26:16 is the explanation for how these guys actually think about everything They are looking at metaethics from the perspective of what would work best for their purposes, not trying to find out what is true, looking for what is useful
Hey Lance, this might be a bit off-topic, but I’m curious what you think of Peter Railton’s moral naturalism, where morality is roughly what an idealised version of ourselves would advise us to do. I remember you discussed this with Matthew Adelstein at some point and seemed to reject it pretty firmly. Why don’t you find it plausible?
(1) If moral facts depend on ideal agents I am not sure I would consider that a type of realism and (2) naturalism tends to furnish us with descriptive facts. Just take some set of natural facts and call some of them "moral." This has no bearing on what I have any interest in doing. So typically the issue I have with naturalist accounts is that they strike me as trivial. Some purport to give us a robust type of normativity, like Copp, who just put out a book. Guess I'd have to look at the specifics to see how compelling I would find that to be.
26:16 is the explanation for how these guys actually think about everything
They are looking at metaethics from the perspective of what would work best for their purposes, not trying to find out what is true, looking for what is useful
Hey Lance, this might be a bit off-topic, but I’m curious what you think of Peter Railton’s moral naturalism, where morality is roughly what an idealised version of ourselves would advise us to do. I remember you discussed this with Matthew Adelstein at some point and seemed to reject it pretty firmly. Why don’t you find it plausible?
(1) If moral facts depend on ideal agents I am not sure I would consider that a type of realism and (2) naturalism tends to furnish us with descriptive facts. Just take some set of natural facts and call some of them "moral." This has no bearing on what I have any interest in doing. So typically the issue I have with naturalist accounts is that they strike me as trivial. Some purport to give us a robust type of normativity, like Copp, who just put out a book. Guess I'd have to look at the specifics to see how compelling I would find that to be.