Operation Starvation; The Strategic Bombing Campaign No One Remembers
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 6 дек 2023
- Buy my book: amzn.to/3preYyO
Sources for this video can be found at the relevant article on:
militarymatters.online/
If you like this content please consider buying me a coffee or else supporting me at Patreon:
ko-fi.com/ednashmilitarymatters
/ ednash
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement. 
Развлечения
Another brilliant historical recounting by Mr. Nash.
"Nobody is going to make movies about aerial mining" sums up nicely why these successful operations are virtually unknown to history.
I served on a naval minesweeper (USS Enhance). She was made out of wood and had aluminum block engines. We had many tricks to sweep mines but we figured our life expectancy was pretty low if we were to sweep real mines in combat. I later learned she served in the Gulf sweeping Iranian mines. Great video sir.
My father was also on the Enhance when I was just a boy (early 80's I think) If I recall correctly, he said one could fish off the fan tail.
@@kerberospresents2862 I may have served with him. I left her in 81
Sadly, naval mine warfare is always the red-headed stepchild, ignored until ships start exploding without apparent cause or plans go to crap because you have devote time and resources to sweep and clear.
EXACTLY what is wrong with being a red-head?
Wouldn't use of mines constitute a form of scorched earth policy? A war crime?
I never realised how effective mines were.
@@rob5944 Wihout mines we'd be short of coal, metals, building materials ............. Ah. As you were 🙄
@@Farweasel There's a Gilligan's Island gag here...
Also a problem was the low priority the IJN placed on mine warfare which was even lower than the one it put on anti-submarine warfare. The fact that the head of the mine warfare section wasn't even a Flag Officer tells that convincingly. I'm not sure the IJN had much capability of sweeping magnetic mines and most of their purpose built minesweepers had been suborned as anti-submarine escorts by that point
An English born Australian John Mould wrote a book ,(post war) about his experiences as a mine / bomb disposal officer during the war, a rattling good read called, Softly tread the brave.
There’s another good one called “All Mine”
Why isn't operation starvation better remembered? Because there was no Ed Nash video on the subject. Thank you for FINALLY fixing that.
I never knew even the slightest thing about this.
Please don't stop educating us about this sort of thing?!
One thing with mines is that when you sink one ship it delays many others, especially if the ship sinks in a choke point. And stopping ships stops industry which starves armies.
_If_ you're facing an opponent who heavily relies on water traffic, as did Japan. Germany, not so much. They mostly relied on their rail system.
@@Caseytify the German navy did want to use airdropped mines but as the navy had to rely heavily on the airforce, and Goring was not going to oblige the navy, the pilots were untrained and dropped them without regards to their proper placement. This is what you get when you don't foster cooperation between people.
Yeah but in context, especially WWII, the Japanese would've developed a nuclear weapon with what resources they would've had. They had already tested a nuke before the Hiroshima event. Hook that up to an Ohka and see what seeds you would've sewn.
The sheer number of mines dropped by the B-29 is insane. It is on par with defensive minefields laid by purpose build minelayers basically. I don't think there ever was any offensive minelaying on a comparable scale
Very interesting video, Ed. It's intriguing how reluctant the US was during WW2 to adopt measures that the UK and Commonwealth had used from 1939 onwards, in particular the convoy system and as you have identified in this video, the mining of Japanese waters. Excellent video.
It was not reluctance - it was the availability of the very long range / high payload aircraft ( B-29 ) required in the Pacific.
@@petersouthernboy6327And wrt convoys there weren't enough US Navy ships in existence, especially escort craft, thanks to the austere pre-war budgets.
While serving on a USN cruiser, I used to sleep on my radar equipment office up behind the bridge instead of my bunk which was next to the forward missile storage below decks. Thinking about us hitting a mine in the Persian Gulf in 1984.
Thank you very much for covering this little known campaign.
The "WWII U.S. Bombers" channel went into great detail on Operation Starvation several months ago.
Yep, but he didn't give Arthur Harris his dues in coming up with the concept.
Another amazing unknown history lesson. Thanks Ed!
"No one remembers." Really! Even casual students of the war against Japan are aware of this. Other than the 'I'm smarter than everyone" tone of the title, this is a great video.
It not being glamorous is one half of it, I think. The other half being... it's kinda dirty? Just like land mines, which are, unsurprisingly, also exceptionally cost-effective.
And I guess there is post-war cleanup to think about. Kinda wonder how well that went!
Thank you Ed .. this is a real good look at the strategic vision of the various Generals , Admirals and Air Marshals as well ..
Another issue may have been the availability of mines. Since there was not a big demand earlier on production may not have been as high
It is an absolute pleasure to hear about a 'forgotten' operation that is genuinely little-known.
Great video Ed. I know squat about minesweepers, but I think a concern might be that the Japanese would have been able to clear a path through the field, then just keep using that path.
However, depending on the state of the tech nowadays, it seems like it would be fair to use that as a response to Iran's aggression. Maybe a no-fly zone over the Persian Gulf, near Indian Ocean, Iraq etc. Better than nukes man.
Interesting that you should bring this up now. I just read an article in the December issue of Proceedings in which a retired admiral argues that this is precisely the strategy we should be formulating for a potential conflict with China. I find myself in agreement with him. There are many advantages to a maritime mining strategy, not least of which is the severe economic pressure it would put on CCP leadership due to the loss of trade through shipping attrition. Such a tactic could result in the collapse of the regime due to internal pressures and the transition of China into a more egalitarian nation. Mines aren't sexy, but they can be one of the most effective weapons in a nation's arsenal if utilized correctly.
Here's me thinking it was the campaign to feed the straving populations of newly liberated Europe from the air, perhaps a video about that as well?
Thought I knew about most of the air campaigns of WW2, but never heard of this one, thanks for making it, very informative.
That was called the Berlin Airlift.
@@chonqmonkno it wasn’t
The article by Lieutenant Commander Arnold S. Lott is really good for people wanting to learn more.
I had no idea that there were mines weighing a full ton. Yikes
Operation Starvation was also the code name by the Irish Republic Government in 1945 stopping any Irish Citizens who had volunteered to fight for the allies ( British, Canadian,USA)receiving any Irish Government welfare, health care, council/ government jobs, and monitoring by Guarde of where they-lived, in the infamous blue book operated till the 1990s.
The above would make an interesting video, as it unknown except by a few in Ireland.
Fascinating, thank you. I've never heard of this before. I particularly liked your assessment of why it's unknown as a campaign. Very true at the end.
Thanks Ed, I read a lot about WW2 and knew about airdropped mines, but this subject, especially what it might could have achieved, was new to me! Nice to learn something about this subject, many thanks from the Netherlands!
The US now has cheap, precision, stand-off, shallow water mining capability. They take a Mk 80 series general purpose bomb, bolt on a standard JDAM or JDAM-ER kit, and screw in a special sea mine fuze. If an aircraft can deploy a JDAM, it can deploy one of these. No more risky flying low and slow to place mines, now the pilot just programs in the GPS coordinates and drops it like a normal JDAM. Mine glides to the target, hits the water, sinks, then sits there on the floor waiting for a ship to trigger its sensors. In testing with inert bombs, after multiple drops to the same coordinates, they went down to look at the dispersion and found bombs lying on top of bombs.
I'll definitely take sea mining over bombing civilians. Although it does lead me to 2 questions that I never mentioned in this type of discussion.
1/ What happened to those mines after the war? We are finding ordonnance from WW2 on land to this day. It must have been even trickier to find the mines, considering sea currents carried them around.
2/ How do you plan for a land invasion (which was only cancelled thanks to the surrender of Japan) when the sea around your target is littered with mines?
Send minesweepers in ahead of invasion force
They put the surrendered Japanese navy to work on clearing the mines, IIRC.
They mined harbors where merchant and navy ships went, not beaches where invasion forces went. Although presumably the Japanese defenders mined the beaches, and the invaders brought minesweepers and UDT frogmen to clear them.
Sea mines would be either visible (but not easy to see) if on the surface, or susceptible to detection via sonar if they were not. Possibly could use radar for the surface mines. And given we knew where the mines were, we could just land somewhere else. After all you're not going to invade via their ports, you invade a beach somewhere. Ideally near a port, but not directly at one. Last but not least, I vaguely recall that sea mines may have had a device to disable them after a time? Could be wrong, or maybe it was someone else's mines, cannot remember where I heard that or if I'm getting confused with another topic.
@@shannonkohl68Most air-dropped mines are bottom mines, and rest on the sea floor, and hence are quite hard to pick up with sonars. With modern high-frequency sonars it can be done, but this was beyond the state of the art in the 1940s.
The mines used were bottom mines, they rested on the sea floor, they did not drift.
The Invasion plans were mainly based around invading Kyushu and Honshu outside of Tokyo Bay. The mines were laid in the the Shimonoseki straits, the entrances to naval bases and ports like Kure, Sasebo, Hiroshima, Kobe, Osaka Nagoya, inside Tokyo Bay and the Seto inland sea where US Submarines could not enter.
Interesting photo at 2:20 with the mothballed Manchester in the background. Also, mining was often a perilous occupation. The US may have had little opposition by the time of Op Starvation but RAF efforts in the European theatre involved significant losses, as you yourself highlight!
I was wondering if anyone else had spotted the Manchester there!
When I was young and read the term "aerial mine" I had envisioned some sort of explosive strapped to balloons, meant to destroy aircraft. Never made much sense to me.
I fully understand the US's lack of interest in mining operations as there's no machine guns involved. I've always suspected that their interest in daylight bombing was mainly an excuse to drag a lot of machine guns, machine gun turrets, machine gun ammo and machine gunners all over Germany.
Ask the Germans and Russians how well their tanks without machine guns worked.
What a moron.
Effectively, I had never heard of Operation Starvation, I didn't even knew that the Superfortress could drop mines...
Nimitz is one of the greatest military minds of all times, so not much wonder he's the one to give credit to Starvation.
Operation Starvation is fascinating, and a campaign I'm well aware of.
Well argued, I must agree. Japanese & Allied officers nailed it, yet it's effectiveness somehow eluded the US. Honestly, the US's xonstant infighting between services, plus an avalanche of men & materiel, often led to this sort of fubar problem. If they had 'more European' constraints, they might have worked it out. Sigh. Thanks from Canberra.
It was not necessarily " infighting" - it was the availability of the very long range / high payload aircraft ( B-29 ) required in the Pacific.
Peter, I'd honestly call it infighting. They still didn't have a separate AF & navy v army was common. Not as bad as Japan however! Cheers.@@petersouthernboy6327
The Strategic campaign in ETO was the only way the Western Allies could attack the Reich. The targeting was in part affected by locations. Post war analysis puts transportation as the most effective target in crippling the Reich (there is a good argument that OIL was as good or better target) . In a sense the Mine campaign was the PTO's anti transportation campaign.
The electric grid was also ignored, as opinion at the time was that destroying it would have little effect on Germany. As Russia is currently demonstrating in Ukraine, destroying the electric grid is fairly easy and has far-reaching effects. The bombing assessments after the war uncovered a lot of opinions by Germans that going after electricity could have had huge consequences and been fairly easy.
I am sure the British had intimate knowledge of mine warfare since they have been subjected to it over the years being an island nation. It may be seen as unchivalrous. Also difficult to do unless you can do it by air. Subs could be used, risking a valuable asset.
"Operation Starvation" was a stark name coined in the dark days of total war, US-style, and it is an uncomfortable reminder of how far we were willing to go even before we went to Hiroshima.
Check out ‘Operation Gomorrah’ too.
The long distances necessary were a reasonable excuse for delaying mining Japanese ports. Delaying mining North Vietnamese parts was a purely political decision.
War books and programs tend to focus on the human element, the compelling narrative of conflict. Dropping a box in the ocean to kill people just does not fit a narrative frame. This lack of a warrior story is possibly also one of the reasons why the memoirs treated so fleetingly.
Unfortunately the US was held back by a small number of incompetent generals during WW II. We fired something like 100+ generals in the early parts of the war, which was a good thing. But a few eluded dismissal. And Hap Arnold was one of those. As was MacArthur.
Not sure about MacArthur…although I understand your argument.
@@jon9021 The Japanese attacked the Philippines after Pearl Harbor and yet he managed to lose his entire air force without a single plane getting into the sky IIRC. That alone is enough to call him a bad general. But his plan to defend the PI included dividing his troops in such a way that they could not come to each others aid and were therefore much easier to defeat. He was an arrogant jerk although this doesn't necessarily preclude competence, but if you're both incompetent and an a**hole then you're going to be failure. He also performed poorly in the early stages of the Korean war although I doubt you have to go that far to find his next bad decision.
Excellent video. Mine warfare is very much underappreciated.
US Army 8th Air Force sustained around 80,000 casualties over Northern Europe. And yet 1944 the Germans reached their highest war production figures. So the bombing did not stop industrial production, only land forces physically taking the factories from the Germans stopped their production for more than temporary closures.
Why did German Production peak in 1944??? The main reason is forgotten by the Bombing Critics is that for around 5 months of that Year the USAAF and Bomber Command were not attacking Germany industry, but attacking targets in France as part of Overlord or the Anti V Weapon campaign. The Bombing offensive did put a dent in German War Production as it forced the Germans into defending their homeland instead of deploying every thing they had to the fronts.
The tactical air assets were used for those missions predominately. A 5 month pause of the 8th AF over Germany?!? what are you smoking? German indy was showing the results of rationalization programs that should have been in place from before the start of the war. Night shifts, more women in the workforce, slave labor, specialized tools over general purpose, more automation & assembly lines, & in some cases dispersed manufacture of sub assemblies making a harder to hit target industry. The long and short is those factories did not stop till they were in the hands of the Soviet or US troops. Only nukes made the strategic bomber a viable weapon system against a 1st rate power. And No Japan did not count as one.
The bombing didn't stop production but it certainly hindered it. Add to that the amount of resources that were drawn back for defense and therefore couldn't be used on the fronts and it certainly had an effect. For instance if the 88's and the crews to man them had instead been on the front lines it would have been significant. All those fighters kept back to deal with the bombers would have been very useful elsewhere. Tally up all these secondary effects and it was taking a lot of German resources out of play. If instead of having to disperse manufacturing and take it underground they were able to have it more centralised in large factories production would have been much higher because it would have been more efficient.
Instead of building flak towers the same resources could have gone into fortifications. The disruption caused by the destruction of infrastruction would have also been significant.
Maybe strategic bombing didn't end production but it had a massive, if hard to quantify, effect on the overall war effort of the Germans. It would be interesting to know how many front line divisions and aircraft those diverted resources might have added and how much higher production would have been without bombing.
@@michaelbizon444 Bomber Command's operations records say you are wrong!!!
I agree with your assessment. @@littlefluffybushbaby7256
Strategic bombing did help, but it was never going to win the war single handedly as some would have us believe. And was it worth the cost? Was it even humanly ethical? The Bits made no bones about it, they could not hit indy so they went after the cities full of civilians, the same kind of indiscriminate killing that they damned the Germans for doing on a vastly smaller scale.
And the nukes were meant for the German cities, if they would have somehow held on for just a few more months, it would have been their fate. Does that make it right, better, or worse? The tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany peaked in 44 so to did German war production. Those are facts, that show with out nukes heavy bombers were not worth the effort put into them against a 1st rate power.
Never seen any of this in any WW2 documentary. Great stuff
www.youtube.com/@WWIIUSBombers
WOW, read alot about the Pacific war, but have seen little to none about this. We did a few practice mining missions in my P3 squadron, but I always thought they'd be suicide mission in real life! LOL
Thanks Ed!
As you say Ed. It was too sublime for the gun totting yankies !! And until YOU mentioned this campaign l had no idea .......thanks Ed.
Never heard of it Ed thanks
I only learned of this event maybe 2 years ago. You're right that it's recalled so poorly compared to the regular high altitude bombing campaigns. It's not "sexy" of a war story. But the result speak for themselves as it strangled Japan's ability to build and run its weapons of war, as well as feed the country.
The US Navy tried to complete the blockade with its successful submarine campaign. It worked very well in all other directions except the water ways between Japan and Korea. They tried sending submarines there but it was too dangerous. Everywhere else American subs were doing great. Japanese sailors based out of Singapore used to joke in 1944, "You could walk from Singapore to Tokyo on top of American periscopes." Just that area between Japan and Korea they could not close off.
I had seen elsewhere that LeMay wasn't happy with the results of traditional bombing operations, so he wasn't afraid to shake things up, i.e. going to low altitude night bombing and all that.
The USN's submarine campaign was one hand clasped around Japan's throat. When the USAAF committed to mining operations, the second hand was wrapped around Japan's throat. Time was ticking for the Japanese government before everything ground to a halt and mass starvation set in.
Historically, when the Allies occupied Japan they had to do emergency shipments of food because the country was on the edge of famine.
The B-29 bomb bay shown in 11:00 has a long range fuel mounted up the top of the bomb bay this is the first photo I've see of this type of fuel tank.
I'd never heard of this! Thanks for sharing Ed
Fantastic job - thanks, Ed !!
Thanks Ed.
Wow. Excellent research work, Ed. Nice job.
Excellent and very well delivered piece on a little known aspect of the war. Thank you👍
Very interesting piece, as usual, but even more-so. Great work as always!
You mean "farther", not "further". You were talking about actual distance that can be measured with a ruler, hence "father".
Who needed mines when the American Torpedoes were so good !
Oh snap!
Thank you Ed, that was very interesting. Sounds like there must have been many other missed opportunities with regards to mine warefare, that is some spectacular success.
Good timing, with this video being relevant to the newly released Godzilla Minus One
This topic is something I hope Taiwan is paying attention to. Both offensive mining, and especially, defensive. AAAD at its best.
I think it was the name. If it had been called “Operation Blockade” we would probably have heard more about it
Amateurs think tactics, strategists think logistics.
WW II US Bombers channel did this about 3 months ago, but probably too technical / dry for most people. Good to hear Ed Nash covering it. The CCP should be awake at night thinking about this.
That’s why China has nukes. You simple minded people.
Good to know when I play War in the Pacific.
2:35 very rare Manchester I
While the impact of aerial mining isn't well known to the general public, I'd say it's going a bit far to say that "no one remembers" it, as I've seen it mentioned as a factor in Japan's defeat going as far back as history books from the 1960s. In fact, off the top of my head, I think it's mentioned in Edward Jablonski's "Airwar" from about 1970, for instance.
The real issue here is that people tend to pin victory in the Pacific down to a couple of dramatic threads--the aerial bombing campaign (and even further dumb that down to just the atomic bombings) and the island hopping campaign. But those aren't the people who know the actual history of the war, and aren't people who are even *amateur* historians.
Anybody who studies the war from a bit more than a casual stance is aware of both the submarine campaign against Japan's shipping as well as the aerial mining campaign, and would know to what extent it squeezed the island and its people.
But this is the thing: victory over Japan wasn't down to one factor or even a couple factors. It was a combination of a large group of factors, with the arguable tipping point being the atomic bombs. And even there, you need to stress "tipping point," as even after Nagasaki, the Japanese cabinet was split on whether to end the war or not. It took the emperor to break that stalemate. And before Nagasaki, but just after Hiroshima, you still have military leaders in the cabinet and outside it demanding one last fight in the homeland. This despite people starving, cities bombed to rubble, Russians overwhelming the Japanese army in Manchuria, etc. etc. etc.
Back off on most of these factors and just rely on the mining campaign, then? Nah. Maybe in the long run, it *might* have finally worked. But how long would it take? What about the war that was still going on in parts of Asia? What about the soldiers and sailors and airmen still dying in Asia and the Pacific? How long would the American public have put up with the war just grinding on until the Japanese people *maybe* rose up in revolt out of sheer starvation and war weariness? In retrospect, there's no sure indication or evidence we have that that would have occurred at all, but it certainly wasn't likely to happen overnight. And even if the mining campaign had been started earlier... you're still left with the fact that Japanese leadership was unwilling to surrender in real life until Hirohito stepped in and said to end it. The grinding down of the Japanese war effort and the starvation of its people could have and probably would have taken just as long as the war took to play out in real life.
We'll just never know for sure if the war would have been shorter had things been done differently... history is what it is, and the people who were living in it at the time did not have the luxury of our hindsight.
It is not a warcrime if you are the winner
Could perhaps have been more popular w/ a given name 4 the type of mission, such as 'gardening'?
Unfortunately, we lost at least two submarines to our own mines in 1945. Once Mr. Mine is set, he is no longer anyone’s friend.
Some things could have been kept in the back pocket so it gots forgotten and then can be reused with fewer possible countermeasures?
The British heavily mined German Baltic ports during WWII.
Interesting story.
We don't have advance air mine to day or modern type use to day
Did those things float around, bothering and damaging at unintended places, for considerable time?
One of the reason Starvation is not often mentioned is that since the 4th Geneva Protocol it is classed as a war crime, (deliberate policy to deny an enemy civilian population means of sustainence) the name itself is ominous, indeed it may have been a primary motivation in including it in the 1948/9 legislation, but that said Gov't don't want discourse about it bacause it might well be used at some later date -something we have already seen in Russian attacks on Ukranian agriculture production and distribution, especially around Odessa. Whereas the mining of Hiaphong in 1972 was limited to deny the NVA of equipment and means to continue the war, but also limited because of Soviet ships in Hiaphong, a straight bombing of ships in harbour was regarded as an escalation.
There is also a certain irony that the USA made pretty much the same accusation against Britain in 1914 when Britain's blockade of the Central Powers included foodstuffs as something that would sustain Germany's war effort, and therefore would be stopped.
@@Simon_Nonymous Yes you can deny war materials and some foodstuffs but in the case of Japan and a lesser extent the UK by Submarine blockade, Germany in both world wars had opportunity to obtain foodstuffs elsewhere and of course its own resources,however Japan was in the unenivable situation of a population around 75 million about twice the UK and agricultural area around half the UK
@@SCjunk I would slightly disagree; the civilian population of Germany were starving by 1918, as Germany could not get food into their country effectively due to the blockade. A lot of that food came from the USA, hence their protests were as much financial as ehtical.
@@Simon_Nonymous There is a difference in the level of starving, in 1918 Austro-Hungary and Germany nearly came to blows because wheat shipments bound for Germany on the Danube were siezed by the Austrians, so in effect Germany was beggaring its neighbours by 1918 so the Sit Rep was probably worse the further from the centre -and interesting variation on fighting/starving to the last Hungarian.
The GC IV protocol defines starvation almost to the level of a mediheval siege - hence the reason why neither the Ukranian complaint against Russia earlier this year, and the on going complaint by various NGOs about Israel re Gaza have gone nowhere.
That said except with few exceptions -UK in WW2 the obvious choice, most beligerents suffer from starvation losses, Japan in 1945 was the worst example -a rumour went around the Dept charged with civilian food supply that a family in Nagoya were subsisting on the authorised ration -Tokyo University hospital sent investigators out to confirm it, needless to say...🤣
Jesus, the numbers are crazy.
Because mining operations don't sell new fighters, helicopters, aircraft carriers, etc. Keep in mind several of these guys would go on to be essentially the stool pigeons of the industrial war complex, and they didn't make near as much selling shipping mines as they did new planes, ships, radar guided missles and ICBM's.
Another good video, thank you.
This also supports the thesis that the atomic bombs were superfluous and that their use was more to inform Russia of their existence.
I didn't know Harris was a mine fan. Interesting.
Mines use in Europe was limited to riverine traffic. Most of the targets were on land.
The strategic bomber offensive is still debated because everyone uses different metrics, and ignores important parts of history.
I suspect King didn't spare much attention for mines since they were a very small part of global operations. In the Pacific the main thrust was multiple amphibious invasions & CAS. In the Atlantic it was convoy duty and (again) support for amphibious invasions.
Mining was very effective on Japanese home water shipping. It's a good thing the Germans didn't have the same success against Great Britain. IIRC the US results were classified until the 1970s.
If memory serves mining was also more successful than submarine operations against shipping.
@Caseytify Harris proposed the Tactic while in a Joint Warfare Planning group. Royal Navy Officers within the group were totally against the idea as they saw the UK coming off worst if a Mining war started between the Germans and UK. Harris's view was if the UK developed magnetic mines , it would also allow the UK to develop countermeasures. The Royal Navy decided where the mines were to be laid and supplied the weapons. Harris then delivered them. The Royal Navy Mining Organisation and Bomber Command had one of the most unified joint service operations going. Most mines were not laid inland!!! They were laid in shallow waters around the major northern ports and river estuaries, plus known coastal shipping routes. Next to no inland mining was done as the major rivers and canals in Germany were covered by quite extensive light Flak defences. The only major river mining Campaign in Europe was done by the RAF Mediterranean Air Force who closed the Danube for a couple of Months in the mid part of 1944, just before the Soviets captured the Romanian oil fields.
Half the Anti-tank guns are in Berlin. Think that made a difference? Wonder what the Survivors of Nanking China thought of Tokio burning? Di you think the German fuel shortage made a difference? Just asking
How were the unexploded mines delt with post war?
what happened to those mines after the war ended? i hope they sunk by themselves after a certain time?
Who cleared the waters around Japan post war , and by what method. Was DeGaussing an effective defense against allied mines . If yes then why didn't the Axis parties use it.
Stupid question - how did they keep the parachutes from giving the mine locations away?
Parachute mines tended to be laid on the sea bed rather than being buoyant mines. So they took their parachutes down with them.
Thank you!!@@bob_the_bomb4508
yes, the heroes are the fighter pilots.
the forgotten heroes are the backroom guys.
Naval mines don't produce those nice BDA photos everyone likes.
wow 303 aircraft lost to kill 90 ships ? that does not seem a good trade
Actually, aerial mining of the waters around Japan made a much accelerated end to the Pacific War more necessary and humane, lest many millions of Japanese die of starvation in the winter of 1945-1946. And that accelerated end was brought about by ...
Soviet entry into WW2
Particularly effective because Japan didn't have the escorts to protect even its troop vessels and tankers from subs let alone other effort.... Britain in 39 40 absolutely spewed small escort vessels and sweep rigged ships from its ports to reduce vulnerability as much as possible.. the reason we built so little (against capacity) during the war was because we fought an all aspect war with massive numbers of personnel equipping these assets instead of flashy larger vessels..
BTW the air campaign against Germans turned every part into a front line and tied down 100s of thousands of troops and workers plus copious ordnance that would have only gone to war effort elsewhere so for that alone it was justified..
BEFORE anyone (inevitably, pathetically) attacks Ed for his politics (either Right, Left or Otherwise) please take a look at the perspective of his news-oriented videos, and the history of what he has done. This guy is OK. Leave him alone.
"Operation Starvation" was a brutal name. Although I do remember there were plans to literally destroy crops in Japan, hopefully this was more focused on starving war factories and machines of needed supplies. Raw materials were in short supply, and nothing like the supply situation in the US.
I think the reason why Op Starvation isn't discussed more in history is because any talk of its success and effectiveness would generate a lot of HARD questions about our use of atomic weapons during the war, and no one wants to do that
Not to people who can read the minutes of the imperial cabinet. After Starvation, and the bombs, and the USSR declaration, the military command was still determined on the Glorious Death of 100 Million. The emperor’s intervention itself was only moderately helpful and there was considerable arm twisting needed to finally get the military officers to agree to surrender.
Without sea transport, Japan could not get resources for itss factories in Japan. Japan had to import practically everything. In fact Japan needed to import food, so without merchant ships, Japan starved. In fact if the US had invaded Japan, Japaan would have had little to fight the Americans with at the same time the US could have used massive bombardment to minimize cost is American lives much as it had done in Manilla. Look at American losses in Manilla compared to Japanese, and now the Japanese would have less to fight with.
The name probably doesn't help
The US navy is still somewhat averse to the whole mine warfare business and basically has outsourced it to NATO
Wonsan Harbor Korean War
Samuel Roberts Gulf war
Why should the navyUSN worry about mines?
There was no reason to drop the atom bombs, nor to invade Japan, because the USA had effectively isolated Japan by submarine warfare and the Japanese were being starved out. The question is: what is more humane - starvation or bombing? The bombs won out because they ended the war quickly, rather than allowing it to drag on for........Who knows?
One question I have always had about strategic bombing is the what if we hadn’t question. I always see stats saying what disruption was caused - but not the alternative if the bombing hadn’t happened and nations could have ramped up production with little disruption. If someone could suggest a place to look I’d be fascinated?
I recommend The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze. It's an economic history of Nazi Germany but it does discuss the effects of the bombing campaigns. For example, the RAF's Ruhr campaign was extremely successful and caused German war production to flat line for a period when it had been steadily increasing. Many of the production increases that occurred in late war Germany occurred due to new factories opening that had been under construction earlier in the war.
Lack of resources was the main limiting factor of the axis production. Allied resources would have been better spent stopping the axis's ability to get key resources. As this video supports. And there were would have been just as much, if not more "disruption" caused. Instead of wasting resources on the failed belief that bombing cities would break the enemies' morale. Which the blitz already proved wrong.
@@craigmcculloch4342 I agree that book is a must read. It helps debunk the idea that strategic bombing was ineffective.
@@gort8203not that the strategic bombing was ineffective, it's that it was inefficient. There were better ways for the allies to use those resources, which this video shows one of them. Resources were a significant limiting factor for the axis production, more than means of production. You can have all the factories you need to meet your production needs, but those factories are worthless without resources.
@@flarvin8945 I don't see how resources being an obvious limitation on war production makes bombing of that production inefficient. One would have to believe that it is more efficient to destroy a weapon after it is in the hands of the enemy soldier trying to kill you with it.
All Lemay did with 20th Air Force was copy what Arthur Harris had been doing since he took over Bomber Command in 1942. Harris actually came up with the Long Range air dropped mining concept in the UK in the mid 1930's while he was a Group Captain in a Staff job in the Air Ministry. Royal Navy were against it due to the UK being the side to most likely be hurt most by such a strategy. After the Germans started doing it in 1939, Harris volunteered his No 5 Bomber Group to do the mission from April 1940 onwards and when He became AOC in C Bomber Command in 1942, he gave all groups the mining mission and told the Navy to give him as many mines as they could produce. Harris covers it in depth in his 1947 book Bomber Offensive.
Question: how do you monitor the success of a mine laying campaign?
Watch the video.
Taiwan -- please take note!
I'm glad I didn't live during the Blitz.
Even worse - dying during the blitz.