Arguing the OE, Episode 16: The Folly of "Unfamiliar Problems"

In this episode, I challenge a distinction that is made in classroom instruction and within Army doctrine. I refer to the distinction between familiar problems on the one hand and unfamiliar problems on the other. This distinction matters to those who employ insofar as they believe--incorrectly, I argue--that troop-leading procedures (TLP) and the military decision making process (MDMP) are well-suited to explore familiar problems whereas the Army Design Methodology (ADM) is only really necessary for unfamiliar problems. Of course, this assessment of ADM is a fundamental failure to see how this planning method is really a way (a bundle of practices, really) to structure a commander's understanding, visualization, and description, which a commander better be doing regardless of the type of operation he or she is given. The practices that compose ADM (asking four big questions; cultivating collaboration, dialogue, and argument; systems thinking; perspective-taking; and creating working and presentation diagrams) are powerful in all operations. Moreover, it is a sign of hubris to believe one has the ability to know when one is about to embark on a familiar problem or an unfamiliar problem. It is a better, more humble leadership style to appreciate that all significant military problems (including variations of the attack, defense, and movement to contact as well as stability operations and support to civilian authorities) are to some degree unfamiliar. Each operation contains its own bundle or confluence of factors and dynamics that are appearing in the world for the first time. We, as military leaders in charge of troopers and resources, can never afford to turn off our brains. It follows that a thorough understanding of factors, dynamics, and context matters.....and ADM helps us take a cut at this understanding. In this episode, I point to the example of Colonel Perkins during the Thunder Run(s) in Baghdad, 2003. Here is a tactical-level leader not simply thinking in terms of military tasks. He deliberately thought through (understanding, visualization, and description) how his tactical actions would contribute to strategic ends. He exemplified mission command by exercising initiative at his level. It is precisely this sort of approach to leadership and planning that the ADM cultivates.
In the episode above, I paraphrase General Martin Dempsey, CJCS, on the link between military power and intended outcomes. The exact quotation is: "The application of force rarely produced, in fact, maybe never produces the outcomes we seek." (quoted in the Washington Post, "Within Military, Deep Doubts about a Strike on Syria," Ernesto Londono, Thursday, August 29, 2013; the articles quotes Dempsey from an interview he conducted with ABC News).

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OODA loop the solution.