Hey this is just a suggestion from someone illiterate in Pacific Island geography, but could you show a zoomed out map of the war in the Pacific and then zoom into where specifically they’re fighting each week? It’s just hard to put the island conflict of each battle into context of the whole theatre.
The Solomon Island chain is directly east of New Guinea. New Guinea itself is directly north of Australia. Think of those islands as a chain of shields protecting Australia. Wedged between the western end of the Solomon Chain and New Guinea are the two islands of New Britain and New Ireland, in the straight between those two islands is Rabaul, the biggest Japanese naval base in the region. You force the Japanese from the Solomons and the Northern coast of New Guinea, you force them out of Rabaul, which in turn opens up the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago and eventually the Philippines. Make sense now?
I loved how you visualize plans crashing with reality by first showing the map with plans made and then how it developed meanwhile working for fresh troops. Please more of this. Otherwise all seems like a forgone conclusion or fate. This peak into the minds of generals is very intriguing
@@blockmasterscott It was in last weekends weekly video. I cannot recall where exactly but Soviets pushed into a major area of resupply for the Germans in which there was a station.
For those who missed it on last week's episode: when the Soviets liberated Piatykhatky, their advance was so rapid that the Germans in charge of supply there had no idea what's happening and a train full of newly arrived Panther tanks waiting to be unloaded fell into the Soviet hands.
Good to see some in depth coverage on the Pacific Theater this week, especially on the completion of the Burma Death Railway and its horrors. Thank you for the great weekly episode as usual team.
I am from Australia. I am so grateful for the balanced comprehensive coverage of this history from week to week . It is good reading other people's comments with tangible information to add . For others that insist in voicing their ignorance. " Even a fool may seem wise if they hold their tongue . "
About problems British faced crossing Volturno river (1) The reasons why the British infantry divisions had such a bad time are laid out in Clark’s autobiography. His version of events has been accepted as true because X Corps Commander, Lt-General Sir Richard McCreery, KBE, DSO, MC†, left no memoirs and X Corps’ War diary, which might have been expected to record some details of the battle, restricts itself to trivia such as ration returns. McCreery opposed simultaneous crossings with the US Division on the grounds that the British infantry division had the harder job. McCreery wanted them to cross twenty-four hours after the US divisions so as to draw off the enemy fire from his own division. Clark insisted on simultaneous crossings. Or so he says. In fact in his original plans for the crossing - Operations Instructions No. 6 - the British division were to cross after the US division (the 3rd). Clark had realized that McCreery’s reasons for opposing simultaneous crossings made good sense. McCreery was a very experienced soldier. As a subaltern he had served with the cavalry on the Western front from 1915 to 1918, being wounded and winning the MC. Like Alexander and Montgomery, he had been shocked by the way senior generals had used their front line troops and was determined that none under his command should be treated as cannon fodder. His regiment, the 12th Lancers, was among the first to be mechanized and, when he became its CO, McCreery earned a reputation for preferring tanks to horses, an unusual trait amongst British cavalry officers. In 1939 Alexander, then commanding British 1st Division, chose McCreery as his Chief of Staff. The 1st Division formed part of the BEF in France, Once there McCreery, who wanted the experience of handling armour in battle, persuaded Alexander to let him take command of an armoured brigade. During the BEF’s retreat to Dunkirk the brigade formed part of its rearguard. McCreery’s handling of his armour earned him the DSO. Back in the UK he was given command of one of the newly formed armoured divisions. Early in 1942 he went to the Middle East and became General Sir Claude Auchinleck’s adviser on Armoured Fighting Vehicles. When Alexander succeeded Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, he made McCreery his Chief of Staff. McCreery stayed with Alexander until Lt-General Sir Brian Horrocks, who had just taken over command of the newly formed X Corps, was wounded in a German air raid on Bizerta in July, 1943. Prior to the crossing of the Volturno Clark had considered a number of options. Replacing X Corps, whose heavy casualties at Salerno had not been made good, with US II Corps - 1st US Armored Division and 36th US Division, under the command of Major-General Geoffrey Keyes - was one of them. Clark had finally decided to reinforce X Corps and US 3rd US Division - the only US division at the Volturno - by bringing up US 1st Armored Division. Alexander pointed out that, owing to its supply problems, 5th Army would be unable to support two armoured divisions. Clark, aware that the Allied armour outnumbered the enemy’s by about eight to one, reluctantly abandoned the idea. On 12 October Clark drew up his ‘definitive’ plans - Operations Instructions number 63 - for the crossing. US 3rd Division would make simultaneous attacks with X Corps’ British 46th and 56th Divisions. British 7th Armoured Division would make a ‘display’ on the US 3rd Division’s left flank. McCreery objected to the plans, for reasons already given, and Clark agreed to put US 3rd Division across twenty-four hours before the British Divisions. When Major-General Lucas, US VI Corps’ new commander, informed General Truscott of the contents of Operations Instructions number 6 Truscott objected to the plan as vigorously as McCreery had objected to the idea of simultaneous crossings, and on much the same grounds. If the US 3rd Division crossed by itself it would draw all the ememy’s fire. Lucas reported back to Clark. Once again the Army Commander changed his plans. On the morning of 13 October he informed Lucas and McCreery that the US 34th Division would be brought into the attack and that VI Corps and X Corps would make simultaneous crossings that night. The chopping and changing of Clark’s plans delayed his attack almost as much as the weather. Truscott’s crossing, which von Vietinghoff describes as ‘a brilliant operation’, outwitted and almost outflanked the Hermann Göring Division. The intense US pressure on both flanks of XIV Panzer Korps forced Hube to ask permission to withdraw. During the night of 14/15 October von Vietinghoff in turn asked Kesselring’s permission. Kesselring, well content with the way his retreat schedule had been kept to - courtesy of the weather and Allied generals disagreeing among themselves - was confident enough to sanction XIV Panzer Korps’ withdrawal without asking Hitler’s permission.
About problems British faced crossing Volturno river (2) The failure of the British 56th Division to cross the river highlights the importance of security in the approaches to a large river, and how ill-equipped 5th Army was to carry out such a crossing. The 56th Divisional Commander, Major-General D. A. H. Graham, had been badly injured in a road accident as the Division was moving up towards the Volturno. At the crossing the Division was under the temporary command of Brigadier L. O. Lyne, 169th (Queen’s) Brigade. Brigadier C. E. A. Firth’s 167th Brigade was to spearhead the assault across the river. During the night of 12/13 October their leading battalion, the 7th Ox and Bucks, moved into a factory close to the river. At Salerno one of the two battalions brigaded with the 7th Ox and Bucks had been overrun by the enemy, the other had withdrawn, leaving the Ox and Bucks to hld the line by itself. It had done so. After the battle McCreery had visited Battalion HQ to congratulate congratulate the battalion’s CO, a singular honour. On the morning of 13 October Brigadier Firth called an ‘O’ Group. Three senior officers of the Ox and Bucks had to leave the factory in full view of the enemy. They disguised themselves as peasants. Its one thing to dress like a peasant, another to walk like one. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which was commanded by Colonel Baade,* was not fooled. It now knew where the crossing would take place, and the whereabouts of the troops who would lead it. Colonel Baade had his divisional artillery zero in on the factory and the length of river in front of it. At dusk on 13 October the Ox and Bucks filed out of the factory towards the river. The enemy artillery opened up on them. The battalion suffered eighty casualties within a few minutes. Their companies reformed, took to their boats and began crossing the river. Enemy guns blasted them out of it, causing another forty casualties and destroying most of the boats. Men Brigadier Lyne could replace, boats he could not. Like all Allied divisions in 5th Army, the 56th only had enough boats to equip one battalion. The crossing was scuppered. As Brigadier Firth reported the destruction of the boats, and Brigadier Lyne called off the crossing, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division sent a fighting patrol across the river. Slipping through 167th Brigade’s lines, the patrol made its way to Capua, where Brigadier Lyne had his headquarters. The enemy shot up the town, then withdrew across the river.5 The raid had the Baade touch. He wouldn’t have led it, but he probably planned it: rubbing salt into the enemy’s wounds. Countdown to Cassino - Alex Bowlby(2)
@@chaptermasterpedrokantor1623 one of the worst decisions Clark did was to race to Rome apparently blatantly disobeying of General Alexander and permitted the German 10th army to retreat passing Valmontone, I know quite well the area around, to reach the Gothic line, Pisa, Livorno, Florence and other towns incurring unnecessary heavy losses among the allies, civilians and heavily damaged medieval towns. My late Italian father remembered very well seeing the German troops retreating near his town on the road to Pisa......
@@paoloviti6156 He should have been sacked, like Lloyd Fredenhall after the battle of Kasserine Pass. But I reckon an army commander who has just taken a former Axis capital has more clout to save him then a lowly corps commander who just embarrassed the US. But you are right. That decision cost the Allies, and Italy, greatly.
😊 I am pleased, very pleased! I actually received the notification for this broadcast came early this morning. As usual your broadcast was excellent! Thanks y'all
There is also action by British 13th Corps on the eastern flank in Italy this week. 1st Canadian Division troops of both 1st and 2nd Brigades cross the Biferno River to take several small villages some heavily defended. Edmontons of 2nd Brigade are involved in bitter hand-to-hand to fighting in the Colle d'Anchise area. Their supporting tanks of the Ontario regiment struggle to cross the Biferno and when they do are ambushed by German mark iv's. The Edmontons have only their PIATs to defend themselves from German armour but they prevail. The PPCLI take Spintete after it is bombed by 24 Bostons of the South African air force. 1st Brigade takes Torella and Molise on the 27th. On the 29th the RCR move into Duronia.
Iv seen to many WW2 glory films or history of, how many ways can u retell the story evey night on history or military channel, however this channel this show is unprecedented in it's depth pace and all that, bravo 5 stars, among the best of RUclips, ty
I’ve been following this channel for a while, and it’s just incredible how you guys can upload such research-intense videos on a weekly basis! Each of these must’ve taken hours upon hours of research, writing and editing. Thank you so much for your work!
Hi Indy! I have a great time watching you and the all episodes are very interesting. I am a Pole and the specially history of World War II is particularly close to me. Please continue to create new materials because you guys are doing it great! If I made a lot of mistakes when translating this post from Polish into English, I apologize
By the way, the Cuban Missile Crisis documentary really is the definite documentary to watch. Older documentaries will not cut it due to the recently declassified stuff. It's great and I wish there had been more of them.
I don't really get why some viewers think of this series as "American centric". One if the reasons I'm always looking forward for every new weekly videos is the details and measurements you guys take to show the war as it really was; a global conflict. In my opinion it also fills my need to gain knowledge of the Russian contribution in the war that in my personal case was null. It also helps me put in a time-line military actions in Europe the Pacific and how both theaters of war share but also diverted from each other. Believe me Indie, in my case, is not falling in deaf ears.
@@anonguy4687 they sometimes do but my guess is that the need to cover the war from larger events that promoted big changes in certain areas but also we need to remember; China, other parts of Asia and The Balcans will have a bigger prominent role in the post war.
It's a smaller campaign, but what about the battles on the Dodecanese islands? Rhodes, Kor and Leros? It was one of the last English defeats in ww2, when 7500 German troops defeated 55,000 Italian troops and 4800 British soldiers.
The Day of Battle - Rick Atkinson(1) Volturno (2) Italy would break their backs, their bones, and nearly their spirits. But first it would break their hearts, and that heartbreak began north of the Volturno, where the terrain steepened, the weather worsened, and the enemy stiffened. Allied casualties in Italy totaled eighteen thousand between September 3 and October 20-fifteen thousand in Fifth Army and three thousand in Eighth Army. Yet that was only a down payment on the campaign to come. German demolitions had begun five miles from Salerno-“no bridge or culvert seems too small to escape their eye,” an Army observer reported-and it soon became evident that Italy would be a battle of engineers: the speed of advance would be determined by bulldozers, if not by a nervous soldier on his hands and knees, prodding for mines with a bayonet. An AFHQ study estimated that one thousand bridges would be needed to reach the Po River in the north, a disheartening number given that for weeks the U.S. Army had only five prefabricated Bailey bridges in Italy. In the event, the Allies would erect three thousand spans in twenty months, with a combined length of fifty-five miles. Some were built and rebuilt, as autumn rains put the Italian rivers in spate. The fickle Volturno soon rose eighteen feet in ten hours, sweeping away every hard-won bridge but one. “The floods bring down quantities of debris, ranging from whole trees to bulls, the horns of which had a disastrous effect on the plywood sides of a pontoon,” Fifth Army engineers reported. Ingenuity became the order of the day, every day. When German sappers blew up stone houses to block narrow village streets, American sappers bulldozed “new tracks across the rubble heaps, often at the level of the second stories,” Truscott noted. Engineers reportedly filled road craters with “broken bathtubs and statues and sinks and hairbrushes and fancy fedora hats.” Bridge builders fashioned a pile driver from the barrel of an Italian 240mm gun, and the Allies built rolling mills, cement works, foundries, nail works, and enough sawmills to cut nine thousand tons of Volturno lumber a month. They used the timber to corduroy muddy roads, as armies had for centuries. Yet no engineer could corduroy the weather. “It got darker, colder, wetter,” a 45th Division soldier recalled. Autumn rains began on September 26, and soldiers soon realized why their Italian phrase books included Piove in rovesci, “It’s raining torrents.” Censorship rules forbade writing home about the weather-“One may write of mist,” a wag proposed, “but not of rain”-though nothing precluded bivouac grousing. “No conversation, genteel or otherwise, can be carried on without mentioning the weather,” a diarist in the 56th Evacuation Hospital noted in November. Campfires were banned after five P.M., so troops ate at four, bolting their supper before rain pooled in their mess kits, then went to bed at 7:30. Craps games lasted “until darkness obscures spots on the dice.” Rain soon grayed the soldiers, making them one with the mud in which they slept and fought until they seemed no more than clay with eyes. As Allied planners had misjudged the harsh North African winter, so they underestimated-perhaps less pardonably-the even harsher Italian climate: Rome shares a latitude with Chicago. “The desert war had made men forget the mud of Flanders,” wrote the British general W.G.F. Jackson, but no veteran of Italy would ever forget Italian mud, which Bill Mauldin insisted lacked “an honest color like ordinary mud.” A private from Michigan complained, “The trouble with this mud is that it’s too thick to drink and too thin to plow.” Even in summer, the roads of southern Italy were barely adequate; now the British and Americans would be canalized on the only northbound hard-surface roads-Highways 6, 7, 16, and 17-that could carry the prodigious traffic of armies. Foul weather constrained maneuver, obviated the advantages of motorization, and undermined air superiority by halving the number of Allied bombing sorties. Churchill cursed the “savage versatility” of Italy’s climate, but GIs simply called it “German weather.” Mines made it much worse. “All roads lead to Rome,” Alexander quipped, “but all the roads are mined.” So were footpaths, lovers’ lanes, alleys, goat trails, streambeds, shortcuts, and tracks, beaten and unbeaten. “I never had a moment that I didn’t worry about mines and booby traps,” a 7th Infantry officer said. Forty percent of Fifth Army battle casualties in early November came from mines. “Watch where you step,” Clark’s headquarters advised, “and have no curiosity at all.” North of the Volturno, “you could follow our battalions by the bloodstained leggings, the scattered equipment, and the bits of bodies where men had been blown up,” the 168th Infantry reported. Big Teller mines could destroy a truck or cripple a tank, but German antipersonnel mines became particularly diabolical. “Castrators” or “nutcrackers” fired a bullet upward when an unwitting soldier stepped on the pressure plate. “Shoe” mines, built mostly of wood, proved nearly impossible to detect. Enemy sappers mined or booby-trapped doorknobs and desk drawers, grapevines and haystacks, apples on the tree and bodies on the ground, whether Italian or German, Tommy or Yank. At least two chaplains lost legs trying to bury the dead above the Volturno. “A man’s foot is usually blown loose at the ankle, leaving the mangled foot dangling on shredded tendons,” an Army physician noted in his diary. “Additional puncture wounds of both legs and groin make the agony worse.” A combat medic later wrote, “Even though you’d give them a shot or two of morphine, they would still scream.” In a minefield, Bill Mauldin observed, “an old man thinks of his eyes and a young man grabs for his balls.” The Army bought 100,000 of the SCR-625 mine detector-dubbed a “manhole cover on a stick”-but they proved useless in the rain and befuddled by the iron ore and shell fragments common in Italian soil. The device also required its operator to stand upright, often under fire, while listening for the telltale hum that signified danger. A secret program to train canine detectors-“M dogs”-failed when half the mines in field tests remained unsniffed.
I always think being inside a tank in combat must be pretty horrible but imagine being stuck inside one of the static armoured emplacements under attack….horrific! 😮
Something about the tank reserves transferred to Ukraine from Europe: “After the disaster at Stalingrad, I formed several tank divisions from the remnants of the defeated divisions, whose tank soldiers, due to injury, illness and other reasons, managed to avoid capture. I did the same with the survivors of the remnants troops after the loss of Africa. The 21st Panzer Division was created in France from the occupying units armed with captured materiel. The 25th Panzer Division was formed in a similar way in Norway. Its commander was General von Schell. Schell worked with me in the Ministry of the Reichswehr 1927 to 1930 when I dealt with issues of automobile troops.I supported his desire to deploy this unit in a tank division and achieved the transfer of his unit to France.However, after the collapse of the Citadel plan, the Eastern Front took all the forces from France and so weakened the occupying units located there that they needed urgent replenishment. The 25th division needed to be familiarized with the experience of combat operations on the Eastern Front. then she could be given a feasible task in accordance with the level of her training. And what happened? At the beginning of October 1943, on Hitler's orders, this division was to transfer over 600 newly received vehicles to the Eastern Front for the formed 14th Panzer Division; the high command of the armed forces and the main command of the ground forces believed that the 25th Panzer Division would remain in France for a long time, and therefore could do without them, being content with low-quality French equipment. This greatly worsened the armament of the division, which now could only be used in the Western Theater. Sappers and the 1st battalion of the 146th motorized regiment also received new armored personnel carriers. The 9th Panzer Regiment was not yet fully equipped. The 91st Artillery Regiment was to receive German light field howitzers and 100-mm guns instead of captured Polish guns. The anti-aircraft division lacked one battery, the anti-tank division lacked a company of self-propelled guns. There were not enough radio communications. All these shortcomings were known. They had to be eliminated in a calm environment in France. Despite all this, in mid-October, an order was received to transfer the division to the east." Heinz Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier". We will soon find out what will happen with the 25th Panzer Division on the eastern front )
Thank you for the lesson. I have two ideas for videos. 1. Logistically what does it take to move a division from Germany to the Eastern Front. 2. Maybe special series on the various special operations units. Especially the lesser knowm ones.
Construction of Bernhardt Line , before Winter (Gustav) Line , October 1943 General Hans Hube , commander of 14th Panzer Corps , returned from his reconnaissance of the Bernhardt on 8 October. He reported that the line was as formidable as the map indicated. He had chosen Minturno, at the mouth of the Garigliano River, as its western edge. It then ran along the Garigliano until it reached the edge of the Abbruzzi - the Camino Massif. The ground to the south and west of the Camino Massif was flat and the western slopes of the Massif were easy to climb. This was the Bernhardt’s one weakness. (Kesselring quickly resolved it by having a large lake dammed and flooding the flat ground.) At the foot of the Camino Massif lay the small town of Mignano, twelve miles south-west of Cassino. The gap between the Camino Massif and the mountain east of Mignano, Monte Cesima, was one mile wide. Hube called this the Mignano Gap. The Naples-Rome rail line passed through the town and Highway 6 just outside it. There were areas of flat terrain beyond the town where the gap between mountains opened up to twon miles across. Although the narrowness of the Mignano Gap made it dangerous for tanks, it might tempt the Allies to use them just the same. Cassino and the Liri Valley were so close. Mignano Gap would be the focal point of XIV Panzer Korps sector of the Bernhardt. The Korps would also be responsible for defending the mountains north and east of the town of Venafro. The eastern half of the Bernhardt ran through the 6000-foot Maiella Mountains, past Castel di Sangro behind the River Sangro, and terminated at Fossechia. Von Vietinghoff at once contacted the 10th German Army’s Chief Engineer, Major-General Hans Bessel, and gave him precise instructions on how he wanted the Bernhardt to be fortified. Bunkers for the infantry were to be sited behind the crests of the mountains and on the rear slopes so as to avoid the worst of the enemy artillery. Underground command posts were to be built on the rear slopes as well. No attempt should be made to construct a line. The defences should be in depth, enabling any enemy penetration to be sealed off. Rest centres were to be built close to the bunkers so the men could have breaks from the wet and the cold. Kesselring had allotted two battalions of Todt workers and three battalions of engineers to General Bessel’s command. General Bessel told Vietinghoff he was confident he could increase the work force by 4000-5000 men by offering local Italians high wages and three good meals a day. Vietinghoff thought this an excellent idea. Both generals were being a little naive. Italian males were being rounded up all over Italy to work for the Germans as official or unofficial Todt workers. Most local Italians steered clear of General Bessel’s bait and local mayors refused to order their villagers to join in the scheme. Instead of 4000-5000 men General Bessel got 400. In addition to labour shortage he had to cope with lack of the right materials. He had no reinforced concrete or steel; presumably all available supplies were being earmarked for Cassino. His engineers were instructed to build bunkers large enough to hold about twenty-five men. Blasted deep into solid rock they were roofed with railway sleepers/ties, oak beams, loose rock and topped with concrete. Only three feet of the bunkers were above ground, making them virtually impossible for an Allied observer to spot. From an engineer’s viewpoint they were model defensive positions. From an infantryman’s they were a death trap. They were not sited to give mutual support. Attacking infantry could take them out one at a time. Once they were close enough to slip grenades through the bunker’s loopholes it would be too late to surrender. And the sergeant* in charge of the bunker would be unlikely to allow any of his men to use the one exit before the infantry closed on the bunker. Similar bunkers were built on the western slopes of Monte Sammucro. A remarkable one-off job, a thirty foot tower, was erected on Monte Camino. The tower’s ramparts could accommodate twenty men and its base was built with bevelled blocks of stone four feet long and two feet wide. Whoever had the idea of building such a Frederick Barbarosa type watchtower picked a winner. General Bessel also had trouble getting hold of as many mines as he wanted. Most were being sent straight to the front. Bessel had to scrounge his share of them. Then he had to get them up the mountains. Mules could only take them so far. He had to use men to carry them up to the peaks. This took time, and time was another thing Bessel was short of. He only had three weeks to complete the job. Countdown to Cassino , Battle of Mignano Gap - Alex Bowlby
I'm sure most have seen John Ford's documentary of the Battle of San Pietro plus the World at War series outlining how difficult the Italian campaign was and the terrible losses the allies sustained. Even Spike Milligan became a casualty there.
On a recent comment review someone remarked that they felt Indy and the WWII IN REAL TIME was "Americacentric" in nature. Much to Indy's chagrin. Personally, I think this is one of the best WWII series ever made. I could see this having been a network TV series running a hour a week. I wouldn't call it "Americacentric" at all. In fact, my critique would be that too much emphasis is placed on the Eastern front and not nearly enough on the Pacific campaign. Understanding that the Eastern front was by far the largest territory on land under arms and had the most engaged combatants, I still would like to see more in-depth and comprehensive study of the Pacific War. Additionally, I don't see alot of coverage of the air war. Overall, the series is excellent and I congratulate you on a well made program. Please keep up the good work and perhaps open up more coverage on those other areas..
Despite the recent complaints on the coverage of the Pacific war, I think this is literally the only WW2 documentary that has ever covered Operation Cartwheel in any sort of major detail. Most just kinda skip from Midway to Tarawa, with maybe the occasional mention of the Battle of Bismark Sea.
If someone call this series Americancentric , then that person never watched high budget World War 2 movies made by Hollywood. Like Patton , Saving Private Ryan , U-571 , Fury etc. Not that they are bad in cinematic quality but God in historical accurancy , you might get the idea of Tom Hanks who was the altar ego of Captain America , became General George Patton , went to Hitler's Bunker , punxched him in the chin and won the war single handedly.
Is it me or is Indy's face out of focus in the recent episodes? Don't mean to complain, just an observation. Absolutely amazing content keep up the great work Team Timeghost!
Hi Indy Another womderfull week. Looks like some fuel left in german tank. But in end we know what will happen. Please restart between two war episode. That nice one. Thanks.
The escort of Stalin's plane to Teheran was led by a Spanish pilot: José María Bravo. He had been the top ace of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, and after the Republican defeat, he exiled to the USSR and entered the Red Army's Air Service. After Franco's death he returned to Spain and was reinstated in the Spanish Army of the Air, retaining his rank.
With all the Aid from America and Britain that Stalin is getting and the fact that His Army is rapidly clawing back occupied Land at an alarming rate for the Hitler and the OKH He is quite Happy with how the Allies are bogged down in Italy as He can see the Great prize of Eastern Europe falling into his Hands and who is then going to take it off Him !?..Cheers Indy always a well balanced and unbiased as well as interesting Video so refreshing in this Day and Age!
ADDITIONAL GERMAN FAILURES ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC RUN (October - November 1943) (part 1) To replace the failed wolfpack group Schlieffen (that lost six U-Boats but sank only one straggling merchant last week on Convoys ON 206 and ON 20) , on October 24 U-boat Control directed the formation of a new wolfpack group, Siegfried. In its final configuration, Siegfried was comprised of eighteen U-boats. Of these, eleven, or almost two-thirds, were commanded by green skippers; six in new boats from Norway and five in experienced boats from France. Owing to the absence of U-tankers, Control was compelled to order Siegfried to attack eastbound convoys, thereby bringing the fuel-low U-boats closer to French bases, but also closer to the most effective Allied land-based air. From timely Enigma decrypts, the Allies were aware of wolfpack group Siegfried. To avoid this line, they diverted all eastbound Halifax and Slow convoys-those with valuable cargoes-to a southerly course. At the same time, Allied authorities designated the empty ships of convoy Outbound North 207 , ON 207 a “bait convoy,” and deliberately sent it directly at group Siegfried to seek a naval confrontation. For this purpose the Outbound North ON 207 was massively protected. The Canadian Escort Group C-l, Royal Navy “jeep” carrier HMS Biter, which sailed inside the convoy, and a MAC ship provided close escort. The famous Royal Navy Support Group B-2, commanded by Captain Johnny Walker (best anri submarine warfare officer of war , ace of U-Boat hunters among Allies), to which the new Royal Navy “jeep” carrier HMS Tracker had been attached, patrolled nearby, as did Peter Gretton’s Support Group, B-7. Land-based RAF Coastal Command aircraft of all types lent added support. The battle commenced on the morning of October 23. A B-24 Liberator bomber of RAF Coastal Command Squadron 224, en route to Gretton’s B-7 group to airdrop some radar spare parts, sighted a U-boat of group Siegfried. This was the new VII U-274, commanded by Günther Jordan, age twenty-four, ten days out from a fuel stop in Norway. The pilot, Edward Jacques (Billy) Wicht, a Swiss serving in the RAF, attacked with eight rockets, gave the alarm, and dropped a smoke float. Gretton in Royal Navy destroyer HMS Duncan accompanied by his other destroyer, HMS Vidette, raced to the float, trailed by the slower corvettes. Meanwhile, Wicht in his Liberator bomber , drove the U-274 under with gunfire and dropped two depth charges. Upon gaining a sonar contact, HMS Duncan twice attacked U-274 with her Hedgehog depth charge mortar and HMS Vidette carried out another depth-charge run. These attacks destroyed U-274 with the loss of all hands. The kill was confirmed by what Gretton described as “gruesome evidence” that rose to the surface. Johnny Walker, who had not yet got a U-boat kill this trip, radioed Gretton congratulations. “We were delighted to have wiped the eye for once of the leading expert in the Navy, who had forgotten more about ‘pinging’ than any of us had ever learnt,” Gretton wrote with modesty in his memoir. The British divided credit for the kill among Wicht’s B-24, Duncan, and Vidette. Three days later, on October 26, one of eight B-24 Liberator bombers of Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron 10, based at Gander, Newfoundland, which came out to escort Outbound North 207, sighted another Siegfried boat. She was thought to be Type VII submarine U-420, commanded by Hans-Jürgen Reese, age twenty-five, which, in early July, had been badly damaged by aircraft of the same squadron. This second assault on the supposed U-420 was mounted by pilot R. M. Aldwinkle. On the first pass, five of six depth charges failed to explode and the other fell wide. On the second pass, after a brief gun duel, the U-boat dived and Aldwinkle dropped a Fido homing torpedo (called “Zombie” by Canadians), but it probably missed or malfunctioned. On a third pass, Aldwinkle dropped two more depth charges that exploded close to the U-boat that sank with all hands. The Admiralty credited him with the kill of U-420. Into this great congregation of Allied ships and aircraft in mid-Atlantic came two more US Navy “jeep” carrier groups. The first was USS Block Island, newly assigned to Atlantic ASW operations and equipped with long-range, radar-equipped, night-flying Avenger bombers. USS Block Island group relieved the “jeep” carrier USS Core and her screen. The second “jeep” carrier was USS Card, which had resupplied in North Africa. The main mission of USS Block Island and USS Card carrier groups was to sink the tanker U-488 and the XB provisional tankers U-219 and U-220. USS Block Island group DFed (locating U-Boat via direction tracker finding apparatus) a refueling rendezvous of U-488, and other boats on the night of October 25-26. Two four-stack destroyers of the screen, USS Parrott and USS Paul Jones (both veterans of the Asiatic Fleet of 1942), found U-488, but they botched the attack and the harassed tanker got away. However, the boats seeking fuel from U-488 had to endure more days of anxiety. That same day, October 26, a B-24 Liberator bomber found and attacked Typr VII submarine U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen. Intercepting and decrypting a report of this attack by gunfire and depth charges, Allied codebreakers surmised that it probably was carried out by a B-24 of Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron 10. The U-91, which had been out from France thirty-six days and was seeking Type VII submarine U-584 to give her fuel, was not seriously damaged. Two days later, on the morning of October 28, two aircraft from USS Block Island found the XB provisional tanker U-220, commanded by Bruno Barber, and her flak-boat escort, U-256, commanded by Wilhelm Brauel. It was believed that Avenger bomber pilot Franklin M. Murray and Wildcat fighter pilot Harold L. Handshuh sank U-220 with the loss of all hands and so severely damaged U-256 that Brauel, like Barleben in the other flak boat, U-27I, was forced to abort to France. Hitler's U-Boat War - Clay Blair Jr
Failure of overprised wonder weapons: accustic torpedo and 4 barrel 20mm flak took a heavy toll among the young crews of German Navy. Naive believe in wonder weapons payed with lives.
@@edopronk1303 Daniel V. Gallery wrote several books, one was "U-505" where the task force led by the Jeep Carrier "Guadalcanal" captured a U-boat. (He also wrote "Cap'n Fatso", fiction, set in the 1960's, funny, but it gives a snapshot of what the Cold War was like on an ordinary day.) (As long as I am talking about humor, the movie "Man's Favorite Sport" is worth watching, take your mind off the war.) Thanks, take care.
We need to send "Leanne,(smiley face) to island hop and the eastern front if she still doubts your unbiased accounts. I'm with you Indie, as is Canada... great coverage... can't wait for more. As always, cheers from London Ontario, CANADA.
@10:10 Stalin would have been aware of the defeat of the North African Afrika Korps and how many German forces and resources that the defense of Italy was soaking up. Plus lend lease was ramping up, so it was the "Western offensive" that he had asked for had been answered, so he had no real reason to complain.
Should mention the Germans advance in small arms. We've seen the MG42 and MP40 but we should look now at rifles. The G43 is being put into production during this month, Germany's proper answer to the Soviet SVT-40. The earlier G41 wasn't as reliable so the SVT's gas system was partially copied over to make the G43 better, among other fixes. But by 1943 the Germans are experimenting with roller blocked and roller delayed systems. Despite Hitler suspending the programe, the MKb 42 (Machine Carbine 42) H and W variants have already progressed into the MP43 which by last month is finally given the green light for large scale production. The SS troops in the East get them this month. Originally thought to replace the Kar98k, the MP43 is now to supplement it. So the G43 is still seen as necessary in German small arms doctrine. The STG-44 will come later. Not to be outdone, the Soviets have been developing their intermediate cartridge in response to the Germans. The 7.62x39mm round that the AK47 uses would be created. And they're trying to match the Germans new "sturmgewehrs". The development of the STG (both the 44 and 44 variants) deserves its own video due to its influence on modern firearms, the stupid bureaucracy of Nazi Germany weapons development, Hitler meddling, it's got the lot.
Hello @worldwartwo I'm a fan since the first videos about ww1. But sometimes I can't watch every video as it comes but only a few days/weeks later. This makes it harder to understand where the battles are fought. It would help a lot of you would zoom in from far away when showing maps. Thx.
In a book about artilley I once read about something called the " time on target serenade" during the campaign of Bougainville. It was very sparse on details. Could you elaborate on it ?
Time on target means coordinating various artillery batteries so that all the shells arrive at the same time. Since some batteries are closer some farther away it takes coordination and math to figure out how all the shells launched will arrive simultaneously.
Time On Target (TOT) missions involved timing the firing of multiple batteries so that all fire on the same location, with the firing times adjusted to cause the rounds to all impact at the same time (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996). Bombardment may cease after the initial volley or be maintained in Fire For Effect mode, creating a sustained saturation of the area with detonations. This tactic was used by the Americans in WW2 (Sulzen, 2000), however, Sultzen is incorrect that only the Americans used it - the British also used this technique. Fire For Effect means that the battery will fire continuously at it’s maximum sustained rate (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996). The Americans stopped firing when the Forward Observer (FO) called “Cease Fire”, but the British normally fired a certain number of rounds per gun. According to Ellis the Americans called this a ‘Serenade’ in WW2 although by Vietnam they were certainly using the term ‘Fire for Effect’. -from balagan.info/artillery-and-mortar-tactics-of-ww2
Looks like Rick Arkinson did not learn how to box the compass to 32 points. There is no point "north by northeast." We have "Northeast by North" and "North by East" (and Northeast by East and East by North) but no "north by northeast. And the arrow on the map indicates generally north westerly direction with no easterly component at all.
Haven't heard what is happening in the North of the Soviet-German front for a very long time... Can't even remember the last episode that talked about it. I'm guessing it's been very quiet and static?
Finland's refusal to advance past its' pre-Winter-War borders back in 1941 guaranteed that front would stay quiet. If they'd been willing to go all-in against the USSR it's possible they could have taken Murmansk and blocked off the northern Lend Lease route.
@@Raskolnikov70 They did go beyond the prewar borders but not very much more. They also attacked Murmansk with the Germans and they did not succeed but not because they did not try en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Silver_Fox. It certainly could have had a strategic effect on the war and the Soviets.
@@Raskolnikov70 That's a great answer, thanks for that. But that only partially explains the inactivity. For a start we've had no activity on the whole northern front, everything on the Axis Orel northwards, not just in the far North around Finland and Leningrad. Secondly it only explains it from the German point of view. Why are the Soviets attacking, have they given up advancing towards Smolensk, Vitebsk, Bryansk for now ? (Maybe to focus on the South).
@@patrickhshirley I think the shortage of German units was the biggest factor overall. As Cary pointed out above, Finland did take part in the initial Barbarossa invasion and the advance on Murmansk, but stopped suddenly because they didn't want to enrage the Allies. If they hadn't stopped short, if they'd been more willing to contribute to the war, Germany would have more troops available and would have been able to concentrate more on AG North's area. As it was, Barbarossa was done on a shoestring and started to peter out in mid-October '41 because the Germans ran out of strength. Fall Blau in '42 was the only big German advance that year because they didn't have the strength to do much in AG North and Center except hold their positions. Even after their lines were shortened due to Soviet advances during Mars and Saturn, the extra units freed up were used mainly in the south to push back against the Red Army and launch Citadel (Kursk), which failed and put them on the run again in 1943 which is where we are now. Germany never had the extra forces to push forward against the Soviets anywhere else. And as hard up as the Red Army was the first couple of years of the war, they probably weren't eager to open more active fronts than they could handle with what they had available.
How ironic is it that right after the discussion of the brutality of the Burma-Thailand railroad, I get a mid-roll ad about the efficiency of some US freight rail company?
I got curious what the panzer inventory was of reconstituted units. According to Nafziger, around this time the 14th and 24th panzer divisions had 49 PkwIVs and 44 StuGs. The 25th panzer division had 93 PkwIVs. I would like clarification on one bit of this presentation. You mentioned that Kleist ordered the withdrawal of 17th army from the Crimea on the 26th which order was countermanded by Hitler later that evening. A bit later you mention the Germans attack on the 27th around Melitopol to allow 17th army time to escape Crimea. So . . . was this attack planned in conjunction with Kleist's order to withdraw? Did this attack proceed because someone didn't get the word that Hitler had cancelled Kleist's order?
The late-war panzer division was intended to be equipped with 79 Panthers and 101 Mark IVs. Of course, this was frequently not achieved, as your examples show.
You know what would be a cool addition? Aerial views of the terrain! I have a hard time imagining what the actual theaters look like, and it would really help me.
For some reason RUclips hasn't been sending me a notifications for the past month for when you put out a new video and I have everything on right and was getting them for a long time but have stopped for some reason
From 16:49 to 17:03 you don't mention the advance of the soviets in the South despite what I see as major gains. The map as well confused me for a second as while the narration Saya a German attack the soviets one is more noticeable. Great episode as always despite my nitpick.
I asked Indy why the 4th Ukrainian Front's rapid gains in the south don't get as much coverage as the 2nd Ukrainian Front's battle around Krivoy Rog, and he sent me the following reply: 'Well, it does depend on what kind of gains those are, you know? Some territory is more valuable strategically than other territory. Should the Soviets take Krivoy Rog they can conceivably cut off the entire southern wing of the German forces. I've talked about this before. The land being eaten up now after Melitopol does not have that sort of game changing theoretical possibility. I mean, sure, they will isolate Crimea next week, but that's only by land, certainly not by sea (and the Soviets have learned very costly lessons recently about sending warships out on the Black Sea). When they reach Nikopol that is of more overall importance, since that is the manganese center which the Germans really need for military production, and which Hitler wants to hold more than any other place in the whole region.' I hope that explains for you why Indy seemingly glosses over the Soviet advance to the lower Dnieper. Thanks for the question, Sietse (who does the research behind the maps)
Kesselring tented to smile when photographed for propaganda and Stillwell hated his posting to China and was a insufferable prick to the nationalist Chinese mainly to Chang
Man, reading such titles these days always makes you wonder if it is about historic or present developments until you look twice and see the year and the SU mentioned.
It’s quite impressive the USSR has been able to maintain an offensive ever since Stalingrad near 10 months ago. Who was the logistic genius behind this? I would really enjoy a special episode on the USSR logistics that give us some insight to this! @World War Two
Someone did a show on the shuttle missions over Axis targets, the planes landing in Russia, and doing another bombing mission on the way home. A logistics nightmare.
Me too but...... these guys don't particularly care to take the time to cover the Pacific. In depth. The last time I asked, I recieved a SCATHING comment from Indy that finished with: STFU.
@@todiathink8864 It is late 43. The Essex class carriers are starting to get commissioned. The Enterprise has been refitted and Hellcats are being produced in number. Nimitz is about to start the push across the central Pacific.
Join the TimeGhost Army: bit.ly/WW2_218_PI
Indy ends with "this is modern war". Any long term fans know when Indy first used this line?
During his WWI week by week.
Want it week 4 of ww1? The week that the French lost like 28000 men in a single fight
Does one replace white sugar with raw sugar 1:1? And is there a fresh SNL tonight?
all I know wit it's part of an ancient drinking game from the great war
For a detailed operational discussion of the fighting Indy describes read Prit Buttar Retribution the soviet reconquest of central Ukraine 1943
Hey this is just a suggestion from someone illiterate in Pacific Island geography, but could you show a zoomed out map of the war in the Pacific and then zoom into where specifically they’re fighting each week? It’s just hard to put the island conflict of each battle into context of the whole theatre.
Right now, it's just north of Australia.
@@Orvieta Well north east. The huge island of New Guinea is directly north of Australia.
@@Dave_Sisson North East is still North of Australia. OP wanted to get a broad picture, I'm giving it to him.
@@Orvieta And south is still north if you go far enough, still incorrect and misleading to say that.
The Solomon Island chain is directly east of New Guinea. New Guinea itself is directly north of Australia. Think of those islands as a chain of shields protecting Australia. Wedged between the western end of the Solomon Chain and New Guinea are the two islands of New Britain and New Ireland, in the straight between those two islands is Rabaul, the biggest Japanese naval base in the region.
You force the Japanese from the Solomons and the Northern coast of New Guinea, you force them out of Rabaul, which in turn opens up the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago and eventually the Philippines. Make sense now?
I loved how you visualize plans crashing with reality by first showing the map with plans made and then how it developed meanwhile working for fresh troops. Please more of this. Otherwise all seems like a forgone conclusion or fate. This peak into the minds of generals is very intriguing
Good comment!
Kiwis still doing the heavy lifting - in Casino and the Solomon's - whilst providing over half the food for Pacific forces - absolute legends
After losing a whole train full of Panthers I can understand the hesitancy to fulfill an armor request as well....
Last week show number 217 I believe it's is covered.
@@blockmasterscott It was in last weekends weekly video. I cannot recall where exactly but Soviets pushed into a major area of resupply for the Germans in which there was a station.
It just means that the need is more pressing.
I never heard that a whole train Full of Panthers got lost somewhere in Russia around 1943! Details and links please 🙏
For those who missed it on last week's episode: when the Soviets liberated Piatykhatky, their advance was so rapid that the Germans in charge of supply there had no idea what's happening and a train full of newly arrived Panther tanks waiting to be unloaded fell into the Soviet hands.
I like the subtle blue and yellow colours on Indy’s desk.
Nice to see their support
What are you talking about? They are just folders coincidentally ofcourse 😉
Glory to Ukraine 🇺🇦!
I noticed these too.
2 years later and Ukraine still stands. Slava Ukraini!
this show is awesome when live, feels like a news cast in real time. keep it up, and going.
Fighting in Italy was hell especially when on the offensive.
Weren't the Allies on the offensive pretty much the whole time in Italy?
@@sam8404 yes
to be fair the western front(s) are a picnic compared to where the real war is fought, in the east
@@Jeyeyeyey Imagine going up to a vet and saying that the sacrifice he and his friends made didn’t matter because it “wasn’t the real war”
@@Jeyeyeyey yeah in comparison but the western fronts were no picnic.
Bouncing Betty's; a camper's best friend in any World War Two shooter.
"It's a legitimate strategy!"
@@scottski02RvB!
Good to see some in depth coverage on the Pacific Theater this week, especially on the completion of the Burma Death Railway and its horrors. Thank you for the great weekly episode as usual team.
I am from Australia.
I am so grateful for the balanced comprehensive coverage of this history from week to week .
It is good reading other people's comments with tangible information to add .
For others that insist in voicing their ignorance.
" Even a fool may seem wise if they hold their tongue . "
My great uncle, Elsa Boyer, once stepped on a Bouncing Betty. It jumped up into the air but did not go off, a dud. Capt.Boyer was a chaplain.
Thanks for sharing. And thanks to your Uncle for serving
Both the Cuban Missile crisis and the Suez Crisis docs were excellent, can't recommend them enough!
Saturday just wouldn't be Saturday without Indy and team. A national treasure!
Don't be stingy. The lot of them are a global treasure.
About problems British faced crossing Volturno river (1)
The reasons why the British infantry divisions had such a bad time are laid out in Clark’s autobiography. His version of events has been accepted as true because X Corps Commander, Lt-General Sir Richard McCreery, KBE, DSO, MC†, left no memoirs and X Corps’ War diary, which might have been expected to record some details of the battle, restricts itself to trivia such as ration returns. McCreery opposed simultaneous crossings with the US Division on the grounds that the British infantry division had the harder job. McCreery wanted them to cross twenty-four hours after the US divisions so as to draw off the enemy fire from his own division. Clark insisted on simultaneous crossings. Or so he says. In fact in his original plans for the crossing - Operations Instructions No. 6 - the British division were to cross after the US division (the 3rd). Clark had realized that McCreery’s reasons for opposing simultaneous crossings made good sense.
McCreery was a very experienced soldier. As a subaltern he had served with the cavalry on the Western front from 1915 to 1918, being wounded and winning the MC. Like Alexander and Montgomery, he had been shocked by the way senior generals had used their front line troops and was determined that none under his command should be treated as cannon fodder. His regiment, the 12th Lancers, was among the first to be mechanized and, when he became its CO, McCreery earned a reputation for preferring tanks to horses, an unusual trait amongst British cavalry officers. In 1939 Alexander, then commanding British 1st Division, chose McCreery as his Chief of Staff. The 1st Division formed part of the BEF in France, Once there McCreery, who wanted the experience of handling armour in battle, persuaded Alexander to let him take command of an armoured brigade. During the BEF’s retreat to Dunkirk the brigade formed part of its rearguard. McCreery’s handling of his armour earned him the DSO. Back in the UK he was given command of one of the newly formed armoured divisions. Early in 1942 he went to the Middle East and became General Sir Claude Auchinleck’s adviser on Armoured Fighting Vehicles. When Alexander succeeded Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, he made McCreery his Chief of Staff. McCreery stayed with Alexander until Lt-General Sir Brian Horrocks, who had just taken over command of the newly formed X Corps, was wounded in a German air raid on Bizerta in July, 1943.
Prior to the crossing of the Volturno Clark had considered a number of options. Replacing X Corps, whose heavy casualties at Salerno had not been made good, with US II Corps - 1st US Armored Division and 36th US Division, under the command of Major-General Geoffrey Keyes - was one of them. Clark had finally decided to reinforce X Corps and US 3rd US Division - the only US division at the Volturno - by bringing up US 1st Armored Division. Alexander pointed out that, owing to its supply problems, 5th Army would be unable to support two armoured divisions. Clark, aware that the Allied armour outnumbered the enemy’s by about eight to one, reluctantly abandoned the idea.
On 12 October Clark drew up his ‘definitive’ plans - Operations Instructions number 63 - for the crossing. US 3rd Division would make simultaneous attacks with X Corps’ British 46th and 56th Divisions. British 7th Armoured Division would make a ‘display’ on the US 3rd Division’s left flank. McCreery objected to the plans, for reasons already given, and Clark agreed to put US 3rd Division across twenty-four hours before the British Divisions.
When Major-General Lucas, US VI Corps’ new commander, informed General Truscott of the contents of Operations Instructions number 6 Truscott objected to the plan as vigorously as McCreery had objected to the idea of simultaneous crossings, and on much the same grounds. If the US 3rd Division crossed by itself it would draw all the ememy’s fire. Lucas reported back to Clark. Once again the Army Commander changed his plans. On the morning of 13 October he informed Lucas and McCreery that the US 34th Division would be brought into the attack and that VI Corps and X Corps would make simultaneous crossings that night.
The chopping and changing of Clark’s plans delayed his attack almost as much as the weather. Truscott’s crossing, which von Vietinghoff describes as ‘a brilliant operation’, outwitted and almost outflanked the Hermann Göring Division. The intense US pressure on both flanks of XIV Panzer Korps forced Hube to ask permission to withdraw. During the night of 14/15 October von Vietinghoff in turn asked Kesselring’s permission. Kesselring, well content with the way his retreat schedule had been kept to - courtesy of the weather and Allied generals disagreeing among themselves - was confident enough to sanction XIV Panzer Korps’ withdrawal without asking Hitler’s permission.
About problems British faced crossing Volturno river (2)
The failure of the British 56th Division to cross the river highlights the importance of security in the approaches to a large river, and how ill-equipped 5th Army was to carry out such a crossing. The 56th Divisional Commander, Major-General D. A. H. Graham, had been badly injured in a road accident as the Division was moving up towards the Volturno. At the crossing the Division was under the temporary command of Brigadier L. O. Lyne, 169th (Queen’s) Brigade. Brigadier C. E. A. Firth’s 167th Brigade was to spearhead the assault across the river. During the night of 12/13 October their leading battalion, the 7th Ox and Bucks, moved into a factory close to the river. At Salerno one of the two battalions brigaded with the 7th Ox and Bucks had been overrun by the enemy, the other had withdrawn, leaving the Ox and Bucks to hld the line by itself. It had done so. After the battle McCreery had visited Battalion HQ to congratulate congratulate the battalion’s CO, a singular honour.
On the morning of 13 October Brigadier Firth called an ‘O’ Group. Three senior officers of the Ox and Bucks had to leave the factory in full view of the enemy. They disguised themselves as peasants. Its one thing to dress like a peasant, another to walk like one. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which was commanded by Colonel Baade,* was not fooled. It now knew where the crossing would take place, and the whereabouts of the troops who would lead it. Colonel Baade had his divisional artillery zero in on the factory and the length of river in front of it.
At dusk on 13 October the Ox and Bucks filed out of the factory towards the river. The enemy artillery opened up on them. The battalion suffered eighty casualties within a few minutes. Their companies reformed, took to their boats and began crossing the river. Enemy guns blasted them out of it, causing another forty casualties and destroying most of the boats. Men Brigadier Lyne could replace, boats he could not. Like all Allied divisions in 5th Army, the 56th only had enough boats to equip one battalion. The crossing was scuppered. As Brigadier Firth reported the destruction of the boats, and Brigadier Lyne called off the crossing, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division sent a fighting patrol across the river. Slipping through 167th Brigade’s lines, the patrol made its way to Capua, where Brigadier Lyne had his headquarters. The enemy shot up the town, then withdrew across the river.5 The raid had the Baade touch. He wouldn’t have led it, but he probably planned it: rubbing salt into the enemy’s wounds.
Countdown to Cassino - Alex Bowlby(2)
Well, thankfully at least Mark Clark's reputation was never that high, even in the US. Easily one of the worst US commanders in WW2.
I8
@@chaptermasterpedrokantor1623 one of the worst decisions Clark did was to race to Rome apparently blatantly disobeying of General Alexander and permitted the German 10th army to retreat passing Valmontone, I know quite well the area around, to reach the Gothic line, Pisa, Livorno, Florence and other towns incurring unnecessary heavy losses among the allies, civilians and heavily damaged medieval towns. My late Italian father remembered very well seeing the German troops retreating near his town on the road to Pisa......
@@paoloviti6156 He should have been sacked, like Lloyd Fredenhall after the battle of Kasserine Pass. But I reckon an army commander who has just taken a former Axis capital has more clout to save him then a lowly corps commander who just embarrassed the US. But you are right. That decision cost the Allies, and Italy, greatly.
😊 I am pleased, very pleased! I actually received the notification for this broadcast came early this morning. As usual your broadcast was excellent! Thanks y'all
This isn't a broadcast old man...
There is also action by British 13th Corps on the eastern flank in Italy this week. 1st Canadian Division troops of both 1st and 2nd Brigades cross the Biferno River to take several small villages some heavily defended. Edmontons of 2nd Brigade are involved in bitter hand-to-hand to fighting in the Colle d'Anchise area. Their supporting tanks of the Ontario regiment struggle to cross the Biferno and when they do are ambushed by German mark iv's. The Edmontons have only their PIATs to defend themselves from German armour but they prevail. The PPCLI take Spintete after it is bombed by 24 Bostons of the South African air force. 1st Brigade takes Torella and Molise on the 27th. On the 29th the RCR move into Duronia.
Nothing better than waking up to this on a Saturday morning
Another stellar video Indy to you and your excellent staff! Good job!
Iv seen to many WW2 glory films or history of, how many ways can u retell the story evey night on history or military channel, however this channel this show is unprecedented in it's depth pace and all that, bravo 5 stars, among the best of RUclips, ty
Yeah, the Soviets not being willing to share even weather information should have been the first clue to the Western Allies
Stalin. Stalin not being willing. Was the most paranoid man in existence.
@@Inoffensive_name Hitler's betrayal of the Pact really hit him hard.
@@Inoffensive_name and the Soviet system. Stalin just took it to an 11.
"2 years too late to care about us, big guys"
and the atom bomb was the clue that no one should trust the west ,sounds balance to me 😉
Now I finally understand the line "my sons lay burried by the Burma railway" in the song Now I'm easy by the Dubliners!
Comprehensive and enlightening, as always.
The blue and yellow folders on the desk, very subtle.
I’ve been following this channel for a while, and it’s just incredible how you guys can upload such research-intense videos on a weekly basis! Each of these must’ve taken hours upon hours of research, writing and editing.
Thank you so much for your work!
It’s me that does all the research and writing (as well as hosting) for the regular weekly episodes. So thank you. Nice to be appreciated!
I'm awaiting next weeks episode. My grandfather served on the USS Montpelier seeing action at Empress Augusta Bay.
You finally got me off my butt and joined the TimeGhosts. Keep up the good work.
yes, the Cuban Missile Crisis coverage was most excellent
Hi Indy! I have a great time watching you and the all episodes are very interesting. I am a Pole and the specially history of World War II is particularly close to me. Please continue to create new materials because you guys are doing it great! If I made a lot of mistakes when translating this post from Polish into English, I apologize
By the way, the Cuban Missile Crisis documentary really is the definite documentary to watch. Older documentaries will not cut it due to the recently declassified stuff. It's great and I wish there had been more of them.
I never noticed what’s on Indy’s desk, good work team.
I don't really get why some viewers think of this series as "American centric". One if the reasons I'm always looking forward for every new weekly videos is the details and measurements you guys take to show the war as it really was; a global conflict. In my opinion it also fills my need to gain knowledge of the Russian contribution in the war that in my personal case was null. It also helps me put in a time-line military actions in Europe the Pacific and how both theaters of war share but also diverted from each other. Believe me Indie, in my case, is not falling in deaf ears.
We rarely hear information on China or balkan areas in the weekly series
@@anonguy4687 they sometimes do but my guess is that the need to cover the war from larger events that promoted big changes in certain areas but also we need to remember; China, other parts of Asia and The Balcans will have a bigger prominent role in the post war.
😔 Sorry for my sloppy English grammar. English is my 2nd language.
@@LordWhatever Don't worry: your English is far better than that of most native English-speakers on youtube ... !
Would have been nice to know what was happening on the Huon peninsula. Big Japanese counterattack there.
2:20 Imma just stop you right there...portable armored pillboxes? Thats wild to me.
My Granddad was in the RA Anti-Aircraft unit when Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-Shek met in Egypt. Got extra breakfast rations that morning
"Mountainous hinterlands" - oof, not a good sign. It's probably better than Terra Incognita or "They Be Dragons" though.
0:47 I like how the guy behind the camera was laughing too.
Another fantastic episode!
Subtle yellow and blue, im not sure if I'd noticed prior to this episode.
I love the show Indy! Surely after Ww2 week by week you do the Napoleonic wars week by week!
There's prob not nearly enough info for that :(
The logistics behind the scenes must have been colossal..!
It's a smaller campaign, but what about the battles on the Dodecanese islands? Rhodes, Kor and Leros? It was one of the last English defeats in ww2, when 7500 German troops defeated 55,000 Italian troops and 4800 British soldiers.
Already covered about two weeks ago.
@@extrahistory8956 That was Battle of Kos. Battle of Leros is the bigger one in November.
Probably because the attack hadn't started being concentrated in this week, let alone the landings.
The Day of Battle - Rick Atkinson(1)
Volturno (2) Italy would break their backs, their bones, and nearly their spirits. But first it would break their hearts, and that heartbreak began north of the Volturno, where the terrain steepened, the weather worsened, and the enemy stiffened. Allied casualties in Italy totaled eighteen thousand between September 3 and October 20-fifteen thousand in Fifth Army and three thousand in Eighth Army. Yet that was only a down payment on the campaign to come. German demolitions had begun five miles from Salerno-“no bridge or culvert seems too small to escape their eye,” an Army observer reported-and it soon became evident that Italy would be a battle of engineers: the speed of advance would be determined by bulldozers, if not by a nervous soldier on his hands and knees, prodding for mines with a bayonet. An AFHQ study estimated that one thousand bridges would be needed to reach the Po River in the north, a disheartening number given that for weeks the U.S. Army had only five prefabricated Bailey bridges in Italy. In the event, the Allies would erect three thousand spans in twenty months, with a combined length of fifty-five miles. Some were built and rebuilt, as autumn rains put the Italian rivers in spate. The fickle Volturno soon rose eighteen feet in ten hours, sweeping away every hard-won bridge but one. “The floods bring down quantities of debris, ranging from whole trees to bulls, the horns of which had a disastrous effect on the plywood sides of a pontoon,” Fifth Army engineers reported. Ingenuity became the order of the day, every day. When German sappers blew up stone houses to block narrow village streets, American sappers bulldozed “new tracks across the rubble heaps, often at the level of the second stories,” Truscott noted. Engineers reportedly filled road craters with “broken bathtubs and statues and sinks and hairbrushes and fancy fedora hats.” Bridge builders fashioned a pile driver from the barrel of an Italian 240mm gun, and the Allies built rolling mills, cement works, foundries, nail works, and enough sawmills to cut nine thousand tons of Volturno lumber a month. They used the timber to corduroy muddy roads, as armies had for centuries.
Yet no engineer could corduroy the weather. “It got darker, colder, wetter,” a 45th Division soldier recalled. Autumn rains began on September 26, and soldiers soon realized why their Italian phrase books included Piove in rovesci, “It’s raining torrents.” Censorship rules forbade writing home about the weather-“One may write of mist,” a wag proposed, “but not of rain”-though nothing precluded bivouac grousing. “No conversation, genteel or otherwise, can be carried on without mentioning the weather,” a diarist in the 56th Evacuation Hospital noted in November. Campfires were banned after five P.M., so troops ate at four, bolting their supper before rain pooled in their mess kits, then went to bed at 7:30. Craps games lasted “until darkness obscures spots on the dice.” Rain soon grayed the soldiers, making them one with the mud in which they slept and fought until they seemed no more than clay with eyes.
As Allied planners had misjudged the harsh North African winter, so they underestimated-perhaps less pardonably-the even harsher Italian climate: Rome shares a latitude with Chicago. “The desert war had made men forget the mud of Flanders,” wrote the British general W.G.F. Jackson, but no veteran of Italy would ever forget Italian mud, which Bill Mauldin insisted lacked “an honest color like ordinary mud.” A private from Michigan complained, “The trouble with this mud is that it’s too thick to drink and too thin to plow.” Even in summer, the roads of southern Italy were barely adequate; now the British and Americans would be canalized on the only northbound hard-surface roads-Highways 6, 7, 16, and 17-that could carry the prodigious traffic of armies. Foul weather constrained maneuver, obviated the advantages of motorization, and undermined air superiority by halving the number of Allied bombing sorties. Churchill cursed the “savage versatility” of Italy’s climate, but GIs simply called it “German weather.”
Mines made it much worse. “All roads lead to Rome,” Alexander quipped, “but all the roads are mined.” So were footpaths, lovers’ lanes, alleys, goat trails, streambeds, shortcuts, and tracks, beaten and unbeaten. “I never had a moment that I didn’t worry about mines and booby traps,” a 7th Infantry officer said. Forty percent of Fifth Army battle casualties in early November came from mines. “Watch where you step,” Clark’s headquarters advised, “and have no curiosity at all.” North of the Volturno, “you could follow our battalions by the bloodstained leggings, the scattered equipment, and the bits of bodies where men had been blown up,” the 168th Infantry reported. Big Teller mines could destroy a truck or cripple a tank, but German antipersonnel mines became particularly diabolical. “Castrators” or “nutcrackers” fired a bullet upward when an unwitting soldier stepped on the pressure plate. “Shoe” mines, built mostly of wood, proved nearly impossible to detect.
Enemy sappers mined or booby-trapped doorknobs and desk drawers, grapevines and haystacks, apples on the tree and bodies on the ground, whether Italian or German, Tommy or Yank. At least two chaplains lost legs trying to bury the dead above the Volturno. “A man’s foot is usually blown loose at the ankle, leaving the mangled foot dangling on shredded tendons,” an Army physician noted in his diary. “Additional puncture wounds of both legs and groin make the agony worse.” A combat medic later wrote, “Even though you’d give them a shot or two of morphine, they would still scream.” In a minefield, Bill Mauldin observed, “an old man thinks of his eyes and a young man grabs for his balls.” The Army bought 100,000 of the SCR-625 mine detector-dubbed a “manhole cover on a stick”-but they proved useless in the rain and befuddled by the iron ore and shell fragments common in Italian soil. The device also required its operator to stand upright, often under fire, while listening for the telltale hum that signified danger. A secret program to train canine detectors-“M dogs”-failed when half the mines in field tests remained unsniffed.
I always think being inside a tank in combat must be pretty horrible but imagine being stuck inside one of the static armoured emplacements under attack….horrific! 😮
Surely the Panzertruppen will turn the tide just like they did at Kur....oh wait...
Something about the tank reserves transferred to Ukraine from Europe:
“After the disaster at Stalingrad, I formed several tank divisions from the remnants of the defeated divisions, whose tank soldiers, due to injury, illness and other reasons, managed to avoid capture. I did the same with the survivors of the remnants troops after the loss of Africa. The 21st Panzer Division was created in France from the occupying units armed with captured materiel. The 25th Panzer Division was formed in a similar way in Norway. Its commander was General von Schell. Schell worked with me in the Ministry of the Reichswehr 1927 to 1930 when I dealt with issues of automobile troops.I supported his desire to deploy this unit in a tank division and achieved the transfer of his unit to France.However, after the collapse of the Citadel plan, the Eastern Front took all the forces from France and so weakened the occupying units located there that they needed urgent replenishment. The 25th division needed to be familiarized with the experience of combat operations on the Eastern Front. then she could be given a feasible task in accordance with the level of her training. And what happened? At the beginning of October 1943, on Hitler's orders, this division was to transfer over 600 newly received vehicles to the Eastern Front for the formed 14th Panzer Division; the high command of the armed forces and the main command of the ground forces believed that the 25th Panzer Division would remain in France for a long time, and therefore could do without them, being content with low-quality French equipment. This greatly worsened the armament of the division, which now could only be used in the Western Theater. Sappers and the 1st battalion of the 146th motorized regiment also received new armored personnel carriers. The 9th Panzer Regiment was not yet fully equipped. The 91st Artillery Regiment was to receive German light field howitzers and 100-mm guns instead of captured Polish guns. The anti-aircraft division lacked one battery, the anti-tank division lacked a company of self-propelled guns. There were not enough radio communications. All these shortcomings were known. They had to be eliminated in a calm environment in France. Despite all this, in mid-October, an order was received to transfer the division to the east."
Heinz Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier".
We will soon find out what will happen with the 25th Panzer Division on the eastern front )
"China could be a great counterweigh to Soviet expansion there..."
He didn't know...
Thank you for the lesson.
I have two ideas for videos.
1. Logistically what does it take to move a division from Germany to the Eastern Front.
2. Maybe special series on the various special operations units. Especially the lesser knowm ones.
Construction of Bernhardt Line , before Winter (Gustav) Line , October 1943
General Hans Hube , commander of 14th Panzer Corps , returned from his reconnaissance of the Bernhardt on 8 October. He reported that the line was as formidable as the map indicated. He had chosen Minturno, at the mouth of the Garigliano River, as its western edge. It then ran along the Garigliano until it reached the edge of the Abbruzzi - the Camino Massif. The ground to the south and west of the Camino Massif was flat and the western slopes of the Massif were easy to climb. This was the Bernhardt’s one weakness. (Kesselring quickly resolved it by having a large lake dammed and flooding the flat ground.) At the foot of the Camino Massif lay the small town of Mignano, twelve miles south-west of Cassino. The gap between the Camino Massif and the mountain east of Mignano, Monte Cesima, was one mile wide. Hube called this the Mignano Gap. The Naples-Rome rail line passed through the town and Highway 6 just outside it. There were areas of flat terrain beyond the town where the gap between mountains opened up to twon miles across. Although the narrowness of the Mignano Gap made it dangerous for tanks, it might tempt the Allies to use them just the same. Cassino and the Liri Valley were so close. Mignano Gap would be the focal point of XIV Panzer Korps sector of the Bernhardt. The Korps would also be responsible for defending the mountains north and east of the town of Venafro. The eastern half of the Bernhardt ran through the 6000-foot Maiella Mountains, past Castel di Sangro behind the River Sangro, and terminated at Fossechia.
Von Vietinghoff at once contacted the 10th German Army’s Chief Engineer, Major-General Hans Bessel, and gave him precise instructions on how he wanted the Bernhardt to be fortified. Bunkers for the infantry were to be sited behind the crests of the mountains and on the rear slopes so as to avoid the worst of the enemy artillery. Underground command posts were to be built on the rear slopes as well. No attempt should be made to construct a line. The defences should be in depth, enabling any enemy penetration to be sealed off. Rest centres were to be built close to the bunkers so the men could have breaks from the wet and the cold. Kesselring had allotted two battalions of Todt workers and three battalions of engineers to General Bessel’s command. General Bessel told Vietinghoff he was confident he could increase the work force by 4000-5000 men by offering local Italians high wages and three good meals a day. Vietinghoff thought this an excellent idea. Both generals were being a little naive. Italian males were being rounded up all over Italy to work for the Germans as official or unofficial Todt workers. Most local Italians steered clear of General Bessel’s bait and local mayors refused to order their villagers to join in the scheme. Instead of 4000-5000 men General Bessel got 400. In addition to labour shortage he had to cope with lack of the right materials. He had no reinforced concrete or steel; presumably all available supplies were being earmarked for Cassino. His engineers were instructed to build bunkers large enough to hold about twenty-five men. Blasted deep into solid rock they were roofed with railway sleepers/ties, oak beams, loose rock and topped with concrete. Only three feet of the bunkers were above ground, making them virtually impossible for an Allied observer to spot. From an engineer’s viewpoint they were model defensive positions. From an infantryman’s they were a death trap. They were not sited to give mutual support. Attacking infantry could take them out one at a time. Once they were close enough to slip grenades through the bunker’s loopholes it would be too late to surrender. And the sergeant* in charge of the bunker would be unlikely to allow any of his men to use the one exit before the infantry closed on the bunker. Similar bunkers were built on the western slopes of Monte Sammucro. A remarkable one-off job, a thirty foot tower, was erected on Monte Camino. The tower’s ramparts could accommodate twenty men and its base was built with bevelled blocks of stone four feet long and two feet wide. Whoever had the idea of building such a Frederick Barbarosa type watchtower picked a winner.
General Bessel also had trouble getting hold of as many mines as he wanted. Most were being sent straight to the front. Bessel had to scrounge his share of them. Then he had to get them up the mountains. Mules could only take them so far. He had to use men to carry them up to the peaks. This took time, and time was another thing Bessel was short of. He only had three weeks to complete the job.
Countdown to Cassino , Battle of Mignano Gap - Alex Bowlby
Enjoyed your video and I gave it a Thumbs Up for your channel as I always do
Yep, the Cuba Crisis is one of the best documentary about it you can find out there. Cool episode !
I'm sure most have seen John Ford's documentary of the Battle of San Pietro plus the World at War series outlining how difficult the Italian campaign
was and the terrible losses the allies sustained. Even Spike Milligan became a casualty there.
John Houston not John Ford.
Still the quickest twenty minutes in my week 😀👍
I didn’t know Bouncing Betty’s existed during WW2!
RIP LCPL ROY M. WHEAT, USMC (MoH), in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam 1967; to a Bouncing Betty
Yes, and the concept of the other small mine he mentioned (Shoe Mine?) was revived by the US as the Gravel Mine in Vietnam.
@@robdgaming i lookedthem up and sawthe whole story.
This was a great episode well done
On a recent comment review someone remarked that they felt Indy and the WWII IN REAL TIME was "Americacentric" in nature. Much to Indy's chagrin. Personally, I think this is one of the best WWII series ever made. I could see this having been a network TV series running a hour a week. I wouldn't call it "Americacentric" at all. In fact, my critique would be that too much emphasis is placed on the Eastern front and not nearly enough on the Pacific campaign. Understanding that the Eastern front was by far the largest territory on land under arms and had the most engaged combatants, I still would like to see more in-depth and comprehensive study of the Pacific War. Additionally, I don't see alot of coverage of the air war. Overall, the series is excellent and I congratulate you on a well made program. Please keep up the good work and perhaps open up more coverage on those other areas..
Despite the recent complaints on the coverage of the Pacific war, I think this is literally the only WW2 documentary that has ever covered Operation Cartwheel in any sort of major detail. Most just kinda skip from Midway to Tarawa, with maybe the occasional mention of the Battle of Bismark Sea.
If someone call this series Americancentric , then that person never watched high budget World War 2 movies made by Hollywood. Like Patton , Saving Private Ryan , U-571 , Fury etc. Not that they are bad in cinematic quality but God in historical accurancy , you might get the idea of Tom Hanks who was the altar ego of Captain America , became General George Patton , went to Hitler's Bunker , punxched him in the chin and won the war single handedly.
The Kiwis surely had some goodtime on the Solomons this week!
Is it me or is Indy's face out of focus in the recent episodes? Don't mean to complain, just an observation. Absolutely amazing content keep up the great work Team Timeghost!
shut up
He's been replaced by a deepfake
Love the blue and yellow folders you have on the table. I SEE WHAT YA DID THERE!
Such great content!
Hi Indy
Another womderfull week.
Looks like some fuel left in german tank.
But in end we know what will happen.
Please restart between two war episode. That nice one.
Thanks.
How many pow victims died under Allied tricked into thinking it was the axis.(casualties by friendly fire?)
12:02 Can't wait to listen to that once more
The escort of Stalin's plane to Teheran was led by a Spanish pilot: José María Bravo. He had been the top ace of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, and after the Republican defeat, he exiled to the USSR and entered the Red Army's Air Service. After Franco's death he returned to Spain and was reinstated in the Spanish Army of the Air, retaining his rank.
Cool
With all the Aid from America and Britain that Stalin is getting and the fact that His Army is rapidly clawing back occupied Land at an alarming rate for the Hitler and the OKH He is quite Happy with how the Allies are bogged down in Italy as He can see the Great prize of Eastern Europe falling into his Hands and who is then going to take it off Him !?..Cheers Indy always a well balanced and unbiased as well as interesting Video so refreshing in this Day and Age!
Bouganville is pronounced bow-gn-ville. Thanks for the great coverage.
Bougainville is a French word. "Ou" in French is always pronounced "oo". Is "bow-gn-ville" the American pronunciation of the name?
@@angelonunez8555 local and Australian
ADDITIONAL GERMAN FAILURES ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC RUN (October - November 1943) (part 1)
To replace the failed wolfpack group Schlieffen (that lost six U-Boats but sank only one straggling merchant last week on Convoys ON 206 and ON 20) , on October 24 U-boat Control directed the formation of a new wolfpack group, Siegfried. In its final configuration, Siegfried was comprised of eighteen U-boats. Of these, eleven, or almost two-thirds, were commanded by green skippers; six in new boats from Norway and five in experienced boats from France. Owing to the absence of U-tankers, Control was compelled to order Siegfried to attack eastbound convoys, thereby bringing the fuel-low U-boats closer to French bases, but also closer to the most effective Allied land-based air.
From timely Enigma decrypts, the Allies were aware of wolfpack group Siegfried. To avoid this line, they diverted all eastbound Halifax and Slow convoys-those with valuable cargoes-to a southerly course. At the same time, Allied authorities designated the empty ships of convoy Outbound North 207 , ON 207 a “bait convoy,” and deliberately sent it directly at group Siegfried to seek a naval confrontation. For this purpose the Outbound North ON 207 was massively protected. The Canadian Escort Group C-l, Royal Navy “jeep” carrier HMS Biter, which sailed inside the convoy, and a MAC ship provided close escort. The famous Royal Navy Support Group B-2, commanded by Captain Johnny Walker (best anri submarine warfare officer of war , ace of U-Boat hunters among Allies), to which the new Royal Navy “jeep” carrier HMS Tracker had been attached, patrolled nearby, as did Peter Gretton’s Support Group, B-7. Land-based RAF Coastal Command aircraft of all types lent added support.
The battle commenced on the morning of October 23. A B-24 Liberator bomber of RAF Coastal Command Squadron 224, en route to Gretton’s B-7 group to airdrop some radar spare parts, sighted a U-boat of group Siegfried. This was the new VII U-274, commanded by Günther Jordan, age twenty-four, ten days out from a fuel stop in Norway. The pilot, Edward Jacques (Billy) Wicht, a Swiss serving in the RAF, attacked with eight rockets, gave the alarm, and dropped a smoke float. Gretton in Royal Navy destroyer HMS Duncan accompanied by his other destroyer, HMS Vidette, raced to the float, trailed by the slower corvettes. Meanwhile, Wicht in his Liberator bomber , drove the U-274 under with gunfire and dropped two depth charges. Upon gaining a sonar contact, HMS Duncan twice attacked U-274 with her Hedgehog depth charge mortar and HMS Vidette carried out another depth-charge run. These attacks destroyed U-274 with the loss of all hands. The kill was confirmed by what Gretton described as “gruesome evidence” that rose to the surface. Johnny Walker, who had not yet got a U-boat kill this trip, radioed Gretton congratulations. “We were delighted to have wiped the eye for once of the leading expert in the Navy, who had forgotten more about ‘pinging’ than any of us had ever learnt,” Gretton wrote with modesty in his memoir. The British divided credit for the kill among Wicht’s B-24, Duncan, and Vidette.
Three days later, on October 26, one of eight B-24 Liberator bombers of Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron 10, based at Gander, Newfoundland, which came out to escort Outbound North 207, sighted another Siegfried boat. She was thought to be Type VII submarine U-420, commanded by Hans-Jürgen Reese, age twenty-five, which, in early July, had been badly damaged by aircraft of the same squadron. This second assault on the supposed U-420 was mounted by pilot R. M. Aldwinkle. On the first pass, five of six depth charges failed to explode and the other fell wide. On the second pass, after a brief gun duel, the U-boat dived and Aldwinkle dropped a Fido homing torpedo (called “Zombie” by Canadians), but it probably missed or malfunctioned. On a third pass, Aldwinkle dropped two more depth charges that exploded close to the U-boat that sank with all hands. The Admiralty credited him with the kill of U-420.
Into this great congregation of Allied ships and aircraft in mid-Atlantic came two more US Navy “jeep” carrier groups. The first was USS Block Island, newly assigned to Atlantic ASW operations and equipped with long-range, radar-equipped, night-flying Avenger bombers. USS Block Island group relieved the “jeep” carrier USS Core and her screen. The second “jeep” carrier was USS Card, which had resupplied in North Africa.
The main mission of USS Block Island and USS Card carrier groups was to sink the tanker U-488 and the XB provisional tankers U-219 and U-220. USS Block Island group DFed (locating U-Boat via direction tracker finding apparatus) a refueling rendezvous of U-488, and other boats on the night of October 25-26. Two four-stack destroyers of the screen, USS Parrott and USS Paul Jones (both veterans of the Asiatic Fleet of 1942), found U-488, but they botched the attack and the harassed tanker got away. However, the boats seeking fuel from U-488 had to endure more days of anxiety.
That same day, October 26, a B-24 Liberator bomber found and attacked Typr VII submarine U-91, commanded by Heinz Hungershausen. Intercepting and decrypting a report of this attack by gunfire and depth charges, Allied codebreakers surmised that it probably was carried out by a B-24 of Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron 10. The U-91, which had been out from France thirty-six days and was seeking Type VII submarine U-584 to give her fuel, was not seriously damaged.
Two days later, on the morning of October 28, two aircraft from USS Block Island found the XB provisional tanker U-220, commanded by Bruno Barber, and her flak-boat escort, U-256, commanded by Wilhelm Brauel. It was believed that Avenger bomber pilot Franklin M. Murray and Wildcat fighter pilot Harold L. Handshuh sank U-220 with the loss of all hands and so severely damaged U-256 that Brauel, like Barleben in the other flak boat, U-27I, was forced to abort to France.
Hitler's U-Boat War - Clay Blair Jr
Thank you.
I am going to search what "jeep" carier means
Failure of overprised wonder weapons: accustic torpedo and 4 barrel 20mm flak took a heavy toll among the young crews of German Navy.
Naive believe in wonder weapons payed with lives.
@@edopronk1303 Daniel V. Gallery wrote several books, one was "U-505" where the task force led by the Jeep Carrier "Guadalcanal" captured a U-boat.
(He also wrote "Cap'n Fatso", fiction, set in the 1960's, funny, but it gives a snapshot of what the Cold War was like on an ordinary day.)
(As long as I am talking about humor, the movie "Man's Favorite Sport" is worth watching, take your mind off the war.)
Thanks, take care.
We need to send "Leanne,(smiley face) to island hop and the eastern front if she still doubts your unbiased accounts. I'm with you Indie, as is Canada... great coverage... can't wait for more. As always, cheers from London Ontario, CANADA.
Incidently, us of the Pacific Rim, pronounce Bougainville as 'BOW-GAN-VILLE' Ironically, In Australia, a 'Bogan' is slang for an uncultivated person..
Can we get a ww1 era Indy to do a review of the new Netflix all quiet on the western front movie?
@10:10 Stalin would have been aware of the defeat of the North African Afrika Korps and how many German forces and resources that the defense of Italy was soaking up. Plus lend lease was ramping up, so it was the "Western offensive" that he had asked for had been answered, so he had no real reason to complain.
shuttle air raids did occur at times various times allied planes land in USSR, then get back to allied controlled regions
Interesting as always
Should mention the Germans advance in small arms. We've seen the MG42 and MP40 but we should look now at rifles.
The G43 is being put into production during this month, Germany's proper answer to the Soviet SVT-40. The earlier G41 wasn't as reliable so the SVT's gas system was partially copied over to make the G43 better, among other fixes.
But by 1943 the Germans are experimenting with roller blocked and roller delayed systems. Despite Hitler suspending the programe, the MKb 42 (Machine Carbine 42) H and W variants have already progressed into the MP43 which by last month is finally given the green light for large scale production. The SS troops in the East get them this month. Originally thought to replace the Kar98k, the MP43 is now to supplement it. So the G43 is still seen as necessary in German small arms doctrine. The STG-44 will come later.
Not to be outdone, the Soviets have been developing their intermediate cartridge in response to the Germans. The 7.62x39mm round that the AK47 uses would be created. And they're trying to match the Germans new "sturmgewehrs".
The development of the STG (both the 44 and 44 variants) deserves its own video due to its influence on modern firearms, the stupid bureaucracy of Nazi Germany weapons development, Hitler meddling, it's got the lot.
Nice table placement... Indie ,
Hello @worldwartwo
I'm a fan since the first videos about ww1.
But sometimes I can't watch every video as it comes but only a few days/weeks later.
This makes it harder to understand where the battles are fought.
It would help a lot of you would zoom in from far away when showing maps.
Thx.
00:47 Yes, more Panzer. But smile of Indy that is what we need to keep Hearts high in these complicated Times!!!
well done as usual..
In a book about artilley I once read about something called the " time on target serenade" during the campaign of Bougainville. It was very sparse on details. Could you elaborate on it ?
Time on target means coordinating various artillery batteries so that all the shells arrive at the same time. Since some batteries are closer some farther away it takes coordination and math to figure out how all the shells launched will arrive simultaneously.
Time On Target (TOT) missions involved timing the firing of multiple batteries so that all fire on the same location, with the firing times adjusted to cause the rounds to all impact at the same time (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996). Bombardment may cease after the initial volley or be maintained in Fire For Effect mode, creating a sustained saturation of the area with detonations. This tactic was used by the Americans in WW2 (Sulzen, 2000), however, Sultzen is incorrect that only the Americans used it - the British also used this technique.
Fire For Effect means that the battery will fire continuously at it’s maximum sustained rate (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996). The Americans stopped firing when the Forward Observer (FO) called “Cease Fire”, but the British normally fired a certain number of rounds per gun. According to Ellis the Americans called this a ‘Serenade’ in WW2 although by Vietnam they were certainly using the term ‘Fire for Effect’.
-from balagan.info/artillery-and-mortar-tactics-of-ww2
@@caryblack5985 Thnx 🙂 I'm familiar with the term time on target, the serenade part is what baffled me.
@@BobK58 Brit soldier slang then. Ok, thnx Bob K
Great work!
What a difference one lifetime makes
May we live in interesting times
What/Who is the 1st division (XX) near Crimea at 15:50?
Slovak state
Thank you, love your weekly videos, great work. 👍
Looks like Rick Arkinson did not learn how to box the compass to 32 points. There is no point "north by northeast." We have "Northeast by North" and "North by East" (and Northeast by East and East by North) but no "north by northeast. And the arrow on the map indicates generally north westerly direction with no easterly component at all.
Haven't heard what is happening in the North of the Soviet-German front for a very long time... Can't even remember the last episode that talked about it. I'm guessing it's been very quiet and static?
Not much movement things will start happening in Dec 1943/Jan 1944.
Finland's refusal to advance past its' pre-Winter-War borders back in 1941 guaranteed that front would stay quiet. If they'd been willing to go all-in against the USSR it's possible they could have taken Murmansk and blocked off the northern Lend Lease route.
@@Raskolnikov70 They did go beyond the prewar borders but not very much more. They also attacked Murmansk with the Germans and they did not succeed but not because they did not try en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Silver_Fox. It certainly could have had a strategic effect on the war and the Soviets.
@@Raskolnikov70 That's a great answer, thanks for that. But that only partially explains the inactivity. For a start we've had no activity on the whole northern front, everything on the Axis Orel northwards, not just in the far North around Finland and Leningrad. Secondly it only explains it from the German point of view. Why are the Soviets attacking, have they given up advancing towards Smolensk, Vitebsk, Bryansk for now ? (Maybe to focus on the South).
@@patrickhshirley I think the shortage of German units was the biggest factor overall. As Cary pointed out above, Finland did take part in the initial Barbarossa invasion and the advance on Murmansk, but stopped suddenly because they didn't want to enrage the Allies. If they hadn't stopped short, if they'd been more willing to contribute to the war, Germany would have more troops available and would have been able to concentrate more on AG North's area.
As it was, Barbarossa was done on a shoestring and started to peter out in mid-October '41 because the Germans ran out of strength. Fall Blau in '42 was the only big German advance that year because they didn't have the strength to do much in AG North and Center except hold their positions. Even after their lines were shortened due to Soviet advances during Mars and Saturn, the extra units freed up were used mainly in the south to push back against the Red Army and launch Citadel (Kursk), which failed and put them on the run again in 1943 which is where we are now.
Germany never had the extra forces to push forward against the Soviets anywhere else. And as hard up as the Red Army was the first couple of years of the war, they probably weren't eager to open more active fronts than they could handle with what they had available.
How ironic is it that right after the discussion of the brutality of the Burma-Thailand railroad, I get a mid-roll ad about the efficiency of some US freight rail company?
I got curious what the panzer inventory was of reconstituted units. According to Nafziger, around this time the 14th and 24th panzer divisions had 49 PkwIVs and 44 StuGs. The 25th panzer division had 93 PkwIVs.
I would like clarification on one bit of this presentation. You mentioned that Kleist ordered the withdrawal of 17th army from the Crimea on the 26th which order was countermanded by Hitler later that evening. A bit later you mention the Germans attack on the 27th around Melitopol to allow 17th army time to escape Crimea. So . . . was this attack planned in conjunction with Kleist's order to withdraw? Did this attack proceed because someone didn't get the word that Hitler had cancelled Kleist's order?
The late-war panzer division was intended to be equipped with 79 Panthers and 101 Mark IVs. Of course, this was frequently not achieved, as your examples show.
The subtle Ukrainian flag on the desk was a nice touch
You know what would be a cool addition? Aerial views of the terrain! I have a hard time imagining what the actual theaters look like, and it would really help me.
For some reason RUclips hasn't been sending me a notifications for the past month for when you put out a new video and I have everything on right and was getting them for a long time but have stopped for some reason
From 16:49 to 17:03 you don't mention the advance of the soviets in the South despite what I see as major gains. The map as well confused me for a second as while the narration Saya a German attack the soviets one is more noticeable.
Great episode as always despite my nitpick.
Yes the narration along the visuals gives a "We did it Patrick, we saved the city" meme vibes.
"we saved the German front"
Mannstein style. Take 50 km losing 50k men, and then lose 100km.
I asked Indy why the 4th Ukrainian Front's rapid gains in the south don't get as much coverage as the 2nd Ukrainian Front's battle around Krivoy Rog, and he sent me the following reply:
'Well, it does depend on what kind of gains those are, you know? Some territory is more valuable strategically than other territory. Should the Soviets take Krivoy Rog they can conceivably cut off the entire southern wing of the German forces. I've talked about this before. The land being eaten up now after Melitopol does not have that sort of game changing theoretical possibility. I mean, sure, they will isolate Crimea next week, but that's only by land, certainly not by sea (and the Soviets have learned very costly lessons recently about sending warships out on the Black Sea). When they reach Nikopol that is of more overall importance, since that is the manganese center which the Germans really need for military production, and which Hitler wants to hold more than any other place in the whole region.'
I hope that explains for you why Indy seemingly glosses over the Soviet advance to the lower Dnieper.
Thanks for the question,
Sietse (who does the research behind the maps)
@@WorldWarTwo Thank you very much for the concise explanation, much appreciated
@@WorldWarTwo Thanks you, it does make sense, it was a organized withdrawal by germans on a less important area (except for Crimea).
just curious, how did kesselring and stillwell get their monikers?
Kesselring tented to smile when photographed for propaganda and Stillwell hated his posting to China and was a insufferable prick to the nationalist Chinese mainly to Chang
Хвала!
There is a song about the British Eighth army called D-day dodgers which is made famous by Pete Seeger
Man, reading such titles these days always makes you wonder if it is about historic or present developments until you look twice and see the year and the SU mentioned.
It’s quite impressive the USSR has been able to maintain an offensive ever since Stalingrad near 10 months ago. Who was the logistic genius behind this?
I would really enjoy a special episode on the USSR logistics that give us some insight to this! @World War Two
I'm looking forward to Guderians reintroduction to the Frontline.
As far as I can tell he did not return to the front Line. He became Chief of Staff of the OKH after being Inspector General of the Panzers.
Someone did a show on the shuttle missions over Axis targets, the planes landing in Russia, and doing another bombing mission on the way home. A logistics nightmare.
Blue and Yellow. Never forget.
This thing must have a couple of weeks left at most
Waiting for Tarawa.
Me too but...... these guys don't particularly care to take the time to cover the Pacific. In depth. The last time I asked, I recieved a SCATHING comment from Indy that finished with: STFU.
@@todiathink8864 It is late 43. The Essex class carriers are starting to get commissioned. The Enterprise has been refitted and Hellcats are being produced in number. Nimitz is about to start the push across the central Pacific.