I a loving this campaign series you guys are doing! Fabulous work! I'm looking forward to the completion of this one, and already looking forward to the next one!
"Ah yes, I've just finished landing my massive army on this narrow, swampy peninsula. Surely nothing bad is going to happen that will slow me down." On a more serious note though, I could understand getting intel about terrain wrong about another country, but how do you not know what the terrain and roads are like in an area that was part of your own nation until just a year ago?
Well, to be fair, later on in the campaign, Lee and his forces around the area also had a lot of trouble with the roads, place names, and terrain that was right in front of Richmond!!! So, it wasn't *just* MacClellan having poor terrain intelligence.
Marched up and down, hey? I guess no-one bothered to simply read Magruder's AAR. How would the troops be manning defences if they were too busy marching up and down to man the defences. Magruder pretty accurately described his dispositions, and they were largely for a defence, with Wilcox's Brigade as a mobile reserve. The infantry McClellan faced was: At Lee's Mill: 5 regiments and a Bn, (2nd La, 10th La, 15th La, 10th Ga, 24th Ga and 1st La Bn) with another 4 regts in reserve (Wilcox's Bde) At Dam No. 1 and environs: 3 Regts (14th Al, 13th NC and 14th NC) - note, with Colston's brigade you have to go into diaries, histories to find out when they retook position. It was the night of the 4th-5th. At Wynn's Mill: 3 regts and a Bn (8th Al, 14th La, 3rd Va and 1st La Zouaves) At the Redoubts: 3 Regts and 3 Bns/ partial regts (1st Fl, 13th Al, 23rd Ga, 2nd Ms Bn, 26th Va (partial) and 46th Va (partial) In Yorktown proper: 2 Regts and 23-ish coys of heavy arty (6th Ga and 14th Al, etc.) Magruder's only movement on the 5th April was to order two regiments from the reserve towards Wynn's Mill (9th and 11th Alabama) fearing the redoubts would not be sufficiently defended. On arriving at the redoubts, he found them in a good state of defence, and ordered the 11th Alabama back to the rear of Lee's Mill, leaving the 9th at Wynn's Mill. Operations on 5th April consisted of keeping a strong skirmish line east of the Warwick (and a formed brigade apparently on the Garrow Ridge near Dam No. 1), and keeping a good weight of artillery fire on the Federals. You will note the rebels won both the artillery duels that day.
Grant had actually wanted to do the same thing, taking the Confederate capital of Richmond by the rear, or- failing that- threatening to encircle it completely, was an attractive option.
It wasn't McClellan's choice. At Stanton's behest, the corps commanders had been told to decide on the plan of campaign for McClellan. Stanton wanted to scupper the Urbana movement. To his chagrin, they selected the Peninsula. McClellan didn't like the Peninsula because the estimates were that it would take six weeks to reduce Yorktown, before moving on to attack the Williamsburg Line. This was before the nature of the Warwick was known. He said the Peninsula gave no prospect of a great success. Never-the-less, McClellan actually got up the Peninsula a couple of weeks before he was expected to, due to Johnston's retreat from Yorktown. McClellan was ahead of schedule...
The peninsula approach was considered attractive--at least at first glance--for a few reasons. McClellan lists these, and others, in his February report to the president: (1) Fort Monroe is a secure base of operations; (2) Navigable waters on both sides allow the Navy to provide transport on two flanks, also threatening the rebels with encirclement; (3) It's just 80 miles to Richmond, versus a much longer land route. The objections to the peninsula were clear then (Lincoln himself pointed them out) and clear now in hindsight. McClellan had preferred the Urbanna Plan as his #1 choice but offered the Peninsula as his #2 choice.
@@LittleWarsTV The other thing about The Peninsula is that having the James and the York Rivers as "natural flanks", there was almost no chance of being outflanked and surrounded (which, as we'll see might have been a possibility in different circumstances). It wasn't until McClellan deployed just in front of Richmond (having pretty much emerged from the direct protection of the two rivers) that he began to experience issues with regards to his flanks and his supply base. The "twin river flanks" aspect of the plan was very sound. But perhaps the only aspect of it that was...
@@Stiglr That's interesting. An attacking force worrying so much about his flanks that they negate any flanking move they might make (other than along the rivers). I suppose McClellans biggest handicap making any kind of offensive move was his overestimation of the size of the Confederate army. Surely a 2 or 3 pronged advance north to south would have yielded results? Might have to wargame that counter factual campaign!
FWIW, you have completely missed the events of the 27th. It was on that day Magruder abandoned his first line, and Lee authorised reinforcements. Johnston was told to have 5 brigades ready to move. Wilcox's brigades and Colston's brigades at City Point and Fort Huger, respectively, were authorised to go to Magruder. Several slack regiments in Richmond were sent to Magruder. Magruder said he started with 11,500 and before the arrival of DH Hill had received 16,000 reinforcements. Roughly half of those reinforcements were received before the morning of the 5th. Magruder had about 20,000 effectives. By the same measure that Magruder had 20,000, McClellan had around 42,000 in his columns. Closer to 2:1 than 4:1. However part of that was in the reserve column that had no chance of reaching the field and the actual force approaching the Warwick by that evening (after Peck's detachment) was closer to 30,000 effectives. 3:2 raw odds for wargamers, before Magruder's bonus' for entrenched defence, defending a river etc.
Indeed, we've missed a lot of detailed events. There is daily activity in the campaign and we've planned 20 videos for the series, picking key highlights.
Great stuff, and I'm watching with EXTREME interest. However, I did notice some typos: in the soldier's quote about the mud, you misspelled "frightful" as fightful. And Erasmus Keyes' name is missing its second S. I know how much of a thankless job proofreading can be, especially with a time-crunched production on these "anniversary" episodes... but it will save a lot of embarrassment if you bear down on this! (Word to the wise) Also, this whole series should serve as a great resource for many years to come ... so I'll request you go back into your video files and shore these little goofs up!!
You assume, Sir, that I will submit to the despotic rule of Spelling Convention. No, kind Sir, I shall not not bend the knee to the tyranny of Websters dictionary - long live the free range spelling movement!
Dam No 1 in Newport News was the first outing for our firstborn...only a few weeks old. And he became the only of our three kids to like Wargaming and military history. Maybe I should have taken the other two babies to battlefields too.
..anybody else think that, if they made a movie about this, they'd cast Gene Hackman as Magruder? *Spitting image* (albeit maybe 20 years ago for Hackman) :D
Appreciate the feedback, Jerry. We wanted to try something new and see how it worked! We were thinking that frequent, bite-sized updates would be an interesting way to tell a longer story.
McClellan had placed Magruder's strength at 15,000 on the 3rd April, and at 30,000 ca. the 6th or 7th. The journal of the Comte de Paris for the 4th says he expected they'd find 25,000 at Yorktown. McClellan's estimates of Magruder's strength were actually pretty accurate, and whatever choices he made, they were not due to an overestimation of Magruder's strength.
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As a brit I'm loving this series. Seeing the landscape I have read so much about.
Nice presentation, thank you.
I do believe that this is my favorite channel.
Never before, has such a well known story, available from so many sources, still caused so much anticipation.
you guys are doing a GREAT job with these little films.
I a loving this campaign series you guys are doing! Fabulous work! I'm looking forward to the completion of this one, and already looking forward to the next one!
"Ah yes, I've just finished landing my massive army on this narrow, swampy peninsula. Surely nothing bad is going to happen that will slow me down."
On a more serious note though, I could understand getting intel about terrain wrong about another country, but how do you not know what the terrain and roads are like in an area that was part of your own nation until just a year ago?
Well, to be fair, later on in the campaign, Lee and his forces around the area also had a lot of trouble with the roads, place names, and terrain that was right in front of Richmond!!! So, it wasn't *just* MacClellan having poor terrain intelligence.
He could have marched down from DC, on those horrible roads, and risk much more molestation from the Confederates, the way John Pope did.
Interesting update. Some plans even fail before you meet the enemy. 😁
These videos make my morning every time I love this series so far
Thanks for this little series.
Marched up and down, hey? I guess no-one bothered to simply read Magruder's AAR. How would the troops be manning defences if they were too busy marching up and down to man the defences.
Magruder pretty accurately described his dispositions, and they were largely for a defence, with Wilcox's Brigade as a mobile reserve.
The infantry McClellan faced was:
At Lee's Mill: 5 regiments and a Bn, (2nd La, 10th La, 15th La, 10th Ga, 24th Ga and 1st La Bn) with another 4 regts in reserve (Wilcox's Bde)
At Dam No. 1 and environs: 3 Regts (14th Al, 13th NC and 14th NC) - note, with Colston's brigade you have to go into diaries, histories to find out when they retook position. It was the night of the 4th-5th.
At Wynn's Mill: 3 regts and a Bn (8th Al, 14th La, 3rd Va and 1st La Zouaves)
At the Redoubts: 3 Regts and 3 Bns/ partial regts (1st Fl, 13th Al, 23rd Ga, 2nd Ms Bn, 26th Va (partial) and 46th Va (partial)
In Yorktown proper: 2 Regts and 23-ish coys of heavy arty (6th Ga and 14th Al, etc.)
Magruder's only movement on the 5th April was to order two regiments from the reserve towards Wynn's Mill (9th and 11th Alabama) fearing the redoubts would not be sufficiently defended. On arriving at the redoubts, he found them in a good state of defence, and ordered the 11th Alabama back to the rear of Lee's Mill, leaving the 9th at Wynn's Mill.
Operations on 5th April consisted of keeping a strong skirmish line east of the Warwick (and a formed brigade apparently on the Garrow Ridge near Dam No. 1), and keeping a good weight of artillery fire on the Federals. You will note the rebels won both the artillery duels that day.
Great info!
I love these short videos! Great work! I never could do so well.
Despite having heard Macs' reasoning for the landings, I still can't see why bottling up his army at the foot of a peninsula was an attractive option.
Grant had actually wanted to do the same thing, taking the Confederate capital of Richmond by the rear, or- failing that- threatening to encircle it completely, was an attractive option.
It wasn't McClellan's choice. At Stanton's behest, the corps commanders had been told to decide on the plan of campaign for McClellan. Stanton wanted to scupper the Urbana movement. To his chagrin, they selected the Peninsula.
McClellan didn't like the Peninsula because the estimates were that it would take six weeks to reduce Yorktown, before moving on to attack the Williamsburg Line. This was before the nature of the Warwick was known. He said the Peninsula gave no prospect of a great success.
Never-the-less, McClellan actually got up the Peninsula a couple of weeks before he was expected to, due to Johnston's retreat from Yorktown. McClellan was ahead of schedule...
The peninsula approach was considered attractive--at least at first glance--for a few reasons. McClellan lists these, and others, in his February report to the president: (1) Fort Monroe is a secure base of operations; (2) Navigable waters on both sides allow the Navy to provide transport on two flanks, also threatening the rebels with encirclement; (3) It's just 80 miles to Richmond, versus a much longer land route.
The objections to the peninsula were clear then (Lincoln himself pointed them out) and clear now in hindsight. McClellan had preferred the Urbanna Plan as his #1 choice but offered the Peninsula as his #2 choice.
@@LittleWarsTV The other thing about The Peninsula is that having the James and the York Rivers as "natural flanks", there was almost no chance of being outflanked and surrounded (which, as we'll see might have been a possibility in different circumstances). It wasn't until McClellan deployed just in front of Richmond (having pretty much emerged from the direct protection of the two rivers) that he began to experience issues with regards to his flanks and his supply base.
The "twin river flanks" aspect of the plan was very sound. But perhaps the only aspect of it that was...
@@Stiglr That's interesting. An attacking force worrying so much about his flanks that they negate any flanking move they might make (other than along the rivers).
I suppose McClellans biggest handicap making any kind of offensive move was his overestimation of the size of the Confederate army. Surely a 2 or 3 pronged advance north to south would have yielded results? Might have to wargame that counter factual campaign!
Got to say loving this campaign series 😀👍
McClellan left plenty of troops in the DC area to defend DC. It is absolute non-sense that he didn't and most historians agree on this point.
FWIW, you have completely missed the events of the 27th. It was on that day Magruder abandoned his first line, and Lee authorised reinforcements.
Johnston was told to have 5 brigades ready to move. Wilcox's brigades and Colston's brigades at City Point and Fort Huger, respectively, were authorised to go to Magruder. Several slack regiments in Richmond were sent to Magruder.
Magruder said he started with 11,500 and before the arrival of DH Hill had received 16,000 reinforcements. Roughly half of those reinforcements were received before the morning of the 5th. Magruder had about 20,000 effectives.
By the same measure that Magruder had 20,000, McClellan had around 42,000 in his columns. Closer to 2:1 than 4:1. However part of that was in the reserve column that had no chance of reaching the field and the actual force approaching the Warwick by that evening (after Peck's detachment) was closer to 30,000 effectives. 3:2 raw odds for wargamers, before Magruder's bonus' for entrenched defence, defending a river etc.
Indeed, we've missed a lot of detailed events. There is daily activity in the campaign and we've planned 20 videos for the series, picking key highlights.
Great stuff, and I'm watching with EXTREME interest.
However, I did notice some typos: in the soldier's quote about the mud, you misspelled "frightful" as fightful. And Erasmus Keyes' name is missing its second S.
I know how much of a thankless job proofreading can be, especially with a time-crunched production on these "anniversary" episodes... but it will save a lot of embarrassment if you bear down on this! (Word to the wise) Also, this whole series should serve as a great resource for many years to come ... so I'll request you go back into your video files and shore these little goofs up!!
You assume, Sir, that I will submit to the despotic rule of Spelling Convention. No, kind Sir, I shall not not bend the knee to the tyranny of Websters dictionary - long live the free range spelling movement!
@@milesreidy7864 Webster's Dictionary, with an apostrophe, denoting possession or association. (I just had to). 😆
@@Stiglr Ha!
I am learning a lot. Rule number one recon in force to test intelligence.
I think another quote from this campaign was “Virginia used to be in the South. Now it’s in the mud.”
Dam No 1 in Newport News was the first outing for our firstborn...only a few weeks old. And he became the only of our three kids to like Wargaming and military history. Maybe I should have taken the other two babies to battlefields too.
Interesting.
You guys should do fort Sumter
..anybody else think that, if they made a movie about this, they'd cast Gene Hackman as Magruder? *Spitting image* (albeit maybe 20 years ago for Hackman) :D
Hell ya ! Old George equals sad boy
McClellan multiplied the Confederates by 10. So he thought Jackson would have had 30 thousand when we rejoined Lee.
SHOW ME THE GAME !
Love the series, not a huge fan of the short video format though.
Appreciate the feedback, Jerry. We wanted to try something new and see how it worked! We were thinking that frequent, bite-sized updates would be an interesting way to tell a longer story.
Personally, I like the short but sweet videos. But I do hope the actual wargaming videos are a trifle longer.
Wow, so many details and concepts wrong, I recommend you read Beattie's Army of the Potomac Vol 3.
Ha! Ha! First!
McClellan outnumbered McGruder 4-to-1
Little Mac thought he was outnumbered by the Confederates 2-1
McClellan had placed Magruder's strength at 15,000 on the 3rd April, and at 30,000 ca. the 6th or 7th. The journal of the Comte de Paris for the 4th says he expected they'd find 25,000 at Yorktown.
McClellan's estimates of Magruder's strength were actually pretty accurate, and whatever choices he made, they were not due to an overestimation of Magruder's strength.
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Unfortuate to be a Democrat under the Lincoln Adinistration.