Regarding valuing the prerequisites for other values, a person in his comment section suggested a counterexample: "I couldn't possibly derive any value from chemotherapy, if cancer did not exist. Does that mean that I ought to value cancer?"
I think we might have a slippery slope where once people dont recognize thise values, or violated say property or dignity, then such a person may start to pose a threat to us.
This person seems to value avoiding contradictions, yet this notion that things contain the "property" of value _itself_ leads to contradictions. An example I like to use is as follows: Two people (Person A and Person B) live on adjacent properties in the middle of nowhere in Alaska. Person A has tons of firewood on their property. It's so much firewood, they couldn't use all of it in 7 lifetimes. This firewood is actually taking up space on their property, space they would prefer to utilize for other things. Person B, on the other hand, has no firewood on their property. Winter is coming and firewood is essential for survival in this situation. Both Person A and Person B are inclined toward survival. Person A feels negative value for much of their firewood. They would actually pay someone to take most of their firewood. Person B is in dire need of firewood and would pay a lot to acquire some, and so Person B feels positive value for this firewood. If value is a "property" that exists within the firewood, then this firewood on Person A's property simultaneously "has" positive and negative value. This makes it unclear exactly what value this firewood "has." Does it "have" both values simultaneously? We are still inclined to talk about the valuation of this firewood as it pertains to the needs of each individual. And this was a simple example using only 2 individuals. It gets wildly more complex when considering scenarios involving millions or billions of individuals in various contexts. Do things simultaneously "have" millions or billions of different values? (Shifting values, at that) And speaking of contexts, this idea that we "ought" to value the things categorically, that provide for, or give rise to other things we value, leads to complications as well, and runs into particularization issues. For example, I value (meaning: feel an attraction to) consuming specific amounts of caffeine because I have an inclination to have certain mental states supported by caffeine consumption. Caffeine is a stimulant. Caffeine is a compound. Is it the case that I "ought" to value all stimulants? Is it the case that I ought to value all "compounds"? Or just caffeine? I "ought" to value caffeine categorically? I value 200mg of caffeine, separated into 2 cups of coffee per day. Does that mean I also "ought" to value 200kg of caffeine? I would value 200kg of caffeine, in coffee form, when separated for consumption in individual cups of coffee not exceeding 2 per day. But I would not value 200kg of caffeine in my body all at once, as it would cause me much suffering and unalive me. So, I don't value caffeine categorically, I value specific amounts in particular contexts. _I_ value it. If my only option for the ingestion of caffeine was to consume 200kg all at once, I would not value it. There are also times when caffeine affects me in ways I do not like, and I need a break from it due to sensitivity. If a bag of coffee is in my cupboard prior to my period of sensitivity, and it is still there during my period of sensitivity, did the "property" of value it had before disappear (under the "property" view)? Or did it change? Did something about the coffee change or did something about me change? Such a strange view.
I love your example! and I think it is a good one...That said, the idea that one thing can have different properties given the context in which you find it doesn't seem all that wacky to me at all...some things are buoyant in honey but will sink in water. And I think that sort of analogy works better for my view...To say something has value is that it has the properties that allow it to fulfill a desire or fulfill a purpose for some conscious, desire having being...SUre there are tensions and problems...But i think there are going to be problems with conflicting desires no matter the theory. If I have your view right (and it might be similar to Lance's) then it seems like y'all may have defined the possibility of stance neutral/independent facts/normativity out of existence....Which could be an awesome way to go, It just isn't mine... If the only way value can exists place is when someone has an occurrent desire and is recognizing that desire and is conscious of the state of affairs that are leading to the desire being satisfied??? Then it is going to absolutely be impossible to come up with a stance independent conception of value, because it seems like y'all have defined 'value' as being stance dependent. Id ask you to consdier the possibility that maybe we sometimes think (and talk) about value as being a property of something such that it has the potential to satisfy one's desires if in the right circumstances...just like a cork is buoyant even if it isn't currently floating.
@@Philosofunkulist Thanks for the response! I think I agree with your basic point, and it is my position already, but I think it misses my greater point. I'll try to be clearer and break this into sections: 1. "...the idea that one thing can have different properties given the context in which you find it doesn't seem all that wacky to me at all..." Important note here: it's not "properties" in general, it's _properties of value_ with respect to the common semantic approach regarding agents, stances, and what can be observed of objects. 2. "...some things are buoyant in honey but will sink in water." That's how it seems to me too. This is a descriptive account of 'property' in which the constitution of a thing results in certain outcomes contingent upon the constitution of the things with which it comes into an effective proximity. We don't say that water's desire is satisfied or dissatisfied by the cork. And even if you wanted to phrase it that way, I think there are clearer, more accurate, and less confusing ways to describe this. 3. "To say something has value is that it has the properties that allow it to fulfill a desire or fulfill a purpose for some conscious, desire having being..." This is how many people _use_ words, I agree. Monetary value is an example. But I would ask you to engage with questions I asked in my OP (my example used coffee, but I'll refer to money here): does anything in the money itself change? When monetary value changes, what is the source/location of the change? When two people value money differently, is the money simultaneously two different things? 4. "SUre there are tensions and problems...But i think there are going to be problems with conflicting desires no matter the theory." What are the problems with explaining that people simply want what they want as unique agents, with the objects of their desire simply being what they are? 5. "...it seems like y'all may have defined the possibility of stance neutral/independent facts/normativity out of existence..." I'm not convinced we can define possibilities out of existence. But, if I take what you mean correctly, I don't think that is what we have done. I am just working with what people have claimed, assuming other particulars are agreed upon and granted, and proposing a description process that accounts more accurately for the source of things, preventing equivocation. I'll expand upon that more later (the eradication of moral normative language, which Lance does not agree with). 6. "If the only way value can exists place is when someone has an occurrent desire and is recognizing that desire and is conscious of the state of affairs that are leading to the desire being satisfied???" If I'm not mistaken, there are some typos here; I'm not confident that I understand this sentence completely. That said, I think someone can dispositionally value something. I still find more coherent semantic function in saying that the location of the valuation is in the agent. One way to put it is that if I feel thirsty then I feel attracted to water, but if I don't feel thirsty I am not attracted to water (dismissing other possibilities such as wanting to shower, or feeling inclined to put out a fire at that time, or whatever); however, the water itself does not change, as far as I can tell. The water is not attracted to me if I am thirsty. Likewise, the water is not me-phobic if I have rabies. I take the semantic application of value in the agent as being more accurate and less susceptible to equivocation. This is why I do not support the use of moral normative language by anti-realists. For example, Lance will say things are "good" when he simply means that he stance-dependently approves of them. In my view, this leads to equivocation, when not fully explained, due to the assumption of some others about stance-independent 'goods'. Why not just say 'I like that' rather than "that is good"? (Also, it's the same number of syllables when spoken, and the former even has one less letter, for writing considerations). 7. "Then it is going to absolutely be impossible to come up with a stance independent conception of value, because it seems like y'all have defined 'value' as being stance dependent." Again, I'm not convinced about the mere "defining" of things this way. I simply: a) do not see how objects themselves could _contain_ normative values; and, b) don't think using that language provides the greatest accuracy. Furthermore, even on your view, the concept of "value" is stance-dependent considering that a person is required for the thing to "have" that value. If anything, you are referring to things 'having' 'possible values given that some agent has a relevant desire'. That would still _depend_ on the stance of the agent. Also, I don't see a need for the possibility of a stance-independent concept of value. 8. "Id ask you to consdier the possibility that maybe we sometimes think (and talk) about value as being a property of something such that it has the potential to satisfy one's desires if in the right circumstances...just like a cork is buoyant even if it isn't currently floating." I don't think that "maybe" we think and talk this way, I recognize that many people _do_ think and talk this way due to historical and current sociolinguistic conventions. However, this is distinct from the concept of whether objects actually _contain_ or "have" value properties. This is a semantic vs actual distinction. That said, I am not convinced we can fully grasp the 'actual', but simply on the semantic, descriptive approach I find that using this linguistic process results in greater specificity with less equivocation potential. Someone could argue for some kind of pragmatic utility (such as a false religious teaching that might make someone less inclined to act in a way that someone wants to avoid), but I am not interested in that. We agree on the seeming epistemic reliability that, in our experience of our environment, corks (as we name them) are consistently made of a given category of materials such that, when they are placed within some spatial relation to other things, there is some consistent outcome. Floating is one outcome. If Alice likes seeing all things float, and does not like seeing anything sink, we can say that Alice likes seeing corks put into water, and does not like seeing steel put into water. Bob, on the other hand, likes the opposite. The _value_ of _liking_ floating here, with respect to Alice or Bob, is dependent on their respective stances. If at some point Bob's inclinations change, and he comes to like seeing things float, nothing about _floating_ changes. In order to talk about 'the value of floating', in this way, we would still need to refer to the stances of those specific individuals. So, why would we linguistically assign 'liking values' to the floating? In the initial scenario, floating simultaneously 'has' the values of 'liked' and 'disliked'? What does that do for us? We still need to specifically detail the respective stances of Alice and Bob. Finally, to complete the elaboration on my proposal to eradicate normative language, if I were to say "p is good" I would just mean _I like p._ To a realist, if I don't explain my anti-realist meaning, they might think I mean 'stance-independently good.' I don't mean that. "I like p," however, means _I like p._ To someone else, even if they are not a realist, they might think that by saying "x is good" I mean 'people should do p.' I don't mean that. I mean _I like p._ That said, I am not sure it is even possible for us to change our language entirely in this way, and I think I have even failed to do so myself in this response, at times. Hopefully I have stated this clearly.
@@cloudoftime Thanks so much for the thoughtful and awesome response...I think I'll likely be doing a video addressing Lance's watch-party-stream-critique and I think I'll touch on some of the comments/chat in that video. I think it could be of interest to some of the folks who watch my videos, to see some of the criticisms and my responses. I'll do my best to come back and address any of your comments that I don't touch on in that video. Either way, I really mean it when I say that I appreciate your comments and they gave me a ton to think about... I haven't thought about much of this stuff 20 years: what the hell my position actually is, how to explain it and/or what it would take to present a remotely compelling, remotely complete, remotely defensible account of that position... I'm used to presenting everything as a means to getting people think and talk and engage... and doing it for people with no background in philosophy....So I have a lot of learning/catching up to do, your comments are super helpful in that regard. I really do appreciate you taking the time to consider my response and share your thoughts. Thanks again.
@@Philosofunkulist Hey, I really like what you said here. I got a lot from this short engagement and enjoyed it. What you have said has instigated further thought within my own mind, and I will be thinking about it more (and questioning my own inclinations). I look forward to seeing your response video. Do you plan to have a discussion with Lance directly at all? It seems like he is open to that, if I am not mistaken.
Love the show. A suggestion is to watch the clips beforehand. Then just make your points once. There seems to be a lot of reptition (e.g. valued vs valuable)
I had a similar situation in university. Had a group project coding something in assembly language, it took us a few weeks to finish. In the end one line was wrong and it crashed the prof's test suite. 0 points lol.
This views seems really bizarre. I don’t value atoms, per se. And if I did value atoms, would I also have to value quantum fields?! Would this further imply I value all arrangements of excitations of all quantum fields??!!
31:22 why does it matter one way or the other if the debater knows what they are saying? The important thing is if they make good arguments. Chatgpt could make good arguments. It doesn't understand them though.
It matters *a lot*. Each of us has the potential to develop a well-integrated worldview, in which our views fit well with the rest of our views. If one externalizes and outsources all of their thinking to others and wields arguments like learned moves, one doesn't need to trouble themselves with whether these arguments are consistent with one another or stem from a common, holistic, well-integrated understanding of the world. Internalizing this way of engaging with others is a lazy approach that limits one's ability to learn, grow, and think effectively.
Agreed. I'm speaking from the standpoint of a viewer of a debate. Whether the interlocutors have an inner world or not seems irrelevant to what I'd get from the debate.
@@Rain-q8x I think that's shortsighted. When people don't understand the arguments they're presented they won't be able to respond well to questions in cross-examination, notice connections between other ideas, and so on. It's performative. Compare: Who is a better lecturer on history: someone who understands a historical period, or someone who is reciting history they read from a book? The former is better. The latter's understanding is rigid and they can't respond well to questions.
I take great offense to the claim that sunflower seeds are “not that great”. On several occasions I’ve bought 16oz bags of unsalted sunflower kernels and finished them within 1-2 days.
![BLACK BAG - Official Trailer [HD] - Only in Theaters March 14](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/Du0Xp8WX_7I/mqdefault.jpg)
Video actually starts at 49:09
@@Androide323 haha the stuff before isn't video lol
Lance, your very straight, level-headed, rational approach to these subjects has made things a lot clearer for me, and changed my views.
Hell yea!
Regarding valuing the prerequisites for other values, a person in his comment section suggested a counterexample:
"I couldn't possibly derive any value from chemotherapy, if cancer did not exist.
Does that mean that I ought to value cancer?"
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н Oof. That's a good one.
Kane B did a nut tier list. It'd be great if you had a discussion/debate where you hash out your different views on nuts.
@@samsklair4701 Wait really? I wonder if I saw that and forgot about it.
@@lanceindependentyeah I think it was like a year ago
Did it include Humer?
Water is valuable and therefore you are valuable... for your water. I was just watching Dune. Makes sense to me.
I have bad tinnitus too and use white noise / fans especially to sleep, surprised to hear you also suffer from it! rsad but relatable
On the subject of best foods, one of my favorite dishes I made last year was shaking beef
I've heard of that but don't know what it is.
19:26 I think the quote you're looking for is Bill O'Reilly quote "Fuck it, I'll do it live!"
This argument leads not only to an anti-choice position, but to an anti-contraception one. Wearing a rubber destroys a future value creator.
I think we might have a slippery slope where once people dont recognize thise values, or violated say property or dignity, then such a person may start to pose a threat to us.
This person seems to value avoiding contradictions, yet this notion that things contain the "property" of value _itself_ leads to contradictions. An example I like to use is as follows:
Two people (Person A and Person B) live on adjacent properties in the middle of nowhere in Alaska. Person A has tons of firewood on their property. It's so much firewood, they couldn't use all of it in 7 lifetimes. This firewood is actually taking up space on their property, space they would prefer to utilize for other things. Person B, on the other hand, has no firewood on their property. Winter is coming and firewood is essential for survival in this situation. Both Person A and Person B are inclined toward survival.
Person A feels negative value for much of their firewood. They would actually pay someone to take most of their firewood. Person B is in dire need of firewood and would pay a lot to acquire some, and so Person B feels positive value for this firewood.
If value is a "property" that exists within the firewood, then this firewood on Person A's property simultaneously "has" positive and negative value.
This makes it unclear exactly what value this firewood "has." Does it "have" both values simultaneously? We are still inclined to talk about the valuation of this firewood as it pertains to the needs of each individual.
And this was a simple example using only 2 individuals. It gets wildly more complex when considering scenarios involving millions or billions of individuals in various contexts. Do things simultaneously "have" millions or billions of different values? (Shifting values, at that)
And speaking of contexts, this idea that we "ought" to value the things categorically, that provide for, or give rise to other things we value, leads to complications as well, and runs into particularization issues. For example, I value (meaning: feel an attraction to) consuming specific amounts of caffeine because I have an inclination to have certain mental states supported by caffeine consumption. Caffeine is a stimulant. Caffeine is a compound. Is it the case that I "ought" to value all stimulants? Is it the case that I ought to value all "compounds"? Or just caffeine? I "ought" to value caffeine categorically? I value 200mg of caffeine, separated into 2 cups of coffee per day. Does that mean I also "ought" to value 200kg of caffeine? I would value 200kg of caffeine, in coffee form, when separated for consumption in individual cups of coffee not exceeding 2 per day. But I would not value 200kg of caffeine in my body all at once, as it would cause me much suffering and unalive me. So, I don't value caffeine categorically, I value specific amounts in particular contexts. _I_ value it. If my only option for the ingestion of caffeine was to consume 200kg all at once, I would not value it.
There are also times when caffeine affects me in ways I do not like, and I need a break from it due to sensitivity. If a bag of coffee is in my cupboard prior to my period of sensitivity, and it is still there during my period of sensitivity, did the "property" of value it had before disappear (under the "property" view)? Or did it change? Did something about the coffee change or did something about me change?
Such a strange view.
I love your example! and I think it is a good one...That said, the idea that one thing can have different properties given the context in which you find it doesn't seem all that wacky to me at all...some things are buoyant in honey but will sink in water. And I think that sort of analogy works better for my view...To say something has value is that it has the properties that allow it to fulfill a desire or fulfill a purpose for some conscious, desire having being...SUre there are tensions and problems...But i think there are going to be problems with conflicting desires no matter the theory.
If I have your view right (and it might be similar to Lance's) then it seems like y'all may have defined the possibility of stance neutral/independent facts/normativity out of existence....Which could be an awesome way to go, It just isn't mine...
If the only way value can exists place is when someone has an occurrent desire and is recognizing that desire and is conscious of the state of affairs that are leading to the desire being satisfied??? Then it is going to absolutely be impossible to come up with a stance independent conception of value, because it seems like y'all have defined 'value' as being stance dependent.
Id ask you to consdier the possibility that maybe we sometimes think (and talk) about value as being a property of something such that it has the potential to satisfy one's desires if in the right circumstances...just like a cork is buoyant even if it isn't currently floating.
@@Philosofunkulist Thanks for the response! I think I agree with your basic point, and it is my position already, but I think it misses my greater point. I'll try to be clearer and break this into sections:
1. "...the idea that one thing can have different properties given the context in which you find it doesn't seem all that wacky to me at all..."
Important note here: it's not "properties" in general, it's _properties of value_ with respect to the common semantic approach regarding agents, stances, and what can be observed of objects.
2. "...some things are buoyant in honey but will sink in water."
That's how it seems to me too. This is a descriptive account of 'property' in which the constitution of a thing results in certain outcomes contingent upon the constitution of the things with which it comes into an effective proximity. We don't say that water's desire is satisfied or dissatisfied by the cork. And even if you wanted to phrase it that way, I think there are clearer, more accurate, and less confusing ways to describe this.
3. "To say something has value is that it has the properties that allow it to fulfill a desire or fulfill a purpose for some conscious, desire having being..."
This is how many people _use_ words, I agree. Monetary value is an example. But I would ask you to engage with questions I asked in my OP (my example used coffee, but I'll refer to money here): does anything in the money itself change? When monetary value changes, what is the source/location of the change? When two people value money differently, is the money simultaneously two different things?
4. "SUre there are tensions and problems...But i think there are going to be problems with conflicting desires no matter the theory."
What are the problems with explaining that people simply want what they want as unique agents, with the objects of their desire simply being what they are?
5. "...it seems like y'all may have defined the possibility of stance neutral/independent facts/normativity out of existence..."
I'm not convinced we can define possibilities out of existence. But, if I take what you mean correctly, I don't think that is what we have done. I am just working with what people have claimed, assuming other particulars are agreed upon and granted, and proposing a description process that accounts more accurately for the source of things, preventing equivocation. I'll expand upon that more later (the eradication of moral normative language, which Lance does not agree with).
6. "If the only way value can exists place is when someone has an occurrent desire and is recognizing that desire and is conscious of the state of affairs that are leading to the desire being satisfied???"
If I'm not mistaken, there are some typos here; I'm not confident that I understand this sentence completely. That said, I think someone can dispositionally value something. I still find more coherent semantic function in saying that the location of the valuation is in the agent. One way to put it is that if I feel thirsty then I feel attracted to water, but if I don't feel thirsty I am not attracted to water (dismissing other possibilities such as wanting to shower, or feeling inclined to put out a fire at that time, or whatever); however, the water itself does not change, as far as I can tell. The water is not attracted to me if I am thirsty. Likewise, the water is not me-phobic if I have rabies. I take the semantic application of value in the agent as being more accurate and less susceptible to equivocation. This is why I do not support the use of moral normative language by anti-realists. For example, Lance will say things are "good" when he simply means that he stance-dependently approves of them. In my view, this leads to equivocation, when not fully explained, due to the assumption of some others about stance-independent 'goods'. Why not just say 'I like that' rather than "that is good"? (Also, it's the same number of syllables when spoken, and the former even has one less letter, for writing considerations).
7. "Then it is going to absolutely be impossible to come up with a stance independent conception of value, because it seems like y'all have defined 'value' as being stance dependent."
Again, I'm not convinced about the mere "defining" of things this way. I simply: a) do not see how objects themselves could _contain_ normative values; and, b) don't think using that language provides the greatest accuracy. Furthermore, even on your view, the concept of "value" is stance-dependent considering that a person is required for the thing to "have" that value. If anything, you are referring to things 'having' 'possible values given that some agent has a relevant desire'. That would still _depend_ on the stance of the agent.
Also, I don't see a need for the possibility of a stance-independent concept of value.
8. "Id ask you to consdier the possibility that maybe we sometimes think (and talk) about value as being a property of something such that it has the potential to satisfy one's desires if in the right circumstances...just like a cork is buoyant even if it isn't currently floating."
I don't think that "maybe" we think and talk this way, I recognize that many people _do_ think and talk this way due to historical and current sociolinguistic conventions. However, this is distinct from the concept of whether objects actually _contain_ or "have" value properties. This is a semantic vs actual distinction. That said, I am not convinced we can fully grasp the 'actual', but simply on the semantic, descriptive approach I find that using this linguistic process results in greater specificity with less equivocation potential. Someone could argue for some kind of pragmatic utility (such as a false religious teaching that might make someone less inclined to act in a way that someone wants to avoid), but I am not interested in that.
We agree on the seeming epistemic reliability that, in our experience of our environment, corks (as we name them) are consistently made of a given category of materials such that, when they are placed within some spatial relation to other things, there is some consistent outcome. Floating is one outcome. If Alice likes seeing all things float, and does not like seeing anything sink, we can say that Alice likes seeing corks put into water, and does not like seeing steel put into water. Bob, on the other hand, likes the opposite. The _value_ of _liking_ floating here, with respect to Alice or Bob, is dependent on their respective stances. If at some point Bob's inclinations change, and he comes to like seeing things float, nothing about _floating_ changes. In order to talk about 'the value of floating', in this way, we would still need to refer to the stances of those specific individuals. So, why would we linguistically assign 'liking values' to the floating? In the initial scenario, floating simultaneously 'has' the values of 'liked' and 'disliked'? What does that do for us? We still need to specifically detail the respective stances of Alice and Bob.
Finally, to complete the elaboration on my proposal to eradicate normative language, if I were to say "p is good" I would just mean _I like p._ To a realist, if I don't explain my anti-realist meaning, they might think I mean 'stance-independently good.' I don't mean that. "I like p," however, means _I like p._ To someone else, even if they are not a realist, they might think that by saying "x is good" I mean 'people should do p.' I don't mean that. I mean _I like p._
That said, I am not sure it is even possible for us to change our language entirely in this way, and I think I have even failed to do so myself in this response, at times.
Hopefully I have stated this clearly.
@@cloudoftime Thanks so much for the thoughtful and awesome response...I think I'll likely be doing a video addressing Lance's watch-party-stream-critique and I think I'll touch on some of the comments/chat in that video. I think it could be of interest to some of the folks who watch my videos, to see some of the criticisms and my responses.
I'll do my best to come back and address any of your comments that I don't touch on in that video.
Either way, I really mean it when I say that I appreciate your comments and they gave me a ton to think about... I haven't thought about much of this stuff 20 years: what the hell my position actually is, how to explain it and/or what it would take to present a remotely compelling, remotely complete, remotely defensible account of that position... I'm used to presenting everything as a means to getting people think and talk and engage... and doing it for people with no background in philosophy....So I have a lot of learning/catching up to do, your comments are super helpful in that regard.
I really do appreciate you taking the time to consider my response and share your thoughts.
Thanks again.
@@Philosofunkulist Hey, I really like what you said here. I got a lot from this short engagement and enjoyed it. What you have said has instigated further thought within my own mind, and I will be thinking about it more (and questioning my own inclinations).
I look forward to seeing your response video. Do you plan to have a discussion with Lance directly at all? It seems like he is open to that, if I am not mistaken.
@@cloudoftime Looks like that'll be happening...right...about now :)
Love the show. A suggestion is to watch the clips beforehand. Then just make your points once. There seems to be a lot of reptition (e.g. valued vs valuable)
Video starts 47:20.
I had a similar situation in university. Had a group project coding something in assembly language, it took us a few weeks to finish. In the end one line was wrong and it crashed the prof's test suite. 0 points lol.
Oof.
This views seems really bizarre. I don’t value atoms, per se. And if I did value atoms, would I also have to value quantum fields?!
Would this further imply I value all arrangements of excitations of all quantum fields??!!
31:22 why does it matter one way or the other if the debater knows what they are saying? The important thing is if they make good arguments. Chatgpt could make good arguments. It doesn't understand them though.
It matters *a lot*. Each of us has the potential to develop a well-integrated worldview, in which our views fit well with the rest of our views. If one externalizes and outsources all of their thinking to others and wields arguments like learned moves, one doesn't need to trouble themselves with whether these arguments are consistent with one another or stem from a common, holistic, well-integrated understanding of the world.
Internalizing this way of engaging with others is a lazy approach that limits one's ability to learn, grow, and think effectively.
Agreed. I'm speaking from the standpoint of a viewer of a debate. Whether the interlocutors have an inner world or not seems irrelevant to what I'd get from the debate.
@@Rain-q8x I think that's shortsighted. When people don't understand the arguments they're presented they won't be able to respond well to questions in cross-examination, notice connections between other ideas, and so on. It's performative.
Compare: Who is a better lecturer on history: someone who understands a historical period, or someone who is reciting history they read from a book?
The former is better. The latter's understanding is rigid and they can't respond well to questions.
Fair point.
Plan on getting him on the show for a chat?
yea
I'd love to see that discussion
I take great offense to the claim that sunflower seeds are “not that great”. On several occasions I’ve bought 16oz bags of unsalted sunflower kernels and finished them within 1-2 days.
I have too, but they're still not that great.
Lance, you are the best! Thank you for the thoughtful content.
I wonder if commenting about getting views will get more views.
His argument is wrong because it contains too many joe rogan references
"Argumentum ad Roganum"
This guy sounds like InspiringPhilosophy
Did you say you have 14/10 tentitis ? What is that ?
Tinnitus. It's ringing in the ears.
Is your view similar to emotivism?
Mine? A bit I suppose.