I had a new barrel turned and installed on my Martini Henry. The specs are Bore: .450"-.452" Groove: .458"-.460". I have several boxes of Kynoch with a bullet diameter of .440. Do you think I can shoot the vintage ammo?
magnificent oh most dapper sir, long been a fan of the good colonel too so hearing the two of you has been a real treat. Thanks Rob. Abu Klea and the Sudan has to be in the frame as topic for any future conversations.
Surely this is a family orientated channel and we can do without gratuitous cruelty to antique rifles? :D But yes a bit more 'on topic' discussion with Colonel Snook would be delightful. I seem to remember he had rather more to say about Martini's in the South African context than the two of you got around to covering, extempore handguards for example. The Sudan opens the door to talk about the Snider too, not to mention 450 Adams revolvers and 12 gauge shotguns... poor old Burnaby. Oh, the thought occurs that to be valid you'd want a 'testing grade' Martini without the post-Sudan modifications and escapees from that upgrade program arn't common to begin with. Thanks again for the awesome content :D
Thank you, once again, for another excellent, edifying, and enjoyable installment in your series. These segments with you interacting with the Colonel are most engrossing.
A fascinating video. I particularly liked Col Snooks's lecture on the changes in the British regimental organisation. I knew most of it but found the bits I didn't know very educaitonal. Perhaps a bit of an explanation about the difference between British Regiments and Continental/US ones might have helped those with the misfortune to have been born outside the UK.
If you’re interested I put a 90% MH dated 1879 in Kidd Family auctions. It’s a beauty untouched with case colour hardening seen on the lever. Stock never sanded and you can feel the raised grain. Though this one is of interest because so few are found in this shape but please remove this post if you find it not to your liking. I just think it’s a great opportunity to get a minty MH
Good job Rob! Particularly liked the Welshness bit, being Welsh I read a good book about this, think it's called Dragon rampart, goes on about how the majority of the Welsh in that regiment were in the companies that where not at rorkes drift
Hello Mr Morgan (I'm guessing!), Dragon Rampant is a book about the 23rd (The Royal Welsh Fusiliers) who were not in Zululand and had nothing to do with the Zulu War. There is no substance in historical terms to any notion that B Coy was any more or less well off for Welshmen than any other company, except in so far that it might conceivably have been differnet to the average balance purely by fluke. But there are no bona fide numbers and, if memory serves, about 20-30 men out of 84 where we have no clues whatever, a sufficient grey area to tip the balance either way. My point is that there is more than enough history for both the English and the Welsh to take pride in the courage of our (British) men at RD. Even the Swiss get a look in with Corporal Schiess VC.
@@mikesnook9514 oh I'm not bothered about it either way as anything more than a point of historical interest. So then Dragon rampart it must of been a chapter in there about the origin of the names of the enlisted at different periods up until 1815 Couldn't remember if the book finished in 1815 or 1914. Long time since I read it. Pretty good book though. As a ex RN bloke I found the excerpt on page (roughly 100) of a old tar telling the 23rd that Nelsons own victory was on the horizon coming to pull them from the peninsula at the conclusion of John Moore's campaign really interesting
Hazzar hazzar hazzar Epic informative educational video could have sat and watched the whole series in one go Congratulations you dapper chap well deserved on the win Hazzar hazzar hazzar hazzar! Bestest from Scotland 👏👏👏👏👏👏
Outstanding work Rob ..thank you so much ....even more exciting.... we are going next to Rorke's Drift ....and please... if you find just a few spare months don't forget the Crimea ...I'm still sat up on the hill watching the Russians down in the valley after the Coldstreams went crazy .....and the French finally decided to act . ..what next ???
Crimea not forgotten... the Guards are at the bottom of the hill and in a bit of a bind... the French are holding the centre, but there are still thousands of Russians yet to commit to battle!
excellent, professional and thorough ,, nothing on the zulu war compares, and ive read most of the reputed authors,, i own and have fired my mk1 martini at bisley,, i have read and been told, many times,, only the mk1 was used at the start of the zulu war,, the 24th being 1 of the first regiments to receive the martini,, is this true,, ??????? ps,, i only fired 2 rounds,, the kick was to much for me,, lol, but hit the target at 250 yards, and im not a good shot
OK, here’s my two cents worth, as Monday morning quarterback re the circumstances of Coghill/Melville leaving the camp. Melville was apparently following orders to “save the Colour” so his absenting himself is legitimate from all angles. Perhaps the Colonel could have explained, however, why Coghill left earlier. Bad knee notwithstanding, he was mounted and still in a position to lend direction or moral support to the men in extremis. Parallels must be drawn to events at the Battle of Intombe, some weeks later, where, outnumbered and under pressure, Lt HH Harward left his men as he was the “only one with a horse so it had to be him that rode off to get help”. Luckily Sgt AC Booth (subsequent VC) of the 80th Regt “rallied a few men and covered the retreat of 50 soldiers and others for 3 miles. Had it not been for the coolness displayed by this NCO, not one man would have escaped”. Triple H faced a court martial for cowardice and his conduct inspired Wolseley to write a missive that was endorsed by the Duke of Cambridge and read out to every regiment in the army. One sentence reads - “The more helpless a position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill”.
Hello Henry, That's a fairly expressed comment. However there are some nuances to be contemplated. Harward was directly with Booth and in command at the time he made what was always going to be a wrong judgement call in moral terms. I think I explained tolerably well in part 2 (I think it was) how dramatic and devastating was the moment when the right flank folded, because of the elevated view that the lie of the land permitted to anybody in the vicinity of the tents and the saddle area. Everybody in that area could see over a timespan amounting to minutes few (as the right horn surged and further enveloped) that the battle was irretrievably lost. The first time we can really nail down Coghill's location is in the mouth of the saddle, when the RA survivor Lt Curling reports that he reined in beside him and there was a hurried conversation about making a stand in the saddle. Coghill we know replied with words to the effect that he did not think that it could be done. If you wish to condemn him for leaving the camp at that juncture then you condemn everybody who survived Isandlwana and I'm not sure that's in any way fair. As we discussed there was a great distance between the saddle and the retiring firing line. It was obvious to those in the saddle that the infantry would be overwhelmed and annihilated....that no other outcome was possible. So it's not that he LEFT the infantry; he wasn't with them at that time. He would have had to ride forward to join them and necessarily have accepted that he was riding to his certain death. The key point I think is that he made it to safety in Natal. Somebody of dubious courage would have kept going; but that not what he did; seeing that the adjutant still gamely clinging to the Queen's Colour in midstream, where he had been washed off his horse and was clinging to a rock, (the imagery of the river does not capture it's state in January 1879 when it was very high and raging through as a torrent so to speak). Perceiving that he might be able to save Melvill and the colour he turned his horse back into the river to try and effect a rescue. His horse was shot almost immediately at which point he became completely useless due to his physical incapacity, something he more than anybody would have appreciated when he took the decision to risk his life for a friend and a piece of silk. That's courage; to be precise it's Valour. There is much to admire about Wolseley but he was also slightly 'touched' and almost invariably condemnatory, frequently spiteful to boot, when it came to judging others. I think there is an essential difference, a key difference, between an officer who leaves his men (as in Hardward's case) and an officer who would have to ride across a battlefield to join men who were not under his command only in order to die a few minutes later. Nobody's duty requires that they go out of their way to commit suicide, whereas by contrast it is always an officer's duty duty to stand fast with the men. In this instance Coghill wasn't with the men. He went out of the camp with or alongside the guns.
If you take the time to Google a map and check out the length of the initial British front line ,, it’s facing direction relative to the mountain and the distance between the right hand company and the saddle your whole appreciation of this engagement will be enhanced. I was amazed at the distances
Indeed. And as Snook explains it was kept extended in order to support Durnfords left flank when Durnford decided to make a stand at the donga rather than closer to the camp, otherwise undoubtedly it would not have remained so extended.
@@lyndoncmp5751 there must have been something more to Durnfords move ,,,, what on earth was a trundling rocket battery (a few mules with kit strapped to them) doing out in the open ? It must have been known they would take a while to deploy and need range to be effective .... I will visit one day...
@@davepangolin4996 I have no idea. It was a completely bizarre decision from Chelmsford. The poor rocket battery was already tired after doing the journey from Rorke's Drift. Durnford also tried to get 2 companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out there as well, but Pulleine rejected this and told him his orders were to act on the defensive. Durnford is alleged to have replied "very well, it does not matter much". Hmm if it did not matter much then why did he try and get them out there? Durnford's decisions seem incomprehensible.
Lol, Durnford I meant, not Chelmsford. I was still thinking of another post and discussion Id just made. Completely bizarre decision by Durnford to order the rocket battery out miles to support him. The first British unit to be wiped out at Isandlwana.
the problem at the Battle of Isandlwana, is un professional commanders, who buy commissions, and consider it un gentlemanly, to be professionals of war,, in 1850, it was considered bad form to study the art and science of war , this is what wolseley wanted to change,, why he wanted the commission system abolished,, if wolseley had been their in command,, the failures would have been avoided, its a case of typical british upper class commissioned incompetence, and as usual the rank and file pay the price
I dont think Pulleine did much wrong. He was compromised by Durnfords decisions, and of course nobody had any idea of the sheer numbers of Zulus facing them until late on. The early reports were of Zulus in the 4,000 to 7,000 number, not 20,000.
@@lyndoncmp5751 what a shame you dont live near me,, as im sure we would have the most enjoyable discussion/ debate . with the appropriate beverages,, for hours,,, every boar in natal new the size strength of the zulu army, its fighting quality's, strengths, weaknesses, movement and supply capability, any mediocre intelligence officer would kno this,,, i agree chemsford was a complete armature, who only believed in british superiority, over lower breeds,, typical of the period,, exactly why wolseley changed everything, just in time for the boar war,, pauline and glyn were the same,, curling for example had never read a book on the art of war, i own and have fired at bisley my mk1 martini,, i can assure you 20,000 zulus, defending there homeland against a aggressor, armed with sticks is not enough to take on 5000 british soldiers if led correctly, at 400 yards its harder to miss a solid formation, chelmsford also gave orders of the day, at the start of the campaign, to fight in extended line, ordering 8 paces between files on the firing line, pauline did not need to follow this, if circumstances dictated otherwise,, its a lack of initiative, initiative was drummed out of officers and men in this period, then after learning the hard way, at ulundi he formed square, even tho zulus had at least 400 captured martinis, and lots of amo,, the odds of zulus against boars at blood river was similar, yet boars only had muzzle loaders,, rorks drift was a simple all round barricade, as was kambula,, evelyn wood was in command at kambula,, he was a professional, raised on hard earned merit, rare at that time, if the camp had been left to wood,, disaster avoided,, incidentally, average rounds expended per man at rorks drift was 30 per man,,, losses at rorks drift? odds zulu to red coat?,, expecting the camp to be moved at any time is no excuse when at war, enemy can attack at any time day or night, and the regulations of the day regarding pickets was very slip shod, and un professional, the reason woseley was dispatched asap to the cape, was we needed a professional on the scene, dont we just love the disasters more than the one sided knock overs, like the kaffir war, fought just a year before,,, at least the quality of officers had improved since the idiots in the crimea,,,
L c Cheers for the invite. I think you may have misunderstood what I meant. What I was saying was that until late on Pulleine had no idea the main Zulu impi was in the hills to the north and northeast of the camp. Don't forget that Chelmsford went off early that morning towards the hills to the southeast to confront what was expected to be the vanguard of the main impi, based on the reports of the recon patrol which engaged about 2,000 Zulus the afternoon before. There were vedettes in the hills near camp and they spotted Zulu movements in the hills to the northeast very early that morning. A bit later on Zulus even showed themselves on the escarpment north of camp. John Chard even saw them and he hurried back to Rorkes Drift. However, the total number of these Zulus seen in the hills to the north and northeast were maximum estimate of 4,000 to 7,000. When Durnfords men discovered the main impi of 20,000 men far beyond in the Ngwebeni Valley this information did not get back to Pulleine quickly. As far as Pulleine was concerned when the battle started at most he assumed he would only be engaging about 7,000. This is why none of his dispatches to Chelmsford showed any sign of panic, even after the battle started. The main Zulu force was still thought to be out near where Chelmsford was. Had Pulleine known the full number of the Zulus advancing on the camp after midday he likely would have done things differently. Even if he didn't know the full numbers of Zulus he still likely would have defended tighter had Durnford not neglected to act on the defensive. As Snook explains, the British line was only kept out there extended because Durnford obliged Pulleine to support him and Durnford made that stand at the donga, one mile out from the camp. Had Durnford decided to make a stand closer to camp then Pulleine would have drawn his line in closer. We can see that by Pulleines preferred method of defence early that morning during the false alarm. Pulleine kept the 24ft Foot close to camp just in front of the tents. However, then Durnford arrived and upset the apple cart. He disregarded Pulleine's orders to act on the defensive and instead went on the attack. It all fell apart from there. Im with Mike Snook in that had Durnford remained in camp to defend it then with his 250 mounted men, plus another near 150 other armed colonials and Imperial Mounted Infantry alongside the 6 companies of the 24th this would have given them nearly 1,000 rifles in a far more concentrated and compact field of fire and the camp may well have been successful. Durford could have defended the rear at the saddle (a small area) and the 6 infantry companies and the other colonials/IMI could have defended the front and north shoulder of the hill. Cheers.
L c, Id like to point out as well that unlike in the films, the Zulus were not running forward in one solid mass easy to fire into. At Isandlwana they were often going to ground in the long grass, crawling forward, making a rush, going to ground again etc etc. They also took cover in the many donga and dips. Despite this, the 24th Foot was actually holding the Zulu chest at bay and were winning. It was out on the right flank where Durnford was where the battle turned. Durnford was too extended, he was being outflanked by the extreme of the Zulu left horn and his men ran out of ammo. All of a sudden Durnford had to withdraw and this caved in the right flank at a time the Zulu chest was being held at bay by the 24th. Regarding the pickets and vedettes, they actually did their jobs. They spotted the Zulus at first light on the morning of the battle, or at least any Zulus within 4 miles of the camp. True, they did not spot the whole Zulu impi but then the Zulu impi only reached the Ngwebeni Valley late afternoon/evening the day before and it was soon dark. As I said, as soon as it was light the next day the outlying vedettes did report thousands of Zulus milling about in the hills to the north/northeast. The Zulus did not get within 4 miles of the camp undetected. Durnfords men later found the main impi at midday, at rest and not intending to attack that day. The Zulus were as surprised as the British were.
@@lyndoncmp5751 totally agree,,, but the reconnaissance was poor, and not to the manual,, the main zulu army was able to encamp in its jump of positions 5 miles from the camp undetected, thats quite a journey from ulundi undetected,,for it to then watch half the british, force move of, south east, at approx 3am, gave them great joy and that is why the zulus chose to attack when they did,, chelmsofird instructed pauline to be redy to join him the next day,, paulines action regarding the safely of the now half strength camp were extreme poor, he should be ready to receive attack, at any minuet when on a war footing, when wolesley invaded ashanti land his scouts were over 10 miles in advance, and native scouts even further in advance, when not on the move they camped in a square, according to curling whos 2 guns were attached to the 24th had been with them for over 6 months, stood to arms along side the 24th at 7.30 am, and had breakfast with the 24th officers while troops were fighting on the north ridge, he noted "the company's were terribly under strength, with no more than 50 men per company",, yet pauline only sent half strength company's upto the ridge, to the north,, the other companys and half companys actually went back into camp to cook breakfast,, pauline also allowed the rocket battery to leave the camp, it was customary to not leave rocket batteries without infantry support, the zulu right horn would have outflanked the the camp even if the left was not, the dispositions and moments ordered by pauline were not of a soldier who new his profession,, durnford was under pauline, just look at woods dispositions at kampala,, and the simple all round barricade at rorks drift,, pauline once notified of 5 or 7000 zulus could and should have assumed it could be the main zulu army and made immediate dispositions to defend the camp, striking tents and forming square, not march troops away from it,, especially knowing in advance the zulu method of attack, forming of square was standard practice, and used by chelmsford at ulundi,, a square does not leave flanks hanging in the air, both flanks were open and both penetrated,, and my point is, incompetent commissioned upper class leaders,, cause the rank and file to suffer unnecessary losses,, your point regarding zulus not rushing headlong into a wall of lead, is so true, at 1 point the british line moved forward, as the zulus had found dead ground to take cover,, unlike british soldiers in ww1, who repeatedly walked into machine gun fire and barbed wire,, although against orders the zulu army did rush blindly onto the redoubt at kambula and suffered very heavy casualties, the boars with the army were horrified at the british dispositions regarding the camp,, isnt this subject addictive,, i would highly recommend the ashanti wars, the first invasion ended with the general loosing his head, literally, but wosleys campaign a few years later was a masterpiece, and if wolesley had been in command , the troops would have been home by xmas
Rob, just wanted to say a huge thank you to yourself and the contributors to the South Africa series, for such an engaging and informative view of the realities, detail and myths / misconceptions of Isandlwana. Really brought home how it is a combination of events and decisions that dictate the outcome of a battle!! Delighted to hear that the series is not over and that you will be moving on to the subject of Rorkes Drift. Just one question, you mentioned that the NNC used carbines rather than Martini-Henry rifles - but what did they use? I read somewhere that they used the Westley Richards 'monkey tail' carbine, but as that source also quoted a lot of the misconceptions surrounding Isandlwana I was not sure if it was correct?
I believe that the mention re the NNC was "rifles".... it is somewhat unclear as to the firearms carried. They could have been Martinis or perhaps Swinburns like the NNMC. Ammunition commonality would have been, to a degree, desired.
Hello Steve, The NNC companies had 19 firearms amongst a theoretical 109 personnel. There were nine Europeans, three officers and six NCOs, who all carried the long M-H and a full allotment of ammunition. The 10 rifles carried by Africans were 5 x MH and 5 x Snider. They were given only a few rounds apiece due to the prevailing paranoia amongst settler society about arming Africans. We do not know whether there was a proper provision for them to scoop a couple of handfuls of extra rounds from bulk ammunition stocks on going into action. I imagine there was but we do not know for sure.
@@britishmuzzleloaders Thank you Rob and for taking the time to reply, the series has really given me a much better understanding and cleared up some of the misconceptions I acquired from earlier histories, well done and keep up the great work. Can't wait for the next presentation!!
2 года назад
Very interesting Video and a nice escape from current events.
isnt this channel simply brilliant,, looking forward to the next inkerman installment,, because of the time lapse between episodes, i have to start from the beginning each time,, same with this series,, so i end up watching part 1 about 6 times, lucky me,, the first series on isandlwana was fantastic,, as good as any book ive read,,
Gunk buildup on cartridge cases from the leather bandolier makes sense. I stopped keeping .45 Colt in my cartridge belt for long periods because of that. If i had to wear a bandolier or cartridge belt, I would check the cartridges every morning and give them a good wipe to insure something like that wouldn't happen.
Apart from the initial bombardment on the escarpment and the slopes, it wasn't that effective. You can't cover much area when the 20,000 Zulus are spread out so much. Literally miles between horns.
Love your content, sir! Question: would you be able to share a source for a Snider Enfield 1* long rifle British buff sling? I've been searching for a while and can't find one that looks accurate. Thank You
Hi Rob This was a great video as usual! I watched the whole thing! :) Any chance you could list the titles of his books? Could you recommend some writings that would introduce a reader to the Zulu conflicts? Thank you again ! Stay healthy and keep up the tremendous content! Brent, VT USA
donald morris, washing of the spears is the essential read, it also contains a history of the zulu nation, the curling letters gives an account from a subalterns view, he survived the battle, the memoirs of sir garnet wolesley, is very useful in understanding the british army and officer class and the troops of this period, this channel is also highly recommended,
Rob: Well done on winning the Gundies award!
Thank you! and to the voters!
I had a new barrel turned and installed on my Martini Henry. The specs are Bore: .450"-.452"
Groove: .458"-.460". I have several boxes of Kynoch with a bullet diameter of .440. Do you think I can shoot the vintage ammo?
That stuff is for the most part done... very poor reliability.
magnificent oh most dapper sir, long been a fan of the good colonel too so hearing the two of you has been a real treat. Thanks Rob. Abu Klea and the Sudan has to be in the frame as topic for any future conversations.
Perhaps... if I can locate a Martini that I'd be willing to damage as part of a test... 😀
Surely this is a family orientated channel and we can do without gratuitous cruelty to antique rifles? :D
But yes a bit more 'on topic' discussion with Colonel Snook would be delightful. I seem to remember he had rather more to say about Martini's in the South African context than the two of you got around to covering, extempore handguards for example. The Sudan opens the door to talk about the Snider too, not to mention 450 Adams revolvers and 12 gauge shotguns... poor old Burnaby.
Oh, the thought occurs that to be valid you'd want a 'testing grade' Martini without the post-Sudan modifications and escapees from that upgrade program arn't common to begin with.
Thanks again for the awesome content :D
@@shanerogers24 Lot's to talk about for sure!
Thank you, once again, for another excellent, edifying, and enjoyable installment in your series. These segments with you interacting with the Colonel are most engrossing.
Most kind! Cheers.
A fascinating video. I particularly liked Col Snooks's lecture on the changes in the British regimental organisation. I knew most of it but found the bits I didn't know very educaitonal. Perhaps a bit of an explanation about the difference between British Regiments and Continental/US ones might have helped those with the misfortune to have been born outside the UK.
"The Army" is explained in Part Two of the series. Cheers.
Hi from Syracuse NY USA everyone thank you for sharing your thoughts and facts and truth about the weapons of this time in history
Glad you enjoyed it!
I always enjoy your videos and shooting different rifles and different uniforms
If you’re interested I put a 90% MH dated 1879 in Kidd Family auctions. It’s a beauty untouched with case colour hardening seen on the lever. Stock never sanded and you can feel the raised grain. Though this one is of interest because so few are found in this shape but please remove this post if you find it not to your liking. I just think it’s a great opportunity to get a minty MH
A little mercenary, IMO.....
Yet another great video from one of the very best military channels on YT. Many thanks Rob and the good Colonel.
Cheers!
Good job Rob! Particularly liked the Welshness bit, being Welsh
I read a good book about this, think it's called Dragon rampart, goes on about how the majority of the Welsh in that regiment were in the companies that where not at rorkes drift
Like the Colonel mentioned, there is no irrefutable proof of the "nationality" of the ranks within the Regiment at this time.
@@britishmuzzleloaders indeed. Interesting though
Hello Mr Morgan (I'm guessing!), Dragon Rampant is a book about the 23rd (The Royal Welsh Fusiliers) who were not in Zululand and had nothing to do with the Zulu War. There is no substance in historical terms to any notion that B Coy was any more or less well off for Welshmen than any other company, except in so far that it might conceivably have been differnet to the average balance purely by fluke. But there are no bona fide numbers and, if memory serves, about 20-30 men out of 84 where we have no clues whatever, a sufficient grey area to tip the balance either way. My point is that there is more than enough history for both the English and the Welsh to take pride in the courage of our (British) men at RD. Even the Swiss get a look in with Corporal Schiess VC.
@@mikesnook9514 oh I'm not bothered about it either way as anything more than a point of historical interest. So then Dragon rampart it must of been a chapter in there about the origin of the names of the enlisted at different periods up until 1815
Couldn't remember if the book finished in 1815 or 1914. Long time since I read it. Pretty good book though. As a ex RN bloke I found the excerpt on page (roughly 100) of a old tar telling the 23rd that Nelsons own victory was on the horizon coming to pull them from the peninsula at the conclusion of John Moore's campaign really interesting
@@morgs456 One of many occasions when the Army has had good reason to be grateful to the Royal Navy!
More of my fav fuzzy stashed lad. Huzzah! now Stiffen your extractors with two fingers of Gordon’s London Dry and have at thee.
Haha!
@@britishmuzzleloaders indeed. ^~^
Hazzar hazzar hazzar
Epic informative educational video could have sat and watched the whole series in one go
Congratulations you dapper chap well deserved on the win
Hazzar hazzar hazzar hazzar!
Bestest from Scotland
👏👏👏👏👏👏
Very kind! Thank you.
Outstanding work Rob ..thank you so much ....even more exciting.... we are going next to Rorke's Drift ....and please... if you find just a few spare months don't forget the Crimea ...I'm still sat up on the hill watching the Russians down in the valley after the Coldstreams went crazy .....and the French finally decided to act . ..what next ???
Crimea not forgotten... the Guards are at the bottom of the hill and in a bit of a bind... the French are holding the centre, but there are still thousands of Russians yet to commit to battle!
Very well done. I found this to be fascinating, and interesting for a history nerd such as myself! Thank you for this "deep dive"!
Most welcome!
excellent, professional and thorough ,, nothing on the zulu war compares, and ive read most of the reputed authors,, i own and have fired my mk1 martini at bisley,, i have read and been told, many times,, only the mk1 was used at the start of the zulu war,, the 24th being 1 of the first regiments to receive the martini,, is this true,, ??????? ps,, i only fired 2 rounds,, the kick was to much for me,, lol, but hit the target at 250 yards, and im not a good shot
👍
Been really enjoying these discussions with Colonel Snook. Great work Rob.
Great work Colonel!
What better way to spend an hour and a half at 16:20 on a wet Tuesday.
Cheers!
OK, here’s my two cents worth, as Monday morning quarterback re the circumstances of Coghill/Melville leaving the camp. Melville was apparently following orders to “save the Colour” so his absenting himself is legitimate from all angles.
Perhaps the Colonel could have explained, however, why Coghill left earlier. Bad knee notwithstanding, he was mounted and still in a position to lend direction or moral support to the men in extremis.
Parallels must be drawn to events at the Battle of Intombe, some weeks later, where, outnumbered and under pressure, Lt HH Harward left his men as he was the “only one with a horse so it had to be him that rode off to get help”. Luckily Sgt AC Booth (subsequent VC) of the 80th Regt “rallied a few men and covered the retreat of 50 soldiers and others for 3 miles. Had it not been for the coolness displayed by this NCO, not one man would have escaped”.
Triple H faced a court martial for cowardice and his conduct inspired Wolseley to write a missive that was endorsed by the Duke of Cambridge and read out to every regiment in the army. One sentence reads -
“The more helpless a position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill”.
Hello Henry, That's a fairly expressed comment. However there are some nuances to be contemplated. Harward was directly with Booth and in command at the time he made what was always going to be a wrong judgement call in moral terms. I think I explained tolerably well in part 2 (I think it was) how dramatic and devastating was the moment when the right flank folded, because of the elevated view that the lie of the land permitted to anybody in the vicinity of the tents and the saddle area. Everybody in that area could see over a timespan amounting to minutes few (as the right horn surged and further enveloped) that the battle was irretrievably lost. The first time we can really nail down Coghill's location is in the mouth of the saddle, when the RA survivor Lt Curling reports that he reined in beside him and there was a hurried conversation about making a stand in the saddle. Coghill we know replied with words to the effect that he did not think that it could be done. If you wish to condemn him for leaving the camp at that juncture then you condemn everybody who survived Isandlwana and I'm not sure that's in any way fair. As we discussed there was a great distance between the saddle and the retiring firing line. It was obvious to those in the saddle that the infantry would be overwhelmed and annihilated....that no other outcome was possible. So it's not that he LEFT the infantry; he wasn't with them at that time. He would have had to ride forward to join them and necessarily have accepted that he was riding to his certain death. The key point I think is that he made it to safety in Natal. Somebody of dubious courage would have kept going; but that not what he did; seeing that the adjutant still gamely clinging to the Queen's Colour in midstream, where he had been washed off his horse and was clinging to a rock, (the imagery of the river does not capture it's state in January 1879 when it was very high and raging through as a torrent so to speak). Perceiving that he might be able to save Melvill and the colour he turned his horse back into the river to try and effect a rescue. His horse was shot almost immediately at which point he became completely useless due to his physical incapacity, something he more than anybody would have appreciated when he took the decision to risk his life for a friend and a piece of silk. That's courage; to be precise it's Valour. There is much to admire about Wolseley but he was also slightly 'touched' and almost invariably condemnatory, frequently spiteful to boot, when it came to judging others. I think there is an essential difference, a key difference, between an officer who leaves his men (as in Hardward's case) and an officer who would have to ride across a battlefield to join men who were not under his command only in order to die a few minutes later. Nobody's duty requires that they go out of their way to commit suicide, whereas by contrast it is always an officer's duty duty to stand fast with the men. In this instance Coghill wasn't with the men. He went out of the camp with or alongside the guns.
Very kind of the Col to add his comments!
I enjoyed Col. Snook’s insights so much that I bought his two books on the subject, thanks to your wonderful channel. Thanks again, Rob!
Cheers! You're in for a good read!
Great series! Glad I found it. Quite enjoyable and educational. I can't find it. Was there a part 4?
Part Four will be the Rorke's Drift episodes.. not done yet...
I keep learning so much from you. Just wish I could fire a martini in England 🇬🇧 🇨🇦
You can! With the appropriate navigation of the red tape...
@@britishmuzzleloaders very, very hard to do a local "gun" club shotguns and air riffles "said don't bother " lol
Interesting! We appreciate your good work.
Thank you kindly!
Superb … look forward to this when it’s time to rest !!!
Cheers!
Fantastic episode, even more so with a glass of claret or two.
Glad you enjoyed it!.. and the episode!
Many thanks for the new video and discussion.
Most welcome!
This video was both informative and entertaining. Bravo sirs!
Cheers!
Sublime stuff, fantastic documentary
Cheers!
If you take the time to Google a map and check out the length of the initial British front line ,, it’s facing direction relative to the mountain and the distance between the right hand company and the saddle your whole appreciation of this engagement will be enhanced. I was amazed at the distances
Or you could watch the remainder of the series and see all kinds of maps and aerial photography... 😀
Indeed. And as Snook explains it was kept extended in order to support Durnfords left flank when Durnford decided to make a stand at the donga rather than closer to the camp, otherwise undoubtedly it would not have remained so extended.
@@lyndoncmp5751 there must have been something more to Durnfords move ,,,, what on earth was a trundling rocket battery (a few mules with kit strapped to them) doing out in the open ? It must have been known they would take a while to deploy and need range to be effective .... I will visit one day...
@@davepangolin4996
I have no idea. It was a completely bizarre decision from Chelmsford. The poor rocket battery was already tired after doing the journey from Rorke's Drift.
Durnford also tried to get 2 companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out there as well, but Pulleine rejected this and told him his orders were to act on the defensive. Durnford is alleged to have replied "very well, it does not matter much". Hmm if it did not matter much then why did he try and get them out there?
Durnford's decisions seem incomprehensible.
Lol, Durnford I meant, not Chelmsford. I was still thinking of another post and discussion Id just made.
Completely bizarre decision by Durnford to order the rocket battery out miles to support him. The first British unit to be wiped out at Isandlwana.
the problem at the Battle of Isandlwana, is un professional commanders, who buy commissions, and consider it un gentlemanly, to be professionals of war,, in 1850, it was considered bad form to study the art and science of war , this is what wolseley wanted to change,, why he wanted the commission system abolished,, if wolseley had been their in command,, the failures would have been avoided, its a case of typical british upper class commissioned incompetence, and as usual the rank and file pay the price
I dont think Pulleine did much wrong. He was compromised by Durnfords decisions, and of course nobody had any idea of the sheer numbers of Zulus facing them until late on.
The early reports were of Zulus in the 4,000 to 7,000 number, not 20,000.
@@lyndoncmp5751 what a shame you dont live near me,, as im sure we would have the most enjoyable discussion/ debate . with the appropriate beverages,, for hours,,, every boar in natal new the size strength of the zulu army, its fighting quality's, strengths, weaknesses, movement and supply capability, any mediocre intelligence officer would kno this,,, i agree chemsford was a complete armature, who only believed in british superiority, over lower breeds,, typical of the period,, exactly why wolseley changed everything, just in time for the boar war,, pauline and glyn were the same,, curling for example had never read a book on the art of war, i own and have fired at bisley my mk1 martini,, i can assure you 20,000 zulus, defending there homeland against a aggressor, armed with sticks is not enough to take on 5000 british soldiers if led correctly, at 400 yards its harder to miss a solid formation, chelmsford also gave orders of the day, at the start of the campaign, to fight in extended line, ordering 8 paces between files on the firing line, pauline did not need to follow this, if circumstances dictated otherwise,, its a lack of initiative, initiative was drummed out of officers and men in this period, then after learning the hard way, at ulundi he formed square, even tho zulus had at least 400 captured martinis, and lots of amo,, the odds of zulus against boars at blood river was similar, yet boars only had muzzle loaders,, rorks drift was a simple all round barricade, as was kambula,, evelyn wood was in command at kambula,, he was a professional, raised on hard earned merit, rare at that time, if the camp had been left to wood,, disaster avoided,, incidentally, average rounds expended per man at rorks drift was 30 per man,,, losses at rorks drift? odds zulu to red coat?,, expecting the camp to be moved at any time is no excuse when at war, enemy can attack at any time day or night, and the regulations of the day regarding pickets was very slip shod, and un professional, the reason woseley was dispatched asap to the cape, was we needed a professional on the scene, dont we just love the disasters more than the one sided knock overs, like the kaffir war, fought just a year before,,, at least the quality of officers had improved since the idiots in the crimea,,,
L c
Cheers for the invite. I think you may have misunderstood what I meant. What I was saying was that until late on Pulleine had no idea the main Zulu impi was in the hills to the north and northeast of the camp. Don't forget that Chelmsford went off early that morning towards the hills to the southeast to confront what was expected to be the vanguard of the main impi, based on the reports of the recon patrol which engaged about 2,000 Zulus the afternoon before.
There were vedettes in the hills near camp and they spotted Zulu movements in the hills to the northeast very early that morning. A bit later on Zulus even showed themselves on the escarpment north of camp. John Chard even saw them and he hurried back to Rorkes Drift.
However, the total number of these Zulus seen in the hills to the north and northeast were maximum estimate of 4,000 to 7,000.
When Durnfords men discovered the main impi of 20,000 men far beyond in the Ngwebeni Valley this information did not get back to Pulleine quickly. As far as Pulleine was concerned when the battle started at most he assumed he would only be engaging about 7,000. This is why none of his dispatches to Chelmsford showed any sign of panic, even after the battle started. The main Zulu force was still thought to be out near where Chelmsford was.
Had Pulleine known the full number of the Zulus advancing on the camp after midday he likely would have done things differently. Even if he didn't know the full numbers of Zulus he still likely would have defended tighter had Durnford not neglected to act on the defensive. As Snook explains, the British line was only kept out there extended because Durnford obliged Pulleine to support him and Durnford made that stand at the donga, one mile out from the camp. Had Durnford decided to make a stand closer to camp then Pulleine would have drawn his line in closer. We can see that by Pulleines preferred method of defence early that morning during the false alarm. Pulleine kept the 24ft Foot close to camp just in front of the tents. However, then Durnford arrived and upset the apple cart. He disregarded Pulleine's orders to act on the defensive and instead went on the attack. It all fell apart from there.
Im with Mike Snook in that had Durnford remained in camp to defend it then with his 250 mounted men, plus another near 150 other armed colonials and Imperial Mounted Infantry alongside the 6 companies of the 24th this would have given them nearly 1,000 rifles in a far more concentrated and compact field of fire and the camp may well have been successful. Durford could have defended the rear at the saddle (a small area) and the 6 infantry companies and the other colonials/IMI could have defended the front and north shoulder of the hill.
Cheers.
L c,
Id like to point out as well that unlike in the films, the Zulus were not running forward in one solid mass easy to fire into. At Isandlwana they were often going to ground in the long grass, crawling forward, making a rush, going to ground again etc etc. They also took cover in the many donga and dips.
Despite this, the 24th Foot was actually holding the Zulu chest at bay and were winning. It was out on the right flank where Durnford was where the battle turned. Durnford was too extended, he was being outflanked by the extreme of the Zulu left horn and his men ran out of ammo. All of a sudden Durnford had to withdraw and this caved in the right flank at a time the Zulu chest was being held at bay by the 24th.
Regarding the pickets and vedettes, they actually did their jobs. They spotted the Zulus at first light on the morning of the battle, or at least any Zulus within 4 miles of the camp. True, they did not spot the whole Zulu impi but then the Zulu impi only reached the Ngwebeni Valley late afternoon/evening the day before and it was soon dark. As I said, as soon as it was light the next day the outlying vedettes did report thousands of Zulus milling about in the hills to the north/northeast.
The Zulus did not get within 4 miles of the camp undetected. Durnfords men later found the main impi at midday, at rest and not intending to attack that day. The Zulus were as surprised as the British were.
@@lyndoncmp5751 totally agree,,, but the reconnaissance was poor, and not to the manual,, the main zulu army was able to encamp in its jump of positions 5 miles from the camp undetected, thats quite a journey from ulundi undetected,,for it to then watch half the british, force move of, south east, at approx 3am, gave them great joy and that is why the zulus chose to attack when they did,, chelmsofird instructed pauline to be redy to join him the next day,, paulines action regarding the safely of the now half strength camp were extreme poor, he should be ready to receive attack, at any minuet when on a war footing, when wolesley invaded ashanti land his scouts were over 10 miles in advance, and native scouts even further in advance, when not on the move they camped in a square, according to curling whos 2 guns were attached to the 24th had been with them for over 6 months, stood to arms along side the 24th at 7.30 am, and had breakfast with the 24th officers while troops were fighting on the north ridge, he noted "the company's were terribly under strength, with no more than 50 men per company",, yet pauline only sent half strength company's upto the ridge, to the north,, the other companys and half companys actually went back into camp to cook breakfast,, pauline also allowed the rocket battery to leave the camp, it was customary to not leave rocket batteries without infantry support, the zulu right horn would have outflanked the the camp even if the left was not, the dispositions and moments ordered by pauline were not of a soldier who new his profession,, durnford was under pauline, just look at woods dispositions at kampala,, and the simple all round barricade at rorks drift,, pauline once notified of 5 or 7000 zulus could and should have assumed it could be the main zulu army and made immediate dispositions to defend the camp, striking tents and forming square, not march troops away from it,, especially knowing in advance the zulu method of attack, forming of square was standard practice, and used by chelmsford at ulundi,, a square does not leave flanks hanging in the air, both flanks were open and both penetrated,, and my point is, incompetent commissioned upper class leaders,, cause the rank and file to suffer unnecessary losses,, your point regarding zulus not rushing headlong into a wall of lead, is so true, at 1 point the british line moved forward, as the zulus had found dead ground to take cover,, unlike british soldiers in ww1, who repeatedly walked into machine gun fire and barbed wire,, although against orders the zulu army did rush blindly onto the redoubt at kambula and suffered very heavy casualties, the boars with the army were horrified at the british dispositions regarding the camp,, isnt this subject addictive,, i would highly recommend the ashanti wars, the first invasion ended with the general loosing his head, literally, but wosleys campaign a few years later was a masterpiece, and if wolesley had been in command , the troops would have been home by xmas
Rob, just wanted to say a huge thank you to yourself and the contributors to the South Africa series, for such an engaging and informative view of the realities, detail and myths / misconceptions of Isandlwana. Really brought home how it is a combination of events and decisions that dictate the outcome of a battle!! Delighted to hear that the series is not over and that you will be moving on to the subject of Rorkes Drift.
Just one question, you mentioned that the NNC used carbines rather than Martini-Henry rifles - but what did they use? I read somewhere that they used the Westley Richards 'monkey tail' carbine, but as that source also quoted a lot of the misconceptions surrounding Isandlwana I was not sure if it was correct?
I believe that the mention re the NNC was "rifles".... it is somewhat unclear as to the firearms carried. They could have been Martinis or perhaps Swinburns like the NNMC. Ammunition commonality would have been, to a degree, desired.
Hello Steve, The NNC companies had 19 firearms amongst a theoretical 109 personnel. There were nine Europeans, three officers and six NCOs, who all carried the long M-H and a full allotment of ammunition. The 10 rifles carried by Africans were 5 x MH and 5 x Snider. They were given only a few rounds apiece due to the prevailing paranoia amongst settler society about arming Africans. We do not know whether there was a proper provision for them to scoop a couple of handfuls of extra rounds from bulk ammunition stocks on going into action. I imagine there was but we do not know for sure.
@@mikesnook9514 Thank you for taking the time to give some further detail, it is much appreciated!! This series has absolutely incredible.
@@britishmuzzleloaders Thank you Rob and for taking the time to reply, the series has really given me a much better understanding and cleared up some of the misconceptions I acquired from earlier histories, well done and keep up the great work. Can't wait for the next presentation!!
Very interesting Video and a nice escape from current events.
Thank you!
Simply excellent
Thank you!
isnt this channel simply brilliant,, looking forward to the next inkerman installment,, because of the time lapse between episodes, i have to start from the beginning each time,, same with this series,, so i end up watching part 1 about 6 times, lucky me,, the first series on isandlwana was fantastic,, as good as any book ive read,,
Thank you. Inkerman is still in production...
The 'Men of Harlech' scene in 'Zulu' may have been unhistorical, but it is an all time classic.
Haha! Beauty is in the eye of the beholder!
Most excellent
Cheers!
Outstanding, congratulations most Dapper and the good Colonel
Haha! Cheers, V.
Gunk buildup on cartridge cases from the leather bandolier makes sense. I stopped keeping .45 Colt in my cartridge belt for long periods because of that. If i had to wear a bandolier or cartridge belt, I would check the cartridges every morning and give them a good wipe to insure something like that wouldn't happen.
Hey, there were very few bandoliers in use... the MI and NNMC... all the infantry had Valise equipment.
@@britishmuzzleloaders Ah thats right. The bandoliers didn't become more prominent until the '80s-90s.
Nice video
Cheers
@@britishmuzzleloaders yes
May i recommend sir that you talk about artillery maybe just maybe thanks for your time
Joshua
The artillery is talked about as required in the remainder of the series. Not much to say really...
Apart from the initial bombardment on the escarpment and the slopes, it wasn't that effective. You can't cover much area when the 20,000 Zulus are spread out so much. Literally miles between horns.
Love your content, sir! Question: would you be able to share a source for a Snider Enfield 1* long rifle British buff sling? I've been searching for a while and can't find one that looks accurate. Thank You
Search for Shedtime Leather.
What Schlachtschule said...
@@britishmuzzleloaders this is Hugh Knight, Rob.
@@Schlachtschule Ah-ha!
Hi Rob
This was a great video as usual! I watched the whole thing! :)
Any chance you could list the titles of his books? Could you recommend some writings that would introduce a reader to the Zulu conflicts? Thank you again ! Stay healthy and keep up the tremendous content! Brent, VT USA
Hello Brent. The books were listed in Part One of the discussion at the beginning (3:24).
Oh jeez! Sorry I must have missed it! Appreciate it!
@@brentheathersimons7042 Not a problem. That's "Part 3E" not "Part One" of the whole series....
@@britishmuzzleloaders Gotcha! Thank you :)
donald morris, washing of the spears is the essential read, it also contains a history of the zulu nation, the curling letters gives an account from a subalterns view, he survived the battle, the memoirs of sir garnet wolesley, is very useful in understanding the british army and officer class and the troops of this period, this channel is also highly recommended,
:)
👍
Superb show.
Thank you!
Your not British
Rob is Canadian, Colonel Snook is British, you're illiterate. "You're."
Very clever.
Amazin!!!!!!!!!!!!
thanks for the series Brother! watched each 3 or 4 times now.
Epic and yup watched it about the same amount too😁😁😁
@@viperscot1 Great minds think alike....
Cheers!
Always enjoy these
Cheers!