Great video, really helped me! But where does virtue epistemology fit into all of this? Isn't Schonefeld's point about rationality not being affected in 'community' similar to whether one reasoned virtuously or not?
Virtue epistemology is one of several possible views on the structure or basis of justification (if we're talking about virtue reliabilism), or sometimes (if we're talking about virtue responsibilism), about what things count as proper epistemic goals and praiseworthy epistemic traits of agents. Permissivism is a view about *epistemic standards*. So: they are compatible, but one does not necessarily require the other. Virtue epistemologists can disagree about permissivism. You can be a virtue responsibilist who thinks the virtuous agent will be permissive, or a virtue responsibilist who thinks the virtuous agent will be impermissive. You can also be a permissivist who does not like the virtue framework at all. Schoenfeld herself never explicitly identifies herself as a virtue epistemologist, but she does talk a lot about reliability, so it wouldn't be bizarre for her to find virtue reliabilism plausible. However, she probably shouldn't be characterized as a virtue responsibilist.
@@professorohatvassar1274 Thank you! I'm over here in Norway writing a paper where I argue that there is no single rational response to disagreement, rather that it relies on the case and whether it allows for permissivism or a unique response to the evidence. You've been a great help on these topics.
Humans are always going to disagree with one another and my view in the end is that none of these disagreements or disputes justify war, and violence although this is what actually happens all the time.
I'm wondering how Pascal's Wager is relevant in this discussion. My view is that it really doesn't matter as in Pascal's Wager whether you believe God exists or not because your beliefs whether true or false don't affect Reality and Truth. So Pascal reasoned that believing in God was a good wager because even if you were incorrect or wrong it dosen't matter because Reality is Reality. My view is that of a Pantheist like Spinoza and Einstein that Nature and the physical laws of Nature are objective and real and can be labeled as God or Ultimate Reality.
At best, postmodernism is a tedious parlor game for art and literature. It's about as interesting as listening to someone else prattle on about their dreams and physical ailments. In "praxis", postmodernism is acid on the foundations of Civilization.
Hi! I don't think the view discussed (permissivism) has much to do with postmodernism, as it is just one option or alternative for solving the problem of disagreement in epistemology. Postmodernism is a collection of views or styles of analysis in art theory and sometimes literary theory. Some will apply the label in cultural studies or social sciences of various sorts for different purposes. But it is not helpful for understanding this particular epistemic problem.
@@professorohatvassar1274 Disagree, as it sounds like it's just more rhetorical trickery and manipulation to devalue rationalism, empiricism and objective reality in the agenda of Wokeness where the (unverifiable) and usually unspecified "lived experiences"/"storytelling"/"ethnographies" of "marginalized identities" are taken as the highest gospel truth. Postmodernism has infected our entire society where "my truth" is one of the popular expressions. On the woke left, that is.
@@ribbrascal I understand the confusion. However, permissivism is not incompatible with rationalism or empiricism or objective reality. I think if you watch the Epistemology video series, it may become clearer. Or perhaps the problem set up was not clear in this video? This is part of a subunit on disagreement and different approaches to disagreement between (I) epistemic peers who have (II) the same or equivalent evidence. So, we're not thinking of the easier scenario where someone is more of an expert than someone else, in which it is obvious what to do. You also have to remember that even once we presuppose or assume that reality fixes all truths singularly (what I believe myself), whether rational beings can always access those singular truths depends on our epistemic capacities and practices. For example, there is a fact about whether penguins have knees. But when asking the question, if two people disagree about it, AND are epistemic peers, AND they have identical evidence, you have to have some way of determining who is correct that doesn't go back to the first order issue. One way to go is to say neither person actually knows. Another way is to say epistemic standards do not fix the issue when the same evidence can lead to two different opinions. A third way is to say only one is right because someone made a mistake. Each of these views is discussed in a different video. I myself do not have a set view about which is the correct standard. These are meant to be overviews for my college students of the options.
Anyway! I can see how the permissivism or conciliationism views might seem "postmodern". But it is not necessarily radical to say other people might know just as much as we know, and that we should accommodate our own possible mistake when deciding what is likely true. The kind of skepticism you're worried about is a possibility - some people think we can never know anything, or that any knowledge claims are relative, or that everything is subjective and there's no truth that is intersubjectively accessible - but not one considered here.
Great video, really helped me! But where does virtue epistemology fit into all of this? Isn't Schonefeld's point about rationality not being affected in 'community' similar to whether one reasoned virtuously or not?
Virtue epistemology is one of several possible views on the structure or basis of justification (if we're talking about virtue reliabilism), or sometimes (if we're talking about virtue responsibilism), about what things count as proper epistemic goals and praiseworthy epistemic traits of agents. Permissivism is a view about *epistemic standards*. So: they are compatible, but one does not necessarily require the other. Virtue epistemologists can disagree about permissivism. You can be a virtue responsibilist who thinks the virtuous agent will be permissive, or a virtue responsibilist who thinks the virtuous agent will be impermissive.
You can also be a permissivist who does not like the virtue framework at all.
Schoenfeld herself never explicitly identifies herself as a virtue epistemologist, but she does talk a lot about reliability, so it wouldn't be bizarre for her to find virtue reliabilism plausible. However, she probably shouldn't be characterized as a virtue responsibilist.
@@professorohatvassar1274 Thank you! I'm over here in Norway writing a paper where I argue that there is no single rational response to disagreement, rather that it relies on the case and whether it allows for permissivism or a unique response to the evidence. You've been a great help on these topics.
@@professorohatvassar1274 I just finished the paper. Only a year late! But I've revisited your videos a lot, still a great help, thanks again!
Humans are always going to disagree with one another and my view in the end is that none of these disagreements or disputes justify war, and violence although this is what actually happens all the time.
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I'm wondering how Pascal's Wager is relevant in this discussion. My view is that it really doesn't matter as in Pascal's Wager whether you believe God exists or not because your beliefs whether true or false don't affect Reality and Truth. So Pascal reasoned that believing in God was a good wager because even if you were incorrect or wrong it dosen't matter because Reality is Reality. My view is that of a Pantheist like Spinoza and Einstein that Nature and the physical laws of Nature are objective and real and can be labeled as God or Ultimate Reality.
At best, postmodernism is a tedious parlor game for art and literature. It's about as interesting as listening to someone else prattle on about their dreams and physical ailments.
In "praxis", postmodernism is acid on the foundations of Civilization.
Hi! I don't think the view discussed (permissivism) has much to do with postmodernism, as it is just one option or alternative for solving the problem of disagreement in epistemology.
Postmodernism is a collection of views or styles of analysis in art theory and sometimes literary theory. Some will apply the label in cultural studies or social sciences of various sorts for different purposes. But it is not helpful for understanding this particular epistemic problem.
@@professorohatvassar1274 Disagree, as it sounds like it's just more rhetorical trickery and manipulation to devalue rationalism, empiricism and objective reality in the agenda of Wokeness where the (unverifiable) and usually unspecified "lived experiences"/"storytelling"/"ethnographies" of "marginalized identities" are taken as the highest gospel truth.
Postmodernism has infected our entire society where "my truth" is one of the popular expressions. On the woke left, that is.
@@ribbrascal I understand the confusion. However, permissivism is not incompatible with rationalism or empiricism or objective reality. I think if you watch the Epistemology video series, it may become clearer. Or perhaps the problem set up was not clear in this video? This is part of a subunit on disagreement and different approaches to disagreement between (I) epistemic peers who have (II) the same or equivalent evidence. So, we're not thinking of the easier scenario where someone is more of an expert than someone else, in which it is obvious what to do.
You also have to remember that even once we presuppose or assume that reality fixes all truths singularly (what I believe myself), whether rational beings can always access those singular truths depends on our epistemic capacities and practices. For example, there is a fact about whether penguins have knees. But when asking the question, if two people disagree about it, AND are epistemic peers, AND they have identical evidence, you have to have some way of determining who is correct that doesn't go back to the first order issue. One way to go is to say neither person actually knows. Another way is to say epistemic standards do not fix the issue when the same evidence can lead to two different opinions. A third way is to say only one is right because someone made a mistake. Each of these views is discussed in a different video.
I myself do not have a set view about which is the correct standard. These are meant to be overviews for my college students of the options.
Anyway! I can see how the permissivism or conciliationism views might seem "postmodern". But it is not necessarily radical to say other people might know just as much as we know, and that we should accommodate our own possible mistake when deciding what is likely true.
The kind of skepticism you're worried about is a possibility - some people think we can never know anything, or that any knowledge claims are relative, or that everything is subjective and there's no truth that is intersubjectively accessible - but not one considered here.