers-in-arms down Matabeleland mineshafts.
RMY
I believe that large formations of enemy troops in conventional mode would have been far easier to deal with than hunting small groups of terrs ad nauseum mainly because we had an air force.
Sure, but the one comes first to soften the opponent and the other is the end game.
All the various deal from 1976 onwards actually meant that the endgame was an election and acceptance and not a Saigon-type catastrophe.
RMY
@@Toncor12 Your assertion that large formations of enemy troops in a conventional mode would have been easier to deal with than hunting small groups of guerrillas is overly simplistic, especially considering the budding strength of ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) during the Rhodesian Bush War.
1. ZIPRA’s Budding Air Force
ZIPRA had invested heavily in creating a formidable air force, a strategy that was unprecedented among African liberation movements at the time. With training and equipment supplied by the Soviet Union and other allies, ZIPRA’s air capability was poised to grow into a significant threat. Had the war continued or shifted to a conventional theater, their air force could have challenged Rhodesia’s dominance, even rivaling the RAF’s presence in the region. The introduction of aerial capabilities would have changed the entire dynamic, reducing the Rhodesian forces’ reliance on their air superiority and forcing them into a more balanced confrontation.
2. The Transition to Conventional Warfare
ZIPRA’s strategy focused on transitioning from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. They organized their forces into battalions, equipped them with tanks, heavy artillery, and surface-to-air missiles, and trained them for large-scale operations. This shift was a game-changer. If the war had progressed to this stage, Rhodesian forces, despite their professionalism and air support, would have struggled to adapt to a conventional battlefield where ZIPRA was equipped and ready for open engagements.
3. Soviet and Cuban Support
The support ZIPRA received from the Soviet Union and Cuba was not limited to training. They were supplied with advanced weaponry, including SAM systems capable of targeting Rhodesian aircraft. This external support ensured that ZIPRA’s growing air force and conventional capabilities were sustainable. In a prolonged conflict, ZIPRA’s air defense systems could have neutralized Rhodesia’s air force advantage, making conventional formations far more challenging to engage.
4. Strategic Challenges for Rhodesia
Large formations of conventional troops require significant logistical support, air superiority, and cohesive command structures. While Rhodesia excelled in asymmetric warfare against small guerrilla groups, a transition to conventional warfare would have exposed their vulnerabilities. A ZIPRA-led conventional assault, supported by air capabilities and heavy weaponry, would have overwhelmed Rhodesian resources and created a far more balanced military conflict.
5. The Psychological and Strategic Impact
The mere existence of a ZIPRA air force and conventional strategy would have forced Rhodesian forces to divert resources from their counter-insurgency operations. The psychological impact of losing air superiority or engaging in conventional battles with well-trained ZIPRA forces would have eroded morale and strained Rhodesia’s already limited manpower and economic resources.
Conclusion
While hunting guerrillas was undoubtedly frustrating and resource-intensive, ZIPRA’s strategic shift toward conventional warfare, supported by an air force, posed a long-term existential threat to Rhodesian forces. Had the conflict continued, the combination of ZIPRA’s conventional tactics and air capabilities could have reshaped the theater of war, diminishing the Rhodesian forces advantage and potentially altering the outcome of the struggle.
As an observer from a land and time far away, all of those Rhodesian soldiers that stayed always try to justify why they sold their fellow Rhodies out. If they backed ZIPRA they'd have had more leverage in the coalition and Mugabe's bloody reign never would've reached the heights it did. I pity those soldiers that let down their countrymen.
@@sennest this has to be one of the most inaccurate and skewed observations I have ever seen.
Ex Rhodies said the same thing
They regretted helping Mugabe
You are not going to make many friends Tony because the details in this episode clearly indicates that a civil war occurred in the early years of Zim and some people i don't know why want to paint a pic of unprovoked and unwarranted the early Zim government by taking decisive action to avoid recurrence of such incidents again was not right
So we sweep history under the carpet to keep the peace do we and remove the 3 other episodes on the subject. Whats your point? Its not about making friends its history. Anyway what was not right im not sure what you mean by not right? Tony
@@Mutemafamily so when the 5th brigade descended on the Ndebele, indiscriminately killing people including women and children is to be written off as "decisive action" to stop an uprising that had already been halted?
As Tony said it's about history not making friends by changing the facts to portray corrupt murderous actions in a better light.
Are u trying to justify Gukurahundi which happened in 83 way after Zipra was disbanded?
There is a lot that happened in the National army between 81 and 83
@bekisto82 it has been bubbling under the surface since 1980
@Abbonorvall in war situations, unfortunately, collateral damage is inevitable, especially when it's not a conventional war or against a regular army.
The Inthumbane battles clearly shows not only the friction between Zanla and Zipra but how armed to the teeth were some of these rogue elements and I can not imagine any other effective way than applied but ofcoz with hindsight so many brilliant options and ideas easily pop up.
The war mentality was still palpable, probably that is why they used the fifth brigade unfortunate option
I didn't mean literally making friends, I mean not many warm up to the idea that a lot happened before 83 to suggest that there was a need to stop a potential civil war , most people want to start in 1983 , just like what Israel try to create a narrative that the Gaza genocide started on the 7th of Oct