தமிழ் மக்கள் npp யை ஆதரித்த பிறகு மக்கள் ஆனையை கேள்வி கேட்க நீங்கள் யார்🤐🤐 உங்கள் அரசியல் நலன்களுக்காக ஒற்றுமையாக வாழும் எங்களிடம் பிரிவினை வாதத்தை விதைக்காதிர்கள் 🙏🙏🙏
ஊழலற்ற எல்லோருக்கும் மதிப்பான வாழ்க்கை அமைந்தால் மகிழ்ச்சியாக ஏற்றுக்கொள்வோம் இது தான் இன்றைய யாதார்தமான உண்மை நீங்களும் தமிழகத்தை மாற்றி ஊழலற்ற தமிழ்நாடாக மாற்ற முயற்சியுங்கள்
மக்கள் பட்டினிச் சாவை எதிர்கொள்ளும் போது அவர்களுக்கு தேவை பொருளாதார சமத்துவம் அனைவருக்கு வேலைவாய்ப்பு கிட்டவேண்டும் என இளைஞர்கள் விரும்பு வதன் பலன்தான் இன்றைய தமிழ் வாக்குக்கள் அவர்களுக்குக் கிடைத்தமைக்கான காரணம்.
பல ஆண்டுகளாக பல அரசியல் கட்சிகள் போட்டியிட்ட போதும் தமிழ் கட்சிகளுக்கு மட்டும் வாக்களித்த தமிழ் மக்கள் அனைவரும் இம்முறை மயக்கத்தில் இருக்கிறார்கள் நீங்கள் மட்டும் தெளிவாக இருக்கிறீர்கள் அல்லவா😅😅😅😅😅😅
தமிழர்கள் ஆதரிக்கமலே அனுர பெரும்பான்மையுடன் வென்றிருப்பார். தமிழ்நாட்டில் தமிழ் தேசியத்தை , தமிழ் உணர்வு கொண்ட தமிழ் தலைவர்களை ஆட்சிக்கு வந்தால் மட்டுமே , தமிழ் ஆய்வாளர்கள் , தமிழ் தலைவர்கள் இலங்கைத் தமிழர்களுக்கு ஆலோசனை வழங்கலாம் , அல்லது தமிழ் தேசியத்தை அமைக்க ஊக்கப்படுத்தலாம்.
When Dixit explained the wide gap between Tamil aspirations and what Sinhalese-dominated governments were prepared to offer, Bhandari chided him "for not having a positive attitude". "The punchline in his admonition," Dixit writes, was that "I must not function in the mindset of Indira Gandhi and G. Parthasarathy period" (page 42). Dixit makes a telling comment about Bhandari's monumental ignorance about Tamil leaders and even Tamil names. New Delhi had prepared a "non-paper", to be used as a basis for further negotiations between Colombo and Tamil groups. Copies of the "non-paper" were to be given to both sides. In the course of a conversation, Bhandari told Dixit: "Mani, as soon as you reach Colombo, hand over the documents to Chelvanayakam." "I pointed out that Chelvanayakam had died two decades ago. So handing over the papers to him would not be possible. I said perhaps he meant I must hand over the paper to Dr. N. Thiruchalvam. Bhandari was impatient. He said, "Mani, give the paper to Chelvanayakam, Thiruchalvam, whosoever it is. All these South Indian names are confusing." With Bhandari at the helm of affairs in South Block, no wonder the Thimpu talks ended in a fiasco. Dixit's narration of the background to the Accord is revealing. Attempts made by New Delhi to narrow down the differences between Colombo and the Tamil groups could not make much headway because of the intransigence of both sides. Colombo did not entertain any proposal that would change the unitary character of the Constitution, and the Tamil organisations, especially the LTTE, vetoed one proposal after another. New Delhi's determination not to permit Colombo to solve the ethnic problem through military means and the possible effects of the "fall of Jaffna" on Tamil Nadu and on Centre-State relations were key considerations as far as India was concerned. Attempts made by Sri Lanka to internationalise the ethnic conflict and encourage the involvement of external powers was an example of cutting one's nose to spite one's face. Finally, when the moment of reckoning came in May-June 1987, no external power lifted a finger against India. The demoralisation within the Sri Lankan armed forces and the increasing despair all around compelled Colombo to sign the India-Sri Lanka Agreement. Dixit refers to a conversation that he had with J.R. Jayewardene's wife during the course of which she asked whether Rajiv Gandhi "would ensure the safety of the President and his continuation in power" if he faced the danger of "being overthrown" (page 135). In the final chapter, "Why did India fail?", Dixit admits that he "overestimated the sincerity and the political will of Jayewardene to come to a genuine compromise with the Tamils with the help of the Government of India". Dixit says that his assessment that Jayewardene "will be decisive in neutralising Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali and their policies against Tamils and the Agreement also proved wrong" (pages 344-45). The conflicting and contradictory views among the higher echelons of the government in New Delhi exacerbated problems in the post-Accord period. According the Dixit, General K. Sundarji, the Chief of the Army Staff, underestimated Prabakaran's qualities of leadership and his determination to fight a prolonged war to attain the goal of Tamil Eelam. Dixit's version of General Sundarji's assessment need to be highlighted: "Rajiv Gandhi asked the then Chief of Army Staff General K. Sundarji what his assessment was. The General's reply was that once the LTTE endorsed the Agreement, they would not have the wherewithal to go back and confront India or the Sri Lankan Government. He went on to say that if the LTTE decided to take on India and Sri Lanka militarily, Indian armed forces would be able to neutralise them militarily within two weeks" (page 156). The fact was, as Dixit puts it, the Army brass did not consider any contingency plans to be put to work in case the LTTE did not cooperate and resorted to an armed struggle. The smug assumption was that "there was no expectation that India would have to undertake a large scale military intervention in Sri Lanka to enforce the Agreement" (page 156). How did RAW view the LTTE? S.E. Joshi, Secretary of RAW, who was due to retire soon, "was cautious". He explained that the "LTTE was not a trustworthy organisation and the Agreement in a manner went against their high flown demand for Eelam." Only External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao introduced a note of caution. When the draft Agreement was shown to Narasimha Rao, he told Dixit that India "should not rush" into it. Secondly, he said that India should consider carefully the wisdom of being a direct signatory to the Agreement. He wanted the Agreement to be signed between Colombo and the Tamils and suggested that "we just be the guarantors". Thirdly, he suggested that India assess carefully the motivations of various parties to find out whether it was based "on a genuine desire for peace" or whether it was "only a tactical move" (pages 119-20). Above all, India's Sri Lanka policy got derailed because New Delhi did not make a correct assessment of the LTTE. During the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Bangalore, it was evident that Prabakaran was unhappy with the peace process. Equally important was his uncompromising commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam. The sudden shifts in the LTTE's stance on several occasions can be understood only if one keeps in mind the fact that the LTTE undertakes negotiations only as a matter of strategy; it would take a step backward only to consolidate itself and later leap forward. In New Delhi, Prabakaran was taken aback when he was confronted with the fait accompli of the Accord. He wanted a chance to put his demands to Rajiv Gandhi and his hope was that "he would be allowed to negotiate with Jayewardene and finalise the Agreement" (page 147). According to Dixit, Rajiv Gandhi persuaded Prabakaran "to go along with the Agreement even if he did not formally endorse it" (page 150). Rajiv Gandhi was convinced that with the endorsement of the Agreement by the Tamil Nadu Government, New Delhi should not be obstructed in its effort to bring back peace and normalcy to Sri Lanka. WITH the benefit of hindsight, Dixit makes a correct assessment of the LTTE: "One over-arching miscalculation of India was our under-estimating Prabakaran's passionate, even obsessive, commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam, his authoritarian and single minded nature, his tactical cleverness and his resilience in adversity. The second miscalculation about him and his cadres was that India and Sri Lanka together could persuade other Tamil groups and the Tamil population in general to join the mainstream of democratic politics bypassing the LTTE" (page 343). One disappointing aspect about the book relates to innumerable spelling mistakes and factual errors. Names of Sri Lankan leaders, Sinhalese and Tamil, are sometimes spelt wrongly. As for factual errors, a few are cited here: Alfred Duriappa was killed by the LTTE in 1975, not 1978 (page 12); Sinhalese constitute 74 per cent of the population, not 85 per cent (page 13); there are no Sinhalese Tamils in Sri Lanka (page 21); EPRLF is not Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Forum (page 27); Indian Tamils were rendered stateless in the late 1940s, not 1950s (page 71); Quakers are referred to as "Quackers" (page 74) and Pongal is not Tamil New Year Day, but a harvest festival (page
Srilanhan's issue should solve by us not by un palastine problem not solve by un india only messup tamil's problem go n study about caatalonia issue don't bluff
தமிழ் மக்கள் npp யை ஆதரித்த பிறகு மக்கள் ஆனையை கேள்வி கேட்க நீங்கள் யார்🤐🤐
உங்கள் அரசியல் நலன்களுக்காக ஒற்றுமையாக வாழும் எங்களிடம் பிரிவினை வாதத்தை விதைக்காதிர்கள்
🙏🙏🙏
ஊழலற்ற எல்லோருக்கும் மதிப்பான வாழ்க்கை அமைந்தால் மகிழ்ச்சியாக ஏற்றுக்கொள்வோம் இது தான் இன்றைய யாதார்தமான உண்மை நீங்களும் தமிழகத்தை மாற்றி ஊழலற்ற தமிழ்நாடாக மாற்ற முயற்சியுங்கள்
Aatchiil irupathu anura India பதிமூன்றை மறந்துவிட வேண்டும்
Srilankan Tamils will be happy & peaceful... No need for discussion by Indian Tamils.
That's correct .Thank you for your comment.
AKD’s party will be continue grow and peaceful Tamil and singalee in one nation be get long time wonderful lifetime.
மக்கள் பட்டினிச் சாவை எதிர்கொள்ளும் போது அவர்களுக்கு தேவை பொருளாதார சமத்துவம் அனைவருக்கு வேலைவாய்ப்பு கிட்டவேண்டும் என இளைஞர்கள் விரும்பு வதன் பலன்தான் இன்றைய தமிழ் வாக்குக்கள் அவர்களுக்குக் கிடைத்தமைக்கான காரணம்.
பல ஆண்டுகளாக பல அரசியல் கட்சிகள் போட்டியிட்ட போதும் தமிழ் கட்சிகளுக்கு மட்டும் வாக்களித்த தமிழ் மக்கள் அனைவரும் இம்முறை மயக்கத்தில் இருக்கிறார்கள் நீங்கள் மட்டும் தெளிவாக இருக்கிறீர்கள் அல்லவா😅😅😅😅😅😅
Mr. Thiyagu we Sri Lankan tamils are capable of looking after ourselves. Please look after poor tamils in India.
😀
Its people power of victory
I am ĵaffna tamil .we voted npp and we will be happy and peace full. Don't talk racism.
தமிழர்கள் ஆதரிக்கமலே அனுர பெரும்பான்மையுடன் வென்றிருப்பார். தமிழ்நாட்டில் தமிழ் தேசியத்தை , தமிழ் உணர்வு கொண்ட தமிழ் தலைவர்களை ஆட்சிக்கு வந்தால் மட்டுமே , தமிழ் ஆய்வாளர்கள் , தமிழ் தலைவர்கள் இலங்கைத் தமிழர்களுக்கு ஆலோசனை வழங்கலாம் , அல்லது தமிழ் தேசியத்தை அமைக்க ஊக்கப்படுத்தலாம்.
When Dixit explained the wide gap between Tamil aspirations and what Sinhalese-dominated governments were prepared to offer, Bhandari chided him "for not having a positive attitude". "The punchline in his admonition," Dixit writes, was that "I must not function in the mindset of Indira Gandhi and G. Parthasarathy period" (page 42). Dixit makes a telling comment about Bhandari's monumental ignorance about Tamil leaders and even Tamil names. New Delhi had prepared a "non-paper", to be used as a basis for further negotiations between Colombo and Tamil groups. Copies of the "non-paper" were to be given to both sides. In the course of a conversation, Bhandari told Dixit: "Mani, as soon as you reach Colombo, hand over the documents to Chelvanayakam." "I pointed out that Chelvanayakam had died two decades ago. So handing over the papers to him would not be possible. I said perhaps he meant I must hand over the paper to Dr. N. Thiruchalvam. Bhandari was impatient. He said, "Mani, give the paper to Chelvanayakam, Thiruchalvam, whosoever it is. All these South Indian names are confusing." With Bhandari at the helm of affairs in South Block, no wonder the Thimpu talks ended in a fiasco.
Dixit's narration of the background to the Accord is revealing. Attempts made by New Delhi to narrow down the differences between Colombo and the Tamil groups could not make much headway because of the intransigence of both sides. Colombo did not entertain any proposal that would change the unitary character of the Constitution, and the Tamil organisations, especially the LTTE, vetoed one proposal after another. New Delhi's determination not to permit Colombo to solve the ethnic problem through military means and the possible effects of the "fall of Jaffna" on Tamil Nadu and on Centre-State relations were key considerations as far as India was concerned. Attempts made by Sri Lanka to internationalise the ethnic conflict and encourage the involvement of external powers was an example of cutting one's nose to spite one's face. Finally, when the moment of reckoning came in May-June 1987, no external power lifted a finger against India. The demoralisation within the Sri Lankan armed forces and the increasing despair all around compelled Colombo to sign the India-Sri Lanka Agreement. Dixit refers to a conversation that he had with J.R. Jayewardene's wife during the course of which she asked whether Rajiv Gandhi "would ensure the safety of the President and his continuation in power" if he faced the danger of "being overthrown" (page 135).
In the final chapter, "Why did India fail?", Dixit admits that he "overestimated the sincerity and the political will of Jayewardene to come to a genuine compromise with the Tamils with the help of the Government of India". Dixit says that his assessment that Jayewardene "will be decisive in neutralising Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali and their policies against Tamils and the Agreement also proved wrong" (pages 344-45).
The conflicting and contradictory views among the higher echelons of the government in New Delhi exacerbated problems in the post-Accord period. According the Dixit, General K. Sundarji, the Chief of the Army Staff, underestimated Prabakaran's qualities of leadership and his determination to fight a prolonged war to attain the goal of Tamil Eelam. Dixit's version of General Sundarji's assessment need to be highlighted: "Rajiv Gandhi asked the then Chief of Army Staff General K. Sundarji what his assessment was. The General's reply was that once the LTTE endorsed the Agreement, they would not have the wherewithal to go back and confront India or the Sri Lankan Government. He went on to say that if the LTTE decided to take on India and Sri Lanka militarily, Indian armed forces would be able to neutralise them militarily within two weeks" (page 156). The fact was, as Dixit puts it, the Army brass did not consider any contingency plans to be put to work in case the LTTE did not cooperate and resorted to an armed struggle. The smug assumption was that "there was no expectation that India would have to undertake a large scale military intervention in Sri Lanka to enforce the Agreement" (page 156).
How did RAW view the LTTE? S.E. Joshi, Secretary of RAW, who was due to retire soon, "was cautious". He explained that the "LTTE was not a trustworthy organisation and the Agreement in a manner went against their high flown demand for Eelam."
Only External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao introduced a note of caution. When the draft Agreement was shown to Narasimha Rao, he told Dixit that India "should not rush" into it. Secondly, he said that India should consider carefully the wisdom of being a direct signatory to the Agreement. He wanted the Agreement to be signed between Colombo and the Tamils and suggested that "we just be the guarantors". Thirdly, he suggested that India assess carefully the motivations of various parties to find out whether it was based "on a genuine desire for peace" or whether it was "only a tactical move" (pages 119-20).
Above all, India's Sri Lanka policy got derailed because New Delhi did not make a correct assessment of the LTTE. During the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Bangalore, it was evident that Prabakaran was unhappy with the peace process. Equally important was his uncompromising commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam. The sudden shifts in the LTTE's stance on several occasions can be understood only if one keeps in mind the fact that the LTTE undertakes negotiations only as a matter of strategy; it would take a step backward only to consolidate itself and later leap forward. In New Delhi, Prabakaran was taken aback when he was confronted with the fait accompli of the Accord. He wanted a chance to put his demands to Rajiv Gandhi and his hope was that "he would be allowed to negotiate with Jayewardene and finalise the Agreement" (page 147). According to Dixit, Rajiv Gandhi persuaded Prabakaran "to go along with the Agreement even if he did not formally endorse it" (page 150). Rajiv Gandhi was convinced that with the endorsement of the Agreement by the Tamil Nadu Government, New Delhi should not be obstructed in its effort to bring back peace and normalcy to Sri Lanka.
WITH the benefit of hindsight, Dixit makes a correct assessment of the LTTE: "One over-arching miscalculation of India was our under-estimating Prabakaran's passionate, even obsessive, commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam, his authoritarian and single minded nature, his tactical cleverness and his resilience in adversity. The second miscalculation about him and his cadres was that India and Sri Lanka together could persuade other Tamil groups and the Tamil population in general to join the mainstream of democratic politics bypassing the LTTE" (page 343).
One disappointing aspect about the book relates to innumerable spelling mistakes and factual errors. Names of Sri Lankan leaders, Sinhalese and Tamil, are sometimes spelt wrongly. As for factual errors, a few are cited here: Alfred Duriappa was killed by the LTTE in 1975, not 1978 (page 12); Sinhalese constitute 74 per cent of the population, not 85 per cent (page 13); there are no Sinhalese Tamils in Sri Lanka (page 21); EPRLF is not Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Forum (page 27); Indian Tamils were rendered stateless in the late 1940s, not 1950s (page 71); Quakers are referred to as "Quackers" (page 74) and Pongal is not Tamil New Year Day, but a harvest festival (page
Leave us alone ,Thank you.
Why these people are worried?
இலங்கை மக்கள் தீர்மானிப்பார்கள்.
நமக்கு வேலை இல்லை.
பதிமூன்றுபற்றி இனியரும் பேசாதே
ARUMAISAGOTHARAR THIYAGU SOLLUVADHU 1OO% ALLA 1OOO% UNMAI
கஜேந்திரகுமார் 😂
Srilanhan's issue should solve by us not by un palastine problem not solve by un india only messup tamil's problem go n study about caatalonia issue don't bluff