Reading Tim Cook, I came across a funny quote from a Canadian Arty officer during this time: "if 'fuck' and 'frontal' were removed from the military vocabulary, the Canadian army would have been both speechless and unable to attack." It really does speak to their rough experience in northern Europe.
Granatstein reported this quote in his book The Generals long ago - it was apparently inspired by Chris Vokes who really didn't seem to have much finesse on the Ortona/Moro River front in Italy.
Another absolutely outstanding presentation by WW2TV! I knew absolutely nothing about the Scheldt Campaign until Woody's brilliant series of programs about it.🎉
Had to catch up while in Turkey. As always, David, Mike, and Arthur's collective expertise on our Canadian Heroes is unsurpassed. Under manned, under-resourced, terrain and an enemy which in hindsight under appreciated. These three Canadian historians give us so much into the planning, leadership, and pure fighting capability of Canadian forces. Once again, excellently chaired.
These are three of my favourite historians! It's great to learn more about the operations of the Canadian army, which in the UK are not given enough coverage (as with most history which is not given enough focus or proper analysis).
Wow!! What a superb discussion, brilliantly co-ordinated too. If I may say two things as a Brit..... 1) I thought these three historians spoke quite superbly, typically Canadian trait (maybe British even too) of being so subjective and fair and not driven by national prestige motive. This for me increases immensely, the value of what they say. 2) I never understand why overall the Canadians should feel underappreciated here in the UK, though I do understand that the Scheldt battle was perhaps under-reported. Concurrently, I have read much about it. Overall however, the Canadian contribution was pivotal for determining the outcome in the west in both wars. Everyone with a military interest here in the UK fully acknowledges this. They were just superb.
Great presentation , I learned a lot about Scheldt and Walcharen Campaign. As usual Montgomery takes a lot of unwarranted blame I think though. The tough fight and heavy casaulties in Scheldt Campaign was bound to happen no matter what. They were inevitable. Breskens , Scheldt peninsula and Walcharen and Northern Beverlard were very well fortified even before D-Day and during 1944 summer and that was before entire 15th German Army ( more than seven German divisions almost 90.000 Germans ) was pursued , driven and cornered im Breskens pocket and Schelsdt peninsula in early September 1944. After that army cmdr Von Zagen evacuated 75.000 men or so over Beverland via causeways and ferries ( something incomprehensibly missed by Allied RAF , USAAF recon and interdiction) over into German occupied Holland , they still left 15.000 men in Scheldt as reargusrd with maybe hundreds of artillerey batteries and minefields both on ground and on sea at Scheldt channel that prevented Allied shipping. And even these reduced numbers delayed the capture of Scheldt till November and opening of Antwerp till December 1st. Even if 30th Corps cut Scheldt over Leopold canal , entire 15th German Army would not give up and surrender , they would either break out weakened 30th Corps lines at northern edges of Antwerp or evacuate as they actually did over Beverland to north and again leave a strong rear guard or even worse a stronger rear guard that could not be evacuated to Holland therefore delaying the clearing of Scheldt and opening of Antwerp further (more troops in a concentrated area , harder they resist unless their command demoralised and German generals of WWII espcially in 1944 were not British generals in Singapore and Tobruk 1942. Under Hitler's direct orders they fought to last man and bullet in Channel Ports to deny their capture and use by Allies) And everyone forgets the geography and topography that dictated the battle and course of the fight. With one narrow istmus and a few causeways linking the peninsula and Walcharen to mainland over a flat terrain , it is easy to defend a peninsula from landside since the attacking side had only one way to advance and the defence efforts could concentrate against them ( amphibious landings initiated at later stages of the Walcharen campaign) ver flat , waterlogged terrain under sea level most cases. It would be a close dirty close infantry combat no matter what and this time it was Canadians who were there at that sector at that time. The slackening in artillery shell supply was not Montgomery's fault , he was also providing shells for Allied drive and operations far in east against West Wall and Market Garden salient due to shell shortage from US manufacturers and suplliers that became more and more dire in 1944 fall and 21st Army Group had to ration and share artillery munitions and even battery firepower to support 1st US Army and 9th US Army especially in Geilenkirchen Salient. Besides , the malfunctioning of over 1400 British trucks due to a faulty piston design in 1944 summer , hampered British logistics a lot.
Top Drawer presentation from the three musketeers Arthur, Mike and David. The canadian effort in this phase of the war deserves more coverage than it has ever got. I learned more today and in the last week with the previous episodes than in my whole life. Please do a follow up episode we love it. If you like this please join and donate.
The Canadian government produced a history of the Canadian Army within three years of the end of the war, and a full 3 volume set about a decade later. Every regiment that fought on the Scheldt has published its own history, some regiments more than one. Denis Whitaker published a brilliant analysis of the campaign called Tug of War, Terry Copp included it in his Maple Leaf Route series, and more recent pop historians like Mark Zuehlke and Ted Barris have published books either devoted to it or inclusive of it. Jeffery Williams focused on it in his book The Long Left Flank. And there have been memoirs like Charlie Martin's "Battle Diary." That doesn't even count the excellent Dutch books like Autumn Gale or De Eerste Dam or Slagveld Sloedam. If you're referring to coverage from the German side, perhaps I'd be inclined to agree with you but as far as the Canadian experience - have you read any of the dozens of volumes already in print? What more do you feel needs to be said?
I got in a bit late to catch the end of this one, but went back to the beginning to view the rest. Thanks to all the participants, host included for a very astute discussion. My special thanks to Mike Bechtold for explaining why the causeway was so cratered when trying to hem in the 15th Army from escaping. I suppose no one ever imagined that it was going to end up as the avenue of advance for the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade. I now agree that holding the east bank and making any escaping Germans come to them would have been more likely to induce the enemy to surrender, which is a very Sun Tsu type approach: "Always leave an avenue of escape for your foe." As was mentioned though, too much pressure was on the taking of the island ASAP.
German forces on eastern Walcheren included two fortress battalions - these were static formations for defence. Not sure they would feel any need to go attacking off the island, especially since - as I showed in my own most recent video - the Atlantic Wall fortifications on South Beveland were all created pointing west to defend from an attack from that direction. And of course, the Germans knew that.
Very good chat show Thank You. I always fealt there was a great deal of blame to go round with Market Garden as Monty by no stretch of the imagination was responsible for all the planning. In particular the Airborne assault. The only person at SHEAF that wanted the Scheldt cleared as a top priority was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey RN. The other Commanders came to that opinion after Market Garden.
Robin Neillands covers this at some length in his book on the 1944 campaign. Monty notes his error in his Memoirs, in believing the Canadians could proceed alone; whilst Neillands goes in some length about the competing directives coming from Eisenhower. The result is that the Scheldt doesn't get the attention, and support, that it might had Eisenhower acted on the importance of Antwerp earlier. I'll admit, I didn't know much about the Scheldt campaign, but it was bravely fought and has been a privilege to learn more about the battle and the Canadians
the question remains-why was the air support so poor wrt walcheran island and the breskens pocket?the lack of spotter aircraft for the monitors is just deplorable.
Paul, is that a Toronto Maple Leafs jersey you're wearing? Pretty gutsy -- that's the team pretty well any hockey fans west of Ontario love to hate! (Although, since they haven't won the Stanley Cup since 1967, it's more like schadenfreude).
I do have a question: Did the British treat the Canadian forces in a tactile condescending fashion because they were "colonials?" This would be in regards to their expendability, not their combat effectiveness. I recall hearing someone share a soldiers account that he felt the Canadians were always given the worst combat missions, or something along those lines. Thank you.
I do have a question: Did the British treat the Canadian forces in a tacitly condescending fashion because they were "colonials?" This would be in regards to their expendability, not their combat effectiveness. I recall hearing someone share a soldiers account that he felt the Canadians were always given the worst combat missions, or something along those lines. Thank you.
It’s interesting that the manpower shortage in the Canadian Army is tied directly to the conscription policies of the McKenzie King administration. French Canada was overwhelmingly opposed to Conscription and the compromise the federal government made was to exclude conscripts from service overseas. There had been a serious threat of Quebec secession over conscription during WW1. Thus there were some 60,000 trained conscript infantry “defending” the West Coast or the East Coast of Canada while Canadian volunteers were dying during the Scheldt campaign. These conscripts who refused to volunteer to fight overseas were derisively termed Zombies by the rest of the Canadian Army.
Thanks again. About the weather I agree. You feel horrible already. Never understood why we Dutch decided this would be a nice place to settle in the past. 😂 Imagine being shelled and laying in the dirt and cold. Fighting a war.
monty definitely lost focus on logistics-this should have happened before market garden. according to horrocks , the 11th armoured still had 100km in their petrol tanks-the stop at antwerp is inexcusable
Tanks might still have gas but 11th Armored Division had very little or almost no infantry left to stretch further north after liberating Antwerp , its last infantry battalion still in city fighting to subdue enemy pockets of resistance on 4th September and Horrocks rear supply logistics line stretched almost 400 km from Seine to Antwerp ( according to his own memoirs A Soldiers Story) Tanks alone without infantry and artillery , could not stand alone well esp against a well executed and improvised breakout in which German Army excelled (as shown in Eastern Front and Falaise pocket)
16,000 arrived in early 1945, Stacey says they were assimilated well, but probably not needed as badly as originally thought as the Nijmegen Salient remained very quiet over the winter and the army had time to rest before the Rhineland campaign and the final operations on the far side of the Rhine.
Reading Tim Cook, I came across a funny quote from a Canadian Arty officer during this time: "if 'fuck' and 'frontal' were removed from the military vocabulary, the Canadian army would have been both speechless and unable to attack." It really does speak to their rough experience in northern Europe.
That’s a great anecdote. Typical of military dark humour.
Granatstein reported this quote in his book The Generals long ago - it was apparently inspired by Chris Vokes who really didn't seem to have much finesse on the Ortona/Moro River front in Italy.
Another absolutely outstanding presentation by WW2TV!
I knew absolutely nothing about the Scheldt Campaign until Woody's brilliant series of programs about it.🎉
Had to catch up while in Turkey.
As always, David, Mike, and Arthur's collective expertise on our Canadian Heroes is unsurpassed.
Under manned, under-resourced, terrain and an enemy which in hindsight under appreciated.
These three Canadian historians give us so much into the planning, leadership, and pure fighting capability of Canadian forces.
Once again, excellently chaired.
This was fascinating with such an amazingly knowledgeable panel. The First Canadian Army certainly had a tough time and should always be remembered.
Great show with these 3 guys! A lot of knowledge comes together.
I could listen to these three top historians talking with Woody for hours, brilliant stuff.
These are three of my favourite historians! It's great to learn more about the operations of the Canadian army, which in the UK are not given enough coverage (as with most history which is not given enough focus or proper analysis).
Fantastic discussion all around. Thank you gentlemen.
This is the most in depth discussion of the Canadian Army's Scheldt campaign that I've ever seen presented.
Great panel discussion! Thanks Woody!
Wow!! What a superb discussion, brilliantly co-ordinated too.
If I may say two things as a Brit.....
1) I thought these three historians spoke quite superbly, typically Canadian trait (maybe British even too) of being so subjective and fair and not driven by national prestige motive. This for me increases immensely, the value of what they say.
2) I never understand why overall the Canadians should feel underappreciated here in the UK, though I do understand that the Scheldt battle was perhaps under-reported. Concurrently, I have read much about it. Overall however, the Canadian contribution was pivotal for determining the outcome in the west in both wars. Everyone with a military interest here in the UK fully acknowledges this. They were just superb.
Woody a fascinating panel discussion, learn a lot about the whole Scheldt battle from the various presentation. Key up the excellent work
Great presentation , I learned a lot about Scheldt and Walcharen Campaign. As usual Montgomery takes a lot of unwarranted blame I think though. The tough fight and heavy casaulties in Scheldt Campaign was bound to happen no matter what. They were inevitable. Breskens , Scheldt peninsula and Walcharen and Northern Beverlard were very well fortified even before D-Day and during 1944 summer and that was before entire 15th German Army ( more than seven German divisions almost 90.000 Germans ) was pursued , driven and cornered im Breskens pocket and Schelsdt peninsula in early September 1944. After that army cmdr Von Zagen evacuated 75.000 men or so over Beverland via causeways and ferries ( something incomprehensibly missed by Allied RAF , USAAF recon and interdiction) over into German occupied Holland , they still left 15.000 men in Scheldt as reargusrd with maybe hundreds of artillerey batteries and minefields both on ground and on sea at Scheldt channel that prevented Allied shipping. And even these reduced numbers delayed the capture of Scheldt till November and opening of Antwerp till December 1st. Even if 30th Corps cut Scheldt over Leopold canal , entire 15th German Army would not give up and surrender , they would either break out weakened 30th Corps lines at northern edges of Antwerp or evacuate as they actually did over Beverland to north and again leave a strong rear guard or even worse a stronger rear guard that could not be evacuated to Holland therefore delaying the clearing of Scheldt and opening of Antwerp further (more troops in a concentrated area , harder they resist unless their command demoralised and German generals of WWII espcially in 1944 were not British generals in Singapore and Tobruk 1942. Under Hitler's direct orders they fought to last man and bullet in Channel Ports to deny their capture and use by Allies)
And everyone forgets the geography and topography that dictated the battle and course of the fight. With one narrow istmus and a few causeways linking the peninsula and Walcharen to mainland over a flat terrain , it is easy to defend a peninsula from landside since the attacking side had only one way to advance and the defence efforts could concentrate against them ( amphibious landings initiated at later stages of the Walcharen campaign) ver flat , waterlogged terrain under sea level most cases. It would be a close dirty close infantry combat no matter what and this time it was Canadians who were there at that sector at that time.
The slackening in artillery shell supply was not Montgomery's fault , he was also providing shells for Allied drive and operations far in east against West Wall and Market Garden salient due to shell shortage from US manufacturers and suplliers that became more and more dire in 1944 fall and 21st Army Group had to ration and share artillery munitions and even battery firepower to support 1st US Army and 9th US Army especially in Geilenkirchen Salient. Besides , the malfunctioning of over 1400 British trucks due to a faulty piston design in 1944 summer , hampered British logistics a lot.
Top Drawer presentation from the three musketeers Arthur, Mike and David. The canadian effort in this phase of the war deserves more coverage than it has ever got.
I learned more today and in the last week with the previous episodes than in my whole life.
Please do a follow up episode we love it.
If you like this please join and donate.
The Canadian government produced a history of the Canadian Army within three years of the end of the war, and a full 3 volume set about a decade later. Every regiment that fought on the Scheldt has published its own history, some regiments more than one. Denis Whitaker published a brilliant analysis of the campaign called Tug of War, Terry Copp included it in his Maple Leaf Route series, and more recent pop historians like Mark Zuehlke and Ted Barris have published books either devoted to it or inclusive of it. Jeffery Williams focused on it in his book The Long Left Flank. And there have been memoirs like Charlie Martin's "Battle Diary." That doesn't even count the excellent Dutch books like Autumn Gale or De Eerste Dam or Slagveld Sloedam. If you're referring to coverage from the German side, perhaps I'd be inclined to agree with you but as far as the Canadian experience - have you read any of the dozens of volumes already in print? What more do you feel needs to be said?
I got in a bit late to catch the end of this one, but went back to the beginning to view the rest. Thanks to all the participants, host included for a very astute discussion. My special thanks to Mike Bechtold for explaining why the causeway was so cratered when trying to hem in the 15th Army from escaping. I suppose no one ever imagined that it was going to end up as the avenue of advance for the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade. I now agree that holding the east bank and making any escaping Germans come to them would have been more likely to induce the enemy to surrender, which is a very Sun Tsu type approach: "Always leave an avenue of escape for your foe." As was mentioned though, too much pressure was on the taking of the island ASAP.
German forces on eastern Walcheren included two fortress battalions - these were static formations for defence. Not sure they would feel any need to go attacking off the island, especially since - as I showed in my own most recent video - the Atlantic Wall fortifications on South Beveland were all created pointing west to defend from an attack from that direction. And of course, the Germans knew that.
Wished I had caught this live
hi midi this is a good one
Very good chat show Thank You. I always fealt there was a great deal of blame to go round with Market Garden as Monty by no stretch of the imagination was responsible for all the planning. In particular the Airborne assault. The only person at SHEAF that wanted the Scheldt cleared as a top priority was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey RN. The other Commanders came to that opinion after Market Garden.
An interesting idea for your 1944 series could be the manpower crisis of all the powers.
I’m undecided on market garden, but I do believe it was an error not to properly resource the Scheldt campaign properly
Robin Neillands covers this at some length in his book on the 1944 campaign. Monty notes his error in his Memoirs, in believing the Canadians could proceed alone; whilst Neillands goes in some length about the competing directives coming from Eisenhower.
The result is that the Scheldt doesn't get the attention, and support, that it might had Eisenhower acted on the importance of Antwerp earlier.
I'll admit, I didn't know much about the Scheldt campaign, but it was bravely fought and has been a privilege to learn more about the battle and the Canadians
the question remains-why was the air support so poor wrt walcheran island and the breskens pocket?the lack of spotter aircraft for the monitors is just deplorable.
Paul, is that a Toronto Maple Leafs jersey you're wearing? Pretty gutsy -- that's the team pretty well any hockey fans west of Ontario love to hate! (Although, since they haven't won the Stanley Cup since 1967, it's more like schadenfreude).
I was wearing an Ipswich Town hoodie
It's also the team those of us to the east of Toronto love to hate :)
I do have a question: Did the British treat the Canadian forces in a tactile condescending fashion because they were "colonials?" This would be in regards to their expendability, not their combat effectiveness.
I recall hearing someone share a soldiers account that he felt the Canadians were always given the worst combat missions, or something along those lines.
Thank you.
I do have a question: Did the British treat the Canadian forces in a tacitly condescending fashion because they were "colonials?" This would be in regards to their expendability, not their combat effectiveness.
I recall hearing someone share a soldiers account that he felt the Canadians were always given the worst combat missions, or something along those lines.
Thank you.
It’s interesting that the manpower shortage in the Canadian Army is tied directly to the conscription policies of the McKenzie King administration. French Canada was overwhelmingly opposed to Conscription and the compromise the federal government made was to exclude conscripts from service overseas. There had been a serious threat of Quebec secession over conscription during WW1. Thus there were some 60,000 trained conscript infantry “defending” the West Coast or the East Coast of Canada while Canadian volunteers were dying during the Scheldt campaign. These conscripts who refused to volunteer to fight overseas were derisively termed Zombies by the rest of the Canadian Army.
Thanks again.
About the weather I agree. You feel horrible already. Never understood why we Dutch decided this would be a nice place to settle in the past. 😂
Imagine being shelled and laying in the dirt and cold. Fighting a war.
monty definitely lost focus on logistics-this should have happened before market garden. according to horrocks , the 11th armoured still had 100km in their petrol tanks-the stop at antwerp is inexcusable
Tanks might still have gas but 11th Armored Division had very little or almost no infantry left to stretch further north after liberating Antwerp , its last infantry battalion still in city fighting to subdue enemy pockets of resistance on 4th September and Horrocks rear supply logistics line stretched almost 400 km from Seine to Antwerp ( according to his own memoirs A Soldiers Story) Tanks alone without infantry and artillery , could not stand alone well esp against a well executed and improvised breakout in which German Army excelled (as shown in Eastern Front and Falaise pocket)
how many canadian refusniks were actually transported to europe to fill the gaps in 1st canadian army?
16,000 arrived in early 1945, Stacey says they were assimilated well, but probably not needed as badly as originally thought as the Nijmegen Salient remained very quiet over the winter and the army had time to rest before the Rhineland campaign and the final operations on the far side of the Rhine.