Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Perception
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- Опубликовано: 13 июл 2022
- In this video, Dr. David Peña-Guzmán discusses key features of Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, drawing from early essays written by Merleau-Ponty in the 1930s. These features later go on to frame the French phenomenologist's book The Phenomenology of Perception.
This guy communicates information very effectively! Pleasure to listen to.
Speaks in a very weird way. I was distracted and could not follow.
That was a great explanation. Thank you.
an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty.
Wow, now my new interest is perception, I like the idea that perception as a child and adult is different, such a new concept to look into
Thank you so much for the video; your knowledge is greatly appreciated and has been incredibly helpful!
Thank you for sharing. I hope to have some discussing online video chat on your channel.
Science has evolved so much and intersecting with philosophy. Te matter of perception in Neuro is much different now that 100 years ago as the meaning of time and space. New thinkers will need to figure that out both versed in science and philosophy.
Well done, thank you
Very good presentation.
I'm a bit skeptical of the whole move away from Kant in this period though.
can i ask you if there is the transcript??
I cant find these early essays anywhere
Does Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of perception a form of direct realism (naive realism) or indirect realism (representationalism)?
Kant the phenomenologist?
Yeah I had the same thought… I’m pretty sure early interpreters thought that he was phenomenalist idealist a la Berkeley but that has since been supervened by other interpretations of his philosophy I.e from Henry Allison among others.
maybe it was a lapsus, confusing him with Husserl, both germans
🌷😇🌷
Maurice MP's book was Heideggerian NOT Kantian.
It is not wise to dispense with the matter/form distinction. Neither am I arguing for naïve realism. Somethings which exist conceptually can be denied genuine material expression. That is not cause to abandon a useful axiom. The phenomenon of becoming can not be explained outside of dualism. That polarity does not need physical rootedness anymore than irrational numbers need to be physically handled to understand indebtedness or want. This idea of brute physicality is the wall against which philosophy breaks it's nose. A preposterous desire to have real world corollaries pushes modern thinkers to believe that ancients were hasty. This reminds me of the scavenger hunt for unified field theory. We need to knock on the wood of our thoughts as superstition. That is why philosophy has come to a screeching halt with the aid of fools like Habermas. Truth is not found in appearance, so it makes no difference how we apply it's already analogous import. It is reason that accelerates insight, not the most accurate lay of the land.
Aren't these just as arbitrary as Kant's transcendental categories? Assuming that one's perception is accurate regarding things like figure/background and depth begs the question of "how do you know that?"
Here's the problem in a nutshell: you've got a set of things labeled "things I know." I come along and ask you "how do you know that you know these things?" You can't reference inside the set, as that would be viciously circular. You can't say "I just do," as that would be affirming arbitrariness as part of philosophical argumentation, which would affirm contradictions. You can't reference outside of the set, as you don't know those things.
You seem to associate "arbitrary" with "unmediated".
@@fede2 I don't see exactly what you mean by that. "Unmediated" replacing "arbitrary" could lead to a number of interpretations.
By "arbitrary" here, I mean that these things (Husserl's transcendental reductions/Kant's transcendental categories) are taken to be foundations of experience without justification.
@@bebopbountyhead "...without justification". Eh?? The justification is that they are required in order for experience to be intelligible. They're both pretty clear on that...
@@bebopbountyhead Their internal coherence to experience itself. Their relation to ontological primitives is another story though.
@@noahlibra Seeming coherence, genuine correspondence, and facticity aren't the same things.
In order to distinguish between parts of experience for the sake of thinking or talking about them, one must delineate between them.
To take these delineations as defining basic elements of experience is to put them beyond that which can be questioned. However, this leads to the question "how do you know that your delineations are true?" not being answerable. It's the same problem that all foundationalist systems of inquiry. Saying "I can't think of it differently" isn't a justification for knowledge of the truth of something.
If, on the other hand, one decides to say that the delineations are contrived, then they're left with the same problem of not being able to confirm or deny any claims about their experience.