10.00 The 406th Infantry Division had 2,300 men, five armoured cars and three half tracks with quad 20mm flak guns. At the same time Kampfgruppe Gobel with "just 24 medium mortars" attacked Reithorst. page 98 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division As I understand it most of 82nd artillery was due on the second lift. With the help of the fighters escorting the gliders, the Germans were driven off the Heights as gliders landed among them.
What did the 82nd ammunition/supply situation look like at the time they decided to wipe out the 416th German division around Groesbeek? If they were low on ammunition/supply it might have been more imperative to secure their LZs rather than push on towards further objectives (Nijmegen).
From 0630 on day two all available units were required to repel attacks in different areas. The Heights landing zone was retaken at 1330 as gliders landed among the retreating Germans. Most of 82nd artillery was on that lift. map Nijmegen day one i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
Watching this and remembering pilot officer William S Monger who died 19th Sept presumably during the 2nd drop He was 22 years old and is buried at Oosterbeek . His parents only child and my mother's friend.
Lathbury was supposed to take over 1st airborne div if Urquhart was missing. Urquhart thought it would be very unlikely that both he and his 2nd in command would be become missing. Hacket was senior to Hicks, but as Hicks had landed on the first day and was more informed about the situation he would have to take over. Urqhuart told this to MacKenzie. Hicks and Hackett became both surprised, when it became clear that Hicks was in command of 1st airborne division.
If the 82nd had captured and held the Nijmegen bridge on the 17th or 18th, they would not have had to assault the opposite bank of the Waal using boats in the daylight. Forty-eight paratroopers were killed, but the assault was successful. It's somewhat of a cruel irony, that Viktor Graebner's Recon Squadron didn't recon the situation across the Arnhem Road Bridge before attempting to cross it. In that sense, it was a disaster.
+TIK I think you should take a little bit harder look at Gavin's troop to task and actual combat power available. It would have taken a miracle to take and hold two bridges that size against actual armored infantry would have been a nightmare, especially without his Div Arty. I think Gavin did the best he could considering how large the area was.
+Gary Thomas It is hilarious to me that you Brits will do anything to actually say these words. Montgomery mucked it up. It isn't rocket science. Both Monty and Ike should have been relieved for this nightmare.
akgeronimo501 Gary's not a Brit. And why are you arguing so much to defend Gavin? Is it because you're from the USA? Or is it because you're disputing the evidence I'm presenting to you - evidence I pulled from several books on the subject? Let's face it, you're defending Gavin because you're American. Well, I'm a "Brit" and yet I think Churchill was an awful leader who was responsible for several disasters in both wars, Gallipoli being probably the worst. He had his good points and his bad points, just like everyone else. But overall - as a military strategist - I'd say he did a bad job. I haven't studied Montgomery enough yet to come to a definite conclusion about him. But I'm not liking what I'm seeing so far. I prove he was lying in the video I linked to you in the other message (repost here just for benefit of others ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html) and I'm certain that he wasn't as good as he made himself out to be. It appears he wasn't as good as O'Connor was during Operation Compass ruclips.net/video/b71kdhj27rk/видео.html In Gavin's case, he was a good airborne leader... who made a big mistake in this battle. That's not a slight against 'Merica, nor against Gavin as a person, that's just an argument that makes a lot of sense given the evidence. I want to find the truth as to what happened during these battles. There's no point reading history "to defend the Brits" if it doesn't show me the truth. In fact, I was debating whether to change my conclusion to blame Browning because I was scared of the backlash I'd get if I concluded it was Gavin's fault. Then I remembered that the purpose of me making this was to find the truth and I'd do myself injustice if I didn't say what I found. At the end I say "new evidence could come along and sweep away the conclusions we make today". Hopefully that happens because then I can create another Market Garden documentary disputing my original :)
***** Two points. I don't need fifty lines. One Gavin's number one priority ahead of all others is to take and defend a drop zone. Especially when it was to receive follow on forces for four days. Two. Browning was co-located with Gavin. Do you actually believe if he had any problem with what Gavin was doing he wouldn't have put a stop to it? Bonus: You are British and you all suffer from on thing I don't understand. In every Army on earth that I'm aware of, except yours, the commanding officer is responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen on his watch. Having said that, Montgomery and Ike should have both been shown the door.
11.00 If 10th SS panzer did not cross and move to Nijmegen it would still be in Arnhem. The 88's and quad 20's were already there to defend the bridges against bombers and airborne landings.
Urquhart was stuck with Mackenzie in the attic at 14 Zwarteweg. Lathbury was injured on the way (in the stomach by an mg42) and was left with some Dutch people. Hicks assumed command because of standing orders left by Urquhart in the event of his going missing or being killed.
In your following comment you said "I appreciate your efforts, but the information is innacurate and so it's annoying to watch." - and here you say "Urquhart was stuck with Mackenzie in the attic at 14 Zwarteweg." Problem is that Mackenzie was Urquhart's operations officer and he was still at Division HQ. Urquhart's companions in the Zwarteweg 14 attic were Captain William Taylor of the Brigade's headquarters staff and Captain James Cleminson of the 3rd Battalion. Your comments are inaccurate and annoying to read.
+Christian S. (DerBalu) it is for future documentaries, but sadly, too late for this one :( The issue I had was if I put the names of the units on the map, there would be too much text. But I was aware of this and I do need to address it, so if you have any suggestions, let me know!
I really like all the movements and animations, no other documenary is this detailed on it! Unit names would indeed be a nice addition. When this series finishes I hope you will do more operations like this. They should have dug in in Nijmegen like they did in Arnhem and not letnthe Germans move in. But I guess we will never know what would have happened then.
+Gripen85 I agree with the names, so thanks for the constructive feedback :) I'm already working on the next documentary... if you check my Twitter, you'll see what I'm working on ;) Ah, you think the 82nd made the biggest mistake then??
+Martin Juda too long! I've been working on it for months. The animation side of it was the biggest hurdle to get over. Sadly, just as I was getting to the end, I realised I could have animated it a lot quicker if I'd just done one thing differently. But you live and learn :)
painstaking research once again, but got dizzy trying to match the narration to the fast changing graphics. Labelling units with their designations would have helped, as would using a larger map with everything fixed in place for the observer. Maybe a little less sexy , but a lot easier to follow! Thank you!
Hi, thanks for your comment and constructive criticism :) this was my first documentary, and a lot of mistakes were made. I've been trying to improve things since then, and my most recent documentary on Operation Battleaxe is a world apart in quality. Started using Nato symbols and names on the units themselves to make them distinct. Also 3D graphics (although still a birds-eye view). I'll leave the link in case you're interested in seeing Battleaxe ruclips.net/video/lqGo57Drs24/видео.html
Having just finished Beevors book plus Neillands one I have just read John frosts book a Drop too many. I have to believe that the contributing factor to the failure of the bridge at Arnhem has to be the failure to capture the Nijmegan bridge. However in my opinion Browning has to take the blame for this as what he did at the beginning of the operation.
Browning planned a glider coup de main assault on the Nijmegen bridge, and then after that was deleted by Brereton and Williams he asked Gavin to drop a battalion on the north end of the bridge. Gavin toyed with the idea but eventually discarded it because of his experience with a scattered drop in Sicily. Can't blame Browning because he did try.
2 minutes in, unfortunately it's a Friday night after the start of the rugby world cup so I'm pissed. Damn. Deep breath. No one else does this level of interesting. Will be back after hangover.
Had they taken the bridge and not the heights and their intelligence (Which both Gavin and Browning believed) was accurate then it could have been worse. Imagine the mess that happens if the heights are in German Hands, the 82nd can't hold the far side which is likely without their Division Artillery. Then what? I would love to know your source, because I was in the 505th and I seem to remember the numbers of casualties being a lot worse than that. It is very easy to look back and play armchair General, but on the ground you have to fight the fight you believe you have. I checked out your sources. I have read two of those books and don't remember much of that. Well I guess I will read the rest of them. Just funny how you never seem to fault Monty and Ike. Neither of them should have stayed employed after this fools errand. Day two the "Allies had the situation in hand except Nijmegen", I doubt anyone on that day would agree with you, especially Frost.
They did drop with their artillery. And I do criticize Monty in another video ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html I'm not "defending" him here for the sake of defending him. I'm looking at the tactical situation based on the books I've read and saying "actually, this could have worked" and "it's not as rotten a plan as some have made it out to be". If you want to criticize their strategic decision to launch Market Garden, fine. But I do think that this could have been won tactically if a unit had been sent to take Nijmegen bridge straight away. The intelligence they did have didn't suggest there was a sizable German armoured force in the Reichswald. They falsely believed there were tanks in the Reichswald based on rumour and speculation alone. I quote Frost at the end of this series, and his conclusion mirrors mine - that the battle was lost at Nijmegen.
***** So why would Browning and Gavin both agree that there were forces there? Were they both touched in the head? One didn't drop artillery in those days. It was on gliders and arrived D+3. General Browning HQ was brought in on D+2. So Frost is qualified to second guess Browning? Why because his guys just missed the German blocking force and fought like hell because they had no other choice? His Sandhurst education?
"The experienced 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion had - in slightly over an hour - ten of its twelve 75mm pack howitzers ready for action..." - Poulussen, Lost at Nijmegen. They did have artillery in day one. Not ALL their artillery, but a reasonable portion of it. They also had eight 57mm anti-tank guns of the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion on day one too. All the intelligence reports they had said there was nothing in the Reichswald. But yet Gavin believed there were 1000 tanks in the forest because he sent the 505 PIR to question civilians about the "1000 tanks in the Reichswald". This was at a point where Germany was on the backfoot, and there's obviously no way they could spare 1000 tanks to sit in a forest miles behind the front lines. I would recommend you read Poulussen's book or Robin Neillands book listed in the description.
***** The 376th PFAR? Who the hell is that. It has never, ever supported the 82nd Airborne division. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd BN of the 319th PFAR is the only, and still supports the 82nd. Another example of this fools ineptness. Poulussen is in fact a walking talking crime against history. What intelligence report? By whom? So explain to me how the Overall airborne commander, Browning, and one of the Division commanders, Gavin, thought there were forces there? Did they just make it up? Who said they believed there were 1000 German tanks? Where? When? Source. If you say Poulussen then I will have to see his source. Maybe it was "Combat Interview" or maybe the City of Nijmegen's "Report". Just saying man. Damn.
akgeronimo501 as it says in Poulussen's book (as well as other books) the 505 PIR said in their report they were asking civilians and searching the forest for the 1000 tanks they thought were in there. Considering that none of the reports said there was anything in the forest (there wasn't), we're left with assumption that their superiors must have feared a substantial counterattack from the Reichswald. It makes sense when you consider a large portion of the 82nd just sat at Groesbeek instead of moving to the bridge.
Oh my gosh what a donnybrook. Reminds me so much of hills and dales of New England with its watershed and the border wars we had in the woods and mist this time of year. Could the British 1st Recon with it's jeeps could have gone full tilt at Arnhem up to Nijmegen as a hammer to the anvil? Maybe the Germans would have thought they were surrounded. Tippping my hat to Student who used a similar ruse in an airborne operation I believe back in 1940 against a Dutch fort.
German fallschirmjäger success at Belgian fort(complex) Eben Emael...but Kurt Student's Fallschirmjägers LOST it at the operations around The Hague at three small airfields Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg. All lost against growing resistance of dutch infantry, inexperienced and with obsolete rifles..yet they won. Because of TIME and because of ARTILLERY. That is the lesson Student learned (and at Crete again) Once the paras are localised and STATIC , then more and more numbers of even the poorest quality infantry will overrun your paras. The absolute killer is the artillery and mortars. (At Crete the brits didnot have the influx of more reserves and their artillery was detected by the Stukas (good coordination/communication paras and luftwaffe)..).
Interesting, but VERY simplistic analysis. There were a lot of other factors in play, unfortunately. Horrocks killed it by listening to Monty and thinking of his promotion, rather than going headlong for the Arnhem bridge. Horrocks should have been court-martialled for abandoning the 1st Airborne. Instead of which, Urquhart carried the can. He was never given another command, and was never promoted. He should never have left his command post, but the radios were rubbish. He didn't know that the Dutch telephone exchange was still working. A disaster that could have been a triumph.
Wow - what a sh*tstorm in the comments...I guess that's to be expected when you're busting myths. Gavin's handling of his division was very poor. It was really the first time he had handled a divisional organisation in an airborne role so was probably a bit overstretched. Ultimately in all combat but especially airdrops - if you don't take your objective it's all in vain. Excessive anxiety about the drop zones is a rookie mistake.
10.00 The 406th Infantry Division had 2,300 men, five armoured cars and three half tracks with quad 20mm flak guns. At the same time Kampfgruppe Gobel with "just 24 medium mortars" attacked Reithorst. page 98 Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne & Guards Armoured Division As I understand it most of 82nd artillery was due on the second lift. With the help of the fighters escorting the gliders, the Germans were driven off the Heights as gliders landed among them.
What did the 82nd ammunition/supply situation look like at the time they decided to wipe out the 416th German division around Groesbeek? If they were low on ammunition/supply it might have been more imperative to secure their LZs rather than push on towards further objectives (Nijmegen).
From 0630 on day two all available units were required to repel attacks in different areas. The Heights landing zone was retaken at 1330 as gliders landed among the retreating Germans. Most of 82nd artillery was on that lift.
map Nijmegen day one
i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg
Watching this and remembering pilot officer William S Monger who died 19th Sept presumably during the 2nd drop He was 22 years old and is buried at Oosterbeek . His parents only child and my mother's friend.
Lathbury was supposed to take over 1st airborne div if Urquhart was missing. Urquhart thought it would be very unlikely that both he and his 2nd in command would be become missing. Hacket was senior to Hicks, but as Hicks had landed on the first day and was more informed about the situation he would have to take over. Urqhuart told this to MacKenzie. Hicks and Hackett became both surprised, when it became clear that Hicks was in command of 1st airborne division.
If the 82nd had captured and held the Nijmegen bridge on the 17th or 18th, they would not have had to assault the opposite bank of the Waal using boats in the daylight. Forty-eight paratroopers were killed, but the assault was successful. It's somewhat of a cruel irony, that Viktor Graebner's Recon Squadron didn't recon the situation across the Arnhem Road Bridge before attempting to cross it. In that sense, it was a disaster.
+Gary Thomas you bring up a valid point there about the Nijmegen bridge :) and who would think that a recon unit wouldn't do any recon!?
+TIK I think you should take a little bit harder look at Gavin's troop to task and actual combat power available. It would have taken a miracle to take and hold two bridges that size against actual armored infantry would have been a nightmare, especially without his Div Arty. I think Gavin did the best he could considering how large the area was.
+Gary Thomas It is hilarious to me that you Brits will do anything to actually say these words. Montgomery mucked it up. It isn't rocket science. Both Monty and Ike should have been relieved for this nightmare.
akgeronimo501 Gary's not a Brit.
And why are you arguing so much to defend Gavin? Is it because you're from the USA? Or is it because you're disputing the evidence I'm presenting to you - evidence I pulled from several books on the subject?
Let's face it, you're defending Gavin because you're American.
Well, I'm a "Brit" and yet I think Churchill was an awful leader who was responsible for several disasters in both wars, Gallipoli being probably the worst. He had his good points and his bad points, just like everyone else. But overall - as a military strategist - I'd say he did a bad job.
I haven't studied Montgomery enough yet to come to a definite conclusion about him. But I'm not liking what I'm seeing so far. I prove he was lying in the video I linked to you in the other message (repost here just for benefit of others ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html) and I'm certain that he wasn't as good as he made himself out to be. It appears he wasn't as good as O'Connor was during Operation Compass ruclips.net/video/b71kdhj27rk/видео.html
In Gavin's case, he was a good airborne leader... who made a big mistake in this battle. That's not a slight against 'Merica, nor against Gavin as a person, that's just an argument that makes a lot of sense given the evidence.
I want to find the truth as to what happened during these battles. There's no point reading history "to defend the Brits" if it doesn't show me the truth. In fact, I was debating whether to change my conclusion to blame Browning because I was scared of the backlash I'd get if I concluded it was Gavin's fault. Then I remembered that the purpose of me making this was to find the truth and I'd do myself injustice if I didn't say what I found.
At the end I say "new evidence could come along and sweep away the conclusions we make today". Hopefully that happens because then I can create another Market Garden documentary disputing my original :)
***** Two points. I don't need fifty lines. One Gavin's number one priority ahead of all others is to take and defend a drop zone. Especially when it was to receive follow on forces for four days.
Two. Browning was co-located with Gavin. Do you actually believe if he had any problem with what Gavin was doing he wouldn't have put a stop to it?
Bonus: You are British and you all suffer from on thing I don't understand. In every Army on earth that I'm aware of, except yours, the commanding officer is responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen on his watch. Having said that, Montgomery and Ike should have both been shown the door.
11.00 If 10th SS panzer did not cross and move to Nijmegen it would still be in Arnhem. The 88's and quad 20's were already there to defend the bridges against bombers and airborne landings.
Very good series!!
Urquhart was stuck with Mackenzie in the attic at 14 Zwarteweg. Lathbury was injured on the way (in the stomach by an mg42) and was left with some Dutch people. Hicks assumed command because of standing orders left by Urquhart in the event of his going missing or being killed.
In your following comment you said "I appreciate your efforts, but the information is innacurate and so it's annoying to watch." - and here you say "Urquhart was stuck with Mackenzie in the attic at 14 Zwarteweg."
Problem is that Mackenzie was Urquhart's operations officer and he was still at Division HQ. Urquhart's companions in the Zwarteweg 14 attic were Captain William Taylor of the Brigade's headquarters staff and Captain James Cleminson of the 3rd Battalion.
Your comments are inaccurate and annoying to read.
is it possible to get the names of the units on the map ?
But again, very good 👍
+Christian S. (DerBalu) it is for future documentaries, but sadly, too late for this one :(
The issue I had was if I put the names of the units on the map, there would be too much text. But I was aware of this and I do need to address it, so if you have any suggestions, let me know!
I really like all the movements and animations, no other documenary is this detailed on it! Unit names would indeed be a nice addition. When this series finishes I hope you will do more operations like this. They should have dug in in Nijmegen like they did in Arnhem and not letnthe Germans move in. But I guess we will never know what would have happened then.
+Gripen85 I agree with the names, so thanks for the constructive feedback :) I'm already working on the next documentary... if you check my Twitter, you'll see what I'm working on ;)
Ah, you think the 82nd made the biggest mistake then??
With reference to your opening - Sadly for him, to be more specific
how long you make this video
+Martin Juda too long! I've been working on it for months. The animation side of it was the biggest hurdle to get over. Sadly, just as I was getting to the end, I realised I could have animated it a lot quicker if I'd just done one thing differently. But you live and learn :)
thx
TIK I’ve been there before!
@@mandr3w you reminded me a 4 year old video, very epic.
painstaking research once again, but got dizzy trying to match the narration to the fast changing graphics. Labelling units with their designations would have helped, as would using a larger map with everything fixed in place for the observer. Maybe a little less sexy , but a lot easier to follow! Thank you!
Hi, thanks for your comment and constructive criticism :) this was my first documentary, and a lot of mistakes were made. I've been trying to improve things since then, and my most recent documentary on Operation Battleaxe is a world apart in quality. Started using Nato symbols and names on the units themselves to make them distinct. Also 3D graphics (although still a birds-eye view). I'll leave the link in case you're interested in seeing Battleaxe ruclips.net/video/lqGo57Drs24/видео.html
Having just finished Beevors book plus Neillands one I have just read John frosts book a Drop too many. I have to believe that the contributing factor to the failure of the bridge at Arnhem has to be the failure to capture the Nijmegan bridge. However in my opinion Browning has to take the blame for this as what he did at the beginning of the operation.
Browning planned a glider coup de main assault on the Nijmegen bridge, and then after that was deleted by Brereton and Williams he asked Gavin to drop a battalion on the north end of the bridge. Gavin toyed with the idea but eventually discarded it because of his experience with a scattered drop in Sicily. Can't blame Browning because he did try.
2 minutes in, unfortunately it's a Friday night after the start of the rugby world cup so I'm pissed. Damn. Deep breath. No one else does this level of interesting. Will be back after hangover.
+Robert “IvorRama” Biggin lol. How's the hangover? :D
Try to watch Mark Felton before you get pissed next time.
Grabner and 9th ss recce, must have had a pervitin party before crossing the bridge that day
Gavin was to blame.
Had they taken the bridge and not the heights and their intelligence (Which both Gavin and Browning believed) was accurate then it could have been worse. Imagine the mess that happens if the heights are in German Hands, the 82nd can't hold the far side which is likely without their Division Artillery. Then what? I would love to know your source, because I was in the 505th and I seem to remember the numbers of casualties being a lot worse than that. It is very easy to look back and play armchair General, but on the ground you have to fight the fight you believe you have. I checked out your sources. I have read two of those books and don't remember much of that. Well I guess I will read the rest of them. Just funny how you never seem to fault Monty and Ike. Neither of them should have stayed employed after this fools errand. Day two the "Allies had the situation in hand except Nijmegen", I doubt anyone on that day would agree with you, especially Frost.
They did drop with their artillery. And I do criticize Monty in another video ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html I'm not "defending" him here for the sake of defending him. I'm looking at the tactical situation based on the books I've read and saying "actually, this could have worked" and "it's not as rotten a plan as some have made it out to be". If you want to criticize their strategic decision to launch Market Garden, fine. But I do think that this could have been won tactically if a unit had been sent to take Nijmegen bridge straight away.
The intelligence they did have didn't suggest there was a sizable German armoured force in the Reichswald. They falsely believed there were tanks in the Reichswald based on rumour and speculation alone. I quote Frost at the end of this series, and his conclusion mirrors mine - that the battle was lost at Nijmegen.
***** So why would Browning and Gavin both agree that there were forces there? Were they both touched in the head? One didn't drop artillery in those days. It was on gliders and arrived D+3. General Browning HQ was brought in on D+2. So Frost is qualified to second guess Browning? Why because his guys just missed the German blocking force and fought like hell because they had no other choice? His Sandhurst education?
"The experienced 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion had - in slightly over an hour - ten of its twelve 75mm pack howitzers ready for action..." - Poulussen, Lost at Nijmegen.
They did have artillery in day one. Not ALL their artillery, but a reasonable portion of it. They also had eight 57mm anti-tank guns of the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion on day one too.
All the intelligence reports they had said there was nothing in the Reichswald. But yet Gavin believed there were 1000 tanks in the forest because he sent the 505 PIR to question civilians about the "1000 tanks in the Reichswald". This was at a point where Germany was on the backfoot, and there's obviously no way they could spare 1000 tanks to sit in a forest miles behind the front lines.
I would recommend you read Poulussen's book or Robin Neillands book listed in the description.
***** The 376th PFAR? Who the hell is that. It has never, ever supported the 82nd Airborne division. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd BN of the 319th PFAR is the only, and still supports the 82nd. Another example of this fools ineptness. Poulussen is in fact a walking talking crime against history. What intelligence report? By whom? So explain to me how the Overall airborne commander, Browning, and one of the Division commanders, Gavin, thought there were forces there? Did they just make it up? Who said they believed there were 1000 German tanks? Where? When? Source. If you say Poulussen then I will have to see his source. Maybe it was "Combat Interview" or maybe the City of Nijmegen's "Report". Just saying man. Damn.
akgeronimo501 as it says in Poulussen's book (as well as other books) the 505 PIR said in their report they were asking civilians and searching the forest for the 1000 tanks they thought were in there. Considering that none of the reports said there was anything in the forest (there wasn't), we're left with assumption that their superiors must have feared a substantial counterattack from the Reichswald. It makes sense when you consider a large portion of the 82nd just sat at Groesbeek instead of moving to the bridge.
Oh my gosh what a donnybrook. Reminds me so much of hills and dales of New England with its watershed and the border wars we had in the woods and mist this time of year. Could the British 1st Recon with it's jeeps could have gone full tilt at Arnhem up to Nijmegen as a hammer to the anvil? Maybe the Germans would have thought they were surrounded. Tippping my hat to Student who used a similar ruse in an airborne operation I believe back in 1940 against a Dutch fort.
German fallschirmjäger success at Belgian fort(complex) Eben Emael...but Kurt Student's Fallschirmjägers LOST it at the operations around The Hague at three small airfields Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg.
All lost against growing resistance of dutch infantry, inexperienced and with obsolete rifles..yet they won.
Because of TIME and because of ARTILLERY.
That is the lesson Student learned (and at Crete again) Once the paras are localised and STATIC , then more and more numbers of even the poorest quality infantry will overrun your paras.
The absolute killer is the artillery and mortars.
(At Crete the brits didnot have the influx of more reserves and their artillery was detected by the Stukas (good coordination/communication paras and luftwaffe)..).
Interesting, but VERY simplistic analysis. There were a lot of other factors in play, unfortunately. Horrocks killed it by listening to Monty and thinking of his promotion, rather than going headlong for the Arnhem bridge. Horrocks should have been court-martialled for abandoning the 1st Airborne. Instead of which, Urquhart carried the can. He was never given another command, and was never promoted. He should never have left his command post, but the radios were rubbish. He didn't know that the Dutch telephone exchange was still working. A disaster that could have been a triumph.
Wow - what a sh*tstorm in the comments...I guess that's to be expected when you're busting myths. Gavin's handling of his division was very poor. It was really the first time he had handled a divisional organisation in an airborne role so was probably a bit overstretched. Ultimately in all combat but especially airdrops - if you don't take your objective it's all in vain. Excessive anxiety about the drop zones is a rookie mistake.
Monty owns this disaster He campaigned for and got it,BTW he never showed up on the front like the Real Field marshall Model
I appreciate your efforts, but the information is innacurate and so it's annoying to watch.