Who's to Blame for the Failure of Operation Market Garden? BattleStorm 8/8
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- Опубликовано: 29 сен 2015
- Who's fault was it that the tanks never got to Arnhem? Let's see what historians think.
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Sources:
John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009.
Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004.
Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007.
Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009.
Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014.
Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011.
Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974
Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958.
Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.
Music used:
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Damnation by Jens Kiilstofte machinimasound.com/music/damn...
Escape from the Temple by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound.com/music/esca...
Incursion by Per Kiilstofte machinimasound.com/music/incu...
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I removed my previous comment and will simply say that this is indeed the most in-depth, detailed, and thorough documentary of an operation that shared many one sided views and speculations about what really happened. No one, and I mean, no one could have done this better than TIK. I am amazed at the amount of detailed information of this battle period you were able to document in this series. As a current American Airborne soldier who has served and conducted many jumps in the 82nd in recent past, to be able to watch and learn of the division's history is priceless and valued. Thank you for an extravagant effort! Job well done!!
+Charles C. Thank you for your kind comments! I'm not sure I saw your last comment, but yes I set out to make it as detailed and in-depth as possible, so I'm thrilled you enjoyed it. I've been reading up on this battle for years and it was an obvious choice for me to do a documentary on this, since a lot of the documentaries on TV spout the same opinion over and over, and only vaguely explore what happened at Eindhoven and Nijmegen.
I'm doing more documentaries like this. The next one is on Operation Compass, but my intention right now is to work my way through North Africa (including Tunisia where the 82nd first deployed), then Italy, Normandy (where they deployed again)... then cover battles like Crete 1941, and generally work my way up until I'm tackling bigger Operations like the Fall of France or Barbarossa. Not sure if I'll keep to that order or skip ahead for some... but I hope you can find the ones without the 82nd or airborne forces as enjoyable :)
The ability of the Germans to take a mishmash of broken, depleted, and training units from a wild assortment of backgrounds, and organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.
I heard this was paralleled on the fire-team level, too.
Model (the German commander) was outstanding at improvising. He was Hitler's fireman and would be put at collapsing locations for the Germans throughout the war. He was the one that gets the responsibility of improvising the defense. Browning ignored the German Armour, allowed the long distance for the British landing zone, and only one drop for the British landing. He should have pushed for a second drop (or at least a partial) on the first day. A drop closer to the Arnhem Bridge would have saved time and allowed a faster taking of the bridge with more troops. It would have prevented the weather from causing as many problems. The British needed more and better anti-armour weapons at the bridge. British weapons at the bridge were very poor and ran out of ammo thus allowing the Germans to move up point blank and destroy Frost's group. Working radios with the British would have allowed them to contact Headquarters and adjust the resupply drops. This caused huge problems and wasted resources. Gavin should have taken his bridge, but Brown was the senior commander and was there. It was his responsibility and he did not command. Brown wasted aircraft dropping his headquarters (which did nothing). Those planes should have dropped more combat forces that could have been used to go for the bridge. That bridge was only secured by about a dozen German soldiers at the beginning of the battle. Why didn't they use jeeps like the British plan for Arnhem to quickly secure the Bridge? Surprise and quick movement is vital for airborne troops. The III Corps was too slow. They needed to take the losses necessary to get to Arnhem. They took the time to go up the road and would not risk moving at night. They allowed their movement to be slowed by Dutch civilians. They should have been prepared to move the Bailey Bridge up quickly and the boats. They were unable to improvise. They stopped and waited for British infantry support once they got across the Bridge. They should have used American troops form the 82nd and/or had back up infantry move through various parts of Nijmegen so their tanks could have moved forward immediately. I believe Browning should take the most blame. There was plenty of blame to spread around. Montgomery did not give time to plan and fix problems. Hitler did the same thing at the Battle of the Bulge a few months later. Montgomery was usually know as a very cautious general that was slow and over-planned. He was horrible at Caen and beat Rommel because he heavily outnumbered Rommel. Patton would have made Market Garden work. He would have improvised and pushed through.The British should have gotten American Bazooka's to help their airborne with anti tank defense. The piatt (piat) was horrible. American radios could have been supplied to the British if there was any question about the radios and resupply was a huge issue. Improvising required communication to say the drop zones had been lost.The British failed to improvise as needed. The British lost most of their 1st Airborne because of their many of mistakes.
Don Gilleo uncletigger exactly. Everyone looks at it as a British or allied failure at planning level. Reality, it was a German victory.
@Mark Corfield The American bazooka was useless against Panthers and Tigers unless a point-blank shot against their rear armor was possible whereas the piat fared much better against German armor, but it was bulky, relatively time consuming to use, and was wildly inaccurate at anything beyond thirty meters. Cheers!
Don Gilleo
The Germans usually excelled at improvisation and aggressive, ad hoc response.
The fact that their infantry, with the possible exception of the SS Panzergrenadiers, were a far cry indeed from the men of ‘41 and ‘42 makes their victory all the more remarkable.
Basically, I think the operation failed was because too many factors--capture of bridges, arrival of units, etc.--had to go perfectly, Plus, the Germans fought well. I think too many Allied generals believed the Germans were beaten and on the run, and didn't realize they could still put up a fight.
In short, it was a ‘rotten plan’ and one of the many reasons for that is that Montgomery under-estimated the German’s ability to respond to the campaign.
The debates will go on.. and on.. and on. Having served 20yrs in the British Army, one thing springs to mind - the number of radio systems that have failed to work as required, been delayed coming into service, running massively over cost..... seems little has changed.
@Clive Sinclair My hats off to you for 20 years.I was 4 years US Navy.The main thing that steered me from being a lifer was you still had to play politics to get anywhere in the military. Even at the enlisted level.
Clive Sinclair
The radios never worked because of the high iron content in the soil, which was not known.
@@MrBluecollar8 Agree, politics kill soldiers. ATW
@@rayalmendarez2076 Trump killed Soleimani
And there was no WW3
So trump accidentally reduced tensions in the Middle East
Hi TIK, just wanted to say your videos are brilliant; very informative and well researched. Rare in this day and age to get such a thorough and balanced perspective. Well done sir, keep up the good work
An excellent overview of the battle. That said, I tend to disagree with your conclusions.
I feel that the biggest problem with your theory is treating XXX Corps as a monolithic entity. When you say they reached X at Y time, it really means advance elements reached X at Y time - not the whole Corps. Thus, I feel the focus on the actions of Gavin and the 82nd is really a distraction concealing the inability to move sufficient men and tanks forward fast enough to relieve Arnhem (much less push deep into Germany).
Even if Gavin had taken and held the bridge on day 1, given German counterattacks along the highway and their defense of the island, I'm unsure XXX Corps would have been able to reach Arnhem in time. And if it did, it would still have to fight its way through Arnhem in a battle every bit as difficult as Nijmegen and then continue its advance on a narrow front in the face of heavy resistance. Thus, I believe the plan was doomed from the start and should never have been attempted.
However, in watching your series, I was also extremely impressed by the ability of the Germans to quickly react and target all of the key Allied positions. In the face of a less competent enemy, Gavin's time table would likely have been perfectly adequate.
Hmm, never thought of it that way. Good comment
Excellent comment
I am no historian or military expert, but I think laying the entirety of the failure at Gavin's feet when we already established that the plan was entirety flimsy from the get go and his commanders also having had made several blunders even getting here in the first place. Not that Gavin is at all free of blame here
Gen Horrocks, in his auto-biography, tells how the road was never secure, and lead elements had to keep returning along the road to help repel German attacks. He relates that only THREE tanks managed to cross Nijmegen bridge after it was taken, and one of those had to be manned by US airborne troops, because all the others had gone back to repel a German attack on the road, which is the real reason that XXX Corps did not push on to Arnhem that night; Three tanks were not going to get very far.
Thanks for posting. Market Garden has always fascinated me since watching the motion picture "A Bridge Too Far" as a child. I have just begun to read the book "It Never Snows In September". Thanks again for all your hard work.
I guess my big question is why Gavin and possibly Brown decided that there were a thousand German tanks in the forest? What was their evidence for this enemy force?
Historian Victor Davis Hanson's new book on WWII says M-G was "...flawed from the outset: bad or warped intelligence, poor weather forecasting, and poor planning..." By XXX Corps' own timetable, by the time they reached the Nijmegen bridge, they were suppose to already be in Arnham. Once across the bridge, the armor division waited 18 hours before renewing their attack. Gavin felt he needed to take two other bridges and the high ground, Groesbeek heights, to protect the LZ for reinforcements. As it was, the LZ was attacked and had to be retaken while the reinforcements were delayed by weather. In hindsight, it would have been easier to take the bridge sooner. But to say the M-G failure we due to Gavin while there were so many flaws from planning to command decisions is, well, flawed.
Sosabowski pointed all the flaws of this plan during planing and Montgomery ignored his imput and after all his flaws showed to be true Montgomery lied about Sosabowski and his man and made a scapegoat out of him and the guy died in poverty and until 2006 British was doing everyithing to block any recognition of Sosabowski and his man action during operation Market Garden. In 2006 Dutch made the move to put some light on the truth but it is not the truth that British are ready to accept.
Airborne operations on this scale are just insanely complicated. Add another layer of complexity of mixing in armored forces and ground infantry. Add a timetable with no flexibility. Add another layer of confusion with an allied chain of command. It's astonishing that it had any success at all. One has to ask what was Monty thinking. He was a ground pounder with no apparent Airborne experience. The plan just screams risk. I'd lay the blame at his feet.
And yet at the time of it's planning, all commanders (Both British and US) fully believed the plan would succeed up to and including Ike.
I would have to blame Montgomery, or his superior , Ike. Orders flow down from the top, not up from the bottom. Other than that quite simple explanation, it comes down to a combination of factors. Everything, i repeat, everything had to go right for the allies. The Germans simply had to delay the Allies advance, which should have been expected. Since it was 1 road thru enemy territory, that was the access of advance.
Agreed. Everything had to go right and it did not not.
Ike originally was hesitant about the plan from Montgomery. Eventually, he gave into the operation.
The higher the level of enthusiasm of the line level commanders the more stringent should be the review by their commanders.
Monty would have claimed the laurels if it had worked so he carries the can for the failure!
I agree that those wanting to criticise Monty should throw a little at Eisenhower too, he was very 'hands off' to begin with. I think all the Allied troops did the best they could and deserve credit, but even legendary elite soldiers from democracies are not the same as those from dictatorships. Guards Armoured were not an SS Panzer division and the fine Airbirne troops British and American were not Fallschirmjaeger from a culture that worshipped war
Highly informative. Kudos on an excellent, well-reasoned video.
1) Unrealistically optimistic plan
2) Fierce and competent German resistance
Hi again, just ran into a quote from Montgomery concerning Market Garden.
"There were many reasons why we did not gain complete success at Arnhem. The following in my view were the main ones. First. The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as the spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank designed to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr - the one objective in the West which the Germans could not afford to lose. There is no doubt in my mind that Eisenhower always wanted to give priority to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered this to be done, and he thought that it was being done. It was not being done. Second. The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective - the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and 1st Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so. Third. The weather. This turned against us after the first day and we could not carry out much of the later airborne programme. But weather is always an uncertain factor, in war and in peace. This uncertainty we all accepted. It could only have been offset, and the operation made a certainty, by allotting additional resources to the project, so that it became an Allied and not merely a British project. Fourth. The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was quickly brought into action against the 1st Airborne Division." The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery' (1958)
In answer to your three options:
1. It was a hasty plan, conducted with severe restrictions (the German rout and Brereton's lift plans.)
2. Your enemy always has a vote in your success. (Model and Bittrichs presence so close to objectives)
3. Loose sight, loose the fight. (Gavin at Nijmegen forgot he was a commando leader, lost sight of his primary objective.)
These are all well known, well travelled truths of combat, taught in some way at every leadership school. They are also the combat soldier's trade and lot.
In the Falklands war a young RM Captain was explaining the landing plan to his men "If the SBS signal with a green lamp, it means there is no enemy and we go in unopposed. If they signal with a red lamp, it means there is enemy and we go in opposed." "What if there's no signal Sir!" says one of his men. "That means the Argies have killed the SBS and are waiting for us in their thousands." "What do we do then Sir?" "We go in anyway!"
You can only hope to mitigate your problems, not eliminate them, and being a solider if a higher rank says go, you go whatever the risk. This was a problem for Guderian in 1940 over much the same ground, and he won taking greater risks the other way around. They were factors at Dunkirk, 1st and 2nd El-Alamein, Sicily, Anzio, D-Day, Goodwood and Cobra. Not all of them victories, all of them bigger than Market Garden, each one a necessary attempt at going forwards.
Points 1 and 2 are to be expected in any fight. Despite all the planning problems and the swift and vicious german response, XXX Corps was on the Southern bank of the Waal in force, on schedule, while 1st Airborne still had two beachheads North of the Rhine.
Point 3 is why this necessary, hasty, restricted plan in the face of a fearsome enemy didn't come off. Gavin's conduct was not that of a Commando leader and he dramatically missed the intentions behind his orders.
Ignore your flanks, that is the spirit of commando ops. Go for the jugular, swiftly and violently, ignore all distractions from your objective. Surprise and the violence of action can carry the day against a superior foe. He ignored all this to dig in against an unknown threat, that didn't materialise. He was attempting to fight a conventional light infantry battle, 50 miles behind enemy lines against a suspected armoured opponent.
Holding the high ground is Buford at Gettysburg - different war, different situation, different orders, different responsibilities. If there were Panzer divisions in the Reichswald, Gavin had a far better chance of holding out in the dense urban area of Nijmegen town. He stood a better chance of survival if he took the bridges and stopped reinforcement from the North. A simple way of cutting down his engaged front.
If he had to hold onto landing zones, why must they be on the vulnerable Groesbeek? The 504th had landed around Grave, why not hold those sites for the second lift? Or use the small airfield nearby? He thought light infantry divisional artillery would hold off a mass of German armour coming from the East? The whole of XXX corps would have foundered in the face of 1,000 panzers. No part of his plan makes sense.
Groesbeek was a XXX corps objective. The bridges and town were the 82nds objective. If Gavin couldn't see that, and if Browning couldn't make that clear, they are responsible for failure of Market Garden.
If Nijmegen had been taken on time, If the Guards had got to Elst for day three, Market Garden might have been pulled off.
If it had, we wouldn't be arguing over poor intel, Browning flying in on day 1, the single road, XXX Corps tea breaks....etc... the 9th and 10thSS PzDiv would be described as 'shattered, lacking all forms of equipment'. We would be talking about bold, imaginative planning and swift violence of action. Many victories, German and Allied, had been based on poor intel, single line logistics, hasty and rash actions and plenty of tea had been drunk up to this point.
Kan we haz remayk titled _A Bridge Right There, WTF_ naow?
A strong finish, as anticipated. I'll be rewatching the series this weekend and I'll come back to you with as much feedback as I can.
+Svenpaa Magnus Novus excellent! I look forward to hearing it :) be brutally honest!
Model and his fellow officers at first thought that the target was themselves as they watched the planes fly overhead and imagined what they could have achieved with such great resources.
Excellent documentary TIK. In fact it got me into another playthrough of CC2 xD (God I had forgotten how hard it was to hold onto Arhnem on the last few days, I ended with a few buildings and a bunch of Recce and PIAT teams).
Good luck on the next project, I can barely wait to see what you come up with!
+RadGGaming Haha, i had to do just the same just to spend time between episodes! :D
whats cc2?
Close Combat II: A Bridge to Far....It was a top down war game. Squad level simulation of the operation. It came out in 1996 . There is a long running series of the games that simulate other battles CC3 was the Russian front for instance.
Gavin screwed the pooch all right. But his superiors should have given him solid written orders that the bridges were his #1, #2, and #3 priorities and anything else should come after the bridge was secured. "Get the bridge or don't come back", in short.
Planning an airborne operation so big you were incapable of delivering ALL the airborne assets in one day is also a big point of failure. You can NEVER count on the weather co-operating all across that large an operational area for three full days.
That the Germans managed to do as well as they did with literal 'bottom of the barrel' troops against elite airborne units is just the icing on the cake.
Great stuff TIK, I just got to this and it's absolutely your best work yet. Keep up the great work!
+Agrippa Maxentius thanks Agrippa! Really glad you think that :D How's things with you??
*****
Work work work xD. But I guess that's life ;D. I would love you to do one eventually on the German "Police" units during WW2. Mind you these are not SS units, but rearguard units that fought against partisans etc. There is very little info on them that I can find, I'd love to know if they were just as responsible for warcrimes as the SS or if they were different. Keep up the great videos!
A number of factors, but a paramount one with the planning and assumptions made up to Sept 44. People naturally think linearly and don't appreciate dynamic factors upon initial review. Previous two months went very well for the allies and they made a series of assumptions based on the recent successes, a borderline defeated German army, etc. Also, as they approached Germany, and the Ruhr particularly, the supply lines for the Germans shortened and probably became more secure, where the Allies were longer and easier to be disabled. The optimistic assumptions and this failure to appreciate the proximity to Germany, led to an acceptance of certain assumptions, disregard of vital intel, etc. A number of contributing factors.
I have always said that Gavin was at fault.........and he was. I am happy to been vindictated at last about this issue.
Great review of the battle. All I will say is that hindsight is the perfect science.
And so it ends. Thanks for the amazing documentary, TIK!
+Dowly it does, but there will be more :)
Political pressure allowed Montgomery to launch this blunder Ike did not want it but was forced into it. Ike had to stop pattons 3rd army which was almost to the German border for this epic failure
Even if the allies did capture Nijmegen, the delay at Son would still wreak havoc on XXX Corps advance, instead of a German defense based on Nijmegen, the Germans could establish a blocking line on the Island, perhaps in the vicinity of Elst, which could still be as just a hindrance to relieving the 1st Airborne. Who without adequate resupply, communications and reinforcement would find it hard to maintain their position. Also XXX Corp would still be just as susceptible along Hell's Highway regardless. A problem which couldn't be resolved unless the appropriate flanking corps could exert pressure on the German positions along the salient.
+KingSNAFU Good points. The point about Son is that the 101st can't really be blamed. They went for it, and the Germans blew it up. But at least they went for it. The difference with Nijmegen is that the 82nd didn't go for it until it was too late in the day. You could certainly argue that the capture of Nijmegen on day 1 would still have lead to a defeat around Elst rather than at Nijmegen. It's reasonable to assume though that XXX Corps would have had a better chance had Nijmegen bridge been taken early, or at least the delay wouldn't have been as bad.
+TIK I'm not blaming the 101st. The point of fact is that there still would be a delay, which would give the German times to dig in at Elst and establish a blocking line. Secondly, if that did happen, then XXX Corp would most definitely need British infantry to move across the Island. Said infantry could still be engaged along the corridor, if the German counterattacks persist. Thirdly, after the fall of the Bridge at Nijmegen, their was very little by way of a German defense on the island, since their defense was focused on Nijmegen. Victory was still possible after the delayed capture of the bridge. The problem was that no one thought of ahead to providing some form of infantry to the British armor to maintain this advance. Kind of weird that no one thought of this, when one considers that the point of the Waal crossing was to get the bridges to enable a quick drive to reach Arnhem. it astounds me that such a possibility was not considered by Horrocks or any other commander, whether it be Browning or Gavin, and that he did not think to get some sort of infantry detachment so that the initiative could be maintained. Sadly, the nearest infantry was either helping in Nijmegen or was still sitting in trucks further down the highway near Grave, or in the 101st's sector. I'd also like to mention that you point out that Gavin believed a large counterattack would come from the Reichswald, which it never did and that intelligence reports didn't suggest that such larger formations existed there. However it was never an impossibility, the appearance of potent kampfgruppes next to the 101st sector, reveal that Gavin's worries were not unfounded. We can lament his focus on the Groesbeck Heights and the delays in Nijmegen, but his fears did have some justification. Those kampfrgruppes that attacked Taylor's 101st from the 107th Panzer Brigade could have just as easily been moved north to the Reichswald and attacked Gavin's 82nd. In all honesty, no one can take solo blame for Market Garden's failure, rather the plan slowly unraveled as unforeseen difficulties appeared, mixed with standard human error. This gave the German's the opportunity to better counter the allied plan.
Actually, XXX Corps made up the delay imposed upon them by the destruction of the Son bridge and were basically back on schedule when they reached Nijmegan. The fact that Gavin did not occupy the bridge when surprise had been achieved and opposition limited meant that XXX Corps had to fight their way through the town and onto and over the bridge which blunted their ability to proceed in force. The angry American captain who berated the British tankers as 'cowardly bastards' appears to have ignored the fact that these tankers raced over a bridge most of them expected to be blown up from under them as they crossed. Hardly the act of a 'cowardly bastard'. Of the course the US captain was upset at his losses due to the requirement to make a daylight river crossing to seize the north end of the bridge but his General's failure to secure the Nijmegan bridge on the 17th made the river assault necessary on the 20th and furthermore many more British paratroopers were lost due to Gavin's tactical and strategic mistakes than were lost by the Yanks in their river crossing. General Browning is also to blame foor not ordering Gavin to grab the bridge on the first day.
TIK
If XXX Corps ran over the bridge at Nijmegen when they reached it, there would have been no resistance at Elst.
Blisterhead Carrington and Guards Armor stopped in Lent and stayed there for 18 hours .Both the Germans and GIs recorded this - you may now return to Fantasy Island
Great vid - thanks , really informative
I guess, the decisive mistake was made by Gavin, for not taking the bridge at Nijmegen. Even if he assumed tanks were ready to attack from the east, a better defensive was in the town, closer to the bridge.
This is the best review of battle I have seen
Montgomery! He and he alone must bare responsibility for the failure of this Operation Market Garden as his ill formed plan was insufficiently developed and doomed to failure from the moment it left his desk.
Gavin may well be responsible for the failures at Nijmegen, he was a part of a plan made by an insulated, secure in his position, protected (as a blue blood, favorite of Churchill - also a failed leader - Gallipoli) General Montgomery who was trying desperately to gain control of the whole of the war at this stage and be the first to enter Berlin. As a matter of pride more than anything else, he invented this half baked plan to make himself number one. I believe he had aspirations, after the war, of entering into his retirement as a national hero along the lines of Nelson and dreamed often (read his memoirs) of another column somewhere noticeable in London.
The plan was too many 'patches of objectives with far too little resources, far too little logistical fore thought, far too little research (the ferry for example) and far too much untouchable arrogance and false pride from Montgomery in his attempts to outshine his competing and better co General - Patton.
Total rubbish.
Where is there any evidence that Montgomery attempted to outshine Patton?
plenty he wanted to outshine everyone look at what he'd tell the Press
@@thevillaaston7811 Fact that gen. Sosabowski during planing of the operation pointed most of the big flaws of this plan and was not only ignored by Mountgomery but he was happy to blame him for his own faults and lie that gen. Sosabowski and his soldiers were fighting badly... gen. Sosabowski died in poverty because of all that lies and British was doing everything to hide truth about him and his men in this whole operation.
Dutch TV showed document about it and ofc noone in Britain saw it or is interested in facts but because of that document Dutch made decision to ignore British wishes and made recognition of Gen. Sosabowski and his man actions...
@@Bialy_1
'Fact that gen. Sosabowski during planing of the operation pointed most of the big flaws of this plan and was not only ignored by Mountgomery but he was happy to blame him for his own faults and lie that gen. Sosabowski and his soldiers were fighting badly... gen.'
There is no evidence that Montgomery and Sosabowski met during the planning for Market Garden. Why would they have? Sosabowski reported to Browning and Brereton.
on 17 October 1944 Montgomery wrote to Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, referring to Arnhem: ‘Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you might like to send them to join the other Poles in Italy.'
Right or wrong, Montgomery was entitled to his opinion, but seemingly he made no specific mention of Sosabowski.
Perhaps Sosabowski might have helped his cause if he had not declined the offer to lead an airborne division, ruling his troops out of taking part in D-Day and then held out for the totally unrealistic aspiration of his brigade being dropped into the Warsaw during the up-rising there.
'Sosabowski died in poverty because of all that lies and British was doing everything to hide truth about him and his men in this whole operation.'
Not really, Sosabowski, like thousands of Poles, was given a home in Britain under terms of the Polish Resettlement Act 1947. The British government was under no obligation to do so. There was camp full of them in my area until they were allowed settle here. There were so many of them, they had, and still have, Polish language services in the local Roman Catholic Church.
And all this before a million of them came over in the early 2000s like a plague, driving down wages , not queing at bus stop and so on. The sooner they fuck off home the better.
'Dutch TV showed document about it and ofc noone in Britain saw it or is interested in facts but because of that document Dutch made decision to ignore British wishes and made recognition of Gen. Sosabowski and his man actions...'
What British wishes? The Dutch award was postumous. Britain had already made him an Honorary Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
I'd say Monty appeared lost but the sad fact is he never appeared at ALL. little villa are you lucian treub?
It seems as if you criticize one commander for ignoring intelligence about potential armor and criticize another for pay heed to it.
As someone with military operational planning experience, I’m going to say that I believe that each of your arguments has an element of truth to them. The plan was ambitious, the British were dropped too far away and under-performed initially, the Germans over-performed, and the 82nd was far too cautious in taking their initial objective. Take away any of these factors and maybe the Allies win.
The 508th also had a vital task - ‘a special destiny’, says the US Official History. The 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren, was charged with taking the road bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen: a prime task of Operation Market was being entrusted here to just one battalion from an entire division.
According to the US Official History, there was some dispute over exactly when the 1st Battalion should go for the bridge. General Gavin was to claim later that the battalion was to _‘go for the bridge without delay’._ However, Colonel Lindquist, the 508th Regimental commander, understood that Warren’s battalion was not to go for the bridge until the other regimental objectives - securing the Groesbeek Ridge and the nearby glider LZs, had been achieved: *General Gavin’s operational orders confirm Warren’s version.* Warren’s initial objective was ground near De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen, which he was to take and organise for defence: only then was he to ‘prepare to go into Nijmegen later’ and these initial tasks took Lieutenant Colonel Warren most of the day. It was not until *1830hrs* that he was able to send a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small, just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a radio - *say forty men.*
"Unfortunately, Company ‘B’ got lost on its way to the rendezvous so only Company ‘A’ moved on the bridge - the efforts of an entire airborne division were now reduced to just one company. It was now around 2000hrs on D-Day, H-Hour plus seven."
Company ‘A’ entered Nijmegen - a city of some 100,000 people in 1944 -and moved cautiously up the main road, the Groesbeekscheweg. After two hours they reached a traffic island near the centre of the town and immediately came under automatic fire from directly ahead. As they went to ground and deployed, a German convoy arrived in one of the side streets on their flank and they heard the clatter of boots and kit as enemy soldiers leapt from their trucks. Company ‘A’ was just a few minutes too late: the Germans were moving troops into Nijmegen from the north and the fight for the road bridge was on. The US Official History mourns this fact, pointing out that _‘the time for the easy, speedy capture of Nijmegen had passed’,_ which was all the more lamentable because during the afternoon, when the division had been engaged on other tasks, the Germans had _‘nothing in the town but mostly low quality troops’_ - and not many of those.
- Neillands
It was clear who was to blame for Market Garden not being a 100% success. Gavin of the 82nd.
Nope during Monty Garden XXX Corp didn't cross the bridge until the 3rd day a 7 pm,And the official history never said that you lie like a rug.You've been busted making shit up and have been caught several times.And Monty unlike a real Field Marshall Model - never showed up,like your family members
More Monty victims
Johnny is a sick juvenile who has made up other accounts to agree with himself
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The entire allied invasion of western Europe was based around getting to Berlin faster than the Soviets. Everything had to be done in haste and plans were based on the Germans offering little to no resistance; Massive airborne landings are a clear sign of this. It has greed and hubris written all over it.
What the British and the Americans forgot, was that they had little experience in WWII-style land combat, whereas the Germans and the Soviets had been engaged in the bloodiest war the world had ever seen, for 4 years prior to Operation Overlord. The Germans were expected to roll over and die, but instead they did what the Soviets had done to them during Operation Barbarossa. Ironically, the Germans learned how to fight on when all your lines are collapsing from the Soviets and in the end it's what gave the Soviets Berlin.
+Serge Hamelberg Agreed. Yes, they absolutely underestimated their enemy. The Germans were on the back foot and they were running out of men, but the men they had were veterans of a long drawn out war. The Allies didn't have the experience of the Eastern Front. Realistically, they'd only fought a fraction of the might of the German army (except for the fall of France where they were all but annihilated) so they were not as experienced, and it showed. Now, that's not to say they didn't fight hard. They fought hard. The problem was that their training, experience, doctrines and leadership on a whole did not match that of the Germans, and it's clear to see in this operation.
Sorry, but that is nonsense. Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt agreed early on that the USSR was going to take Berlin. In fact, the Americans had several opportunities to move into Eastern Germany ahead of the Soviets at many points, but Eisenhower made it clear that he was going to keep to the deal that had been made with Stalin. In addition, Eisenhower made it very clear that in his opinion, getting to Berlin ahead of the Soviets wasn't worth a single American life. And, I've never heard any American veteran claim that anyone ever thought that the Germans would offer "little to no resistance".
Prague was a bit further away and thru mountains, than Berlin..when starting from Antwerp (port)...and Prague was taken by Patton s men.
The British and Americans had been fighting the Germans in North Africa and Italy before the battles in North Europe
Even when the German were victorious in the Battle for Crete afterwards even German high commanders thought that their heavy reliance of airborne division was unnecessary.
My mother, is a retired nurse, one of her former patients was a veteran who was captured at Arnhem. Because of my interest in the Operation MG, he spoke to her to relay to me in great detail about how it made him bitter and adversely affected him for the rest of his life. At the time I was too young to understand what he was trying to to tell me. But with age and a lot of research I recognise that Allied HC saw an opportunity to deliver a knock out blow but I believe that the plan was flawed, and extremely risky.
It's a real shame that most people get their history from Hollywood. Films are nearly always inaccurate because they have to be sold to make money in the US. Its unfair to portray real people, brave men in a different way to suit an agenda. Well done TIC for trying to find the truth.
I tend to go with Frost, he was there on the ground and as able a tactician as any, Gavin should have been overruled and made to get a move on. Browning should have been aware of the importance of taking the objectives quickly and aggressively as the airbourne commander! You could argue that the entire operation was flawed in depending on too many things going right and not allowing for the unforeseen but the operation was a nearly and the delay was the result of poor command at the top.
Whosoever
Gavin was a _general._ Browning only dropped in on the 2nd day thinking the bridge had been taken. He ordered Gavin to take it immediately on finding out it was still in German hands.
Slappy brownings 1955 order has been quoted would you like that again,have the nurses there read it to you
Monty's plan ignored 1 small element...the open left flank. He'd forgot to add a quick response team, the Royal marines and the US Marine corps. By using Alligators [ armed LVT's] and DUKW's [ "ducks" amphibious trucks.] the Rine river made a ready highway straight into Arnham for 75 mm. guns and supplies. Never forget the Navy.
www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi82MaS5ZvWAhVLSyYKHQBFD10QjRwIBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tanks-encyclopedia.com%2Fww2%2FUS%2FGMC_DUKW.php&psig=AFQjCNE3hFpyMiWKrP22H5ecV_KfDrgFHg&ust=1505173165719620
www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiIq-Xs5ZvWAhVCKyYKHfqhA9YQjRwIBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwarfarehistorynetwork.com%2Fdaily%2Fwwii%2Fwwii-vehicles-the-island-hopping-lvt%2F&psig=AFQjCNHBCIsP7g_05bv7bDTMrkuN_peWQA&ust=1505173320256819
Gun armed LVT 4...
www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/ref/Gators/img/Gators-27.jpg LVT-4 transporting105 mm. howitzer.
www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/US/LVT/LVTA1/LVT(A)-1_Amtrack.jpg LVT with Sturat turret, 37 mm gun.
Suppose market garden would have worked, the bridge at Nijmegen taken and held, Frost reached by the others, the bridge at Arnhem held. It would have been intense fighting in and around Arhem. What would the allies strengh be after that? What would happen after market garden? The Germans where not the weak force imagined. They could have rushed in more and better equipped forces to interrupt the long thin line of road and counter attacked Arnhem. Maybe not supermen with superweapons but better than old men and depleated panzer units. They did manage to mount the battle of the bulge though that was later on. So less units than at the battle of the bulge would have been rushed in I guess.
Could it be that the allies would never have have had any benefit from a market garden victory? I am no expert but my guess at it is that any positive effect after market garden would have been much smaller then predicted or nonexistent and then lost to the underestimated Germans. Market gardens success would have proved to be its weakest link I think.
I agree with you. Thanks for the concise information supporting your decision.
11.08 XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three and was "back on schedule". Up to that point It had averaged just over one mile per hour and it was still 24 miles from Arnhem bridge.
11 hours later XXX Corps was on the north side of the River Waal, how is that 36 hours?
Exactly but some get a tad bit pissy when the truth is pointed out. Claiming the high road while falsely foisting the blame on an ally that came to said offended's troops aide by request of a well known leader 😎
XXX Corps was held up for 12 hours while Son Bridge was rebuilt - and we all know why that had to be done...
"back on schedule", not on schedule, on the morning of the third day British troops were at Arnhem Bridge, and XXX Corps would have had a clear run to Arnhem...if Nijmegen hhad been in allied hands.
The stopped south of Valkensaard making 7 miles the 1st day,not starting until 1435 quiting at 1800 with plenty of day light left
@@thevillaaston7811 If XXX Corps had made it to Son by the end of day one as it was supposed to, with a Baily bridge and engineers construction could have started late on day one.
At 0820 on day three XXX Corps arrived at GRAVE. 25 miles from Arnhem on current maps.
@@thevillaaston7811 Almost forgot, coming to the end of the line soon so please FOAD.
1. Land the British division ON arnhem area in a night drop to avoid AAA fire and deal with scattering and casualties. to ensure large forces at the bridge. with atgs in place.
2. Land the 82nd airborne on the south side of the birdge on the 1st drop to guarantee capturing both sides of the bridge The above 2 moves allow much more time to hold out for delayed ground troops..
3. Commit fewer troops to small bridges over small canals and rivers that can be bridged by corps level bridging equipment, saving the best and biggest forces for the major wide river bridges (Arnhem and Nijmegen) These were lightly held and a company could have taken them as well as a battalion.
4. Have bridging units up near the front of the column to handle any blown bridges
5. Divert fuel and other supplies to XII and XIII corps flanking XXX corps for a wider line of advance. The exterior corps would handle flank defense and spread out the response. The fuel would come from US units in 3rd and oher armies.
6. Use the Polish brigade to supplant the american forces used at Arnhem in the south. This area was lightly held and they could have done the job.
7. Include a direct drop on the rail bridge area at Nimegen and Arnhem and the Oosterbeck ferry area on day 1.
8. Use more infantry in XXX corps and move them off-road, using unconventional improvisations to haul supplies over soft ground.
9. glider land a few motorized boats for at least some liason and equipment/supply/men transport capability accross rivers as needed.
10. Ignore street fighting in Nimegen and capture bridge from both ends, including a drop to the north of the bridge to capture both sides at once.
11. Finally, land the infantry division at Deleen airport via cargo planes north of Arnhem to allow longer period to reach them with ground troops.
12. Fix the communications issue including the model 22 radios with 3 mile range.
13. Commit other airborne forces as an emergency reserve despite not being fully reconstituted.
14. Reduce commitment to Groosbeck heights to screening forces only. By the time any german counteract could reach the road and bridge, XXX would be there.
15. Lead the attack up the road with foot infantry units and heavy artillery and airpower, using armor only when lines are breached, saving them for the exploitation phase blasts up the road.
16. Have a plan ready to force the lower Rhine after the battle to the West of Arnhem with reinforcements using traditional river corssing techniques and carpet bombing ..
Very well told videos, Sad this wont be told in school
"Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is an orphan."
I,d say it was Monty by all means. For years the britain's try to wash of the shame of this operation and the horrible treatment of the heroic Polish brigade that was send in to late.
Zionistathome123
You need to look at all the video. Monty had no say in the execution of Market Garden
1. Rotten Plan no, poorly executed yes. 2. I agree with this to an extent. 3. Although the 82nd's delay at Nijmegen didn't help matters, the Germans didn't really have that much of a defense between Nijmegen and Arnhem, following the capture of the bridges. Although German counterattacks against the corridor, made such considerations of speedy advance rather difficult. In summary, the plan as a whole wasn't a rotten plan, the finer details of the plan were a bit sketchy. The plans execution is rather disappointing in various quarter, and enables the Germans to hinder Allied intentions with what meager resources they have. However, allied victory was still a distinct possibility.
Although the Tiger 1's would have been a headache for the British advance, a company, and probably not even a full company of Tigers isn't too much of a defense.
More please 😄
Very good documentary TIK !
+Christian S. (DerBalu) thanks! There will be more soon, don't you worry :)
An absolute eye-opener, and thank you for that. The battle for Arnhem bridge could still have been won with a push for Driel if Horrocks had not been told to close it down. What do you think?
Montgomery devised operation Market Garden so he could beat Patton to Berlin and the Troops paid the price
Bad plan and poorly executed - the supplies should have gone to Patton
Gavin is not to blame. There are plenty of reasons why Market Garden failed. But above all, my opinion is Market Garden was too risky and poorly planned.
The road to itself Arnhem was too risky, the XXX Corps was an easy target for German forces. The chance to take every bridge fast and intact was small, there was almost no "back-up" plan if a bridge would blow up (Son was fixed but it took too many hours).
Almost no information about enemy forces at the objectives. If the Allied commanders knew about the SS Panzer Divisions, they have send their own men to their deaths. Fighting SS Panzer Divisions with light equipment.
Radio not working with air and ground troops, so supplies would land in the middle of nowhere, and no connection with fellow forces on the ground.
The Polish delay. Why not dropped them also on September 17? Did Monty want to take all British glory if they captured the Arnhem bridge in time?
The delay of the capture of Nijmegen bridge.
Who is to blame? Montgomery.
Couple of points. Brereton was the person who decided that there couldn't be two drops per day because it would tire out the transport pilots. That resulted in fewer troops reaching the battlefield, with the Poles delayed significantly. Brereton was the US Airborne Corps commander, so to conclude that that was Montgomery's fault, and that he did it for "British glory" is incorrect.
Why was the road too risky? It was fine until the 4th or 5th day, by which point the battle was already lost. The delay at Son was 14 hours, but XXX Corps made up for lost time by the time they got to Nijmegen and were on schedule. What was more devastating than the factors you listed was the 36 hour delay caused by the failure to take Nijmegen Bridge on day 1. It's fair to assume that XXX Corps would have been at Arnhem on day 3 or 4 had Nijmegen Bridge been taken.
Now, you may conclude that the plan was poor overall and Montgomery should take responsibility and the blame for the failure, and that's fine. However, by the same token it would be fair to make the claim that the plan could have worked had Nijmegen Bridge been taken on day 1, when it could and should have been.
Again though all this comes back to Montgomery. If you don't have enough resources to launch your attack with all the troops you'll need then you don't launch the attack.
I agree with you that General Gavin screwed up royally and sure, he could take a good chunk of the blame for this but Montgomery created and executed a plan without proper equipment, transport, intelligence, and with nearly no redundancy should something not go to plan. Gavin may have been the guy on the ground who messed things up on the day, but the plan itself was a huge throw of the dice that didn't need to be thrown in the first place. That it came so close to success anyway is nothing short of a miracle.
But isn't that MORE the reason Montgomery should have been more rational about how he deployed forces? Brereton's limitations was a known entity at the planning stage. Montgomery's waste of resources CAN ONLY be rationalized by his misplaced priorities.
I think I'll go with this John Frost fellow's assessment, seems like he knows a bit about it!
Also, when I first saw your videos, the first thing I checked was 30 Corps reaching outskirts of Nijmegen on the morning of the 19th.
So, actually my real question is why was there so much debate in history about this?
Perhaps one couldn't blame a senior US general at that stage in the war, though Browning has to be almost as culpable.
Having read about this continually, you and this John chap represent facts that were staring us in the face.
If only we ignored authors conclusions and looked on the map, and studied the nijmegen battle as closely, this might have been more obvious.
Thanks
P.S. this John fellow, maybe they should name a bridge after him?
Seems like he is quite well informed
Well done. I read the Cornelius Ryan book A bridge to far as a kid and then saw the movie, and while visiting Holland I went to the Market Garden museum in Arnhem. Fascinating operation and its always intrigued me. I think the reliance on a razor thin margin of error and the expectation the Germans were on the run were the basis of the plan working when those thing went awry ....
Amazing. A Brit blames the American who had his decision approved by his commander, a Brit. LOL
If Arnhem wasn't so completely botched and the entire 1st Airborne division had gotten to the bridge, the decision at Nijmegen, in the face of unknown enemy disposition, would be moot. If Gavin took the bridge and the Germans had cut the roads behind him the delay would have likely been the same, or worse. He did not know what he was up against, and Browning probably concurred because he saw the same situation.
I really dislike the finger pointing that goes on between the Yanks and the Brits on the internet in discussions like these. We fought side by side and good men shed their blood in common cause during that war. We are and were allies. We should act like it. There were screwups from top to bottom in this operation, any one or maybe two of which, if not occurring, would have led to victory. In the end the Brits were in charge. The buck stops there if you have to make it a matter of that.
What about if someone who's Dutch wrote a book saying that Gavin was to blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden, would that undermine the whole "patriotic" and "nationalistic" argument you've going on there? Yes it would, and here it is - Lost at Nijmegen by R.G. Poulussen amzn.to/1UfBRQ7
So let me make this clear to everybody. Nobody is pointing fingers at the USA, or Britain, or Poland or any other nation state and blaming an ENTIRE COUNTRY for the failure of this (or any other) operation. Nor do we decide blame based on race, gender, creed or patriotic standing. Why? Because that would be moronic. Blind patriotism is something we should all discourage. Nationalism too. Instead, we should look for a true understanding of what actually happened free from such silly distractions.
You cannot learn the lessons of history if they've been clouded by lies and deception. Patriotism is deception. Browning made questionable decisions. Urquhart was the wrong man for the job. 1st Airborne fought hard, but got a lot of things wrong. Frost got to Arnhem bridge. The 101st got a lot of things right, and probably did the best of the three airborne divisions. The 82nd took most of their objectives with ease. The Polish saved 1st Airborne. The soldiers and generals of all nations fought hard. Nobody is denying that.
But people make mistakes. Someone has to take the blame. And some of us think that not issuing clear orders to your officers to take a vital bridge... the only bridge not taken intact or not on the first day... until several hours after you've landed... and then having the Germans beat you to that bridge by mere minutes... and then spending the next four days trying desperately to take that very bridge... having to send your paratroopers over a river in paddle boats like marines which they weren't trained to do to take it from the other side... risking their lives to take an objective that could have been taken on day one... was the main reason for the failure of Operation Market Garden.
And maybe those people are wrong. But let's discuss that without bringing patriotism into it.
“If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame. But, if orders are clear and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.” - Sun Tzu, Art of War
+TIK I wouldn't say a Dutch fellow writing a book necessarily undermines my point. I would say someone who chooses to embrace that account is perhaps simply cherry picking what suits them to bolster their jaundiced view. But that is perhaps not the case.
No Dutchman, Swiss or even Swahili's view can change the fact that Browning was in command and approved Gavin's actions. If there must be a scapegoat, I would nominate Browning. But this is one of those situations where there are so many blunders that focusing blame on any individual seems desperate to address an agenda rather than a forthright assessment.
I have read that the failure to take the bridge the first day stemmed from a misunderstanding between Gavin and Lindquist (508th). Gavin was also addressing objectives over a 25 mile stretch, a huge undertaking for a division on foot. Yes, the intelligence about tanks in the woods was false, but a commander cannot ignore that possibility because if true and not addressed, the entire operation fails. But then, the intelligence from the Dutch Resistance saying SS Panzer divisions were in Arnhem was also ignored. One could make the argument that undertaking the operation at all in the light of those reports was a fool's errand.
Your endeavor to find a scapegoat has no place at Gavin's feet, since there are so many to point fingers at, and Browning did have the final word.
But the real blame in my view lies in the oblivious planning. You do not land airborne troops far away from their objectives.
+caelachyt If you think Browning should take the blame, then honestly that argument is a reasonable one to make. In fact, I was debating including him with Gavin in my ending, but decided against it because Gavin made that first decision, and the argument that Gavin was at fault was the conclusion what Neillands and Poulussen came to. So I wanted to follow their footsteps in case anyone (including yourself) questioned it. I did actually consider having another video explaining why I chose to focus on Gavin instead of Gavin and Browning, but time issues prevented me getting around to doing it.
Browning certainly messed a lot up: the fact remains he shouldn't have dropped in with his HQ, taking vital transport away from the rest of the airborne forces; he was useless when he was on the ground (literally not heard or read anything about the guy once he'd got onto the ground - except the decision to pull out of Arnhem); and approving Gavin's decision not to go for Nijmegen bridge was a vital flaw as well.
If you haven't read Poulussen's book, he goes into a lot of detail about the 82nd's movements at Nijmegen, with a focus on the misunderstanding you mentioned. Probably the most detailed look at the 82nd at Nijmegen there is. Even if you don't agree with his conclusions, it's worth looking at. Not really light-introduction-to-the-topic read though.
I agree that Allied intelligence was wrong/ignored, so you could argue that Gavin's decision to protect against the rumor of 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald is only equal to the fact that the two SS Panzer Divisions at Arnhem were ignored.
Interestingly, the conclusion in Kershaw's book was (among other things) that it wasn't the distance from the objective that was the issue, but that they didn't land enough troops on day one. This comes back to the lack of transport aircraft and the fact the RAF refused to do two drops on day one... and comes round to the planning and even the over ambitiousness of the plan. I do wonder what would have happened if there had been enough transports to get the whole (or just more) of 1st Airborne in on day one even if they'd stuck to the same landing zones.
And the point about this is, you can argue pretty much any point. You can blame Browning, I can blame Gavin, and someone else can blame the RAF, or poor planning, or whatever. And they're all valid points. The consensus is out on this issue because it's such a complicated issue, and really you just have to choose which point you think was the most important in preventing Market Garden from being successful. And if you're going to argue your point, that's fine, I just want to stress that I didn't choose Gavin because he was American and I'm some sort of arrogant "Brit". I chose him because he made the original decision. From the evidence I've seen, I do think that Market Garden was lost at Nijmegen.
Here's one for you. Imagine 1st Airborne had landed at Nijmegen and the 82nd had landed at Arnhem and done the exact same thing. Would it change my opinion? No, because in my opinion the battle was lost at Nijmegen. Even if they 82nd at Arnhem took every objective and done a much better job than 1st Airborne had done, they would have been doomed anyway because the tanks wouldn't have gotten to Oosterbeek (not Arnhem) until day 5 or 6 at the earliest. They would have been starved of supplies, and even if they'd kept their landing zones - they'd be running out of men by that point, just as 1st Airborne were.
In fact, with the exception of Frost (experienced paratrooper as he was), I'd say the commanders of 1st Airborne would have done a worse job than the 82nd did had they landed at Nijmegen. They probably wouldn't have taken as many bridges or at least not as quickly. British leadership (on a whole and with some notable exceptions) was pretty dire during both WW1 and WW2.
+TIK I am glad you are not taking a jaundiced view based on partisan feelings. There is too much of that going on these days between allies. I truly salute the heroic actions of our British cousins in WW2. Their tenacity and courage in the face of dire events throughout the war is nothing short of magnificent.
I don't blame Browning. There are far too many miscalculations by so many people to single out one player in this tragedy. Yes, the delay taking the Nijmegen bridge, co-authored by both Gavin and Browning was crucial, but so so many other aspects were just as crucial. If the radios worked at Arnhem, if the 1st Airborne did not have a period of leadership decapitation, if the drop at Arnhem was closer, if significant resources were not diverted for Browning, if the first bridge was not destroyed, if the battle plan wasn't captured, if more units were added to the ground forces, if the weather was better or if 2 SS Panzer divisions did not happen to be resting in Arnhem, things might well have been different.
So I suppose my real disagreement with you isn't over Browning or Gavin. It is in assigning blame to any individual at all. In the end it was Monty's plan, and it failed. That's a shame because so so many died (Germans too) that would have perhaps survived if the plan worked and the war was shortened.
caelachyt Ah, but here's the thing. I was taught (when studying for my history degree) to come to definite conclusions. So for example, rather than saying "it was a combination of factors that lead to blah blah blah" we would say "this was the main reason for blah blah blah". Now, the reason I think we were taught that was so that actually stated an argument in our essays, which would then lead to higher marks. But the benefit of having an argument when writting essays or in this case a documentary is that it leads to discussion (or an argument lol).
Now, I absolutely agree with you that it was a "combination of factors" that lead to the failure of Operation Market Garden. You listed a good chunk of them above. But for me to just state that it was a "combination of factors" wouldn't teach anything to anybody. It wouldn't discuss the debate that historians are having over this subject, as every documentary out there comes to the same conclusions. Seriously, I ask you to go out there and find a documentary that even mentions the failure at Nijmegen. Nobody mentions it. Why? Because it would lead to debate.
On TV, a debate is bad. You don't want people complaining about your programs so you just pander to the masses. On the internet, debate is good. RUclips is a social platform. I enjoy debating things. I'm enjoying debating it with you now. And that's something we wouldn't have got if I'd said the same thing every other documentary out there had said.
Because I said "it was Gavin" essentially makes this a debate. And that's the point. On the one hand, it's actually arguing something, rather than being a bit indecisive. On the other, it gets people interested in talking about history.
So with all that in mind, here's a question for you (and anyone else reading this). We all accept that it was a combination of factors that lead to Operation Market Garden. BUT if you had to choose ONE reason out of all of the factors listed as the PRIMARY reason for it's failure, which one would you choose? You can only choose one. What problem had the most negative impact on the Operation and cost the Allies the victory? It doesn't matter if you still think it was a "combination of factors". What, in your opinion, was the main factor out of the combination? Was it Browning? Was it Gavin? Was it faulty radios? What part of Monty's plan was it that went wrong?
And I said it when I came to my conclusions in the video but I'll say it again. Every soldier, both Allied and German, fought hard in this battle. Nobody questions that. But sometimes mistakes are made. We just need to figure out what was the biggest mistake in this case.
I will first state that I'm not a military tactician. However, the failure of "Operation Market Garden" seems to me a combination of all three (3) reasons and explanations.
You're possibly right. That said, I like to start debates because it gets people interested, and it's great to see people doing their own research to back up their positions, so I will maintain my position at this time ;)
@@TheImperatorKnight Thank you for your comment. Loved your commentary. Very insightful analysis.
BOO! It's only because your British. Well you did blame Browning too. Taking neimegen was no picnic@@TheImperatorKnight
@@mikeblank7526 As 82nd had the opportunity to capture the undefended bridge within the first ten hours upon landing, it would have been a picnic.
Did I mention that according to Ryan the bridge was the last objective? I think I did. The heights came first. This was decided before they landed. So what is your opinion of Cornelius Ryan? That is the question.@@mathewm7136
Hi my Grandad was with 30 core, fighting for the bridge at Nijmegen i don't know which day, he drove a bren carrier, the jerry's had a 88mm at the far end of the bridge, the British chap in charge on the bridge came up with a plan, they would send 2 or 3 carriers on to the bridge being the fastest thing they had, hoping that the jerry's would not be able to reload the 88 quick enough to get them all and at least one would get to the 88 and take it out! They tried this twice but the jerry's where damn fast at reloading. My Grandad was the first of the 3rd lot to go over when they decided it wasn't going to work, so they withdrew just i little way to slightly higher ground, this is where they began to fire the bren down on the 88. The jerry's returned fire with mortars one of which gave my Grandad a serious head injury, he was one of the lucky ones who got flown out and survived to tell this story. I have never seen any evidence for carriers on the bridge. Can any one confirm or deny this? Did he get a bit mixed up after having half his head blow off?
thanks Jason
An twerp, Ultra and Market Garden "This ferrying activity continued throughout September, and Ultra provided continuous coverage of the German activities while the British failed to seal off their escape route. On 6 September an Ultra message stated that a GAF division and other
64
miscellaneous units had already been ferried across and that they were preparing to
increase their activities. An intercept on 8 September “estimated that so far 25,000 men, 350 vehicles and 50 tons of equipment had been ferried across.”44 Ultra continued to
provide almost daily situation reports that detailed the evacuation of the Fifteenth Army.
On the day that Market-Garden commenced, it was estimated that 70,000 men had been
ferried across the Scheldt Estuary and escaped into Holland.45 By the end of the
evacuation on 23 September, a summary stated that 82,000 men, 530 guns, 46,000
vehicles, and 4,000 horses were ferried out of the pocket.46 These numbers are low
compared to those provided by the 21st Army Group G2 Brigadier Bill Williams. In his
intelligence summary on 18 September, he stated that, “probably over 100,000 men had crossed into the Scheldt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.”47
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
'while the British failed to seal off their escape route. '
While the allies failed to seal off their escape route. By then Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and Land Forces Commander.
who ignorantly believed Montgomery was some kind of Field marshall,Buw-a-a-a
One road in, and a small one at that doomed the plan. If they had multiple roads in it might have worked.
Bad planning. Who planned the operation? Oh yeah....Monty.
At the time of it's planning, all commanders (Both British and US) fully believed the plan would succeed up to and including Ike.
Crap plan Villafication,the moron Monty had no business leading a boy scout assembly as he repeatedly demonstrated
Great documentary, I hope you make many more like this!
I think it is easy to blame Gavin, but it was more of a combination of all three factors:
1. The plan required all the pieces to fit together exactly as planned. One mistake and the plan is doomed.
2. They obviously underestimated the Germans, probably carried away by the success at Normandy. Its amazing how Frost's troops fought against panzers for as long as they did.
3. And obviously, the Gavin's mistake was the missing puzzle piece that the plan required to work.
Absolutely, it was most likely a combination of several different factors. But if you had to choose the worst mistake or the one reason. Which would you choose?
+TIK I think the planning mistake was the biggest one, they expected too much out of a relatively new branch of service.
Gavin failed, but let's say Gavin took and held Nijmegen bridges on day 1, that's not solving problems just creating new ones. Bittrich, Student and Model are still close by observing events and issuing orders. Bittrich sent one division to hold Nijmegen one to hold Arnhem, while Model hoovered up reserves and Student threw them against the whole line. If Nijmegen was already lost on day 1, their planning has to adapt, so you're probably looking at far more troops sent straight to Arnhem. This makes 1st Airborne's battle that bit harder.
Lets say the 82nd didn't have the most objectives and the furthest apart.Let's also say the landing zones weren't attacked twice and had to be defended.Let's also say Graebners 9th didn't show up in APCs,Self propelled 20mmAAguns and halftracks also.Lets say IKE never let Monty anywhere around a war room.Let's say they actually listened to Brian Urquhart. One of the piss poor planned operations ever foisted on unsuspecting troops
*From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 244* I put the responsibility for the operation squarely on the shoulders of Montgomery,who launched it then refused to listen to anyone who wished to modify a bad plan .Finally,he made the incredible statement that the operation was 90% successful.- *Brian Urquhart,2003*
@@bigwoody4704 Rommel's dash to the French Coast in 1940 was appallingly planned - the Op Order went something like 'Go, there, very fast!' Guderian's move to the swiss border astounded his superiors - when he got there, it was the first time they had even heard of the plan. Yamashita speeding down the Malay peninsula by carrying canoes through the jungle worked. Market Garden had a greater chance of success than the Manhattan project when the first $50million was allocated to it.
Hasty, risky and dangerous plans have worked. Why shouldn't Market garden have been tried? The loss of two light infantry brigades to capture all the land approaches to Antwerp was a significant gain for the Allies in Autumn 1944. 23,000 were sacrificed at Hong Kong just to show the flag, 13,000 on Crete to protect Ultra. Market Garden is famous but was little more than an ambitious Corps operation. There had been a dozen of them just to straighten the line around Caen.
I know Brian Urquhart, he's my Great Uncle. I respect him enormously but he spent the Cold War at the UN trying to make it the primary military force on the planet. He was making a political point most of the time when he was bashing the Generals. He always said the operation HAD to take place up to Nijmegen in order to secure Antwerp as a port. Arnhem was Monty adding a cherry to win an argument he had just lost with Ike over broad front vs narrow assault.
I would bet all my money that if XXX Corps had got across the Rhine, Ike would have stopped them there. Ike, Tedder, Ramsay all said Antwerp was the priority in Sept '44. And Market Garden was the second of three stages needed to secure it. That was Ike's plan. And he was the boss. Monty and Ike had just had a storming argument only the week before on this very subject - something that nearly cost Monty his job.
If you are interested the politics of SHAEF in late 1944 has more to do with this operation than the Germans.
@@davidrendall2461 Yes I've read your posts on TIKs original OMG board and you make many compelling points.But his boards are peppered with shall we say creative license.Much like Monty's memoirs and dispatches.Also many on TIKs board say your uncle was wrong but I don't think so but since shit rolls down hill Monty gets off scott free - as he did many times before. And Rommel however didn't roll down one elevated lane open to tank/artillary fire. I've said the UK had great soldiers but he wasn't among them.Would have liked to seen what O'Conner,The Auch,Dorman-Smith,Slim,Alexander or Gott would have done given the same benefits. Monty belittled and berated everyone he came across with not alot to show for the talk.
Just not buying this 70 mile debacle in the Netherlands was the fault of a General(Gavin) who many Monty fan boys conveniently blame for a hastily slapped together operation. That and the fact he wasn't British. When right from the start panzerfausts were taking out XXX Corp tanks south of Valkenswaard .I unfortunately have been reduced and sucked into salty exchanges by some of those slappys.Beevor was right Monty may have had funtioning aspergers .It was only a matter of time before he popped off to the wrong guy.I guess it depends on who's ox is getting gored.Too much group think on some of these boards .As Patton said " If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking."Anyway have enjoyed reading your takes and insights unlike many of the finger pointers
Thanks for your videos. In my opinion: Above all blame the Germans for this mess, not allied commanders and troops assigned the grim task of clearing land the Germans invaded and occupied.It was a hugely ambitious plan. It relied on several crucial missions being accomplished. Having read a lot of reliable sources (ignoring the film Bridge Too Far as a factual source) i think the tanks could not get through to Arnhem as the road was not open, simple, they had already done a great job getting through and those narrow Dutch roads were easily defended by the Germans, who had fully occupied this area for years, had time after the battle started to prepare their defences and were reinforced quickly. the tanks saw some bitter fighting and did achieve much of their mission. the Germans had reinforcements from France and from Germany which made a huge difference. Radio communication was a big problem. The drop zones were far from the objectives. The infantry fighting was very intense and without relief it was impossible to indefinitely hold on to ground taken. Again, the germans reacted quite quickly. All-in-all it was incredibly bold and complex. Perhaps there was pressure from the allied command to stop an organised German retreat, stop the V1 and V2 bombing of England, beat the Russians to Berlin etc etc. Above all my respects to the allied troops and their bravery. Also respect to the local people of the Arnhem area. To the German people I hope you will keep to your own borders in future and not invade any neighbours. Peace to all. Lest we forget.
Oh dear Nick, your patriotism is getting the better of your judgement. We are discussing the failure of Operation Market Garden, not who the baddies were. And secondly, as a British person (presumably), you really are not in a position to wag your finger at other nations and scold them for invading other countries. You quote 'lest we forget'. You seem to forget your lot built an Empire doing just that, invading other countries and taking the resources for yourselves by force and removing the rights of the native peoples. More importantly, there is nothing wrong with the German people, in fact I find them very principled and fair. It's rather rude of you to lecture the present German people who were not even born at the time we are discussing. Regarding the ordinary people who were alive then, I fear you fail to understand what it must be like to live in a totalitarian state. More recently, even in a democracy, you may recall what it was like living in the UK when the Government was hell bent on following America into the Iraq war. Very many British people protested. Should those people be blamed for the Iraq war? Should their children tolerate being lectured by a foreigner now, say a Frenchman? And note they were free to protest, without fear of any consequences. Germans who saw through the propaganda and protested against the Nazi regime, and there were many, were not free to do so and paid with their liberty and often their lives. How dare you lecture them. You appear to be one of those very ignorant (of the shameful episodes in your own country's history), superior types who have not moved on since WWII in your thinking concerning your continental neighbours. Go to Germany now, live there, work there, study there, go on an exchange programme and for God's sake drag yourself into the present. You will find yourself amongst friends, as long as you stop insulting them. And for the record, I am not German, I am not anti-English, but I do feel someone has to point out to people like you how unacceptable your attitude is.
@@barryolaith well put
@@barryolaith I'm really not sure why you have taken such umbrage, Tik is not guilty pf nearly all that you have highlighted.
he was talking to the guy above him,is your education system that broken?
The Son bridge was a Bailey bridge supplied by XXX Corps. British engineers built the bridge, using 101st men to do some pushing. ;)
Very nice documentary TIK! Loved it from beginning till end. Hope there will be loads more on individual operatons and/or whole campaigns.
After watching this episode you kind of changed my views on it. I still think the plan was too ambitious with too little room for errors but indeed Gavin also made a huge mistake by not securing the bridge, which actually was his main objective. Ignoring Dutch resistance was also a BIG error.
+Gripen85 glad you enjoyed it! :) I will be doing more documentaries, don't you worry!
It's good that I made you at least consider an alternative view on the battle. So many people just hear the first argument and go "yep, that's it. Case closed" whereas the reality is a little different. You don't necessarily have to stick to one thing either, you can say it was a combination of Gavin at Nijmegen, ignoring Dutch resistance, and an overly ambitious plan that lead to the failure of Operation Market Garden. The only reason I concluded it was Gavin is because it's nice to say "this is the MAIN reason for failure", if that makes sense
Lots of people want to point the finger of blame at Gavin, for not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately on day one. This idea is flawed in several ways.
First, is the assumption that Gavin COULD have taken the bridge on day one. Everyone assumes it would have been easy. The truth is that there were at least two German reserve infantry companies in Nijmegen, along with a scattering of other miscellaneous units. None of these units were first class, nor particularly well armed, but remember that it was an understrength, poorly armed training battalion that was able to delay the British 1st Parachute Regiment trying to get to Arnhem bridge. They held long enough so that only Frost's 2nd Battalion and a few only smaller units made it to the bridge before reinforcements arrived to hem the British in. Considering that Gavin would have been able to send at maximum two battalions or so, it is highly likely the German units in Nijmegen, fighting within the city itself, would have been able to hold off the Americans until their reinforcements arrived with the recon battalion from the SS Panzer divisions.
Next, if we assume Gavin did send troops immediately, and they did get to the bridge, there is no reason to believe they would have been able to seize the northern end. Any Germans forced to retreat from Nijmegen would have crossed the bridge and dug in on the north side of the river, and German reinforcements would have strengthened that position. You would have a situation similar to Arnhem; a small force of paratroopers, probably surrounded and cut off, holding one end of a bridge with no chance of seizing the other end. With Americans at the bridge, the Germans would have made every attempt to destroy the bridge, rather than preserving it as they did.
Lastly, let's assume Gavin did get men at the bridge on day one, so that they are there when 30th Corps arrives from the south. If the 82nd and Gavin haven't been able to somehow capture the North end of the bridge, and the Germans haven't destroyed or damaged it beyond use, you will have to launch some kind of an attack to cross the river. The Germans will have had three or four days to build up their defenses on the north side of the river, as well as more defenses on the road from Nijmegen to Arnhem. The open terrain makes it poor country for tanks. You will need infantry to fight your way to Arnhem; something of which the British are running out of at this point in the war.
Now supposing everything else goes just right for the British and Americans, 30th Corps will fight it's way to Arnhem just about the same time as the British Airborne troops on the north end of Arnhem bridge are being overwhelmed. Even if you get there when some are still fighting, at best they will be holding an area a few hundred yards square; certainly not large enough for a bridgehead for 30th Corps to advance on the Ruhr, or anywhere else. The rubble and fought over buildings in Arnhem will be perfect terrain for the Germans to seal a bridgehead in. Expanding the bridgehead will require costly street fighting; something the British don't have the infantry to do.
Meanwhile, as all this is going on, the Germans will be attacking the corridor further south, and even cutting it as they historically did; delaying or even completely stopping the flow of supplies, men and equipment further north.
The plan was faulty, overambitious, poorly planned, and required little to no German resistance and for everything to go right as planned. In reality, just about everything that could go wrong, did, and the Germans reacted aggressively and decisively with what little they had, and with priority reinforcements sent to them. The only reason Market-Garden went as well as it did, and had some success, is due entirely to the Airborne troops, British, American, and Polish, who fought spectacularly given the mess they had been put into.
Nijmegen bridge was largely unprotected for the first couple of hours that Gavin delayed. Certainly it wasn't his fault entirely, but if XXX Corps (which would have support of then partially redundant 82nd Airborne, part of which would be left to protect the bridge, but most would go with XXX Corps) was at Arnhem 36 hours earlier, the situation would be different. No they probably wouldn't manage to march on Ruhr immediately. They would have to kill/capture remaining German forces in Area, wait for the entire XXX corps etc. So obviously not easy. But the blame was put on Poles as usual - how is that fair? You say: "The only reason Market-Garden went as well as it did, and had some success, is due entirely to the Airborne troops, British and American, who fought spectacularly given the mess they had been put into.". I say if it wasn't for Polish paratroopers even more British and American soldiers would have died.
@@jannegrey593 You are quite right to call me out on forgetting to include the Polish airborne troops. Looking back at what I wrote, I'm shocked that I forgot them, especially when on other posts about Market-Garden I am usually the one insisting that they fought bravely and we're unfairly treated by the British. My only defense is that by the time the Poles had landed, the operation had come apart at the seams, and there was little to no chance of salvaging it.
Whether Gavin and the 82nd could have taken the Nijmegen bridge on the first day is one of those historical "maybes" that we never know for sure. I certainly think Gavin should have made a more aggressive effort to get to the bridge on Day One. The whole operation depended on capturing bridges, so make that the main effort. Remember, up further north, the Arnhem bridge was also relatively open and undefended at first. Yet, the Germans were able to mobilize some training units and miscellaneous troops from an assortment of sources to throw together a few battlegroups to delay the 1st British Parachute Brigade. I think it's likely the same thing would have happened in Nijmegen. Given the multitude of objectives the 82nd had on Day One, and the wide area over which the division had been dropped, it's unlikely that more than a battalion or two could have been directed at the Nijmegen bridge; a small enough force that the Germans could have scraped together some miscellaneous forces to delay until the reinforcements from the 10th SS arrive.
@@dongilleo9743 Then we are in agreement mostly. I still think it would be possible, given that they took it on day 3/4. If they moved fast and didn't bother securing EVERYTHING for the arrival of Commander of operation it is possible or even probable. Of course there are at least 5 other reasons what went wrong (that's an underestimation), but this decision is the most "close call" if you know what I mean. I shouldn't gone off on you like that, but I had a pretty bad day yesterday, and I am not OK today still. So I apologize for being too rough.
@@jannegrey593 No offense taken. I like to discuss these things, and hear different viewpoints. I think I would have enjoyed being a history professor. Market-Garden is kind of an open ended battle that everyone looks at with a little bit different perspective. Like you said, there were a multitude of problems with Market-Garden: planning, logistics, being over ambitious, underestimating the Germans, etc, etc, etc. Trying to pick just one thing that if done differently would have meant victory is probably futile, and usually depends on a person's preconceived bias.
I think at the time everyone was thinking the war was almost over, and one good final push would end the war "by Christmas". Everyone thought the Germans were on the ropes, and incapable of any serious resistance. Browning want to lead troops in battle, to secure his future military and political position. The airborne forces wanted to prove the expense and effort made to create them was worth it. But in the end, the enemy(in this case the Germans)gets to vote on your plan.
Monty's plan was too complicated which depended on too many variables that would all be successful. His ego and better than thou attitude (comparable to Pattons) doomed it from the start. Up to his death he still failed to accept the defeat. The generals failed not the troops in the field. IMHO.
I find it interesting (and somewhat frustrating) that people keep comparing Monty to Patton...
They were not of the same rank! Nor were they of the same reputation, not even in the German army... Patton was largely unknown in the German high command, where Monty was a known factor, and respected as a commander.
More to the point, Patton was one or two military grades below Monty... He was on par with Browning or Horrocks in leadership positions.
If you want to compare commanders, with Monty, compare him with Bradley
bandholm umm i don't agree, actually it's more the opposite! germans knew & feared Patton out of all allied generals. patton in italy,battle of the bulge & many battles against the germans.
monty's only famed victory is only in el alamane, north africa.
Where have you heard that the Germans knew & feared Patton? The thing is, most of the claims of that, happened after the movies "Patton" and (perhaps more famously) "A bridge too far".
Pattons war career was one battle in North Africa, his outflanking attack in Sicily (where he famously slapped a shell-shocked soldier), his command of the fake army in Britain, and then France, Belgium and Germany. In France he made the breakthrough in Normandy (but in reality without much opposition from the Germans) and later got stopped at Loraine and later in the forrests in Germany. His finest hour was of course the battle of the bulge.
What is important to note, is that very often, Patton is not facing that many troops, meaning most of the units (and thus the commanders) were elsewhere, meaning again that they wouldn't get to know of Patton.
Hilary Doyle a WW2 historian, went to the German achieves and was surprised to note, that most of the senior German commanders didn't know of Patton, and those that did, doesn't seem to pay him any particular respect.
Monty was one of (perhaps even the) most succesful commanders of WW2. Mind you, he defended and got his men out of Dunkirk, later had command of the divisions defending south Britain, then of course North Africa, where he fought and later captured the German and Italian armies. He then held command in Sicily, and was then transferred to Britain to make the plans and win Normandy (something he did very successfully). He then of course lost at Arnhem, but later took command in the battle of the bulge (something he rarely gets credit for in the US) and later crossed the Rhine, taking the Ruhr and effectively ending the war in the West. The difference should be notably.
It doesn't make Patton a bad general, but Montys accomplishments in that war, is reflected in the fact, that he held senior command to Patton, that he commanded both British and US troops on a number of occasions, and that his campaigns were generally more succesful that anticipated. Patton was a fine army corps commander, and it can be argued that he saved the western allies in the battle of the bulge, from very serious losses.
bandholm im not going to read this its too freaking long lol 😂 cheers
Patton was knocked down after he slapped a soldier. Also, Patton and Monty were in direct competition in Sicily and Monty got his ass kicked even though he had a straight shot to Palermo.
_One problem that has bedevilled any objective study of Anglo-US military history in the post-war decades is the tendency of some US commanders and many US historians to play the ‘British’ or ‘Montgomery’ card in order to conceal some glaring American blunder. Omar Bradley’s disastrous failure to provide adequate armoured support for the US divisions landing on Omaha on D-Day, with the terrible losses thus caused to the infantry companies of the 1st and 29th Divisions, have been largely expunged from the public mind - at least in the United States - by constant harping about the British or ‘Montgomery’s failure to take Caen on D-Day - a failure that turned out to have no strategic significance whatsoever._
_Nor is Omaha the only example. As we have seen in earlier chapters, harping on about the ‘slowness’ of XXX Corps or the ‘flawed’ plan of General Urquhart at Arnhem, has successfully diverted critical minds from the cock-up in command that prevented the 82nd Division from either taking the Nijmegen bridge on the first day of the attack or avoiding a frontal attack across the Waal in borrowed boats three days later._
_It appears that all that was necessary to avoid critical press comment in the USA and any unwelcome Congressional interest in the competence of any American commander, was to murmur ‘the British’ or - better still - ‘Montgomery’, and critical comment in the USA either subsided or went unvoiced._
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The fact is, that XXX Corps were not slow, reaching Nijmegen *ahead of schedule.* Urquart's paras took one end of the Arnhem bridge preventing its use by the Germans. If the US 82nd had taken the Nijmegen bridge immediately XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on time relieving the paras and fully securing the bridge.
Caen was a nice to have objective, but Monty saw no need to tie up vital resources on a strategically unimportant target. As Neillands stated it was of _"no strategic significance whatsoever."_
Neillands highlights the glaring unthruths of the US press and historians.
_On 17 September, again defying his Supreme Commander and with the backing of his Army Group commander [Bradley], Patton launched an all-out attack on his two prime objectives, sending XX Corps against Metz and XII Corps in a drive for the Rhine. Success can justify such actions, but neither attack succeeded. The XX Corps was quickly halted at Metz and XII Corps was stopped by a German counter-attack at Luneville. Although he did not know it, George Patton’s glory days of rapid advances against slight opposition were over_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
On the 1st day of Market Garden Patton's two attacks had been repelled - he was going nowhere and moved 10 miles in three months. Also around the time of Market Garden General Collins' attacks around Archen had also failed. This nonsense by Bradley and Patton in not obeying Eisenhower's orders had depleted the US First Army of resources preventing a joint First Army and British 21st Army Group attack to encircle the vital Ruhr. For this Bradley or Patton, most likely Patton, should have been sacked immediately.
@@johnburns4017 The failure to open the harbours in Antwerp has been called "one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war".[29] The "Great Mistake" also included not cutting off the German Fifteenth Army of 80,000 men who were trapped on the coast west of Antwerp, and who were evacuated north over the Scheldt Estuary and then east along the Beveland Peninsula. These forces unexpectedly joined the battles for the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen sectors.[30] Other important ports on the North Sea coast, such as Dunkirk, remained in German hands until May 1945.[31]
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Logistics_problems
Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was "90% successful" and said:
It was a bad mistake on my part - I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ... In my - prejudiced - view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.[185] Montgomery, Bernard Law (1958), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., London: Collins
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#Controversy
*Eisenhower prioritized the* *_northern thrust_* *over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt.* Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt and not retreated back into Germany, under Hitler's orders. *All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.*
_"Since Eisenhower - the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander - approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame?_ *_The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."_*
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
_"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes - 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army - to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"_
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
*Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive.* Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval. *Montgomery asked Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.*
*Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel.* The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. _"the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
_"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful - and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."_
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
_"Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar - and open the Scheldt - using the existing logistical resources."_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
_"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders - or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called - and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
_"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were syphoning off supplies destined for the First army. This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought. A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only *ONE* crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. *Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.*
*Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution.* Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
_"it was not until_ *_9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp,_* _that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
@@nickdanger3802
Market Garden was a success:
♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines.
♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened.
♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London.
♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland.
♦ They reached the Rhine.
♦ The salient was fleshed out.
♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken.
All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forces were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.
Responsibility for the failure of the operation rests with the commanders. First, at the planning stage they failed to property gather and analyze the necessary intelligence regarding the size and disposition of enemy forces. Second, during the execution of the operation they failed to provide for the timely relief of all the airborne units that they had just dropped behind enemy lines. The outcome was foreseeable, even inevitable given the size of the operation. Too bad Monty didn't have the chance to play HOI4.
As my Granddad actually belonged to a small Dutch Resistance Group who fought against German Parachute Regiment 6 for 6 days behind enemy lines under indirect Canadian command, and their Canadian/British/Polish/Dutch unit face raids of MEK40 (the German equivalent of the British Royal Marines) for 130 days after that, I looked in to this matter since 1994 to find out more about the Kampfgruppe Chill and German Parachute Regiment 6.
The German knew well in advance where the ground offensive for Market-Garden would be.
In fact they staged a trap north of Grote Barrier ('Joe's Bridge' near Neerpelt), but had to wait for German Parachute Regiment 6 to arrive and get ready.
We know this unit now as Kampfgruppe Walther.
Even though a British scout team reached the bridge south of Valkenswaard on the 11th of September and roamed around the area, the Germans didn't give themselves away.
Now we are only halfway the series about the Dutch Resistance Group and it's German opponents the part about Market-Garden up to Veghel is ready.
The Resistance Group will come into view after the Battle for Bergen op Zoom though.
And you might think Monty made a blunder with Arnhem?
Well Student made one of the same order in relationship to keep the Port of Antwerp inoperable for the Allies until the Battle of the Bulge began.
Only he was able to cover it up so he didn't have to face the reprisals of Berlin and go in history as the hero who halted the fleeing remnants of German Army from Normandy and savior of the German 15th Army.
On the 31st of October 1944 at 17:55h the bulk of German Parachute Regiment 6 was at the ready to embark for the Walcheren-Causeway, a small long dike between the Isles of South-Beveland and Walcheren.
And the Canadians just reached it.
But instead of being send immediately to the Causeway and the Isle of North-Beveland, it was send to.... Numansdorp.
Three weeks earlier 2nd Canadian Infantry Division were able to approach the 8 Km wide railway dam at Woensdrecht within a 150 meter distance, but had to put up a bitter 3 week long fight to overcome that distance to cross it.
That shows how skillful the German defense was managed.
A small long dam like the Walcheren-Causeway would be much easier to defend for this paratrooper unit.
The next evening another attempted convoy was planned.
But this time from Numansdorp .
But shortly before departure Student received the message that the Canadians crossed the causeway so the convoy didn't depart.
So Student lied and saved face by only mentioning the second attempt.
Something that Monty was not able to do.
And strange or unbelievable as it might sound, the reason why the first attempt never happend was because of the actions of this small Dutch Resistance Group's actions.
And now the first Allied ship reached the Port of Antwerp on Nov.28 1944.
On Dec. 16th the same day the Battle of the Bulge began, the port became fully operational.
It gave the Allies 18 days advantage.
The distance from Normandy to Bastogne is twice as that from Antwerp.
And 5 times that to Nijmegen.
The episodes that are ready and a preview of the Resistance Group. Bare in mind these men didn't sleep for over one and a half week and must have still have been under the influence of the pills that were issued by the Canadians.
In the end they had to take them every 15 minutes.
ruclips.net/video/mwgzw_6xq7g/видео.html
All events and remarks are backed by documents.
A very detailed documentary of the Irish Guards from the Grote Barrier ('Joe's Bridge' near Neerpelt) advance to Valkenswaard
ruclips.net/video/T7UCLf7a-3k/видео.html
Montgomery, and more of his me,me,me personnality
Like Patton's then?
Montgomery certainly had his faults, and he had his weaknesses, but he also had his strengths. Like it or not he was exceptionally good at set piece battles and had a grasp of Logistics that Patton for example never had. He was not so good at pursuit actions. This is why Market Garden has always struck me as odd, as a plan it was very much not in Montgomery's character, far too risky. One accusation as a General you CAN lay at Montgomery's door is that he had a tendancy to caution.
If you are to attack Montgomery for his personality, then you must also do it for the other Generals of the era. Generals, especially succesful ones, tend to have an ego. Mark Clarke for example, and he did not even have the excuse of being a good general.....
Can't disagree with you enough. Montgomery was in command because Britian needed a general in the field and there just wasn't anyone else left, not because of any great skill on Montgomery's part. In the desert, Rommel ran rings around him and only lost when he was no longer being properly supplied, not because of any great skill of Montgomery. He was humiliated in Sicily by Patton despite taking what he believed was an easier path through the area. Montgomery turning Caen into rubble was a disaster after D-Day and his failure to cut off the retreating German army after the battles in the hedgerows as they fled France extended the war greatly. His attempt at Market Garden to fix this blunder despite all the flaws in the plan is merely the cherry on top.
MONTY GARDEN,Bernard was shyt and only won when the allies provided him with an embarrassment of riches
The British!
Michael Wonsower
The Americans!
The bridge was the objective! The high ground was second! Take the bridges, re-enforce the objective!The high ground second! Question? Why didn't most of First Para head to Arnhem? They decided to chill, like the 82nd! Galvin also pondered, the delay!
How does this play out for XXX Corps? 82nd captures bridge (edit, on day one) from 18 guards (actually 750) and puts four battalions across. 9th SS Panzer recon arrives (after driving over bridge at Arnhem) and stays and is joined by elements of 10th SS Panzer. In reality Around 0630 on day 2 all available 82nd units were required to retake the Heights for that days landing. The 406th Inf. Div. (ersatz) with 5 armored cars (the gun on most AC's was a 20mm auto loader) and 3 half tracks with quad 20mm were driven off the LZ at 1330 as gilders landed among them.
"...in common with most German units, the attackers had a high proportion of machine-guns to cover the advancing riflemen."
page 99 NIJMEGEN US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division Pen & Sword Books Limited South Yorshire
'How does this play out for XXX Corps? 82nd captures bridge'
When did that happen before the late afternoon of he third day?..
Theoretically. Also, Here's What Went Wrong
www.history.com/news/operation-market-garden-failure-allies
When this operation is looked at in total it's obvious that the Americans wanted to run the show and they did make some crucial decisions. To then turn around and blame the British and particularly Montgomery for the failure ignores their own failings, self examination was not one of their strong points and that still seems to be the case. As for Monty, they were probably jealous of his successes in North Africa and against Rommel which showed up their own poor performances there.
Monty was a moron propped up by the overall superiority of men/material.He should have been removed but British public had been duped by what monty told the press
To blame General Gavin's division not taking Nijmegen bridge on day 1 for the failure of Market Garden assumes that had the 82nd done so, Market Garden would have been a success and the Allies would have poured into Germany and captured the Ruhr before Christmas. I sincerely doubt that would have happened. So I blame the complicated plan, the extremely short planning and preparation time and all the problems that caused, and the heavier than expected German military presence for its failure. I will add that it was a gamble that just didn't pay off. If it had Monty would be considered genius, but lucky would have been a better description.
Steve Carey
If Gavin had done his job the US would have landed at Nijmegen with assault boats. Instead they spent a day unsuccessfully trying to get the boats in Nijmegen. Unsuccessful, they had to wait for XXX Corps supply boats - and then had the gall to blame the British.
When XXX corps arrived at Nijmegen they had to fight their way through the city, rather than driving straight over the Bridge
When Gavin got the job of advisers to the muck 'A Bridge Too Far' he could probably hardly believe his luck as he got the chance to rewrite history.
@@TheVillaAston The Paratroopers - were supposed to bring boats with them? How stupid are you?
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@@BobSmith-dk8nw
As bridges across rivers were going to be assaulted, boats should have been included in the cargos of gliders that landed with the airborne forces.
US 82nd failed to take boats with them, and then spent a day scouring Nijmegen to try to find boats. XXX Corps were forced to make good the lack of boats by sending up boats that had been used by Engineers to build bridges.
The American Joseph E Levine had the bare faced cheek to heap the blame for the lack of boats onto the British in his chauvinistic pukefest 'A Bridge Too Far.
How stupid are you?
@@thevillaaston7811 And ... just what was going to be left out of those gliders so they could carry these boats? Paratroopers were always short on ammunition, supplies and weapons. Were they going to leave out their pack howitzers? How about what jeeps they had? What were they going to sacrifice to carry these boats? There were only so many gliders that they had - and only so many that could be towed to the destination at one time. How many of those assault boats could have been fit in a glider? How many boats did the British 1st Airborne carry with them? Apparently the Poles had some small inflatables - but - how well did those work out? One thing about those canvas assault boats - a puncture might cause a leak - but it wouldn't cause the whole thing to deflate - now would it?
The other thing is - where were they going to get these boats from in the first place? Paratroopers do not normally have a lot of boats laying around. How much time was there to prepare for this operation? Do you really think they could have gotten enough boats in that period of time?
I actually don't blame the British for not having those boats at the head of their column. They had a lot of stuff to put up that road.
What I blame - is Monty's plan - which was trying to put all that stuff, boats included - up what roads were available to them - through all that soft ground.
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@@BobSmith-dk8nw
Who can say? The material point is that the boats were not there when they were needed. First Airborne not taking boats to Arnhem never became an issue in the same way.
'Do you really think they could have gotten enough boats in that period of time?' I does not seem like too much to organise given that the First Allied Airborne Army was created to move quickly and that its first operations were going to be in the Low Countries.
I don't know, I was not there. Were you?
‘What I blame - is Monty's plan - which was trying to put all that stuff, boats included - up what roads were available to them - through all that soft ground.’ Your words.
There is no sense in that. XXX Corps having to supply assault boats should never have been an issue.
Our 95 year old padre -Bert at The Brookwood Last Post Association was a surveyor with the Guards tanks at Market Garden. He said to me that when he got to Nymegen to 82nd. " Had Done Nothing" and it was up to the Brits to take the town before crossing the bridge...tanks were the sent down the road toward Arnhem, but these were easily picked off so no further progress was mad. He suggested to his bosses that radio should be para'd into Arnhem so that once contact was made accurate shelling could take place...My uncle was 505th PIR 82nd airborne...I am jumping into Arnhem with the Pathfinders (Teuge) in September...Eddie Jones Facebook: The Trench Experience Artists Rifles Collection.
"On 20 September, D+3, he (General Ridgway) was moving through the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides.
[W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division." page 26 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500814.pdf
Yea, and the only bit he missed out was the one the about them stopping for tea.
as you point out, very aggressive plan like Market Garden requires very aggressive execution for a hope of success. Timidity is an acceptance of defeat before the battle begins and is 'this is a snafu and all we can do is lose more or lose less'
The problem is that the real history has the taste to be the most probable outcome. That is not true. Even in this failure the allies had still luck! Nijmegen bridges could have been easily blown up by a more cautious general than Model. A more cautious general than Harzer could have also secured the Arnhem bridge with more man preventing Frost to get it. This shows that the plan took many, many unplanable risks. It was much to ambitious
Leberecht Friedeberg
Market Garden was largely successful.Over 50 miles of German held territory was taken.The towns of Eindhoven and Nijmegen were liberated.It protected the only port taken intact, Antwerp.It prevented the Germans from operating V rocket from that part of Holland.It isolated a whole German army.Troops from Nijmegen turned East into Germany.
As Bradley said, Montgomery rarely won a battle any other competent general wouldn't have won as well or better. Gelb also notes, that Montgomery was not only famously insensitive and deliberately insulting to his brothers in arms, but he was capable of outright lies if he thought it would elevate him above potential rivals
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Born General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
The 82nd are unsung heroes and need more of a spotlight I agree that the Germans just out Foxed allies and secured victory combined with accurate reports from the Dutch resistance being dismissed
Don't forget, the Germans had a set of the battle plans for Market Garden. Even with weakened forces this gave them a heads up.
That didn't help. The 'plans' were no more than a resupply schedule for 101st Airborne (it was their liaison officer that crashed on his way to Browning's HQ at Groesbeek). Student, an airborne commander himself with his headquarters nearby, had the documents translated and realised he could extrapolate the airlift schedule for all three divisions. Model was not convinced (the Hollywood film got that bit right), but Student went ahead and alerted his own Luftwaffe chain of command and had fighter aircraft over the drop zones at the right time. Fortunately the weather in England delayed the airlifts and the fighters were back at their bases in Germany being refuelled when the transports arrived.
my opinion: its all 3 reasons .
1. A grandiose plan that would have been a glorious victory had it succeeded, but didn't, because there were so much that could have gone wrong. ( and did go wrong)
2. The Germans weren't a pushover, especially when talking about Panzer divisions ( even if under strength) versus lightly armed paratroops.
3. Yes, the delay at Nijmegen, obviously dealt a fatal blow to British at Arnhem, but only one of many blows that also may been fatal.
My question to all is this: Once XXX Corps had come that close to Arnhem, and whether or not the bridge was secured, why didn't the Allies ( XXX Corps and other large armoured units that could follow through) push on and take Arnhem? Why didn't they exploit the salient and still come up behind the Siegfried lines?
What with obviously superior air power( where were they), material, man power( experienced troops vs scrape the barrel Germans)?
Nonsense.
1. Things always go wrong in military operations, but an unforced error in the plan not even being followed at Nijmegen on the first afternoon was the fatal mistake that compromised the whole operation.
2. Lightly armed paratroopers may be, but the anti-tank batteries at Arnhem had plenty of 6-pounder and 17-pounder anti-tank guns. In fact, the 1st Airborne Division and attached Polish Brigade had exactly the same number of anti-tank guns (84) as Model had operational tanks in his entire Heeresgruppe B from Aachen to the North Sea in September. Just a stunning coincidence, or the universe's way of telling you that you're wrong?
3. What other blows were fatal? The Division at Arnhem held its bridge objective for 80 hours, nearly twice as long as should have been needed.
At Arnhem, they dropped practically on top of Model's Army Group Headquarters and the Headquarters of the SS Panzerkorps. With so many top commanders and administrative assets available, the panic and confusion that is the objective of the first few hours of an airborne operation just didn't happen. At Arnhem, there was no surprise, no confusion, no contradictory reports, the top commanders could see and measure the drop with their own eyes. Unable to disrupt such short lines of communication, ad hoc battle groups were formed not in hours but in minutes, and the Germans were able to get there firstest with the mostest. If the 9th SS recon battalion had been alert or alerted, they were actually already in a position to block Frost's movement to the bridge, but instead rolled to Nijmagen while Frost himself watched them. The super quick and alert German response was what lost the battle.
I agree it was Gavin that cost the Operation. He is the only one in the plan that didn't even try to capture the objective. Instead, he made a personal decision to ensure that he and his men would not be into harms way until XXX Corps arrived. It's a shame, since many lives at Arnhem could have been saved.Good series- what's next? Stalingrad?
+Gary Thomas That's exactly what I think, and I'm glad you came to that conclusion too :) next is the early part of the Western Desert Campaign, but I may move around a bit and do different battles (so, maybe do a few different playlists going at the same time, if that makes sense). I'd love to do Stalingrad, but I think it's a little too ambitious for where I am right now in terms of the quality of the work I'm producing. One day though :)
I think that the real reason is a bit of all three main points, with emphasis on no.2 and 3. About main reason 1 "Poorly planned and executed", for a plan as bold as that, Allies did surprisingly well in my opinion.
But the answers for these kind of questions are always more than the sum of their factors.
+99Ole99 probably. I was taught to come to a definite conclusion when I was doing my degree, so for that reason I wanted to pick one person as the one to take responsibility. Realistically it's probably a combination of factors. The point I would make though is that the battle could have been won, and it wasn't a bad plan just because it failed.
You forget the fact that Brits didn't wanna spear too much airplaines, and that Germans found a plans of the operations in one of the grounded gliders! Also that Browning heavily ignored inteligence and send Brian Urquhart on a sick leave because he wouldn't wanna "rock the boat", just because Montgomery wanted to prove that is better then Patton, who could take over the Metz and ride into the Germany but he couldn't do that because he didn't get enough of oil for the tanks!
Great description, TIG. Enjoyed it. Seems to me an important failure was the lack of interdiction of the ferry crossing east of Arnhem, that allowed SS panzer troops to drip feed into the defence of Nijmegen. It is even conceivable, though hardly an excuse, that the tardy attempts at taking the Nijmegen bridge were down to the assumption that the ferry crossing didn't exist and no Germans were going to be able to come in via north of Nijmegen.
+Chris Whittington very true. The RAF played almost no part in this battle as it was feared that they might shoot down their own transport planes. Kershaw says the lack of air support and interdiction to hamper German movements was a significant reason for the failure of the Operation.
Is it really just a coincidence that General Model, one of the Wehrmacht's most capable senior commanders, if not THE most capable at this stage, just happened to have his Army Group HQ at the Hartenstein Hotel, just a couple of miles from 1st Airborne's landing zones? He immediately took over command and control and initiated the first, vital reaction to the attack.
There were so many peculiar circumstances in connection with Market-Garden that one gets the impression that either the whole affair had the worst lousy luck one can imagine, or the whole operation was meant to fail and/or had been leaked to German Intelligence even before the first aircraft and gliders took off on day one. Was the alleged dossier with all operational plans really found in an American glider or was this just a cover story? Who was the officer who allegedly took top secret documents with him in a glider - one of the most vunerable and insecure methods of transport one can imagine? I cannot imagine that many such dossiers were handed out, and then only to specific intelligence officers, so who was it - who was missing? The whole story is suspicious. It goes on - even after the Nijmegen bridges were taken, several high ranking 82nd Airborne officers pleaded with Carrington to let their men join the tanks in a dash for Arnhem - not only that, a British Infantry Brigade from 43rd Wessex was waiting doing nothing South of the road Bridge all the time - sounds peculiar then that the Guards refused to act. And then there was the confirmation by Standartenfuehrer Harmel to Robert Kershaw that no SS troops could have opposed a column of tanks if they had gone straight to Arnhem that evening, at a time when Frost still held the bridge at Arnhem!
There are so many - too many - legitimate queries pertaining to the questionable decisions made by several senior commanders of various units and formations (Browning, Horrocks, Adair(?) of the Guards Division, maybe Gavin, Montgomery, Hollingbrook, Brereton) to be just brushed off as unlucky circumstances. An independent official court of enquiry would have had a field day - if one had been convened...but it wasn't, was it. Too many good and very courageous men lost their lives just to put the failures of Market-Garden down to ...bad luck and British tea drinking !
But it is not a coincidence that gen. Sosabowski was able to point every flaw of this plan as he was the best guy to be in charge, but he was not British noble like Montgomery so now people like you gonna blame everyone but not people responsible.
Montgomery was happy to lie after the failure that it was all Sosabowski and his men fault and the guy died in poverty as British striped him out of his military pension because of all the lies that they were happy to spread...
"During the planning for Operation Market Garden, Sosabowski expressed serious concerns regarding the feasibility of the mission.[2] Among Sosabowski's concerns were the poorly conceived drop zones at Arnhem, the long distances between the landing zones and Arnhem Bridge and that the area would contain a greater German presence than British intelligence believed.[3] Despite Sosabowski's concerns and warnings from the Dutch Resistance that two SS Panzer Division were in the operations area, Market Garden proceeded as planned."
you can find it even on wikipedia...
Frost’s quote is interesting about the single Bn from 82 Abn being sent to take the bridge.... Frost was in exactly the same position.
I must agree with the last argument after watching this. Even on day one (after seeing your document part 1/8) I wondered why they didn't seem to send anyone to scout the forest and then stop wasting ammo and manpower there for pointing the guns at Nijmegen. I mean those tanks couldn't have been hiding from the eye of inf for long if there would have been any tanks. I think scouting could have possibly made them turn their attention to the bridge and if not, then I seriously wonder why the two men were in command (actually I'm already wondering that, but I guess mistakes must be made... WITH A BLIND EYE). Also I partially support the second option, because German forces did fought very admirably.
Thanks for the great document TIK and rest in peace to all those soldiers from both sides who fought at the time of this operation.
+Ville “Villemaisteri” metsänmiettijä I'll have to double check, but I'm sure they did send scouts into the Reichswald. The problem was that by the time they'd done that it was too late and the Germans were dug in at Nijmegen.
+TIK Good to know. I thought that they would have had more time and that their scouting wouldn't taken as much time. But it still makes me wonder because if they dropped at early afternoon and put up the defences and guns, after which they started shooting, then at what time did the scouts start their search and could the arty fire have made it harder for them to do their job? Anyway I'm maybe overthinking it and it's also hard to know exactly what happend.
Also a question, what will be coming next on the channel? And will the awesome LP campaigns continue? :)
Even with the rushed preparation schedule, I still can't believe they proceeded without first having an adequate and successful com check. If proper communications between all units had been in effect from the start of the operation, situation reports could have been forwarded, resupply coordinated, and those supposedly in overall charge (Browning) could have at least had the chance to make decisions based on the situation as it unfolded. None of this occurred, so I lay the blame on the only person who can bear responsibility for this failure -- and that would be General Browning.
No, Gavin was NOT to blame. He was PARTLY blame, but to assign him the whole of the responsibility is simply absurd. It completely ignores the fact that 30 Corps, and in particular the Guards Armoured Division consistently operated in a wholly inflexible "by the book" fashion, unwilling or unable to modify its procedures in spite of the continued by Horrocks to stress the need for haste; the simple lack, despite Horrocks' urgings, of a proper sense of urgency -- the Guards Armoured Division was late in jumping off from the Neerpelt Bridgehead, was extremely prompt in ceasing operations at the onset of darkness, and equally tardy in resuming the advance for the first FOUR days of the operation (at NO occasion when it was advancing into German-held territory did it begin advancing before midday, squandering hours of precious daylight each time). It completely ignores the decision, made by Montgomery and Browning, to assign the most important objective the airborne division that was least experiences in operating as a unified division (the British 1st Airborne). It completely ignores the British decision to ignore the intelligence reports received from the Dutch resistance that there were German tanks in and around Arnhem (these were actively suppressed by Browning, who ordered intelligence officer Maj. Brian Urquhart [no relation to 1st Airborne's CO] to take sick leave when he kept bringing the intelligence reports up, and threatened him with court martial if he didn't comply; thus Gen. Urquhart and Brig. Lathbury based a lot of their plans on incomplete intelligence that left them seriously underestimating German strength). It completely ignores the failure by Brereton and Williams to authorize more than two lifts each day. It completely ignores the mistakes made by Gen. Urquhart to go haring off with his second in command and leave the British 1st Airborne floundering without effective leadership. It completely ignores GEn. Urquhart's acceptance of the RAF's appropriating untrammeled control over the airborne drop, and dictating absurdly unsuitable and too-distant drop zones to the British paratroopers. It completely ignores that Urquhart -- a totally inexperienced airborne commander -- was foisted upon the 1st Airborne Division by General Browning, replacing a highly experienced commander already in place (Brig. Eric Down). It ignores the fact -- and this is really egregious -- that Browning, after the second lift was down, asked Gavin to refocus from Groesbeek to the Nijmegen bridge ASAP (which Gavin had already been doing on his own initiative, with elements of the 82nd's 508th regiment since the early hours of 18 September), and when he presented Browning a plan for a three-pronged assault using the 508th and elements of the 504th, BROWNING vacillated and switched back to his original preoccupation with holding the Groesbeek Heights, and effectively postponed the assault on the Nijmegen bridge a further 18 hours. It ignores a whole hell of a lot, frankly. I could go on for literally pages, but space doesn't permit.
To say "Gavin is responsible for the failure of Market Garden" is egregiously bad oversimplification. No single figure can be assigned the blame, and it's unjust to attempt to do so. The figure most responsible for the failure of the operation was BROWNING. He had a hand in most of the bad decisions made that doomed the operation. But even he can't get saddled with all of it. There's blame enough to go around, and Gavin certainly gets a portion of it, but Browning gets a lot more.
Browning was an inept commander IMO. Gavin admitted that he took the decision; he is responsible for the failure.
@John Cornell Are the Grenadiers, Irish, and Coldstream Guard battalions or brigades? If they are battalions (50 tanks each), there is no schwerpunkt and where is the rest of Guards Armored? Regardless, this litany of distractions shows that there were no plans to push out on the flanks. Instead, Garden was a one battalion wide offensive whose follow-on units resembled the Faber College marching band, waiting to be pinched from the flanks. .
Every leading regiment -- which should have been a combined arms kampfgroup -- moving north should have been followed by two trailing regiments -- one pushing east and the other west, first before Eindhoven and then again after Eindhoven. This would have put the downtime lost at Son and Nijmegen to better use than simply idling.
@John Cornell There were no plans for outflanking attacks to widen the breach. Not before the battle. Not during the battle. Instead, an entire corps -- less its leading battalion -- were left idling with their thumbs up their asses for while stuck at Son and then again when stuck at Nijmegen. The "flanking advances" would have crumbled the German shoulders if XXX Corps had attacked in either direction.
Really enjoyed this, lot of effort & research on a subject that's fascinated me for years, probably because my late uncle was a glider pilot, unwillingly transferred from the RAF. As to the blame for failure, yes i agree with your conclusion (mostly) as to how the battle played out. However as to the overall failure there are many in the allied command who were guilty of what today would be regarded as negligence.
The plan was ambitious yes but not impossible or as some have stated rotten.
If more attention to detail had been paid the results could have been very different. It almost beggars belief after Overlord & the build up to it Market Garden was approached with almost total disregard for the enemy or his reaction.
If Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton's refusal to force the transport commanders to fly two drops on day one was almost criminal, allowing them to force 1st Airborne to land piecemeal miles from their objective was.
Also Browning's refusal to accept the intelligence reports of II SS panzer Corps or pass them to the divisional commanders through fear of the operation being cancelled was beyond madness.
2nd tactical air force should have been tasked to deal with II SS, ensuring any movement was suicidal as in Normandy.
In your last episode Gavin takes the blame for the failure at Nijmegen bridge, i agree with the failure to capture it on day one, however once the 82 nd & Guards had taken the bridge, Gen Horrocks had stated, his tanks would be lined up hell bent for Arnhem in the interview with Captain Moffett Burris. Wasn't is Gen Alan Adair who delayed the Armour assault on Arnhem until the 43 rd Wessex arrived, he has escaped blame in nearly all accounts I've read.
Also Gen Richard O'Connor commander of VIII Corps was heavily criticised for the poor performance in supporting XXX corps flank.
At the end of the day many allied commanders failed those on the ground, unfortunately individual mistakes during the course of the battle stand out.
Getting back to the intelligence available i have read the radio failure at Arnhem was due in part of the iron ore deposits in the ground around Oosterbeek this was known by the Dutch Army, but nobody asked them.
Also a part of II SS was due to en-train to Germany as one of the commanders stated he had attempted to delay this, surely had this been known a good proportion of II SS could have been removed from the area before committing Airborne, even destroyed en route.
As to the Germans winning with under strength forces, there have been many written accounts that the Germans had anticipated an Airborne landing & training to deal with one captain Paul Grabner had practiced dashing to Nijmegen bridge & the fact this unit was the first to engage 2nd Battalion at Arnhem shows. As well as the deployment pf Kraft's battalion to block 1st Airborne reconnaissance & 1st Parachute Brigade's route into Arnhem.
Anyway sorry for the waffle. Really enjoyed your documentary, look forward to seeing more. 6th & 17th Airborne's Rhine crossing perhaps?
Thanks Simon. I don't see your comment as a waffle :) crossing the Rhine is something I definitely want to cover at some point as they supposedly learnt from the lessons of Market Garden. Currently working on a documentary on Fort Eben Emael in 1940 and will cover a large battle after that, so who knows. Interestingly, I actually bought a book on why O'Connor's performance in Europe didn't live up to expectations, especially since he was exceptional during Operation Compass. Haven't had time to fully read it. If you haven't seen my Operation Compass documentary, here's the link ruclips.net/video/b71kdhj27rk/видео.html O'Connor is a great unknown...
I agree with your assessment of Market Garden. There's definitely a lot of mistakes on the Allied part, most of them in the details of the plan and several mistakes by the Allied commanders that ultimately lead to the defeat. But for this video I decided to select one of them as the most important. If you had to select just one element or one commander for the failure of the operation, who or what would you pick?
+TIK Thanks for the reply, was looking forward to hearing back.
I think my finger would point at Brereton as he was the army commander and therefore in a position to object or at least obtain generals Marshall and Eisenhower's weight to overrule the air transport commanders on dropping zone's and insertion times of the airborne. with 1st airborne inserted close to Arnhem inside 24 hours even II SS would have had a hard time moving an entire division from a defensive position. the poles arriving on day two could have then been available for either reinforcement of 1st airborne or could have stuck south to Nijmegen to support 82nd.
however i have an interesting one for you, although general Gavin made the error at Nijmegen, was brigadier Lathburys decision not to move 1st para brigade on the night of the 17th down 2nd battalions route after major Hibbert made contact that evening also a game changer? as major Lewis managed to advance down this route and linked up with Frost's group. had the brigade made it could the operation had a different outcome?
instead they sat out the night and missed the opportunity resulting in the outcome we know.
like to know what you think?
Apologies for late reply. In my opinion, the performance of 1st Airborne in the first couple days of the battle was awful. With the exception of Frost and the troops that made it to the bridge, it's hard to point to any unit and say that they did well in the Arnhem sector until the formation of the Oosterbeek pocket and the landing of the Polish Brigade. Urquhart's decision to accompany Lathbury and then the latter's decision to not to attempt an advance with 3rd Para Battalion on the first night was vital in the sense that it stopped reinforcements getting to Arnhem bridge.
However, 10th SS Panzer Division had already crossed the Waal and was sat in Nijmegen. This fact would prevent XXX Corps from getting to Arnhem until after the Arnhem bridge was lost. Potentially, the addition of another Battalion at Arnhem bridge may have allowed Frost to hold the bridge even longer. If this is the case, the 36 hour delay at Nijmegen may not have been as a big an issue as XXX Corps probably could have gotten to Arnhem bridge if that bridge was still in British hands.
It's a great argument, but I'm not convinced that Lathbury could have made it to the bridge that evening. Kraft's unit and Kampfgruppe Spindler were between Lathbury and the bridge. Spindler cut the route with a subordinate Kampfgruppe called "Harder" that evening after Frost's men had gotten through. It seems unlikely the other battalions could have squeezed past before Harder closed the gap. And whilst there was always a chance Lathbury could have fought their way through, the way the Para attack towards Arnhem on day 3 went (it was a complete disaster) it's doubtful they could have broken through.
What is perhaps more decisive is the refusal for the RAF to land the Polish Brigade (or any other British unit) to the immediate south of Arnhem bridge. The Polish Brigade was meant to have been dropped there, but were dropped near Driel because the situation had changed by the time they arrived. So if a battalion or two had been dropped south of Arnhem bridge on day 1, there could have been two, three or even four battalions at Arnhem bridge, rather than one. In that case, the British may have been able to hold the bridge long enough for XXX Corps to arrive. And 10th SS Panzer may not have gotten to Nijmegen either, meaning there may not have been a 36 hour delay as Gavin's delayed attack towards Nijmegen bridge wouldn't have been stopped by 10th SS Panzer.
In my opinion, looking at the battle after the troops had landed, Gavin made the biggest mistake. But looking at the plan prior to the troops landing, for me the biggest mistake was not landing at least one Battalion of British or Polish paras south of the Arnhem road bridge in conjunction with the units already landing to the West of Oosterbeek. Whether we blame Browning, Urquhart, the RAF or Montgomery for this, it's entirely up to you, but for me, this is a missed opportunity that would have been viable and may have changed the outcome of the battle.
+Simon Warnes
_"hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings"_
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
*but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem*
_Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden._
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
-*From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358* *LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English drank too much Tea* *the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent,if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
*From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359* as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate *yet the Guards Armored Division did not move* While the Germans used the windfall respite to organise their blocking line.
*From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, *we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge - we were stopped. I never felt so much despair*
The more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life.
I'm sure you have plenty of topics for your next documentary, but if I may, might I suggest the raid on St. Nazaire. It would fit your style and gives the opportunity for more of your excellent graphics.
I have, and the next one is decided. However... I think you'll be pleased to note I've just purchased a book on the St Nazaire raid, since I know nothing on it. Looks interesting. Can you recommend any more?
+TIK Good books on Operation Chariot are hard to come by, but I enjoyed The Greatest Raid of All, C. E. Lucas Philips, late 1950's (not sure of the publisher as I don't have it with me at the moment). It takes the reader from training through execution of this remarkable operation.
+David Pittman might have difficulty getting a copy of that, but I'll see what I can find. Thanks for the recommendation! :)
I read a lot ofbooks on this operation also the ones recommended by you. I go for option 3 as the main cause of the failure. I focus on colonel Lindquist who claims that there wasn't a prebattle plan. It is a simple fact that if airborne troops dont make use of the element of surprise they are doomed.
As has been stated by many other comments on this video, the blame has to lie with Montgomery and the rest of the high command and generals that created the plan in the first place. If the only way for the operation to succeed is if it goes perfectly, then it will fail. No plan survives contact with the enemy, so expecting this one to go off with no problems was just plain stupid.
Nonsense. The facts do not bear that out. The plan was still succeeding even where it was not working perfectly, but the fatal compromise was the one point of failure to even follow the plan, and that was at Nijmegen on the first afternoon. That was an unforced command failure that had nothing to do with planning, intelligence, weather, or Germans.
If your argument relies on people who were there and fighting the war for five years already being "stupid", then it's time to re-appraise your argument.
++++ J O E Vandeleur is buried at Brookwood Cemetery. His headstone simply reads 'Once an Irish Guardsman'......
Only 6 British tanks got over Nijmegen bridge, 2 were then quickly knocked out. No intelligence was available on the strength of operation down to road to Arnhem.
So....4 Sherman tanks against a division of King Tigers. How long would they have lasted?
The failure was not down to XXX Core. It was the delay taking Nijmegen.
6 tanks? What happened to the rest of 30 corps?
@@mikeblank7526 Stuck in Nijmegan clearing the town if Germans.
Thank you@@asc.445
I agree...but...I don't think there were any King Tigers, let alone a division, at Market-Garden.
@@mathewm7136 there were Tiger IIs in Arnhem. The tight confines of the town made them less than brilliant and many of the German tanks (including at least 1, if not 2 Tiger IIs) were dealt with by the British Paras with PIATS, no less. However, these tanks were not in Arnhem originally, being reinforcements that began to arrive from about day 3 onwards.
Amazing documentary I give it a 100/10 vodka bottles and I would drink to it again keep doin what your doin Lewis and stay awesome
+Thegamer8324 I'm not sure I can drink that much vodka, I may have to share it with everyone ;)
Whoo party I'll bring the vodka
These videos have provided remarkable insights into what can go right or wrong in that most risky (and ridiculously immoral) of human endeavours, the battlefield. And indeed, the historical view can never by final because further research provides further insight.
Some avenues for further research into the things that went wrong for the losing side:
1. Anglo-American anticipation of German defensive measures.
1.1 Forces available to the Germans; how and where could they be expected to intervene in the battle.
1.1.1 Why did the Anglo-Americans expect the Germans to have strong forces in the forests immediately to the East of their line of attack? Was it before or during the battle that the Anglo-Americans decided to prioritise the defence of their Eastern flank over the capture of Nijmegen Bridge?
1.1.2 Why did the Anglo-Americans expect the Germans would not have strong(ish) forces in the vicinity of Arnhem? Why was this expectation so strong that some glimpses of tanks by aerial reconnaissance near Arnhem were discounted?
2. Unreliability of Anglo-American radio communications for battlefield command, coordination, and improvisation
2.1 German battlefield radio communications seem to have been reliable throughout WW2.
2.1.1 Historians seem to have concentrated on code-breaking, resistance network communications, radar and navigation, but not on the development of ground forces' radio communications. What was wrong with the British and American radios? Why was it sufficient then and since just to record that equipment didn't work when it need to?
2.1.2 The foregoing question opens a field of research as technically demanding as that of tank, surface ship, submarine, and aircraft development. Where in the radio manufacturing process or the signals training process were things going wrong and who were the manufacturers and signals commanders who consistently failed to observe, analyse, and correct the technical and human faults?
My grandpa played golf with Sean Connerys character in the film
D-Day planning took months. This was a rush job, bad planning, bad radios. There should have been secondary routes, and alternate paths in. It was a combination of all three.