Wittgenstein's Tractatus - Video 3 (English) - 2.1-2.225
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- Опубликовано: 7 ноя 2024
- In this series, we will look at Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I have just published a new Dutch translation of the book with Boom Uitgevers, which I will use in the Dutch version of these videos, but in these English videos we will be using the English translations.
Fantastic video as all the rest have been. Thank you for your clear PICTURING of the OBJECTS of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
Your lovely accent always makes such explanations on such philosophy additionally enjoyable and soothing.
Thank you so much Victor! You have made this intense text so clear and fun. It is a shame that you did not finish the whole book!
Planning to add more episodes in the future, but until the summer I'm swamped with teaching. (Only uploading videos related to my courses.)
@@VictorGijsbers Awesome. Really looking forward to it!
FYI, picturing objects in 4-D can be done, with some practice, by picturing their 3-D projection on the xyz space, and then painting how far the object is from w=0 by coloring it. Yellow is w=0, red is negative w and blue is positive w with the rainbow of colors spanning distant from far w0.
Great Section Victor, “displaying” - “language” are these similar to the paradox of self-referencing - a kind of fractal process in time ?
You are a rock star! Can't wait for Video 4.
Dear Victor, which is in your idea the pessimistic Wittgenstein? The First one or the Second one?
This is my first time reading the Tractatus, so maybe this will be answered later in the book, but you made me think about the following. Note: At this point, I do not know if "picture" and "name" overlap, but you describe the pictures as a theory of language, so here is my question: The story you gave us in the previous video and this one seems quite close to what I read in Kripke's Naming and Necessity (which was admittedly a long while ago), if a name refers to an object in logical space, and logical space is read modally as possible worlds, then a name would fail to name something unless it designates something in all possible worlds where that something exists; this seems a plausible way to read 2.0123 and 2.0124-2.0141, together with what follows. I seem to remember, however, Kripke lumping Wittgenstein in with Russell as having a _descriptive_ theory of language, that is, a name refers to some cluster of properties that may or may not be instantiated by an object - do you think that this is a possible reading of this part of the Tractatus? If the picture refers to the form of reality (2.171) and the form is opposed to content (2.025) and the world is "Sachverhalte" rather than objects (2.04), could one read the pictures rather as clusters of properties? I don't know exactly what to think here, I am just trying to sort out my impressions. And as a general question, how do you see the relationship between Wittgenstein and Kripke?
Also, I think your example of little toy models of reality where "close represents far" and "red represents blue" as a cumbersome but possible system, is actually a very good description of German board game design!
It is very very long ago that I read Naming and Necessity, and so I can't really say anything about it. But I can imagine that one would attribute a descriptive theory of names to Wittgenstein *insofar as ordinary names* are concerned -- names like Victor Gijsbers and Jonathan Jonsson. Not that Wittgenstein says anything about such names in the Tractatus, but at least it make sense. But I don't think you could say this about proper Tractarian names. These are precisely not descriptions.
About German board games... yeah, I've got Andor lying around, so I know how it feels to look at 328 different pieces and wonder what represents what. :D
Hello Victor, grandios video as always. Do you have any recommendations on good secondary literature, readers guide? Preferably ones which are as straight forward and clear as your Lecture :D I’ve read roger Whites introduction but would like to diversify.
So correct me if I'm wrong but logic as a system in it's self is meaningless (can't tell us anything, even about itself) but through logic we can have pictorial forms, that resembles facts in the world and through language as a tool that corresponds with logic, we can talk about facts in the world? And as I understand we can only talk about tautology of some fact, we can't meaningfully say if something exists or not?
This makes total sense if we understand Kant’s view of Transcendental Idealism as a good approximation of how the mind works. If we take T Idealism to mean the indirect and never absolutely complete and true representing of things-in-themselves. It makes sense that the mind which is limited by its perception and faculties which are not absolute and cannot perceive things-in-themselves as they are in themselves, that language which is formed from this mind too cannot speak absolutely. IMO that is.
Wonderful as always, Victor!
Two questions rose while watching:
1. What was the influence of Wittgenstein on postmodernism, in particular Rorty? On the one hand this picture theory of language seems quite close to a correspondence theory of truth (if not identical). On the other, the model metaphor already implies perhaps multiplicity of truths, as each model, by definition has a particular goal/purpose, where some relationships are important and to be modeled accurately, and some are less important and can in extremis be ignored. This already comes quite close to what Rorty might say (my knowledge here being solely based on your earlier video’s!) on truth being related to one’s particular goals.
2. Do you know why the translators chose “picture” rather than the (to my ears) much more natural and, dare I say, accurate word “image”?
Thanks! The picture theory could indeed be seen as a version of a correspondence theory,, especially in the context of the Tractatus as a whole. Wittgenstein clearly believes that language mirrors reality, even to the extreme. (The real names must correspond to the simple objects, and so on.) Later Wittgenstein will be more of a pragmatist, and Rorty explicitly discusses him as an influence.
You are right that Bild could be translated pretty well as image, but you then get into trouble with abbilden. You can say that a sentence pictures reality, but not that it images or imagines reality!
@@VictorGijsbers Interesting!
Re: abbilden, I don’t like “picture” as a verb in this sense at all, anyway, so that doesn’t seem like a big loss. I also don’t see a particular need to use the same stem to translate the two words. “Depict” seems like the obvious choice to me.
So, what is the difference between X.0Y and X.Y (e.g. 2.01 and 2.1)?
In one of the videos, perhaps there first one, I indicated that Wittgenstein's own explanation of the numbering system leaves this completely unclear! Perhaps 2.01 was not important enough to be 2.1? But this is mere conjecture.
@@VictorGijsbers My apology. I thought you are going to explain it more during 2.1.
Dear Victor, would you please present your videos in slide format, so that a viewer apart from watching the lecture, is also in a position to save these slides and revert to them as and when required. It is a humble request. Please consider it, provided it is not only possible but also convenient to you.