potentially stupid question: token identity theorists say something like the following: pain1 = c-fibre firing pain2 = d-fibre firing so what makes tokens pain1 and pain2 both pains? Are token identity theorists committed to functionalism?
That’s a great question. For Lewis-style identity theorists, it would be because both brain-states occupy the same kind of causal role, one associated with bodily damage (on the input side) and pain-behavior as an output. As you say, it isn’t far from there to functionalism!
Your videos are Great! Thx. 🎉 Question: If you would have a working theory for the the ship of theseus Problem, what would you do with it? Publish at the next pub? 😅
Thanks! Have you got a Ship of Theseus theory? Best thing is to talk in through with others interested, to find out what the pressure points might be - try places like r/askphilosophy if in-person isn't an option.
One is Kripke’s modal argument: mental states (even token ones) are essentially mental, whereas physical states aren’t essentially mental. So they can’t be identical. Another objection is that the theory may be true but doesn’t say enough. Typically, philosophers of mind want to understand eg what pain is, and token theory doesn’t say.
It’s interesting how some philosophers who are materialist insist that animals don’t have the level of thinking that humans do. So based on this explanation, the materialist doesn’t seem to preoccupy themselves with the worry of brain states correlating to the mind in animals - I’m not sure if their theory would be a type-type theory?
Most contemporary physicalist philosophers would be committed to saying that animals have consciousness insofar as their brains are similar to ours. So, if neuroscience identifies a certain brain state with human pain, and an animal has similar brain states, then it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they feel pain roughly as humans do. That’s usually seen as a plus point of physicalism. Historical Substance dualists, by contrast, typically didn’t treat animals as being conscious at all.
From what I understood: The identity theory of mind attempts to bridge the gap between the mental (mind) phenomena and physical (brain) phenomena. It sounds like 'mind' phenomena such as thought and 'pain' are the same as 'brain' phenomena. If not the same, then they are at least equivalent. Such that a mental x(+) has a corresponding physical x(-). (a) Basically, your conscious feeling is the same with your biology. (1) A type-type identity theory of mind posits that when one being (x) experiences a mind event (phenomena such as 'pain'), such a mind event, e.g. 'pain', is synonymous with another being (y)'s experience of that phenomena. Your pain is the same as my pain - as is a dog's experience of pain. It is the same physical process, 'brain event' (2:58). (a) (1, continued) However due to the problem of justifying univocally (perhaps this is the word i'm looking for; the same across all types and things) consituted brain acts across people, animals, and everything in between, people just decided to drop (1) and shift (1) into (2). (2) token-token identity theory posits that a mind event, such as 'pain', is equivalent to *some* brain event. It is not necessarily the same in different organisms and beings. (a, less so 50:50 it looks like)
This video was awesome and very informative!
So glad!
Thanx for this, trying and failing to get my head around it. This video lesson does help a bit tho. So cheers!
You’re welcome - philosophy isn’t meant to be easy!
potentially stupid question:
token identity theorists say something like the following:
pain1 = c-fibre firing
pain2 = d-fibre firing
so what makes tokens pain1 and pain2 both pains? Are token identity theorists committed to functionalism?
That’s a great question. For Lewis-style identity theorists, it would be because both brain-states occupy the same kind of causal role, one associated with bodily damage (on the input side) and pain-behavior as an output. As you say, it isn’t far from there to functionalism!
Your videos are Great! Thx. 🎉
Question:
If you would have a working theory for the the ship of theseus Problem, what would you do with it?
Publish at the next pub? 😅
Thanks! Have you got a Ship of Theseus theory? Best thing is to talk in through with others interested, to find out what the pressure points might be - try places like r/askphilosophy if in-person isn't an option.
Thanks for the great video/
one question that i still wondering about is what are the arguments against token identity ?
One is Kripke’s modal argument: mental states (even token ones) are essentially mental, whereas physical states aren’t essentially mental. So they can’t be identical. Another objection is that the theory may be true but doesn’t say enough. Typically, philosophers of mind want to understand eg what pain is, and token theory doesn’t say.
It’s interesting how some philosophers who are materialist insist that animals don’t have the level of thinking that humans do. So based on this explanation, the materialist doesn’t seem to preoccupy themselves with the worry of brain states correlating to the mind in animals - I’m not sure if their theory would be a type-type theory?
Most contemporary physicalist philosophers would be committed to saying that animals have consciousness insofar as their brains are similar to ours. So, if neuroscience identifies a certain brain state with human pain, and an animal has similar brain states, then it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they feel pain roughly as humans do. That’s usually seen as a plus point of physicalism. Historical Substance dualists, by contrast, typically didn’t treat animals as being conscious at all.
Awesome ❤️
Thanks!
I don't get it...
From what I understood:
The identity theory of mind attempts to bridge the gap between the mental (mind) phenomena and physical (brain) phenomena. It sounds like 'mind' phenomena such as thought and 'pain' are the same as 'brain' phenomena. If not the same, then they are at least equivalent. Such that a mental x(+) has a corresponding physical x(-).
(a) Basically, your conscious feeling is the same with your biology.
(1) A type-type identity theory of mind posits that when one being (x) experiences a mind event (phenomena such as 'pain'), such a mind event, e.g. 'pain', is synonymous with another being (y)'s experience of that phenomena. Your pain is the same as my pain - as is a dog's experience of pain. It is the same physical process, 'brain event' (2:58). (a)
(1, continued) However due to the problem of justifying univocally (perhaps this is the word i'm looking for; the same across all types and things) consituted brain acts across people, animals, and everything in between, people just decided to drop (1) and shift (1) into (2).
(2) token-token identity theory posits that a mind event, such as 'pain', is equivalent to *some* brain event. It is not necessarily the same in different organisms and beings. (a, less so 50:50 it looks like)
@@rigourless this makes so much sense thank you