Question for Jacob: Deleuze is very insistent that Nietzsche, and himself, are against dialectics. But I find dialectics all over Nietzsche, Deleuze, and the Deleuze and Guattari. I think if you take the second or third aphorism in BGE when Nietzsche, “How can anything derive from its opposite?” then we can imagine an anti-dialectical Nietzsche. But the issue with me, and with my learning of Hegel (what I was taught), is that the stress of “opposites” -- with regard to negation -- is overplayed. Negation is no a direct opposite, but is more simply an instance of not-ness (negation). The I learned negation is to imagine a white canvas; and then to imagine an imperfection on that canvas (like Rauschenberg’s white painting). The dot is a negation, but the dot is not THE negation. So this issue of Rebellion as the negation of Mastery only to create a new Mastery to be is dialectics in classically understood (and never endorsed by Hegel) form: thesis->antithesis->synthesis. My point is that the people I talk to about these things imagine antithesis as opposite, while I imagine antithesis as ‘not thesis’, which is not an ‘opposite,’ but is mere difference. Difference and repetition, is actually what I understood dialectics to be before I even knew what Deleuze was. I’m 1:03:10 minutes in. Will you take up the issue of dialectics?
No discussion of dialectics, but not only a nod toward. Discussions at the about the rebel figure in Nietzsche but no mention of the Dionysian element, the very figure of revelry: the androgynous demigod that Bronze Age Pervert (and perhaps Nietzsche himself) would want to pretend is not androgynous. But I am very fascinated by -- what I would call -- the dialectic of the Master and the Rebel. Is this not exactly the Hegelian fight to the death, that results in Hegel’s Master/Slave? But what of slave morality and ressentiment? Are there not intricate inversions at play here? Between a Master and a Rebel, does one have more drive to punish (ressentiment) than the other? Between a Master and a revival (Rebel), the Master may not have the luxury of ‘forget’ the Rebel. I’ve always found Nietzsche to be dialectical because of the ongoing struggle (I prefer the term ‘fight’) for synthesis, where Will-to-Power and perpetual synthesis (eternal return) are synonyms: all negations are resolved by an eternal ‘yes.'
Jacob here, I think this is a really good question, and I ultimately think that you are right about a lot of what you are saying. I’ll try to take up the various aspects of your question. First, it isn’t inherently correct to suggest that Deleuze is against dialectics. In Difference and Repetition, for instance, Deleuze speaks quite positively about dialectics (specifically in the discussion of Plato at the end of chapter 1). When Deleuze speaks negatively about dialectics, he tends to be talking about Hegel. He’ll critique Hegel in that same chapter during the discussion of the Large and the Small. Here, the issue is not so much ‘dialectics’ as a whole (which has a rich history in philosophy), but instead a particular type of dialectics that subordinates difference to identity. Second, then, we need to test whether or not Deleuze’s reading of Hegelian dialectics is accurate. Deleuze’s reading of Hegel is largely inspired by his teachers, Hyppolite and Kojeve, who tend to identify the dialectic with a certain form of negativity (that might be drawn out in the caricature of Hegel, ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). In this manner, I think we could say that Deleuze doesn’t have the strongest reading of Hegel, and that their projects might be more aligned than Deleuze thought. (There is some literature on this, such as Henry Somers-Hall’s book “Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation” that might be of interest to you). Third, we might ask, following these two points, whether or not we can still take Deleuze’s critique of Hegelian dialectics seriously, despite a possible misunderstanding of what Hegel is doing. My position would be that we can. Here is why: even if we (i) correctly identify that thesis, antithesis, synthesis is a misreading of Hegel, and (ii) recognize that Hegel does not necessarily subordinate affirmation to negation, we can nevertheless (iii) note that Hegel does subordinate difference to identity. Throughout his position we find that the unfolding of history is consistently premised on some identity undergoing the movement of difference. In this way, Hegel is quite Aristotelean. For instance, we might take the beginning of The Science of Logic where we see the opening through the relationship of being and nothingness. We do not begin with difference but with Being as an indeterminate immediacy. Here, the movement must be determined through non-being as being and its negation. Hegel must conceive of a tension in this ‘indeterminate immediacy’ in order for the unfolding to unfold. Thus, even if we conceive of this unfolding as something more closely associated to difference in itself, that difference in itself cannot fully be difference in itself (in a Deleuzian sense), insofar as it is first premised on the identity of being (and non-being) found in their dialectical tension. Thus, difference remains premised on identity, rather than thought ‘in-itself.’ As for the issue of dialectics, I don’t touch on it here or my work on Deleuze and Laruelle, but am dealing with Hegel’s writing on teleology in my dissertation, which goes quite a bit into his philosophy of history.
power is political, so there is that ... and the will to power underlies our needs, which forms our social manipulations and structures; the laws and politics. what our values are should ultimately be our politics, but we are not there yet in our human systems. in that way, nietzsche questions the very essence of what it is to be political. marx's historical materialism, nietzsche's psychology, heidegger's ideas on being - all of these are important and related contributions, all influence each other on how reality is perceived and humanity is defined. and there are many commonalities, and one is control. how to be social beings without falling into the trap of wanting to control others. this is wrapped up inside what it is to be human; another being born to seek things on our earth, and the responsibility we inherit via our position in the world. non-philosophy seems to be the moving away from categories and doctrines and divisions, and this is a good tonic and refreshing perspective, yet in itself is an elusive essence, in that humans, in very basic quotidian ways, need grounding, especially purpose/narratives in our societal systems.
the missing link - "the mnemotechnics of pain" and child-rearing patterns (which no doubt you will relate to the reproduction of labour-power). also, take Freud seriously when he sees N as a gifted pre-cursor who has single-handedly established the 'truths' of psychoanalysis. you should head deleuze off at the pass. thanks, good stuff :)
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What an amazing discussion! Laruelle's Nietzsche-interpretation is truly interesting. Thank you so much for this episode.
1:07:15 it's the swamp thang ( swamp thing with an "a")
Amazing one. You guys should do more shorts, I love the one on Badiou, there's a lot of potential there
Question for Jacob: Deleuze is very insistent that Nietzsche, and himself, are against dialectics. But I find dialectics all over Nietzsche, Deleuze, and the Deleuze and Guattari. I think if you take the second or third aphorism in BGE when Nietzsche, “How can anything derive from its opposite?” then we can imagine an anti-dialectical Nietzsche. But the issue with me, and with my learning of Hegel (what I was taught), is that the stress of “opposites” -- with regard to negation -- is overplayed. Negation is no a direct opposite, but is more simply an instance of not-ness (negation). The I learned negation is to imagine a white canvas; and then to imagine an imperfection on that canvas (like Rauschenberg’s white painting). The dot is a negation, but the dot is not THE negation. So this issue of Rebellion as the negation of Mastery only to create a new Mastery to be is dialectics in classically understood (and never endorsed by Hegel) form:
thesis->antithesis->synthesis. My point is that the people I talk to about these things imagine antithesis as opposite, while I imagine antithesis as ‘not thesis’, which is not an ‘opposite,’ but is mere difference. Difference and repetition, is actually what I understood dialectics to be before I even knew what Deleuze was.
I’m 1:03:10 minutes in. Will you take up the issue of dialectics?
No discussion of dialectics, but not only a nod toward. Discussions at the about the rebel figure in Nietzsche but no mention of the Dionysian element, the very figure of revelry: the androgynous demigod that Bronze Age Pervert (and perhaps Nietzsche himself) would want to pretend is not androgynous. But I am very fascinated by -- what I would call -- the dialectic of the Master and the Rebel. Is this not exactly the Hegelian fight to the death, that results in Hegel’s Master/Slave? But what of slave morality and ressentiment? Are there not intricate inversions at play here? Between a Master and a Rebel, does one have more drive to punish (ressentiment) than the other? Between a Master and a revival (Rebel), the Master may not have the luxury of ‘forget’ the Rebel.
I’ve always found Nietzsche to be dialectical because of the ongoing struggle (I prefer the term ‘fight’) for synthesis, where Will-to-Power and perpetual synthesis (eternal return) are synonyms: all negations are resolved by an eternal ‘yes.'
Jacob here, I think this is a really good question, and I ultimately think that you are right about a lot of what you are saying. I’ll try to take up the various aspects of your question.
First, it isn’t inherently correct to suggest that Deleuze is against dialectics. In Difference and Repetition, for instance, Deleuze speaks quite positively about dialectics (specifically in the discussion of Plato at the end of chapter 1). When Deleuze speaks negatively about dialectics, he tends to be talking about Hegel. He’ll critique Hegel in that same chapter during the discussion of the Large and the Small. Here, the issue is not so much ‘dialectics’ as a whole (which has a rich history in philosophy), but instead a particular type of dialectics that subordinates difference to identity.
Second, then, we need to test whether or not Deleuze’s reading of Hegelian dialectics is accurate. Deleuze’s reading of Hegel is largely inspired by his teachers, Hyppolite and Kojeve, who tend to identify the dialectic with a certain form of negativity (that might be drawn out in the caricature of Hegel, ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). In this manner, I think we could say that Deleuze doesn’t have the strongest reading of Hegel, and that their projects might be more aligned than Deleuze thought. (There is some literature on this, such as Henry Somers-Hall’s book “Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation” that might be of interest to you).
Third, we might ask, following these two points, whether or not we can still take Deleuze’s critique of Hegelian dialectics seriously, despite a possible misunderstanding of what Hegel is doing. My position would be that we can. Here is why: even if we (i) correctly identify that thesis, antithesis, synthesis is a misreading of Hegel, and (ii) recognize that Hegel does not necessarily subordinate affirmation to negation, we can nevertheless (iii) note that Hegel does subordinate difference to identity. Throughout his position we find that the unfolding of history is consistently premised on some identity undergoing the movement of difference. In this way, Hegel is quite Aristotelean. For instance, we might take the beginning of The Science of Logic where we see the opening through the relationship of being and nothingness. We do not begin with difference but with Being as an indeterminate immediacy. Here, the movement must be determined through non-being as being and its negation. Hegel must conceive of a tension in this ‘indeterminate immediacy’ in order for the unfolding to unfold. Thus, even if we conceive of this unfolding as something more closely associated to difference in itself, that difference in itself cannot fully be difference in itself (in a Deleuzian sense), insofar as it is first premised on the identity of being (and non-being) found in their dialectical tension. Thus, difference remains premised on identity, rather than thought ‘in-itself.’
As for the issue of dialectics, I don’t touch on it here or my work on Deleuze and Laruelle, but am dealing with Hegel’s writing on teleology in my dissertation, which goes quite a bit into his philosophy of history.
kudos for the shout out to your mentor!
power is political, so there is that ... and the will to power underlies our needs, which forms our social manipulations and structures; the laws and politics. what our values are should ultimately be our politics, but we are not there yet in our human systems. in that way, nietzsche questions the very essence of what it is to be political.
marx's historical materialism, nietzsche's psychology, heidegger's ideas on being - all of these are important and related contributions, all influence each other on how reality is perceived and humanity is defined. and there are many commonalities, and one is control. how to be social beings without falling into the trap of wanting to control others. this is wrapped up inside what it is to be human; another being born to seek things on our earth, and the responsibility we inherit via our position in the world.
non-philosophy seems to be the moving away from categories and doctrines and divisions, and this is a good tonic and refreshing perspective, yet in itself is an elusive essence, in that humans, in very basic quotidian ways, need grounding, especially purpose/narratives in our societal systems.
46:45 emopire strikes back
the missing link - "the mnemotechnics of pain" and child-rearing patterns (which no doubt you will relate to the reproduction of labour-power). also, take Freud seriously when he sees N as a gifted pre-cursor who has single-handedly established the 'truths' of psychoanalysis. you should head deleuze off at the pass. thanks, good stuff :)
I so badly want to know what was cut at 22:34 out of morbid curiosity
Probably my dog going nuts.
Nietzsche is a satirist doing satire.
Sa-teer, however, is quite too real!